ps 503 - pro-seminar: approaches to comparative political analysis … · ... pro-seminar:...

PS 503 - PRO-SEMINAR: APPROACHES TO COMPARATIVE POLITICAL ANALYSIS Fall 2014

Professor Kelemen

Time: Monday 9:00-11:40 Hickman Hall, Room 313 Email: [email protected] Office Hours: Center for European Studies, Wednesday 10-12

Course Description and Objectives: This course provides doctoral students with an advanced introduction to the study of comparative politics. The course has two basic objectives: to acquaint students with several key substantive areas of research in the field of comparative politics and to introduce the major theoretical and methodological debates that animate the field. The course will provide students with intellectual tools that will improve their ability to analyze some of the most pressing political problems around the world today. Comparative politics is both a subfield of the discipline of political science and an approach to the study of politics. As a subfield, comparative politics has an incredibly wide scope – with comparativists studying topics as diverse as the origins of the state, democratization, the dynamics of competitive authoritarianism, revolution, economic development, the welfare state, economic and social regulation, collective action, interest group representation, the impact of various democratic institutions on the effectiveness of government, executive-legislative relations, processes of judicialization, elections, parties, party systems, ethnicity, civil war, and the role of ideas in politics (to name but a few) – in countries around the world. As an approach to the study of politics, comparative politics embraces – unsurprisingly – comparison! These comparisons take many forms, some small-N and qualitative, some large-N and quantitative. While there are ongoing methodological debates about the merits and limitations of various approaches, in a broad sense comparativists share a commitment to learning about politics through comparison. As this course is designed to provide graduate students with a baseline knowledge of debates in the subfield, the requirements are different from those that would apply in a research seminar. There is less emphasis on independent research and far more emphasis on extensive reading of foundational and important recent works in the field. Students should go beyond the required readings, and read from the recommended readings as much as possible.

REQUIREMENTS Requirements include: (a) active participation in class discussions (20% of the final grade); (b) five 1000-1200 word reaction papers, based on the required readings for a particular week. These papers should be posted on the course’s website by 5:00 pm on the Sunday before the class meets (30%); (c) and a take-home final examination (50%). Additionally, each member of the seminar will act as discussion facilitator for one class meeting. The facilitator's principal duty is to present commentaries on the weekly readings (10-15 minute presentation) intended to raise questions and offer a critical assessment of the readings. A mere summary of the readings is not appropriate for this purpose.

mailto:[email protected]

Comparative Political Analysis Pro-Seminar/page 2

BOOKS

Required

1. Lichbach, Mark Irving and Alan S. Zuckerman, eds. 2009. Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture and Structure. 2nd Edition. New York: Cambridge University Press. (Note: do NOT use 1st edition!)

2. Parsons, Craig. 2007. How to Map Arguments in Political Science. New York: Oxford University Press. 3. Brady, Henry and David Collier. 2010. Rethinking Social Inquiry, 2nd Edition. Rowman and Littlefield

Highly Recommended 4. Clark, Roberts William, Matt Golder, and Soa Nadenichek Golder. Principles of Comparative Politics. CQ

Press, 2009. 5. Boix, Carles and Susan C. Stokes, The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics. Oxford UP, 2007. 6. Mahoney, James and Dietrich Rueschemeyer, eds., Comparative Historical Analysis and Social Sciences.

Cambridge UP, 2003.

SCHEDULE Session 1 (Sept 8) Introduction Session 2 (Sept 15) Comparison and Causal Inference Session 3 (Sept 22) The State Session 4 (Sept 29) Regime Types: Democracy and Authoritarianism Session 5 (Oct 6) Democratization Session 6 (Oct 13) Rebellion and Revolution Session 7 (Oct 20) Political Economy of Development Session 8 (Oct 27) Political Economy of Advanced Democracies Session 9 (Nov 3) Collective Action, Contentious Politics and Interest Intermediation Session 10 (Nov 10) Executive, Legislative and Judicial Institutions Session 11 (Nov 17) Parties, Party Systems and Elections Session 12 (Nov 24) Ethnicity and Nationalism Session 13 (Dec 1) Culture and Ideas as Causes Session 14 (Dec 8) Mapping the field SESSION 1 (Sept 8) INTRODUCTION SESSION 2 (Sept 15) COMPARISON AND CAUSAL INFERENCE

Questions:

Is comparative politics a method, a sub-field, or something else?

Is a science of comparative politics possible?

What is a cause?

What is causal inference? Required

Mackie, JL. Causes and Conditions. American Philosophical Quarterly 1965

Mill, “Two Methods of Comparison” from A System of Logic


Brady and Collier, Rethinking Social Inquiry, Volume 2, Chapters 1-5, 7.

Mahoney, James, “After KKV: The New Methodology of Qualitative Research,” World Politics 62:1 (January 2010).

Mahoney, James, and Gary Goertz, “A Tale of Two Cultures: Contrasting Quantitative and Qualitative Research,” Political Analysis 14:3 (Summer 2006): 227-249.

Sartori, Giovanni. 1970. Concept Misformation in comparative politics. APSR, LXIV(4):1033-1053.

Slater, Dan and Daniel Ziblatt. 2013. The Enduring Indespensibility of Controlled Comparison. Comparative Political Studies. 46, 10: 1301-1327.

Recommended:

King, Keohane, and Verba, Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994).

Mahoney, James, “Toward a Unified Theory of Causality,” Comparative Political Studies 41:4/5 (April/May 2008): 412-436.

Collier, David, “The Comparative Method,” in Ada W. Finifter, ed., Political Science: The State of the Discipline II (Washington, D.C.: American Political Science Association, 1993), pp.105-19.

George, Alexander L., and Andrew Bennett, “Case Studies and Theory Development,” in George and Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Science (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 2005), pp. 3-36.

Gerring, John, “What Makes a Concept Good?: An Integrated Framework for Understanding Concept Formation in the Social Sciences,” Polity 31:3 (Spring 1999), pp. 357-393.

Goertz, Gary, Social Science Concepts: A User’s Guide (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005)

Coppedge, Michael. Thickening Thin Concepts and Theories: Combining Large N and Small in Comparative Politics. Comparative Politics, 1999

SESSION 3 (Sept 22) THE STATE Questions:

What is the state?

Does it make sense to distinguish between strong and weak states?

What factors explain the formation and ongoing dominance of the state as a form of political organization?

Why did scholars need to ‘bring the state back in’? Where had it gone? Required

Chapter 7 (by Migdal) in Lichbach & Zuckerman.

Chapter 9 (by Spruyt) in Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics

Ertman, Thomas. The Birth of the Leviathan. Cambridge University Press, Chapter 1, 7.

Skocpol, Theda, “Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research,” P. Evans et al, eds. Bringing the State Back In. Cambridge, 1985, pp. 3-37.

Krasner, Steven. 1984. Approaches to the state: alternative conceptions and historical dynamics. Comparative Politics, 16, p.223-246.

Caporaso, James. The European Union and Forms of State: Westphalian, Regulatory or Post-Modern. Journal of Common Market Studies 34(1):29-52.

R. Daniel Kelemen, “European States in Comparative Perspective,” in The Oxford Handbook of Historical Institutionalism, edited by Orfeo Fioretos, Tulia G. Falleti, and Adam Sheingate (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, forthcoming). Chapter 24.


Recommended:

Alesina, Alberto and Enrico Spolaore. 2005. The Size of Nations. MIT Press. (or Alesina and Spolaore. 1997. On the number and size of nations. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112(4) 1027-56.)

Almond, Gabriel A., “The Return to the State,” APSR 82 (September 1988): 853- (including the discussion). Also in Gabriel A. Almond, A Discipline Divided. Schools and Sects in Political Science, 1990, Sage Publications, pp.189-218.

Bartolini, Stefano. 2005. Restructuring Europe. Oxford University Press.

Bourdieu, Pierre, “Rethinking the State: Genesis and Structure of the Bureaucratic Field,” in George Steinmetz, ed., State/Culture. State-Formation after the Cultural Turn. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999, pp. 53-75.

Clark, Roberts William, Matt Golder, and Soa Nadenichek Golder. Principles of Comparative Politics. CQ Press, 2009, Chapter 4, “The Origins of the Modern State,” pp. 91-123.

Davis, Eric, “Introduction,” Memories of State: Political, History and Collective Identity in Modern Iraq. University of California Press, 2005, pp. 1-28.

Fukuyama, Francis. 2011. The Origins of Political Order (Farrar, Strauss, Giroux)

Grzymala-Busse, Anna and Pauline Jones Luong, “Reconceptualizing the State: Lessons from Post-Communism,” Politics and Society, 30, 4 (December) 2002: 529-54.

Herbst, Jeffrey. 1990. War and the State in Africa. International Security 14, pp. 117-39.

Migdal, Joel. “The State in Society,” in Howard J. Wiarda, ed. New Directions in Comparative Politics. Third Edition, 2002, pp. 63-79.

Levi, Margaret, “The State of the Study of the State,” in Helen Milner and Ira Katznelson, eds., The State of the Discipline 3. American Political Science Association, 2004.

Levi, Margaret. 1988. Of Rule and Revenue. Berkeley: UC Press.

Migdal, Joel, “Introduction: Developing a State-in-society Perspective,” in Joel S. Migdal, Atul Kohli, Vivienne Shue, eds., State Power and Social Forces, 1994, Cambridge UP, pp. 1-34.

Mitchell, Timothy, “The Limits of the State: Beyond Statist Approaches and Their Critics,” APSR 85/1 (March) 1991: 77-95 and “Going Beyond the State: Comments on Mitchell,” APSR 86/4, (Dec.1992): 1007-1021.

Nettl, Peter. The State as a Conceptual Variable. World Politics, 20: 559-592

Poggi, Gianfranco, The State: Its Nature, Development, and Prospects. Stanford University Press, 1991.

Scott, James C., Seeing Like A State. How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Failed. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998.

Spruyt, Hendrik, “The Origins, Development, and Possible decline of the Modern State,” Annual Review of Political Science, 5, 2002: 127-49.

Spruyt, Hendrick. The Sovereign State and Its Competitors. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994, chs.1-2, pts. III-IV, pp. 9-33, 151-94.

Strayer, Joseph. 1970. On the Medieval Origins of the Modern State. Princeton University Press.

Tilly, Charles. “Epilogue: Now Where?” Steinmetz, ed., State/Culture. State-Formation after the Cultural Turn. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999, pp. 407-19.

Tilly, Charles. 1975. The Formation of national States in Western Europe. Princeton University Press.

Tilly, Charles. 1990. Coercion, Capital and the European States. Cambridge: Blackwell.

Ziblatt, Daniel. 2004. “Rethinking the Origins of Federalism: Puzzle, Theory and Evidence in Nineteenth Century Europe.” World Politics 57(1):70-98.


SESSION 4 (Sept 29) REGIME TYPES: DEMOCRACY AND AUTHORITARIANISM Questions

How should scholars define democracy?

How can democracy be measured and how can democracies be identified in the real world?

Is it more useful to think of regimes as being on a continuum or as being distinct types?

How should scholars define authoritarianism?

Required

Boix, Carles and Milan Svolik The Foundations of Limited Authoritarian Government: Institutions, Commitment, and Power-Sharing in Dictatorships. The Journal of Politics, 75(2), pp 300-316

Dahl, Robert, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971), chs. 1 (pp. 1-16), 3-7 (pp. 33-123).

Schmitter, Philippe and Terry Karl. 1991. What Democracy Is…and Is not. Journal of Democracy 2(3):75-88.

Collier, David, and Steven Levitsky, “Democracy with Adjectives: Conceptual Innovation in Comparative Research,” World Politics 49:3 (April 1997), pp. 430-51.

Linz, Juan, “Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes,” in Fred Greenstein and Nelson Polsby, eds., Handbook of Political Science, vol. 3 (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Pub. Co., 1975), pp. 187-196, 264-306, 336-350.

Levitsky, Steven and Lucan Way. 2010. Competitive Authoritarianism. Cambridge University Press, Chapter 1-2.

Elkins, Zachary. 2000. Gradations of Democracy? Empirical Tests of Alternative Conceptualizations AJPS 44(2):293-300.

Recommended

Collier, David, ed., The New Authoritarianism in Latin America (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979), chapters 1, 5, 8, 9.

Dahl, Robert, Democracy and Its Critics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989).

Gandhi, Jennifer, and Adam Przeworski, “Authoritarian Institutions and the Survival of Autocrats,” Comparative Political Studies 40:11 (2007): 1279-1301.

Huntington, Samuel P., The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century(Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), chs. 1-3, pp. 3-163.

Magaloni, Beatriz, Voting for Autocracy: Hegemonic Party Survival and its Demise in Mexico. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).

Munck, Gerardo and Jay Verkuilen. 2002. Conceptualizing and Measuring Democracy: Evaluating Alternative Indices. Comparative Political Studies 35:5-34.

O’Donnell, Guillermo, Modernization and Bureaucratic-authoritarianism: Studies in South American Politics (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973), pp. 1-165.

Schumpeter, Joseph. Capitalism, Socialism, & Democracy. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1947 Chpt XXII Sec I pp.269-273

Winters, Jeff. 2011. Oligarchy (Cambridge University Press).

http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayJournal?jid=JOP


SESSION 5 (Oct 6) DEMOCRATIZATION

Questions:

What are the most important factors explaining why non-democratic regimes transition to democracy?

What factors explain the survival of democracy (as opposed to its breakdown)?

Are there ‘preconditions’ for democracy, or can democracy emerge in any background conditions?

Does the level of inequality in a society affect the likelihood of democratization?

Required

Przeworksi, Adam & Fernando Limongi. 1997. “Modernization: Theories and Facts,” World Politics 49: 155-183.

Boix, Carles and Susan C. Stokes, “Endogenous Democratization,” World Politics, 55 (July 2003), pp. 517-49.

Acemoglu, Daron and James A. Robinson, Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2006, pp. 15-87

Haggard, S. and R. Kaufman. 2012. Inequality and Regime Change. APSR, 106, 03, pp.495-516.

Geddes, B. What Causes Democratization? In Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics, 317-339.

Capoccia, Giovanni and Daniel Ziblatt. 2010. “The Historic Turn in Democratization Studies: A New Research Program and Evidence from Europe,” Comparative Political Studies 43(8/9): 931-968

Recommended:

Anderson, Lisa.ed. Transitions to Democracy. Columbia University Press, 1999

Boix, Carles, Democracy and Redistribution. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2003.

Bratton, Michael. and Nicolas Van de Walle, Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime Transitions in Comparative Perspective. Cambridge University Press, 1997.

Capoccia, Giovanni and Daniel Ziblatt, “The Historic Turn in Democratization Studies: A New Research Program and Evidence from Europe,” Comparative Political Studies

Clark, Roberts William, Matt Golder, and Soa Nadenichek Golder. Principles of Comparative Politics. CQ Press, 2009, Chapter 5, “Conceptualizing and Measuring Democracy” and Chapter 6, “The Economic Determinants of Democracy,” pp. 147-205.

Collier, Ruth Berins, Paths Toward Democracy: The Working Class and Elites in Western Europe and South America. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.

Colomer, Joseph. Strategic Transitions. Game Theory and Democratization. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins UP, 2000.

Diamond, Larry, and Marc F. Plattner, eds., The Global Resurgence of Democracy, 2nd ed. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996)

Fish, M. Steven. Islam and Authoritarianism World Politics - Volume 55, Number 1, October 2002, pp. 4-37

Fish, M. Steven. 1997. “The Determinants of Economic Reform in the Post-Communist World,” Eastern European Politics and Societies 12:1, 31-48.

Fish, M. Steven. Mongolia: Democracy Without Prerequisites. Journal of Democracy - Volume 9, Number 3, July 1998, pp. 127-141

Geddes, Barbara, (1999). “What Do We Know about Democratization after Twenty Years?” Annual Review of Political Science 2: 115-144.

Gerschenkron, Alexander, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective: A Book of Essays. Belknap Press of Harvard UP, 1962.


Haggard, Stephan and Robert Kaufman, The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions. Princeton University Press, 1995, pp. 3-44 and 365-79.

Huntington, Samuel, The Third Wave. Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. Norman: Oklahoma University Press, 1991.

Kaufman, Robert. 2009. “The Political Effects of Inequality in Latin America: Some Inconvenient Facts” Comparative Politics, 41(3):359-79.

Kitschelt, Herbert, “Political Regime Change: Structure and Process-Driven Explanations?” [Review essay] American Political Science Review 86:4 (December 1992), 1028-1034

Linz, Juan and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, pp. 3-65.

Lipset, Seymour M, “Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy, APSR, 53, 1959, pp. 69-105.

Lipset, Seymour M, “Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy, APSR, 53, 1959, pp. 69-105.

Luebbert, Gregory M., Liberalism, Fascism, or Social Democracy. New York: Oxford University Press, 1991.

McFaul, Michael, “The Fourth Wave of Democracy and Dictatorship. Noncooperative Transitions in the Postcommunist World,” World Politics 54 (January) 2002, pp. 212-44.

Munck, Geraldo L., “The Regime Question. Theory Building in Democracy Studies,” World Politics 54 (October 2001), pp. 119-44.

Munck, Gerardo L. and Carol Skalnik Leff, “Modes of Transition and Democratization. South America and Eastern Europe in Comparative Perspective,” Comparative Politics, April 1997, pp. 343-362.

O’Donnell, Guillermo and Philippe C. Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule. Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986.

Olson, Paul Baran, “On the Political Economy of Backwardness,” in Charles Wilbur, ed., The Political Economy of Development and Underdevelopment, 1987, pp. 91-102.

Przeworski, Adam, Democracy and Market. Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America, Cambridge University Press, 1991, “Transitions to Democracy,” pp. 51-99.

Przeworski, Adam, Michael E. Alvarez, José Antonio Cheibub and Fernando Limongi, Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World 1950-1990. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2000.

Rueschemeyer, Dietrich, Evelene Huber Stephens, and John D. Stephens, Capitalist Development and Democracy, Chicago, 1992.

Rustow, Dankwart, “Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model,” Comparative Politics, 2 (April 1970), pp. 337-364.

Schmitter, Philippe and Terry Karl. 1994. The Conceptual Travels of Transitoligists and Consolidologists. Slavic Review 53(1).

Schmitter, Philippe. 2000. How to Democratize the European Union…and Why Bother? Rowman and Littlfield.

Stepan, Alfred C. Religion, Democracy, and the "Twin Tolerations" Journal of Democracy - Volume 11, Number 4, October 2000, pp. 37-57

Tilly, Charles, Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2007, pp. 1-24.

Valenzuela, Samuel J., “Democratic Consolidation in Post-Transitional Settings: Notion, Process, and Facilitating Conditions,” in Scott Mainwaring, Guillermo O'Donnell and J.


Samuel Valenzuela, eds., Issues in Democratic Consolidation. The New South American Democracies in Comparative Perspective. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, pp. 57-104.

Wedeen, Lisa, “Concepts and Commitments in the Study of Democracy,” in Ian Shapiro, Rogers M. Smith and Terek E. Masoud, eds. Problems and Methods in the Study of Politics, Cambridge UP, 2004, pp. 274-306.

Weingast, Barry, “The Political Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of Law,”American Political Science Review 91: (2) June 1997, pp. 245-263.

Ziblatt, Daniel, “How did Europe Democratize?” World Politics 58 (January) 2006, pp. 311-38.

SESSION 6 (Oct 13) REBELLION AND REVOLUTION

Questions:

What role do international factors play in revolution?

How do scholars define ‘revolution’? In what ways is the meaning of the concept contested? What problems does this present for scholarship on revolutions?

Have large-N studies of revolutions yielded generalizable findings about the causes of revolutions? Required

Skocpol, Theda, States and Social Revolutions. Cambridge, 1981, pp. 3-43.

James Scott, The Moral Economy of the Peasant: Rebellion and Subsistence in Southeast Asia. Yale University Press, 1976, pp.1-90

Samuel Popkin, The Rational Peasant: The Political Economy of Rural Society in Vietnam. University of California Press, 1979, pp.1-132

Kuran, Timur.1991. Now Out of Never: The Element of Surprise in the East European Revolution of 1989. World Politics 44(1):7-48.

Goldstone, Jack. 2003. Comparative Historical Analysis and Knowledge Accumulation in the Study of Revolutions. In James Mahoney and Dietrich Reuschemeyer, eds., Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Scienes. Cambridge University Press,pp.41-90

Recommended:

Goldstone, Jack. Revolution and Rebellion in the Early Modern World. University of California Press, 1991.

Gurr, Ted. Why Men Rebel. Princeton University Press, 1970.

Hunt, Lynn, Politics, Culture, and Class in the French Revolution. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984, 1-51, 123-179.

Paige, Jeffery, Agrarian Revolution. Free Press, 1975.

Scott, James, Weapons of the Weak. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987, pp. 28-47.

Sewell, William H., Jr. 1996. “Historical Events as Transformations of Structures: Inventing Revolution at the Bastille,” Theory and Society 25, 841-881.

Tilly, Charles. The Politics of Collective Violence. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. SESSION 7 (Nov 20) POLITICAL ECONOMY OF DEVELOPMENT

Questions:

What role do political institutions play in underpinning economic development? Can differences in political institutions explain why some nations are rich and others poor?


Why do politicians sometimes pursue policies that undermine economic development?

Required

North, Douglas C., Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 83-104, 107-117.

North, Douglass and Barry Weingast. 1989. Constitutions and Commitment: Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in 17th-Century England. Journal Of Economic History 49: 803-832.

Acemoglu, Daron and James Robinson. 2006. Economic Backwardness in Political Perspective. American Political Science Review 100, 1.

Acemoglu, Daron, and Robinson, James. 2012. Why Nations Fail. Crown Business, selected chapters.

Sachs, Jeffrey. 2012. Government, Geography, and Growth: The True Drivers of Economic Development. Foreign Affairs.

Przeworski, Adam and Fernando Limongi. 1993. Political Regimes and Economic Growth. Journal of Economic Perspectives 7:51-69.

Ginsburg, Tom. 2000. Does Law Matter for Economic Development? Evidence from East Asia. Law & Society Review 34, 3.

Recommended:

Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S. and Robinson, J. 2005. Institutions as a fundamental cause of long-run growth. In Handbook of Economic Growth, Aghion and Durlauf, Eds. Elsevier Publishers.

Barro, Robert, “Inequality and Growth in a Panel of Countries,” Journal of Economic Growth 5 (March 2000), pp. 5-32.

Barro, Robert. 2000. Rule of Law, Democracy and Economic Performance. In Index of Economic Freedom. Washington DC: Heritage Foundation.

Bates, Robert H., ed., Towards a Political Economy of Development: A Rational Choice Perspective (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988)

Bates, Robert H., Markets and States in Tropical Africa: The Political Basis of Agricultural Policies (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981), Chap 1, 2.

Clark, D. 2003. Economic Development and the Rights Hypothesis: The China Problem. 51 The American Journal of Comparative Law 89.

Cooter, Robert. 1997. The Rule of State Law versus the Rule-of-Law State: Economic Analysis of the legal foundations of development. In …

Doucouliagos, Hristos and Mehmet Ali Ulubaşoğlu. 2008. Democracy and Economic Growth: A Meta-Analysis. American Journal of Political Science Volume 52, Issue 1, pages 61–83

Evans, Peter J. Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995, (pp. 3-73).

Gerschenkron, Alexander, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962), pp.5-30.

Glaeser, Edward, Rafael LaPorta, Florencio Lopez de Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer, “Do Institutions Cause Growth?” Journal of Economic Growth 9 (2004): 271-298.

Greif, Avner, Paul Milgrom and Barry Weingast. Coordination, Commitment and Enforcement: The case of the Merchant Guild. Journal of Political Economy 102(4):745.

Haggard, Steph and Robert Kaufman. 1995. The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ajps.2008.52.issue-1/issuetoc


Haggard, Steph and Sylvia Maxfield. 1996. The Political Economy of Financial Internationalization in the Developing World. International Organization 1996, pp.35-68.

Haggard, Steph. 1990 Pathways from the Periphery. Cornell U. Press.

Haggard, Stephan, Pathways from the Periphery: The Politics of Growth in the Newly Industrializing Countries (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990), pp. 23-48.

Johnson, Chalmers, MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925-1975 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1982), pp. 3-34.

McFaul, Michael. 1995. State Power, Institutional Change and the Politics of Privatization in Russia. World Politics 47.

Milgrom, Paul, Douglas North and Barry Weingast. 1990. The Role of Institutions in the Revival of Trade: The Law Merchant, Private Judges and Champagne Fairs. Economics and Politics 2(1):1.

North, Douglass. 1981. Structure and Change in Economic History. New York: W.W. Norton & Co. pp. 3-68.

North, D., Wallis, J.J. and Weingast, B. 2009. Violence and Social Orders. Cambridge University Press.

Olson, Mancur. 1993. Dictatorship, Democracy and Development. APSR 87:3, 567-576.

Olson, Mancur The Rise and Decline of Nations: Economic Growth, Stagflation, and Social Rigidities. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982.

Polanyi, Karl, The Great Transformation. Rinehart & Co., 1944

Przeworski, Adam, and Michael Alvarez, José Antonio Cheibub, and Fernando Limongi, Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950-1990 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp. 142-179.

Przeworski, Adam. 2004. “The Last Instance: Are Institutions the Primary Cause of Economic Development?” European Journal of Sociology 45(2): 165-188.

Przeworski, Adam and Carolina Curvale. 2006. “Does politics explain the economic gap between the United States and Latin America?” In Francis Fukuyama (ed.), La Brecha entre America Latina y los Estados Unidos. Buenos Aires: Fondo de Cultura Economica.

Riker, William and David Weimer. 1995. The Political Economy of Transformation: Liberalization and Property Rights. In Jeffrey S. Banks and Eric Hanushek, eds., Modern Political Economy. Cambridge: Cambridge U. Press.

Rodrik, Dani 1999. Why do More Open Economies Have Bigger Governments? Journal of Political Economy.

Rodrik, Dani, “Understanding Economic Policy Reform,” Journal of Economic Literature 34 (March 1996): 9-41.

Rodrik, Dani, Arvind Subramanian, and Francesco Trebbi, “Institutions Rule: The Primacy of Institutions Over Geography and Integration in Economic Development” Journal of Economic Growth 9 (2004), pp. 131-158.

van de Walle, Nick, African Economies and the Politics of Permanent Crisis, 1979-1999, Cambridge University Press, 2001.

Weingast, Barry. 1997. The Political Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of Law. APSR 91: 245-63.

Zysman, John. 1994. How Institutions Create Historically Rooted Trajectories of Growth," Industrial and Corporate Change.

SESSION 8 (Oct 27) POLITICAL ECONOMY OF ADVANCED DEMOCRACIES

http://politics.as.nyu.edu/docs/IO/2800/archives_2004.pdf

http://politics.as.nyu.edu/docs/IO/2800/archives_2004.pdf

http://politics.as.nyu.edu/docs/IO/2800/ba_gap.pdf

http://politics.as.nyu.edu/docs/IO/2800/ba_gap.pdf


Questions:

What factors explain differences in the scale of (and the approach to) redistribution in various advanced economies?

How do ‘generous’ welfare states compete in a global economy?

How do liberal market economies differ from social market economies?

What impact do political institutions have on the degree of distribution in a democracy? Required:

Hall, Peter A., and David Soskice, Varieties of Capitalism (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001), “Introduction.”

Lichbach and Zuckerman, Chapter 13 by Rodden

Lichbach and Zuckerman, Chapter 14 by Mares

Lichbach and Zuckerman, Chapter 8 by Blyth

Iverson, T. and T.R. Cusack, The causes of welfare state expansion: deindustrialization or globalization?

Swank, D. Globalisation, domestic politics, and welfare state retrenchment in capitalist democracies, Social Policy and Society, 2005

Recommended:

Calmfors, Lars and John Driffill "Bargaining Structure, Corporatism and Macroeconomic Performance, "Economic Policy 6 1988. 13-61.

Cameron, David. 1984. Social Democracy, Corporatism, Labor Quiescence and the Representation of Economic Interest in advanced capitalist Society. In J. Goldthorpe, Order and Conflict in Contemporary Capitalism. New York: Oxford U. Press.

Culpepper, Pepper. 2005.“Institutional Change in Contemporary Capitalism: Coordinated Financial Systems since 1990,” World Politics 57: 173-99.

Esping-Andersen, Gøsta, Politics Against Markets: The Social Democratic Road to Power (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985).

Esping-Andersen, Gosta. 1993. The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism. Princeton: Princeton U. Press., Selections, TBA.

Gourevitch, Peter, Politics in Hard Times: Comparative Responses to International Economic Crises (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 1986).

Hall, Peter. 1986. Governing the Economy. Oxford: Oxford U. Press.

Iversen, Torben. 1999. Contested Economic Institutions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Iversen, Torben, and Anne Wren, “Equality, Employment, and Budgetary Restraint: The Trilemma of the Service Economy,” World Politics, 50, 1998, pp. 507-46.

Katzenstein, Peter, ed., Between Power and Plenty: Foreign Economic Policies of Advanced Industrial States (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1978).

Katzenstein, Peter. 1985. Small States in World Markets. Ithaca: Cornell U. Press, pp. 17-79.

Kenworthy, L. and J. Pontusson. 2005. Rising Inequality and the Politics of Redistribution in affluent countries. Perspectives On Politics. 3(3).

Lange, Peter and Geoffrey Garrett. 1985. The Politics of Growth: Strategic Interaction and Economic Performance, 1974-1980. Journal of Politics 47: 792-82.

Lars Calmfors and John Driffill, "Bargaining Structure, Corporatism and Macroeconomic Performance," Economic Policy 6 (1988), 13-61.

http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0043887100016567

http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0043887100016567

http://journals.cambridge.org/production/action/cjoGetFulltext?fulltextid=293077

http://journals.cambridge.org/production/action/cjoGetFulltext?fulltextid=293077

http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~iversen/PDFfiles/Calmfors&Driffill1988.pdf

http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~iversen/PDFfiles/Calmfors&Driffill1988.pdf


Martin Rhodes, “The Political Economy of Social Pacts: ‘Competitive Corporatism and European Welfare Reform” in Paul Pierson, ed., The New Politics of the Welfare State. New York: Oxford University Press: 165-94.

Peter Hall and Daniel Gingerich. Varieties of Capitalism and Institutional Complementarities in the Macroeconomy: An Empirical Analysis. MPIfG Discussion Paper 04/5 Available at: http://www.mpi-fg-koeln.mpg.de/pu/mpifg_dp/dp04-5.pdf

Pierson, Paul, “The New Politics of the Welfare State,” World Politics, 48, 1996, pp. 143-79.

Przeworski, Adam, Capitalism and Social Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985).

Rueda, David and Jonas Pontusson. 2000. Wage Inequality and Varieties of Capitalism World Politics - Volume 52, Number 3, pp. 350-383

Scharpf, Fritz. 1991. Crisis and Choice in European Social Democracy. Cornell U. Press.

Swank, Global Capital, Political Institutions and Policy Change in Developed Welfare States (CUP 2002).

Williamson, Oliver, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism (New York: Free Press, 1985).

Zysman, John, Governments, Markets and Growth: Financial Systems and the Politics of Industrial Change (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983).

On the welfare state:

Cameron. 1978. The Expansion of the Public Economy: A comparative Analysis. APSR 72, 1243-61.

Esping-Andersen and Korpi. 1984. Social Policy as Class Politics in Post-War Capitalism. In John Goldthorpe, Order and Conflict in Contemporary Capitalism. New York: Oxford U. Press.

Heclo, Hugh, Modern Social Politics in Britain and Sweden: From Relief to Income Maintenance (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974).

Hicks, Alexander, and Duane Swank, “Politics, Institutions and Welfare Spending in the Industrialized Democracies, 1960-1982,” American Political Science Review, 86, no. 3 (September 1992), pp. 658-675.

Iversen, Torben, and David Soskice, “Electoral Institutions and the Politics of Coalitions: Why Some Democracies Redistribute More Than Others,” American Political Science Review 100:2 (2006): 165-181.

Iversen, Torben, and John D. Stephens, “Partisan Politics, the Welfare State, and Three Worlds of Human Capital Formation,” Comparative Political Studies 20:10 (2008): 1-37.

Jacobs, Alan. 2012. Governing for the Long Term: Democracy and the Politics of Investment. (Cambridge University Press)

Mares, Isabela. The Politics of Social Risk: Business and welfare State Development. Cambridge University Press

Mares, Isabela. 2006. Taxation, Wage Bargaining and Unemployment. Cambridge University Press

Pierson, Paul. 1994. Dismantling the Welfare State: Reagan, Thatcher and the Politics of Retrenchment. Cambridge, England ; New York : Cambridge University Press.

Pierson, Paul. 1996. The New Politics of the Welfare State. World Politics 48(1).

Przewroski, Adam and Michael Wallerstein. 1982. The Structure of Class Conflict in Democratic Captialist Societies. APSR 72.

Rueda, David. 2005. Insider-Outsider Politics in Industrialized democracies. American Political Science Review 99:61-74.

http://www.mpi-fg-koeln.mpg.de/pu/mpifg_dp/dp04-5.pdf


Globalization and National Institutions

Berger, Suzanne and Ronald Dore, eds. 1996. National Diversity and Global Capitalism. Ithaca: Cornell U. Press.

Garrett, Geoffrey. "Global Markets and National Politics: Collision Course or Virtuous Circle?" International Organization Fall 1998, pps. 787-824.

Garrett, Geoffrey. 1999. Partisan Politics in the Global Economy. New York: Cambridge U. Press. Chapters 2 and 6.

Garrett, Geoffrey. Globalization and Government Spending Around the World. Studies in Comparative International Development 35(4):3-29.

Haggard, Stephan and Robert Kaufman. 2008. Development, Democracy and Welfare States. Princeton University Press.

Kaufman, Robert R. and Alex Segura-Ubiergo. Globalization, Domestic Politics and Social Spending in Latin America. 53(4):553-587.

Keohane, Robert and Helen Milner, eds. Internationalization and Domestic Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge U. Press.

Kitschelt et al. eds, 1999. Change and Continuity in Contemporary Capitalism. NY: Cambridge University Press. Chapters by Kitschelt, Lange, Marks and Stephens ("Convergence and Divergence in Advanced Capitalist Democracies" and chapter by Stephens, Huber and Ray ("The Welfare State in Hard Times").

Maurizio Ferrera, Anton Hemerijck and Martin Rhodes. The future of the European “Social Model” in the Global Economy. Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis. August 2001.

Session 9 (Nov 3) Executive, Legislative and Judicial Institutions

Questions:

What are the main differences between majoritarian and consensus democracies?

How do Parliamentary and Presidential government differ in terms of democratic accountability?

Is parliamentary government conducive to better political outcomes than presidential government?

How can a democracy maintain an independent judiciary? Why is this important?

Is politics in democracies around the world being judicialized? Why? Readings:

Lijphart, Arend. 1999. Patterns of Democracy. New Haven: Yale U. Press, Chapters 1-4 and 7.

Strom, Kaare. 2000. Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies. European Journal of Political Research 37:261-289.

Mainwaring, Scott and Matthew Shugart. 1997. Juan Linz, Presidentialism, and Democracy: A critical Appraisal. Comparative Politics

Vanberg, George. 2008. “Establishing and Maintaining Judicial Independence” In Oxford Handbook of Law and Politics, Whittington, Kelemen and Caldeira, eds. Oxford University Press

Hirschl, Ran. 2008. “The Judicialization of Politics”. In Oxford Handbook of Law and Politics, Whittington, Kelemen and Caldeira, eds. Oxford University Press.

Stone Sweet, Alec. 2000. Governing with Judges. Oxford University Press, Chapters 1 and 2.

Recommended:

Garrett, Geoffrey and George Tsebelis. 2000. The Institutional Foundations of Intergovernmentalism and Supranationalism in the European Union. International Organization.


Hardin, Russell. 1989. Why a consititution? In the federalist papers and the new instutionalism ed. Bernard Grofman and Donald Wittman. New York: Agathon.

Lijphart, Arend. 2004. Constitutional Design for Divided Societies. Journal of Democracy 15(2):96-109.

The Federalist Papers

Tsebelis, George 1995. Decision Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, Multicameralism and Multipartyism. British Journal of Political Science. (25): 289-325.

Tsebelis, George 1999. Veto Players and Law Production in Parliamentary Democracies: An Empirical Assessment. APSR 93(3) 591-608.

Tsebelis, George. 2002. Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work. Princeton: Princeton U. Press.

On Presidentialism v. Parliamentarism

Cheibub, Jose Antonio, and Fernando Limongi, “Democratic Institutions and Regime Survival: Parliamentary and Presidential Democracies Reconsidered,” Annual Review of Political Science 5 (2002): 151-79.

Laver and Schofield. 1990 Multiparty Government. Oxford: Oxford U. Press

Laver and Shepsle 1990. Coalitions and Cabinet Government" APSR 84(3): 873-90.

Laver and Shepsle Making and Breaking Governments. Cambridge: Cambridge U. Press.

Linz, Juan, 1994. Presidentialism or Parliamentarism: Does It Make a Difference? Linz and Valenzuela eds. The Failure of Presidential Government. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP.

Linz, Juan. 1990. The Perils of Presidentialism: Journal of Democracy, Winter: 51-69.

Mainwairing, Scott and Matthew Shugart 1997. "Juan Linz, Presidentialism and Democracy: a Critical Appraisal." Comparative Politics 29 (4):449-72.

Moe and Caldwell. 1994. "The Institutional Foundations of Democratic Government: A Comparison of Presidential and Parliamentary Systems." Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Politics 150/1: 171:95.

Shugart, Matthew and John Carey. 1992. Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics. NY: Cambridge UP. Chapter 2.

On judicial institutions:

Cooter, Robert D. and Tom Ginsburg 1996. Comparative Judicial Discretion. International Review of Law and Economics 16: 295-313.Stone, Alec. Judicialization and the Construction of Governance. Comparative Political Studies 32 : 147-184.

Cooter, Robert, and Drexel, Josef. (1994). The logic of power in the emerging European constitution. International Review of Law and Economics, 14, 307-26.

Epp, Charles. 1998. The Rights Revolution. Chicago: The U. of Chicago Press.

Eskridge, William N. Jr. and John Ferejohn. (1994). The Elastic Commerce Clause: A Political Theory of American Federalism. Vanderbilt Law Review 47 (5):1355-1400.

Ferejohn, John and Barry Weingast. 1992. A Positive Theory of Statutory Interpretation. International Review of Law and Economics 12, 263-279.

Ferejohn, John and Barry Weingast. 1992. Limitations of Statutes: Strategic Statutory Interpretation. The Georgetown Law Journal 80: 565.

Ferejohn, John. 1995. Law, Legislation and Positive Political Theory. In Jeffrey Banks and Eric Hanushek, eds. Modern Political Economy: Old Topics, New Directions. New York: Cambridge University Press.


Garrett, Geoffrey, R. Daniel Kelemen and Heiner Schulz. 1998. The European Court of Justice, National Governments and Legal Integration in the European Union. International Organization 52(1).

Gely, Rafael and Pablo T. Spiller. (1992). The Political Economy of Supreme Court Constitutional Decisions: The Case of Roosevelt's Court-Packing Plan. International Review of Law and Economics 12:45-67.

Ginsburg, Tom. 2008. The Global Spread of Constitutional Review, pp. 81-98.

Helfer, Lawrence and Anne Marie Slaughter. "Why States Create International Tribunals: A Response to Professors Posner and Yoo," 93 California Law Review 899 (2005)

Helmke, Gretchen. 2002. The Logic of Strategic Defection: Court–Executive Relations in Argentina Under Dictatorship and Democracy. American Political Science Review, 96: 291-303.

Kagan, Robert. 1997. Should Europe Worry About Adversarial Legalism? Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 17(2).

Kelemen, R. Daniel. 2001. "The Limits of Judicial Power: Trade-Environment Disputes in the GATT/WTO and the EU" Comparative Political Studies 34, 6.

Kelemen, R. Daniel. 2011. Eurolegalism: The Transformation of Law and Regulation in the European Union. Harvard University Press.

Magalhaes, Pedro. 1999. The Politics of Judicial Reform in Eastern Europe. Comparative Politics 32: 43-62.

McCloskey, Robert G. (1960). The American Supreme Court. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

McCubbins, Matthew, Roger Noll and Barry Weingast. (1995). Politics and the Courts: A Positive Theory of Judicial Doctrine and the Rule of Law. Southern California Law Review 68:1631-1683.

McCubbins, Matthew, Roger Noll and Barry Weingast. (1995). Politics and the Courts: A Positive Theory of Judicial Doctrine and the Rule of Law. Southern California Law Review 68:1631-1683.

Pablo Spiller and Rafael Gely. 2008. Strategic Judicial Decision-making. In Whittington, Kelemen and Caldeira, eds, The Oxford Handbook of Law and Politics, pp. 34-45.

Ramseyer, J. Mark 1994. The Puzzling Independence of Courts: A comparative Approach. Journal of Legal Studies. 23:721-747.

Ramseyer, J. Mark and Frances Rosenbluth. 1996 Japan's Political Marketplace. New Haven: Yale U. Press. Chapters 5, 6.

Ramseyer, J. Mark. 1989. Reluctant Litigant Revisited: Rationality and Disputes in Japan, Journal of Japanese Studies 111 (1988).

Rosenberg, Gerald. 1992. Judicial Independence and the Reality of Political Power. The Review of Politics 54(3).

Shapiro, Martin and Alec Stone, eds. Special Issue: The New Constitutional Politics of Europe. Comparative Political Studies, 26.

Shapiro,Martin. 1981. Courts: A comparative and Political Analysis. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Simmons, Beth. 2008. International Law and International Relations. In Whittington, Kelemen and Caldeira, eds, The Oxford Handbook of Law and Politics, pp. 34-45.

Stone, Alec. 1995. The Birth of Judicial Politics in France. New York: oxford U. Press.

Vanberg, Georg. 2008. Establishing and Maintaining Judicial Independence. In Whittington, Kelemen and Caldeira, The Oxford Handbook of Law and Politics, pp.99-118.

http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=670821

http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=670821

http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract;jsessionid=AC3F5DFD7CF2862A98E7DBFC503DC4F8.tomcat1?fromPage=online&aid=107287


On Delegation and control of the bureaucracy:

Franchino, Fabio. (2004) 'Delegating Powers in the European Community'. British Journal of Political Science. 34: 449-76.

Huber, John and Charles Shipan. The Costs of Control: Legislators, Agencies and Transaction Costs. Legislative Studies Quarterly 24(1):25-52.

John Huber and Charles Shipan. 2004. Deliberate Discretion? Institutional Foundations of Bureaucratic Autonomy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Kelemen, R. Daniel. 2002. “The Politics of Eurocratic Structure: The New European Agencies.” West European Politics, 25(4):93-118.

McCubbins and Schwartz. 1984 Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols v. Fire Alarms. American Journal of Political Science 28: 165-79.

McCubbins, Noll and Weingast (McNollgast) 1987. "Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 3(2): 243-77.

Moe, Terry. 1989. 'The Politics of Bureaucratic Structure'. In Can the Government Govern? John E. Chubb and Paul E. Peterson, Eds. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution.

Pollack, Mark A. (1997) 'Delegation, agency and agenda setting in the European Community'. International Organization 51 (1).

Ramseyer and Rosenbluth. Japan's Political Marketplace. Chapter 6 & 7. SESSION 10 (Nov 10) PARTIES, PARTY SYSTEMS AND ELECTIONS Questions:

What factors explain the emergence (or transformation) of electoral systems?

What are the most important consequences of electoral systems?

Why do politicians form parties? Readings:

Downs, Anthony, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper, 1957), pp114-163.

Lipset, Seymour, and Stein Rokkan, “Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter Alignments: An Introduction,” pp. 1-64 in Lipset and Rokkan (eds.), Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives, (1967).

Boix, Carles, “Setting the Rules of the Game: The Choice of Electoral Systems in Advanced Democracies,” American Political Science Review 93:3 (1999): 609-624.

Cusack, Thomas R., Iversen, Torben and Soskice, David (2007), ‘Economic Interests and the Origins of Electoral Systems’. American Political Science Review 101: 373-391.

Iversen, Torben and David Soskice. 2006. Electoral Institutions and the Politics of Coalitions: why some democracies redistribute more than others. APSR 100(2):165-181.

Aldrich, John, Why Parties?: The Origins and Transformation of Party Politics in America (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), pp. 3-61.

Recommended:

Bawn, Kathleen 1993. The Logic of Institutional Preferences: The German Electoral Law as a Social Choice Outcome." AJPS 37(4) November 965-989.

Benoit, Kenneth (2007), ‘Electoral Laws as Political Consequences: Explaining the Origins and Change of Electoral Institutions’ Annual Review of Political Science 10: 363-90.

Benoit, Kenneth and John. W. Schiemann (2001) “Institutional Choices in New Democracies, Bargaining over Hungary’s 1989 Electoral Law.” Journal of Theoretical Politics 13 (2): 152-182


Cox, Gary. 1997. Making Votes Count: Strategic Coordination in the World's Electoral Systems. Cambridge U. Press. Chapter 2,

Lijphart, Arend (1990), ‘The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws’ APSR 84 (2) pp 481-496.

Lijphart, Arend. 1994. Electoral Systems and Party Systems. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Powell, G Bingham (2000), Elections as Instruments of Democracy: Majoritarian and Proportional Vision.

Przeworski, Adam, Susan Carol Stokes and Bernard Manin (1999), Democracy, Accountability and Representation

Rae, Douglas (1971), The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws.

Ramseyer, J. Mark and Frances McCall Rosenbluth. 1993. Japan's Political Marketplace. Chapters 2 & 4.

Sartori, Giovanni (2001), ‘The Party-Effects of Electoral Systems’, in Larry Diamond and RichardGunther (eds), Political Parties and Democracy.

Shugart, Matthew and John Carey. 1992. Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics. NY: Cambridge UP. pp, 206-272

Taagepeera, Rein and Matthew Shugart (1989) Seats and Votes SESSION 11 (Nov 17) COLLECTIVE ACTION, CONTENTIOUS POLITICS & INTEREST

INTERMEDIATION Questions;

Why do diffuse interests have more difficulty engaging in collective action than concentrated interests?

How does corporatism differ from pluralism?

How do political opportunity structures influence patterns of mobilization and interest group activity? Readings:

Olson, Mancur, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1965).

Kitschelt, Herbert, “Political Opportunity Structures and Political Protest,” British Journal of Political Science, 16 (1986), pp. 57-85.

Tarrow, Sidney, Power in Movement. Second edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), selections TBA.

Schmitter, Philippe. 1974. Still the Century of Corporatism? The Review of Politics 36: 85-131.

Lichbach and Zuckerman, Chapter by McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly. Recommended:

Almond, Gabriel. 1983 Corporatism, Pluralism and Professional Memory. World Politics.

Berger, Suzanne, ed. 1981 Organizing Interests in Western Europe. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Dahl, Robert. 1961. Who Governs? Yale University Press.

Dahl, Robert. 1978. Pluralism Revisited, Comparative Politics,

Fox Piven, Frances, and Richard Cloven, Poor Peoples Movements: Why They Succeed and How They Fail, (New York: Pantheon Books, 1977).

Hirschman, Albert O., Exit, Voice and Loyalty (1970), chs. 1-3 (pp. 1-43).

Lehmbruch, Gerhard and Philippe Schmitter. 1982. Patterns of Corporatist policy-making. Sage Publications.


Lindblom, Charles. 1977. Politics and Markets: The World's Political-Economic Systems, New York: Basic.

McAdam, Doug, John McCarthy and Mayer Zald. Eds. 2004., Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunties, Mobilizing Structures and Cultural Framings. Cambridge University Press.

McAdam, Doug, Sidney Tarrow and Charles Tilly, The Dynamics of Contention (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).

McCarthy, John, and Mayer Zald, “Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial Theory,” American Journal of Sociology 82 (1977), pp. 1212-41.

Schattschneider, E.E. 1960. The Semi-Sovereign People. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston,

Streeck, Wolfgang and Philippe Schmitter. 1991. From National Corporatism to Transnational Pluralism: Organized Interests in the European Market. Politics & Society 19:133-164.

Session 12 (Nov 24) ETHNICITY AND NATIONALISM Questions:

Fearon and Laitin argue that cooperation, not conflict, characterizes most ethnically diverse societies. Is their argument convincing? Explain why or why not.

Discuss how various conceptualizations of culture employed in studies of nationalism and ethnicity may influence research findings.

According to Gellner, what explained the rise of nationalism?

What insights, if any, does political science offer in explaining why people would fight and die on behalf of ‘collective identities’?

Readings:

Gellner, Ernest, Nations and Nationalism, 1983, Basil Blackwell (selections).

Fearon, James D. and David D. Laitin, “Explaining Interethnic Cooperation,” APSR 90/4 (Dec. 1996): 715-735.

Risse, Thomas. 2010. A Community of Europeans. Cornell University Press. Selections TBA

Kalyvas, Stathis. 2008. Ethnic Defection in Civil War. Comparative Political Studies 41(8):1043-1068.

Chapter by Kanchan Chandra in Lichbach and Zuckerman

Recommended:

Alexander J. Motyl, ed., Thinking Theoretically about Soviet Nationalities. History and Comparison in the Study of the USSR, 1992, Columbia University Press.

Anderson, Benedict, Imagined Communities. Revised Edition. Verso, 1991 (original 1983).

Barbara Callaway, The Heritage of Islam: Women, Politics and Change in West Africa. Lynne Rienner, 1995.

Beissinger, Mark, Nationalist Mobilization and the Collapse of the Soviet State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 1-40, 159-178.

Bhabha, Homi K. ed., Nation and Narration. Routledge, 1990.

Brubaker, Rogers, Nationalism Reframed. Cambridge UP, 1996.

Chatterjee, Partha, The Nation and Its Fragments. Princeton, 1993.

Craig, Calhoun, Nationalism. Minnesota, 1998.

Darden, Keith. 2007. The great divide: literacy, nationalism and the Communist Collapse. World Politics.


Deutsch, Karl, Nationalism and Social Communication: An Inquiry into the Foundation of Nationality (New York: Wiley, 1953).

Dmitry Gorenburg, “Not With One Voice: An Explanation of Intragroup Variation in Nationalist Sentiment,” World Politics 53 (October 2000): 115-142.

Fearon, James, and David Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War.” American Political Science Review. 97(1), 2003, pp. 75-90.

Gale Stokes, “Class and Nation: Competing Explanatory Systems,” Miroslav Hroch, “How Much Does Nation Formation Depend on Nationalism?,” Ernest Gellner, “The Dramatis Personae of History,” and Roman Szporluk, "In Search of the Drama of History: Or, National Roads to Modernity." The whole discussion in East European Politics and Societies, 4 1 (Winter) 1990: 98-150.

Greenfeld, Liah, Nationalism. Five Roads to Modernity, Harvard University Press, 1992.

Hechter, Michael “Nationalism and Rationality,” Studies in Comparative International Development 35/1 (Spring 2000): 3-19

Hechter, Michael, Containing Nationalism. Oxford UP, 2000, pp. 1-69.

Horowitz, Donald, L., Ethnic Groups in Conflict. Updated Edition With a New Preface. University of California Press, 2000.

Jankowski, James and Israel Gershoni, Rethinking Nationalism in the Arab Middle East (Columbia, 1997).

Kalyvas, Stathis N, “The Ontology of ‘Political Violence’: Action and Identity in Civil Wars.” Perspectives on Politics, 1(3), 2003, pp. 475-94.

Kalyvas, Stathis, The Logic of Violence in Civil War. Cambridge UP, 2006.

Kuran, Timur, “Ethnic norms and their transformation through reputational cascades,” Journal of Legal Studies 27 (2), Part 2, June 1998, pp. 623-659.

Laitin, David D., Identity in Formation. The Russian-Speaking Populations in the Near Abroad. Cornell University Press, 1998.

Laitin, David, “Hegemony and Religious Conflict,” in Peter B. Evans, Dietrich

Liah Greenfeld and Daniel Chirot, “Nationalism and Aggression,” Theory and Society, 23 (1994): 79-130

Lijphart, Arend, Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977), chapters 1-2 (pp. 1-52).

Nationalism. Edited by John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Petersen, Roger D., Understanding Ethnic Violence. Fear, Hatred, and Resentment in Twentieth-century Eastern Europe. Cambridge UP, 2002.

Rogers Brubaker and David D. Laitin, “Ethnic and Nationalist Violence,” Annual Review of Sociology 24 (1998).

Ronald Rogowski, “Causes and Varieties of Nationalism: A Rationalist Account,” in E.A. Tiryakian and R. Rogowski, eds., New Nationalisms of the Developed West: Toward Explanation, 1985, Allen and Unwin.

Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, eds., Bringing the State Back In (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 285-316.

Rustow, Dankwart A., A World of Nations: Problems of Political Modernization (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1967).

Smith, Anthony, The Ethnic Origins of Nations. Blackwell, 1986.


Snyder, Jack, From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Conflict (New York: W. W. Norton, 2000)

Snyder, Jack, From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Conflict. Norton, 2000.

Varshney, Ashutosh, “Ethnic Conflict and Civil Society: India and Beyond,” World Politics 53 no. 3 (April 2001), pp. 362-398.

Varshney, Ashutosh, “Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict, and Rationality” Perspectives on Politics, 1(1), 2003, pp. 85-99.

Varshney, Ashutosh, Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life: Hindus and Muslims in India (Second edition. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002), pp. 3-52, 281-300.

Yael Tamir, “The Enigma of Nationalism,” World Politics 47 (Apr. 1995): 418-40. Session 13 (Dec 1) CULTURE AND IDEAS AS CAUSES Questions:

What does it mean to speak of ideas or culture as a ‘cause’ of political phenomena?

Through what processes to ideas affect politics?

Are there cultural preconditions for capitalism? For democracy?

Upton Sinclair said, “It is difficult to get a man to understand something when his job depends on not understanding it.” Do actors interests shape their ideas or do ideas shape actors understandings of their self-interests?

Required:

Putnam, Robert. 1993. Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy. Princeton University Press.

Weber, Max. The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism.

Swidler, Ann. Culture in Action: Symbols and Strategies. American Sociological Review 51(2): 273-286.

Hall, Peter A., “Policy Paradigms, Social Learning and the Case of Economic Policy Making in Britain,” Comparative Politics, 25 (April 1993), pp. 275-296

Parsons, Craig. Showing Ideas as Causes: The Origins of the European Union.

Lichbach and Zuckerman, Chapter by Ross. Recommended

Aronoff, Myron, “Political Culture,” International Encyclopedia of Social Sciences, 2002.

Aronoff, Myron, Israeli Visions and Divisions. Cultural Change and Political Conflict, 1989, Transactions.

Blyth, Mark. Great Transformations: Economic Ideas and Institutional Change in the Twentieth Century. Cambridge University Press.

Blyth, Mark. 2003. Structures Do Not Come with an Instruction Sheet: Interests, Ideas, and Progress in Political Science. Perspectives on Politics 1, 4: 695-706.

Blyth, Mark. 2013. Austerity: History of a Dangerous Idea. OUP.

Hirschman, Albert. The Passions and the Interests: Political Arguments for Capitalism before its Triumph. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1977

Inglehart, Ronald and Christian Welzel, “Political Culture and Democracy,” in Wiarda, Howard J. ed., New Directions in Comparative Politics. Third Edition, pp. 141-64.

Inglehart, Ronald and Wayne E. Baker, “Modernization, Cultural Change, and the Persistence of Traditional Values,” American Journal of Sociology, 65 (February), 19-51.

Inglehart, Ronald, “The Renaissance of Political Culture,” APSR, 82 (December) 1988: 1203-30.

Jabko, Nicolas. 2006. Playing the Market: A Political Strategy for Uniting Europe. 1985-2005. Cornell


University Press, Chapter 1, 3.

Jowitt, Kenneth, “An Organizational Approach to the Study of Political Culture in Marxist-Leninist Systems,” American Political Science Review, 68:1171-91. Also in Ken Jowitt, New World Order. The Leninist Extinction, University of California Press, pp.50-87.

Kubik, Jan The Power of Symbols against the Symbols of Power. The Rise of Solidarity and the Fall of State Socialism in Poland. University Park: The Penn State University Press, 1994.

Laitin, David D., “Political Culture and Political Preferences,” and Wildavsky’s reply, APSR, 82 (June) 1988: 589-97.

Laitin, David D., Hegemony and Culture, The University of Chicago Press, 1986 (selections).

McNamara, Kathleen. 1998. The Currency of Ideas: Monetary Politics in the European Union. Cornell University Press.

Parsons, Craig. 2007. A Certain Idea of Europe. Cornell University Press.

Putnam, Robert D., “Studying Elite Political Culture: The Case of ‘Ideology’,” APSR, 65, 3 (September 1971): 651-81.s

Thompson, Michael and Richard Ellis, Aaron Wildavsky, Cultural Theory, 1990, Westview.

Wedeen, Lisa, “Conceptualizing Culture: Possibilities for Political Science,” APSR, 96, 4 (December) 2002: 713-28.

Wedeen, Lisa, Peripheral Visions. Publics, Power, and Performance in Yemen. The University of Chicago Press, 2008.

Wildavsky, Aaron “Choosing Preferences by Constructing Institutions: A Cultural Theory of Preference Formation,” APSR, 81: 3-21.

Wilson, Richard W., Compliance Ideologies: Rethinking Political Culture, 1992, Oxford.

Wilson, Richard, “The Many Voices of Political Culture: Assessing Different Approaches,” World Politics 52, 2: 2002.

Session 14 (Dec 8) MAPPING THE FIELD Required:

Parsons, Craig. 2007. How to Map Arguments in Political Science. Oxford University Press.

Lichbach and Zuckerman, Chapters 1-3.

Laitin, David D. (2002), ‘Comparative Politics: The State of the Subdisicipline,’ pp. 630-659 in Ira

Katznelson and Helen V. Milner (eds.), Political Science: State of the Discipline, New York: W.W. Norton & Washington, DC: American Political Science Association.

Munck, Gerardo and Richard Snyder, Debating the Direction of Comparative Politics 40(1):5-31.

Mahoney, James. 2007.Debating the State of Comparative Politics. Comparative Political Studies40(1):32-38.

Recommended:

Geddes, Barbara (2003), ‘Paradigms and Sand Castles: Theory Building and Research Design inComparative Politics

Ronald Rogowski, (1993), ‘Comparative Politics,’ in Ada W. Finifter (ed.), Political Science: The State of the Discipline II, Washington, D.C.: The American Political Science Association.

Schmitter, Philippe (1993), ‘Comparative Politics,’ pp. 171-77, in Joel Krieger (ed.), The Oxford Companion to the Politics of the World, New York: Oxford University Press.


Mair,Peter (1996), ‘Comparative Politics: An Overview,’ pp. 309-35, in Robert Goodin and HansDieter Klingemann (eds.), The New Handbook of Political Science, Oxford: OUP.

Almond, Gabriel (1988), ‘Separate Tables’ PS: Political Science and Politics 21 (Fall 1988):828-41

Eckstein, Harry. (1962), ‘A Perspective on Comparative Politics, Past and Present,’ Comparative Politics: A Reader, Free Press, pp. 3-32.

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