public finance seminar spring 2015, professor yinger property tax incidence

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Public Finance Seminar Spring 2015, Professor Yinger Property Tax Incidence

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Page 1: Public Finance Seminar Spring 2015, Professor Yinger Property Tax Incidence

Public Finance SeminarSpring 2015, Professor Yinger

Property Tax Incidence

Page 2: Public Finance Seminar Spring 2015, Professor Yinger Property Tax Incidence

Property Tax Incidence

Class Outline

Who Bears the Burden of the Property Tax?

◦ The Traditional, New, and New New Views

Accounting for Variation in the Property Tax Across Jurisdictions

◦ Including the Role of Property Tax Capitalization

Property Tax Incidence and Public Policy

Page 3: Public Finance Seminar Spring 2015, Professor Yinger Property Tax Incidence

Question 1

The first question in property tax incidence is:

◦ Who bears the burden of a nationwide property tax (or, equivalently) of the average property tax rate?

Three answers have appeared:

◦ The Traditional View◦ The New View◦ The New New View

Property Tax Incidence

Page 4: Public Finance Seminar Spring 2015, Professor Yinger Property Tax Incidence

The Traditional View

The traditional view is based on an analysis of the markets for individual types of property.

It concludes that the property tax is regressive.

◦ Business owners, who have many options, can escape the burden of the tax, and shift it onto consumers, workers, and renters.

◦ Because business owners have relatively high incomes, this shifting makes the tax regressive.

Property Tax Incidence

Page 5: Public Finance Seminar Spring 2015, Professor Yinger Property Tax Incidence

The Traditional View, 2

This view is focuses on the behavior of responsive firms with property as an input:

P

Q

S

S+tax

DP1=P3

P2

Product markets (commercial &industrial property is an input)or the rental housing market.

Property Tax Incidence

Page 6: Public Finance Seminar Spring 2015, Professor Yinger Property Tax Incidence

The Traditional View, 3

Even in the Traditional View, the property tax on land is progressive:

Q

P S

DP3

P1=P2tax

The land market

Property Tax Incidence

Page 7: Public Finance Seminar Spring 2015, Professor Yinger Property Tax Incidence

The Traditional View, 4

For single-family houses, the Traditional View depends on the income elasticity of demand for housing (θ):

To see why, note that: /t PH rT tV t PH

Y Y Y r Y

( ) /

/

PH PH

Y Y

Property Tax Incidence

Page 8: Public Finance Seminar Spring 2015, Professor Yinger Property Tax Incidence

The Traditional View, 4

An examination of the national average tax holds t/r constant, so

◦T/Y increases with income if θ >1◦T/Y decreases with income if θ <1

There is a strong consensus that θ < 1, so T/Y decreases with income and this portion of the tax is regressive.

Property Tax Incidence

Page 9: Public Finance Seminar Spring 2015, Professor Yinger Property Tax Incidence

The New View

This view is based on a general equilibrium analysis of all markets.

A property owner cannot escape a tax in one market if the same tax is levied everywhere.

Since almost all property is taxed, property owners cannot escape the tax.

Because property owners have relatively high incomes, the property tax is progressive.

Property Tax Incidence

Page 10: Public Finance Seminar Spring 2015, Professor Yinger Property Tax Incidence

The New View, 2

In effect, this view assumes the supply of property in the nation (K) is fixed:

i

K

D

i1

S

i2Burden on owners of K

tax

Property Tax Incidence

Page 11: Public Finance Seminar Spring 2015, Professor Yinger Property Tax Incidence

The New New View

The New New View points out that the amount of property might respond to interest rates over time.

◦through investment decisions

◦or through international flows in financial capital.

This "correction" implies that the New View may be too extreme, but concludes that most of the burden is still likely to fall on property owners.

Property Tax Incidence

Page 12: Public Finance Seminar Spring 2015, Professor Yinger Property Tax Incidence

The New New View, 2

This graph shows the New View (S-R) and theNew New View (L-R)

i

K

L-R S

(L-R S)+t

D

i1

i2

i3

tax L-R burden on consumers/workers

L-R burden on owners of K

S-R S

i4S-R burden on owners of K

tax

Property Tax Incidence

Page 13: Public Finance Seminar Spring 2015, Professor Yinger Property Tax Incidence

Other Questions

Some scholars say that the Traditional View and the New View address different questions.

The Traditional View

◦ This view applies to the incidence of a property tax increase in one place, holding property taxes in other places constant.

◦ In this case, property owners can move from one place to another to escape the tax increase.

◦ Thus, the burden of a property tax increase in one place, such as a big city, may be regressive.

Property Tax Incidence

Page 14: Public Finance Seminar Spring 2015, Professor Yinger Property Tax Incidence

The New View or the New New View

These views seems appropriate for the incidence of the property tax nationwide.

◦Thus, most scholars agree that the property tax as a whole is progressive.

◦This conclusion is relevant in deciding the extent to which a federal system should rely on local property taxes.

Property Tax Incidence

Page 15: Public Finance Seminar Spring 2015, Professor Yinger Property Tax Incidence

The Benefit View

A final view of the property tax incidence is the Benefit View (=Tiebout/Hamilton)

◦In this view, the property tax is simply the price a household pays to live in a community.

◦Households live where this price equals their benefits from the public services, so the property tax is fair according to the benefit principle.

Property Tax Incidence

Page 16: Public Finance Seminar Spring 2015, Professor Yinger Property Tax Incidence

The Benefit View

The Benefit View implies that there will be no capitalization:

◦If households all select their optimal community, they have no reason to bid up the price of housing anywhere else.

◦The extensive evidence of capitalization therefore leads to a clear, unambiguous rejection of the Benefit View.

Property Tax Incidence

Page 17: Public Finance Seminar Spring 2015, Professor Yinger Property Tax Incidence

Capitalization and Incidence

Capitalization implies that property owners cannot escape a tax increase, even if they have opportunities elsewhere.

If tax changes are capitalized into property values, then owners bear the burden of the tax if they stay (and pay higher taxes) or leave (and experience a capital loss).

Property Tax Incidence

Page 18: Public Finance Seminar Spring 2015, Professor Yinger Property Tax Incidence

Capitalization and Incidence, 2

Capitalization also implies that any incidence analysis has a new distinction, namely between owners at the time a tax change is announced and future owners.

This distinction does not correspond to the categories in previous incidence analysis (such as owners, consumers, workers, and renters or rich and poor).  

Property Tax Incidence

Page 19: Public Finance Seminar Spring 2015, Professor Yinger Property Tax Incidence

Capitalization and Incidence, 3

Capitalization also implies that a key conclusion of the Traditional View, namely, that property tax increases in one jurisdiction are regressive, may not be correct.

With capitalization, the burden falls on current property owners, who have relatively high incomes.

Moreover, many property owners in a particular jurisdiction may not be residents, but may instead be:

◦ corporate shareholders who live around the country

◦ landlords who live elsewhere.  

Property Tax Incidence

Page 20: Public Finance Seminar Spring 2015, Professor Yinger Property Tax Incidence

Carroll/Yinger (NTJ 1994)

In the case of rental housing, some evidence on these points is provided by C&Y.

Tax shifting from landlords to tenants must take the form of higher rents.

C&Y estimate the extent to which higher property taxes lead to higher rents in the Boston area, all else equal.

Property Tax Incidence

Page 21: Public Finance Seminar Spring 2015, Professor Yinger Property Tax Incidence

Carroll/Yinger, 2

Higher property taxes alone do not make an apartment more desirable to a tenant, so in the case of mobile tenants:

P

Q

SS+tax

D

P3

P1=P2tax

The rental housing market (within an urban area)

Property Tax Incidence

Page 22: Public Finance Seminar Spring 2015, Professor Yinger Property Tax Incidence

Carroll/Yinger, 3

However, even mobile tenants will pay higher rents if they receive better public services.

◦ This effect will be larger where public service costs are lower.

Thus, landlords can shift a property tax increase to tenants only to the extent that this increase leads to better public services.

The question is: To what extent does this type of shifting occur?

Property Tax Incidence

Page 23: Public Finance Seminar Spring 2015, Professor Yinger Property Tax Incidence

Carroll/Yinger, 4

This is what happens when higher property taxes lead to better public services:

P

Q

SS+tax

DP3

P1tax

The rental housing market (within an urban area)

D + Value of New ServicesP2

Property Tax Incidence

Page 24: Public Finance Seminar Spring 2015, Professor Yinger Property Tax Incidence

Carroll/Yinger, 5

C&Y estimate that a $1.00 increase in property taxes results in a rent increase of about $0.15, on average, which implies that landlords bear about 85% of the property tax burden.

Thus, the conclusion from the Traditional View, namely, that tenants bear a large share of the burden of a property tax increase, is not correct, at least not in the Boston area.

Property Tax Incidence

Page 25: Public Finance Seminar Spring 2015, Professor Yinger Property Tax Incidence

Property Tax Incidence

Carroll/Yinger, 6

• The precise answer depends on the price elasticities of demand (μ) and of supply (σ) for housing.

Page 26: Public Finance Seminar Spring 2015, Professor Yinger Property Tax Incidence

Property Tax Incidenceand Public Policy

All views of property tax incidence say that taxes on homeowners are regressive.

Voters want programs to cut this regressivity.

◦Voters are particularly concerned about elderly homeowners.

Property Tax Incidence

Page 27: Public Finance Seminar Spring 2015, Professor Yinger Property Tax Incidence

Property Tax Incidence and Public Policy

Graduated property tax rates are possible (e.g. Minnesota) but do not make sense for nonresidential property.

◦ The issue is regressivity across people, not across businesses.

◦ A business with a small factory may be owned by a very rich person!

So states turn to circuit breakers and homestead exemptions.

Property Tax Incidence

Page 28: Public Finance Seminar Spring 2015, Professor Yinger Property Tax Incidence

Circuit Breakers

A circuit breaker provides a tax break (usually in the form of an income tax rebate) if a person’s property tax payment exceeds a given share of their income.

( ) if ( ) 0

0 if ( ) 0

CB tV W tV W

CB tV W

Property Tax Incidence

Page 29: Public Finance Seminar Spring 2015, Professor Yinger Property Tax Incidence

Circuit Breakers

About half of the states have circuit breakers for elderly homeowners or elderly renters.

◦ A few states have circuit breakers for all homeowners or all renters.

◦ Governor Cuomo has proposed one for NY.

◦ For details, go to http://www.lincolninst.edu.

Circuit breakers provide tax relief for people who have a hard time paying property taxes out of their income.

Property Tax Incidence

Page 30: Public Finance Seminar Spring 2015, Professor Yinger Property Tax Incidence

Circuit Breakers

Circuit breakers help many home owners who do not need help.

Empty-nesters with a valuable house can borrow against their equity; the circuit breaker just protects their children’s inheritance!

Circuit breakers for all taxpayers lower tax prices and have unintended consequences.

Circuit breakers cannot be given to renters without an implicit analysis of property tax incidence!

Property Tax Incidence

Page 31: Public Finance Seminar Spring 2015, Professor Yinger Property Tax Incidence

Homestead Exemptions

A homestead exemption alters the calculation of a homeowner’s property tax payment.

With an exemption of $X, the tax payment is

The local government may or may not receive reimbursement from the state.

( )T t V X

Property Tax Incidence

Page 32: Public Finance Seminar Spring 2015, Professor Yinger Property Tax Incidence

Homestead Exemptions

Almost all states have some form of homestead exemption.

◦Most states have special exemptions, usually for the elderly or veterans.

◦Several states have general exemptions.

◦Only a few states reimburse local governments for the exemptions.

◦For details, go to http://www.lincolninst.edu.

Property Tax Incidence

Page 33: Public Finance Seminar Spring 2015, Professor Yinger Property Tax Incidence

Homestead Exemptions

Homestead exemptions cut the regressivity of the property tax on homeowners.

Reimbursed homestead exemptions lower tax prices and have unintended consequences.

Homestead exemptions cannot be given to renters without an implicit analysis of property tax incidence!

Property Tax Incidence