public interest report · needs to be said has been said but not everyone has said it”. it’s...

TOWARD TRUE SECURITYFAS and the Natural Resources Defense Councilpublished a report that calls for the immediatedeclaration that the sole mission of all U.S.nuclear weapons is to deter a nuclear attack, takeall nuclear weapons off launch-ready alert, andreduce the U.S. arsenal to a total of 1000 nuclearwarheads. The PDF of the report is located athttp://www.fas.org/press/news/2008/feb_toward_true_security.html.More on page 4.

AD HOC SCHEME CONTRIBUTED TO DIVERSION OF SMALL ARMSAt the outbreak of the insurgency in Iraq, weaponswere rapidly transferred to the Iraqi SecurityForces using an ad-hoc security program with noclear accountability requirements. These weakstandards contributed to the diversion of weaponsto unintended users within Iraq and outside its bor-ders. Katarzyna Bzdak reports on the poor prepa-ration by the U.S. for the post-war period in Iraq.More on page 6.

U.S. INTERCEPTED SPY SATELLITEWhile the Bush administration justified the interception on the basis of public safety, therewas virtually no mention of the political conse-quences or the arms control implications of theUnited States conducting its first anti-missile test in more than two decades. The U.S. and other space-faring nations should be working toban anti-satellite weapons. More on page 13.

THE FEDERATION OF AMERICAN SCIENTISTS Volume 61, Number 1 Spring 2008

PublicInterest Report

President’s Message 2

New Report Calls for Steps Toward a Nuclear-Free World 4

Ad Hoc Equipping Scheme Contributed to 6

Diversion of Small Arms

Become a Member and Support FAS 11

A New Look to FAS.org 12

U.S. Intercepted Failed Intelligence Satellite 13

To Win the Peace, Restore the Corps 15

THE FEDERATION OF AMERICAN SCIENTISTS

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nearby methamphetamine lab. TheDefense Department is quick to point outthat no one was in immediate dangerbecause of these incidents. What they donot point out is that, in spite of enormousprecautions, mistakes are made even withthe most dangerous and sensitive equip-ment.

The most frightening risks, of course, lie in the security of the command and control systems used by the United Statesand Russia to give instructions to theweapons that they maintain ready to launchin seconds. The U.S. has 776 weapons inthis status and the Russians 629. Severalfrightening stories have emerged over theyears chronicling alerts triggered by falsealarms. In 1995 the Russian program went to full alert—and President Yeltsin’s“nuclear suitcase” activated—because of an alarm generated by a Norwegianresearch rocket. It’s become increasinglydifficult to get a clear picture of theRussian measures for physical protectionof their materials or the reliability of theircommunication system. U.S. help throughthe Cooperative Threat Reduction andother programs have greatly reduced therisk of physical diversion but there are continued reports of attempts to steal or divert Russian fissionable materials.There’s certainly reason to believe that the security of antiquated communicationnetworks is at increasing risk to error andpotentially malicious hacking.

What’s clear from all this is that therisks of maintaining the nuclear status quoare very real. The core question is whetherthe risks are worth the benefits gained.There is growing bipartisan consensus thatthey are not.

Building on Ronald Reagan’s observa-

When the Secretaries of the AirForce and Navy receive anurgent directive from the

Secretary of Defense instructing them to“to undertake a comprehensive review andphysical inventory by serial number of allnuclear weapons and nuclear weapons-related materials under the possession orcustody of your respective military depart-ment or agency” it’s hard to avoid theimpression that the U.S. nuclear programis not being managed by the A-team. Theinventory is going to take a lot of work. The United States has 4,075 operationalnuclear weapons and 5,400 in a reservestockpile. And there are huge inventoriesof associated equipment. (Worldwide thereare 31 thousand nuclear weapons today –94 percent owned by the United States andRussia, and the rest owned by six othercountries.

The March 26 directive was prompted by the astonishing discovery that some ofthis associated equipment—four highlyclassified Mark-12 fuses for the weaponscarried by Minuteman missiles—was mis-takenly sent to Taiwan as helicopter batter-ies. This debacle comes on top of newslast year that six W80-1 nuclear warheadscapable of yields up to 150 kilotons weremistakenly flown across the country—andthe mistake went unnoticed for a full day.Hans Kristensen of FAS found that therewere 237 “Dull Sword” incidents involvingmistaken handling of nuclear weaponequipment since 2001.

And we’ve all but forgotten the fiascosthat convulsed Los Alamos National Lab afew years ago. There were at least threeincidents of missing computer disks filledwith sensitive design information with themost recent insult being the discovery ofweapons information during a raid on a

PRESIDENT’S MESSAGE

The Risks of Maintaining

the Nuclear Status Quo

Are Very Real

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About FAS

The Federation of American Scientists(FAS), founded on 8 December 1945 asthe Federation of Atomic Scientists byManhattan Project scientists, works toensure that advances in science are usedto build a secure, rewarding, environ-mentally sustainable future for all peopleby conducting research and advocacy on science public policy issues. Currentweapons nonproliferation issues rangefrom nuclear disarmament to biologicaland chemical weapons control to moni-toring conventional arms sales and spacepolicy. FAS also promotes learning technologies and limits on governmentsecrecy. FAS is a tax-exempt, tax-deductible 501(c)(3) organization.

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SPRING 2008 | PUBLIC INTEREST REPORT

tion that nuclear weapons are “...totallyirrational, totally inhumane, good for noth-ing but killing, possibly destructive of life on earth and civilization” a path-breaking2007 article in the Wall Street Journal byGeorge Shultz, William Perry, HenryKissinger, and Sam Nunn outlined the“tremendous dangers” presented bynuclear weapons and concluded that“Reassertion of the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons and practical measurestoward achieving that goal would be, andwould be perceived as, a bold initiative consistent with America’s moral heritage.The effort could have a profoundly positiveimpact on the security of future genera-tions.” A recent meeting sponsored by thefour authors at the Hoover Institution ofStanford resulted in another Journal articleby the four and an additional set of pro-posals.

In parallel with this work, FAS, TheNatural Resources Defense Council, andthe Union of Concerned Scientists releasedan updated version of Toward TrueSecurity: Ten Steps the Next PresidentShould Take to Transform U.S. NuclearWeapons Policy, which was first publishedin 2001. While the recommendations arenot identical to those of the HooverInstitution, there is a remarkable degree of overlap—including steps to reduce therisk of launches from false warnings, reintroducing the Comprehensive Test BanTreaty, steps aimed at the elimination ofshort range nuclear weapons, stopping theproduction of fissional materials worldwide,and substantially reducing the size ofnuclear arsenals.

This broad bipartisan consensus, together with the opportunity presented byhaving an American president willing tolook at the issue with fresh eyes, presents a rare opportunity to make progress in oneof the most important and politically haz-ardous areas of U.S. and world security policy. Nuclear weapons policy in the U.S.has been suspended in a strange floating

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world for at least a decade. Once the crownjewels of U.S. security, it has drifted withincreasingly strained efforts to explain therole and mission of any U.S. nuclearweapons in today’s world given the over-whelming U.S. superiority in conventionalweaponry – let alone explain why we couldconceivably need 10 thousand wantons.Trapped with increasingly unconvincingstrategic justification, the programs arefighting to avoid errors generated by whatmust be mind-warping boredom and inac-tion. The disastrous timing of the debateover the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty—which followed hard upon the Senate’s fail-ure to remove President Clinton fromoffice—allowed the rawest kind of politics todominate what could have been a reasoneddebate about U.S. nuclear policy. The scarsleft by this process, coupled with old-fash-ioned pork barrel politics, have protectedthe programs from serious scrutiny in spiteof the fact that they have been unable toconvince serious security analysts of eitherparty that they have a clear mission – partic-ularly in their current form.

Here’s what should happen:

We should work to create a strong bipar-tisan consensus on the need to dramaticallyreform U.S. nuclear posture and rebuild theinternational coalition on non-proliferation.The Senate is critical for this. Partisanwrangling over the core principles would bedisastrous.

The new president should undertakeimmediate, unilateral steps that could meetthe Shultz, Kissinger, Perry, Nunn objectiveof being a “bold initiative consistent withAmerica’s moral heritage”. This is essentialfor the United States to be taken seriously ininternational debates after eight yearswhere our reputation as a moral leader hasbeen badly damaged. The ten steps outlinedin Toward True Security would be an excel-lent start. Of the steps, an ability to moveseriously toward a CTB would be the mostdifficult but create the strongest impression

that U.S. attitudes have changed.

Immediately begin work to replace theStrategic Arms Reduction Treaty scheduledto expire on December 5, 2009 with anagreement that would move toward totalinventories of nuclear weapons far below the1000 recommended as a unilateral U.S. step.

As an initial step toward building anaggressive Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty(NNPT) that could move toward a goal ofzero nuclear weapons worldwide, the UnitedStates should announce that it is willing toput its entire nuclear fuel cycle under inter-national control and commit to a completecessation of production of fissionable mate-rial under an acceptable non-proliferationregime.

Work with the current nuclear nations torebuild the NNPT with a determination tofulfill the original intention of the treaty,which was to create a world with no nuclearweapons where civilian nuclear power couldbe used safely.

Find a bipartisan agreement on missiledefense. This could include supporting R&Dbut making any further deployment contin-gent on (1) the defense system’s capabilitybeing demonstrated through rigorous testingand (2) developing deployment plans in coop-eration with other nuclear-armed states thatare working to dramatically reduce theirnuclear arsenals.

In Washington you often hear the last of a lengthy list of speakers justify his turn atthe microphone by saying: “everything thatneeds to be said has been said but noteveryone has said it”. It’s hard to find any-thing about nuclear policy that hasn’t beensaid over and over again since 1946. But atthis point it seems that most of the peoplewith serious expertise in the field of nuclearpolicy are close to saying the same thing.This is an unprecedented moment. Let’s not blow it. FAS


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New Report Calls for Steps Toward a Nuclear-Free World

The Federation of American Scientists,along with the Natural ResourcesDefense Council (NRDC), the Union of

Concerned Scientists (UCS), and independ-ent analysts, have issued a report, TowardTrue Security, that calls for immediatelydeclaring that the sole mission for U.S.nuclear weapons is to deter nuclear attack,for taking all nuclear weapons off launch-ready alert, and for reducing the U.S.nuclear arsenal to a total of 1000 warheads,including reserves, as an immediatelyachievable, secure step toward a nuclear-free world.

According to the report, the greatestnuclear dangers to the United States are anaccidental, unauthorized or mistakenRussian nuclear attack, the spread ofnuclear weapons to more nations, and theacquisition of nuclear materials by terror-ists. U.S. nuclear weapons policy, the reportconcludes, fails to adequately address theserisks and too often exacerbates them.

Toward True Security stresses the need totake U.S. nuclear weapons off hair-trigger

Lisbeth Gronlund, a physicist and co-directorof the Union of Concerned Scientists’ GlobalSecurity Program, and a report co-author. “It has been nearly two decades since theBerlin wall came down, but U.S. policy isstill mired in Cold War thinking. It’s time fora major change.”

Toward True Security goes beyond theformer government officials’ recommenda-tions by arguing that the United Statesshould not wait for bilateral or multilateralagreements; it should take unilateral stepsto begin the process. These steps, the reportmaintains, would make the United Statessafer, whether or not the eventual goal of aworldwide ban is ever achieved.

“Our next president should declare thatthe only purpose for U.S. nuclear weapons isto deter and, as a last resort, respond to theuse of nuclear weapons by another country,”said Christopher Paine, director of NRDC’sNuclear Program and a report co-author.“Making it clear that we will not use nuclearweapons first would reduce the incentive forother nations to acquire them to deter apotential U.S. first strike.”

Dr. Richard Garwin, a National Medal ofScience recipient, developer of the hydrogenbomb, and a report co-author, added thatthe U.S. stockpile would still provide a credi-ble deterrent with significantly fewer war-heads. “The U.S. should unilaterally cut itsnuclear arsenal to no more than 1,000nuclear warheads,” he said. “There is noplausible threat that justifies maintainingmore than a few hundred survivable nuclearweapons, and no reason to link the size ofU.S. nuclear forces to those of any othercountry.”

The report outlines 10 specific, unilateralsteps the next president should take totransform U.S. nuclear policy, which would

alert. “Increasing the amount of timerequired to launch U.S. weapons would easeRussian concerns about the vulnerability ofits nuclear weapons,” said Ivan Oelrich, aphysicist and vice president for strategicsecurity programs at FAS, and a report co-author. “That would give Russia the incentiveto take its weapons off alert, reducing therisk of an accidental or unauthorizedRussian launch on the U.S.”

The report echoes the sentiments of for-mer Secretaries of State George Shultz andHenry Kissinger, former Secretary ofDefense William Perry, and former SenateArmed Services Chairman Sam Nunn. Theyoutlined their prescription for embracing a“vision of a world free of nuclear weapons”in two Wall Street Journal opeds. The firstran in January 2007; the second ran lastmonth.

“The next U.S. president can reduce thedangers that nuclear weapons pose to theUnited States and to the rest of the world bytaking unilateral steps to lessen U.S.dependence on nuclear weapons,” said Dr.

By Ivan Oelrich, Vice President of the FAS Strategic Security Program


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put the world on a path to eventually bannuclear weapons, and demonstrate globalleadership:

1. Declare that the sole purpose of U.S.nuclear weapons is to deter and, if nec-essary, respond to the use of nuclearweapons by another country.

2. Take nuclear weapons off alert, so theycan be launched within days instead ofminutes.

3. Eliminate preset targeting plans.Replace them with the capability topromptly develop a response tailored to aspecific situation if nuclear weapons areused against the United States or itsallies.

4. Promptly reduce the U.S. nuclear arsenalto no more than 1,000 warheads.

5. Halt all programs to develop and deploynew nuclear weapons.

6. Retire all U.S. nonstrategic (tactical)nuclear weapons.

7. Commit to making further cuts in theU.S. nuclear arsenal on a bilateral ormultilateral basis.

8. Declare that the United States will notresume nuclear testing, and work withthe Senate to ratify the ComprehensiveTest Ban Treaty.

9. Halt further deployment of the ground-based missile defense system and dropany plans for a space-based missiledefense system.

10. Reaffirm the U.S. commitment to pursuenuclear disarmament and present a planto meet that goal.

A copy of the report is located athttp://www.fas.org/press/news/2008/feb_toward_true_security.html. FAS

Attention FAS MembersIn our continuing effort to provide the FAScommunity with articles about nationalsecurity, learning technologies and otherareas of science and technology policy, weare inviting members to submit proposalsfor articles (maximum of 1,000 words).Selection of articles is at the discretion ofthe Editor and completed articles will bepeer-reviewed.

Please provide us with your full mailing

address, including email in all correspon-dence.

Proposals should be sent to:

Editor, PIR Federation of American Scientists

1725 DeSales Street, NW6th Floor

Washington, DC 20036

or to [email protected].

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By Katarzyna Bzdak, Scoville Fellow at the Federation of American Scientists

U.S. failure to balance rapid equip-ment transfers with stringentaccountability procedures is just one

example of the poor preparation for thepost-war period in Iraq. At the outbreak ofthe insurgency, weapons were rapidly trans-ferred to the Iraqi Security Forces using ad-hoc security assistance programs that hadneither clear nor stringent accountabilityrequirements. As the insurgency took rootand expanded, expediency became the pri-mary consideration in the effort to developthe ISF.i

These weak accountability standards con-tributed to the diversion of weapons to unin-tended end users within Iraq and outside itsborders. Several government watchdog andmedia groups reported on suspected casesof diversion and U.S. authorities madechanges to strengthen accountability meas-ures. These stricter measures slowed thepace of weapons transfers, leading Iraq topurchase weapons from countries likeSerbia and China. More recently, the U.S.moved toward a happy medium betweenrapid weapons transfers and accountabilitystandards, modifying traditional securityassistance programs, namely the ForeignMilitary Sales program, to quickly movemuch needed equipment to the ISF.

At the end of major combat operations inIraq, Multinational Force-Iraq (MNF-I)ii—themilitary command spearheading the U.S.effort in Iraq—and the Coalition ProvisionalAuthority (CPA)—the transitional govern-ment that temporarily administered Iraquntil June of 2004—were jointly responsiblefor training and equipping the security forcesof Iraq, under the so-called “train-and-equipprogram”. After the collapse of many ISFforces in the spring of 2004, particularly dur-ing the battle of Fallujah, the U.S. changedthe overall structure of MNF-I and greatly

increased the flow of resources to Iraqi mili-tary and police forces. The Department ofDefense administered the program whilethe Multinational Security TransitionCommand-Iraq (MNSTC-I), a subordinatecommand of MNF-I established in June of2004, implemented it on the ground.iii

Special funds—the Iraq Relief andReconstruction Fund (IRRF) and later theIraq Security Forces Fund (ISFF)—wereestablished to sustain the train-and-equipprogram and to bolster ISF capabilities asquickly as possible.iv

Due to conditions on the ground at thetime, and perhaps because U.S. securityassistance programs were not configured forwartime conditions, the train-and-equip pro-gram operated outside of traditional securityassistance programs. DOD officials arguedthat “accountability requirements normallyapplicable to these programs did not apply,”v

and proceeded with a degree of flexibility inthe program’s implementation. General

David Petraeus—then commander ofMNSTC-I—admitted that rapidly equippingthe Iraqi forces was considered more impor-tant than keeping thorough records of equip-ment distribution (which would have beenlegally required by established assistanceprograms).vi As one U.S. Army Colonel putit: “We had folks getting killed becauseequipment wasn’t moving. Were there timeswhen all the right forms were not signed?Probably. But we had a mission to do, andwe were going to do it the best way we couldat that time.”vii

The ad-hoc nature of the train-and-equipprogram was problematic: recent reportsfrom official United States Governmentagencies and news media outlets haveexposed lax accountability standards forweapons transfers to the ISF, particularlywith regard to small arms. According tosome sources—including U.S. governmentofficials, the Turkish government, and anumber of news organizations—equipmentpaid for and delivered by the U.S. ended upin the hands of insurgent and criminalgroups, both within Iraq and outside its bor-ders. While most of the evidence remainsuncorroborated or anecdotal, some diver-sions have been confirmed and the frequen-cy of these reports suggests that the pooraccountability standards practiced by U.S.forces had damaging consequences.

The Special Inspector General for IraqReconstruction (SIGIR), the GovernmentAccountability Office (GAO), and theInspector General of the Department ofDefense (DODIG) have each issued reportshighlighting the haphazard and inconsistentaccounting procedures for weapons trans-ferred to the ISF and revealed that thou-sands of weapons are simply unaccountedfor. The overarching problem is that themateriel tracking system used to monitor

Ad Hoc Equipping Scheme Contributed

to Diversion of Small Arms

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the train-and-equip program was poorlyorganized and poorly maintained. No cen-tralized mechanism was established to trackthe distribution of weapons, serial numberswere sporadically recorded, and there wasgeneral confusion about which regulationsapplied to the program. These problemswere compounded by a lack of sufficientstaff dedicated to maintaining accountabilityprocedures. The end result was a disorgan-ized and inconsistent system.

The Special Inspector General’s October2006 audit first drew attention to the lack ofaccountability standards for arms transfersto the ISF, specifically for arms procuredunder the Iraq Relief and ReconstructionFund.viii SIGIR found weapons accountabilityto be “questionable” because the propertybooksix maintained by the MultinationalSecurity Transition Command-Iraq did notaccount for all weapons known to be pro-cured by IRRF funds.x The audit also foundthat the DOD and its subordinate commandsfailed to comply with the DOD’s Small ArmsSerialization Program (SASP), whichrequires a contractor to provide the serialnumbers for small arms so that they can beentered into a centralized database for thepurposes of tracking.xi

In a July 2007 report, the GAO found simi-lar problems in weapons transfer accounta-bility procedures. Echoing the findings ofthe Special Inspector General, the GAOfound that MNSTC-I failed to create andmaintain a centralized database of equip-ment transferred to ISF prior to December2005.xii In the final tabulation, the propertybooks failed to account for 190,000 weapons:110,000 AK-47s and 80,000 pistols.xiii TheGAO report additionally found that DOD offi-cials did not think they were required to con-form to the normal requirements for smallarms registration. In fact, there was generalconfusion amongst DOD officials as towhether (and what) other regulationsapplied to the train-and-equip program.xiv

These problems were compounded by criti-

cal personnel shortages: former MSNTC-Iofficials argued they had neither sufficientstaff to devote to managing the accountabili-ty process for weapons transfers nor a fullyoperational equipment distributionnetwork.xv xvi

The DOD Inspector General’s audit of theIraq Security Forces Fund, released inNovember of 2007, concluded that MNSTC-Ifailed to establish sufficient controls andprocedures for equipment transfers.xvii Morespecifically, the Inspector General found thatMNSTC-I did not maintain accountable prop-erty records, provide adequate oversight(MNNSTC-I only had 1 auditor and 16 comp-trollers for a FY2007 budget of $5.5 billion,far fewer oversight staff than other com-mands with smaller budgets),xviii or provideadequate resources for efficient manage-ment.xix

While it is by no means certain that all oreven most of these unaccounted forweapons fell into the wrong hands, manyreports have surfaced revealing apparentdiversions of weapons to unintended users,including insurgent groups.

Among the most prominent examples arereports in the Turkish and U.S. media thatcite cases of American-supplied Glock 9-mmpistols ending up in the hands of the PKKand other criminal organizations in Turkey.xx

According to a 20 August 2007 Newsweekreport, more than “1,000 [Glocks] had beentaken from criminals, guerillas, terroristsand assassins all over the country,” some ofwhich were reportedly traced to the U.S.Mission in Iraq.xxi The same report cited a“senior Turkish security official” who esti-mated that 20,000 Glocks had been trans-ferred over the Iraq-Turkey border in thepast three years.xxii In August of 2007, thePentagon confirmed that the serial numbersof some weapons discovered in Turkeymatched those distributed to Iraqi policeforces.xxiii Department of Defense GeneralCounsel William Haynes was dispatched toassuage Turkish concerns and assess theextent of these problems.xxiv

A recent New York Times report based on interviews with over two dozen officialsalleges that the supply chain to the ISF was

See Small Arms, p. 8

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mired in chaos, and that many weapons supplied by the U.S. were sold for privategain by corrupt officials involved in theprocess. According to the Times, weaponsfrom a profiled warehouse were distributedto “anybody with cash in hand,” includingprivate contractors, non-U.S. securityguards, and Iraqi militias.xxv The article cites several U.S. military personnel thatdescribed the disappearance of entire batches of weapons. The DOD and theDepartment of Justice have launched criminal inquiries to assess these claims.

In a closed door hearing before the HouseDefense Committee on Appropriations, DODInspector General Claude Kicklighter con-firmed that U.S. weapons were diverted.xxvi

Kicklighter admitted that “[w]e were alsobeginning to find some weapons that theU.S. had supplied to (Iraqi security forces)were in the hands and control of insurgentgroups and U.S. contractors in Iraq.”xxvii

Kirklighter revealed that a contractor impli-cated in a bribery scheme in Kuwait ran awarehouse in Iraq where weapons for Iraq’spolice were stored, although it is unclearwhether any of these weapons werepilfered.xxviii

Clearly, the train-and-equip program suf-fered from major failings in accountabilitymethods and procedures. While conclusivelinks have not been established, these laxstandards may have contributed to the diver-sion of weapons from the ISF. The scale ofdiversion is unknown, and perhaps unknow-able.

To improve accountability, MNSTC-I draft-ed a more rigorous and consistent standardoperating procedure for the distribution ofequipment. The command is also attempt-ing “to improve procedures for transfer andacceptance of real property” and setting up asection to ensure accurate and timely over-sight of accounting processes documents.xxix

Per a recommendation from SIGIR, MNSTC-Iis also establishing a serial numbers inven-tory system.xxx MSNTC-I also noted it isentering receipts from weapons deliveredprior to the establishment of the aforemen-tioned system into the property books.xxxi

Congress also weighed in on the matter,enacting several requirements for armsexports to Iraq in the most recent NationalDefense Authorization Act (January 2008).Section 1228 requires registration for allsmall arms; the establishment of an end-use monitoring program for all defense

articles of a lethal nature and the mainte-nance of detailed records of the origins,transport, and distribution of military equip-ment transferred under any of the U.S. fundsor security assistance programs.xxxii Thislegislation effectively covers the main cri-tiques of the train-and-equip program fromgovernment oversight groups.

Perhaps most significantly, weapons forthe Iraqi Security Forces are now procuredthrough the Foreign Military Sales (FMS)program instead of ad-hoc funds. The IraqiMinistry of Defense took over primaryresponsibility for weapons procurement inlate 2005,xxxiii utilizing the FMS program topurchase urgently needed equipment. In2006, the Pentagon notified Congress that itmade $2.25 billion in proposed FMS agree-ments with Iraq; in 2007, this figure jumpedto $4.9 billion.xxxiv While it is unclear exactlyhow procedures have changed on the ground(efforts to obtain this information from theDefense Security Cooperation Agency andMNSTC-I were unsuccessful), the FMS pro-gram is statutorily obligated to abide by DODstandards for arms transfers, which “specifyaccountability procedures for storing, pro-tecting, transporting, and registering smallarms and other sensitive items transferredto foreign governments,”xxxv and requirecountries to “provide substantially the samedegree of security afforded to [defense arti-cles and services} by the United States.”xxxvi

The more stringent requirements associatedwith FMS are evident in the recent transferof M-4 and M-16 rifles to the ISF. Theserifles are being “matched to their users witha sophisticated database using fingerprintsand retinal scans, as well as serial num-bers.”xxxvii

While the shift to the FMS program hasassured more stringent safeguards inweapons transfers, it has increased delaysand significantly slowed the flow of criticalmaterials to the ISF. Iraqi President JalalTalabani has argued that the U.S. FMS sys-tem is too slow at delivering weapons, notingin October 2007 that only one out of five Iraqi

Small Arms, from p. 7

9


police officers was armed.xxxviii DefenseSecretary Robert Gates and CommandingGeneral in Iraq David Petraeus criticizeddelays in military deliveries, arguing that the FMS system was designed for peacetimetransfers, not for the kind of emergency situation present in Iraq where rapid transfers are critical to ongoing combatefforts.xxxix According to Senators JohnWarner and Carl Levin, military command-ers in Iraq complained “of problems in theU.S. bureaucracy that are hindering thedelivery of badly needed military equipmentfor Iraqi forces purchased with Iraqi funds.”xl

Although timelines vary by product and bythe urgency of a particular request, U.S. AirForce Lt. Col. Keith Muschalek estimatedthat it takes roughly a year from the accept-ance offer (which occurs about 120 daysafter Iraqis send a letter of request) untilmerchandise is delivered.xli Secretary Gatesstated that only $600 million of the equip-ment Iraq paid for has been delivered, leaving $2 to $3 billon in the pipeline.xlii

As Lt. Col. Muschalek stated, “one of thebiggest problems is (Iraqi officials) under-standing the FMS system and program.”xliii

Citing the delays in the FMS system, theIraqi MOD recently signed a $100 milliondeal with China for additional military mate-rial, including AK-47 assault rifles, and a$230 million deal with Serbia to buy assaultrifles, machine guns, anti-tank weapons,ammunition, and explosives.xliv

In a letter to the House Armed ServicesCommittee, Secretary Gates noted that theDOD has dramatically increased its securityassistance staff (from 6 to about 70) in Iraqto expedite FMS procedures, that thePentagon has developed a tracking systemto establish common operating proceduresfor FMS transfers to Iraq, and that the StateDepartment has expedited all sales to Iraq.xlv

The DOD has also opened a Budget,Execution, Acquisition and RequirementsOperations Center at the Ministry of Defensein Iraq to increase staff involved in the pro-curement process and to centrally manage

or implemented after weapons transfers hadalready begun.xlvii Though the damage donein Iraq may not easily be rectified, if at all,we can only hope that the lessons learnedby using an ad-hoc equipping scheme willinform future U.S. methods.

i The ISF consists of Ministry of Defense (MOD) forces, theIraqi Army, Special Operations Forces, the Navy, and the Air Force;and Ministry of the Interior (MOI) forces, namely the Iraqi Policeforces, which include several functionally specified branches, likethe National Police and the Border Enforcement Police.

ii Multinational Force-Iraq replaced the Combined Joint TaskForce 7.

iii Until May of 2004, MSNTC-I was known as Combined JointTask Force-7. See Government Accountability Office, Report toCongressional Leadership and Committees, Securing, Stabilizing,and Rebuilding Iraq: Key Issues for Congressional Oversight(GAO-07-308SP: 24 January 2007), p. 33.

iv The US has spent approximately $19.2 billion dollars todevelop the ISF from 2003 to March 2007, $2.8 billion of which wasspent specifically on the purchase and transport of equipment tothe ISF. See: United States Government Accountability Office,Report to Congressional Committees, Stabilizing Iraq: DOD CannotEnsure that US-Funded Equipment has Reached Iraqi SecurityForces (GAO-07-711: July 2007), p. 1.

the internal Iraq Ministry of Defense budgetexecution process (which should improveaccountability of current contracts and FMScases). Additionally, U.S. security assistancestaff in Iraq has dispatched mobile teams totrain Iraqi officials to use the FMS programmore effectively and efficiently.xlvi

Though the train-and-equip program initially proceeded haphazardly, U.S. authorities responded to the criticisms andcritiques of the program, particularly as itrelated to weapons transfers, with increasedaccountability standards. The early failure totrack weapons may have caused widespreaddiversions of arms to militias, insurgentgroups, and other criminals. The scope ofthis problem will likely never be known.

Fortunately, the DOD, Congress, and theMultinational Transitional Command-Iraq all took steps to bolster accountability standards. Unfortunately, as the SpecialInspector General for Iraq has pointed out,many of these procedures were established See Small Arms, p. 10

10


v United States Government Accountability Office, Report toCongressional Committees, Stabilizing Iraq: DOD Cannot Ensurethat US-Funded Equipment has Reached Iraqi Security Forces(GAO-07-711: July 2007), introduction.

vi Josh White, “General Blames Clerical Errors in the Case ofMissing Arms,” The Washington Post, 8 August 2007.

vii Eric Schmitt and Ginger Thompson, “Broken Supply ChannelSent Arms for Iraq Astray,” The New York Times (11 November2007).

viii Interestingly, Senator John Warner, Chairman of the SenateCommittee on Armed Services, commissioned SIGIR to report onthe logistics capabilities of the ISF: a review of accountability pro-cedures for weapons transfers to the ISF was not formally request-ed by any government agency.

ix These were essentially two Excel spreadsheets intended to record issues pertaining to MOD and MOI equipment (includingweapons), which were first developed in July 2005. MSNTC-I personnel began entering equipment data into the property booksat the end of 2005, relying on the file copies of original issue documents to account for weapons that were already transferred.MSNTC-I began to transfer the data from Excel to Access at thetime of the audit. See: Office of the Special Inspector General forIraq Reconstruction, Iraqi Security Forces: Weapons Provided bythe US Department of Defense Using the Iraq Relief andReconstruction Fund (SIGIR-06-033: 28 October 2006), p. 1.

x The property books for three of the twelve weapons typestransferred under IRRF were inaccurate. IRRF funds were used topurchase 751 M1-F assault rifles (none of these rifles were listed inthe MOD or MOI property books); 176,866 handguns (the propertybooks only accounted for 163,386, a discrepancy of 13,180 firearms(over 7%); and 518 MP-5 machine guns (the property books onlyaccounted for 419, a difference of 99 machine guns (about 19%).See: Office of the Special Inspector General for IraqReconstruction, Iraqi Security Forces: Weapons Provided by the USDepartment of Defense Using the Iraq Relief and ReconstructionFund (SIGIR-06-033: 28 October 2006), p. 8

xi Of the 370,000 IRRF-funded weapons, only 10,000 (about2.7%) were registered with the SASP. SIGIR did find that MNSTC-Imaintained file copies of documents that “appeared to contain theserial numbers of weapons issued to various ISF organizations.”However, only a small fraction of these serial numbers wererecorded in the property books: of the 505,093 weapons that wereissued or warehoused, the serial numbers of 12,128 were recorded,about 2% of the total. See: Office of the Special Inspector Generalfor Iraq Reconstruction, Iraqi Security Forces: Weapons Providedby the US Department of Defense Using the Iraq Relief andReconstruction Fund (SIGIR-06-033: 28 October 2006), p. 9-10.

xii When the property book system was finally developed,efforts were made to recover past records and issuance data. This was a difficult task, since 355,000 weapons had already beendistributed by September of 2005. See: United States GovernmentAccountability Office, Report to Congressional Committees,Stabilizing Iraq: DOD Cannot Ensure that US-Funded Equipmenthas Reached Iraqi Security Forces (GAO-07-711: July 2007), 11.

xiii According to the former commander of MNSTC-I, 185,000AK-47 assault rifles and 170,000 handguns were distributed to Iraqi Security Forces by September 2005. MNSTC-I property books, however, accounted for only 75,000 AK-47s and 90,000 pistols distributed in the same period. United States GovernmentAccountability Office, Report to Congressional Committees,Stabilizing Iraq: DOD Cannot Ensure that US-Funded Equipmenthas Reached Iraqi Security Forces (GAO-07-711: July 2007), p. 11.

xiv The GAO also found that MNSTC-I failed, from the onset ofthe train-and-equip program, to “consistently [collect] supporting

records confirming the dates the equipment was received, thequantities of the equipment delivered, or the Iraqi units receivingthe items.” MNSTC-I has attempted to bolster the collection ofthese documents since June of 2006 (22 months after its establish-ment) but the GAO nonetheless found “continuing problems withmissing and incomplete records” in a review of the January 2007property books. See: United States Government AccountabilityOffice, Report to Congressional Committees, Stabilizing Iraq: DODCannot Ensure that US-Funded Equipment has Reached IraqiSecurity Forces (GAO-07-711: July 2007), introduction, 7.

xv United States Government Accountability Office, Report toCongressional Committees, Stabilizing Iraq: DOD Cannot Ensurethat US-Funded Equipment has Reached Iraqi Security Forces(GAO-07-711: July 2007), 2-3.

xvi United States Government Accountability Office, Report toCongressional Committees, Stabilizing Iraq: DOD Cannot Ensurethat US-Funded Equipment has Reached Iraqi Security Forces(GAO-07-711: July 2007), 9.

xvii The Inspector General found that an “end-to-end audit trail”for ISFF-procured equipment was impossible to establish becauseof inconsistencies in receiving reports, serial number recordings,hand receipts, and posting references (which are used to traceequipment back to the original obligation document, like a con-tract, purchase order, or invoice).xvii In a review of two weaponscontracts, the Inspector General found that “MNSTC-I could notprove that the ISF received 12,712 of 13,508 weapons procured”—the weapons that could be accounted had not yet been transferredto the ISF (they remained in a warehouse). See: Office of theInspector General, United States Department of Defense,Management of the Iraq Security Forces Fund in Southwest Asia –Phase III (Report No. D-2008-026: 30 November 2007), 7-9.

xviii In comparison, the US Army Training and Doctrine Command,with an FY2007 budget of $3.2 billion, had 8 auditors and 64 comp-trollers; the US Army Forces Command, with an FY2007 budget of $3.0 billion, had 6 auditors and 47 comptrollers; and the USArmy Tank-Automotive and Armaments Command, Life CycleManagement, had 7 auditors and 45 comptrollers for an FY2007budget of $3.6 billion. See: Office of the Inspector General, UnitedStates Department of Defense, Management of the Iraq SecurityForces Fund in Southwest Asia – Phase III (Report No. D-2008-026:30 November 2007), iii.

xix Office of the Inspector General, United States Department of Defense, Management of the Iraq Security Forces Fund inSouthwest Asia – Phase III (Report No. D-2008-026: 30 November2007), 14.

xx See Christopher Dickey, “Iraq’s Arms Bazaar; How FirearmsIntended for Iraqi Security Forces are Winding Up in the Hands ofExtremists Across the Region,” Newsweek, 20 August 2007; DavidS. Cloud and Eric Schmitt, “U.S. Weapons, Given to Iraqis, Move toTurkey,” The New York Times, 30 August 2007; “Turkey ConfirmsUS Weapons Supplied to Iraqis, Pentagon Confirms,”Turkish DailyNews, 31 August 2007; “28 Guns Seized,” Turkish Daily News, 8August 2007; Sedat Gunec and Emine Kart, “Pentagon OfficialVisits Ankara for Talks on PKK Arms Claims,” Today’s Zaman, 27July 2007; “Pentagon: We Don’t Know the Whereabouts of 190,000Weapons Sent to Iraq,” Today’s Zaman, 5 October 2007.

xxi Christopher Dickey, “Iraq’s Arms Bazaar; How FirearmsIntended for Iraqi Security Forces are Winding Up in the Hands ofExtremists Across the Region,” Newsweek (20 August 2007), p. 32.

xxii Christopher Dickey, “Iraq’s Arms Bazaar; How FirearmsIntended for Iraqi Security Forces are Winding Up in the Hands ofExtremists Across the Region,” Newsweek (20 August 2007), p. 32.

xxiii David S. Cloud and Eric Schmitt, “U.S. Weapons, Given toIraqis, Move to Turkey,” The New York Times, 30 August 2007.

xxiv Sedat Gunec and Emine Kart, “Pentagon Official VisitsAnkara for Talks on PKK Arms Claims,” Today’s Zaman, 27 July2007.

xxv Eric Schmitt and Ginger Thompson, “Broken Supply ChannelSent Arms for Iraq Astray,” The New York Times, 11 November2007.

xxvi Richard Lardner, “Flow of Weapons to Iraq Still a Problem,”AP, 29 January 2008.

xxvii Richard Lardner, “Flow of Weapons to Iraq Still a Problem,”AP, 29 January 2008.

xxviii Richard Lardner, “Flow of Weapons to Iraq Still a Problem,”AP, 29 January 2008.

xxix Office of the Inspector General, United States Department of Defense, Management of the Iraq Security Forces Fund inSouthwest Asia – Phase III (Report No. D-2008-026: 30 November2007), 37.

Small Arms, from p. 9

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xxx Office of the Special Inspector General for IraqReconstruction, Iraqi Security Forces: Weapons Provided by the USDepartment of Defense Using the Iraq Relief and ReconstructionFund (SIGIR-06-033: 28 October 2006), p. 12.

xxxi Office of the Special Inspector General for IraqReconstruction, Iraqi Security Forces: Weapons Provided by the USDepartment of Defense Using the Iraq Relief and ReconstructionFund (SIGIR-06-033: 28 October 2006), p. 12.

xxxii US Congress, National Defense Authorization Act for FiscalYear 2008 (H.R. 4986: 3 January 2008), 375.

xxxiii Iraq also began to bear most of the costs of the train-and-equip program in general. As of September 2007, the Iraqi govern-ment has invested an additional $16.6 billion of its own funds todevelop the ISF. The Iraqi government’s expenditures for the ISFexceeded US contributions for the first time in 2007, and MNSTC-Ianticipates that Iraq will spend about $11.6 billion on the ISF in2008 alone. See: James Jones, Chairman of the Iraqi SecurityForces Independent Assessment Commission, Testimony to HouseArmed Services Committee, US House of Representatives (6September 2007), p. 19.

xxxiv See the “Major Arms Sales Notifications” of the DefenseSecurity Cooperation Agency’s website for further information on these proposed sales: http://www.dsca.mil/PressReleases/36-b/36b_index.htm.

xxxv United States Government Accountability Office, Report toCongressional Committees, Stabilizing Iraq: DOD Cannot Ensurethat US-Funded Equipment has Reached Iraqi Security Forces(GAO-07-711: July 2007), 6.

xxxvi United States Defense Security Cooperation Agency,Security Assistance Management Manual, DOD 5105.38-M, p. 93.

xxxvii Paul Tait, “M-16s a Step Forward for Iraqi Forces, Says US,”Reuters, 22 April 2007.

xxxviii “US Looking to Speed Up Iraq Arms Deliveries Says Gates,”AFP, 5 October 2007.

xxxix “US Looking to Speed Up Iraq Arms Deliveries Says Gates,”AFP, 5 October 2007.

xl “Iraq Says US Behind in Arms Deliveries: Only a Fraction of$2b Order Has Been Filled,” The Boston Globe, 3 November 2007.

xli Seaman William Selby, USN, “U.S. Foreign Military SalesProgram Builds Momentum in Iraq,” American Forces PressService, 28 February 2008.

xlii Farah Stockman, “Iraq Says US Behind in Arms Deliveries:Only a Fraction of $2b Order Has Been Filled,” The Boston Globe, 3November 2007.

xliii Seaman William Selby, USN, “U.S. Foreign Military SalesProgram Builds Momentum in Iraq,” American Forces PressService, 28 February 2008.

xliv “US Looking to Speed Up Iraq Arms Deliveries Says Gates,”AFP, 5 October 2007; “Serbia and Iraq Sign Multimillion WeaponsDeal,” Associated Press, 21 December 2007.

xlv Chris Johnson, “Gates Says Pentagon Will Reform ForeignMilitary Sales Process for Iraq.”

xlvi Seaman William Selby, USN, “U.S. Foreign Military SalesProgram Builds Momentum in Iraq,” American Forces PressService, 28 February 2008.

xlvii Office of the Special Inspector General for IraqReconstruction, Iraqi Security Forces: Weapons Provided by the USDepartment of Defense Using the Iraq Relief and ReconstructionFund (SIGIR-06-033: 28 October 2006), p. 12-13. FAS


12


A New Look to FAS.org

FAS was among the first organiza-tions to publish material online andthe website is a premier destination

on the internet (http://www.fas.org). Theredesign is the first major renovation of thesite since 2003.

The most obvious change is the lookand feel. Most content is organized by thethree main program areas – strategicsecurity, information technologies andenergy and the environment – and via thehorizontal navigation along the top of thepage . The new layout better organizes thesite’s hundred thousand pages and imagesto make it easier to find information. Thenew design also takes advantage of newtechnologies such as video stream.

The FAS website has grown since 1995to provide a rich set of resources that isused by more than a million unique visitorsa month. The site is a valuable resource for other organizations with almost 8,000websites linking to the FAS.org homepage.FAS.org is often the only place to find doc-uments and reports that were once widelyavailable through other websites.

The new site is a work in progress. In the coming months new options andsections will be added to make it easier toshare useful information on the FAS site.Please send your comments and sugges-tions to [email protected]. FAS

By Monica Amarelo

13


U.S. Intercepted Failed Intelligence Satellite

sance satellite. It was designated as US193.

It was successfully placed into a 220 milehigh orbit but radio communication with thesatellite was soon lost. At 220 miles, theEarth’s atmosphere, while tenuous, stillexerts some drag on a satellite the size of asmall school bus that is pushing through itat 17,000 miles per hour. Reconnaissancesatellites are normally placed in low orbits;they are just big cameras after all and youget better resolution in the pictures if thecamera is closer to the thing it is photo-graphing.

other nation on access to space for our economy and security. Any measure thatreduces the threats to satellites will enhanceAmerican security. The test was a public relations bonanza, showing the public how adefensive missile can protect us from a—largely imaginary—danger from above.

In December 2006, the United Stateslaunched a 5000 pound spy satellite from the military space center at Vandenberg,California. Virtually everything about thesesatellites is highly classified. The governmentdeclined to name the manufacturer, muchless give details about what it did. Mostaccounts assumed it was a photoreconnais-

The United States intercepted a dyingreconnaissance satellite with a mis-sile launched from a Navy ship. The

administration justified the intercept on thebasis of public safety. That is a long stretch,indeed, and there was virtually no mentionof the political consequences of the UnitedStates’ conducting its first anti-satellite testin over two decades.

The United States, along with China,Russia, and other space-faring nations,should be working to ban anti-satelliteweapons. Such a ban would work strongly inthe best interests of the United Statesbecause we depend more, by far, than any

By Ivan Oelrich, Vice President of the FAS Strategic Security Program

See Satellite, p. 14


“I cannot attribute motives without being able to

read minds but a normally skeptical person could

be forgiven for at least suspecting that this satellite

offered a chance for the Navy to test its missiles

in an anti-satellite mode for the first time since

the end of the Cold War. I have seen virtually no

discussion of the arms control implications of this.”

Reconnaissance satellites usually carrysome propellant and small thrusting rock-ets, for three reasons. First, if there is a par-ticular place on the Earth that the spy satel-lite needs to photograph, the orbit of thesatellite will—eventually—bring the satelliteright overhead but the intelligence analysts,the military, or the president might not beable to wait. So the satellite can use its pro-pellant and rockets to nudge it a little oneway or the other to shift its orbit enough tobring it over the desired spot on the Earthsooner rather than later. Second, becausethe satellite is in such a low orbit, it will lose

When the interceptor hit the satellite, itwas not like a bullet hitting a car, punchinga hole in the side and coming out the otherside. The interceptor hit the satellite atabout 18,000 miles per hour and the energyof the interceptor was far more than neededto melt and even vaporize the material ofthe interceptor. This happened so quickly itwas as though it were an explosion. Shockwaves traveled through the structure of thesatellite and broke it into pieces, somelarge, some as small as dust.

But the interceptor did not “shoot down”the satellite. The satellite weighted 5000pounds and the interceptor weighted 20pounds. Even if the satellite broke up intopieces, those pieces would move in roughlythe same direction as the satellite was mov-ing, that is, in the same orbit. Some smallerpieces would encounter proportionatelymore air resistance and come down soonerthan the satellite would have. But if the pro-pellant tank broke free, the density of thepropellant tank was higher than the averagedensity of the satellite so the propellanttank by itself would stay up longer than thesatellite by itself would have, had itremained whole.

So what is going on? When control of thesatellite was first lost, the risk from thesatellite was dismissed as trivial, not worthany real concern. Then we needed to “shootit down.” I cannot attribute motives withoutbeing able to read minds but a normallyskeptical person could be forgiven for atleast suspecting that this satellite offered achance for the Navy to test its missiles in ananti-satellite mode for the first time sincethe end of the Cold War. I have seen virtuallyno discussion of the arms control implica-tions of this. Is the U.S. fueling an anti-satellite arms race? Who knows, but I don’tthink anyone in this administration cares.

For more information please visit theStrategic Security Blog –http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp. FAS

for a separate oxidizer and fuel. Just squirtsome onto a catalyst in a reaction chamberand it decomposes, forming hot hydrogenand nitrogen gas that rush out a rocket noz-zle, creating thrust.

The problem with US193 was that radiocontrol was lost, the propellant was notused up, the satellite was about to reenterthe atmosphere, and the propellant tankwas still filled with a thousand pounds ofhydrazine. There was a chance that the tankwould not burn up on reentry, some chanceit would land on a populated area, and somechance the hydrazine would injure someone.Hence the plan to intercept the satellite.

14

Satellite, from p. 13

energy to air resistance and slowly comecloser to the Earth. The rockets can be usedas a booster to occasionally nudge the satel-lite a little higher to keep it in orbit. Third,when the propellant is almost gone and thesatellite is doomed to reenter the atmos-phere, the last bit of propellant can be usedto intentionally slow the satellite and force itdown, usually aiming for the Pacific Oceanwhere debris will fall harmlessly.

The propellant was hydrazine, a com-pound of hydrogen and nitrogen. It is not themost efficient propellant but is extremelysimple to use. It is a monopropellant, whichmeans it can be used by itself with no need

You Can’t “Shoot Down”

a Satellite

Almost all press reports included somestatement about how the Navy was going to“shoot down” the satellite. The image sug-gested a hunter with a shotgun shootingdown a duck. Bang! The duck gets hit, itswings fold, and it falls to Earth. Not the wayit works with a satellite.

This is a satellite; it is in orbit. It stays inorbit because of its momentum and the bal-ance between the centrifugal force and theEarth’s gravity. It is not being “held up” theway an airplane’s wings hold it up in the air.


15

By Arthur S. Obermayer and Kevin F. F. Quigley

The United States can win any war onthe battlefield, but we have notlearned how to win the peace. We are

losing the fight to win over the people we aretrying to help. But there is a way to right ourcourse for the future - by looking to our past.

Overwhelming military superiority is notthe key, because its use wreaks havoc anddestroys lives. Moreover, our traditional pub-lic diplomacy efforts have not worked, withKaren Hughes the most recent governmentPR chief to resign after accomplishing verylittle.

The decline of the U.S. in world opiniondemands that we find more effective ways to regain a leadership role. Primarily, weshould aim to help people achieve betterhealth, education, housing and jobs in countries that need it the most.

On that front, our nation has achievedsome successes: the Marshall Plan torebuild Europe after World War II, recoveryefforts following the Indian Ocean tsunami of 2004, and aid in the wake of Pakistan’sdevastating earthquake two years ago (making Pakistan one of the very few nationswhere approval of the U.S. has risen inrecent years). Now, however, only our military has the means to such ends.

U.S. foreign aid is primarily structuredalong impersonal, government-to-govern-ment lines, and most government agencieshave proved ineffective working on a people-to-people level. The one government entitywith a positive record in this area is thePeace Corps. But despite the Peace Corps’success since its inception in 1961, its budget has remained small.

President John F. Kennedy wanted100,000 volunteers overseas within 10 years.Today - although 20 additional nations areseeking Peace Corps help and three times

To Win the Peace, Restore the Corps

as many volunteers apply as can be accom-modated - budgetary limitations have keptthe number of volunteers down to 8,000.However, there are 190,000 alumni, repre-sented by the National Peace CorpsAssociation. They yearn for continuinginvolvement in a mission that has trans-formed not only their lives and those of people they have helped but also their perspectives on the world.

Among the alumni is Connecticut Sen.Christopher J. Dodd, who served as a volun-teer in the Dominican Republic. Based onthat experience, he is sponsoring a bill todouble the size of the Peace Corps. In themonths after 9/11, Sen. John McCain ofArizona and President Bush both advocatedmajor growth of the Peace Corps.Unfortunately, there was little follow-up.

Like Mr. Dodd, other alumni want to helpnow, and their expertise is invaluable. Mostare mature leaders in business, education,government and the nonprofit world. Manyare primed for a new career challenge that a managerial role in the Peace Corps couldoffer. They have the motivation to resist outside influences and to distinguish anexpanded role for the Peace Corps from the political and bureaucratic vagaries ofgovernment agencies.

To have a significant impact, the PeaceCorps needs to be at least 10 to 20 timeslarger. But even with renewed alumni partic-ipation, it cannot grow quickly enough on itsown. Through its separate, distinct opera-tion, it must enlist the vast array of nonprof-its doing grassroots work abroad. They fallinto three major categories: nongovernmen-tal organizations, non-proselytizing faith-based groups, and universities. In addition togrowing its own operations, the Peace Corpscould also help fund these nonprofit efforts.There are thousands of American philan-thropic initiatives from which it could selectprograms for expansion grants.

The time is right politically to broaden the scope and impact of the Peace Corps.The millions who donate to such charitiesrepresent a powerful constituency whowould back the move. Its objectives are nonpartisan and should be supported byRepublicans and Democrats.

In the media every day, everywhere, we are witness to suffering. As we see theconventional, military-based approach toconflict resolution failing, we must seekalternative means to ending wars and winning the peace. The cost of an expandedPeace Corps would be roughly 1 percent ofour current military budget. Can we affordnot to act promptly?

About the writers:

Arthur S. Obermayer is president of theObermayer Foundation, which focuses on

social justice issues. His e-mail [email protected]. Kevin F. F. Quigley is

president of the National Peace CorpsAssociation. His e-mail is

[email protected].

Copyright © 2007, The Baltimore Sun FAS

* Originally published by The Baltimore Sun on November 27, 2007.


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