public recentdevelopments 14

LLB Recent developments 2014

1

Recent developments 2014 LA1020 Public law

Current edition of the subject guide

The current edition of the subject guide was published in 2013.

The following developments should be noted

Chapter 2: The UK constitution and its core institutions

On the line of succession to the Crown, see the Succession to the

Crown Act 2013.

For discussion of House of Lords reform, see HC 251 of 17 October

2013 House of Lords Reform: What Next?

The House of Lords Reform (No 2) Bill (HC Bill 15), clause 1, provides

that a peer may retire or resign as a member of the House by giving

notice to the Clerk of the Parliaments. Retirement or resignation may

not be rescinded.

On non-attendance, clause 2 of the Bill provides that a peer who does

not attend during a Session will cease to be a member at the beginning

of the following Session. The provision does not apply if the Session is

less than six months long.

Clause 3 relates to conviction of a serious offence. If the Lord Speaker

certifies that a peer has been convicted of a serious offence and

sentenced to imprisonment of more than one year, that peer ceases to

be a member of the House of Lords, with effect from the date of the

certificate. Clause 3 only applies to offences committed after the

coming into force of the section.

Chapter 6: Ministerial accountability

The Chilcot Inquiry Report on the governments decision making in the

run up to the 2003 Iraq War remains unpublished. Hearings began in

2009. The delay is attributed to a dispute over the disclosure of records

of communications between the US President and the UK Prime

Minister of the time.

Chapter 7: Crown and prerogative powers

In R (G) v Home Secretary [2012] EWCA Civ 867; [2013] 2 WLR 1277,

the Court of Appeal considered, inter alia, the relationship between the

royal prerogative and statute. For details see the October 2013 Public

law Newsletter.

Chapter 8: UK primary legislation

On lobbying, see the Transparency of Lobbying, Non-party

Campaigning and Trade Union Administration Act 2014 which was

LA1020 Public law

2

introduced as a Bill in the House of Commons in July 2013 and

received Royal Assent on 30 January 2014. The Act makes provision

for a register of professional lobbyists and a Registrar of Consultant

Lobbyists to supervise and enforce the registration requirements. It will

be a criminal offence to function as a consultant lobbyist when not

registered.

The Act also makes provision for people or organisations that campaign

in relation to elections but are not standing as candidates or a

registered political party. The Act changes the limits which such people

or organisations can spend and the level of spending at which they

must register with the Electoral Commission. It also introduces limits

on the amount that non-party campaigners can spend in a particular

constituency.

Section 27 of the Act changes the existing limits that a third party may

spend in an election, amending s.94(5) of the Political Parties and

Electoral Reform Act 2000. A person wishing to spend 5,000 in

England or 2,000 in each of Scotland, Northern Ireland and Wales

must register as a recognised third party with the Electoral

Commission.

Note that the Bill providing for a referendum on whether the public

wishes the UK to remain a member of the European Union was

defeated by the House of Lords at the end of January 2014. The Prime

Minister has stated that he will have the Bill reintroduced in 2014 and

if necessary use the Parliament Act procedure to get the Bill through.

Chapter 15: Principles of judicial review I: illegality

Public bodies

The Court of Appeal examined the concept of public office in R v

Cosford and others [2013] EWCA Crim 466; [2013] 3 WLR 1064. The

defendants worked in a high security prison as nurses. They were

charged with various offences of misconduct in public office. In their

defence they argued that they were not holders of public office,

submitting that to be a holder of a public office there must be a degree

of authority over the citizen or a fiduciary duty to the citizen before a

person could be held to be the holder of a public office. Reviewing the

authorities (the earliest dating back to 1783), Leveson LJ rejected the

defendants arguments. The correct approach was to focus on the

nature of the duty undertaken:

... and, in particular, whether it is a public duty in the sense

that it represents the fulfilment of one of the responsibilities

of government such that the public have a significant interest

in its discharge extending beyond an interest in anyone who

might be directly affected by a serious failure in the

performance of the duty.

15.8 Reform of judicial review

The government has undertaken consultations on the reform of judicial

review with a view to reducing the number of unmeritorious

applications which have placed a burden on already stretched public

resources, while ensuring that arguable claims can be heard without

delay. On this please see the March 2014 Public law Newsletter.


3

Chapter 16: Principles of judicial review II: procedural fairness

16.2 legitimate expectations

R (Patel) v General Medical Council Times LR 21 June 2013; [2012]

EWHC 3688; [2013] 1 WLR 2694, the Court of Appeal considered the

concept of legitimate expectation. In administrative law, if a public

body creates expectation in the mind of a person affected by its

decision, either through its policy, or the making of assurances, then

that public body cannot simply ignore that expectation. Through

judicial review proceedings the courts will examine whether such an

expectation has been created, and if it has, will require the body

concerned to act accordingly. For details see the October 2013 Public

law Newsletter.

Right to an oral hearing

The Supreme Court examined the circumstances in which a prisoner

was entitled to an oral hearing before the Parole Board in R (Osborn) v

Parole Board; R (Booth) v Same, Re Reilly [2013]UKSC 61; [2013] 3

WLR 1020. While recognising that there could be no exhaustive

definition of when an oral hearing should be granted, the Court held

that an oral hearing was required whenever fairness to the prisoner

requires such a hearing in the light of the facts of the case and the

importance of what is at stake.

The case is interesting also for the analysis of the relationship between

the common law, the Human Rights Act 1998 and the European

Convention on Human Rights. In a summary of the conclusion reached,

Lord Reed JSC explained that relationship in the following manner:

In order to comply with common law standards of procedural

fairness, the board should hold an oral hearing before

determining an application for release, or for a transfer to

open conditions, whenever fairness to the prisoner requires

such a hearing in the light of the facts of the case and the

importance of what is at stake. By doing so the board will

also fulfil its duty under section 6(1) of the Human Rights Act

1998 to act compatibly with article 5.4 of the European

Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and

Fundamental freedoms, in circumstances where that article is

engaged (para.2).

Lord Reed stated that the correct starting point for the analysis of

rights is the common law. The rights guaranteed under the European

Convention (as with much of international law) are expressed in very

broad terms, and in order to be enforced must be translated into

detailed rules in domestic law:

The values underlying both the Convention and our own

constitution require that Convention rights should be

protected primarily by a detailed body of domestic law. The

Convention taken by itself is too inspecific to provide the

guidance which is necessary in a state governed by the rule of

law (at para.56).

On the Human Rights Act 1998, Lord Reed emphasised that although it

is an Act of great importance, it does not supersede the protection of

human rights under the common law or statute. Lord Reed set out

LA1020 Public law

4

several examples from the case law to demonstrate that the analytical

starting point is the common law, not the jurisprudence of the

European Court of Human Rights. In R (Daly) v Secretary of State for

the Home Department [2001] 2 AC 532, Lord Bingham of Cornhill

adopted the approach of Lord Cooke of Thorndon who said that:

It is of great importance, in my opinion, that the common

law by itself is being recognised as a sufficient source of the

fundamental right to confidential communication with a legal

adviser for the purpose of obtaining legal advice. Thus the

decision may prove to be in point in common law

jurisdictions not affected by the Convention. Rights similar to

those in the Convention are of course to be found in

constitutional documents and other formal affirmations of

rights elsewhere. The truth is, I think, that some rights

are inherent and fundamental to democratic

civilised society. Conventions, constitutions, bills of

rights and the like respond by recognising rather

than creating them (at para.58).

Citing also R (Sturnham) v Parole Board [2013] 2 WLR 1157, para.29,

Lord Reed stated that:

... the ordinary approach to the relationship between

domestic law and the Convention was described as being that

the courts endeavour to apply and if need be develop the

common law, and interpret and apply statutory provisions, so

as to arrive at a result which is in compliance with the UKs

international obligations, the starting point being our

own legal principles rather than the judgments of

the international court.

Chapter 17: Principles of judicial review III: irrationality and proportionality

In R (Bibi) v Secretary of State for the Home Department Times LR 5

June 2013 the Court of Appeal ruled that the requirement that a

foreign spouse or partner of a British citizen or person settled in the UK

produce a test certificate of knowledge of the English language prior to

entering the UK was proportionate. The objective was to facilitate the

integration of non-English-speaking spouses. It was a benign measure

and the state should be accorded a wide margin of appreciation [2013]

UKSC 61; [2013] 3 WLR 1020.

For a discussion of a merits-based approach to judicial review, as

opposed to the traditional grounds, see R (Youssef) v Secretary of State

for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs [2013] EWCA Civ 1302; [2013]

WLR(D) 412. The appellants name had been added to a list of persons

subject to sanctions under a UN Security Council Resolution. One of

the grounds of challenge was that the correct standard of review of the

decision is review on the merits rather than the conventional

rationality test.

Laws LJ stated that a merits judgment would be an exception. The

issue touched on the separation of powers. A merits based approach

would tend to usurp the function of either the legislature by displacing

the decision of the decision maker to whom Parliament had entrusted


5

the function, or the executive where the decision was taken under the

Prerogative.

As Laws LJ stated: Manifestly, the courts have no business to usurp the

legislature or the executive (at para.41).

Ultra vires

Where an Act of Parliament confers on a Minister the duty to make

Regulations, and those Regulations do little more than repeat the

statutory words, they will be held ultra vires. The Supreme Court so

held, upholding a decision of the Court of Appeal, in R (Reilly) v

Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2013] UKSC 68; [2013] 3

WLR 1276.

Chapter 18: Human rights protection

Recent case law

Articles 1 and 2

In Smith (and others) v Ministry of Defence [2013] UKSC 41; [2013] 1

All ER 778; [2013] 3 WLR 69, several issues which have wide-ranging

implications for the liability of government for soldiers on active

service were considered.

The case is discussed in detail in the February 2013 Public law

Newsletter. In summary, the Supreme Court held, unanimously, that

the soldiers were within the UKs jurisdiction for the purposes of the

Convention. The Court ruled, by four votes to three, that the claims

should not be struck out on the ground that they were not within

Article 2 and that they should not be struck out on the basis of combat

immunity or that it would not be fair, just or reasonable to extend the

MODs duty of care to those cases.

Each of these cases will now proceed to trial.

The European Court of Human Rights found a violation of Article 2 in

McCaughey and others v United Kingdom; Hemsworth and another v

United Kingdom Application nos 43098/09; 58559/09; [2013] ECHR

682; Times LR 4 October 2013. In 1990 a relative of the applicants in

the first case was shot dead by British Army soldiers. In the second case

a relative had died as a result of head injuries inflicted by police

officers. The investigations into the deaths lasted 23 and 13 years

respectively. The Court ruled that the procedural obligation under

Article 2 had been breached. The investigations into the deaths had

been subject to excessive delays.

In R (Nicklinson) v Ministry of Justice; Lame v Same; R (AM) v Director

of Public Prosecutions [2013] EWCA Civ 961; [2013] WLR(D) 326;

Times LR 8 October 2013, the Court of Appeal considered the difficult

moral and ethical issues involved in the question of assisted suicide.

The Court also made important observations relating to the separation

of powers and the rule of law. For details see the Public law

Newsletter, October 2013.

Note that the appeal to the Supreme Court was heard in December

2013.

In R (Sandiford) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth

Affairs [2013] EWCA Civ 581; [2013] 1 WLR 2938; Times LR 19 July

2013, the Court of Appeal ruled that the Foreign Secretarys policy of

LA1020 Public law

6

refusing to provide funding for legal representation to UK nationals

facing the death penalty abroad was lawful. The policy of not funding

legal advice or representation for nationals abroad was a blanket policy

with no exceptions. It was not irrational. The claimant had argued that

her situation fell within the scope of EU law because the EU

Framework Decision 2004/757/JHA related to minimum provisions on

criminal acts and penalties for illicit drug trafficking and that the

Framework Decision applied to offences committed outside the EU.

However, EU law had not been implemented and the policy therefore

did not breach EU law. The claimant also argued that she fell within

Article 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights, on the basis

that she was within the jurisdiction of the UK because of the activities

of the Foreign Office and its consular offices in Indonesia in connection

with her case. However, the court ruled that mere involvement of UK

officials did not amount to the exercise of authority and control

necessary to establish jurisdiction.

Article 3

In Vinter and others v United Kingdom (No 2) Application nos

66069/09, 130/10 and 3896/10, [2013] ECHR 645; Times LR 11 July

2013, the Court of Human Rights ruled that there was a violation of

Article 3 in respect of life imprisonment sentences where there was no

possibility of release or review. Under the Criminal Justice Act 2003,

the sentencing judge would fix the tariff, or make a whole life order.

There was no provision for review of that order. Prior to that Act the

Home Secretary fixed the tariff, including a whole life tariff, and a

review was carried out after 25 years.

The Grand Chamber ruled that for a life sentence to be compatible

with Article 3 there had to be both a possibility of release and a

possibility of review.

The extradition of a prisoner suffering from paranoid schizophrenia to

the United States of America where he might be held in a maximum

security prison would amount to inhuman or degrading treatment

because the conditions of detention would be like to exacerbate his

condition. The Court of Human Rights so held in Aswat v United

Kingdom Application no 17299/12, [2013] ECHR 322; Times LR 24

April 2013.

In H v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis (Liberty intervening)

[2013] EWCA Civ 69; [2013] 1 WLR 3021, the Court of Appeal ruled

that the police had, inter alia, violated Articles 3, 5 and 8 of the

Convention. There was also established a claim for trespass to the

person and unlawful discrimination contrary to the Disability

Discrimination Act 1995. For details see the Public law Newsletter,

December 2013.

Article 4

In R (Reilly) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2013] UKSC

68; [2013] 3 WLR 1276 the Supreme Court considered the type of

conduct which would amount to a violation of Article 4 (freedom from

slavery and forced labour). In judicial review proceedings, one of the

grounds for challenge was that the requirement that the claimant

undertake two weeks training and two weeks unpaid work in a

discount store, with the risk of losing a Jobseekers Allowance if she


7

refused, amounted to a breach of Article 4. The Supreme Court

rejected that argument. In order to reach the level of exploitation

needed for Article 4, and reciting the phrases used by the Court of

Appeal, the conduct must be unjust, oppressive, an avoidable

hardship, needlessly distressing or somewhat harassing.

Article 5

For a useful review of the Article 5 case law see R (Hicks) v

Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2014] EWCA Civ; [2014]

WLR(D) 30.

Article 6

The Supreme Court examined the requirement in Article 6 of trial

within a reasonable time in ONeill v HM Advocate (No 2); Lauchlan v

Same [2013] UKSC 36; [2013] 1 WLR 1992; [2013] HRLR 25. In 1998

the appellants were detained and interviewed under caution in relation

to the disappearance and murder of M. It was not until April 2005 that

they were charged with murdering M: they were tried and convicted in

2010. The appellants sought to appeal against their convictions for

murder on the grounds that the charges had not been determined

within a reasonable time as required by Article 6.

The appellants argued that they starting point for reasonable time was

1998 (the date on which they were detained) rather than 2005, the

date on which they were finally charged. The reason for the delay was

that the police did not have sufficient evidence to bring a charge

earlier, and the body of the victim had not been recovered. The police

were only in a position to charge the appellants in April 2005, and the

Court held that April 2005 was the date on which the reasonable time

began.

Kapri v Lord Advocate [2013] UKSC 48; [2013] 4 All ER 599

considered an appeal against an Extradition Order. The Albanian

government had requested the return of the applicant to stand trial.

Resisting the application for extradition, the applicant alleged that

there was systemic corruption in the Albanian judicial system which

meant that his right to a fair trial could not be guaranteed. The

Supreme Court ruled that the allegations were sufficiently serious to

make it necessary to look more closely at the evidence than the appeal

court had done. The case was remitted for further consideration of the

allegations.

The European Court of Human Rights considered the presumption of

innocence under Article 6 in Allen v United Kingdom Application no

25424/09; [2013] ECHR 678; Times LR 30 July 2013. A woman had

her conviction for manslaughter quashed by the Court of Appeal. She

had served three years imprisonment. The Grand Chamber stated that

Article 6.2 did not guarantee a person a right to compensation for a

miscarriage of justice. In Ms Allens case, the acquittal was made on the

basis that new medical evidence might have affected the jurys decision

to convict: it was not an acquittal on the merits of the case. In refusing

compensation there had been no undermining of the applicants right to

the presumption of innocence and there was no violation of Article 6.2.

In Mastafa v Her Majestys Treasury (2012) the Queens Bench Division

ruled that Article 6 of the Convention applied to a designation order

made by the Treasury under s.2(1) of the Terrorist Asset-Freezing etc

LA1020 Public law

8

Act 2010. Accordingly, the extent of disclosure of evidence for the

purpose of an appeal against the designation was what was necessary

to enable the designated person to give effective instructions to his

legal representative.

Article 8

The Court of Human Rights ruled that there had been a violation of

Article 8 in MM v United Kingdom Application no 24029/07, [2013]

ECHR 1906; Times LR 16 January 2013.The applicant had been

arrested and cautioned by the police. She was told that the caution

would be retained for life and could, under certain circumstances, be

disclosed to prospective employers. There was no statutory framework

governing the retention and disclosure of cautions, and the Court

found that there was a lack of clarity in the common law police

powers. The retention and disclosure of the caution data could not be

regarded as being in accordance with the law. Therefore there had

been a violation of Article 8.

The holding and retention of personal information on an individual

and the retention of a police warning notice issued by the police would

amount to a breach of Article 8 if the retention was disproportionate to

its legitimate aim. The Court of Appeal so held in R (Catt) v Association

of Chief Police Officers of England, Wales and Northern Ireland [2013]

EWCA Civ; [2013] 1 WLR 3305.

Article 9

In Eweida and others v United Kingdom Application nos 48420/10,

59842/10, 36516/10; [2013] IRLR 231; (2013) 57 EHRR 8, the Court

of Human Rights reconsidered the scope of Article 9: the right to

manifest ones religion. Two of the applicants alleged that their rights

had been infringed by the refusal of their employer to allow them to

wear a Christian cross around their neck at work. In relation to an

employee of British Airways (BA), Ms Eweida, the Court held that

there had been a violation. BA allowed the wearing of other religious

clothing and had amended its dress code to allow for religious

symbolic jewellery, showing that the earlier prohibition was not of

importance. In respect of Ms Chaplin, a geriatric nurse employed in a

hospital, there was no violation. The prohibition was justified on the

grounds of protection of the health and safety of the hospital ward.

The belief that sexual relations outside marriage, whether between

heterosexuals or homosexuals, were sinful, did not excuse conduct

which contravened equality law. The Supreme Court so held, affirming

the decision of the Court of Appeal, in Preddy v Bull [2013] UKSC 73;

[2013] 1 WLR 3741.

Article 10

Article 10 was considered by the Court of Human Rights in Animal

Defenders International v United Kingdom Application no 48876/08;

[2013] ECHR 362; (2013) 57 EHRR 21. The applicant was an

organisation which campaigned on behalf of animal welfare. It wished

to screen a television advertisement. The Broadcast Advertising

Clearance Centre refused permission on the ground that its

transmission would breach the prohibition on political advertising in

s.321(1) of the Communications Act 2003. The Court held that the

restrictions imposed on political advertising were justified. In particular


9

the Court attached weight to the fact that there had been considerable

cross-party parliamentary support for the ban, and that the domestic

courts had given careful consideration to the jurisprudence of the

Court of Human Rights. There were alternative outlets for the

applicant to use to publicise their case. Furthermore, there was no

consensus concerning political broadcasts among contracting states, a

factor which pointed towards allowing a wider margin of appreciation

than normally afforded to restrictions on freedom of expression on

matters of public interest.

Articles 10 and 11

In R (Gallastegui) v Westminster City Council Times LR 5 March 2013;

[2013] 2 All ER 579;[2013] 1 WLR 2377, the Court of Appeal ruled

that restrictions imposed under ss.143 and 145 of the Police Reform

and Social Responsibility Act 2011 were not incompatible with Articles

10 or 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The

restrictions were designed to prevent protesters camping with tents or

sleeping equipment in Parliament Square, and did not infringe their

right to freedom of expression or freedom of peaceful assembly.

Article 12 The right to marry

Note the Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Act 2013.

18.6 Case study prisoners voting rights

The Supreme Court reconsidered the issue of the ban on prisoners

voting in R (Chester) v Secretary of State for Justice; McGeoch (AP) v The

Lord President of the Council [2013] UKSC 63; Times LR 22 October

2013; [2013] 3 WLR 1076. Section 3(1) of the Representation of the

People Act 1983 and s.8 of the European Parliamentary Elections Act

2002 provide that a convicted prisoner in detention while serving his

or her sentence could not vote at any domestic or European Union

election. In Hirst v United Kingdom (No 2) (2005) 42 EHRR 849 the

European Court of Human Rights had ruled that the UKs ban on

prisoner voting was incompatible with Article 3 of the First Protocol to

the Convention. That decision was reaffirmed in Scappola v Italy

(2012) 56 EHRR 663.

In the instant case, the Supreme Court recognised the incompatibility

of the ban with the Convention but declined to issue a Declaration of

Incompatibility on the basis that a declaration had been made in

previous proceedings and that the matter was under consideration by

Parliament. It was for the democratically elected Parliament to

complete its consideration of the matter and accordingly there was no

role for the Supreme Court to play.

Chapter 20: Human Rights Act 1998 and terrorism

The security services

Allegations against the role of the UK security services in relation to the

treatment of terrorist suspects by US forces following the 2001 attacks

on the United States led to the Coalition Government establishing an

inquiry in 2010, chaired by Sir Peter Gibson, a retired High Court

judge. In December 2013 it was reported that the Report is to be

considered by the Intelligence Security Committee.

LA1020 Public law

10

Allegations of abuse of human rights contrary to the Human Rights Act

1998 against undercover police officers fell within the jurisdiction of

the Investigatory Powers Tribunal, and not the High Court. The High

Court so ruled in AKJ and others v Commissioner of Police of the

Metropolis and another [2013] EWHC 32; [2013] 1 WLR 2734.

The claimants were political activists. Undercover police officers

infiltrated the claimants organisations and in order to gather

intelligence entered into sexual relationships with the female claimants

and befriended the one male complainant. The claimants alleged that

the sustained deceptions by the officers were serious interferences with

their right to respect for their private lives.

Section 65 of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000

provides, in part, that:

The jurisdiction of the Tribunal shall be:

(2) to be the only appropriate tribunal for the purposes of

section 7 of the Human Rights Act 1998 in relation to any

proceedings under subsection (1)(a) of that section Which

fall within subsection (3) of this section.

Subsection (3) provides, in part, that:

Proceedings fall within this subsection if:

(a) they are proceedings against any of the intelligence

services;

(b) they are proceedings against any other person in respect

of any conduct, or proposed conduct, by or on behalf of any

of those services;

(c) they are proceedings relating to the taking place in any

challengeable circumstances of any conduct falling within

subsection (5).

It was accepted that if s.65 conferred jurisdiction on the tribunal, then

that jurisdiction is exclusive.

Tugendhat J explained in the course of his judgment that there is more

than one principle of legality: one at common law and one under the

Human Rights Act 1998. Referring to the common law, he cited the

judgment of Lord Hoffmann in R v Secretary of State for the Home

Department, ex parte Simms [2000] 2 AC 115 (decided before the

Human Rights Act came into force). Lord Hoffmann stated that:

Fundamental rights cannot be overridden by general or

ambiguous words [in a statute] In the absence of express

language or necessary implication to the contrary, the courts

therefore presume that even the most general words were

intended to be subject to the basic rights of the individual. In

this way the courts of the United Kingdom, though

acknowledging the sovereignty of Parliament, apply

principles of constitutionality little different from those which

exists in countries where the power of the legislature is

expressly limited by a constitutional document.

In relation to RIPA 2000, Tugendhat J stated that its purpose was to

create defences to conduct that would otherwise be unlawful, but

recognised that there are limits to the conduct which can be authorised


11

under the Act. One of those limits is interference with a fundamental

right such as the right not to be subjected to degrading treatment: a

limit recognised by the common law and under Article 3 of the

European Convention. However, conduct which amounted to no more

than an interference with the right to privacy is capable of being

authorised under the 2000 Act, thereby making that conduct lawful.

In the instant case, the conduct of the police in establishing intimate

relations with another person for the purpose of obtaining information

was conduct which took place in challengeable circumstances (s.65(7)

of the 2000 Act) and accordingly the only appropriate tribunal in

relation to any proceedings relating to an alleged interference with a

Convention right was the Investigatory Powers Tribunal.

On surveillance by the security forces follow the case of Big Brother

Watch v United Kingdom, Application no 58170/13; [2014] ECHR 93.

At the time of writing, the Court of Human Rights has addressed a

number of questions for answer to the parties.

On the definition of terrorism under the Terrorism Act 2000 see R v

Gul [2013] UKSC 64.

On the limits of the Secretary of States power to deprive a person of

citizenship see Secretary of State for the Home Department v Al-Jedda

[2013] UKSC 62.

The Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC)

Note that the Justice and Security Act 2013 strengthens the powers of

the Committee. It extends the ISCs role to include overseeing aspects

of security beyond the three main Agencies. The Act also confers power

to examine, retrospectively, operational activities of the Agencies. In

addition, the ISC is given the power to require information from the

Agencies which can only be vetoed by the Secretary of State, rather

than the heads of Agencies.

public recentdevelopments 14

Documents