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1 Pulsed Neutron Interrogation Test Assembly - PUNITA Bent Pedersen Nuclear Security Unit Institute for Transuranium Elements - ITU Joint Research Centre presented at IPNDV WG3 meeting, 12-13 May 2016 JRC, Ispra site

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Page 1: Pulsed Neutron Interrogation Test Assembly - PUNITA · Based on the (conservative) estimate of a detection limit in the PUNITA configuration of 0.52 g 235 U in a 100 second measurement

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Pulsed Neutron Interrogation Test Assembly - PUNITA

Bent PedersenNuclear Security Unit

Institute for Transuranium Elements - ITUJoint Research Centre

presented at

IPNDV WG3 meeting,12-13 May 2016JRC, Ispra site

Page 2: Pulsed Neutron Interrogation Test Assembly - PUNITA · Based on the (conservative) estimate of a detection limit in the PUNITA configuration of 0.52 g 235 U in a 100 second measurement

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Outline

• characteristics of the Pulsed Neutron Interrogation Test Assembly

• some examples of research applications at PUNITA• fissile mass – differential die-away technique• design of a compact pulsed neutron device• explosives detection• detection of SNM

• useful signatures for nuclear disarmament verification

Page 3: Pulsed Neutron Interrogation Test Assembly - PUNITA · Based on the (conservative) estimate of a detection limit in the PUNITA configuration of 0.52 g 235 U in a 100 second measurement

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205 mm thick graphite linear96 fission neutron counters: He-3 in HDPE

32 monitors for neutron generator output

fast neutron pulse

time

thermal neutrons

10 ms10 ms

Pulsed Neutron Interrogation Test Assembly - PUNITA

14-MeV neutron generator(MF Physics Model A-211)sealed, D-T mixed beampulsing: 100 s-1

Page 4: Pulsed Neutron Interrogation Test Assembly - PUNITA · Based on the (conservative) estimate of a detection limit in the PUNITA configuration of 0.52 g 235 U in a 100 second measurement

• neutron emission:2⋅108 /s, 106/burst in 4π angle

• sealed, D-T mixed beam300-500 hours life

• pulsing of ion source andacceleration voltageno emission between bursts

• neutron burst width:5-10 µs

• burst repetition rate:10 – 150 s-1

© Thermo Fisher Scientific Corporation

MF Physics Model A-211, 14-MeV neutron generator

Pulsed Neutron Interrogation Test Assembly - PUNITA

Page 5: Pulsed Neutron Interrogation Test Assembly - PUNITA · Based on the (conservative) estimate of a detection limit in the PUNITA configuration of 0.52 g 235 U in a 100 second measurement

Features • sample cavity: 50 cm x 50 cm x 80 cm• thick graphite linear on all six side • fission neutron counters: He-3 in

polyethylene

• low pressure, thermal flux monitors

• monitor for n-generator output

side view top view

Pulsed Neutron Interrogation Test Assembly - PUNITA

Page 6: Pulsed Neutron Interrogation Test Assembly - PUNITA · Based on the (conservative) estimate of a detection limit in the PUNITA configuration of 0.52 g 235 U in a 100 second measurement

Exponential time response function of thermal neutrons • maximum thermal flux at 280 μs after 14-MeV burst

• thermal neutron lifetime of 1.05±0.02 milliseconds

0 1 2 3 4 50.0

0.2

0.4

0.6

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Time After Trigger [ms]0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

10-3

10-2

10-1

100

measurements single exponential fit

Nor

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ized

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nts

Time After Trigger [ms]

235-U fission chamber Small He-3 proportional counter

Pulsed Neutron Interrogation Test Assembly - PUNITA

Page 7: Pulsed Neutron Interrogation Test Assembly - PUNITA · Based on the (conservative) estimate of a detection limit in the PUNITA configuration of 0.52 g 235 U in a 100 second measurement

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fissile mass – differential die-away technique

0 2 4 6 8100

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Time after (D-T) trigger /ms

background CBNM 0.31% 235U CBNM 0.71% 235U CBNM 1.94% 235U CBNM 2.95% 235U CBNM 4.46% 235U Thermal n in cavity

235U mass range: 0.5 – 7.5 gMeas. time: 10 min14-MeV rate: 107 /sPulse rate: 100 HzDetectors: 3-He

Detection of prompt fission neutrons - Differential Die-Away technique (DDA)

CBNM U3O8 standards

Page 8: Pulsed Neutron Interrogation Test Assembly - PUNITA · Based on the (conservative) estimate of a detection limit in the PUNITA configuration of 0.52 g 235 U in a 100 second measurement

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0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 80.0

2.0x105

4.0x105

6.0x105

8.0x105

1.0x106

Net

inte

gral

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Mass 235U /g

CBNM low enriched U sources 2nd order poly fit

235U mass range: 0.5 – 7.5 gMeas. time: 10 min14-MeV rate: 107 /sPulse rate: 100 HzDetectors: 96 3-He

Detection of prompt fission neutrons - Differential Die-Away technique (DDA)

CBNM U3O8 standards

Integral range: 700 – 4700 μs

fissile mass – differential die-away technique

Page 9: Pulsed Neutron Interrogation Test Assembly - PUNITA · Based on the (conservative) estimate of a detection limit in the PUNITA configuration of 0.52 g 235 U in a 100 second measurement

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0 200 400 600 800 1000

1.2x105

1.4x105

1.6x105

1.8x105

2.0x105

2.2x105

2.4x105

2.6x105

Net

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gral

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Mass 239Pu /mg

PuGa source, 93% 239Pu linear fit

239Pu mass range: 8.6 – 846 mgMeas. time: 10 min14-MeV rate: 107 /sPulse rate: 100 HzDetectors: 3-He

Detection of prompt fission neutrons - Differential Die-Away technique (DDA)

PuGa standards

Integral range: 700 – 4700 μs

fissile mass – differential die-away technique

Page 10: Pulsed Neutron Interrogation Test Assembly - PUNITA · Based on the (conservative) estimate of a detection limit in the PUNITA configuration of 0.52 g 235 U in a 100 second measurement

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Purpose:mass assay of U and Pu samples of small volume

- e.g. smear samples, process samples, liquid solutions- for accountancy, transport declarations, inventory

Advantages in “compact” design:• less shielding• less 3He detector volume• integrate with existing equipment• lower price

Requirements:• high neutron flux at sample position• long life time in moderator, short life time in detector• high detection efficiency for fission neutrons

Can we design a compact devicefor mass assay of small fissile samples

by active neutron interrogation?

design of a compact pulsed neutron device

Page 11: Pulsed Neutron Interrogation Test Assembly - PUNITA · Based on the (conservative) estimate of a detection limit in the PUNITA configuration of 0.52 g 235 U in a 100 second measurement

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Experimental setup

• 5 detector banks, each composed of:5 3He detectors, polyethylene moderator, complete Cd coverfission neutron detection efficiency: 11.6%

• graphite moderator block:reactor grade purity, density 1.67 g/cm3

dimensions: length: 509mm, height: 420mm, width: 402mmdistance generator target – sample: 240 mm

sample cavityneutron generatordetector banks

design of a compact pulsed neutron device

Page 12: Pulsed Neutron Interrogation Test Assembly - PUNITA · Based on the (conservative) estimate of a detection limit in the PUNITA configuration of 0.52 g 235 U in a 100 second measurement

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Experimental results

239Pu Limit of Detection,3 sigma of background,meas time 1000s:

• Singles: LODS = 0.786 mg

• Doubles: LODD = 5.170 mg

using:

@ neutron emission rate: 0.9*107 s-1,

(max rate 2.0*108 s-1)

Counts in the gate 1.1 ‐ 2.1 ms

Doubles  = 1.6334xPu(mg)R² = 0.9977

0

500

1000

1500

2000

2500

0 20 40 60 80 100 120

Plutonium mass, mg

coun

ts/1000s

Singles  [1000s]

Doubles  x10 [1000s]

Linear (Doubles  x10 [1000s])

1.E+00

1.E+01

1.E+02

1.E+03

1.E+04

1.E+05

1.E+06

1.E+07

0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4

Time/ms

Coun

ts/100

0s

1.0E+00

1.0E+01

1.0E+02

1.0E+03

1.0E+04

1.0E+05

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1.0E+07

0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4

3 backgroundLOD

regression slope=

design of a compact pulsed neutron device

Page 13: Pulsed Neutron Interrogation Test Assembly - PUNITA · Based on the (conservative) estimate of a detection limit in the PUNITA configuration of 0.52 g 235 U in a 100 second measurement

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MCNP simulations, experimental configuration• 5 detector banks (standard “neutron collar”), each composed of:

5 3He detectors, polyethylene moderator, complete Cd coverfission neutron detection efficiency: 11.6%

• graphite moderator block: reactor grade purity, density 1.67 g/cm3dimensions:length: 509mm, height: 420mm, width: 402mmdistance target–sample: 240 mm

vertical cross section vertical cross section

design of a compact pulsed neutron device

Page 14: Pulsed Neutron Interrogation Test Assembly - PUNITA · Based on the (conservative) estimate of a detection limit in the PUNITA configuration of 0.52 g 235 U in a 100 second measurement

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MCNP simulations, improved geometry• better detector position, 3He in HDPE, Cd cover, 80 mm width• only 20% more 3He volumeModerator zone: max length 600 mm, max width 360 mm, height 360 mmReflector zone: width 80 mm14-MeV source: 45 mm radius for W filterSample cavity: void, radius 10 mm, distance to source 240 mm

horizontal cross section horizontal cross section vertical cross section

design of a compact pulsed neutron device

Page 15: Pulsed Neutron Interrogation Test Assembly - PUNITA · Based on the (conservative) estimate of a detection limit in the PUNITA configuration of 0.52 g 235 U in a 100 second measurement

MCNP simulations

Flux at sample position Detection of fission neutrons

design of a compact pulsed neutron device

Page 16: Pulsed Neutron Interrogation Test Assembly - PUNITA · Based on the (conservative) estimate of a detection limit in the PUNITA configuration of 0.52 g 235 U in a 100 second measurement

8.859.220.960Improved geometry, C ρ = 2.07 g/cm3, Ni reflector, W

9.7017.480.555Improved geometry, BeO moderator, Be reflector, W

3.203.201.00Improved geometry with W around 14-MeV source

111Improved geometry

0.9311.770.526Experimental configuration, W around 14-MeV source

0.6031.140.529Experimental configuration

FOMΦ/Φrefε/εrefModel

MCNP simulations,

Integral configurations

design of a compact pulsed neutron device

Page 17: Pulsed Neutron Interrogation Test Assembly - PUNITA · Based on the (conservative) estimate of a detection limit in the PUNITA configuration of 0.52 g 235 U in a 100 second measurement

What “limit of detection” can we achieve in the compact design?

Assuming:

conservative design:

• graphite moderator of ρ = 2.07 g/cm3

• Ni reflector• W on 14-MeV source

conservative generator operation: neutron emission rate: 0.9*107 s-1

(max rate 2.0*108 s-1)

expexp

0.603785 53.68.85

erimentalimproved erimental

improved

FOMLOD LOD g g

FOMμ μ= = =

design of a compact pulsed neutron device

Page 18: Pulsed Neutron Interrogation Test Assembly - PUNITA · Based on the (conservative) estimate of a detection limit in the PUNITA configuration of 0.52 g 235 U in a 100 second measurement

Prompt Gamma Neutron Activation Analysis – PGNAA

Method

• Interrogation first by fast neutrons later by thermal neutrons• Detection of characteristic gamma rays from inelastic scattering and

capture• Known detector efficiency, nuclear data, and net peak areas yields element

ratios• Interesting elements for explosives detection are:

nitrogen, carbon, hydrogen, oxygen, chlorine, fluorine, a.o.

Explosives detection

Equipment• Detector shielding against thermal neutrons and gamma background• Lanthanum bromide scintillation detectors (1½” x 1½” and 2” x 3”)• Digital spectrometers: Ortec DigiBase and Xia Polaris

Page 19: Pulsed Neutron Interrogation Test Assembly - PUNITA · Based on the (conservative) estimate of a detection limit in the PUNITA configuration of 0.52 g 235 U in a 100 second measurement

Shielding arrangements for LaBr3 scintillation detectors

Explosives detection

Page 20: Pulsed Neutron Interrogation Test Assembly - PUNITA · Based on the (conservative) estimate of a detection limit in the PUNITA configuration of 0.52 g 235 U in a 100 second measurement

Experimental setup

Neutron generator

Test sample (NH4Cl)

Explosives detection

Page 21: Pulsed Neutron Interrogation Test Assembly - PUNITA · Based on the (conservative) estimate of a detection limit in the PUNITA configuration of 0.52 g 235 U in a 100 second measurement

Gamma spectrum, PGNAA neutron capture

NH4Cl sample by small LaBr3 scintillation detector

Explosives detection

Page 22: Pulsed Neutron Interrogation Test Assembly - PUNITA · Based on the (conservative) estimate of a detection limit in the PUNITA configuration of 0.52 g 235 U in a 100 second measurement

Result, example: element ratios

Test sample: NH4Cl, and evaluation of the mass ratios H/Cl

Method: prompt thermal activation analysis

0.110.10±0.03

Theoretical mass ratio H/Cl

Measured mass ratio H/Cl

Explosives detection

Page 23: Pulsed Neutron Interrogation Test Assembly - PUNITA · Based on the (conservative) estimate of a detection limit in the PUNITA configuration of 0.52 g 235 U in a 100 second measurement

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Objective: Detection of Special Nuclear Material for Nuclear Security applications

Application:• detection of SNM in shielded containers

Physics principle:• induce fission by epi-thermal/thermal neutrons (pulsed neutron source)• fission signatures are the evidence for presence of SNM:

- only fast prompt fission neutrons appear in PSD peak- neutron coincidences in short gates of 10-20 ns.

Technical implementation issues:• high count rates in neutron/photon mixed fields• fast neutron detection at high efficiency• good neutron/photon separation necessary

Technical/scientific implementation:• 8x 3”x3” EJ-309 liquid scintillation detectors • signal analyzing hardware (fast digitizers)• (online interpretation (PSD) in FPGA hardware)

Detection of SNM

Page 24: Pulsed Neutron Interrogation Test Assembly - PUNITA · Based on the (conservative) estimate of a detection limit in the PUNITA configuration of 0.52 g 235 U in a 100 second measurement

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Detection of triple coincidences using CBNM U3O8 standardsthermal interrogation (250μs to 40000μs)

Kinds of three-fold coincidences:(a) γγγ(b) γγn(c) γnn(d) nnn

Detection of SNM

Page 25: Pulsed Neutron Interrogation Test Assembly - PUNITA · Based on the (conservative) estimate of a detection limit in the PUNITA configuration of 0.52 g 235 U in a 100 second measurement

• neutron generator

• scintillation detector

• graphite

• polyethylene

MCNP model of PUNITA setup

PUNITA simulations:

• To compare experiments to MCNP model we apply thefollowing figure of merit: FOM = [thermal n-flux] x [detector n-efficiency]in order to optimize both parameters individually.

• Due to generator pulsing (100 Hz) we integrate n-fluxover 10 ms period:

ϕth = 224891 cm-2

• As a measure of fission neutron detection efficiency wedefine recoil protons with Ekin > 700 keV as a neutrondetection event:

εn = 6.07 ± 0.30 %

Scale-up of experimental results to industrial size (preliminary results)

Example I, nuclear security:

Detection of SNM

Page 26: Pulsed Neutron Interrogation Test Assembly - PUNITA · Based on the (conservative) estimate of a detection limit in the PUNITA configuration of 0.52 g 235 U in a 100 second measurement

• Assay of Unit Load Devices (ULDs) for air cargo

• Accommodate largest standard ULD:LD1 for Boeing 747-400: 234 x 153 x 163 cm, 4.90 m3

• Device implemented into standard 20-foot containernot shown: - conveyer belt through entire container

- n-generator centered below cavity

• polyethylene

• graphite

• scintillation detector7” x 4” (dia x width)

side view 6096 mm

100 mm

284 mm

334 mm

1680 mm

2500 mm

2438 mm

310 mm

Scale-up of experimental results to industrial size (preliminary results)

Detection of SNM

Page 27: Pulsed Neutron Interrogation Test Assembly - PUNITA · Based on the (conservative) estimate of a detection limit in the PUNITA configuration of 0.52 g 235 U in a 100 second measurement

Scale-up of experimental results to industrial size (preliminary results)

Assay device as implemented in 20-foot container(view from entrance) showing:detector positions, n-generator position

Standard ULD as applied for air cargo

168 cm

166 cm

Detection of SNM

Page 28: Pulsed Neutron Interrogation Test Assembly - PUNITA · Based on the (conservative) estimate of a detection limit in the PUNITA configuration of 0.52 g 235 U in a 100 second measurement

Scale-up of experimental results to industrial size (preliminary results)

Geometry comparison “ULD device / PUNITA”:

moderator volume ratio 11.9• sample cavity size ratio 31.7• detector volume ratio 21.8• neutron generator same (1x 108 /sec, 100 Hz pulsing)

Preliminary simulation results “ULD device / PUNITA”:

thermal n-flux ratio, centre pos. ϕth,ULD device /ϕth,PUNITA = 0.0061 ± 0.0002fission neutron det. efficiency εn, ULD device /εn, PUNITA = 0.379 ± 9.94·10-4

FOM ratio 1/436 ± 1/11065

Based on the (conservative) estimate of a detection limit in the PUNITA configuration of 0.52 g 235U in a 100 second measurement when using the 3-fold neutron coincidences as signature, the detection limit of the “ULD device” described above would be approximately a factor 436 higher, or LOD = 228 g 235U.

Detection of SNM

Page 29: Pulsed Neutron Interrogation Test Assembly - PUNITA · Based on the (conservative) estimate of a detection limit in the PUNITA configuration of 0.52 g 235 U in a 100 second measurement

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Pulsed neutron interrogation fornuclear disarmament verification

Verification of nuclear materials (Pu and HEU)Neutron generator (OK), moderator materials (probably not OK)

• Pulsed n-generator (14-MeV)• Tailor n-spectrum with filters around target• Induce fission with fast and epi-thermal spectrum• Detect useful fission signatures, in particular prompt fission neutrons• Use die-away curve (neutron self-multiplication)

to confirm “presence of large fissile mass”.

Verification of high explosives

• Need for moderator to acquire useful neutron capture gamma lines• In-elastic scattering gamma lines are difficult

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background CBNM 0.31% 235U CBNM 0.71% 235U CBNM 1.94% 235U CBNM 2.95% 235U CBNM 4.46% 235U Thermal n in cavity

Page 30: Pulsed Neutron Interrogation Test Assembly - PUNITA · Based on the (conservative) estimate of a detection limit in the PUNITA configuration of 0.52 g 235 U in a 100 second measurement

Thank you!

Bent PedersenJoint Research CentreInstitute for Transuranium ElementsNuclear Security Unit21027 Ispra (VA), Italy

[email protected]

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