public authority, technology, speech & language

8/3/2019 Public Authority, Technology, Speech & Language

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/public-authority-technology-speech-language 1/19



PublicAuthority,

Technology,Speech&Language

RobertR. SullivanJohnJayCollege,CityUniversityof NewYork

Thereis concernthata crisisof politicalauthoritydevelopsas tech-

nologybeginsto dominate he domainof politicaland othervalues.

ProfessorSullivanexamineshow some of the leadingpoliticalthinkers

of thiscentury-Weber, Ellul,Arendt,and Habermas-have dealtwith

aspectsof this issue.He goes on to arguethat,far from resolving he

crisis,Marxismcompounds t by adoptingan essentially echnological

positionon questionsof politicalvalue.

Robert R. Sullivan s AssociateProfessorat John Jay CollegeofCriminal ustice.He haswrittenotherarticles nthe areaof technologyand politicsand is currentlypreparing book on the conceptsof

philosophy, cience,and technology n the thinkingof Nietzsche,

Heidegger, ndGadamer.

The tendencyof our omnipresentechnology s to be governedby rules

of its ownmaking.This,if

we are to believeJacquesEllul,

is the dilemma

of modem times. He is concerned hatpoliticalcommunitiesmaynot be

able to control echnologyexceptby abdicatinghepolitical unctionand

handingover the central task of devisingand executingconstitutive o-cial rules to a technological lite. Control s boughtat the priceof mak-

ing the technologicalway of life even morepervasiveand morallyau-

tonomous than it was in the first place. In sum, we are creatinga

technologicalpoliticalculture to manageour technologicalcivilization.Ellul conveys a poetic truth that does not easily lend itself to the

rigorousstatementdemandedby the social scientist.A key to rigorisgiven if we comparethe English title of his best known book, The

TechnologicalSociety, to its originalFrenchtitle, La technique.lThe

1. New York: RandomHouse, Vintage Books, 1964.



586 Authority,Technology,Speech&Language

Englishtitle conditionsone to look for a larger-than-lifeocial reality.

The Frenchtitle, on the otherhand,avoids this pitfallandsuggests hatthe objectof Ellul'sanalysis s the distinctlymodernturn of mindthat

generatesour tendencyto treatevery aspectof life, and eventually ife

itself, as a technologicalproblemcapableof beingmanagedand solved.In sum, la technique dentifies he characteristicmental stanceof homo

faberin his workshop.The problem s thatlife itselfis rapidlybecominghomo faber'sobject. Ellul sees homo faber'srules of efficiencyas aninexorablecancermovinginto and destroyingall alternativeparadigmsfor living.The rules of la techniqueare the elementsof a logic of mak-

ingthatinvolve a persistentquestforthe "onebestway"of doing things.These, rather than any traditionalmoralnorms,are the guidinglightsof increasinglymore,andfinallyall, modernactivity.

The problemwith la techniqueas an expressionof moral rulesis thatit derives from reflectionnot on action per se but on one species of

action,namely,making.It is the characteristichinkingof someone so

deeplyimmersed n the practicalconcernsof dailylivingthat he or sheis unable to transcend hese concerns and reach a fixed, metaphysicalreferencepoint. Only a technologicalreferencepoint is attained,and

thisservesas a stimulus o action rather hanas a restraint. nstrumentalreason,as Max Horkheimercalls it, does not admitof belief in tran-scendentalends.2 It concentratessolely on means for achievingends,chosen withoutdeliberation,because they are so instinctiveand per-sonal. HannahArendt'sEichmann s a good exampleof Horkheimer'sinstrumental eason: he does not raise any significantquestionsaboutthe reasonsfor his actions.3He takes it for granted hatcareeradvance-

ment is adequatejustification,becausecareer advancement s virtuallyinstinctive o the

well-adaptedmodernman.He concentrateshis mental

energieson technique,whichin his case was simplya matterof railroad

scheduling.Romeoloves his Juliet,but Don Juanmakeslove to womenand is therefore nclinedto makebody countsa measureof his perfor-mance.HitlerhatedJews,but Eichmannwas simplytrying o do his jobwell. We are accustomed o understanding Romeo or a Hitler butfind it moredifficult o graspa Don Juanor an Eichmann,becausewe

are not yet willingto accept the enormitiesof a morallyautonomous

technological eason.

Just as fascinatingas the recognitionof technological autonomy,

2. Critique of Instrumental Reason (New York: Seabury Press, Continuum

Books, 1974), p. vii.

3. Eichmann in Jerusalem (New York: The Viking Press, Compass Edition,

1971).



RobertR. Sullivan 587

referred o above, is the widespreadrefusalto come to terms with the

problem,at leastin the American iterature.ManfredStanleyhaswrittenone of the best overviews of the autonomy iterature n The Techno-

logicalConscience,4but his work in HarvardUniversity'sProgramon

Technologyand Societyis said to have been relegated o a secondaryposition,a suggestionwhich s corroboratedn thewritingsof Emmanuel

Mesthene,the program'sdirector.5But as LangdonWinnerhas noted,the literatureof assessment and forecasting,which dominatesrecentAmerican iteratureon technology, s consistentlypessimistic n its un-statedpremises.6 t acceptsthe autonomy hesisand, for the most part,

limits itself to a technologicaldiscussionof how technology'snegativeby-productsmay be controlled. Winnerarguesthat such restrictions

costlyinsofaras it keepsus fromgoingin the directionurged by Ellul,Horkheimer, tanley,and Winnerhimself-toward a sociologicalappre-ciationof why the presentstate of affairshas come aboutand how we

may respond o it.

I. Marxand theTechnological ubstructure

The thesisof technology'sautonomys considerably lderthan the writ-ings of JacquesEllul, and so too is the dangerof succumbingo what

mightbe called Ellul'sparadox,the creationof technologicalpoliticalforms (or rationalbureaucraticormsof state authority)to managean

increasingly echnological ociety.We should be awareof the role thatthe conceptandthe realityof technologyhave playedin evolvingwest-ern thought,whichincludes an invertedmetaphysicalradition hat hasbeen fitfullydevelopingsince Plato initiated t with the techneanalogyand his

theoryof ideas. This

interpretation,rawn from Martin Hei-

degger,maybe restatedas follows: SincePlato,and even moredirectlysince Descartes, t has been our habit to beginwith the observationof

beings and then reason that there must be Being. Being is thus the

consequenceof a human mentalactivity,whichfully impliesthat if wewill only manipulatebeingswe will be able to create,or expose,Being.In sum, the Westernmetaphysicalradition s anthropocentric,ot be-causeanyonedecidedto placeman at the centerof existence,butrather

4. New York: The FreePress,

1978.5. Fifth Annual Report, Harvard University Program on Technology and So-

ciety (Cambridge, Mass., 1968-69), pp. 1-4, 14-17. See also Langdon Winner,"On CriticizingTechnology," in Albert H. Teich, ed., Technology and Man's Fu-

ture, 2d ed. (New York: St. Martin'sPress, 1977), p. 358. For Winner'sfull argu-ment, see his Autonomous Technology (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1977).

6. In "OnCriticizingTechnology."




because this is the logical result of invertingthe key relationshipbe-

tween Being and beings. Descarteswas not arbitrary.He was indeedonly drawinga conclusion hatwas implicit n Plato'sobjective dealism.

He was able to createan explicitlysubjectivedealismonly becausethe

scientificrevolutionbegun by Copernicusandconfirmedby Galileowas

so manifestlya human achievement.7Heideggerwould of course re-

verse this. He would ask: Why is there something rather than nothing?,

and he would answerby arguing or the ontologicalpriorityof Being.The resultwould be an end to humanalienation.We wouldno longerbeginwiththe subject/objectdichotomyand find ourselvesplacedin a

positionwherewe had to dependupon a calculatingmentalfacultyanda manipulatingbody to fashionBeing out of beings. How Heideggerwould do this is of course the heart and soul of his philosophy,but it

is beyondthe scope of this paper.My point is simpler:it is to suggestthat the problemof technologicalautonomyhas the deepest possiblerootsbecause it goes rightto the center of the Westernway of thinking.

Insteadof surveying he entireWesternmetaphysicalradition, pro-

pose to discussMarx'sthinkingbecause,as the preanalyticnsighttells

us, his thinking s a live force in our world.Hobbesis as interestingas

Marx, but few people argue over him, and even fewer people formpoliticalparties hat claim to be Hobbesian.Marxprovidesour agewith

one of its most important ets of intellectualreferencepoints for inter-

pretingreality.His thinkinghas the influence hatit does partlybecause

it acceptsthe thesis that technology s and should be the determinant

of culture.But this is a controversial ointwhich shouldbe arg4edand

substantiated,otmerelyasserted.

Marx,in the orthodoxinterpretation, rguesthat culturalforms are

theepiphenomenal utcroppings

f a substructuralet of economicre-

lationships.This interpretation,whichhardlyneeds to be documented,tends to projectMarx as a technologicaldeterminist, or few areasof

humanactivityare more technologicallybased than economics,espe-

cially in the modernindustrialperiod.One mightobject that the ter-

minologyMarxmost often used (relationshipsof production)suggests

somethingapartfroma narrow echnologicalnterpretationf the econ-

omy, namely,a certainset of humanrelationships.t may be argued n

rebuttalthat the kind of human relationshipsMarx has in mind are

7. I am drawing on Heidegger's"Plato'sDoctrine of Truth,"in William Barrett

and Henry D. Aiken, eds., Philosophyin the TwentiethCentury(New York: Harper

Torchbooks, 1971); and his An Introduction to Metaphysics (New Haven: Yale

University Press, 1975); and Being and Time (New York: Harper and Row,

1962).




themselvesa productof the industrializationf economicactivity.The

arguments familiarand need not be recovered n detail: the divisionof labor has created a new class of humanbeings, the laboringclass,whose chief characteristiceems to be an especiallypernicious orm ofalienation.The objectification f the rational-purposivectivityof workhas in effect created a class which, if I understandMarx correctly, s

essentially,or at least potentially, uperfluous.Firstthere is the divisionbetweenmental and physical abor, leavingbehind it a mindless abor-

ing class. Then there are subdivisionsof physical activity,each one

resultingn the replacement f the humansubjectby a machine.Read-

ing Marx,especiallythe famed 1844 Manuscripts,8we find that tech-nologyoperatesas a determinant n a teleologicalsense. It has the po-tentialto create relativesurplusproduct-meaning greaterprofits-andthereforeexerts a seeminglyinexorablemetaphysicalpressureon the

rulingbourgeoisclass constantlyto revolutionize he means of pro-duction.The superfluity f the laboringclass, its ultimate iquidationbya technologicaldeterminanthatis teleological, eems to be at thecenterof Marxiananalysis.

A condensed extualbasis for thiskind of interpretations to be found

in the Preface to the Critiqueof PoliticalEconomy (1859). This textis especially mportantnasmuchas Marxhimselfsays that it expressesthe "guidingprinciple"of his studies,9and, as MauriceDobb attests,generationsof Marxistshave acceptedit as such.O1Here Marx seemsto be saying that social realityhas a threefold rather than a twofoldstructure:First thereis the superstructuref cultural orms,and beneaththis there is a determiningubstructure f economicrelationships.Thismuchis orthodoxandnot surprising, ut Marxalso seems to be sayingthat there is a third and

deeperstructuremade

upof

technologicalrealitieswhichserve as the ultimatedeterminant ot justof the culturalformsbut also of the economicsubstructure.Marxdoes not actuallyusethe termtechnological,but carefulstudyof the formulationshe desig-nates as his "guidingprinciple" eaves little doubt that the "material

productive orces of society"determine he "relationsof production,"which in turn determineculturalforms. Considering he context pro-videdby Marx, t is hardto see how "material roductiveorces"can be

interpretedas anythingotherthan technology.'1GeraldA. Cohen has

8. Early Writings (New York: RandomHouse, Vintage Books, 1975).9. (New York: InternationalPublishers,1970), p. 20.10. Ibid., p. 16.11. Ibid., pp. 20-21.




made a similarinterpretation f this key paragraph,and he too has

concluded hat Marxis a technologicaldeterminist.12Does Marx propose a technologicalsolution to the problemof a

determiningechnologyandthussuccumb o whatwe have called Ellul's

paradox, hat is, the tendencyto createa technologicalpoliticalcultureto managea technological ivilization? n a superficial ense the answeris so obvious that one mightwonderwhy the questionis even raised.In the key paragraph in the Critique of Political Economy, Marx insists

not once but severaltimes that cultural nstitutionsand correspondingconsciousnessesare purelyepiphenomenal:"The mode of production

of material ife conditions the general processof social, political,andintellectualife. It is not the consciousnessof men that determinesheir

existence, but their social existence that determinestheir conscious-ness... ." 13 So why then raise the question of whether Marx proposesa technological olution to the problemof technology'sautonomy?

Grounds for the questionare to be found in Marx'scommentsonworkers' ommunesn TheCivilWar n France.14Generations f Marx-ists have been and continue to be impressed hat in this writingMarxis layingdownthe foundationsor a politicaltheory.When the workingclass comes to power, it will indeed form a "dictatorship," ut thismeans that it will insist on truly democraticforms of political life.

Rulingcouncils will be set up, as was done in Paris in 1871, and what-ever they decidewill be the law. Marx seems to be sayingthat the real

meaningof the Pariscommune,or any communistrevolution, ies in areversalof the technologicaldeterminismhat characterizeshe capitalistphaseof history.Henceforth he cultural uperstructure,ow madeup ofworkers' institutions and correspondingworkers'consciousness,will

determine heunderlying

tructureof economicrelationships.

Marx wasa social scientistanda political eader.As a social scientisthe wastellingus thatwe weredeterminedby technology.As a political eader he was

tellingus that we couldescapethiscondition hroughdetermined ction.There areplentyof reasonsforbeingsuspiciousof thisinterpretation.

First of all, there is the constantinsistencethat these institutionsaredemocraticbecause they are workers'sinstitutions and because theyreflect a working-class onsciousness.This raises some questionas to

the participants' redispositiono attainemancipationrom technolog-ical determination. t is much more

likelythat

theywill do whatMarx

12. Karl Marx's Theory of History; A Defence (Princeton, N.J.: PrincetonUni-

versityPress, 1978).13. Critiqueof Political Economy, p. 21.14.Selected Works (New York: InternationalPublishers, 1970), pp. 288-301.




latersuggested n his Critiqueof the GothaProgram: hey will act ac-

cording to the motto, "from each accordingto his ability; to eachaccordingto his needs." If one takes this motto at its face value, it

impliescontinued echnologicaldeterminism.15he key question s not

what needs we have but what abilitieswe can contribute.As Marxwell

knew, there is no end to humanneed, partlybecause it is a relative

concept.One generation'suxury (the telephone,for example) will be

the next generation'sneed. Need in this formulations the functional

equivalentof profitin the capitalistorder:it will serveas the stimulant

thatwill make technology(the abilityto be contributedby each) into

a teleologicaldeterminant.To sum up at this point, I am arguinga case similarto the one

initiated n the FrankfurtSchool by JiirgenHabermasand broughtto

its conclusion by Albrecht Wellmer.The praxis philosophyof Karl

Marx is deficientbecauseit settlesfor a one-dimensional,echnologicaldetermination f life. Habermasdrawson Hegel to restorecultureto

Marxismin the form of subjectiveinteraction.16Wellmermakes the

rejectionof Marxcompleteand open and thus concludesa processof

FrankfurtSchool redefinition f socialism.17 rankfurtSchooladherents

are utopian ratherthan scientificsocialists,and this means that they

rejectthe technologicaldeterminantn favorof a culturaldefinitionof

socialaction.In takingthis direction he FrankfurtSchoolwas onlymovingtoward

positionsalreadysketchedout by Max Weber and GiambattistaVico.

These two thinkersareimportant ndworthconsideration ecausethey,

too, reject technologicaldeterminismn favor of a definingspeechcul-

ture. I realizeI am makinga large leap fromMarx and the Frankfurt

Schoolto WeberandVico, butit is anecessary

one if the foundations f

speechphilosophy n modernpolitical theoryareto be indicated.

II. Weber,Vico, and theCulturalSuperstructure

Therecan be no doubtthatMax Weberrejected he desirability f tech-

nologicalautonomy:"Iwould ike to protest he statement... that some

one factor,be it technologyor economy,can be the 'ultimate'or 'true'

15. Ibid.,pp. 324-325.16. "Labor and Interaction: Remarks on Hegel's Jena, 'Philosophy of Mind,'"

in his Theory and Practice (Boston, Beacon Press, 1973), pp. 142-170.

17. Critical Theory of Society (New York: Seabury Press, Continuum Book,

1974), passim. Wellmer's argument is brief but dense. It is hard to pick out any

single groupof pages.




cause of another,"Weberassertedto the firstmeetingof the German

SociologicalAssociation.18 o dispelany doubtthat he was referringoMarx,Weberdetailedhis assertion:

To my knowledge,Marxhas not definedtechnology.There are

many things in Marx that not only appearcontradictorybut ac-

tually are foundcontrary o fact if we undertakea thoroughand

pedanticanalysis,as indeed we must. Among other things,thereis an oft-quotedpassage: The hand-millresultsin feudalism,thesteam-mill n capitalism.That is a technological,not an economic

construction, nd as an assertiont issimplyfalse,

as we canclearlyprove.For the age of the hand-mill,which extendedup to modem

times, had cultural"superstructures"f all conceivable kinds inallfields.19

In anothercontextWeberrelenteda bit, conceding hatthe secondpartof Marx's ormulation-the steam-millnecessitates apitalism-mightbe

partiallycorrect.This revisionwould seem to suggest hat he was awareof the possibilityof a technologicallybased society but was not happywith it.20

This was Weber'sspecificresponseto technologicaldeterminismnMarx.More generally,his reactionto the tendencyto transfer echno-

logical norms of performance o politics is containedin his category,

rational-legalauthority,which in politics took the specific form of

bureaucratization. ut bureaucracyn the modernsense of the term

(as opposed to the bureaucraciesof China and India describedbyWeber) is carriedover into politics from moderneconomic activity,

specificallycapitalism.The genericform of modernbureaucracys the

factory,and its characteristic ffect is the alienationof the workerfrom

his work activity.This processof rationalizationmplementedhe drive

for efficiencyand,ultimately,gain. Weber's heoryof rational-legal u-

thoritymay be traced back to the Protestantethic, and his ambivalent

opposition o suchauthoritys groundedn its threatof universalaliena-

tion from the activitiesand valuesof traditional ociety.Just as workers

are relativizedwhenthey are madeinterchangeableartsin the factory

system,so the entirepoliticalworldwill be relativized hroughthe ad-

justmentof ends to means (not means to ends), which is the character-

isticdisposition

of theefficiency

mindedpublic

administrator.

18. Economy and Society, 2 vols. (Berkeley: University of California Press,

1978), 1:lxx.19. Ibid.20. Ibid., 2: 1091.



Robert R. Sullivan 593

In his long arguments and historical descriptions in Economy and

Society, Weber observes that increasingly modem life is coming underthe aegis of an officialdom that is recruited on the basis of ability (a

technological criterion) and functions on the basis of rationality rather

than traditional value.21 The modern civil servant does not follow tra-

ditional values because his norms are primarily those of rationality. Here

Weber's term, translated as rational-legal, can be as confounding as it is

helpful. The modern bureaucrat emerging from Weber's analysis and

description is much more given to obeying rational rules than he is to

obeying legal rules. In this sense the modern bureaucrat embodies the

phenomenon we earlier called Ellul's paradox. He is replacing tradi-tional political authority, rooted in the consensus expressed in speech

acts, with technological expertise, rooted in the magically attractive

rationality of the speechless activities of work and labor.

We need not dwell any longer on the content of Weber's category of

rational-legal authority. The main point is that this category is the con-

tainer for Weber's theory of modernization. His theory of authority, we

recollect, is threefold, compelling us to conclude that each of the three

parts must be finite. The rational mode of authority is only one of three

ways of legitimizing action, and we cannot say that, on balance, Weber

favors it. Indeed, he is skeptical if not opposed to it. Here is the signifi-cant difference between Weber, on the one hand, and Hobbes and Marx

on the other. They are modern political and social philosophers because

their theories of authority are essentially grounded in a technological

activity-work in the case of Hobbes, laboring activity for Marx. They

21. This interpretation may be controversial with professional Weber scholars.

My sense that Weber's ideal type, the rational-legalbureaucrat, s more sensitiveto rational or technical norms than to a political consensus codified into law maybe seen in several of Weber'sspecificcomments in Economy and Society. He notesthat "the rules which regulate the conduct of an office may be technical rules ornorms" (p. 218), and also that "candidates[for office] are selected on the basis oftechnical qualifications"(p. 220). No doubt Weber is referringhere to the pre-conditions for becoming a rational-legal authority (bureaucrat), but he is awarethat the "role of technical qualificationsin bureaucraticorganizations is continu-

ally increasing"(p. 221), that "the primary source of the superiorityof bureau-cratic administrationlies in the role of technical knowledge which, through the

development of modern technology and business methods in the production ofgoods, has become completely indispensable" (p. 225), and that "superior to

bureaucracyin the knowledge of techniques and facts is only the capitalist entre-

preneur" (p. 225). One always gains a strong sense from Weber's specific com-

ments, and even more from the totality of his writings, that he is developing a

type of authority which is determinedby norms of rationalityat least as much as

by legal norms.




placeno limitson the authorizing aradigmof makingand hence leave

us with no conceptualalternative.Thisis partly he consequenceof theirreductionistmethodologies.But Weberlimits the seemingly nexorable

qualityof the politicalmodernization rocessby housingit within oneof three more or less equalcategoriesof authority.He thusestablishesa

complexintellectual oundation or the autonomyof value, or culture.But the foundationis not complete. The autonomyof traditional

authoritys establishedmorefirmly n the writingsof Vico thanin thoseof Weber.22Vico captured omethingof the essentialspiritof moderni-zationwhen he noted that truthand factconvert ntoeach other (verum

et factumconvertuntur)but he capturedeven more of it when he in-sisted that man can know only that which man makes. It would seemthat Vico was writingan epistemology o complementHobbes,but theconnection s superficialbecauseVico's makingwas almostexclusivelyconcernedwith speech acts and not with workin the Hobbesiansense.Vico intended o counter he pretensionsof Cartesian cienceand,more

specifically,Hobbes's rationalisttheory of political authority.But he

also had the positive aim of knowingtraditionalauthoritybecause it

was a human nstitution.Tradition,or history,could be knownby man

because it was made by man. Traditionwas the product of untold

individualspeech acts that condensedauthoritatively t a higherlevel

into fables, songs, myths-whatever languagecould bear-and then

proved itself to be autonomousby withstandinghe ravagesof time.Vico's theory of traditionalauthorityis a stunning anticipationof

twentieth-centuryoliticalphilosophy'sgrowingconcernwith language.In sum, traditionalauthorityconsists of moral ends which are auton-omous because in time they have successfullysynthesizedthe contra-

dictionsof worldly ife and hence takenon a sanctifiedexistence.Theyprovide a teleological framework,that which we may call the vita

morale,withinwhich the mechanicsof the vita activa are channeled.In the face of somethingakin to technologicalautonomy (specificallyHobbesian heory), Vico asserted he culturalautonomyof the productsof intersubjectiveommunication y meansof speechacts.

Vico, it would seem, had no category corresponding o Weber'scharismatic uthority. ndeed,on firstglance,it would seem thatin this

22. Thomas G. Bergin and Max H. Fisch, eds., The New Science of Giambat-tista Vico (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1961); Thomas G. Bergin andMax H. Fisch, eds., The Autobiographyof GiambattistaVico (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cor-

nell University Press, 1975). The best recent commentary by a political philoso-pher is Isaiah Berlin's Vico and Herder (New York: Random House, VintageBooks, 1976).



Robert R. Sullivan 595

instance Weber had again reversed Vico, for Vico's theory of the "true

Homer" in New Science posits that the charismatic hero is a condensa-tion of, and hence reducible to, myriad popular speech acts in time. The

prevailing interpretation has it that Vico debunked charismatic authority

through a brilliant anthropological tour de force which showed that, in

historical reality as well as in figurative speech, the poet was a "man of

the people." But a close examination of New Science will show this

interpretation to be incomplete. Vico is not denying that charismatic

leaders have existed; he is only saying that the speech they express

originates in the people and not in some divine source.23 Weber has

some attachment to the idealist position and one may wonder where hestood, but there is little direct evidence to refute the notion that for him

charisma has a popular base.24

23. Admittedly, Vico is not as clear as one would like, but ambiguity is charac-teristic of all his interpretationsof the "true Homer" in New Science. Vico does

provide some justificationfor the Maxist interpretationthat he was denying theexistence of charismatic authority and asserting the existence of popular author-

ity: "the Greek peoples were themselves Homer" (p. 270). But the trouble is that

Vico also asserts that a person or persons named Homer may have actually ex-isted. He does this explicitly: Different types of evidence "force us to the middle

ground that Homer was an idea or an heroic characterof Grecian men insofar as

they hold their histories in song" (p. 269, italics added). When Vico speaksof thefounders of gentile nations, surely a category that comes close to Weber's charis-matic authorities,he notes that "we must numberHomer, since certainlywe haveno more ancient, profane writer than he" (p. 263, italics added). For Vico, the

"complete absence of philosophy which we have shown in Homer... arouses inus a strong suspicion that he may perhaps have been quite simply a man of the

people" (p. 254, italics added). The suggestionof the above sentences and indeedof the entire Vichean discussion of the absence of reflective thought in Homer

conveys the sense that Vico believed Homer to be an original, popularcharismaticleader.

24. That Weber'scharismaticauthority is, like Vico's "trueHomer,"not an iso-lated instance of genius but rather an expressionof popular spirit is evident fromhis comments in Economy and Society. The central thrust of Weber'scomments isto define the popular preconditions for the rise of charismatic authority ratherthan to define precisely what is charismatic authority. Several specific commentsillustrate this concern. Weber begins his discussion by reminding us that "whatalone is important is how the individual is actually regarded by those subject tocharismatic authority, by his 'followers' or 'disciples'" (p. 242). This sentence

concludes an introductory paragraphin which every sentence stresses not charis-matic authority itself but rather the popular prerequisitesfor charismatic author-

ity. But rather than quote at length, it is better to take single sentences fromWeber's discussion: "It is recognition on the part of those subject to authoritywhich is decisive to the validity of charisma" (p. 242). And later in the same

paragraphhe writes, "but where charisma is genuine, it is not this which is thebasis of the claim to legitimacy. This basis lies rather in the conception that it is



596 Authority, Technology, Speech &Language

Indeed, there is much to be said for attaching Vico's interpretation of

the "true Homer" to Weber's charismatic authority. This enables us tosee charismatic leadership not as an independent type but rather as an

extraordinary adjunct of traditional authority.25Vico's "true Homer"

consists of no more than understanding heroes as fabled expressions of

the popular will. Rational-legal authority is essentially egotistical: it is

generated in the conscious secular minds of modern men, singly and

collectively. It is based on a calculus of gains and losses. Traditional

authority, in opposition, is essentially social. It is the conscious, and

more importantly subconscious, exchange of men and women in com-

munication with each other over time. The poet rises and becomesimportant because he can aid in the sacred task of transmitting old

values to new generations. The charismatic authority springs from the

same source. Whatever else charisma is, it is not the expression of the

interests of the private ego. In Weber's formulations, charismatic au-

thority is clearly opposed to technical, economic activity.26The spirited

the duty of those subject to charismaticauthorityto recognize its genuinenessandact accordingly" (p. 242). Weber also comes close to a Vichean admission that

charismatic authority is in essence no more than an ideal type, a popular fiction

that has to be stabilized: "Indeed, in its pure form charismaticauthority may be

said to exist only in statu nascendi. It cannot remain stable, but becomes either

traditionalizedor rationalizedor a combination of both" (p. 246).25. See Weber'sdiscussion of the "Routinizationof Charisma" n Economy and

Society, especially p. 250: "It is easy for charismatic norms to be transformed

into those defining a traditional social status...." This, indeed, is the theme of

the entire section on routinization.Charismaticauthority is inherentlyunstable. It

tends toward traditional authority: "in the course of routinization,the charismati-

cally ruled organization is largely transformed into one of everyday authorities,

the patrimonial form, especially in its estate-type or bureaucratic variant" (p.

251). The patrimonialform Weber earlierconsideredunder the generic heading of

TraditionalAuthority (see pp. 231-237). It remains only to note that Weber sees

charismatic authority mostly as opposed to rational-legalauthority: "Thereis [in

charismaticorganizations]no system of formal rules, of abstractlogical principles,and hence no process of rational, judicial decision oriented to them" (p. 243).

Furthermore,"the administrativestaff of a charismaticleader does not consist of

'officials'; east of all are its members technically trained"(p. 243). And just a bit

later: "The term 'clan state' [is appropriate o] hereditarycharisma.In such a case,

all appropriationof governingpowers, of fiefs, benefices,and all sorts of economicadvantages follow the same pattern. The result is that all powers and advantagesof all sorts become traditionalized" p. 250).

26. The opposition to economic calculation is one theme of Weber'sdiscussion

of charismaticauthority in Economy and Society, p. 254. "Purecharisma,"Weber

tells us, "is specifically foreign to economic considerations"(p. 244). And later:

"In its pure form charismaticauthorityhas a characterspecificallyforeign to every-




leader is eitherthe reformerof old values,as was MartinLuther,or the

determinednitiatorof a new testamentof values, as were Moses andJesus of Nazareth. In this interpretation harismaticauthority s the

allyof the essentiallypublic,or popular,nature of tradition.

III. SpeechandLanguagen ArendtandHabermas

These interpretationsf Marx on the one handand Vico andWeberonthe otherserveto definethe parameters ot only of the problem denti-fied as Ellul'sparadoxbut those of its possibleresolution.The problem

is thatof rootingpublicauthorityn the essentiallyprivateactivitiesofmaking-specifically,work in the thinkingof Hobbes and labor in the

thinkingof Marx.Weberand Vico suggestthe parameters f a solution

by seekinga publicactivity n whichto rootpublicauthority.A numberof different abelshave been used to describethis activity.It has beencalled language,speech, speech acts, constructiventersubjectiveom-

munication,myths,and may even take the form of inspiredutterances

(charisma).The multiplicity f terms is no accident; t reflects he factthat withinthe broadconsensusthatpublicauthorityroots itself in the

word there is little contemporary greementon just what this means.The above interpretationof Weber's charismaticauthorityand

Vico's"trueHomer" indsits recentparallel n the thinkingof the later

Heideggerand the later Wittgenstein.Weber'stheory of charismatic

authorityhas a counterpart n Heidegger's mystical ruminationson

generic authority,found in his Poetry, Language,Thought.27Vico's

theoryof the "trueHomer"meets its counterpartn Wittgenstein's n-

fortunately parsecommentson practical anguage n his Philosophical

Investigations.28These comments add

upto

reflections on generic au-thorityand set themselves off againstHeidegger's hought.However,HeideggerandWittgensteinranklyserve as littlemore thaninspirationsfor the contemporary ebate on languageandthe socialconstruction f

reality.The laterWittengensteintops short of intersubjectivity y set-

tling for a practical nterpretation f language,and althoughthe later

Heidegger ays a greatdeal, he is so mystical(as is Wittgenstein) hat

day routine structures"(p. 246). "For charisma to be transforedinto an everydayphenomenon, it is necessary that its anti-economic character should be altered"

(p. 251).27. Martin Heidegger, Poetry, Language, Thought (New York: Harper and

Row, 1971).28. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (New York: Macmillan

Co., 1968).




he can be little more than inspirational. n any case, they define the

limits for the kind of debate overpoliticalor social authorityhat takesplace in the writingsof HannahArendtand JurgenHabermas.

However differentArendt and Habermasmay be from each other,

they areunited n rejecting he kind of societyin whichpoliticalauthor-

ity is an offspringof technologicalactivity.Furthermore, oth of themsubscribe o the hermeneutical otion thatpublicauthoritys, andoughtto be, the constructiveconsequenceof intersubjectiveommunication.Theirdifferencesie withinthesebounds.For Arendtconstructiventer-

subjective ommunicationakesplacewithin a historically ircumscribed

framework.Her political people are the Homeric-oriented ristoi ofAthens or the AmericanFoundingFathers.9 They are well educated,and they are caughtup in a web of stories that makes them revolu-tionaries in the sense of wantingto return to the first principlesof

politics, located in the archaic Greek past or the Roman Republic.Authority ies in language, hat is to say, in constructiventersubjectivecommunication, ut language hat informs he presentwith the past andhence determinesthe future.Habermas s more orientedto ordinary

languageanalysis.The pastdoes not greatly nfluencehis considerations

of the sourcesof authority.He looks for a universalthat is currentlyhidden in the confines of ordinary anguage.Habermas s a kind of

sociologicalNoamChomsky, earchingor the deepstructure f political

authorityn the superficialitiesf ordinary anguage.He mighteasilybe

mistaken or a neo-Marxist n questof a deterministicubstructure, ut

the fact that he startswith the culturalsuperstructuref ordinary an-

guage bringsout a key differencebetweenhim and Marx.Yet, in the

finalanalysis,Habermas'swritingsare aimedat establishinga "critical

standard n terms of whichany proposed

set of social norms can in

principlebe assessed." 0 This is an accurate ynopsisof his efforts,and

it suggeststhatwhile he may differfrom Marx in not rootingauthorityin the speechlessactivityof labor, he is similar to Marx in being a

reductionist.

29. This is an interpretationchiefly of Arendt's The Human Condition (Chicago:

University of Chicago Press, 1971) and On Revolution (New York: Viking Press,

Compass Books, 1973). Habermas has commented on Arendt's thinking in On

Revolution in his "Die Geschichte von den zwei Revolutionen,"Merkur

(1966):5, cited in Wellmer,CriticalTheoryof Society, p. 87.

30. Stephen K. White. "Rationalityand the Foundation of Political Philosophy:An Introduction to the Recent Work of Jiirgen Habermas,"Journal of Politics

(November 1979). Habermas'schief concepts are developed in his essay on Hegel,see note 16 above. A relatively easy introduction to Habermas'sthinking may be

gained from his Toward a Rational Society (Boston, Beacon Press, 1970).




The troublewith Arendt andHabermass that the former endsto be

too irrational(or romantic) and the latteroverly rational(or reduc-tionist). ArendtapparentlyakesHeideggerat his wordwhen he insists

that phenomenologys descriptive.She wants to describethe human

condition o us, to takeit as it is "given" o her and not reduceit to a

universal oncept.31This is healthy,but it drivesher into mystifications

preciselywhen she is on the brinkof profoundconceptualization.An

example s her notion of the polis as a lost treasureyingat the bottom

of our sea of contemporary oliticalforms.Indeed,everytime Arendt

engages n etymological xercises,she comesclose to reducing he com-

plexitiesof contemporary xistenceto a single archaicform. Whereasone sympathizeswithher reluctance o depart romdescriptivephenom-

enology,one also wishes she wouldlet go more often andconceptualizethe parcelof existenceshe was dealingwith.

Habermasmaybe moreoriented o ordinaryanguage han Arendt s,but he is questingafter the samepolis Arendt seeks wheneverhe an-

nounces his goal as the attainmentof an "idealspeech situation."Bythis he means a situationof intersubjectiveommunicationhat is not

corruptedby ulterior motives or warped by the pressureof outside,

strategic nterests.The only forcethatprevailshere is the "coercionlesscoercion of the better argument"(zwangloserZwang des besseren

Argumentes).32This latter termmightbe perceivedas doubletalk, an

indication hat Habermas s apotheosizingogic by allowing t the mo-

nopoly of force that political thinkersnormallyaccord to the state.It is hard to tell, for equallyoften he is a critical theoristintentupon

doingbattle with all fetishes (includingthe idees fixe of left-wingstu-dents who have lost all touch with empiricalreality) and returning othe

key relationshipetween the human

subjectandnature.33n

impor-tant respectsHabermasoften resemblesJohn Rawls, whose notionsof

the veil of ignoranceand the originalpositionstronglysuggesta desireto create a Habermasian"idealspeechsituation"by purgingpoliticsofulteriordeterminations.34therwisepoliticsis irrational,an epiphenom-enal outcroppingof underlying nterests,for the most part economic.Habermaswants the rationalsuperstructureo determine he irrationalbase.

31. Arendt,Human Condition,p. 7.

32. Jurgen Habermas, Legitimation Crisis (Boston: Beason Press, 1975), pp.95-110, passim.

33. Habermas,Towarda Rational Society,p. 40.

34. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University

Press,BelknapPress, 1971).




Somedistinctionswithregard o the terms, rrational ndrational,are

in order.WhenI say thatArendthas a tendency o be overlyirrational,I mean that she does not conceptualize nough,and that when she does

conceptualizeshe tends to mystifythings. I do not mean that she is

illogicalor perverse.The phenomenologicalmethod,to which Arendtadheredclosely, only insiststhat one beginwith description. t impliesthat one would end with a greatlyenrichedconceptualization rocess.Similarly,we mustunderstand he sensein which Habermass a ration-alist. German hinkershavelongbeen fond of makingnumerousdistinc-

tions withinthe categoryof rationality,and Habermas s no execption.

He is aware hathe andMarxarebothrationalists, uthe thinksMarx'srationalitys dangerouso politics,because t has tied itselfto an activitywhich is speechlessand basicallyreflective of a pattern,or logic, of

nature.Habermasis consciouslyan intersubjective ationalist,rather

than an objectiverationalist,and this keeps his rationalismwithin the

properbounds of politics.It is unnecessaryo providean extendeddiscussionof the manydiffer-

ences betweenArendtand Habermas. t is moreimportant o note that

their theoriesof authoritydo not harkenback to a privateexperience,as do the theories of Hobbes and Marx,but reach out to an essentiallypublicexperienceof constructiventersubjectiveommunicationn aris-

tocraticor ordinary anguage.The samedistinctionshold in the case of

Weberand Vico, but in differentways. Again, the differencesare not

crucial.Weber's harismaand Vico's "trueHomer"are,to tell the truth,ratherrudimentaryheoriesof language,aristocraticor ordinary.But

note that in all fourcasesconsideredabovethe sourcesof authorityare

in a public activity, namely,language.That Hobbes and Marx base their theories of

authorityon the

speechless activities of work and labor should raise the question of

whether hey arepoliticalphilosophers.This is not a troublingquestionfor Marx,since he lays no claimto being any kind of philosopher. n-

deed, we might interpret he last of his theses on Feuerbachto be a

declarationof technologicalntent.Hobbes,on the otherhand, is often

identifiedas a political philosopher,but of course he respondsto this

sloppyidentification y asserting hathe is a politicalscientist,andthat

indeed political science is no older than his writings.This is not an

outrageousclaim.It simplytells us how deeplycommitted o CartesianrationalismHobbeswas. In any case, both HobbesandMarx construct

theoriesof technologicalauthority,not politicalauthority,and conse-

quentlythey groundtheirsystemsin the privateactivitiesof work and

labor. This is not the case in Weber and Vico and, more recently,Arendt andHabermas.They share the assumptionhat a publicactivity




is one conducted hrough he mediumof speech,or language,and one

in which a pluralityof humanbeingsparticipates.This we mightjustaseasilycall a polis. In all four caseszoon politikon s what he was to theclassical Greeks: the man who speaks. Public authorityoriginates nthe interchanges f public personsand not in the essentially echnolog-ical activitiesof Hobbes's isolatedmechanicalman or Marx'sdeprivedindustrialaborer.

The distinctionbetweenpublicandprivatereiterates he fundamentaldistinctionbetween aristocraticand democraticsocietiesthat providedTocqueville'sDemocracy n Americawith its structure. t opensthe way

to a concludingquestionof an entirelydifferentorder: Is our thinlyveiled antipathy o technologyand privateinterests not also a thinlyveiled antipathy oward the democraticprocessitself? How comfortingit wouldbe to assert,argue,and demonstrate uccessfully hat a mutedbias against echnologyand the interestsof the privatesectorneed notbe translatedas a bias againstdemocracy,but such an effortwouldbe

deeply suspect.The bias againsttechnologydoes translate nto a bias

againstmajoritarianemocracy,becauseof its strongorientation owarda technologicalconceptionof politics, as explicated n the writingsof

Marx and, above all, Lenin. But a bias against the transferof the

technologicalmodel to politics only results in an ambivalentattitudetoward imiteddemocracy.The United StatesConstitution,or example,makesexcitingreadingoncewe realizehowgreatly heFoundingFatherswere concerned with protectingspeech (and the preconditionsfor

speech) frommajoritarianyranny.In the end it all reallydependsonhow one definesdemocracy.

Better still, it all really depends upon what sort of human beingdemocraticmanis. TheAmericanConstitution

ullyassumes hatdemo-

craticman is one who speaks,and by definition his is a publicman.This is also the kind of man assumed n the politicalthinkingof Arendtand Habermas.Hobbesand Marx,in contrast,are dealingwithprivateman, that is to say, with a citizenwhose definingactivities(work and

labor) are done outside the publicrealm.The vast majorityof human

beingsare necessarilyconcernedfirst and last with providing or their

bodily needs. This underlyingeconomicnecessityto earn a living byworkingandlaboringdetermines he mindof privateman to be charac-

teristicallypracticaland hence open to a technologicalapproach o allaspectsof life, includingpolitics.

It mightalso dependon how one definesaristocracyor the elite. Ifthe elite decides that the vast majorityare incapableof transcendingbodily needs, as Lenin clearly decided in "What s to be Done?", itfollows thatthe elitewillgainand retainpower by definingpoliticsas an




activity hatfinallyservesprivateends: breadand land for the peasants,

jobsandapartmentsor the proletarians, lectrification s the equivalentof the political"good."The model neednot be Soviet. It can be restatedin terms of aid to Chrysler, ax cuts for the middleclasses, or moreaffirmative ctionprograms o provide jobs for minorities.In all casesthe result s a deepeningdepoliticization f mass man.The elite increas-

ingly governs people by administeringhings.

public authority, technology, speech & language

Documents