PRODUCTIVITY IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR – OBSTACLES AND

BARRIERS

POLITICAL FACTORS THAT INFLUENCE DECISION MAKING

• POLITICAL FACTORS OFTEN OUTWEIGH MANAGEMENT RATIONALE • EXAMPLES:

• RECOMMENDATIONS TO DEMOLISH RAMSHACKLE CITY-OWNED BUILDINGS THAT COST MORE TO MAINTAIN AND ARE SAFETY HAZARDS ARE REJECTED BECAUSE COMMUNITY GROUPS AND AGENCIES ENJOY THE INEXPENSIVE, TAX-SUBSIDIZED SPACE

• LOW-BID PURCHASING PROCEDURES ARE DISTORTED BY POLITICAL DECISIONS THAT FAVOR LOCAL SUPPLIERS

• A TAX-SYSTEM BASED UPON ENGINEERED WORK STANDARDS THAT WOULD ALLOW METER READERS TO LEAVE THE JOB AFTER THE COMPLETION OF A “FAIR DAY’S WORK” IS REJECTED BECAUSE OF ADVERSE PUBLIC REACTION

LACK OF POLITICAL APPEAL

• THE TASK OF PRODUCTIVITY IMPROVEMENT IS LESS GLAMOUROUS OR APPEALING THAN ADDRESSING OTHER GOVERNMENT PROBLEMS.

• COMPILING RECORDS OF SECURING FEDERAL FUNDS FOR THEIR JURISDICTIONS IS MORE APPEALING THAN COMMITTING TIME TO OVERSEEING THE MANAGEMENT OF PROGRAMS THOSE AND OTHER FUNDS SUPPORT.

SHORT TIME HORIZON

• POLITICIANS, AND THEIR ADMINISTRATORS, TEND TO WEIGH DECISIONS ACCORDING TO A TIME HORIZON ONLY AS DISTANT AS THE DATE OF NEXT ELECTION

• FACED WITH THE DECISION TO MAKE A CAPITAL INVESTMENT PROJECTED TO REAP BENEFITS IN FOUR YEARS OR, WITH THE SAME AVAILABLE RESOURCES, TO PUT POLICE OFFICERS ON THE STREET, AN ELECTED OFFICIAL WHO MUST FIGHT FOR RE-ELECTION IN TWO YEARS WILL CHOOSE THE LATTER

POLICY RATHER THAN PERFORMANCE EMPHASIS

• FRONT-PAGE IN THE LOCAL NEWSPAPER IS RARELY DEVOTED TO STORIES DEALING WITH THE MANAGEMENT OF DAY-TO-DAY GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS

• REPUTATIONS AND REWARDS TEND TO BE EARNED IN THE POLICY AREAS, SENDING AN UNMISTAKABLE SIGNAL TO MANAGERS STRUGGLING TO ALLOCATE PRECIOUS TIME AMONG COMPETING DEMANDS

PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS REGARDING CHANGES AND BENEFITS

• FIRST-YEAR SAVINGS FROM INDIVIDUAL PRODUCTIVITY IMPROVEMENT PROJECTS, EVEN HIGHLY SUCCESSFUL PROJECTS, RARELY REPRESENT MORE THAN A MINOR PERCENTAGE OF THE GOVERNMENTAL BUDGET

• THE CUMULATIVE IMPACT OF MULTIPLE PRODUCTIVITY IMPROVEMENT EFFORTS MAY BE SUBSTANTIAL BUT THEIR RELATIVELY MODEST INDIVIDUAL IMPACT RENDERS THEIR BENEFITS VIRTUALLY INVISIBLE TO THE PUBLIC EYE

FRAGMENTATION OF GOVERNMENT WITIN A GEOGRAPHIC AREA

• THE CONCENTRATION OF NUMEROUS MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENTS WITHIN A SMALL GEOGRAPHIC AREA, OVERLAPPED BY COUNTY GOVERNMENT AND NUMEROUS SPECIAL DISTRICTS FOR SCHOOLS, WATER, AND OTHER SPECIFIC FUNCTIONS, IS A MAJOR IMPEDIMENT TO PRODUCTIVITY IMPROVEMENT

• THE RIO GRANDE VALLEY IS A GOOD EXAMPLE OF FRAGMENTED GOVERNMENT WITH MULTIPLE MUNICIPALITIES NEIGHBORING EACH OTHER TEND TO COMPETE RATHER THAN COOPERATE IN PURSUING ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS BENEFICIAL TO THE ENTIRE REGION

INADEQUATE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

• THE DISJOINTED NATURE OF INDIVIDUAL GOVERNMENTAL UNITS TOGETHER WITH THE SMALL AMOUNT OF INVESTMENT IN DEVELOPMENT RESOURCES RESULTS IN LITTLE TO NO PRODUCTIVITY IMPROVEMENT EFFORTS

ANTI-PRODUCTIVITY EFFECT OF FEDERAL GRANT PROVISIONS

• REGULATIONS GOVERNING GRANT-SUPPORTED PROGRAMS TEND TO BE WRITTEN TOWARD CONTROLLING THE BEHAVIOR OF THE LEAST RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENTAL ENTITIES, OFTEN RESULTING IN TIGHTLY PRESCRIBED AND CUMBERSOME OPERATING PROCEDURES THAT LEAD TO RED TAPE AND DELAYS, WHILE ELIMINATING FLEXIBILITY IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF IMPROVED METHODS. FEW GRANT PROGRAMS PROVIDE REWARDS FOR THE PRODUCTIVE, OR PENALIZE THE UNPRODUCTIVE, USE OF FEDERAL FUNDS; MANY INCLUDE MAINTENANCE-OF-EFFORT PROVISIONS, PROHIBITING ANY REDUCTIONS IN EXPENDITURES

• FEDERAL GRANTS HAVE TENDED TO INCREASE LOCAL GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE PRESSURES, TO DISTORT BUDGET PRIORITIES, AND TO THWART BUDGET-CUTTING EFFORTS, AND MAY EVEN CONTRIBUTE TO FISCAL INSTABILITY

INTERGOVERNMENTAL MANDATES OF LOCAL EXPENDITURES

• FEDERAL AND STATE-IMPOSED REQUIREMENTS THAT LOCAL GOVERNMENTS PROVIDE SPECIFIED SERVICES OR BENEFITS ARE RARELY, IF EVER, ESTABLISHED WITH OPERATIONAL PRODUCTIVITY AS A MAJOR CONSIDERATION.

CIVIL SERVICE RESTRICTIONS

• CIVIL SERVICE SYSTEMS WERE DEVELOPED AS MEANS OF REMEDYING THE PROBLEMS CREATED BY INCOMPETENT OR EVEN CORRUPT GOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATIONS . IN THEIR PRESENT FORM, HOWEVER, CIVIL SERVICE RULES AND REGULATIONS HAVE BECOME BARRIERS RESTRICTING MANAGERIAL ABILITY TO ACHIEVE MAXIMUM RETURN FOR LOCAL TAX DOLLARS. RULES RESTRICTING FLEXIBILITY IN STAFF ASSIGNMENTS AND RE-ASSIGNMENTS, PREVENTING DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT AND REWARDS FOR VARYING LEVELS OF EMPLOYEE PERFORMANCE, AND ELONGATING THE HIRING PROCESS SO THAT TOP CANDIDATES GO WITH OTHER EMPLOYERS, ARE SERIOUS PRODUCTIVITY BARRIERS.

LEGAL RESTRICTIONS

• PROGRAMS INTENDED TO ENHANCE PRODUCTIVITY HAVE IN SOME INSTANCES FACED LEGAL RESTRICTIONS. FOR EXAMPLE, AREAS SUCH AS WORKING-HOUR VARIATIONS, MODIFIED PERFORMANCE-APPRAISAL TECHNIQUES, SHARED-SAVINGS PLANS, AND OTHER EMPLOYEE INCENTIVE PROGRAMS ARE LIMITED.

BARRIERS TO MONETARY INCENTIVE PLANS

• MONETARY INCENTIVE PLANS OFTEN ARE CONFRONTED NOT ONLY BY RESTRICTIVE CIVIL SERVICE REGULATIONS AND OTHER LEGAL BARRIERS, BUT ALSO BY RESISTANT EMPLOYEES, SUPERVISORS, AND LOCAL POLITICIANS. EMPLOYEE OPPOSITION OFTEN IS BASED ON FEAR THAT THE AWARD SYSTEM WILL BE ADMINISTERED INEQUITABLY IF THE PLANS CALLS FOR INDIVIDUAL AWARDS, OR AMONG HIGH-ACHIEVING EMPLOYEES AND SUPERVISORS, THAT POOR PERFORMERS WILL RIDE THE COATTAILS OF TOP PERFORMERS IF GROUP INCENTIVES ARE PRESCRIBED. SOME BELIEF THAT PROGRAMS SUCH AS PAY-FOR-PERFORMANCE INDUCE A PRIVATE SECTOR MENTALITY INAPPROPRIATE TO PUBLIC SERVICE.

DOMINANT PREFERENCE FOR THE STATUS QUO

• SOME BELIEVE THAT THE DOMINANT CLASSES SATISFACTION WITH SERVICES PROVIDED TO ITS MEMBERS WORKS AGAINST INNOVATION

• PUBLIC BUREAUCRACIES ARE SLOW TO INNOVATE BECAUSE THE DOMINANT SOCIAL CLASSES PREFER THE STATUS QUO

ABSENCE OF MARKET PRESSURES

• OPERATING AS UNREGULATED MONOPOLIES, LOCAL GOVERNMENTS FUNCTION WITHOUT THE MARKET PRESSURES COMMON TO MOST PRIVATE SECTOR COMPANIES. UNLIKE THE PRIVATE SECTOR, WHERE INNOVATIVE, COST-CONSCIOUS BUSINESSES THAT PRODUCE GOODS OR SERVICES DESIRED BY THEIR CUSTOMERS ARE REWARDED AND NONINNOVATIVE, WASTEFUL, UNRESPONSIVE BUSINESSES ARE PUNISHED WITH DECLINING MARKET SHARES, THE PUBLIC SECTOR OFFERS NO TRULY ANALOGOUS SET OF REWARDS AND PENALTIES FOR PERFORMANCE OR NONPERFORMANCE, INNOVATION OR FAILURE TO INNOVATE.

EFFECTIVENESS NOT EFFICIENCY

• PRODUCTIVITY INVOLVES EFFECTIVENESS AND EFFICIENCY, A CONCERN FOR QUALITY AND A SENSITIVITY TO COST

• MANY PUBLIC SECTOR PRACTITIONERS EMPHASIZE EFFECTIVENESS AND VIRTUALLY EXCLUDE EFFICIENCY

• MANY SCOFF AT THE IDEA THAT THEIR DEPARTMENT’S PERFORMANCE CAN BE MEASURED

LACK OF ACCOUNTABILITY

• FEW LOCAL GOVERNMENTS DEMAND THAT THEIR MANAGERS, PARTICULARLY LOWER-LEVEL SUPERVISORS, BE ACCOUNTABLE FOR OPERATIONAL PRODUCTIVITY

• MOST ARE EXPECTED TO KEEP THEIR OPERATIONS RUNNING ESSENTIALLY IN THE FASHION THAT THEY HAVE RUN IN THE PAST, TO MINIMIZE COMPLAINTS, AND TO AVOID CONTROVERSY

PERVERSE REWARD SYSTEM

• NOT ONLY DO LOCAL GOVERNMENTS NORMALLY FAIL TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE REWARDS AND RECOGNITION FOR SUPERIOR PERFORMANCE, THEY TYPICALLY REWARD MANAGERS WHO HAVE EXPANDED THEIR BUDGETS AND INCREASED THE NUMBER OF PERSONS THEY SUPERVISE

• THE DEPARTMENT HEAD WHO FINDS WAYS TO MINIMIZE THE RESOURCES NECESSARY TO CONTINUE OPERATING EFFECTIVELY CAN EXPECT A REDUCTION IN THE UPCOMING BUDGET WHILE THE SAVED FUNDS ARE USED TO COVER THE EXPENDITURES OF A LESS EFFICIENT DEPARTMENT

MANAGERIAL ALIBIS

• LOCAL GOVERNMENT MANAGERS FACING DIFFICULT CIRCUMSTANCES OFTEN EXCUSE THEIR FAILURE TO DEAL WITH A PROBLEM BY COMPLAINING ABOUT POLITICAL PROBLEMS, THE COMPLEXITY OF GOVERNMENT, OR SIMILAR OBSTACLES

RELUCTANCE TO ABANDON

• PETER DRUCKER CALLS THE INABILITY TO ABANDON THE MOST DAMNING OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION’S DEADLY SINS

• EVERY PROGRAM EVENTUALLY OUTLIVES ITS USEFULNESS. RELUCTANCE TO ACKNOWLEDGE THAT A PROGRAM HAS OUTLIVED ITS USEFULNESS AND TO ACT UPON THE REALIZATION DRAINS PUBLIC RESOURCES WHILE PRODUCING LITTLE IN RETURN

LACK OF PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT

• PETER DRUCKER’S LIST OF SINS INCLUDES THE LACK OF MEASURES OF PERFORMANCE – “TO HAVE A CHANCE AT PERFORMANCE, A PROGRAM NEEDS CLEAR TARGETS, THE ATTAINMENT OF WHICH CAN BE MEASURED, APPRAISED, OR AS LEAST JUDGED.”

• TOO OFTEN, LOCAL GOVERNMENT OBJECTIVES, IF STATED AT ALL, ARE PRESENTED IN AMBIGUOUS TERMS, SUCH AS, “TO ENSURE PUBLIC SAFETY,” “TO ENHANCE RECREATIONAL OPPORTUNITIES.”

• IN THE ABSENCE OF PRECISE, QUANTIFIABLE OBJECTIVES, LOCAL GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENTS TENDS TO BE A TABULATION OF WORKLOAD MEASURES, SUCH AS THE NUMBER OF CALLS ANSWERED, THE NUMBER OF CASES PROCESSED, THE NUMBER OF APPLICATIONS RECEIVED. (SEE MY ARTICLE ON MEASURING PUBLIC SECTOR PERFORMANCE)

EFFECTIVE PUBLIC MANAGERS OVERCOME BARRIERS