STUDIA PHÆNOMENOLOGOGICA X (2010) ***–***

Psychologism as Positive Heritage of

Husserl’s Phenomenological Philosophy*

Peter Andras VARGA(Institute for Philosophical Research, Hungarian Academy of Sciences)

Abstract: Husserl is famous for his critique of foundational psychologism. How-ever, his relationship to psychologism is not entirely negative. His conception of philosophy is indebted also to nineteenth-century ideas of a psychological foundation of logic and philosophy. This is manifest both in historical influenc-es on Husserl and in debates between Husserl and his contemporaries. These areas are to be investigated, with a particular focus on the Logical Investigations and the works from the period of Husserl’s transition to the transcendental phenomenology. It is hoped that the investigation could contribute towards the better understanding of Husserl’s idea of the foundation of his phenomenology. Keywords: Edmund Husserl, Hermann Lotze, Leonard Nelson, psycholo-gism, foundation of phenomenology

1. Introduction

Husserl’s attack on the foundational psychologism was so successful that even Husserl himself has complained that attacking psychologism became the fashion;1 and in the recent decades the psychologism-controversy has returned

*I am grateful to Prof. Ullrich Melle, Director of the Husserl-Archives at the University of Leu-ven, for his kind permission to quote from Husserl’s unpublished manuscripts. My research was supported by the „Intentionality and Experience” (72360) research project of the Hungarian Scientific Research Fund (OTKA).1 E. Husserl, Einleitung in die Logik und Erkenntnistheorie. Vorlesungen 1906/07, ed. U. Melle, Husserliana (Hua) vol. XXIV, Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1984, p. 143: “[daß] neuerdings und vielleicht nicht ohne Einfluß meiner Logischen Untersuchungen die Polemik gegen den Psycholo-gismus zur Mode werden will und plötzlich niemand mehr hinter dem Ofen gesessen haben will, hinter dem er aufgescheucht worden <ist> [...].” E. Husserl, Logik und allgemeine Wissenschaft-stheorie. Vorlesungen 1917/18 mit ergänzenden Texten aus der ersten Fassung 1910/11, ed. U. Panzer,

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to the focus of historical investigations.2 Yet I think that Husserl’s relation to the psychological foundation of logic and philosophy is not entirely negative. The present essay intends to contribute towards the better understanding of Husserl’s complex relation to psychological foundational attempts by under-taking two historical investigations that hopefully could also provide system-atic insights into Husserl’s philosophy.

First, I will attempt to investigate an impetus that Husserl received for his reflections on the foundation of his phenomenological philosophy. Second, I try to intend to analyse a less known critique of Husserl by one of his contem-poraries, who was trying to work out a psychological foundation of logic. Not only Husserl must have been aware of this critique, but also it is comparable to Husserl’s foundational attempt, and thus could hopefully shed more light on Husserl’s relevant ideas. Both investigations serve the aim of exploring how psychology could contribute to the self-understanding of phenomenological philosophy.

The two investigations are connected to each other by a concept that stems from the early 19th century philosopher, Jakob Friedrich Fries, initiator of a largely neglected psychologistic Kant-tradition. Thereby this essay intends to fulfil, in a certain sense, an indication given by Karl Schuhmann, the distin-guished Husserl scholar, who has once written concerning Fries and Husserl: “Hier kündigen sich vielleicht Argumentationsfiguren an, die dann auch in Husserls Reflexionen über seine Phänomenologie eine Rolle spielen.”3

2. The Emergence of Husserl’s Phenomenological Philosophy

The period between Husserl’s appointment to the University of Göttingen in 1901 and the publication of the Ideas I in 1913 is rich in biographical documents that show Husserl’s growing determination to present himself not only as involved in a particular domain of descriptive psychology and episte-mology, but also as having a philosophy. The most famous document—edited

Husserliana (Hua) vol. XXX, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1996, p. 81: “Gegen den Psychologismus, wie es bei dem Umschlag der Mode üblich geworden ist, loszudonnern [...].”2 The most known exposition of this debate, especially of its historical and sociological back-ground, is undoubtedly M. Kusch, Psychologism. A Case-Study in the Sociology of Philosophical Knowledge, London/New York: Routledge, 1995. It is less known that a large part of the his-torical exploration has been already done earlier (and Kusch relied on it, see his remark in op. cit. n. 1 to p. 187), e.g. by M. Ash, “Academic Politics in the History of Science: Experimental Psychology in Germany, 1879–1941,” Central European History 13.3 (1980), pp. 255–286. Another early monograph is K. Sachs-Hombach, Philosophische Psychologie im 19. Jahrhundert. Entstehung und Problemgeschichte, Freiburg/München: Karl Alber, 1993.3 K. Schuhmann, “Husserls Idee der Philosophie,” in C. Leijenhorst & P. Steenbakkers (eds.) Se-lected Papers in Phenomenology, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2004, pp. 61–78, p. 75. Schuhmann also mentions Hermann Lotze, whose influence on Husserl will be studied below.

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relatively early4—is Husserl’s irregularly kept diary. Its entry from Sept 25 1906 is very telling:

An erster Stelle nenne ich die allgemeine Aufgabe, die ich für mich lösen muß, wenn ich mich soll einen Philosophen nennen können. Ich meine eine Kritik der Vernunft. […] Meine vielen Einzeluntersuchungen haben mir Handha-ben gegeben, sie haben mich Methoden kennengelernt. Ich muß mir zunächst über die allgemeinsten Gesichtspunkte klar werden.5

Correspondingly, many see this period as the decisive one for the forma-tion of Husserl’s philosophy. Since the groundbreaking editing works of U. Melle6 and E. Schuhmann7 it is clearly visible that this period consists of a series of attempts to formulate the phenomenological reduction. It is by now a generally accepted view8 that Husserl’s final breakthrough to phenomeno-

4 E. Husserl, “Persönliche Aufzeichnungen”, ed. W. Biemel, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 16.3 (1956), pp. 293–302. The item from Sept 25 1906, which is the relevant one for our purposes, was published already in Philosophischen Studien 2.3–4 (1951), pp. 306–312. Critical edition of the diary by U. Melle in Hua XXIV, pp. 442–449.5 Hua XXIV, p. 4456 Ullrich Melle has edited the decisive lecture course from this period (Hua XXIV). In his extensive editor’s introduction (Hua XXIV, pp. xiii–li, esp. p. xix ff.) he has first chronicled Husserl’s way to the phenomenological reduction based on the surviving material, thereby dispelling the myths that Husserl arrived at the reduction in 1905 or in 1907. Husserl himself was unsure about the developments of this period. In a research manuscript from 1931 he has first written “1907 habe ich <in> Göttingen zuerst den Gedanken der phänomenologischen Reduktion in Vorlesungen ausgeführt, den ich zuerst zwei Jahre früher gefasst hatte,” then he changed the sentence to “1905 habe ich <in> Göttingen zuerst die phänomenologische Reduktion ausgeführt” (E. Husserl, Zur phänomenologische Reduktion (Texte aus dem Nachlass, 1926–1935), ed. S. Luft, Husserliana (Hua) vol. XXXIV, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Pub-lishers, 2002, pp. 315 and 603, the editor opted for the second variant in the main text). On the possible ground of Husserl’s retrospective mistake (a mistake that is shared by the editor of Hua X as well) see R. Bernet, “Einleitung,” in E. Husserl, Texte zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewußtseins (1893–1917), ed. R. Bernet, Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1985, pp. xi–lxxvii, p. xxxii, cf. p. 103, n. 1.7 E. Schuhmann has edited, amongst others, the 1902/03 Logic, the 1902/03 Theory of Knowledge and the 1905 Theory of Judgements lecture courses in the Husserliana Materialen series, and has identified the original context of the so-called “Lecture E” (Hua XXIV, Beilage XIII), thereby resolving a long-standing uncertainty concerning the development of Husserl’s early philosophy.8 For a recent detailed investigation see J.-F. Lavigne’s voluminous Husserl et la naissance de la phénoménologie, Paris: Presses Universitaires France, 2005. However, Lavigne falls short of ad-equately reconstructing Husserl’s development. Besides the point raised by Hanne Jacobs’ review (Husserl Studies 23.1 (2007), pp. 71–82, see e.g. p. 79, n. 8), Lavigne has, I think, confused some stages of Husserl’s development: (1) He did not respect E. Schuhmann’s clarification of “Lecture E” (see previous note). (2) He tried (pp. 461–462) to identify the M III 3 I 1 I / 39–65, 72–78 (the part marked “ad Ax”) as the remnant of Husserl’s descriptive psychology lecture course in 1904 summer. However, in a table (“Zeittafel”) composed by Ludwig Landgrebe, who compiled and typed this typescript on Husserl’s assignment, it is assigned to 1904/05, which dating is confirmed by the editors of Hua XXXVIII (E. Husserl, Wahrnehmung und Aufmerksamkeit (Texte aus dem Nachlass, 1893–1912), ed. Th. Vongehr & R. Giuliani, Husserliana (Hua) vol. XXXVIII, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2004, see p. xv and p. 421).

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logical reduction occured during his 1906/07 Göttingen lecture course Intro-duction to Logic and Theory of Knowledge. It is here that Husserl succeeded for the first time in securing the domain of phenomena and thus establishing the desired phenomenological theory of knowledge:

Die cartesianische Fundamentalbetrachtung gibt das zweifellose Gebiet: das der Phänomene, näher der Erkenntnisphänomene. Und nun gilt es, Fragen zu stel-len, Analysen zu vollziehen und daraufhin zu klären. Darin figuriert alle Wis-senschaft nicht als Gegebenheit schlechthin, sondern als Phänomen, nicht als Geltung, sondern als Geltungerscheingung, erscheinender Geltungsanspruch.9

The lecture course of 1906/07 is also unique insofar as it already contains germs of Husserl’s reflections on the methodology of phenomenology. A sec-tion composed of such methodical reflections immediately follows Husserl’s observation quoted above. One of its descriptions contains a clue that will guide our further investigation:

In der Natur der Untersuchung liegt es, daß sie nicht mit Hypothesen und transzendenten Substruktionen operieren kann, ohne sinnlos zu werden; nicht einmal die Hypothese des berechtigten “Selbstvertrauens der Vernunft” kann sie gelten lassen. Das reine Schauen und das Analysieren im reinen Schauen bedarf keiner Hypothese, daß das Selbstvertrauen der Vernunft nicht trüge.10

Husserl here characterizes the phenomenological analysis as opposed to an analysis based on hypotheses and “transcendental substructions.” This is a fairly common description; however, Husserl here names a particular counterpoint of the phenomenological analysis: the Selbstvertrauen der Vernunft (self assurance of reason). What is exactly this counterpoint of the phenomenological analysis; and—an even more exciting question—what epistemological problem the Selb-stvertrauen der Vernunft is supposed to solve, and how will phenomenology solve that problem without the Selbstvertrauen der Vernunft? In order to answer these questions, first the probable source of this notion should be established.

3. Who is behind Husserl’s Selbstvertrauen der Vernunft?

Although Husserl does not mention any name here and the standard reference works of philosophy would refer us from the Selbstvertrauen der Vernunft to the early German Idealist philosopher, Jakob Friedrich Fries11;

9 Hua XXIV, pp. 199–200.10 Hua XXIV, pp. 200–201.11 In the Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie the only main-text occurrence of “Selbstver-trauen der Vernunft” is in the context of Fries at vol. 10 columns 1396–1397 (see G. König, “Transzendental; Transzendententalphilosophie VII. Psychologische Kantinterpretation,” in J.

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yet there are good reasons to think that the philosopher behind Husserl’s use of the Selbstvertrauen der Vernunft is Hermann Lotze, the polymath philoso-pher-psychologist-scientist, who was a well-known member of the 19th cen-tury German scientific establishment.

Let us first establish the framework of the supposed connection! In terms of academic lineage (which was very important in Germany), the connection is evident: Before 1901, Husserl was working in Halle an der Saale, and his promoter (later his mentor) was Carl Stumpf.12 Stumpf himself has received his habilitation under Lotze at the University of Göttingen, and he was per-ceived by his contemporaries as someone who was influenced by Lotze.13 The University of Göttingen, where Husserl has received his first tenure position, was a sanctum of Lotzean philosophy: Lotze was teaching in Göttingen be-tween 1844 and 1881, i.e. for most of his career. Husserl himself has said that Göttingen became a “philosophical desert” after Lotze had passed away.14 Julius Baumann, one of Husserl’s new, hostile colleague in the faculty,15 is usu-ally also considered as follower of Lotze.

Husserl’s acquaintance of Lotze is not confined to academic relations. The young Husserl was in possession of all of Lotze’s writings that have ap-peared during the philosopher’s life (including the lecture notes edited by his students).16

Ritter & K. Gründer (eds.), Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie vol. 10, Basel: Schwabe, 1998). In the 1967 edition of The Encyclopedia of Philosophy the above phrase appears only in the headword on Fries (see A. P. D. Mourelatos, “Fries, Jakob Friedrich,” in P. Edwards (ed.), The Encyclopedia of Philosophy vol. III, New York: The Macmillan & The Free Press, 1967, pp. 253–255, see p. 254).12 Stumpf has left Halle in 1889, but the connection has remained alive: Husserl has dedicated the Logical Investigations to Stumpf, and Stumpf has helped Husserl a lot during this period. 13 “Stumpf, der in mancher Hinsicht ebenfalls Lotze nahesteht, in anderer sich von ihm ent-fernt” (T. K. Oesterreich, Friedrich Ueberwegs Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie. Viertel Teil. Die deutsche Philosophie des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts und der Gegenwart, Berlin: E. S. Mittler & Sohn, 1823, 12. Auflage, p. 370), “Carl Stumpf […] ist ausgegangen von Brentano und Lotze” (p. 523).14 E. Husserl, Briefwechsel. Die Neukantianer, ed. E. Schuhmann & K. Schuhmann, Husserliana Dokumente (Hua Dok) vol. III/5, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1994, p. 179. See also E. Husserl, Briefwechsel. Die Brentanoschule, ed. E. Schuhmann & K. Schuhmann, Hus-serliana Dokumente (Hua Dok) vol. III/1, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1994, p. 41.15 A recent detailed overview of Husserl’s relations to other members of the faculty of the Göttin-gen University is provided by E. Schuhmann and K. Schuhmann in their introduction to Husserl’s “Göttinger Doppelvortrag” of 1901: E. Schuhmann & K. Schuhmann, “Husserls Manuskripte zu seinem Göttinger Doppelvortrag von 1901,”, Husserl Studies 17.2 (2001), pp. 87–123.16 Husserl was in possession of the following works of Lotze: Geschichte der Aesthetik in Deut-schland, München: Cotta, 1868 (signature by the Husserl-Archives of Leuven: BQ 282); Grundzüge der Logik und Enzyklopaedie der Philosophie. Diktate aus den Vorlesungen, Leipzig: S. Hirzel, 1883; Grundzüge der Metaphysik. Diktate aus den Vorlesungen, Leipzig: S. Hirzel, 1883; Grundzüge der praktischen Philosophie, Leipzig: S. Hirzel, 1884 (these three volumes are bound together; signature: BQ 283); Grundzüge der Psychologie. Diktate aus den Vorlesungen,

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So far the observations on Husserl’s relation to Lotze suffice to prove only that Husserl must have known Lotze, and a certain influence of Lotze on Hus-serl has now became commonplace. This widely acknowledged influence con-sists in, much in line with Husserl’s self-characterisation17, Husserl’s “Geltung-Platonism,” i.e. the way Husserl has conceived the mode of existence of ideal objects (esp. in the Prolegomena) without resorting to full-fledged Platonism. Some investigations of Lotze and Husserl also include Lotze’s role in Husserl’s “anti-psychologistic interpretation of logic”18 and that Husserl has conceived of “mathematics as a branch of logic”19 (which was, by the way, the most fre-quent source of Husserl references to Lotze).

However, I believe that Lotze has also provided Husserl with a form of episte-mological foundational argument that is summarized by the phrase “Selbstver-trauen der Vernunft.” In order to confirm this hypothesis, let us first look into the occurrences of Selbstvertrauen der Vernunft in Husserl’s oeuvre.

Although the highest profile occurrence is undoubtedly the paragraph from Husserl’s Introduction to Logic and Epistemology lecture (which was quot-ed above), Lotze’s notion of Selbstvertrauen der Vernunft emerges repeatedly in Husserl’s oeuvre, which is thereby a less prominent, but constant feature of Husserl’s thinking, a feature to which—as far as I know—so far nobody has paid enough attention.

In fact, some of the occurrences are not esoteric at all. In the Prolego-mena Husserl says, “Es würde nichts helfen, wenn man unserer Forderung nach Begrenzung und Begründung mit der Berufung auf das ‘Selbstvertrauen der Vernunft’ oder auf die ihnen im logischen Denken anhaftende Evidenz ausweichen wollte.”20 The other part of the occurrences comes from notes or (non-verbatim) excerpts that Husserl made during drafting his works or pre-paring for his lectures. In a section of the manuscripts of the late Freiburg Introduction to Philosophy lecture courses (not yet published) Husserl made extensive notes from Lotze’s epistemology, especially of the various sceptical challenges and how to meet them. Parts of the interwoven arguments read, “Demgegenüber zwei Wege; a) Grundsätze des Selbstvertrauens der Vernunft; denknotwendiges; solange nicht wahr, bis es durch einen <xxx> eine andere

Leipzig: S. Hirzel, 1884; Grundzüge der Naturphilosophie, Leipzig: S. Hirzel, 1882; Grundzüge der Religionsphilosophie, Leipzig: S. Hirzel, 1882 (volumes bound together; BQ 284); System der Philosophie. 1. Logik, Leipzig: S. Hirzel, 1880 (2. Auflage) (BQ 285); System der Philosophie. 2. Metaphysik, Leipzig: S. Hirzel, 1879 (BQ 286); Mikrokosmos I-III, Leipzig: S. Hirzel, 1876–1880 (BQ 287); Allgemeine Physiologie, Leipzig: Weidmann, 1851 (BQ 288); Medicinische Psy-chologie oder Physiologie der Seele, Leipzig: Weidmann, 1852 (BQ 298); Kleine Schriften 2 vol. (BQ 290; note that complete edition contains of three books in four volumes).17 See e. g. E. Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen. Ergänzungsband. Erster Teil, ed. U. Melle, Hus-serliana (Hua) vol. XX/1, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2002, p. 297.18 K. Hauser, “Lotze and Husserl,” Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 85 (2003), pp. 152–178, p. 152.19 Ibid., p. 169.20 E. Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen. Erster Band. Prolegomena zur reinen Logik., ed. E. Holenstein, Husserliana (Hua) vol. XVIII, Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1975, p. 96.

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Aufklärung über sich <xxx> und selbst uns nötigt, es für einen Schein zu erklären” (F I 42 / 26a, transcript p. 30), or “Was das erstere anlangt: das Selbstvertrauen der Vernunft, das Wahrheit überhaupt durch Denken gefun-den werden kann, ist die unvermeidliche Voraussetzung alles Untersuchens” (F I 42 / 27a, transcript p. 33). The last part of the convolute B II 18 (60a ff.) also contains unpublished epistemological notes from Lotze, presumably from Husserl’s Halle period (maybe during the preparation of the Prolegom-ena21), but unfortunately he describes only the content of the principle of Selbstvertrauen der Vernunft, but does not mention its name.22

It is even more interesting that there are some comparably late occurrences too. Again, one of these is not esoteric at all. In the Formal and Transcendental Logic Husserl says, “Es erwächst so die große Aufgabe, alle diese Weisen der Evidenz zu durchforschen […]. Von ober her die Evidenz und das ‘Selbst-vertrauen der Vernunft’ bereden, ergibt hier nichts.”23 For other references though one has to go a greater length. There are some scattered references to the Selbstvertrauen der Vernunft as an alternative answer to the question of evi-dence, e.g. in an unpublished part of the convolute B I 38, “Nur ist das jeden-falls der Sinn der beliebten Rede (Fries, Lotze) vom absoluten Selbstvertrauen der Vernunft [...] als derjenigen Vernunft, der man folgend [...] zu Urteilen kommen kann, die man ganz sicher ist nie preisgeben zu müssen [...]” (B I 38 / 25b, transcript p. 25, this note is explicitly dated to Nov 2 1933).

It seems that the Selbstvertrauen der Vernunft designated a relevant problem for the mature Husserl as well. However, his tone in these later manuscripts is softer, as if he were in possession of a solution. A further remark that will gain significance during our investigations is that Husserl seems to attach the notion of Selbstvertrauen der Vernunft also to Jakob Friedrich Fries. Our task is thus to understand what this index locorum implies. As a first step, let us see what Lotze’s Selbstvertrauen der Vernunft exactly means.

4. The Selbstvertrauen der Vernunft at Hermann Lotze

Lotze’s references to the Selbstvertrauen der Vernunft are scattered, but they span through his entire scientific career. In an early review of a French

21 The retrospective dating on B II 18 / 60a (which could be mistaken, see note above) is further confirmed by the remark “wohl zu Logische Untersuchengen” written in Edith Stein’s hand-writing (Edith Stein was Husserl’s assistant between October 1, 1916 and February 20, 1918).22 I suspect that there is a similar indirect reference in a note from 1908/09 (E. Husserl, Transzen-dentaler Idealismus. Texte aus dem Nachlass (1908–1921), ed. R. D. Rollinger & R. Sowa, Hus-serliana (Hua) vol. XXXVI, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2003, p. 41, col. 31–35).23 E. Husserl, Formale und transzendentale Logik, ed. P. Janssen, Husserliana (Hua) vol. XVII, Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974, p. 169. The Formal and Transcendental Logic was written between November / December 1928 and January 23, 1929.

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book whose author attempted to revive Cartesianism24, Lotze refers to the Selbstvertrauen der Vernunft during discussing the possible criteria of truth. He portrays the reviewed author as claiming that the criterion of truth is evi-dence, and he accuses him of omitting the counter-examples, in which a false statement appears to be directly evident (Lotze calls such cases “pathological evidences”). Lotze believes that truth results only from the deliberation of “di-rect positive” and indirect negative evidences. However, he also assigns a role to the persuasive power of direct evidences:

Dass wir freilich zuletzt das unabweislich Evidente zugestehen müssen, ist wahr, aber so drückt der Satz nur das Selbstvertrauen der Vernunft zu ihrer Wahrheitsfähigkeit überhaupt aus und ist weit mehr eine Art der Gesinnung, ohne die kein Mensch eine Veranlassung zu irgend einer Untersuchung haben könnte, als ein Princip, vermittelst dessen eine solche geführt wird.25

In a late autobiographical essay26, Lotze casts more light on the role of the Selbstvertrauen der Vernunft in the process of arriving at philosophical knowl-edge. A mistrust against radical epistemological endeavours that aim to pro-vide foundation of all knowledge is manifest in this essay, and it stems not only from the wisdom of old age (though Lotze makes occasional use of such rhetoric), but this conviction rests also on philosophical arguments, in which the Selbstvertrauen der Vernunft gets involved.

Lotze believes that reason has no external criterion to which it can resort when establishing the validity of knowledge.

Reason is to decide upon the accuracy of its general methods of procedure, and yet it can use as the motive of its decision nothing but these same neces-sary principles upon which it is to decide. Its labour can accordingly consist in nothing but an approval of itself and a careful reflection upon its own action.27

Thus the Selbstvertrauen der Vernunft (translated as “the confidence of rea-son in itself ”28) is an expression of the reason’s inability to “be ahead of itself ”:

24 H. Lotze, “Recension von Francisque Bouillier, Historie et critique de la révolution cartési-enne,” in Kleine Schriften vol. I, ed. D. Peipers, Leipzig: S. Hirzel, 1885, pp. 257–267. (Origi-nally published in Göttingensche gelehrte Anzeigen (1844) No. 170–172, pp. 1695–1710.)25 Ibid., p. 262.26 H. Lotze, “Philosophy in the Last Forty Years,” in Kleine Schriften vol. III/2, ed. D. Peipers, Leipzig: S. Hirzel, 1891, pp. 451–479. (Originally published in The Contemporary Review 15 (1880) pp. 134–135.) The article was originally written by Lotze in German, and it was trans-lated in England, at the request of the journal, by someone who was not competent in phi-losophy and the German original was not found either among Lotze’s estate or in the journal’s office (see the introduction by Lotze’s editor pp. XLsqq. in H. Lotze, Kleine Schriften vol. III/1, ed. D. Peipers, Leipzig: S. Hirzel, 1891). Therefore a coherent German terminology could be supposed behind the idiosyncratic English renderings.27 Ibid., p. 469.28 See note 26.

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In this way the confidence of reason in itself has inevitably lain at the basis of all philosophical investigations, even of those which relate to the determinati-on of its own truthfulness.29

Let us consider now Lotze’s main philosophical works, which not only provide more detailed arguments, but they were also well known by Husserl.30

In his concise lecture notes on logic, edited by his students, Lotze provides a detailed treatment of scepticism. After refuting some naïve forms of scepti-cism, Lotze remarks that there are still good reasons to doubt our ability of arriving at knowledge:

Ein ebenso allgemeiner, aber motivierter Skeptizismus bezweifelt die Wahr-heitsfähigkeit unsrer Erkenntnis auf den Grund ihrer Entstehung hin: Nur wenn wir uns in die Objekte verwandeln könnten, würden wir die Natur der-selben wahrhaft wiederholen; unsre Erkenntnis aber bleibt immer unser sub-jektiver Zustand, der in seiner ganzen Art und Weise von der Natur unseres Geistes abhängig ist und höchstens zum Teil von der Natur der Dinge, die auf uns wirken, mitbestimmt wird.31

According to Lotze, it is impossible to refute that skeptical argument. However, it does not entail that we should submit ourselves to it:

Vielmehr muß im Gegensatz zu ihm der allgemeine Grundsatz eines Vertrauens der Vernunft zu ihrer Wahrheitsfähigkeit ausgesprochen werden. Dieser Grund-satz besteht in der Überzeugung, daß unmöglich die Welt im Ganzen eine sinnlose Absurdität, daß sie vielmehr ein bedeutungsvolles zusammengehöriges Ganze sei, und daß folglich die Erkenntnis und die Dinge auf irgend eine Weise so für einander geschaffen sind, daß dasjenige, was der Erkenntnis denknotwen-dig erscheint, nicht bedeutungslos für die Natur der Dinge sein könne.32

Up to this point, it could seem that Lotze utilizes the Selbstvertrauen der Vernunft simply in order to escape scepticism without responding to its philo-sophical challenge. Let us take a closer look at this! In the chapter on scepti-cism in his so-called “bigger Logic”33, Lotze gives another run to the relation between irrefutable scepticism and the Selbstvertrauen der Vernunft.

29 Ibid.30 Husserl owned only two of the four volumes of the Kleine Schriften, which is the source of the previous citations (see note 16). On the other hand, Husserl was not only in possession of the works, which are the sources of the quotes below, but his copies also bear reading marks (according to the BQ catalogue cards of his library).31 H. Lotze, Grundzüge der Logik und Encyklopädie der Philosophie (Diktate aus den Vorlesungen), Leipzig: S. Hirzel, 1891, p. 95.32 Ibid., p. 96.33 H. Lotze, System der Philosophie. Erster Teil. Logik. Drei Bücher vom Denken, vom Untersuchen und vom Erkennen, Leipzig: S. Hirzel, 1874.

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Similarly to the lecture notes’ exposition, the Logic’s account of scepticism presents the absolute scepticism as the greatest danger: “[W]ie werden wir gewiss, ob nicht auch jene denknothwendigen Gesetze in unserem Geist die-ser Seite dieser Seite des Irrthums angehören, ob also nicht Alles an sich ganz anders sei, als es uns denknothwendig scheinen muß zu sein?”34

What is yet unclear to us, is, however, the role Selbstvertrauen der Vernunft plays in containing this scepticism. Is the Selbstvertrauen der Vernunft just an excuse for Lotze to neglect the philosophical challenge of absolute scepticism; or does the absolute scepticism share that circular structure of the radical episte-mological endeavours against which the Selbstvertrauen der Vernunft was origi-nally devised? A closer look at the text decides this question in favour of the latter alternative:

Denn jeder Grund, den man gegen sie [sc. diese Skepsis] in das Feld führen kann, wird sich nur auf die Evidenz und Nothwendigkeit stützen können, mit welcher er selbst gedacht wird, und gehört also mit zu dem Bereich des Den-knothwendigen, in Bezug auf welches jene öde Frage, ob nicht dennoch Alles ganz anders sei, ins Unendliche wiederholt werden kann.35

The supposedly irrefutable sceptical position also displays a self-referen-tial circular structure: It is irrefutable, according to Lotze, exactly because it can always be iterated further (“ins unendliche wiederholt werden kann”) by including the counter-argument in the set of necessary truths (“Bereich des Denknothwendigen”) in question.

It could be argued, that Lotze is mistaken about supposing a necessarily circular structure in the argumentation of the absolute sceptical position. The sceptical position might be well reconstructed in other terms. (I venture the remark that answering the sceptical challenge—which is not only an eternal task of the philosophers, but also a particularly popular task of the 19th centu-ry early post-Hegelian philosophers—depends greatly, if not entirely, on how one reconstructs that challenge.) But for Lotze it is a clear case of the circular-ity against that he has devised the principle of the Selbstvertrauen der Vernunft:

[…] dieser Neigung gegenüber würden wir uns wissenschaftlich auf einen Grundsatz des Selbstvertrauen der Vernunft zurückziehen […] : wir würden Denknothwendiges so lange für wahr halten, bis es durch seine eigene Fol-gerungen eine andere Aufklärung über sich gibt und selbst uns nöthigt, es für einen Schein zu erklären, der dann nicht schlechthin ungültiger Schein ist, sondern in einer angebbaren Beziehung zu der Wahrheit steht, welcher er nicht mehr gleicht.36

34 Ibid., p. 475.35 Ibid., pp. 475–476.36 Ibid., p. 477.

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5. Husserl and the Selbstvertrauen der Vernunft: Some Intermediary Observations

Let us summarise our observations so far! The Selbstvertrauen der Vernunft is primarily a negative device for Lotze. His recourse to it always serves the aim of rejecting the challenges of justification. Instead, Lotze propounds the stepwise approach of verification and correction (see e.g. the positive advice of in last citation). It might have pleased the modern proponents of “trial and er-ror” theory of evidence, like Karl Popper (who has incidentally taken recourse to the Selbstvertrauen der Vernunft when expounding his epistemology37).

However, what is more important for our purposes is the circularity that Lotze is trying to counter with resorting to the Selbstvertrauen der Vernunft. In both cases this is an inherent structure that involves presuppositions: the justification of our knowledge presupposes the knowledge itself, and the basis for the refutation of scepticism is always contained in what scepticism doubts. By introducing the Selbstvertrauen der Vernunft, Lotze intends to cut through these circularitiesHusserl rejects the principle of Selbstvertrauen der Vernunft. It is clear from what we have learnt about his knowledge of this principle above and it is also consistent with his opinion of Lotze’s epistemology: Just like his relation to Bolzano, Husserl claims that he had learnt much from Lotze, but he always despised Lotze’s epistemology.38 By rejecting Lotze’s Selbstvertrauen der Vernunft, Husserl incidentally also sided with the aforementioned Julius Baumann, his hostile faculty colleague at Göttingen (albeit probably neither knowing it nor willing to do so).39

However, it is one thing to reject a notion and it is another to solve the underlying philosophical challenge that the rejected notion was supposed to

37 See K. Popper, Frühe Schriften, ed. T. E. Hansen, Gesammelte Werke vol. 1, Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2006 p. 285. Popper’s understanding of the Selbstvertrauen der Vernunft is mitigated by another tradition, which will be investigated below. Thus he perceives the Selbstvertrauen der Vernunft as an alternative of Descartes’ “veracitas Dei” (i.e. as an attempt to secure indubitable evidence). Had Popper been influenced by Lotze’s concept of the Selbstvertrauen der Vernunft, he might have found more affinities between Lotze’s conclusions and his epistemology.38 “Diese Conception Bolzanos haben auf mich stark gewirkt, ebenso wie Lotze’s Umdeutung der Platonischen Ideenlehre. […] Von dem Gedanken einer rein phänomenologischen Aufk-lärung der Erkenntnis findet sich bei ihm [Bolzano] (wie bei Lotze) keine Spur.” (Hua Dok III/1 p. 39) and “Dank schulde ich für diesen ‚Platonismus’ dem bekannten Kapitel in Lotze’s Logik, wie sehr seine Erkenntnistheorie und Metaphysik mich stets abstiess.” (E. Husserl, Briefwechsel. Die Philosophenbriefe, ed. E. Schuhmann & K. Schuhmann, Husserliana Dokumente (Hua Dok) vol. III/6, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1994 p. 460).39 See J. Baumann, Elemente der Philosophie: Logik, Erkenntnistheorie und Metaphysik, Moral (Praktische Psychologie). Für das akademische Studium und zum Selbstunterricht, Leipzig: Veit Comp, 1891, pp. 67–68. Baumann rejects the Selbstvertrauen der Vernunft: “Indes würde die Berechtigung dieses Selbstvertrauens ohne erkenntnistheoretische Prüfung desselben fraglich sein; denn daraus, daß wir den Trieb zu philosophieren haben, läßt sich nicht auf die Erfüllbar-keit dieses Triebes schließen.” (Ibid., p. 68)

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resolve. Thus Husserl has to address the problem of the circular presupposi-tions. This issue is quite pressing for Husserl, as exactly before he involved (and then rejected) the “Hypothese des berechtigten ‘Selbstvertrauen der Vernunft’,” he had to face a regress endangering his phenomenological investigation:

Sicherlich bedarf es auch der Reflexion auf die Untersuchung nach vollzogener Untersuchung. Neben der Aufklärung der natürlichen Erkenntnis bedarf es auch einer Aufklärung der erkenntnistheoretischen Erkenntnis, einer Erwä-gung, ob sie selbst neue Erkenntnisvorkommnisse bietet und ob die Aufklä-rungen erster Stufe schon alles enthalten, was die Vorkomnisse zweiter Stufe aufzuklären gestattet. Will sich jemand darüber ängstigen, da die Reflexion doch prinzipiell immer wieder ansetzen kann, so ist es Sache der näheren Un-tersuchung, ob nicht allgemeine Einsichten sich ergeben, die den Regressus ausschließen.40

Instead of the promised “further investigation,” however, only a half-page long consideration follows, before Husserl returns to the familiar topic of the relationship between psychology and epistemology. In the short consideration Husserl makes some general remarks on why phenomenology is legitimate, and he adds that, although one could resort to the Selbstvertrauen der Ver-nunft, one should not to do so, because that would be a metaphysical presup-position. However, the question remains: What could Husserl do with the circularity endangering the phenomenological foundation of knowledge?

In order to throw further light on this question, it is worth involving a de-claredly psychologistic critic of Husserl, namely Leonard Nelson. He was also a devoted follower of the early 19th century philosopher Jakob Friedrich Fries, to whom the standard reference works would refer us concerning the notion of Selbstvertrauen der Vernunft.

6. Nelson’s Theory of the Psychological Foundations of Logic and the Selbstvertrauen der Vernunft

Whilst the influence of Lotze on Husserl is a virtual relationship, which was mitigated by books; the exchange between Husserl and Leonard Nelson was a real-life event and its results were influencing the career paths of the participants.

Nelson has decided quite early, long before commencing his formal philo-sophical studies, to become a devoted propagator and an apologetic defender of the philosophy of Jakob Friedrich Fries. First he has founded a discussion circle, and later, after his relocation to Göttingen in 1903, an official society

40 Hua XXIV, p. 200.

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for the promotion of Fries’s philosophy.41 The major part of his voluminous literary output has appeared in the self-founded Abhandlungen der Fries’schen Schule, Neue Folge.42 It is here where his 400-pages long study, entitled Über das sogennante Erkenntnisproblem was published in 1908.43 This study is a vehement attack on the whole spectrum of the contemporary German philosophy.

Nelson attacks Husserl together with Frege (and Natorp) under the heading “examples of the ‘dogmatic premises’ in the antipsychologistic arguments.”44 The main mistake of the antipsychologistic arguments is, claims Nelson, that they confuse the different sense of founding logic on psychology:

Frege sieht offenbar in dem Versuch einer psychologischen Begründung der Logik einen Zirkel. Und in der Tat setzt die Psychologie bereits ihrerseits die logischen Grundsätze voraus. Dieser Umstand würde jedoch nur dann einen Zirkelschuß in der Begründung zur Folge haben, wenn diese Begründung ein Beweis sein sollte; denn nur in diesem Falle würde der Grund der logischen Sätze in der Psychologie liegen, und die logischen Gesetze würden zu Folge-sätzen der Psychologie gemacht.45

Nelson has good reasons to think so, as he has developed elsewhere a de-tailed theory of how the psychological foundation of logic is possible without involving circular arguments. This is in fact the core of Nelson’s philosophy, which he relates back to Fries. This theory is best summarised by Nelson’s pro-grammatic essay that opened the first issue of his Abhandlungen der Fries’schen Schule, Neue Folge.46 Nelson distinguishes between two kinds of justifying our judgements: the proof (Beweis) and the demonstration (Demonstration). The former is used two derive true judgements from other true judgements, while the latter serves to justify our principles (Grundurteile), which are at the be-ginning of derivation chains: “Wie wir sahen, begründen wir die Grundur-teile der empirischen und mathematischen Wissenschaften durch Aufzeigung der Anschauung, die ihnen zugrunde liegt.”47

41 See E. Blenke, “Zur Geschichte der Neuen Fries’schen Schule und der Jakob Friedrich Fries-Gesellschaft,” Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 60.2 (1978), pp. 199–208.42 The original Abhandlungen der Fries’schen Schule appeared between 1847 and 1849 in two issues.43 L. Nelson, “Über das sogennante Erkenntnisproblem,” in Schriften zur Erkenntnistheorie, ed. P. Bernays et al., Gesammelte Schriften vol. 2, Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1973, pp. 59–393, originally appeared in Abhandlungen der Fries’schen Schule, Neue Folge 2.4 (1908), pp. 413–818.44 Ibid., p. 167.45 Ibid., p. 169.46 L. Nelson, “Die kritische Methode und das Verhältnis der Psychologie zur Philosophie. Ein Kapitel aus der Methodenlehre,” in Die Schule der kritischen Philosophie und ihre Methode, ed. P. Bernays et al., Gesammelte Schriften vol. 1, Hamburg: Felix Meiner, pp. 9–78, originally ap-peared in Abhandlungen der Fries’schen Schule, Neue Folge 1.1 (1904), pp. 1–88.47 Ibid., p. 25.

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This is so far nothing new; however, Nelson couples this with a Kantian in-terpretation of intuition (Anschauung) that lets him formulate the question of the ultimate source of justification in a clear way: Nelson confines the scope of demonstrations (ostensive justifications through intuition) to the domain of empirical judgements and judgements which stem from mathematical intui-tion. However, this leaves him exposed concerning such judgements that are neither empirical nor mathematical. Nelson is clearly conscious of that: “Die Einheit und Notwendigkeit aber, die wir faktisch in unserm Denken finden und die wir durch die metaphysischen Grundsätze aussprechen, kann nicht aus der Anschauung entspringen.”48

All that together constitutes a dilemma, but Nelson believes that a third kind of justification is available that serves the justification of “metaphysical” principles: “Wie sollen wir aber die metaphysischen Grundsätze begründen? Beweisen können wir sie nicht; denn sonst wären sie keine Grundsätze. Sie können aber auch nicht demonstriert werden; denn sonst wäre sie nicht me-taphysisch. Wir nennen ihre Begründungsweise Deduktion.”49

How does this new kind of justification look like? It shares the properties of demonstration and proof: On the one hand, deduction (Deduktion) has its source in direct knowledge (unmittelbare Erkenntnis), namely in “the di-rect knowledge of the pure reason (reine Vernunft)”50; on the other hand, this knowledge comes to us only through the mediation of reflexion (this is how it differs from demonstration).

How is the acquisition of such direct knowledge possible? “Wir müs-“Wir müs-sen daher den Besitzstand dieser unmittelbaren Erkenntnis der reinen Ver-nunft selbst erst zum Gegenstande einer wissenschaftlichen Untersuchung machen.”51 That scientific investigation must be a special kind of psycholo-gy: “Die Deduktion der metaphysischen Grundsätze ist also ein Geschäft der Psychologie.”52

Nelson provides only sketchy details on how this new science should func-tion. Instead, he tackles a different problem, namely the epistemological sta-tus of deductive justifications. He needs to do so, since it seemed that the generalisations of psychology were unable to safeguard the epistemological status of metaphysical principles:

Obwohl also die Kritik die metaphysischen Prinzipien aus einer Theorie der Vernunft deduziert, welche selbst durch innere Erfahrung, mithin nur induk-

48 Ibid., p. 23.49 Ibid., p. 26.50 Ibid., p. 23.51 Ibid., pp. 27–28.52 Ibid., p. 28.

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torisch gewonnen werden kann, so werden doch die metaphysischen Prinzi-pien ihrer Gültigkeit nach nicht aus Erfahrung oder Induktion gegründet.53

Here is where the Selbstvertrauen der Vernunft enters the equation:

Dies Selbstvertrauen der Vernunft ist das allgemeine Prinzip, das die psycholo-gischen Ableitungen aus der Theorie der Vernunft zur kritischen Deduktionen macht, d. h. das es uns ermöglicht, in der inneren Erfahrung einen Leitfaden für die systematische Begründung der Philosophie zu finden.54

It does so, according to Nelson, by providing the missing logical link be-tween the inductive generalisations of psychology and the presumed high epistemological status of the principles:

Denn [der Grundsatz des Selbstvertrauens der Vernunft] enthält die Legitima-tion aller Sätze, die ihren Ursprung in der reinen Vernunft und mithin sich selbst als metaphysische Grundsätze erweisen können. Welche Sätze aber aus reiner Vernunft entspringen, darüber vermag er nichts auszusagen. Er figuriert also nur als Obersatz in der logischen Form der Deduktion. Ihre Untersätze müssen wir uns auf anderen Wegen versichern.55

Technically speaking, therefore, the Selbstvertrauen der Vernunft is a major premise, and all other “metaphysical” principles are its consequences. Thus Nelson’s theory differs considerably from Lotze’s use of the Selbstvertrauen der Vernunft: For Lotze the Selbstvertrauen der Vernunft is an antidote to scepti-cism, but, at the same time, it is a warning sign to avoid the “pet occupation of our time, the construction […] of a theory of knowledge in general in order to base philosophy upon it afterwards.”56 However, this “pet occupation” is apparently exactly what Nelson intends.

7. Nelson’s Critique of Husserl’s Critique of Psychologism

Nelson then employs his detailed theory of psychological justification in order to accuse Husserl of the same charge as he did with Frege: he charges them with mistaking deduction for proof, thereby falsely assuming that a psy-chological foundation of logic would lead to inevitable circulus vitiosus.

Husserl rejects the psychological founding of logic, says Nelson. Hus-serl’s reason for doing so is, according to Nelson, the irreconcilable difference

53 Ibid., p. 31.54 Ibid., pp. 31–32.55 Ibid., p. 33.56 H. Lotze, “Philosophy in the Last Forty Years,” art. cit., p. 469.

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between the empirical judgements of psychology and the apodictical judge-ments of logic. Nelson believes that Husserl’s argument is flawed. His critique of Husserl is worth a detailed look:

Aber dieses Argument träfe nur den, der die logischen Sätze aus psychologi-schen beweisen wollte; denn allerdings würde ein solcher Beweisversuch, da er die psychologischen Sätze als Gründe der logischen in Anspruch nehmen müßte, an der modalischen Ungleichartigkeit der angeblichen Prämissen und Schlußsätze scheitern. Damit ist jedoch die Möglichkeit einer psychologi-schen Begründung der logischen Grundsätze noch keineswegs ausgeschlossen. [...] Wohl aber gibt es eine kritische Deduktion der logischen Grundsätze, und diese ist, da sie den Grund der zu begründenden Sätze nicht enthält, sehr wohl auf psychologischem Wege möglich.57

Let us take a closer look on this argument! Indeed, the reference to the “modal difference” (to use Nelson’s terminology) between psychological and logical judgements is part of Husserl’s reductio ad absurdum argumentation against psychologism in the Fourth Chapter of the Prolgemena. For the sake of simplicity, let us disregard that the reductio ad absurdum argumentation is only a part of Husserl’s broader strategy against psychologism, and that Husserl’s distinction between psychological and logical judgements is more sophisticated than Nelson’s aforementioned “modal difference”.58 Even after such simplifications, Nelson’s argument turns out to be problematic.

Nelson’s argument against Husserl is flawed because Nelson confuses the “modal difference” of psychological and logical judgements with the act of making psychological laws function as premises of logical laws:

Husserl’s argumentation in the Fourth Chapter of the Prolegomena fol-lowed the pattern of reductio ad absurdum: (1) If logical laws were psycho-logical laws, logical laws would carry the properties of psychological laws. (2) However, psychological laws have properties that are incompatible with the properties of logical laws. (3) Therefore logical laws are not psychological laws.

But Nelson constructs the antipsychologistic argumentation as an argu-ment against the use of psychological laws as premises of logical laws. His an-His an-tipsychologist says: “allerdings würde ein solcher [psychologistische] Beweis-versuch, da er die psychologischen Sätze als Gründe der logischen in Anspruch nehmen müßte, an der modalischen Ungleichartigkeit der angeblichen Prä-missen und Schlußsätze scheitern.” This reformulation is even more visible from what he imputes to Frege in the quote seen above: “Frege sieht offenbar in dem Versuch einer psychologischen Begründung der Logik einen Zirkel.”

57 L. Nelson, “Über das sogennante Erkenntnisproblem,” art. cit., p. 170.58 According to Husserl the laws of psychology differ from logical laws, because they are (1) of inexact nature (i.e. they govern associations), (2) they are justified by induction, and (3) they imply the existence of real things. Nelson’s definition of the “modal difference” claims only that “[daß] die Sätze der Psychologie empirische sind, die der Logik aber apodiktisch.” (Ibid., 169)

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Nelson’s antipsychologist claims that such psychologistic attempt fails (1) because the premises and the conclusions are “modally different,” and (2) a fortiori because they are circular. I will call this form of argument the “premise-argument” (the “premise-argument” is therefore an antipsychologist argument).

Against his own antipsychologism, Nelson can simply answer then that he is not using psychological laws as premises for logical laws (because he does demonstration instead of proof, i.e. he uses the major premise of the Selbst-vertrauen der Vernunft).

The only problem is that Husserl does not claim that the psychologicist uses psychological laws as premises of logical laws. What he claims is only that the psychologicist treats logical laws as if they were psychological laws, and he constructs his arguments against that usage. Thus Nelson’s anti-antipsycholo-gistic argument remains ineffective against Husserl.

8. A Sophistication in Husserl’s Critique and its Background

What is even more interesting is that Husserl explicitly condemns the use of this “premise-argument” as an antipsychologist argument:

Nicht besser glückt es dem folgenden und oft wiederholten Argument, die psychologistische Partei ins Schwanken zu bringen: Die Logik, sagt man, kann auf der Psychologie ebensowenig ruhen, wie auf anderen Wissenschaft; denn eine jede ist Wissenschaft nur durch Harmonie mit den Regeln der Logik, sie setzt die Gültigkeit dieser Regeln schon voraus. Es wäre darnach ein Zirkel, Logik allererst auf Psychologie gründen zu wollen.59

Husserl refutes this argument by pointing out that, on the first hand, it is too strong since it would render logic itself impossible: “Da die Logik als Wis-senschaft selbst logisch verfahren muß, so verfiele sie ja demselben Zirkel; die Triftigkeit der Regeln, die sie voraussetzt, müßte sie zugleich begründen.”60 On the other hand, Husserl remarks, the supposed antipsychologist argument rests on an ambiguity of the word “presupposition:”

Aber sehen wir näher zu, worin der urgierte Zirkel eigentlich bestehen soll. Dar-in, daß die Psychologie die logische Gesetze als gültig voraussetze? Aber man achte auf die Äquivokation im Begriff der Voraussetzung. Eine Wissenschaft setzt die Gültigkeit gewisser Regeln voraus, das kann heißen: sie sind Prämissen für ihre Begründungen; es kann aber auch heißen: sie sind Regeln, denen gemäß die Wissenschaft verfahren muß […]. Beides wirft das Argument zusammen;

59 Hua XVIII, p. 69.60 Ibid.

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nach logischen Regeln schließen und aus ihnen schließen gilt ihm als dasselbe; denn nur, wenn aus ihnen geschlossen würde, bestände der Zirkel.61

It is easily possible, adds Husserl, that a science follows certain rules wi-thout using them as premises: “Aber wie so mancher Künstler schöne Werke schafft, ohne von Ästhetik das Geringste zu wissen, so kann ein Forscher Be-weise aufbauen, ohne je auf die Logik zu rekurrieren.”62

The circumstance that Husserl has engaged himself to refute a superfi-cial antipsychologist argument was part of the style that, as M. Kusch has remarked63, must have helped Husserl’s work to gain academic recognition: Husserl takes his opponents seriously and sometime he even praises them. However, this particular argument could also be very telling for the purpose of the present essay.

The fact that this debate was important for Husserl is clearly indicated by the disproportionately huge number of references he annexes in a footnote.64 If we look into Husserl’s sources, it turns out that Husserl mainly followed the presentation by Carl Stumpf, his teacher and mentor. In a lecture delivered to the Bavarian Academy of Sciences in 189165, Stumpf provides a stepwise expository overview of the arguments in the contemporary psychologism-de-bate. At the beginning, he presents the psychologicist’s position, and then he introduces an initial antipsychologistic argument:

Der […] Argumentation des Psychologisten […] hält der Kriticist entgegen, dass psychologische Forschung uns wol zu gewissen Thatsachen des inneren Lebens […] führen könne, niemals aber zur Erkenntnis allgemeiner und not-wendiger Wahrheiten. Am wenigstens solcher, die auch objectiv gelten sollen, etwa der geometrischen Grundsätze oder des Causalgesetz. Das letztere liege gerade umgekehrt auch aller psychologischen Forschung schon zu Grunde.66

Stumpf then proceeds with the exposition of a counter-argument, which sounds familiar to the readers of the Prolegomena:

61 Hua XVIII, pp. 69–70 (text-variant of the first edition).62 Hua XVIII, p. 70.63 See M. Kusch, Psychologism..., op. cit., p. 203.64 See Hua XVIII, n. 2 to p. 69. Although Husserl makes many references to the contemporary philosophical literature in the Prolegomena, his references are mostly confined to one (or few) author(s) per occasion. Here he not only refers to four authors, but he also enumerates authors on both sides of the debate. Comparably rich footnotes are relatively rare in the Prolegomena (cf. n. 2 to p. 67, n. to pp. 151–152, n. 2 to p. 160, and n. 2 to p. 172, which also shares one reference with the aforementioned footnote).65 C. Stumpf, “Psychologie und Erkenntnistheorie,” Abhandlungen der philosophisch-philolo-gischen Classe der königlich Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften Band 19 Abteilung II (1891), pp. 465–516.66 Ibid., p. 469.

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Zu Erkenntnissen, antwortet [der Psychologist], kann man gelangen ohne Er-kenntnistheorie, ebenso wie man essen und spaziergehen kann ohne Physio-logie. […] Eine Erkenntnis kann nicht blos wahr, sie kann dem Erkennenden bis in ihre letzten Gründe völlig evident sein, ohne er sich eine Theorie dieser Evidenz gebildet hätte.67

This is, I think, the probable source of Husserl’s refutation of the sup-posed antipsychologist argument. The rest of Stumpf ’s essay is filled with the investigation of the Neokantian arguments, their conceptual apparatus and Kant-interpretations. Husserl is reluctant to follow Stumpf on his Kantian path: although he includes references to P. Natorp and to B. Erdmann, the sphere of subjectivity is absent from the Prolegomena until the notion of the “ideal subjective conditions of a theory in general,” or of “noetic conditions” is introduced in the chapter on scepticism.68

Instead, Husserl involves Lotze, who is not present in Stumpf ’s exposi-tion of the debate. Husserl’s reference to Lotze in the same footnote is also worth looking at: It refers to the “Apriorismus und Empirismus” Chapter of the Third Book of the Logic. In the referenced paragraph (§ 332), Lotze admits that the investigation of the “conditions which govern the thoughts as psychical processes” is important, but he denies that this investigation could contribute to philosophical understanding:

Aber wenn wir nun alles wüßten, was wir hierüber zu wissen wünschen kön-nen, so würde es doch eine Täuschung sein, wenn wir darum besser über die Wahrheit unserer logischen Grundsätze urtheilen zu können glaubten; wäre doch ihre Gültigkeit vielmehr die Voraussetzung für die Möglichkeit der Un-tersuchung gewesen, durch die wir diese ihre psychologische Entstehungsge-schichte zu Stande gebracht hätten.69

Husserl is right classifying Lotze’s position as “premise-argument.” But Lotze then adds: “Diesen Zirkel, der uns so oft schon ermüdet hat, will ich hier zum letzten Male erwähnt haben.”70 It seems therefore that Lotze’s antip-It seems therefore that Lotze’s antip-sychologistic position stems from the same circularity as his Selbstvertrauen der Vernunft. More precisely, Lotze has developed the notion of the Selbstver-trauen der Vernunft in order to address the problem raised by self-referential circularities, which is present both in the “absolute scepticism” and in the foundational epistemologies, furthermore, as we can see now, in the psy-chologistic arguments as well. (In fact, the foundational epistemologies and the psychologistic arguments are closely connected, as the psychologism is a kind of epistemological foundational attempt.) Lotze then cuts this circle

67 Ibid.68 Hua XVIII, p. 119sqq. (see also p. 241sqq.).69 H. Lotze, System der Philosophie. Erster Teil. Logik..., op. cit., p. 531.70 Ibid.

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by appealing to the Selbstvertrauen der Vernunft: there is no need to engage ourselves in circular enterprises. Instead, we should rely on the Selbstvertrauen der Vernunft when constructing alternative theories: Thus Lotze rejects both epistemological “pet occupations” and psychologism.

Let us summarise our observations so far! (1) Husserl rejects the “premise-argument,” i.e. he rejects the claim that a psychological foundation of logic would make psychological laws premises of logical laws. (2) This is consistent with Husserl’s taking side against Lotze’s Selbstvertrauen der Vernunft, as Lotze perceives the “premise-argument” as a case for his Selbstvertrauen der Vernunft. (3) Moreover, by rejecting the “premise-argument,” Husserl gives room to a psychological theory of logic that does not reduce logic to psychology. This is of course nothing new for the readers of Husserl, especially for those who have paid attention to the infamous Third Addendum of the Introduction to the Investigations. However, for Nelson, it means that he and Husserl are basically on the same side. If it is so, then Nelson must have serious difficulties with interpreting the Investigations.

9. Nelson on the Investigations

Nelson’s difficulties with Husserl’s Investigations are indeed enormous. It seems to him that Husserl has reverted his position71 between the publication of the Prolegomena in 1900 and the publication of the Investigations in 1901: “Warum—so muß man nach den erwähnten ‘antipsychologistischen’ Darle-gungen fragen—warum ist es nicht ‘Psychologismus’, wenn Husserl selbst im zweiten Bande seiner Logischen Untersuchungen eine ‘Phänomenologie der Denk- und Erkenntniserlebnisse’ […] in Anspruch nimmt?”72

But if Husserl has reverted his position (or, rather, Husserl always main-tained his “second” position that has surprised Nelson so much), then Husserl is essentially on the same side as Nelson. Thus Nelson has to specify, exactly how his “psychological deduction” differs from Husserl’s “phenomenological elucidation of the knowledge” (as Husserl calls his project in the subtitle of the Sixth Investigation).

Nelson is not far removed from recognising this affinity. He recognises that Husserl’s phenomenological enterprise comes down to psychological descrip-tions, just as his deduction does (although he erroneously identifies Husserl’s descriptions with plain inner perceptions): “Woher also erhalten wir die Sätze

71 Given that it was a widespread contemporary misunderstanding, it is regrettable that Hus-serl’s Draft of a Preface for the Second Edition has never appeared in Husserl’s lifetime (it was first published only in 1939 by Eugen Fink, in an artificially edited form). Relevant is especially Hua XX/1 p. 279. 72 L. Nelson, “Über das sogennante Erkenntnisproblem,” art. cit., p. 171.

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der Phänomenologie, wenn nicht aus der Selbstbeobachtung oder der inneren Wahrnehmung?”73

But Nelson is promptly led away from this recognition. Instead, he falls into the trap of another common misunderstanding that suppresses this affin-ity and allows him criticise Husserl easily: he identifies Husserl’s categorical intuitions with “intellektuelle Anschauung.”74 It is a particularly “fortunate” misunderstanding for Nelson, since it lets him transform Husserl to a “decent” antipsychologist philosopher along the following lines: If the phenomenologi-cal elucidation of logical laws leads to inner perceptions and these perceptions are of purely intellectual nature, than the logical laws ultimately rest on some-thing logical. Thereby Nelson’s Husserl could avoid the “modal difference” of the premise and the conclusion (since both are of logical nature).

However, Nelson is ultimately aware of the fact that Husserl is not taking the way he wants Husserl to follow: “Aber uns ist keine Stelle begegnet, an der [Husserl] eine solche intellektuelle Anschauung für die phänomenologische […] Erkenntnis in Anspruch nimmt.”75

If so, then Nelson has to admit the affinity between his and Husserl’s en-terprise:

Was Husserl von der psychologischen Kritik noch trennt, ist lediglich der Um-stand, daß bei ihm der Begriff der Deduktion fehlt und daß ihm infolgedessen in Ermangelung einer dem Beweise koordinierten Begründungsmethode die bloße Berufung auf die innere Wahrnehmung übrigbleibt.76

This recognition gives occasion for Nelson to a very fruitful comparison between his and Husserl’s enterprise (albeit Nelson is further haunted by triv-ial misunderstandings at every step of his investigation).

As we have seen above, Nelson claims that his deduction is a reflexive pro-cess. Unfortunately, Nelson encounters Husserl’s aforementioned Third Ad-dendum, and interprets it as if it would imply that Husserl’s phenomenology is an entirely “theory-less” enterprise.

Of course, Husserl is not championing a “theory-less” description (al-though he joins the contemporary condemnation of fruitless metaphsysical speculations). It is very appropriate, I think, to remind ourselves about this fact by quoting one of Husserl’s favourite citations: the closing sentence of Lotze’s Logic:

Aber im Angesicht der allgemeinen Vergötterung, die man jetzt der Erfahrung […] erweist, […] will ich wenigstens mit dem Bekenntniß, daß ich eben jene vielgeschmähte Form der speculativen Anschauung für das höchste und nicht

73 Ibid., p. 172.74 Ibid., p. 173.75 Ibid.76 Ibid., p. 173.

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schlechthin unerreichbare Ziel der Wissenschaft halte, und mit der Hoffnung schließen, daß […] sich doch die deutsche Philosophie zu dem Versuche im-mer wiedererheben werde, den Weltlauf zu verstehen und ihn nicht bloß zu berechnen.77

No matter how remote Nelson’s charge of “theory-less description” is, he goes on to chastise Husserl for the “Einschränkung der Kritik auf bloße Deskription”78; but in doing so he also says something very noteworthy:

[…] ob eine solche Einschränkung überhaupt durchführbar ist, ob nicht viel-mehr jeder Satz der Phänomenologie bereits eine Anwendung der zu ‘fun-dierenden’ Gesetzte auf das bloße Material der inneren Wahrnehmung ein-schließt, und dies um so mehr, wenn die Phänomenologie nicht nur eine ‘Be-trachtung’, sondern auch eine ‘Analyse’, ‘Vergleichung’ und ‘Unterscheidung’ der Erkenntnisakte enthalten soll.79

Nelson is, I think, gravely mistaken when he excludes the “analysis,” “com-parison” and “distinction” of knowledge acts from the domain of phenom-enology (as any superficial glance into the actual content of the Investigations suffices to prove that). However, he has also a profound remark coupled to this misunderstanding, namely that “every sentence of the phenomenology already consist of an application of the laws that are supposed to be justified.”

This is a very clear articulation of the self-referential character of the phe-nomenological enterprise. As we have seen, Husserl has also arrived at such recognition immediately in the text of the 1906/07 lecture. This is an inter-esting observation, since it implies that Nelson’s theory could have contributed to a methodological problem that Husserl himself faced, had Nelson and Husserl overcome the mutual misunderstandings that separated them.

Unfortunatley, the rest of Nelson’s argument only demonstrate the seduc-ing force of a comfortable misunderstanding. Nelson returns to his conviction that Husserl’s phenomenology essentially reduces philosophical knowledge to knowledge based on immediate intuition, which is a very convenient position for Nelson, as it allows him to quickly dismiss Husserl’s phenomenology as ir-relevant to his purposes: “Man sieht ohne weiteres, daß dem in diesen Sätzen ausgesprochene Schlusse die stillschweigende Voraussetzung zugrunde liegt, alle unmittelbare Erkenntnis sei Anschauung.”80 Such identification would—since the alternative of an intellectual intuition is excluded—destroy philoso-phy very quickly. In the closing parts of his critique, Nelson charges Husserl’s phenomenology exactly with doing such destructive transformation:

77 H. Lotze, System der Philosophie. Erster Teil. Logik..., op. cit., p. 597. Cf. e.g Hua XVIII, p. 19 and E. Husserl, Einleitung in die Philosophie. Vorlesungen 1922/23, ed. E. Goossens, Husserliana (Hua) vol. XXXV, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2003, pp. 298 and 646.78 L. Nelson, “Über das sogennante Erkenntnisproblem,” art. cit., p. 174.79 Ibid., p. 174.80 Ibid., p. 177.

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[Husserls Phänomenologie] setzt […] notwendig die Anschaulichkeit (in dem von uns definierten Sinne) der philosophischen Erkenntnis voraus. Diese Vor-aussetzung hat aber nicht nur die Entbehrlichkeit eines theoretischen Verfah-rens der Kritik zur Folge, sondern muß in ihrer Konsequenz jegliche Kritik der Vernunft überhaupt illusorisch machen und auf einen uneingeschränkten Dogmatismus zurückführen.81

10. Husserl’s Seemingly Non-Philosophical Reply and What it Could Teach to us

As Husserl and Nelson were active at the same university at the same time, it is virtually impossible that Husserl would not know about Nelson’s critique. Yet, at the first glance, it could seem that Husserl has never responded to that challenge.

The largest extant text by Husserl that deals with Nelson is, as far as I know, Husserl’s advisory opinion from 1909 on Nelson’s second request for venia legendi at the University of Göttingen.82 Even the occasion for writing this advisory opinion was external to philosophy: Nelson was not only a de-voted propagator of the philosophy of Fries, but he was also committed to the issue of social reforms, and he took every occasion, including the academic lectures, to disseminate his political views. The university administration, alarmed by Nelson’s political engagements, has submitted Nelson’s request for venia legendi to unusual scrutiny, and Husserl, who was then an already established member of the faculty, was asked to prepare an advisory opinion.

Husserl’s advisory opinion is apparently non-philosophical. Although he aims to “evaluate the scientific activities of the candidate”83, he avoids any philosophical confrontation, his critical remarks are mainly formal, some-times coloured by a fatherly tone (Husserl was then already 50 years old, i.e. 23 years older than Nelson).

Husserl acknowledges Nelson’s already voluminous literary output, and he involves Nelson’s Über das sogennante Erkenntnisproblem, whose critique of Husserl I have presented above (Husserl does not reflect on the critique by Nelson). Husserl also acknowledges Nelson’s acquaintance with both the “Kant-Frisean philosophy”84 and the modern mathematical sciences.

81 Ibid., p. 178.82 E. Husserl, Briefwechsel. Institutionelle Schreiben, ed. E. Schuhmann & K. Schuhmann, Hus-serliana Dokumente (Hua Dok) vol. III/8, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1994, pp. 207–210.83 Ibid., p. 207.84 Ibid., p. 209.

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But Husserl also sees a certain inadequacy of Nelson, which, he suspects, is a consequence of Nelson’s hasty attachment to Fries:

Mit der allzufrühen u[nd] leidenschaftlichen Parteinehme für Fries hängt bei N<elson> ein recht empfindlicher Mangel an innerer Fühlung zur zeitgenössi-schen Philosophie, zu den sie innerlich bewegenden Denkmotiven zusammen und, in weiterer Folge, eine bedauerliche Äußerlichkeit seiner formell meister-haften und bestechenden Polemik.85

In the most theoretical of all of his remarks on Nelson, Husserl claims that this formal character of Nelson’s arguments is a genuine philosophical shortcoming:

Allerdings zeigt sich N<elson> bisher nur als ein eminenter ‘logischer Kopf ’, d.h. ausgezeichnet ist er in der formalen Stringenz seiner Beweisführungen, sowie im Aufspüren von Inconsequenzen, Aequivocationen, Widersprüchen auf Seiten der kritisierten Autoren. Seine Schwäche sehe ich in dem, was allen u[nd] im echten Sinne Originalität ausmacht, in der Intuition: es fehlt, bisher wenigstens, der habitus der sich an den Sachen selbst, s<o>z<u>s<agen> in directem Schauen u[nd] Analysieren bethätigenden Forschung. Vielleicht er-klärt sich dieser Mangel aus der einseitig polemischen Bethätigung N<elsons>. Es scheint mir nicht ausgeschlossen, daß er sich noch zu einem in höherem Sinne selbstständigen Denker entwickle.86

Husserl’s remarks could be interpreted—though it is hard to decide whether Husserl himself has meant them so—as an indication that Nelson’s philosophy suffers from the formal character of his psychological results, i.e. the justifications that Nelson’s deduction is supposed to provide are lacking. Although Nelson has built up a sophisticated theory of how the psychological justification of “metaphysical” laws should progress, he has not attempted to work out such justifications. This applies well to the whole oeuvre of Nelson, and no doubt that Husserl has carried more concrete analyses. On the other, one might remark that—if the disagreements stemming from mutual misun-derstandings are disregarded—Husserl’s phenomenology has much to learn from Nelson’s clear-cut presentation of the framework of the problem of the foundation.

11. Conclusions

It was the notion of the Selbstvertrauen der Vernunft that occupied the fo-cal point of the present essay. Although this notion was first introduced by the early 19th century philosopher Jakob Friedrich Fries, a major thinker of

85 Ibid., p. 208.86 Ibid., p. 210.

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the psychologistic Kant-tradition; instead of Fries, two late offsprings of this tradition have been investigated in detail: Hermann Lotze and Leonard Nel-son. Both have used the notion of Selbstvertrauen der Vernunft in a way that is relevant to the problems of scepticism and the foundation of the philosophi-cal knowledge. Both stood close to Husserl: either through Husserl’s readings and studies, or through the contemporary academic environment. Thus the comparison of the corresponding arguments and influences is a legitimate and interesting philological enterprise in itself: Relatively little research is done on Husserl’s epistemological indebtedness to Lotze and Nelson’s debate with Hus-serl is almost unknown87.

However, I think that Husserl’s relation to Lotze and Nelson’s critique of Hus-serl also provides some philosophical lessons on its own. The evaluation of Hus-serl’s vehement (and highly successful) attack on psychologism needs some refinement. Albeit Husserl’s refusal of the reduction of logic to psychology remains firm, there is more affinity between Husserl and the psychologistic foundational attempts, as a superficial glance at Husserl’s polemical rhetoric would suggest.

Had Husserl been the rigid antipsychologist as many readers of his Pro-legomena believed, he would have simply committed himself to the prem-ise argument (thereby exposing himself to Nelson’s counter-arguments). But Husserl was too much a disciple of Lotze and Stumpf, therefore sensitive to epistemological circularities, to do so. On the other hand, the young Husserl was eager to undertake the “pet occupation” of philosophical foundation that the old Lotze forbade. Interestingly, as I tried to demonstrate, it was exactly Husserl’s rejection of both the premise-argument and Lotze’s version of the Selbstvertrauen der Vernunft that put him in a position to try to accommodate the attempt of the psychological foundation of philosophy. In other words, it could be said that even Husserl’s seemingly so simple and clear-cut Prolegom-ena leaves open the possibility of a psychological foundation – excluding, of course, the possibility of a naïve reductive psychologism, which would substi-tute empirical psychological generalisations for logical laws. Finally, Husserl found the foundational theory he sought after in the form of the transcenden-tal phenomenology, which provides a full-fledged theory of the constitutive role of consciousness.

Furthermore, the notion of the Selbstvertrauen der Vernunft contin-ued to play a prominent role in an exchange between Husserl and Leonard Nelson, a student, later a faculty member in Göttingen. It is the (typical) irony of history that—due to the contingent circumstances and mutual

87 The research on Leonard Nelson’s philosophy and his relationship to Husserl is mainly con-fined to the point of view of the history and philosophy of mathematics (especially by Volker Peckhaus, see e.g. Volker Peckhaus, Hilbertprogramm und Kritische Philosophie. Das Göttinger Modell interdisziplinärer Zusammenarbeit zwischen Mathematik und Philosophie, Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1990, p. 123sqq.); and the full exploration of Nelson’s philosophi-cal intentions, including his exchange with Husserl, is still a desideratum.

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misunderstandings—both Husserl and Nelson remained ignorant of the real intentions of each other’s works, thereby missing the chance for a fruitful dialogue between two similar forms of foundational attempts. In the eyes of Nelson, Husserl was rigid logical objectivist, who was not only committed to the premise-argument in the Prolegomena, but also relapsed into a naïve form of intuitionism in the Investigations. Husserl – who was, of course, neither a rigid objectivist, nor a naïve intuitionist – has clearly seen that Nelson failed to deliver on the concrete content of his idea of psychological foundation. However, given that both of them were essentially on the same side, Nelson’s earnest attempts to work out the foundational implications of the notion of Selbstvertrauen der Vernunft could have contributed to the methodology of Husserl’s phenomenology. A particular example of the methodological impli-cations that could have been relevant for Husserl’s phenomenology is Nelson’s recognition of the necessary self-referential character (Rückbeziehung) and cir-cularity of any justification – which is exactly the context that first led Husserl to consider the notion of the Selbstvertrauen der Vernunft.

Finally, the results of the investigation permit some general observations on Husserl’s alleged antipsychologistic turn. Husserl himself undoubtedly made ample use of the “turn rhetoric” concerning psychologism. However, I think it is beyond doubt that Husserl’s early philosophy represents an organic devel-opment from descriptive psychology to transcendental phenomenology.88 The claim of a deeper inner unity between Husserl’s descriptive psychology and phenomenology (i.e. before and after his alleged antipsychologistic turn) is, of course, fairly common in modern Husserl scholarship. But I believe that even Husserl’s alleged antipsychologist apex, the Prolegomena is deeply embedded in

88 The stages of this development include Husserl’s renewed interest in descriptive psychological themes around 1893 (after some failed attempts in philosophy of mathematics), the question of intentional objects coming to fore in 1894, the devising (or overtaking) of effective arguments against reductive, foundational psychologism around 1896 (which led to the Prolegomena, ex-cept its last two chapters), the formulating of the basic tenets of the Sixth Investigations’ theory of evidence in the last years of 1890s, the reworking (and partial reprinting) of the Sixth Inves-tigations between Autumn 1900 and March 1901, the clarification of the relationship between descriptive psychology and phenomenology between 1901 and 1903, the repeated attempts at the reduction (which I have briefly explored in Section 2 above), the investigations of noema in the second half of the decade, and finally the presentation of his full-fledged phenomenology (already in lecture courses before the Ideas I). Of course, this is by no means an exhaustive list of Husserl’s agenda and some stages overlap. However, there is a different question, which is, I think, the only legitimate core of Husserl’s al-leged antipsychologistic turn, namely the question whether Husserl had adopted a naïve objectivism (which would exclude any meaningful relationship between the act and its object) at some stages of this development. It could be argued that Husserl did so around 1897. If it is the case, then the last two chapters of the Prolegomena (which were added in the first months of 1897) might manifest this position. In any case, such objectivism would constitute an excursus in Husserl’s philosophy (i.e. it would not apply to the development of his entire later philosophy, as the proponents of Husserl’s “objectivism” usually imply).

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contemporary psychological foundational attempts. To rephrase a famous claim: Husserl cannot distance himself from psychological foundational attempts be-cause he was always close to it.89 It is only that he devised a more sophisticated and richer alternative in the form of the transcendental phenomenology.

Peter Andras Varga Pf 594,

1398, Budapest 62, Hungaryvarga@webmail.phil-inst.hu

.

89 It is worth quoting Husserl’s description of exactly what he is fighting against (which was written only ten weeks (!) after the printing of the Logical Investigation had been finished): “[W]ogegen ich mich wehre, ist die Unterordnung der erkenntniskritischen Aufklärung des Reinlogischen in der Wissenschaft unter die Gesichtspunkte der psychologischen Genesis und der biologischen Anpassung” (Hua Dok III/6 255). Or, as Husserl has summarized 13 years later, reflecting upon the confused contemporary reception of his work, “[N]ur wer sich durch die kritische Auflösung der blendenden Vorurteile des Psychologismus zur Anerkenntnis des reinlogisch Idealen genötigt sieht, [...] nur er kann davon erfüllt sein, dass das ‚Ansichsein’ der idealen Sphäre in seiner Beziehung zum Bewusstsein eine Dimension von Rätseln mit sich führe, welche [...] durch eigene Untersuchungen, und wie der Verfasser meint, durch phäno-menologische gelöst werden müssen.” (Hua XX/1, pp. 278–279)