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Introduction1.1 Background:There had been great international “conflict and violence” in the 20 th century.
Approximately sixty million people lost their lives in two World Wars. No sooner WWII
had ended than the new conflict, the cold war, engulfed the globe. During the cold war
years, millions died in proxy wars from Greece and Korea to Vietnam, Afghanistan, and
Nicaragua, and everywhere. The cold war ended with the disintegration of the USSR in
1991. The world was left unipolar with the US as the sole superpower. During 1990s, the
tragic events in Kuwait, Bosnia, Rwanda, and at many other places on the globe, conflict
and war continued in the post-cold war period. Though the Soviet threat had disappeared
with the end of the cold war, yet the US kept approximately “hundred thousand military
forces” in Europe and about the same size in Northeast Asia.1
The US kept such a large number of military forces abroad along with hundreds
of military bases on the globe. The US did so because with the passage of the time the
dangerous rivalries among states, particularly between the major powers, were bound to
emerge. In this era of unipolarity, the US political and military dominance almost had
become unchallengeable. No power in history had ever dominated world political and
military system in the past as did the US in the post-cold war era. Such an international
environment existed when 9/11 occurred, argued Stephen Zunes.2
After disintegration of the USSR in 1991 the US approximately maintained
250,000 military personnel in over one hundred countries of the world. Even after
collapse of the USSR the US also maintained hundreds of military bases around the
globe. The US was in possession of large number of nuclear weapons as well. The US
1 John J. Mearsheimer. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (WW Norton & Company, 2001), xi-xii
2 Rick Fawn and Raymond Hinnebusch, (Eds.). The Iraq War: Causes and Consequences. (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2006), 26
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remained the only country around the globe with a global power projection capability
along with the most sophisticated military weapons. The US military forces also had been
enforcing the “no-fly zones” in Iraq since 1991.3
Then came 9/11 and the US foreign policy agenda was transformed with the
launching of war on terror. Within 18 months, the US President George W. Bush invaded
Iraq unilaterally in March 2003 ignoring UN and the world public opinion. Iraq became
the first victim of President George Bush’s newly pronounced offensive doctrine of pre-
emption. The US embarked upon a “neo-imperial” course to dominate the world.4 G.
John Ikenberry argued about the National Security Strategy of President Bush that the
“fundamental commitment” initiated by NSS was to “maintain a unipolar world”. The US
wanted a world different from the older one, where the US would be without “peer
competitor.”5
“The US-Iraq Policy 2001 to 2008: An Application of Offensive Realism”
constituted the topic of this dissertation. The objective of the dissertation had been to
make an analytical study of the US policy towards Iraq under George Bush from 2001 to
2008. With the end of the Cold War, the “centre of gravity” of world politics had shifted
from Europe to the Middle East as Gen. (Retd.) Keane had quoted.6 Iraq could be
regarded as the litmus test case for the US policy toward the region. The contours of Iraqi
policies and Iraq’s position vis-à-vis global and regional politics had been a major pretext
in setting the pace of the events in the region.
America had become an empire.7 Michael Ignatieff, director of the Carr Centre at
the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard argued that America had become an
“empire… a world hegemon.”8 The Bush Administration had been contemplating the US
invasion of Iraq even before 9/11 happened.9 September 11, provided the US
3 Stephan M. Walt. Taming American Power: The Global Response to US Primacy (New York: W.W. Norton, 2005), 34-35
4 John Gaddis. “Grand Strategy in the Second Term”, Foreign Affairs (2005): 2-155 John Ikenberry. “America's Imperial Ambition”, Foreign Affairs (2002): 44-606 Bob Woodward. The War Within (UK: Simon & Schuster, 2008), 392-3937 Tom Clancy, Gen Tony Zinni (Retd.), and Tony Koltz. Battle Ready (New York, G.P.Putnam’s
Sons, 2004), 4318 Michael Ignatieff. “The Burden” New York Times Magazine, January 5, 20039 Richard A. Clarke. Against All Enemies: Inside America’s War on Terror. (New York: Free
Press, 2004), 30, 265
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administration with a big opportunity to invade Iraq “under false pretenses.”10 The neo-
conservatives sitting in the Bush Administration pushed their agenda that predated 9/11
tragedy ensuring “American global supremacy.”11 They believed in the aggressive use of
US “military forces” for ensuring “global hegemony.”12
The President George W. Bush decided to invade Iraq for multiple reasons.
Michael Ignatieff while writing in September 2003 after the US invasion of Iraq argued
“New rules for intervention, proposed by the US… would end the canard that the US, not
its enemies, is the rogue state.”13 Samuel Huntington, author of “The Clash of
Civilizations” while arguing on President Bill Clinton’s policies, well before 9/11, argued
that major part of the world regards the US as a “rogue superpower” and for those people
the US was the single greatest external threat to their societies.14
1.2 Statement of Problem:After end of the Cold War the US emerged as the sole dominant power in the post-Cold
War world15. Unipolarity emerged as the defining feature of this period. During the Cold
War years, Europe was the “global center of gravity”. Security and dominance of Europe
were the “vital US interests” in the 20th century.16
Historically, Middle East, owing to its geostrategic, economic and political
importance had been one of the major battlefields of great power’s struggle. With the
discovery of oil as a strategic asset in the Middle East, rivalry among the imperial
European powers for the dominance of the region intensified in the 20th century. Owing
to the dynamics of the Cold War, the US involvement in the region increased since
1950’s. Writing in mid 1990s, Richard Nixon, the former US President, wrote that
10 Ron Suskind. The Way of The World: A Story of Truth and Hope in an Age of Extremism (London: Simon and Schuster, 2008), 37311 George Soros. The Bubble of American Supremacy: Correcting the Misuse of American Power (London: Widenfield and Nicholson, 2004), 3-4
12 Noam Chomsky. American Power and the New Mandarins (India: Penguin Books, 2003), 2-313 Michael Ignatieff. “Why Are We in Iraq? (And Liberia? And Afghanistan?)” New York Times
Magazine, September 7, 2003
14 Samuel P. Huntington. “The Lonely Superpower”. Foreign Affairs 78, no. 2, (1999): 3515 Soros, Buble of American Supremacy, 3
16 Bob Woodward. The War Within (UK: Simon and Schuster, 2008), 392-393
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America had two basic interests in the Middle East – “Oil and Israel”. America must
“protect” them at any cost.17
Iraq possessed the second largest known oil reserves in the region after Saudi
Arabia. Iraq was also bordered by three of the five largest oil producers in the world.
Dominating Iraq would provide the US with large leverage not only by controlling the oil
of the country but also establishing a permanent military presence in the heart of the
region.18
The September 11, 2001 initiated a shift in the US foreign policy. President
George W. Bush launched war on terror against Osama bin Laden, his organization al-
Qaeda based in Afghanistan, and his protector Taliban regime.19 President George W.
Bush held al-Qaeda responsible for 9/11 tragedy. As had already been written that in the
post-Cold War era, the world “centre of gravity” had been shifted from Europe to the
Middle East owing to its economic and geostrategic importance.
President Bush while addressing the cadets at West Point Military Academy in
June 2002, announced the Bush Doctrine. The doctrine asked for “preemptive use of
military” against the US enemies.20 The rationale of invasion provided by the Bush
Administration was that Iraq was a rogue state pursuing WMD threatening the US and
world security, Saddam Hussain had links with al-Qaeda and, was a co-plotter in 9/11,
and liberation of Iraq and promoting democracy, as a post- hoc rationale in the region
starting from Iraq.21
Iraq had “second highest known oil reserves” in the world. Israel factor also was
in place. The US invasion of Iraq in 2003 was a classic case of conflation of causes. It
would help containing Iran. Security of the “Gulf oil” was also an important reason.22
The “neocons” in the Bush Administration, powerful “Israel lobby” in America
believed that removing Saddam Hussain from power would “immensely benefit” 17 Richard M. Nixon. Seize the Moment: America’s Challenge in a One-Superpower World
(Random House Value Publishing, 1992), 196
18 Fawn and Hinnebusch (Eds), Iraq War, 2919 B. W. Jentleson. American Foreign Policy: the Dynamics of Choice in the 21st Century. (WW
Norton, 2007), 36020 Bob Woodward. Plan of Attack. (London: Pocket Books, 2004), 131-13221 John J. Mearsheimer, and Stephan Walt. The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy, (Farrar,
Straus and Giroux, 2007), 229-23222 Noam Chomsky. Power and Terror: Post-9/11 Talks and Interviews. (New York: Seven Stories
Press, 2004), 131
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America and Israel alike improving their “strategic position” in the Middle East.23
Installing a U.S. friendly government in Baghdad would get recognition for Israel from
Iraq. It would also “deprive” Palestinians from their big Arab source of support. The
move was also a part of Bush Administration’s “corporate globalization” policy as a step
toward realizing global agenda.24 President George W. Bush’s policy toward Iraq from
2001-2008 was of great importance. It had serious repercussions not only for the world
political system and the UN but also for the “US security” itself and its world role. It
seriously affected the Middle Eastern political and strategic environment as well.
Several scholars have investigated only one of the multiple and complex aspects
of President Gorge W. Bush’s Iraq policy. Yet no comprehensive study has been carried
out on this topic. I found no previous work which approached US-Iraq policy from this
perspective. There is a serious lack of comprehensive or detailed analysis of American
policy toward Iraq during 2001 to 2008, and, also, the necessity to discover US
operational objectives behind that policy. This study is an attempt to provide a
comprehensive analysis of US- Iraq policy and fill the gap. Its operational objectives and
implications in the wider context have been examined in depth. This study has
investigated US-Iraq policy from 2001 to 2008 making offensive realist model as a
standard.
1.3 Central Questions:President George W. Bush invaded Iraq in March 2003. The presence of WMD in Iraq,
regime’s links with Al Qaeda, and promotion of democracy in Iraq as the post- hoc
rationale were among the stated objectives of the US-Iraq policy. For the President
“regime change” in Iraq remained the only viable strategy to fulfill these declared
objectives. However, the operational policy in Iraq did not conform to the stated goals.
There had been a contradiction between stated objectives of invasion and operational
policy. The real objectives of the war could be found in the strategic, economic, and
23 Mearsheimer and Walt, Israel Lobby, 23024 Mark Levine. Why They Don’t Hate Us: Lifting the Veil on the Axis of Evil (Oneworld
Publications, 2005), 240, 282-283
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political US interests in the Persian Gulf region in accordance with the assumptions of
offensive realism in general, and in Iraq in particular. The central questions of the
dissertation revolve around the same reality. The central questions addressed in the
dissertation are as followed:
1. How did the US-Iraq policy during 2001-2008 closely fit the assumptions of
offensive realism?
2. Why did the Bush Administration exploit the opportunity provided by 9/11 to
pursue its Iraq agenda and invade Iraq in 2003 not before?
3. Why did the Bush Administration use the issue of Saddam Hussain’s WMD to
invade Iraq?
4. Why did the Bush Administration fail to materialize its objective of promoting
democracy and reconstruct Iraq?
1.4 The Main Argument:The main argument of the dissertation is that the US-Iraq policy under President George
W. Bush Administration from 2001 to 2008 constituted an excellent case study of the
application of offensive realism particularly in the context of US preemptive and
unilateral invasion of Iraq in 2003. The second argument is that there has been a
contradiction in the stated objectives of the war and US operational policy in Iraq. The
case of post-hoc rationale of promotion of democracy in Iraq mainly remained rhetoric.
The hypothesis: In the aftermath of 9/11 the Bush Administration pursued offensive
realist model in the conduct of US war on terror particularly in its preemptive and
unilateral invasion of Iraq in March 2003. The US-Iraq policy constituted the
independent variable and the outcome of the invasion the dependent variable.
1.5 Significance of the Study:Historically, Iraq has been an important player in the Middle East. This dissertation is an
effort to understand the Iraq war and its ramifications. The US policy under President
George W. Bush has been a crucial and most critical factor in molding of the region’s
present situation. The dissertation would focus the US policy during 2001 to 2008.This
study constitutes a new perspective. After studying the existing literature at length a gap
has been identified in it. The US invasion of Iraq presented an excellent case study of
offensive realist model. No research work, based on this theme, has been found. This
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work would fill this gap. This work would also be a new addition in the existing
literature.
1.6 Theoretical Framework:Since 1939 onward, leading theorists and policy-makers continued to see world politics
through the conceptual lenses of realism. The realist prescriptions particularly augured
well to the US rise to the status of “predominant global power”. Realism offered a
manual for maximization of US power in a hostile and anarchic environment. The basic
reason for the continuity of dominant position of realism in international political system
is that it is the embodiment of “universal laws of world politics” which remained true
across “time and space.”25
International political security is the broad field in which this study is being
conducted. Theory of realism, particularly its latest variant, deals with international
political security. While invading Iraq in March 2003, President George W. Bush
invoked the logic wedded in “power politics” paradigm, the dominant paradigm of
international politics. The theory of offensive realism given by John J. Mearsheimer
constitutes the theoretical framework of this study. The President’s Iraq policy
represented great power conduct in international politics and his drive for “US global
dominance”. The neoconservatives who occupied positions of power in the
administration 2001-2008, believed that the US should “remain engaged” in world
politics and the US, as predominant world power, carried special obligations in the realm
of international security.26
The preeminent goal of a state in international politics is its survival. It is the first
and foremost responsibility of a leader and no leader could “ever compromise” on it.27 In
international politics there has been absence of a higher authority to defend a state against
the use of force. Security of a state, therefore, could only be guaranteed through self-help.
Historically, the principle of “balance of power” operated as the mechanism by which
“security” of a great power could be protected. All strands of realism do not view balance
25 Timothy Dunne. “Realism”, in The Globalization of World Politics, edited by Baylis and Smith, (Oxford/N.Y.: Oxford University Press, 1997), 11026 Francis Fukuyama. America at the Crossroads: Democracy, Power and the Neoconservative Legacy. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006), 48-4927 Kissinger, Henry. American Foreign Policy. (W.W. Norton & Company, 1977), 204
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of power as a stable condition. Traditionally, the balance of power has been broken by
two ways either through war or peaceful change.28
The story of realism began with Thucydides and his famous “Melian Dialogue”.
During this dialogue the logic of power politics was asserted. The dialogue asserted the
realist iron law that “the strong do what they have the power to do and the weak accept
what they have to accept”. Later realists confirmed that the logic of “power politics” had
universal applicability. For Athens and Melos, we could substitute Nazi Germany and
Czechoslovakia in 1939, the USSR and Hungary in 1956.29 The same logic of power
politics also held good in case of the US war on Iraq in 2003.
E. H. Carr, a modern British realist, argued in 1939 that there were profound
conflicts of interest among states and people alike. International relations were but about
the “struggle between clashing national interests.”30 For Morgenthau, human nature was
at the root cause of conflict in anarchic international relations as human beings were self-
interested and power-seekers. Resultantly, international politics was a “struggle for power
among states” and the immediate goal of international politics was accumulation of more
power.31
Realism stressed the recurrence of continuity and repetition of war as instrument
of state-craft. Power politics would continue as long as states remained preeminent
players in international relations. States could not ignore needs of their security. They had
no choice but to prepare for war as the ultimate eventuality. Modern realists, Carr and
Morgenthau, combined two things. They combined pessimistic view of “human nature”
with a concept of “power politics” among states in an anarchic world. There were no
chances for qualitative change in international politics.32 By the same logic, it could be
argued that powerful states would always continue to prey on weaker ones. The US
invasion of Iraq in 2003 was a case in reference.
28 Dunne, Realism, 117-11829 Ibid, 110-11130 Robert Jackson, and George Sørensen. Introduction to International Relations. (N.Y.: Oxford
University Press, 1999), 4131 Hans Morgenthau. Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace. (New York:
McGraw-Hill Publishers, 1960), 29
32 Jackson and Sørensen, International Relations, 44
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Anarchy had remained the “ordering principle” of international political system.
Systemic forces “homogenized” the functional aspect of all states. States were
“socialized” into an environment characterized by mutual distrust, self-reliance and the
pursuit of security. States continuously strive for increasing their power. Functionally all
states were similar, however, they differ in their capabilities. Waltz further argued that
great powers were the agents of change in the “structure” of international political
system.33 The US invasion of Iraq was an attempt on the part of a great power to
restructure the political map of the Middle East.
There had been an oft repeated realist claim about the “recurrence of wars” in
international politics. Wars were interrupted by “periods of peace” as the interval for the
preparation for next showdown. This had remained true over the last twenty-five
centuries. There remained little doubt for thinking that realism would be the predominant
philosophy during the twenty-first century. Today Europe remained “divided by
interests” rather than “united” by a common goal. In the post-Cold War era the axis of
world politics had shifted from Europe to Asia-Pacific region. Realism would guide the
world leaders in their policy making.34 The theory of offensive realism constituted the
theoretical framework of this dissertation. The theme of the theory has been explained by
John J. Mearsheimer in his book The Tragedy of Great Power Politics as followed.
There would be continuity of the cycle of “conflicts and wars” long into the new
millennium. The establishment of peace in international politics would not be possible.
The reasons being, the great powers that shaped world political system “feared” each
other. They competed for power, resultantly. Great power’s “ultimate goal” was to attain
a position of “dominance” over the rival powers. For dominance remained the best way
to ensure one’s own survival. For “strength ensures safety and the greatest strength is the
greatest insurance of safety”. States under such a scenario were “fated to clash” because
they competed for comparative advantage at the cost of others. This had been a tragedy
but there was no escape to this reality. “So conflict and war are bound to continue as
large and enduring features of world politics.”35
33 Kenneth Waltz. Theory of International Relations. (N.Y.: McGraw-Hill Publishers, 1979), 93-97
34 Dunne, Realism, 119-12235 Mearsheimer, Tragedy of Great Powers, xi-xii
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Great powers have always been “power maximizers”. Their predominant aim has
been to maximize “their share of world power” at the cost of other states. Their final
objective has been to become “hegemon” within the international political system-the
only great power in the system.36 Great powers are never “status quo powers” and they
were rarely satisfied with the current disposition of power in the international political
system. They have been constantly engaged to change the distribution of power in their
favor in the system. In fact, they always cherished “revisionist” intentions. They would
use force to change the balance of power in their favor, particularly, if possible, at some
acceptable cost.37 However, sometimes the costs and risks of revisionist moves are too
high. They wait for “favorable” circumstances to come. But endless wishes for
accumulation of more power never wither away, unless they achieve their ultimate aim.
Since none of the great powers is likely to gain “global hegemony” however, the world is
condemned to permanent great power competition in the system.38
In that endless pursuit of power great powers are constantly “looking for
opportunities” to exploit them to change the current disposition of power in their favor in
the system. They would immediately seize upon these opportunities. In other words,
“great powers are primed for offense”. Great powers would also try to prevent rival
powers to gain power at their expense.39 Theory of offensive realism, however, would be
discussed in detail in the next chapter, titled theoretical framework. Theory of offensive
realism is the most relevant and compelling theoretical explanation of the US-Iraq policy
from 2001 to 2008. The war hawks in the Bush Administration played important role in
making US-Iraq policy culminating into the invasion of Iraq in 2003. The
neoconservative’s agenda constituted only a peripheral and contributory role in
reinforcing the theory of offensive realism as theoretical framework of this dissertation.
The 9/11 events provided war hawks in the Bush Administration with a big
opportunity to materialize their world agenda. By 9/11, the war hawks seemed well
prepared to exploit the opportunity.40 The happenings of 9/11 created a “new context” for
36 Ibid, 237 Mearsheimer, Tragedy of Great Powers, 238 Ibid, 239 Ibid, 340 Stefan Halper, and Jonathan Clarke. America Alone: The Neo-Conservatives and the Global
Order. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 33
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US foreign policy. The plans for the invasion of Iraq had “already been made” under
President Bush (senior) Administration by Richard Perle and Paul Wolfowitz.41 President
George W. Bush’s National Security Strategy (NSS), September 2002, was really an
offensive realist document based on two domineering documents- DPG and PNAC. 42 It
fulfilled all the ambitions of the US Administration. The National Security Strategy of
September 2002 provided the US with a big opportunity to exploit the circumstances to
implement its global pursuit of interests.43
The neoconservatives in the Bush Administration wanted US “dominance”
beyond challenges.44 They supported American forces to develop unipolarity in the
international political system. The US must be willing to “use its military forces
unilaterally” to protect US security.45 In contemporary era, the US power is the dominant
reality. It has taken an “aggressive” turn.46
The Bush Administration exploited the opportunity provided by 9/11 in war on
terror to benefit from the “unipolar” moment.47 The unilateral pursuit of US global
interests adopted a new approach known as preemptive action.48 The war hawks in the
Bush Administration viewed the world only through the prism of national interest.49 The
war hawks in the administration believed in the “use of military” might to counter the
challenges to the US supremacy. For them, the main challenge was international
terrorism. They adopted “preemptive strategy” for the of use military forces.50
The war hawks already had made a plan for the invasion of Iraq in DPG in the
decade of 1990s. For them the absolutist Saddam regime was the challenge to the US
41 Halper and Clarke, America Alone, 3342 Max Boot. “Neocons”. Foreign Policy, (2004), 20-2843 Gaddis, Grand Strategy, 2-1544 Gary Dorrien. Imperial Designs: Neoconservatism and the New Pax Americana. (N.Y.:
Routledge, 2004), 16-1745 Demitri K. Simes. “America’s Imperial Dilemma”. Foreign Affairs 82, no 6, (2003)46 Fareed Zakaria. The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad. (WW
Norton and company, 2004), 4847 Melvin Gurtov. “American Crusades: Unilateralism, Past and Present”. In Confronting the Bush
Doctrine: Critical Views from the Asia-Pacific. Edited by Mel Gurtov and Peter Van Ness, (N.Y.: Routledge, 2005), 2
48 Gaddis, Grand Strategy, 2-1549 Jean A.Garrison. Making China Policy: From Nixon to GW Bush. (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005), 55-56
50 Gaddis, Grand Strategy, 2-15
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supremacy in the Middle East. The geostrategic environment in the Middle East justified
the military invasion51. Several high dignitaries of the Bush Administration like
Wolfowitz, Douglas Feith and Richard Perle were Jews and strongly supported Iraq war.
They wanted to make “Israel safe.”52
The Bush Administration believed that rogue states such as Iran, Iraq and North
Korea were a challenge to “US global interests and hegemony”. These regimes must be
eliminated.53 There were two big dangers to US interests. They were coming from these
rogue states and their WMD. For war hawks, it was quite possible that these rogue states
“secretly” handed over WMD to terrorists.54 The theory of offensive realism constituted
the theoretical framework of this dissertation. The theory, however, did not explain all the
aspects of the US-Iraq policy from 2001 to 2008. The Neoconservative agenda, as a
circumstantial factor, reinforced theory of offensive realism and explained some aspects
of the US-Iraq policy during the period. There had been a close fit between offensive
realist model and the US-Iraq policy 2001- 2008. Offensive realism provided the best
theoretical explanation of the policy for the period under study.
1.7 Research Methodology:This study is analytical based on interpretative methodology to investigate the problem in
a scientific way. In interpretivism social reality is not given. Rather we come to know
about it through interpretation of meanings of actor’s actions, policies, and statements.
This research is qualitative because it is based on interpretivism. The data collection
methods and data analysis methods are also qualitative. The qualitative data collection
methods involve four things. It is related to the analysis of relevant books, articles, and of
official statements. It is also related to the analysis of official / policy documents. They
are analyzed and interpreted accordingly. I have also conducted interviews of scholars as
a primary data. The reasoning used in this study is inductive. Both primary and secondary
sources have been used to write this dissertation. Primary sources included speeches and
presentations of the Bush Administration before the US Congress, reports of the
Commissions and autobiographies of the principals of the Bush Administration.
51 Simes, America’s Imperial Dilemma, 200352 Fukuyama. America at the Crossroads, 1253 Boot, Neocons, 20-2854 Ibid
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Moreover, the interviews of scholars, Dr. Tahir Amin, Dr. Muhammad Islam, Dr. Noman
Omar Sattar, Dr. M. Riaz Shad, Dr. R. B. Raees and Dr. Riffat Hussain Syed, have been
conducted. Secondary sources included scholarly works, international journals,
journalistic works, websites and newspapers.
1.8 Literature Review:Since 9/11 there has been extensive literature on US War on Terror. However, an attempt
has been made to discuss all the major academic and journalistic works on the US-Iraq
policy. Without any exaggeration, Bob Woodward, has written most extensively on the
topic especially US unilateral military invasion of Iraq in March, 2003. He has written
four books on it. As a reporter of The Washington Post, he had developed intimate
relationship with the entire Bush Administration personnel. He interviewed President
Bush six times from the happenings of 9/11 to May 2008. In addition, he conducted
hundreds of multiple–time interviews from the President’s national security team, senior
deputies and other key players who were responsible, in any way, for US military
invasion of Iraq in 2003. These people had first hand knowledge of documents, meetings
and events which ultimately led to the war. They rather constituted primary sources. The
White House declassified dozens of documents in the process. He had access to many a
secret and classified documents. Most interviews were conducted on “background”. It
meant that the information provided could be used without disclosing the sources.
Bob Woodward, Bush at War (2002): The first one in his series of four books.
The book under reference was a step by step story of the President’s decision to go to war
against international terrorism after 9/11. The book mainly dealt with the US war on
terror in the context of Afghanistan. The writer argued that President Bush did not want
an open ended discussion on the topic. Bush had no alternatives in his mind except going
to war. Bob Woodward argued that Bush was a “gut player” and he proceeded on the
principle of certainty. The book carried little relevance to Iraq war except laying down
President Bush’s broader principles and his philosophy of war on terror. The major goals,
said Bush, in his interview with the author in December, 2001, that the US would root out
terrorism from the world and would also achieve world peace and unity at home.
Bob Woodward, Plan of Attack (2004): Much like the first book told a story of the
US unilateral military invasion of Iraq in March, 2003. The book unveiled the secret
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developments in Washington leading to the Iraq war. Though the President had been
continuously denying at different forums that he was poised to go for Iraq invasion, yet
he was secretly preparing for the same. He had included Iraq in the “axis of evil” in his
State of the Union address in January, 2002. In a subsequent speech in June 2002 at West
Point, New York, President Bush announced what was called “The Bush Doctrine”. He
invoked the US right for “preemptive action” against “rogue states” that could threaten
US security and her international interests. WMD were used as a major pretext for Iraq
war. It was repeatedly claimed by the principals of Bush administration that Saddam
Hussain possessed WMD and had close links with al-Qaeda.
National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), in October and December 2002 argued
inter-alia that Saddam retained a small stockpile of chemical and biological weapons. In
October 2002, the US Congress passed a resolution authorizing the President to use
military forces in Iraq. Colin Powell, the US Secretary of State, addressed the UN on the
issue of Iraq as a “rogue state pursuing WMD” and it seemed as a declaration of war
against Iraq. Three major powers, France, Russia and Germany tried to dissuade the
President not to take an invasion of Iraq but all in vain. President Bush attacked Iraq
despite great opposition worldwide.
The above cited book also recounted the developments from November 2001 to
the invasion of Iraq in March 2003. There were many meetings between Donald
Rumsfeld, General Tommy Franks and the President discussing detailed plan of invasion.
The President did not seek, the author writes, recommendations from anybody including
former President George H.W. Bush, Colin Powell, Donald Rumsfeld and George Tenet.
It was a brilliant account telling the story of US invasion of Iraq in March 2003. The
book unveiled behind– the– scenes narration of the causes and consequences of Iraq War.
It was based on the “background” interviews of 75 participants of the key decision
makers about the war in Washington.
Bob Woodward, State of Denial (2006): The third important book by the same
writer on the US war on terror. The US went to war against Iraq on the pretext of a rogue
state relentlessly pursuing WMD which was a threat to the US security and international
interests. But after the fall of Baghdad in April 2003, no WMD were found in Iraq
whatsoever. The author was of the view that fall of Saddam Hussein created power
28
vacuum in Iraq. Paul Bremer, the first civil US administrator of Iraq, did two sinister
things–“de-Baathification of Iraq and disbanding” the Iraqi army. Post-Saddam Iraq was
suddenly caught into an ever increasing upward spiral of violence. In post-Saddam Iraq,
the main issue was the security.
The author was of the opinion that the main sources of violence were former
Baathists, Saddamists, al-Qaeda under the leadership of Zarqawi, and sectarianism. But
the more dreadful thing about Iraq was its sudden drift toward “civil war” between
Sunnis and Shias. The delay in the “transfer of sovereignty” to the Iraqis also created
doubts in the minds of Iraqis about the US motives. Iraq slowly degenerated into a
quagmire. The situation on the ground in Iraq became worse with every passing day and
it seemed as if it was spinning out of control. Bush Administration was under great stress.
But for the last three years from 2003 to 2006 the Bush Administration had not been
telling the American people the truth about the complex security situation in Iraq. The
Bush Administration consistently followed the “strategy of denial”. Woodward gave a
glaring dissection of the conduct of war in Iraq. The incompetence and arrogance of Bush
Administration was stunning during 2003 – 2006 years.
Bob Woodward, The War Within: A Secret White House History 2006 – 2008
(2008): The book unveiled the most important secret developments going on in the White
House about the Iraq War. During these years Iraq had been degenerated into a hell of
violence. The bulk of Iraq insurgency was coming from Sunnis who were main
beneficiaries of Saddam regime. Former Baathists and Saddamists, different militias in
Iraq, al-Qaeda activities and interference from Iran and Syria were adding fuel to the fire.
For all practical reasons Iraq was in the pains of civil war. America had been spending
about $2 billion a week to quell insurgency but all in vain. The Iraq study Group had
recommended withdrawal of combat troops by 2008. But President Bush and General
David Petraeus, the US commander in Iraq, insisted that leaving Iraq would be a total
disaster. Ultimately, a new strategy of troop surge to Iraq in 2008 was adopted which led
to a timely steep decrease in the level of violence and insurgency in Iraq. The book under
reference threw in- depth light on the secret wrangling going on in Washington D.C., on
Iraq War during 2006–2008.
29
The material presented by the author in his four investigative books was a good
example of great power conduct in international political system. It fitted the “power
politics paradigm” of which the US was operating in war on Iraq. The above books
showed how the opportunity provided by 9/11 events was exploited by the Bush
Administration. The administration wanted to increase its “share of world power and to
become a hegemon” in the system. The excellent material provided in the above books
had been supportive to my main argument i.e. how did the great power like America
exploit this opportunity and how did she replace rival power, the Saddam regime, which
could be problem in her way to attain “hegemony” in the system. The US Iraq policy
fitted the offensive realist model and the material presented by Woodward provided the
good supportive sources.
In the interviews with David Barsamian in Imperial Ambitions: Conversations on
the Post-9/11 World (2005): Noam Chomsky threw light on the new and crucial aspects
of US foreign policy. The interviews discussed American foreign policy in post-Cold war
era, an ever increasing unstable world. Noam Chomsky, a known orientalist, offered his
views with piercing insight on American invasion and occupation of Iraq in 2003, the
Bush doctrine of “preemption”, the rogue states, and the future of the Bush
administration. He warned the world community about the threats to world peace and
security posed by the “US global hegemonic” drive.
Noam Chomsky, Power and Terror (2004): Edited by John Junkerman and Takei
Masakazu. Since 9/11 there had been a great discussion in the world about the causes of
the tragedy. Noam Chomsky moved to the centre stage of the global discussion. He
possessed an encyclopedic knowledge of the history of American foreign policy. The
book under reference consisted of his post –9/11 talks and interviews on US foreign
policy and global politics. Chomsky believed that all countries irrespective of their size
and power should follow the same standard conduct in International Relations. On US
foreign policy toward the Middle East, he was of the opinion that it was “imperialist” in
nature; and the stated causes of the US invasion of Iraq were not real. For him, the real
cause was the “US oil interest” in the region. Iraq possessed the “second largest oil
reserves” in the Middle East. The book was a collection of his insight relevant to 9/11.
30
Noam Chomsky, Hegemony or Survival: America’s Quest for Global Dominance
(2003): In this book, argued Chomsky, that 9/11 expedited the US drive for “global
hegemony” by invoking what was known as the Bush Doctrine of preemptive strikes
against the potential US enemies. The US war on terror was not new in its foreign policy
pursuits rather the doctrine had previously been invoked in cases like Cuba, Nicaragua,
Libya and Panama etc. The possession of “WMD” by Saddam Hussain was used as a
lame pretext to invade Iraq in 2003. The US drive for global dominance, included among
other things, to ignore international institutions, international treaties and its
militarization of space program. We must awaken ourselves to the deadly dangers ahead
before it was too late.
The main argument put forward by Chomsky was that the US had grown
“imperialist” and had been following the course of “global hegemony”. The US used 9/11
and the case of Iraq’s “WMD” as a lame pretext for invasion of Iraq. By doing this the
US posed a danger to the international security. It was not “Iraq” but the US that was a
danger to the international peace and security. The neoconservatives played important
role in shaping President George W. Bush’s Iraq policy. The argument and the material
strongly supported my main argument.
Peter W. Galbraith, The End of Iraq (2006): Galbraith argued that how Bush
Administration’s incompetence pushed Iraq into an open – ended war. The author spent
twenty six years in Iraq, mostly working for the US government. This book was a product
of that “rich” experience. The book concentrated on post–Saddam era and the basic
argument of the Peter W. Galbraith was that the US policies immediately in the post-
Saddam period were flawed conceptually and wrong in implementation. The major
mistake on the part of Bush Administration had been its “failure” to see Iraq as it was.
Rather the Administration wished it might be Bush Administration’s this initial failure,
argued the author, led the US government to make further serious mistakes. Iraq was not
a voluntary creation of its people and had ever been held together by the repressive use of
brute force since its inception. The author suggested a course of action which, if
implemented upon truly, could pull the US out of this mess in Iraq. Peter Galbraith
presented a vivid and persuasive argument against the reconstruction and nation building
31
in Iraq. He provided an in-depth view of the “US occupation failure”. He contended that
“political disintegration of Iraq was inevitable”.
However, the empirical evidence contradicted Peter Galbraith’s argument that the
“nation building” in Iraq was the “only stated goal” of the US President. Nation building
in Iraq was not a “real US” goal. Therefore, it might also be disagreed with the author’s
central theme. Disintegration of Iraq unsuited to the objectives of the Bush
Administration as it would create further instability in the region that ran contrary to the
ultimate US regional goal.
Vassilis K. Fouskas and Bulent Gokay, The New American Imperialism: Bush’s
War on Terror and Blood for Oil (2005): the Cold War ended and Soviet Union suddenly
collapsed in 1991 giving rise to Bush senior’s New World Order in which America was
the only superpower. However, the organizing principles of new world order of 21st
century were not yet clear till the sad happening of 9/11. After 9/11, the cold war struggle
against communism was replaced by the US “War on Terror”. The neoconservative
ideologues were the main proponents of this “neo-imperialism” with its emphasis on
Eurasian oil. This was basically the “operationalization” of PNAC. America was not
liberating Afghanistan and Iraq as it did Germany and Japan after WWII. The US was not
reconstructing these countries as she did in Western Europe after WWII through Marshall
Plan. Instead, the authors argued, the US was trying to stretch her “imperial” tentacles on
the “natural resources” of the developing world. And the basic objective of the US “neo-
imperial vision” was to keep the rest of the developed world dependent on the US
management of the “global economic” system. The situation was untenable. Resultantly,
the US entered in uncertain waters of 21st century. The authors argued, the best thing for
the US was to withdraw her formidable power before it was too late to avoid impending
human and environmental tragedy.
It might bed disagreed to the authors to the extent that neoconservatives were the
main driving force behind the President in making Iraq policy. They constituted the
circumstantial factor only. It was a move on the part of US to extend her control over the
“natural resources” of the developing world. This was the main argument that great
powers always looked for “opportunity” to increase their “share of world power”.
32
Richard Crockatt, America Embattled: September 11, anti-Americanism and the
Global Order (2003): The book focused on the phenomenon of terrorism both in
historical as well as contemporary contexts. The work made a piercing analysis of the
“underlying causes” for such violent hatred on the “West” in general and America in
particular. The book particularly focused on the perceptions in the outside world about
American international role. The author tried to understand America, both state and
society, from within. The author’s second concern was the world political system, the
atmosphere where American foreign policy was conducted in the pursuit of its national
interests.
The main argument of the book, according to the author, was that the tragedy of
9/11 must be understood in the “context of America’s hegemonic role” after the end of
the Cold War, the origin and rise of phenomenon of political Islam particularly in the
Middle East and the complex phenomenon of globalization. In his final analysis, argued
the author, the real essence to understand 9/11 tragedy was the nature of interaction
between America and the world. The argument presented by the author was supportive to
the main argument of this dissertation that the US role could be understood only in its
“hegemonic” moves in the international political system.
General Tony Zinni and Tony Koltz, The Battle for Peace: A Frontline Vision of
America’s Power and Purpose (2006): General Tony Zinni, the son of an Italian
immigrant to America had served in the battle fields of Vietnam and Middle East as a
soldier. His experience there provided a great understanding of the complex situation
there and America’s role in the world. General Zinni argued that America was an “empire
now” and there was a big resistance to its policies in the world. Bush Administration
invaded Iraq but had no plan of reconstruction. In the aftermath of the fall of Saddam
Hussein everything went against the wishes of the invaders. The problem was they (Bush
and his team) did not understand the multiple complexities of “Iraqi state and society”.
The root causes of the turmoil in the world were not being addressed and America’s
aggressive policies were making the situation worse. The outcomes of these aggressive
policies were catastrophic for the safety of America itself. The goal was better and stable
world. America could promote a stable world but with its realistic and pragmatic policies
based on cooperation with the rest of the world.
33
The author was right to say that America had grown “imperialist”. The US
“aggressive policies” were a root cause of the turmoil in the world. The reason being that
America was not an exception, great powers had always tried to manage the international
political system according to their interests. The argument and material presented was
supportive to the hypothesis of this dissertation.
James H. Lebovic, Deterring International Terrorism and Rogue States: US
National Security Policy After 9/11 (2007): There was a widely held belief in America
that international terrorists and rogue states among other US enemies in the world could
not be deterred. The author, James Lebovic argued, that principles of deterrence strategy
in contravention of widely held view continue to apply. The author focused upon the
President Bush’s national security strategy along with its three basic pillars-missile
defense, preemption and homeland security. The author asserted that the “Bush doctrine
of preemption” was greater threat to the US security than the WMD in possession of
rogue states. The current US foreign policy had been “overstretched” notwithstanding the
resource constraints and unintended consequences. It might be disagreed with the author
that principles of deterrence strategy were applicable against terrorists. The terrorists
were non-state transnational actors.
Glenn Kessler, The Confidante: Condoleezza Rice and the Creation of the Legacy
(2007): Rice, an admirer and a teacher of the works of Hans J. Morgenthau, remained one
of the powerful and activist Secretaries of State in recent US history. Glenn Kessler, a
Washington Post diplomatic correspondent, provided a revealing view of Rice and
President George Bush’s controversial foreign policy particularly toward Iraq. She
exercised noticeable influence on President Bush. Glenn Kessler had written a sort of
biography of Rice. She played very important role in “shaping” President Bush’s foreign
policy. The author personally interviewed Rice multiple times and developed intimacy
with her, a very rare phenomenon. Kessler took the reader to the “secret meetings”. He
had great access to all the sources related to Rice. Most importantly, Kessler exposed her
“secret role particularly in making nuclear deal with India” and containing Israel –
Hezbollah war. The book was basically a primary source on George Bush’s years in
White House.
34
Antonia Juhasz, The Bush Agenda: Invading the World, one Economy at a Time
(2006): The central idea floated by the book was that Bush Administration really
followed “corporate globalization” agenda. The administration’s leading policy makers
including Dick Cheney among others actually were long time proponents of this radical
agenda. The 9/11 tragedy provided them the ripe “opportunity” to aggressively
implement it. The author, Juhasz, exposed the “key role” of the US corporations like –
Halliburton, Bechtel, Lockheed Martin and Chevron in inventing this agenda and its
aggressive implementation through Iraq war (2003). The driving force, wrote Juhasz, in
invading Iraq (2003) was its “oil reserves” in the Middle East after Saudi Arabia. The
Bush administration’s corporate allies were reaping the advantages of Iraq war by making
big profits. The results of these “corporate globalization” policies, among others were
ever increasing violence and terrorism stretching in different regions of the globe. The
work the Bush Agenda, uncovered the harsh realities about the future. That where the
Bush administration and her corporate allies were leading the world to?
The main argument of the author presented was that leading policy making
figures in the Bush Administration were “long time proponents” of Iraq invasion. Their
real goal was US big corporation’s access to the “oil resources” of Iraq. The argument
was supportive to my hypothesis. The direct access to Iraq’s oil resources increased the
US share of world power.
Stephen M. Walt, Taming American Power: The Global Response to US Primacy
(2005): Stephen M. Walt, the Kennedy School Professor, argued that America had grown
as the “most powerful empire” the human history had ever seen. Americans assumed that
their overwhelming dominant global role was benign. It’s a source of pride for them.
America’s powerful and dominant global position performed two functions. First, it
provided security to America and second, the America’s special position could be used to
restructure the world suitable to the US “interests and values”.
But there was another aspect of the situation that the US primacy was seen as a
source of political instability, resentment and fear in the rest of the world, both friends
and foes alike. The book basically gave the answer to the question why other countries
hated America’s current global role. Professor Stephen Walt argued that what strategies
the other countries follow to counter American power. These strategies, followed both by
35
friends and foes alike, threaten the US foreign policy goals and, in the end, might
irreversibly undermine the US dominant position. Finally, the author argued that the US
foreign policy making elite must adopt conciliatory foreign policy welcomed by other
countries. Rather confrontationist US foreign policy would reinforce the fear of American
military might. The core issue was how to maintain “US global leadership” without
generating global resistance?
It might be agreed with the author to the extent that great powers, like the US, use
their special position to restructure the international political system suitable to them
irrespective of the fallouts of such policies. The argument and material provided were
supportive to the argument of this dissertation that great powers “shape” the world
political system, making them “hegemon” in the system.
Jonathan Steele, Defeat: Why They Lost Iraq (2008): Jonathan Steele, one of the
best foreign correspondent working in Britain, presented a different thesis about Iraq war.
He rejected the common argument that the occupiers had no plan of reconstruction. The
author argued the “occupation was doomed to be failure” from the very beginning. When
the period of occupation was prolonged the suspicion grew within the people that the
occupier’s real aims were but “imperialistic”. The occupation immediately degenerated
into a disaster. The occupation of Iraq had no comparison with the occupation of Japan
and Germany on very fundamental reasons. The analogs were fit for explanation. The
Middle East repeatedly had been occupied and humiliated by the West in the last century.
Iraqis assumed that imperial objectives of occupation were the protection of Israel and
gaining control over the Middle Eastern oil.
The biggest mistake of the occupiers was their misunderstanding to see the
strength of Islamism in the region. The core argument presented here was that “Islamism”
opposed “hegemonic” position of the West in the Middle East region. Jonathan Steele, a
representative of the newspaper, Guardian, offered the view that Arab culture was
different from Western Culture. And occupiers could not understand this difference and
Iraq war degenerated into a human tragedy. The neoconservatives always wanted a
prolonged occupation of the country to fulfill their own agenda. None of the declared
goals democracy, security the occupiers could achieve.
36
It might be disagreed with the author that the US policy makers did not
understand the strength of “Islamic forces” in the Middle East. They did. Still they went
ahead under “false pretexts”. Islamic forces came to the forefront to oppose American
“hegemony” in the Middle East. On the other hand the US Iraq policy was exactly
suitable to long term and big US presence in the region. The war hawks in the
administration wanted this. The work is supportive to my hypothesis.
Stephen Zunes, Tinderbox: U.S. Foreign policy and the Roots of Terrorism
(2003): The book provided an overview of the historical and current U.S. foreign policy
in the Middle East. The author pointed out that the historical U.S. foreign policy in the
region revolved around exploitation by U.S. oil companies, selfish use of the UN,
unstinting support for authoritarian regimes, absolute umbrella to Israel, and direct
military intervention. Such a US regional role backfired and created “anti-Americanism”
in the Middle East. This anti-Americanism culminated into 9/11’s sad happenings. The
author had raised some important moral and legal questions about the US Middle East
policy.
The US policy of “militarization” of the region basically was “self-defeating”
and engenders security threats to the US security itself. The US foreign policy was not
based on its values of “freedom, democracy and rule of law”. The central thread running
through the entire book was that the US historical and recent/current policy toward the
Middle East was “counterproductive” and had made Americans less safe. It might be
agreed with the author to the extent that there had been discrepancy between stated US
goals and operational policy in Iraq. The promotion of democracy was not “US goal” in
Iraq. The work supported the argument of this dissertation.
Reshapping Rogue States: Preemption, Regime Change, and U.S. Policy Toward
Iran, Iraq and North Korea (2004), A Washington Quarterly Reader, (edited by)
Alexander. T.J. Lennon and Camille Eiss: In the seismic aftermath of 9/11, President
George W. Bush, in his second State of the Union address in January 2002 declared Iraq,
Iran and North Korea constituted an “axis of evil”. It was just rhetoric like President
Ronald Reagan’s “evil empire”. These rogue states, according to President Bush, were a
threat to the “world peace and security”. This was a new enemy. To defeat this new
37
enemy required new strategy. The new strategy to reshape rogue states consisted of dual
policy of newly invoked “The Bush Doctrine of preemption” and “Regime change”.
The central idea of this work was that under “special circumstances” the doctrine
of preemption and regime change might be justified. The test case for implementation the
“new strategy” was Iraq where America invaded unilaterally. The case of Iran and North
Korea had gone to the background at least for the time being. America was facing a new
Iraq different from the one they perceived at the time of invasion. Iraq became under the
grips of insurgency, political instability and turmoil. It might be disagreed with the
central argument of the authors that “special circumstances” justified doctrines of
preemption, unilateralism and regime change. They rather constituted great power
strategy to achieve ultimate goal of “hegemony” in the international political system.
Mel Gurtov, Superpower on Crusade: The Bush Doctrine in US Foreign Policy (2003):
Mel Gurtov gave a harsh analysis of President Bush’s handling of foreign policy. An
opportunity to seize the “uni-polar moment” was lost in 1990s. Bush Administration did
not want to lose the second opportunity provided to it by 9/11. The administration seized
the opportunity to build the US Empire. The intellectual fodder of the Bush doctrine, a
combination of three interlinked themes unilateralism, preemption and regime change,
was provided by neoconservatives thinking. Iraq war was more a case of “political
failure” rather than intelligence failure. Gurtov contends that the real basis for “empire
building” was laid down by “NSC–68” in the year 1950.
Neocons were looking for an “opportunity” to aggressively implement their agenda and
9/11 came as a blessing for them and America speeded up its course of world domination.
The work was well researched. The real gem of the work remained its last chapter. Here
Gurtov made a heart breaking analysis in a very emotional manner that what and where
has gone wrong. America should have followed a different path. The author was “hyper
critical” of Bush administration’s foreign policy particularly Iraq war. It might be agreed
with Mel Gurtov that the Bush Doctrine and subsequent invasion of Iraq was a handy
work of neoconservatives. They wanted “US global hegemony” starting from the Middle
East. The author’s viewpoint supported the main argument of this dissertation.
Ron Suskind, The One Percent Doctrine: Deep Inside America’s Pursuit of its
Enemies Since 9/11 (2006): Ron Suskind, an American journalist, uncovered the inside
38
story of America’s relentless pursuit of terrorists in US war on terror. It was interesting to
note that in the very first meeting of NSC in January 2001. Rice, the NSC adviser to the
President Bush, put two things before the participants– how Saddam Hussein had been
destabilizing the region and how he could be removed from power. 9/11 provided them
with unprecedented “opportunity” to remove Saddam Hussein from power. The Cheney
Doctrine “The One Percent Doctrine” was to become the “guiding” principle of US war
on terror.
Although there was no convincing proof of al-Qaeda- Saddam Hussein link but
still a case was made slowly for the invasion of Iraq. In making case for Iraq invasion
Bush declared Iraq an “axis of evil” along with Iran and North Korea in his second State
of the Union address in January, 2001. Again the same reference was made by the
President in June 2002, at West Point, New York. Later on a British intelligence report
linked Iraq buying uranium from Niger, Africa. Ron Suskind uncovered this whole secret
story making a case for invasion of Iraq in March, 2003. The US war against terror
continued with all its attendant disaster. In the end, the author put a question, could the
US win this war against ingenious enemy?
It might be agreed with the author to the extent that the Bush Administration
slowly made a case for war on Iraq without any justifiable cause. However, it might be
disagreed with the author on the grounds that it was a “deliberate” policy and could be
understood only under the offensive realist model for great power conduct in
international political system. A great power’s ultimate aim was to become “hegemon” in
the system.
William Shawcross, Allies: The U.S., Britain, Europe and the War in Iraq (2003):
The work was not an Iraq war narrative. Rather it looked on the way the shocked
international community “confronted the new danger” of terrorism. Now the threat to
global peace and security was different. In order to confront this new menace Bush and
Blair were driven by their “neo-imperial” vision enshrined in The Bush Doctrine. The
neoconservatives got an “opportunity” to reconstruct the world according to their own
vision.
Another argument presented in the book was that how world community could
confront this problem of terrorism. For whatever reasons, Iraq had moved to the centre of
39
the war against terror. However, at the same time the Bush Doctrine with its three basic
elements “prevention, preemption, and expansion of military” capacity had created
tensions among the US allies worldwide. Shawcross concluded the “world community”
could not afford defeat in the hands of terrorists. The Iraq war had also demonstrated that
a new era of 21st century global politics had set in.
Tom Clancy with General Tony Zinni (Ret.) and Tony Koltz, Battle Ready
(2004): In the aftermath of Gulf War First, Saddam Hussein agreed to a UN supervised
disarmament aimed at the destruction of WMD, if any, and the program related to their
production. The authors were of the “opinion” that it was “big lie” and Saddam never
intended to give up his pursuit of WMD. With the happenings of 9/11, American goal in
Iraq changed from WMD to “regime change”. It might be disagreed with the authors that
America went to Iraq unplanned without having plan for reconstruction. Rather it suited
well to the real goals of Bush Administration in Iraq as “democratic reconstruction” of
Iraq was not “operational” US goal. However, it might be agreed with the authors that
America was “imperialist”. This lasts argument fitted to the scheme of this dissertation.
America was an “empire” for all practical purposes. However, it was not an
empire in the traditional “military sense” rather it was an “empire of influence”. The
authors were of the opinion that they went to Iraq without any plan of “reconstruction”
and nation building. America was now in a mess in Iraq. They argued that Americans
were reluctant deliverers. Regional hegemons and rogue states would, as a response to
the US wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, develop their own capabilities to counter the US all
over the world and globalization was adding to this confusion. Iraq, Iran and North Korea
still remained major military problems for the US. America should update the capacity of
her military forces to perform its global role.
The Iraq War: Causes and Consequences eds. (2007): Rick Fawn and Raymond
Hinnebusch: Opinion, not only in America but worldwide, had been sharply divided on
the issue of US invasion of Iraq. The entire world supported, both physically and morally,
the US war on Afghanistan in the aftermath of 9/11. The book under reference examined
in-depth the causes and the logic thereof, both declared and hidden, for the war and its far
reaching consequences on the region, the key players and the nature of the international
political system in future. There was a big shift in the conduct of the “global” hegemon.
40
The Iraq war had far reaching implications on the standard and paradigms governing
international relations since the end of World War II. One core objective of the book,
argued authors, was to “unveil the actualities” in the conduct of ruling elites in the US.
The US had grown as a “global hegemon”. The war carried serious implications on the
traditional theories of international relations discipline.
John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, The Israel Lobby and US Foreign
Policy (2007): Since 1960s the “US foreign policy” in the Middle East has been
revolving around a single principle: unflinching support for Israel. Professor
Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt argued, this overwhelmingly “one dimensional” US
foreign policy, had been the handiwork of powerful “Israel lobby” in the US. The US had
been providing remarkable material, strategic and diplomatic support to Israel. The core
argument of these two professors was that this “exceptional level” of US support to Israel
could not be fully explained on either moral or strategic grounds. This was due largely to
the political influence of the Israel lobby in the US.
The Israel lobby was behind the use of American power to “remake the political map” of
the Middle East. The Iraq war also was due largely to the activities of the lobby. The
professors contended that by so doing Israel lobby irreparably had damaged not only the
US “national and strategic interests” in the Middle East but had also damaged, in the long
terms, Israel’s own” security”. The US foreign policy toward the Middle East remained
one of the central challenges of today for the US foreign policy making elites. As the
region had been beset with numerous deadly problems and was going to be as such at
least for another generation.
The professors had given a piercing view of Israel lobby’s important role in
making US Middle East policy in general and Iraq policy in particular. However, it might
be disagreed with the professors that Israel factor had been the only determinant of US
Iraq policy. It was over simplification of the complex determinants of US policy towards
Middle East in general and Iraq in particular. The argument presented partially fitted to
the scheme of this dissertation.
Rashid Khalidi, Resurrecting Empire: Western Footprints and America’s Perilous
path in the Middle East (2004): American unilateralism, under the cover of doctrine of
preemption to invade Iraq, was in fact a continuity of “Western imperialism” in the
41
Middle East at the footprints of Britain and France in early 20 th century. The Bush
administration’s decision to invade Iraq in March 2003 basically was shaped by the
“neoconservative” ideologues in the higher rungs of the administration. However, by so
doing Bush administration ignored lessons of history. Mr. Khalidi argued that the
subsequent violent insurgency was the result of “misconceived” ill-military adventure in
Iraq. The main cause of insurgency, contended Khalidi, was the US “occupation” of Iraq.
The insurgency was not going to end till occupation of Iraq continued. In the end, Khalidi
gave a solution to solve Iraqi problem by invoking the help of UN, other major powers
and its neighbors.
It might be partially agreed with Khalidi to the extent that neoconservatives
shaped President Bush’s decision to invade Iraq in 2003. The argument fitted to the
scheme of this dissertation. But it might be disagreed with the author that it was
continuity of British and French imperialism in 21st Century. It was oversimplification of
a complex reality.
Robert J. Jackson and Philip Towle, Temptations of Power: The United States in
Global Politics After 9/11(2006): End of the Cold War and disintegration of USSR led to
the creation of uni-polar world where the US rose to the position of unrivaled “world
hegemon”. The 9/11 happenings provided the US with an “unprecedented opportunity” to
advance neoconservatives “global” agenda. For all practical purposes America had
become an “empire” and its war on Iraq in 2003 was a witness to American
“imperialism”. Whatever might be the causes of this war but it was nothing less than an
“imperial” drive to regulate the world on its own terms. It might be agreed to the writers
that it was an “imperial” drive. However, it might be disagreed with them that it was
imperialism in the historical and traditional sense. These arguments fitted to the scheme
of this dissertation.
Jeremy Black, Great Powers and the Quest for Hegemony: The World Order
Since 1500 (2008): Jeremy Black started this work by giving reference and explaining
thereby Paul Kennedy’s work, Rise and Fall of Great Powers contending that Paul
Kennedy’s emphasis was on the dependent relationship between “economic strength and
great-power status”. Paul Kennedy also argued that “strategic overstretch” could weaken
the economic base of great powers. The author of the book gave plenty of examples from
42
history to substantiate his view from Roman Empire to USSR. While meditating on Paul
Kennedy, the author quoted Kennedy that more military expenditure could backfire and
could be counterproductive. The US had been running the same familiar risk of “imperial
overstretch”. The US global interests had grown too much to be defended.
In the post 9/11 focus, the US war on terror led to two regional wars –
Afghanistan and Iraq wars. The US military budget skyrocketed from $295 billion in
2000 to $441.3 billion in 2007. Regime change became necessary in Iraq to ensure peace
and stability. The Bush government seriously “misjudged” the negative effects of military
adventure in Iraq. Finally, the author was of the opinion that Paul Kennedy’s thesis as
such could not be applied on the US. However, he did not reject Paul Kennedy’s thesis
summarily. It might be agreed with the author that US ran the risk of ‘imperial
overstretch’. At the same time it might be disagreed with him that “regime change” in
Iraq was necessary for peace and stability in the region. However, it was not supported by
empirical evidence.
George Kassimeris (editor), The Barbarisation of Warfare (2006): The work was
a collection of essays on US wars. During the Cold War years America fought many
wars, both proxy and two direct wars – Korean War and Vietnam War. Marilyn Young,
the writer of an essay in the work cited Stephen Peter Rosen, a Harvard Professor giving
his opinion on US war on terror. Professor Rosen was of the view that in this era of “total
American dominance” the wars would not end and would remain constant. America was
an “empire” now. As with other empires in history, the US goal was not defeating the
enemy but maintaining the “imperial” position. Imperial wars might end but imperial
garrisons might remain at place to ensure stability.
President Bush’s 2002 National Security Strategy was based on professor Rosen’s
concept of imperial warfare. The war on terror was not going to end soon. The
neoconservatives supplied the intellectual fodder to this war as Charles Krauthammer, a
well known American conservator, puts it shortly before 9/11 tragedy. America was not
just a hegemon rather it’s a uniquely “benign imperium”. Christian Zionism along with
Neo-conservatism, supported this war. Christian Zionism in America vigorously
supported Israel and its policies in the Middle East. The theme of the work was that US
43
wars on terror– Afghanistan and Iraq were not going to “end soon” owing to the above
cited reasons.
It might be agreed with the main argument of the author that it was an era of US
dominance. The war on terror was an imperial war and would not end soon. The
neoconservatives and Christian Zionists in the US supported this war. The whole
argument supported the main scheme of this dissertation that the US invasion of Iraq was
the case of offensive realism.
Kees Van der Pijl, Global Rivalries: From the Cold War to Iraq (2006): The
argument given in the work was that Middle East historically had been the region of
“global rivalries” among great powers. Whatever had been the historical reasons but the
current reason of big power rivalry in the region mainly was driven by oil concerns. The
American war on Iraq, argued the author was driven by “energy security”. Definitely,
there had been Israel connection as well. The author put neoconservatism on the forefront
to convince President George Bush to go for invasion of Iraq in 2003. The region had
been greatly “militarized” as well by the West in general and America in particular.
The argument presented by the author was that the US war on Iraq was mainly
driven by “oil” concerns supported by neoconservatives. The argument exactly fitted to
the scheme of this dissertation that great powers were always “looking for opportunities”
to increase their “share” of world power.
Jeremy Jones, Negotiating Change: The New Politics of the Middle East (2007):
The author deeply dissected one of the most publicly cited goals of the US invasion of
Iraq in 2003 – promotion of democracy in Iraq and subsequently elsewhere in the Middle
East. The Bush Administration had no plan for reconstruction and democratic promotion
in post-Saddam Iraq. Consequently, owing to the flawed policies Iraq degenerated into
violent insurgency. The American variant of democracy could not be imposed in a
foreign land simply by going for regime change in a country where people had long
traditions of tribalism. The writer was of the opinion that the only solution to the Iraqi
situation or otherwise for the whole region was to recognize the new realities of the
region.
The only way out was “negotiations” with the people of the region. Somebody
like or not, Hamas, Hizbollah, Muslim Brotherhood, and Iranian government, were the
44
true representative of the “popular opinion” in the Arab world. The region was socially
and culturally complex and diverse. If Western governments wanted to play positive role
in the region they must had opted for negotiation and accepted the consequences of such
negotiations whatsoever. It might be agreed with the writer that US motive in invading
Iraq was not promotion of democracy there. It was used as a public “sell out” case. The
US could not impose democracy, even if it was sincere with, through the use of force.
The argument supported the scheme of this dissertation.
Robert Zubrin, Energy Victory: Winning the War on Terror by Breaking Free of
Oil (2007): For the last century oil had been on the “centre of global politics”. It had been
decisive factor in finally determining victory or defeat of a nation struggling for “world
hegemony”. The US dependence on foreign oil in 1972 was 30%; the same figure had
risen to 60% in 2006. The corresponding rise in US oil import bill had been from $4
billion to $260 billion. American left viewed the US war on terror as a struggle for “oil
control” in the Middle East. However, this theory was indefensible. American
dependence on foreign oil increased greatly within the last four decades. The main
argument presented above supported the scheme of thought of this dissertation that great
powers were always looking for opportunities to exploit in their favor. The US moves in
Iraq could be seen in the US dependence on foreign oil.
Gilles Kepel, The War for Muslim Minds: Islam and the West (2004): The central idea of
the work was, the neocons who were on the front chair of Bush administration, wanted to
“restructure the entire Middle East” starting from regime change in Saddam’s Iraq.
Saddam regime would be replaced by a pro-America democratic government in Baghdad.
The pro-American government in Baghdad would “recognize” Israel. The case of Iraq’s
possession of “WMD” was used as a “justification” to invade Iraq. Saddam was the most
vocal enemy of Israel in the region. The US invasion of Iraq in 2003, under whatever
pretext, was ultimately to give security to Israel and protection for oil.
The United States Contested: American Unilateralism and European Discontent
(eds.) (2006): Sergio Fabbrini, the American elections of 2000 were a watershed in US
foreign policy. The reason was the success of an ideological coalition in the election. 9/11
provided the opportunity to this coalition to invoke US unilateral invasion of Iraq in
2003, which in turn triggered a widespread protest movement worldwide especially in
45
Europe, having a tone of anti-Americanism. World saw significant increase in “mistrust”
between Europe and America as 9/11 led to “radical” transformation of the US foreign
policy. The central idea of the work was that 9/11 initiated a process of aggressive
unilateralism in the US foreign policy which in turn increased feelings of anti-
Americanism in Europe. President Bush pursued unilateralist strategy in Iraq. Later on,
the US took immediate control of the oil wells in Iraq. It provided the rationale. Sergio
Fabbrini argued that American “conservative nationalism” was destined to clash with
European “supra-nationalism” as the former reflects nationalist worldwide drive whereas
latter represents post-nationalist perspective. If Europe could have provided alternatives
to US unilateralism instead of contesting it then it could have helped in moderating
American conservative nationalism.
It might be agreed with the core argument of Fabbrini that 9/11 introduced
“aggressive unilateralism” in US foreign policy. However, it might be disagreed with the
author that conservative American nationalism was destined to clash with European
supra-nationalism on the grounds that the wave of anti-Americanism in Europe was not
that confrontationist. As Europe depended on American military might for oil supplies
from the Middle East. The argument presented supports my hypothesis.
Gabriel Kolko, The Age of War: The United States Confronts the World (2007):
The argument presented in this book was that the current pattern of the US foreign policy
towards the Middle East could be properly understood in historical context starting from
1950s. The US policy towards the region was continuity of its historical legacy. By 1940
the US spent only 18% of its budget on defense but coming of the Cold War saw a steep
rise in it up to 72% in 1952. There had been a fundamental shift in the original goals of
the US policy in the region which had resulted into frustrations and failures of US policy
in international arena. 9/11 tragedy was the “direct result” of US policy towards the
Middle East since 1950.
The author put forward the argument that Neocons played “critical role” in
making President Bush’s decision to invade Iraq, however, they were not the only factor
behind this crucial decision. The Neocons simply exploited this big opportunity to
“restructure” Middle East compatible to Israel’s interests in the region. Finally, the author
argued that there was nothing “new and original” in President Bush’s policy towards the
46
region in particular. This policy was not an exception after 9/11 but a continuity of US
foreign policy tradition.
It might be disagreed with the author to the extent that neocons wanted to
restructure Middle East suitable to Israel only. The US policy was multifaceted and
complex. Neocons exploited the opportunity to increase US interest in the region. The
argument was supportive to the main argument of this dissertation that great powers tried
to “restructure world order” according to their interests.
Robert K. Brigham, Is Iraq Another Vietnam? (2006): The author was of the view
that Saddam’s Iraq was a rogue state pursuing “WMD” to threaten world peace and
security and his links with al-Qaeda in making 9/11 a reality were the “false pretexts”
used by the Bush Administration to invade Iraq unilaterally in March, 2003. The Vietnam
War was waged to stop the spread of communism and saving the falling dominos in
Southeast Asia. The central argument of this book was to explore the big differences
between the two wars. There were numerous important differences between the two wars.
However, the author pointed out a startling similarity between the two the ever
declining support of American public. Most Americans disagreed with Bush
Administration’s mission of planting the seeds of popular “democracy” in the region.
America had been suffering from great difficulty in Iraq since 2003. The great lesson of
the two wars, argued the author, was that in future the US must use its power cautiously
and wisely.
Richard Lock–Pullan, US Intervention Policy and Army Innovation: From
Vietnam to Iraq (2006): Whereas the question of US unilateral and preemptive invasion
of Iraq in 2003 was concerned the author discussed the causes of invasion but gave a
regrettable scenario of post-Saddam miscalculation. The US invaded Iraq, argued the
author under the basis of “faulty intelligence” and wrong assumptions but it resulted into
a big and perhaps unintended human tragedy. Iraq immediately degenerated into an all
around violent insurgency. Neither the Bush Administration nor the occupation military
forces had preconceived plan of “reconstruction” and nation building. The main idea of
the author was that the Bush Administration deliberately “deceived” American people
and the world on the issue of Iraq’s WMD to pursue American “global dominance”. The
argument exactly fitted to the scheme of thought of this dissertation that how great
47
powers conducted their foreign policies in international political system and their
ultimate aim had been to gain “hegemony” in the system.
George Soros, The Bubble of American Supremacy: Correcting of Misuse of
American Power (2004): The Bush Administration’s war on terror was a declaration to
implement a radical foreign policy agenda that predated the attacks on World Trade
Centre and Pentagon. As the US indisputably had acquired the status of the most
dominant power in the post-Cold War era, by dint of its sheer power, it was in a position
to enforce her interests and values on the rest of the world. Occupation of Iraq was a part
of this agenda and the first application of the Bush Doctrine. Both the president Bush and
neocons exploited the opportunity, argued the author. The proponents of invasion of Iraq
were ready to argue the case even if it involved “deliberate deception”. And they did it.
The case of Iraq possessing WMD was deliberately pushed to deceive Americans and the
world at large. North Korea was and continued to be a more dangerous state.
Finally, the core idea of the work was the Bush Administration’s unflinching
course to pursue American worldwide dominance was a dangerous turn. Those who
supported Bush realized their mistake. They felt that they were deceived. One main
theme of the work also was that Americans must had repudiated the Bush Doctrine as a
foreign policy strategy and must had pursued a path of more enlightened vision for
playing the better US role in the world.
Mark Levine, Why They Don’t Hate Us: Lifting the Veil on the Axis of Evil
(2005): America, once again, had started the noble crusade of liberating Iraq by killing
them. Creation of Chaos, both in Afghanistan and Iraq, was necessary prerequisite for
liberation. The clash of civilizations between democratic America and axis of evil
seemed dangerous. The author argued that there could have been no “Axis of Evil” had
there been no “Axis of Arrogance and Ignorance” in the world. The Bush Administration
used this “axis of evil” fiction to strike terror in the hearts of Americans to justify his
invasion of Iraq as a part of his total dominance of the world.
The other theme of the book was that they should bring together the persons who
were, both interested and capable, of lifting the veil from both Muslim and Western
societies, particularly American society for initiating a positive “social change” in
Muslim and American cultures alike. This was indeed the most important thing before
48
scholars and activists. Their focus should be specifically on the culture of the Middle East
in the age of “globalization”. The task of social change was always through culture rather
than through political machinations and occupation and violence.
Solomon Hughes, War on Terror, INC Corporate Profiteering from the Politics of
Fear (2007): For some people war was a commercial bonanza. Solomon Hughes argued
that war on terror had extended the role of “private” companies bringing them on areas of
public policy that traditionally had been the sole responsibility of both politicians and
state alike. Hughes argued that the private sector with its army of lobbyists and salesmen
were lowering the practical and moral standards of military interventions (Afghanistan
and Iraq). Who was behind these private companies reaping the dividend of the war on
terror? Hughes threw light on it. These businessmen were close to the US political
“decision–makers”. Hughes cataloged the applying record of the private contractors that
were doing American government’s work. They were doing it in a dirty manner.
Yossef Bodansky, The Secret History of the Iraq War (2004): Soon after
Afghanistan, the Bush Administration invaded Iraq in 2003 to remove Saddam regime.
Instead of democracy taking hold, as claimed by the President, the country plunged into
violent insurgency with no end in sight. Yossef Bodansky offered a new version of the
Iraq war. The war, writer argued, was “doomed to be failure” from the beginning. It was
rather intelligence failure. Bodansky an expert on and director of the Congressional Task
Force on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare provided a vivid picture that all the
aspects of Iraq war were misunderstood. He gave startling revelations. Bodansky drew
upon previously untapped intelligence and regional sources on the war. The Secret
History of the Iraq War presented not only the convincing but also detailed account of the
most controversial contemporary war. He put the blame on the intelligence system for the
failure of the Iraq War. Empirical evidence disagreed with Bodansky that the Iraq war
actually was intelligence failure. The intelligence was deliberately misinterpreted.
Michael B. Oren, Power, Faith, and Fantasy: America in the Middle East 1776 to
the Presents (2007): The work had been deeply researched. The work provided the
comprehensive survey, in historical perspective of the US involvement in the Middle East
for the last 230 years. Extensively researched, the work provided a vivid picture of how
America replaced Britain in 20th century as an “imperial” power in the region.
49
John Davis, Presidential Policies and the Road to the Second Iraq War (2006):
The main theme of the work was that Saddam Hussain was a threat to regional stability.
He must be eliminated. The invasion of Iraq was also motivated by US “oil interests” in
Iraq. Finally, Iraq was a part of “unfinished” US agenda in the Middle East. The author
presented no new idea. The author supported the main argument of this dissertation. Nine
contributors, War with No End (2007): The work dealt with the anti-war movement in the
US. The movement believed that Iraq war was a “mistake” and it must be ended
immediately. It was an effort on the part of Bush Administration to “legitimize US global
dominance” and for the control of resources. The theme of the book supported the main
argument of this dissertation.
Jason Burke, The 9/11 Wars (2011): The theme of the work was that US invaded
Iraq on the basis of “unverified, false, and misinterpreted” intelligence. The issues used
were WMD and Iraq’s link with al-Qaeda. Real causes were change of “status quo” in the
Middle East, security of Israel, planting US power in the Middle East, security of oil etc.
The book supported the main theme of the dissertation.
James M. McCormick, The Domestic Sources of American Foreign Policy:
Insights and Evidence eds. (2012): The book was a reflection of two dozen articles on US
foreign policy. The articles mainly were related to US invasion of Iraq. The main theme
of the work was that US invaded Iraq under wrong arguments. The real reasons were
different such as oil and Israel. The book supported the main argument of this
dissertation.
Peter L. Bergen, The Longest War: The Enduring Conflict between America and
al-Qaeda (2011): The work analyzed the most important contemporary conflict from the
perspective of bin Ladin. The author himself interviewed bin Ladin in 1997. Osama did
not believe in Saddam. He did not see Saddam as a true Muslim. There was no
connection between al-Qaeda and Iraq. Despite this all, the Bush Administration made
intense propaganda and persuaded Americans to attack Saddam. The author summarily
rejected any connection between them. The author believed that the President “already
had decided” to take on Saddam Hussain before 9/11 happened. The author supported the
main argument of this dissertation.
50
Christopher Doran, Making the World Safe for Capitalism: How Iraq Threatened
the US Economic Empire and Had to be Destroyed (2012): Title of the book was the
major theme of this work. The Iraq war was motivated by the fact that Iraq presented a
threat to US “economic” dominance. The US economic dominance of the world was
rooted in US access to the third world market. WMD was used as a “pretext” to wage war
on Iraq. The war was for the extension of “free market” policies. America has been
earning trillions of dollars. The book provided a fresh perspective on the war. The
argument of the author supported the main argument of this dissertation.
Michael Harland, Democratic Vanguardism: Modernity, Intervention, and the
Making of the Bush Doctrine (2013): The book had been written in the perspective of
“American Exceptionalism.” America had a tradition of “democratic crusade” abroad.
Planting democracy in foreign lands was seen as the best response to terrorism. For the
Bush Administration, rightly or wrongly, that was the solution to the problem of
extremism and terrorism. 9/11 provided the opportunity for democratic crusade. Role of
the Neoconservatives had been exaggerated in making Iraq policy. The principals of the
Bush Administration were the “prime shapers” of the policy. They included the President
himself, Rice, Dick Cheney, Rumsfeld, and Colin Powell. None of these five principals
was a true neoconservative, argued the author. The work supported my scheme of
thought as great powers always try to restructure international political system suitable to
their “interests and values”.
Mohamed Elbaradei, The Age of Deception: Nuclear Diplomacy in Treacherous
Times (2011): The author was IAEA chief during run up to US war on Iraq. For the
author, it was a “needless war” because Iraq already had destroyed its facilities of “fuel
cycles” in 1990s. The inspections restarted in Iraq in November 2002. There were 139
inspections of 106 locations in 60 days. The inspectors did not get any proof of “revival”
of nuclear weapons activities in Iraq. Despite this, Condoleezza Rice made a statement on
CNN about the nuclear use of aluminum tubes in Iraq. It was a “misleading” statement.
They were meant for use in artillery shells.
Similarly, despite this all, both the President in his State of the Union address and Colin
Powell in his address to UNSC accused Saddam regime for buying uranium from Niger,
Africa. The author reported to the UNSC that reports regarding Iraq’s purchase of
51
“yellowcake” were not substantiated by empirical evidence. Still our credibility, as
independent inspectors, was arrogantly “dismissed and discounted”. Elbaradei requested
more time for further inspections but the same was refused by the US and invaded Iraq
unilaterally in March, 2003. The author supported my main argument because great
powers, in their pursuit of interests “cheat and lie”.
The following authors/ works supported the main argument of this dissertation:
(Bob Woodword: 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008); (Noam Choamsky: 2003, 2004, 2005);
(Galbraith 2006); (Vassilis K. Fouskas and Bulent Gokay: 2005); (General Tony Zinny
and Tony Koltz, 2006); (Antonia Juhasz: 2006); (Stephen M. Walt: 2005); (Jonathan
Steele: 2008); (Stephen Zunes: 2003); (Mel Gurtov: 2008); (William Showcross: 2003);
(Tom Clancy with General Tonny Zinni (retd) and Tonny Koltz: 2004); (Rick Fawn and
Raymond Hinnebusch: 2007); (Geroge Kassimeris: 2006); (Kees Van der Pijl: 2006);
(Jeremy Jones: 2007); (Robert Zubrin: 2007); (Sergio Fabbrini: 2006); (George Soros:
2004); (John Davis: 2006); (Nine Contributors: 2007); (Jason Burke: 2011); (James
McCormick: 2012); (Peter Bergen: 2011); (Christopher Doran: 2012); (Michael Harland:
2013); (Mohamed El-Baradei: 2011) setc.
The above cited works supported the main argument of this dissertation. The
authors invariably maintained that the US invasion of Iraq basically was motivated by
power considerations. The core US interest had been the US drive to become hegemon in
the unipolar world under the promulgation of the Bush Doctrine which was a
combination of three interrelated themes of preemption, unilateralism and regime change.
The themes of Iraq’s links with al- Qaeda and possession of WMD were used for public
sell out of war on Iraq. Similarly the promotion of democracy in Iraq was not the
operational goal of the US.
There might be disagreement with some writers who maintained that Israel was
the sole motivation of US-Iraq policy leading to the invasion of Iraq in 2003. The regime
change in Iraq with pro-US democratic government would recognize Israel and remove
the bitterest enemy of Israel. This could be termed as over simplification of a complex
geopolitical reality. That was also contradictory to great power behavior. Single factor
explanation did not fit into great power behavior in world political system, argued an
American scholar J.N.Rosenau (1966, 1980). The above cited arguments by different
52
authors exactly fitted into my scheme of thought. Hence it might be argued that great
powers conducted their foreign polices and exploited opportunities that came in their way
in international political system to “increase their share of world power”. Their ultimate
“aim” has been to become “hegemon” in the system. That also is the argument presented
by offensive realist model. Hence, the main argument of this dissertation is that the US-
Iraq policy from 2001 to 2008 constituted an excellent case study of offensive realist
model.
Several scholars have investigated only one of the multiple and complex aspects
of President Gorge W. Bush’s Iraq policy. Yet no comprehensive study has been carried
out on this topic. There is a serious lack of comprehensive or detailed analysis of
American policy toward Iraq during 2001 to 2008, and, also, the necessity to discover US
operational objectives behind that policy. After studying the existing literature at length a
gap has been identified in it. The US invasion of Iraq presented an excellent case study of
offensive realist model. No research work, based on this theme, has been found. This
work would fill this gap. This study is an attempt to provide a comprehensive analysis of
US- Iraq policy and fill the gap. Its operational objectives and implications in the wider
context have been examined in depth.
1.9 Organization of the Study:The present dissertation consists of seven chapters followed by a conclusion.
The ‘Introduction’ clearly states the title, statement of problem, the theoretical
framework, the central questions, the main argument and the organization of this
dissertation along with literature review. The chapter two ‘Theoretical Framework’ the
main argument presented in this chapter is that there has been a close fit between the
theory of offensive realism and the US-Iraq policy from 2001-2008. The theory of
offensive realism constitutes the theoretical framework of this dissertation. The chapter
three ‘Overview of Historical US-Iraq Policy’ the main argument of this chapter is that
the US-Iraq policy from 2001-2008 in historical perspective fitted the power politics
paradigm. The historical policy was aimed at power maximization, particularly in the
post-WWII era.
53
The chapter four ‘US Invasion under False Pretexts’ the main argument presented
in this chapter is that the declared objectives of the US unilateral and pre-emptive
invasion of Iraq in 2003 did not withstand the test of empirical verifiability, and were
discredited after investigations. The US invaded Iraq under false pretexts. The chapter
five ‘The Operational Objectives’ the argument made in this chapter is that the
operational US-Iraq policy from 2001-2008 fitted the assumptions of offensive realism.
The empirical evidence in detail has been provided to prove the case.
The chapter six ‘Occupation Policy in Iraq’ the argument made in this chapter is
that the US occupation policy in Iraq from 2003-2008 further substantiated the empirical
evidence of the main argument of this dissertation. The prolonged occupation of Iraq was
in line with principles of offensive realism. The chapter seven ‘Consequences and
Implications’ this part of the dissertation discusses in detail the consequences and
implications of the US-Iraq policy for the period under study. The benefits US derived far
exceeded the limits of reasonable cost of the policy. It is followed by a conclusion.
Chapter Two
Theoretical Framework
54
The theme of the argument presented in this chapter was that there had been a close fit
between the US-Iraq policy from 2001 to 2008 and the theory of offensive realism. The
US-Iraq policy during this period could be analyzed, interpreted, and understood through
the theoretical framework of offensive realism. The theory provided the most convincing
explanation of the policy under study.
For understanding foreign policy of a state, there had been some conceptual or
theoretical foundations known as theories of international relations. The theories gave
intellectual guidelines to the researchers and provided the best explanation of foreign
policy of a state. Theory of realism, owing to certain reasons, remained the dominant
theory of international relations as it provided the most convincing explanation of war,
the permanent feature of international relations.55
2.1 Realism:Theory of realism, especially its latest variant neo-realism, fundamentally dealt with
international political security. The most important theme of world politics had been
power politics. President George W. Bush, while invading Iraq, pursued the paradigm of
power politics, more specifically offensive realism to reshape and dominate global
political system. The Neoconservatives in the George W. Bush Administration reinforced
his drive to restructure and dominate international political system.
The President’s policy in the US war on terror could be explained from the
perspective of John Mearsheimer’s theory of offensive realism, the latest variant of realist
tradition, to explain and understand the US unilateral and preemptive decision to invade
Iraq in March 2003. The realist tradition in international relations had been identified as a
pursuit of national self-interest by a state in an anarchic world where war had remained a
permanent feature of world politics.56 Theory of realism provided the most convincing
explanation of the US unilateral and preemptive invasion of Iraq in March, 2003. Theory
of offensive realism made the theoretical framework of this dissertation.
Henry Kissinger wrote that realist tradition insisted that nothing had changed in
world politics since Thucydides and Machiavelli. Military and economic status of a state
55 Scott Burchill. “Realism and Neo-Realism”, in Burchill Scott, et al. Theories of International Relations. (N.Y.: Palgrave Macmillan, 1996), 67
56 Dunne, Realism, 110
55
determined its fate.57 Realist tradition also maintained that essence of international
politics was the struggle for power among states. Henry Kissinger also wrote that the
given objectives of a state, at a given time, were imposed by the threats to its security and
existence.58 For all realist schools of thought states remained the key actors in
international politics, they must pursue power as there had been no guarantee of their
security in the international political system. War had been the legitimate instrument of
statecraft. The only guarantee of the existence of a state in international political system
is power. Realism offered a “manual for maximizing power” of a state in anarchic
system.59
2.1.1 Classical Realist Tradition:
The earliest realist thinking could be traced back to Thucydides, a Greek philosopher-
cum-historian. The “Melian Dialogue” in his famous book Peloponnesian War had been
cited as the basis of realist thinking in international relations.60 Thucydides wrote that
“power was the central theme of international politics” and all states, whether large or
small, must adapt to that natural reality. If states understood that reality they could
survive otherwise they might be vanished away from the face of the earth.61 Thucydides
made it clear that the “powerful (strong) did what they had the power to do” and the weak
had no choice but to accept. And states had no choice except to conduct their foreign
policies in accordance with power politics paradigm.62
Machiavelli, another important classical thinker, wrote that “power and
deception” were the two basic ingredients for states to conduct their foreign policies.
National independence was the “supreme political value” and the leaders must ensure it
as their primary responsibility.63 Thomas Hobbes traced back realism in human nature.
His understanding of international state of nature was that there could be no guaranteed
57 Stanley Hoffmann. “Clash of Globalizations”. Foreign Affairs, (2002), 104-11558 Ibid59 Robert Keohane. International Institutions and State Power: Essays in International Relations
Theory. (Westview Press, 1989), 3660 Paul Viotti, and Mark Kauppi. International Relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism and
Globalism. (New York: Macmillan, 2001), 5761 Jackson and Sørensen, International Relations, 7262 Ibid, 7263 Ibid, 73
56
peace among states.64 To conclude this section, it could be safely said that classical
realists were of the opinion that “insecurity and conflict” was the human condition. They
also agreed that there was no escape to that reality and “there was no permanent solution”
to the perennial problem of international politics. For them power was at the center stage
of world politics and war was the legitimate instrument of statecraft. They identified
power as a “critical factor” in international politics. All states, irrespective of their size,
pursue power. Like Athens, powerful states were imperialist and they preyed upon
weaker states. The US-Iraq policy from 2003 to 2008 fitted that concept.
2.1.2 Modern Realist Tradition:
E.H. Carr made devastating critique on Wilsonian Idealism as the “basis for political
settlement in Europe” in the post-WWI period.65 His main argument was that Wilsonian
Idealism “ignored the central role of power” in international politics. He also made it
clear that “unequal distribution of power” in international political system was the real
cause of war.66 Pursuit of power was a natural drive, believed Carr. He also believed that
international political system was to be structured by realities of global power.67 Thus, it
might be said that conflict among states was inevitable in an anarchic world.
Hans J. Morgenthau, the real founding father of modern realism, consolidated
realist principles and provided theoretical support to US global role in the post-WWII era.
His theory was to provide intellectual and political guidance to US foreign policy makers
during the Cold-War years. Morgenthau believed that the world was “imperfect due to
the problems in human nature”. He wrote that pursuit of power was wedded in human
nature.68 He also wrote that international politics was “struggle for power” among states.
Whatever might be the other objectives but “pursuit of power” was the immediate goal of
international politics.69 The tradition of centrality of power continued in neo-classical
strand of realism. It also justified the US global role on the basis of power politics during
the Cold War years. It is to be understood that the US, at the end of the Cold War, was
64 Ibid, 75-7665 Burchill, Realism and Neo-Realism, 6766 E. H. Carr. The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International
Relations. (N.Y.: Perential, 1939), 1467 Ibid, 29768 Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 19269 Ibid, 195
57
the largest economy of the world and wielded unchallengeable military forces in the
world.
2.1.3 Neo-Realist Tradition
Neo-realists believed that states remained the principal actors in international politics and
“security of a state” was the ultimate interest which was often ensured by accumulating
power. Waltz focused on the “structure of the international political system” particularly
the relative distribution of power in it. For Kenneth Waltz, the international political
system had a “precisely defined structure.”70 The important feature of international
political system was the lack of order. States existed in the anarchic environment where
their survival entirely depended on their military strength. In such an environment states
were “socialized into mutual distrust, self-reliance and pursuit of security”. They did this
by continuously increasing their power.71 Waltz wrote that structure of the system forced
units to behave in a particular way. The units were distinguished in their “capabilities”
not in their functions.72 Waltz further wrote that great powers changed the structure of
international political system. Waltz identified “the systemic forces” that homogenized
the foreign policies of states. According to Waltz, anarchy in international political
system forced states to accumulate power as a “systemic requirement.”
2.1.4 Offensive Realism
The real objective of John J. Mearsheimer’s theory of offensive realism was to explain
recurrent patterns of behavior of great powers in international political system.
Particularly, he aimed to explain why did great powers strive for dominance and why did
this pattern of behavior was doomed to repeat itself. During this process, they fueled
security competition which, in turn, would cause occasional great power wars.73 There
would be continuity of the cycle of violence in global politics. The peace would probably
not be realized. The great powers, wrote Mearsheimer, “shape international political
system” feared each other and, resultantly, competed for power.
The great power’s ultimate aim had been to gain a position of dominant power
over others. The reason being they wanted dominance which, for them, was the best 70 Waltz, Theory of International Relations, 88-92 71 Ibid72 Ibid, 9773 Mearsheimer, Tragedy of Great Powers, 30
58
means to ensure their survival. Mearsheimer wrote, “Strength ensures safety, and the
greatest strength is the greatest insurance of safety”. The great powers faced with this
incentive were “fated to clash” as they competed for comparative advantage over the
others. There seemed no escape to that tragic situation. The only solution had been the
formation of a world government. However, that seemed unrealistic and hardly possible.
The great powers would not agree on that. Consequently “conflict and war” were bound
to remain perennial and salient characteristics of international politics.74
Ruthlessness always remained in international politics since the dawn of history
and, without any doubt; it seemed to remain that way. For great powers feared each other,
they always competed for power resultantly. Their overriding objective had been the
“maximization of their share of world power.” They wanted to do that at the expense of
their rival powers. They did not merely want to become the most powerful of all their
rival powers. They wanted to be the “hegemon” within the system. That remained their
ultimate aim.75
Status quo great powers were not found in international political system. Great
powers were hardly satisfied with the current distribution of power in the system. They
always tried to change the power distribution in the system in their favor. They always
cherished “revisionist” intentions. They used force to meet that end. They would try to do
that at a “reasonable cost”. In this pursuit of power they would wait for good
circumstances to come. This desire for more power was endless and it ended only when a
great power achieved its ultimate objective of hegemony. The ultimate goal of “world
hegemony” was unlikely to be achieved by any great power. Consequently, that would
lead to perpetual competition among great powers.76
The unending pursuit of power meant that great powers were “looking for
opportunities” for changing the contemporary distribution of power favorable to them.
They would exploit such opportunities, if possible, and if they had the military capability.
In the words of Mearsheimer, “great powers are primed for offense”. That was not their
only job. Great powers also prevented their rival powers to gain the same.77 Why did
great powers behave like that? Mearsheimer wrote that the structure of the international 74 Ibid, xii75 Mearsheimer, Tragedy of Great Powers, 276 Ibid77 Ibid, 3
59
political system based on anarchy forced great powers to adapt such an aggressive
posture.
A combination of certain features of international political system created an
environment of mutual fear among themselves. They included anarchy, some permanent
offensive military capability of states, and that state could never trust other states
intentions. Hence for great powers, the best guarantee of their survival was the pursuit of
hegemony. So that other states could not seriously threaten security of a hegemon. The
theory of offensive realism focused on great power politics because they impacted
international political system greatly. The decision and actions of great powers
determined the fortunes of all states in the system.
2.1.4.1 Five Assumptions of Offensive Realism:
Why had there been mutual competition among great powers? Why did they strive for
hegemony in the system? The answer could be found in the five assumptions of offensive
realism. The most contemporary realists shared those assumptions. The first assumption
was that international political system was based on “anarchy.” Here anarchy meant an
“ordering principle” not disorder. It meant that the system consisted of sovereign states
with no central authority above the states. The second assumption was that there had been
“some inherent offensive military capability” embedded in great powers. They could, if
possible, destroy each other. They had the potential to be mutually dangerous.78
The third assumption was that states could never trust each other. They could not
believe in the “intentions” of other states. It did not mean that states always cherished
hostile intentions. There could be multiple causes of aggression and no state could ever
be sure about other’s motivation. Furthermore, the intentions were not fixed and were
subject to change at any time. Element of uncertainty about other/rival states intention’s
was unavoidable. A state could be benign today and hostile tomorrow. Consequently,
security remained the “prime motivator” of state behavior. The fourth assumption was
that great power’s primary goal was their survival. Their strategy had been to maximize
their security both in the short-term as well as in the long run. The last assumption was
that the great powers were “rational actors.” They were concerned with the consequences
78 Mearsheimer, Tragedy of Great Powers, 30-31
60
and implications of their actions. Particularly, great powers considered the preferences of
other states and vice versa. 79
Mearsheimer did not believe that a great power could ever become a global
hegemon. It could be a regional hegemon. They also attempted to prevent rival/other
powers from becoming regional hegemons. The reason being peer competitors could be
trouble makers for other states in their regions. Taking the above cited five assumptions
together, wrote Mearsheimer, they created an environment of big incentives for great
powers to behave offensively. They resulted into three general patterns of behavior
among great powers including “fear, self-help, and power maximization”. There was an
environment of mutual fear between great powers in addition to mutual suspicion
between them. They were also worried about imminence of war. There was no question
of mutual trust among states. They were reluctant to trust in other states. The element of
war sometimes forced them to see each other as “potentially deadly enemies.”80
States could not trust in others in matters of their own security. Security
vulnerability was their main fear. A great power’s top most priority was its survival in
anarchy. They always acted in self-interest. They had always been apprehensive about the
ill intentions of other states in the system. They knew that the best way to ensure their
existence was to be the hegemon in the system. The reason was understandable: to be
selfish paid dividends in an anarchic world. It was the ideal thing, wrote Mearsheimer, to
become “hegemon in the system.”
Consequently, great powers paid big attention to the distribution of power among
them. In this process, they strived for power maximization. The desire for power
maximization ended only, if ever, they achieved “world hegemony.” Hegemony
eliminated any possibility of a potential challenger in future. No state would ever waste
such an opportunity to become hegemon. Such an environment resulted into an endless
security competition among states, wherein they were ready to cheat, lie, and use brute
force if it paid dividends over their rivals. “The best defense is a good offense”.
That was the best way to seek advantage of other’s weaknesses. In their pursuit of
power maximization and their hunt for hegemony, great powers followed a number of
79 Mearsheimer, Tragedy of Great Powers, 30-3180 Ibid, 33
61
strategies and “war is the best” one wrote Mearsheimer.81 Mearsheimer also wrote that
there was nothing as a status quo power, since the predominant power would behave
more aggressively in the system as they had the capability to do so.82 Mearsheimer gave
convincing answers to the question as to why great powers behaved aggressively in the
international system. The principal motive of such a great power behavior was its
survival. Mearsheimer was of the opinion that his theory of offensive realism was equally
applicable to all great powers.83 Offensive realism provided the most convincing
explanation of the US unilateral and preemptive invasion of Iraq in 2003. The theory
constituted the theoretical framework of this dissertation.
There had been some criticism on Mearsheimer’s theory of Offensive Realism.
Glenn Snyder had rejected Mearsheimer's view of the security dilemma as a synoptic
statement of offensive realism. He had argued that offensive neorealism's positing of all
states as revisionists removed the central proposition, uncertainty about other states'
intentions, on which the whole concept of security dilemma had been grounded.
Aggressive great powers' measures to maximize their security threatened others which
lead to an actual justified security competition between states rather than an unnecessary
one based on hypothetical threats.84
Christopher Layne further had highlighted the problems associated with the
geographic variable. He had criticized Mearsheimer's reasoning according to which the
stopping power of water prevented a great power from achieving global hegemony as this
constraint did not seem to apply to the case of an emerging rival's capacity to exercise
influence beyond its own neighborhood. As Layne had stated, apparently water stopped
the United States from imposing its powers on others in distant regions, but it did not stop
them from threatening American primacy in the Western Hemisphere. Moreover, he
found offensive realism's classification of regional hegemons as status quo powers
difficult to reconcile with the theory's emphasis on great powers as relentless power-
maximizers. In this sense, Layne questioned the ability of the water constraint to
transform a power-maximizing state into a status quo power and contradicts Mearsheimer
81 Mearsheimer, Tragedy of Great Power, 138-16582 Ibid83 Ibid, 5484 Glenn H. Snyder. “Mearsheimer's World- Offensive Realism and the Struggle for Security: A
Review Essay”. International Security 27, no 1, (2002), 149-173
62
by arguing that a regional hegemon remains subjected to the quest for security, thereby
striving to attain global hegemony.85
Another group of criticism had addressed the issue of offensive neorealism's
restrictive focuses. Scholars had criticized Mearsheimer's theory for failing to take into
account domestic politics. No attention had been paid to a rising power's internal political
functioning, its economy or society, which played a role in a state's decision-making
process, in turn influencing its behavior in international politics.86 Moreover, Snyder had
argued that no consideration was given to transnational threats such as terrorism, and that
Mearsheimer's emphasis on security made him ignore states' non-security interests such
as ideology, national unification and human rights as an essential aspect of international
politics alongside power competition.87 Toft and Layne went a step further by asserting
that Mearsheimer had misjudged the United States as a regional hegemon engaged in
offshore balancing. Instead of being a regional hegemon with the strategic aim of
dominating the Western hemisphere while preventing the rise of peer competitors in
Europe and Northeast Asia, these scholars believed that empirical data pointed to the fact
that the United States had sought and achieved global hegemony, which in turn biased
Mearsheimer's predictions regarding future U.S. strategic behavior, mainly in terms of its
military involvement overseas.88
2.2 Neoconservatives: A Contributory Factor:
All aspects of the US- Iraq policy from 2001 to 2008 could not be properly explained by
the theory of offensive realism. For instance why did the US invade Iraq in 2003 and not
before? Who contributed to make the decision of invasion? In order to answer such
questions the theory of offensive realism was reinforced by what was known as
confrontationists or more commonly known as neoconservatives. The confrontationists in
85 Christopher Layne. “The Poster Child for Offensive Realism: America as a Global Hegemon”. Security Studies 12, no 2, (2002), 120–163
86 David C. Hendrickson. “The Lion and the Lamb: Realism and Liberalism Reconsidered”. World Policy Journal 20, no 1, (2003), 93–102
87 Snyder, Mearsheimer’s World, 149-17388 a Layne, Poster Child, 120-163
b Peter Toft. “John J. Mearsheimer an Offensive Realist between Geopolitics and Power”. Journal of International Relations and Development. Palgrave Macmillan. Vol 8 no 4, (2005), 381–408
63
the US viewed political Islam as “the new enemy” in the post-Cold War world.89 The best
intellectual representatives of this trend in the US were Samuel P. Huntington, Bernard
Lewis, and Daniel Pipes. Their main argument was summarized in the post-Cold War
perspective of “The Clash of Civilizations” by Samuel Huntington.
The central theme of the clash of civilizations was that Muslims were turning
toward Islam as a “source of identity.” They accepted modernity but rejected Western
culture. For the Muslims, religion was the “real motivating force” of political Islam. 90
Furthermore, he stressed that “Islam and democracy were incompatible.”91 In the post-
Cold War era, there would be clash at global level between political Islam and the West.92
Islamic world and the Western world saw each other from the enemy angle.93
Confrontationists, like Bernard Lewis, argued that “Islam and democracy” in reality were
antithetical.94 For confrontationists, in the post-Cold War era, Islam replaced communism
as the new threat to the Western predominant power and position in the system.95
The confrontationists gave serious policy recommendations to Washington. They
recommended that political Islam in the Middle East, the heart of Islamic world,
threatened the US and its Muslim allies in the region.96 Their main recommendation to
deal with “the new enemy” was that Islam must be “fought and defeated” the way the
West did against communism during the Cold War years. This group provided
intellectual fodder to the neoconservatives in the President George W. Bush
Administration from 2001 to 2008. The neoconservatives played important role in
making and implementing the US-Iraq policy during those eight years as they occupied
important policy positions during George W. Bush Administration.
89 Fawaz A. Gerges. America and Political Islam: Clash of Culture or Clash of Interests? (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 42
90 Samuel P. Huntington. The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. (Penguin Books, 1997),110
91 Samuel P. Huntington “If Not Civilizations, What? Paradigms of the Post-Cold War World”. Foreign Affairs, (1993),186-194
92 Huntington, Clash of Civilizations, 2293 Ibid, 25, 3994 Bernard Lewis. Islam in History: Ideas, People, and Events in the Middle East. (Open Court
Publishing, 1993), 9195 Daniel Pipes. “Political Islam is a Threat to the West”. Islam: Opposing Viewpoints, (1995),
190-19696 Judith Miller. “The Challenge of Radical Islam”. Foreign Affairs 72, no 2, (1993), 42-56
64
The events of 9/11 set forth a big change in the US foreign policy toward the
Middle East in general, and toward Iraq in particular. The US preemptively and
unilaterally invaded Iraq in March 2003 aiming at regime change Baghdad. The Middle
East carried great importance in global politics owing to its geo-strategic location and big
oil reserves. Almost the entire world had been dependent upon the region for its energy
requirements. Former US president Richard Nixon wrote that Muslim world carried great
negative image in the US even more than the Communist China.97
Michael Harrington used the term neoconservative for the first time. He did it in a
derogatory sense for former comrades.98 They were actually a group of ex-liberals who
were later on driven rightward during 1960s and 1970s.99 The group played important
role during the Presidency of Ronald Reagan. In the post-Cold War era their main
activity was concerned in redefining their agenda in the form of DPG (1992) and PNAC
(1997). During this period their main advocacy was for a muscular US foreign policy
aimed at ensuring US global dominance. For them 9/11 came as a big opportunity. They
exploited it to advance their agenda. For this purpose they advocated the use of force to
ensure “US global dominance.”100 Robert Kagan and Bill Kristol, the two important
neoconservatives, advocated the establishment of “the global superpower” to reshape the
international political system according to the US interest.101
After 9/11 events, a neoconservative think tank in Washington, the Project for
New American Century (PNAC), in an open letter to the US President asked for “ regime
change” in Iraq. They asked the President for unilateral, preemptive, and even preventive
use of force ignoring multilateral institutions and norms of foreign policy behavior. In
reality they were asking the US for pursuing the “neo-imperial course” and that was what
the George W. Bush Administration did.102 Francis Fukuyama summarized
neoconservatives’ basic thoughts. They cherished the belief that the US foreign policy
must reflect the basic values of American society; that as a predominant world power
America needed to remain engaged in world politics and the US had the special function
97 Nixon, Seize the Moment, 19698 Halper and Clarke, America Alone, 4499 Boot, Neocons, 20-28100 Halper and Clarke, America Alone, 17101 Ibid102 Gaddis, Grand Strategy, 2-15
65
to perform in the realm of international security; and that they were skeptic about the
legitimacy of international law and institutions and that they were critical of UN in its
role to dispense international justice.103
Leon Trotsky, Leo Strauss, and Albert Wohlstetter were the three ideologues who
provided thought to the neoconservatives in America. Neocons got revolutionary impulse
from Trotsky. However, Strauss championed the cause of “noble-lie”. He was of the
opinion that the ruling elite were under duty to lie to the general masses. For only the
handful elite were capable of knowing the truth. He had taken this idea from Plato.104
Neoconservatives, particularly Richard Perle and Paul Wolfowitz, inherited the idea of
strategic thought from Albert Wohlstetter. The ideas of expanded defense spending,
strategic Defense Initiative and Star Wars had their roots in Wohlstetter’s thought.
During the decades of 1970s and 1980s, Wohlstetter got involved in the Persian Gulf,
Iraq, the Iran-Iraq War of 1980s and the issue of nuclear proliferation in the region.
Later on, these ideas were taken up by the neocons.105 Inspired from the above
cited ideologues Dick Cheney and Paul Wolfowitz worked in the Presidency of Bush
(senior) and produced Defense Policy Guide (1992), the first “unipolarist blue print.”
Subsequently the DPG was leaked to New York Times and the President disowned it.106
The central theme of the DPG was that the US did not want “peer competitor” in the
post-Cold War era.107 The US policy elite remained sincere to that objective.108 It could be
safely argued that the National Security Strategy of President George W. Bush of
September 2002, in reality, was an updated version of DPG (1992).
William Kristol founded PNAC in the year 1997 to promote the US world
leadership. It was the second major activity of neocons during 1990s. It followed the
theme of DPG (1992). Like the DPG, PNAC was the major contributor to the President’s
foreign policy from 2001 to 2008.109 The 9/11 happening helped create a new context for
103 Fukuyama, America at the Crossroads, 48-49 104 Irwin Stelzer. “Neoconservative Economic Policy: Virtues and Vices”, in Neoconservatism.
Edited by Irwin Stelzer, (Atlantic Books, 2004), 203105 Fukuyama, America at the Crossroads, 33106 John Gaddis. “A Grand Strategy of Transformation”. Foreign Policy, (2002), 50-57107 Mearsheimer, Tragedy of Great Power, 46108 Ibid109 Stelzer, Neoconservative Economic Policy, 5
66
the imperialist and hegemonic US foreign policy.110 National security strategy of the
President of September 2002 was, in fact, the most important development in the US
foreign policy since the end of WWII.111 The national security strategy of September
2002 aimed at establishing the US primacy in the international political system. It also
asked for preemptive strategy, if need be, to check terrorism and weapons proliferation.112
In short, the neoconservatives in the Bush Administration successfully translated
their agenda of “regime change and preemptive strike” through the NSS of September
2002. The US political elite usually used the liberal language in the conduct of their
foreign policy. There had been a perceptible gap between public rhetoric and real policy.
The US foreign policy had been mostly led by realist principles in its conduct. The US
political elite had been in the habit of speaking one way and acting otherwise.113 E.H.
Carr a realist and a British citizen, wrote as early as 1939 that it was the peculiar
characteristic of the Anglo-Saxon people to conceal their self-interests under the guise of
general good. He called this tendency “hypocrisy” of the Anglo-Saxon people.114 Certain
developments in Iraq could not be truly explained by offensive realism especially
phenomenon of introduction of democracy there. It was a failed attempt. This could be
explained by neoconservative agenda not by offensive realism.115
Having said this all, whatever the case might be no neoconservative was included
in the decision making elite of the Bush Administration. The decision makers were a
group of five. They included the President himself, Dick Cheney (the vice president),
Colin Powell, Donald Rumsfeld, and Condoleezza Rice. None of these five decision
makers about the invasion of Iraq in 2003 was a true neoconservative argued Michael
Harland. 116 It could be argued safely that the neoconservative’s role in invading Iraq
remained circumstantial.
2.3 National Security Strategy of September 2002:
110 Stephen E. Bronner. Reclaiming the Enlightenment: Toward a Politics of Radical Engagement. (Columbia University Press, 2004), 3
111 Gaddis, A Grand Strategy, 50-57112 Boot, Neocons, 20-28113 Mearsheimer, Tragedy of Great Power, 25-26114 Carr, Twenty Years’ Crisis, 79115 Interview with Dr. M. Islam (Ex. Director, Dept. of American Studies, Quaid-i-Azam
University, Islamabad) by the Researcher. Islalmabad. August 17, (2016)116 Michael Harland. Democratic Vanguardism: Modernity, Intervention, and the Making of the
Bush Doctrine. (Lexington Books, 2013), 148
67
The National Security Strategy of September 2002 of President George W. Bush was a
big shift in the US foreign policy in the 21st century. The NSS was rooted in DPG (1992)
and PNAC (1997) documents.117 Even before 9/11 happenings, the President pursued
unilateralist policy. In his unilateralist drive the President withdrew from the ABM
Treaty of 1972, rejected Kyoto Protocol of 1997 as the protocol was not beneficial to the
US “economic interests.”118 In 2001, the Administration withdrew from negotiations on
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. Interestingly, the US itself was testing the
biological weapons at the same time.119 The same thing happened to CTBT and
International Criminal Court.
Shawcross quoted David Frum, the President’s speech writer, saying that the
“axis of evil” phrase was inserted for establishing the linkage between “rogue states and
terrorist groups”. The states indicated were Iran, Iraq, and North Korea, much like the
infamous “Tokyo-Rome-Berlin Axis” during WWII. In aggregate, these states constituted
an axis of hatred against the US. The US could not and must not wait for them to attack.
The US must preempt. The President used the expression in his State of the Union
Address in January, 2002. In his address, the President pledged to eliminate the threat to
the US security, posed by “the nexus between the rogue states and the terrorists.”120
The President seemed convinced that the defensive strategy was a wrong strategy.
The US could not win on the defensive. On June 1, 2002 the President delivered a speech
at West Point Military Academy, wherein he made it clear that in future the US could
adopt preemptive strategy to destroy the threats to US values and interests.121 John
Ikenberry called the NSS of September 2002 “a grand strategy” with basic objective to
maintain “unipolarity” in the international political system, wherein the US would be sole
superpower with “no peer competitors”. He used the expression “revisionist state” for the
US.122
117 Melvin Gurtov. Superpower on Crusade: The Bush Doctrine in US Foreign Policy. (New Delhi: Viva Books, 2008), 33
118 John Feffer. Power Trip: US Unilateralism and Global Strategy after September 11. (Seven Stories Press, 2003), 81
119 David M. Malone, and Yuen Foong Khong. Unilateralism and US Foreign Policy International Perspectives. (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003), 31
120 Woodward, Plan of Attack, 95121 Ibid, 132122 Ikenberry, America's Imperial Ambition, 44-60
68
Noam Chomsky had cited an interesting debate among scholars like Carl Kaysen,
Steven Miller, Marting Malin, and William Nordhaus among others, on the issue of the
nature of the Iraq war. In the end, Chomsky concluded that the NSS of September 2002
gave the US “the right” to wage a “preventive” war.123 William Shawcross argued that the
NSS consisted of three constituent elements- prevention, preemption and increased
defense budgets.124 The NSS document was written by Dick Cheney, Wolfowitz,
Rumsfeld and others. The document stressed that the US power must be beyond
challenges. There was a sharp increase in the US defense budget from $ 317 billion in
2002 to $ 419 billion in 2006.125 The NSS invoked preemption and unilateralism as basis
for the “US imperialism” in the 21st century.126
The neoconservatives contributed in the decision making of the Bush Presidency
from 2001 to 2008. They wanted US “global hegemony”. The central theme of
neoconservative’s agenda was the ouster of Saddam regime from power in Iraq. With the
collapse of the USSR in 1991 had ended the cold war. For the US remained the sole
superpower. The US dominance of the international political system was
unchallengeable.127 Richard Perle, a neocon and an adviser to the President Bush, during
a speech in November 2001, argued for a unilateral strategy in war on terror.128
Invasion of Afghanistan in October 2001 was beginning of the US war on terror.
In the words of the President, though the war began in Afghanistan, however, it would
not “end” there. It would become “global” in operation. The invasion of Afghanistan had
the sanction of the UNSC. However, in March 2003, the US unilaterally attacked Iraq.
Iraq became the first test of the newly renounced Bush Doctrine. The US-Iraq invasion
was opposed by the Arab World including even Egypt and Saudi Arabia. At the same
time, the war was also opposed by major American NATO allies, France and Germany.
Russia also joined hands with France and Germany among others. The Bush
Administration, under the cover of war on terror started restructuring the world through 123 Chomsky, American Power, 12124 W. Shawcross. Allies: The US, Britain, Europe and the Aftermath of the War in Iraq. (London:
Westview Press, 2003), 64125 Antonia Juhasz. The Bush Agenda: Invading the World, One Economy at a Time. (N.Y.: Regan
Books, Harper Collins Inc., 2006), 44126 Woodward, Plan of Attack, 203
127 Stephen G. Brooks, and William Wohlforth. “American Primacy in Perspective”, Foreign Affairs 81, no 4, (July-August 2002), 20-33
128 Jentleson, American Foreign Policy, 260
69
unilateral and preemptive strategies. The US began pursuing the “neo-imperial”
discourse.129
Since then, the rationale of the Iraq war had been questioned. Why did the US
invade Iraq? George Packer wrote that “it still isn’t possible to be sure….” And that was
something important about that war. He quoted Richard Haas, an official of the State
Department during the time of Iraq invasion, saying that he (Haas) would “go to his grave
not knowing the answer.”130 George Tenet, director of the CIA at the time of the US
invasion of Iraq in 2003, wrote in his joint memoirs that “one of the great mysteries to me
is exactly when the war in Iraq became inevitable.”131 The war hawks in the
Administration had been the vocal supporters of supremacist ideology to establish and
maintain the US dominance in the international political system.132
They believed in the combination of “force and deception” in their pursuit of
foreign policy goals.133 A French Magazine called them followers of “American
Empire.”134 During two terms of the George W. Bush presidency, there seemed a clear
alliance between neoconservatives, the Zionist Lobby, and the Christian Zionists in
America. They had negative image of Islam.135 (Guardian 10 Nov, 2003). For the US,
they wanted a world with “no peer competitor.”136 They wanted the aggressive use of
military force to pursue their agenda in the post-Cold War era. They also recommended
unilateralist as well as preemptive strategies to the US Administration.137
Similar was the case with the founding statement of the PNAC. The project
wanted total “American dominance” in the international political system. They wanted to
confront the authoritarian rulers worldwide who dared to oppose the US interests.138 The
above cited mission statement was signed by twenty five persons including important
neoconservatives like Elliott Abrams, Zalmay Khalilzad, Lewis Libby, Norman
129 Gaddis, Grand Strategy, 2-15130 George Packer. The Assassin’s Gate: America in Iraq. (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux,
2005), 46131 George Tenet, and Bill Harlow. At the Centre of the Storm: My Years at the CIA. (New York:
Harper Collins, 2007), 301132 Soros, Bubble of American Supremacy, 10-12133 Fawn and Hinnebusch, Iraq War, 298134 Shawcross, Allies, 51135 136 Mearsheimer, Tragedy of Great Power, 46137 Juhasz, Bush Agenda, 33-34138 Shawcross, Allies, 55
70
Podhoretz, Donald Rumsfeld, Francis, Fukuyama, and Paul Wolfowitz among others.
The 2000 AD report of the project declared that the real strategic goals of the US in the
21st century were to preserve “Pax Americana.”139 The central theme of the PNAC was
the ouster of Saddam regime from power.140
The PNAC’s open letter of January 1998, stressed President Bill Clinton to take a
military invasion of Iraq.141 When President Bush came to power in America in January
2001, he appointed a number of neoconservatives to the positions of power such as
Donald Rumsfeld, Lewis Libby, Paul Wolfowitz, Douglas Feith, Richard Perle, Elliott
Abrams, and John Bolton among others. However, for them 9/11 came as a big
opportunity. They exploited the opportunity exactly in accordance with the principles of
offensive realism. The culmination of this exploitation was the preemptive and unilateral
invasion of Iraq in March 2003, despite the absence of empirical evidence of Saddam
Hussain’s involvement in 9/11 happenings in any way whatsoever. However, it must be
remembered that no neoconservative was a member of decision making elite of the Bush
Administration culminating into invasion of Iraq in 2003.
2.4 Close Fit between Offensive Realism and the US-Iraq Policy:
The central theme of theory of offensive realism was that great powers shaped the
contemporary international political system in accordance with their interests and
ideologies. The international political system was based on anarchy as the ordering
principle. There had been an environment of mutual fear and distrust between great
powers. Due to the presence of this mutual fear between great powers they competed for
power in the system. They always had been power maximizers. In their pursuit of power
maximization, they always had been “looking for opportunities in order to increase their
share of world power” at the acceptable cost. There were no “status quo” great powers.
Their final objective was the establishment of their hegemony in the system. Security had
been the top most interest of all states irrespective of their size and strength. According to
Mearsheimer, power guaranteed security of states and greatest power was the greatest
guarantee of their security. That was why great powers always struggled for dominance
139 Juhasz, Bush Agenda, 37140 Fawn and Hinnebusch, Iraq War, 295141 Soros, Bubble of American Supremacy, 8
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in the system. That was why, in an anarchic world, great power’s ultimate goal had been
to become “hegemon” in the international political system.
If we have a close look on the central theme of offensive realism and President
George W. Bush’s Iraq-policy, we could immediately recognize striking similarities
between the two. Now the question arose was there a close fit between the two? The
answer could be both positive as well as negative. However, in this case the answer came
out to be positive. The theory of offensive realism reinforced by neoconservative agenda
exactly fitted the Bush Administration’s Iraq-policy from 2001 to 2008. A positive
relationship existed between them.
There remained an important question still to be answered. What explained the
partial policy failure in Iraq in the aftermath of the US invasion of 2003? To begin with,
insight for our understanding of the world we were part of was fundamentally flawed. It
meant the social world where the human beings were “thinking participants”. I did not
mean natural phenomena. The theory must correspond to the facts. Social world was
entirely different from the natural one. Because human beings, the thoughtful
participants, in a “social phenomenon” could influence it unlike the natural phenomena,
the social phenomena could not become independent standard for judging the authenticity
of our pronouncements. That was why our understanding of the social phenomenon fell
short of fully qualifying as knowledge.
The reality was that human beings, the “thinking participants” in a social
phenomenon might approximate the truth. But some difference was destined to happen
between truth and our understanding of the world. Reality was a moving object and not a
static one. The two features of the social phenomena around us, participation and
understanding, were mutually interfering with each other. It meant that in reality our
understanding of the social phenomenon was really flawed and imperfect. The
implication could be that human actions were entailed by “unintended consequences”.
The phenomenon was known as “reflexivity”. This remained the central theme of this
explanation.
In his book, “Logic of Scientific Discovery” Karl Popper reasoned that scientific
knowledge was not the ultimate truth. Scientific knowledge was accepted as true but only
provisionally. For there could raise a contradiction in the previous scientific knowledge.
72
It meant that there existed asymmetrical relationship between verification and…
falsification. Karl Popper resolved this asymmetry of scientific knowledge. The scholar
argued that the scientific knowledge gained through generalizations was accepted true
only provisionally.
The scientific knowledge could be falsified in future through empirical evidence,
consequently, the human beings, as thinking participants, had no escape but to be wrong
invariably. The magnitude of human misunderstanding could vary from person to person.
The author called this phenomenon the “postulate of radical fallibility”. Closely related to
this phenomenon was the concept of “fertile fallacies”. Fertile fallacies meant that we
might start with a verified concept and extend it to other fields where its application was
questionable. For instance, the application of positivist methodology in natural sciences
gave good results. Consequently, the methodology also was extended to the social
sciences. We already knew well that the two were entirely different. It became a case of
fertile fallacy.
Due to the influence of natural sciences the presumption became that reality was
well constituted. Human beings introduced an element of uncertainty in social
phenomena might be known as “human uncertainty principle”. The concept was taken
from the Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle related to particle behavior in modern
physics. The Bush Administration implemented the ideology of the US supremacy. The
President’s Iraq-policy fitted to this model. The Bush Administration in its pursuit of
American dominance in the system ignored both the concepts of radical fallibility and
human uncertainty principle.
In short, our understanding of the social phenomena around us was really
imperfect. The distortions were deliberately introduced in the public rhetoric of the
administration in the war on terror. For instance “war on terror” and “weapons of mass
destruction” could be cited as examples. Such manipulative distortions were employed.
They were fated to be entailed by some unintended outcome. The invasion of Iraq had an
“element of deliberate deception” on the part of the Bush Administration. Consequently,
some of the outcomes of the invasion and the subsequent prolonged occupation of Iraq
were bound to be unintended. This final note that explained partial failure of the US-Iraq
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policy, specifically the occupation policy was extracted from the book, “The Bubble of
American Supremacy” by George Soros.142
The theory of offensive realism constituted the theoretical framework of this
dissertation. The theory provided the compelling and convincing explanation of the US-
Iraq policy during the presidency of George W. Bush. But the theory could not explain
some aspects of the policy under study. The neoconservative’s agenda in the unipolar
world and in the post-Cold War era reinforced the theoretical framework of this
dissertation in explaining the US-Iraq policy during the Bush Administration. However,
the neoconservative’s agenda constituted only a circumstantial and contributory
explanation of some aspects of the policy. In concluding this chapter, it could be said that
there existed a close fit between the theory of offensive realism and the US-Iraq policy
from 2001 to 2008.
Chapter Three
Overview of Historical US-Iraq PolicyThe argument in this chapter was that the US historical policy, particularly after WWII,
was in line with the logic of offensive realism. The main argument of the chapter was that
the US-Iraq policy in historical perspective fitted the power politics paradigm. The US
policy toward Iraq could be viewed in two different periods of time. The first period dealt 142 Soros, Bubble of American Supremacy, 191-203
74
with the US policy in the broader perspective of the Middle East during the Ottoman rule
of the region. This period roughly ended in the year 1900 AD. Though during this period
the US was not a world power, still the US foreign policy toward the Middle East
reflected the application of realist principles during this period. The policy aimed at
pursuing the national interest even if it involved the use of force. The “Barbary Wars”
provided the empirical evidence of this policy.
The second period mainly dealt with the US policy during the 20 th century. By
1900 AD, the US had become a world power. Iraq was created in the footsteps of WWI
as an independent state. The realist logic dictated the US-Iraq policy, particularly in the
post- WWII era. In this period, particularly after WWII, the US became the predominant
world player in the region. There was an intense competition between the US and USSR
for dominance of the region during the Cold War era. The US-Iraq policy in historical
perspective was one of power maximization with respect to the Middle East. The CIA
was involved in military takeover of Iraq in 1963. That signified the US involvement in
Iraq. Then the US used Saddam regime in checking the influence of Iranian revolution in
the Middle East by supporting Saddam Hussain’s eight year war against Iran. Whatever
the case might be, realist logic dictated the US-Iraq policy, particularly in the post WWII
era.
3.1 Early Phase (1776-1900):John Ledyard, the first citizen of independent America, travelled to London in search of a
sponsor to explore the unexplored regions of the world. In London, he got a sponsor in
the form of African Society in 1788. Henry Beaufoy, secretary of the society, asked
Ledyard to explore the Nile. He undertook this expedition from Cairo (Egypt) to Sudan.
Interestingly, no Westerner had ever undertaken this exploration before. To satisfy his
ambition of exploration, Ledyard immediately accepted the offer and started his
expedition to the Middle East in June, 1788. Thus, Ledyard became the first person of
independent America to interact with and explore the Middle East region. It was rather
beginning of the US policy of involvement in the region. John Ledyard himself wrote to
his mother that his passage will be to “Grand Cairo” and beyond that was unknown. He
also wrote to Thomas Jefferson that it was a “passage to glory.”143
143 Larzer Ziff. Return Passages: Great American Travel Writing, 1780-1910. (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 2000), 36
75
Since 1788, Americans and people of the Middle East had met many times from
battle fields to oil fields, other fields included such as education and Philanthropy. It was
Americans who, for whatever reasons, established the first modern university in the
Middle East region. During the initial phase, immediately after American Revolution of
1776, maritime trade was the basic U.S. drive to the Middle East. The American business
class traders exchanged timber tobacco, sugar and rum for carpers, figs, raisins and
opium. Sometimes unhappy incidents of piracy also occurred “enslaving American
crews” of ships. The pirates usually belonged to Morocco, Tripoli, Tunis and Algiers.
The Westerners collectively called these pirates “Barbary”. Throughout 16th and 17th
centuries “Barbary was the nightmare” of the West. Britain would “bribe” them for
sparing her commercial ships. British extended security to American trade ships till 1776,
the year of “American Declaration of Independence”. The “Barbary” was quick to change
their policy after 1776. Americans were too helpless to defend themselves against these
Barbary pirates.144 These pirates started plundering American commercial ships. They
also started enslaving American crews. The Barbary started capturing US trade ships
along with enslaving their crews. American commercial ships were totally unable to
defend themselves against them.145
John Lamb, America’s first diplomatic mission to Algiers (Middle East) in 1786,
failed to get release even of a single American captive. America started “paying tribute”
to the Barbary States of Tripoli, Morocco, Tunis and Algiers. The total sum was about
one million dollars.146 In the year 1786, for the gift of $20000, America negotiated its first
Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Ship-Signals with Morocco and secured the release of
captive ship “Betsey” and established its “oldest diplomatic mission” in Tangier in the
Middle East.147
Interestingly, as soon as Betsey got its release, it was “seized” by Tunis now. The
captured crews of other ships were “jailed” in Algeria. These were the days of “American
confederation” that had no navy to protect its international trade. A number of imprisoned
144 Robert J. Allison. The Crescent Obscured: The United States and the Muslim World, 1776-1815. (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1995), 3
145 Richard B. Parker. Uncle Sam in Barbary: A Diplomatic History. (Gainesville: Univ. Press of Florida, 2004), 5-20
146 Allison, Crescent Obscured, 8-16147 James A. Field. America and the Mediterranean World, 1776-1882. (Princeton: Princeton Univ.
Press, 1969), 32-33, 40
76
American sailors were “jailed in Barbary States”. The Barbary States’ behavior, among
other factors, made some contribution in the “creation of American Federation.”148 The
U.S. Middle East trade played an important role in making American “Federal
Constitution of 1787” and in creating American Federation. Barbary States continued to
capture American commercial ships and imprison their sailors and the U.S. continued to
pay to these pirate states in “ransom and tribute”. Finally, in 1794, President George
Washington ordered the building of Navy frigates to protect American commerce against
“Algerian Corsairs”. A Treaty of Amity and Friendship was concluded between Hassan
Dey of Algeria (Middle East) and the U.S. in September, 1795. Under the terms of the
treaty the U.S. paid a handsome amount in ransom to get the release of American sailors.
Similar treaties were concluded between the US and Tunis and Tripoli.149
President John Adams continued to “pay tribute” and appointed permanent
representatives to the Middle Eastern regencies of Algiers, Tunis and Tripoli in 1799 to
facilitate American international commerce. Actually, owing to many reasons, Americans
of late 18th century had scant information about the Middle East. And the knowledge they
possessed about the region was mainly coming from “unreliable” sources. For them the
Middle East region was romantic. For the US, Middle East was the “ultimate frontier”
which needed exploration.150
Ledyard landed at Alexandria, Egypt, still a part of Ottoman Empire. By the end
of 18th century, Ottoman Empire had lost its real glory. The distant provinces like Egypt
had grown semi-feudal in nature.151 John Ledyard was “the first contact” between
independent America and the Middle East, which was then under ailing Ottoman Empire.
Ledyard died in Egypt in 1789. He provided valuable information about the Middle East
region. This first contact became the basis for American involvement in the Middle East.
Many Americans visited Middle East in the footsteps of Ledyard. They mainly visited
Syria, Palestine and Mesopotamia (present Iraq). The region remained a great source of
interest for many Americans both explorers as well as decision makers.
148 Alexander Hamilton, John Jay, and James Madison. The Federalist Papers. Cutchogue, N.Y.: Buccaneer Books, 1992: 49-50, 207-208
149 Ray Irwin. The Diplomatic Relations of the United States with the Barbary Powers, 1776-1816. (New York: Russel and Russel, 1970), 100-101
150 Daniel Boorstein. The Americans: The National Experience. (N.Y.: Random House, 1965), 219, 264
151 Bernard Lewis. “Put the Iraqis in Charge”, Wall Street Journal. (August 29, 2003)
77
The “Barbary States” continued their excesses against the US international
commerce. There seemed no end to this agony. Ultimately, President Thomas Jefferson,
side-stepping the Congress, personally authorized “military operation” against the
Barbary States in the Middle East. Thomas Jefferson, in the name of “police action”
made a precedent for future generations of the U.S. Presidents. Tripoli was the first pirate
state against whom America used force to protect US interests in the Middle East.
However, initially the US did not succeed in gaining her objectives.152
Finally, President Madison in 1815, decided to deal with the issue of Barbary
pirates militarily. The US had been waging struggle against the Barbary States to protect
her economic interests for more than “three decades”. During this phase the Barbary
pirates had seized about “thirty-five” American commerce ships and “enslaved seven
hundred sailors”. President Madison crushed them permanently by using US military
against them. These wars in the Middle East (Barbary Wars) in the early decades of
American independence had a “great transformative effect” on the U.S. One legacy of
these Middle Eastern wars was the stationing of “Independence” (US warship)
permanently in the Mediterranean.153
While writing about the purpose of the US “Barbary Wars” Michael B. Oren in
his “Power, Faith and Fantasy, America in the Middle East, 1776 to the Present”,
declared that America wanted to bring enlightenment to the Middle East. The US also
wanted to to remake the region according to the American “interests and values”. It could
be safely argued that the first US historical involvement in the Middle East was centered
on the “theme of power”.
The second US interaction with the Middle East came in the form of American
missionaries to the region. Levi Parsons and Pliny Fisk were the first US Christian
missionaries to reach in the Middle East. They had two objectives to serve-propagation of
Christianity and liberation of “Holy Land”- Palestine.154 Interestingly, the famous French
traveler to America in 1835 – Alexis de Tocqueville in “Democracy in America”
152 Max Boot. The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power. (N.Y.: Basic, 2002), 14-15153 Drew R. McCloy. The Last of the Fathers: James Madison and the Republican Legacy.
(Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. press, 1989), 18-26154 Clifton J. Philips. Protestant America and the Pagan World: The First Half Century of the
American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, 1810-1860. (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1969), 135
78
observed that Christianity carried great influence in America. Here in America, religion
was linked to democratic ideals. The American founding fathers, rightly or wrongly,
shared an idea of a divine mission to perform in the world. They believed in a higher
moral purpose. They shared the idea of emancipation of man.155
To pursue this objective, American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions
was established in the year 1810. The Board’s founding objective was the establishment
of missionary centers around the globe. Middle East was the Board’s special interest. Till
now, Middle East was not claimed by any other European colonial power as its exclusive
sphere of influence as such. At the same time the “idea of restoration” was slowly gaining
ground in America.
The “Repatriation of Jews to Palestine” also was becoming a part of this
American mission to the Middle East. Ex-President John Adams wrote in 1819 to
Mordecai Noah, the first US diplomatic mission to Tunis, that he really wanted
restoration of Jews to the “Holy Land”.156 Levi Parsons was the first American
missionary to enter Jerusalem in December, 1820. He was followed by Pliny Fisk in
1821. Parsons died in February 1822 while Fisk settled in Beirut and established a
missionary school there in 1823. It was the first American institution in the Middle East.
By the end of 1820’s, nine American missionary school-houses were established in
Lebanon. These institutions had a total strength of six hundred students. Parsons and Fisk
were the first American missionaries to introduce American faith to the Middle East.
Ottoman Empire was in the advanced stage of decay and the local leaders in the
Middle East were burning with deep desires of independence. The European colonial
powers were busy in carving out areas of their exclusive control in the region. The
political atmosphere in the Middle East was becoming increasingly complex and
uncertain. An ever increasing number of Americans started traveling and interacting with
the region. Consequently, the US economic and military interests in the Middle East
increased manifold.
By 1820, the US had not established diplomatic relations with Ottoman Empire.
Great Britain and France were the real obstacles in the way of America. They enjoyed 155 Abdul Latif Tibawi. American Interests in Syria, 1800-1901. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966),
1-2156 Naomi Shepherd. The Zealous Intruders: The Western Rediscovery of Palestine. (London:
Collins, 1987), 39
79
commercial and diplomatic relations with the Empire. Now, it was the proper time to
establish diplomatic relations with Ottoman rulers. However, suddenly Greek revolt
broke out in 1821 against the Ottoman Empire.157 Thousands of Americans, in their
capacity, responded to Greek call for help. These American mercenaries viewed it as a
conflict between Islam and Christianity much like the Crusades. However, President
James Monroe refused to intervene in internal European affairs in line with George
Washington’s warning to Americans in his farewell address in 1796.158
This raised American image in Istanbul. Simultaneously, the European imperial
powers sided with the Greek revolt. It created troubles with Istanbul. Now the US was
better placed for the conclusion of a US – Ottoman treaty. Turkish Sultan tried in vain to
crush the Greek revolt. Rather the Sultan was defeated at Navarino in 1827 by the
combined forces of Britain, France and Russia. This defeat of Turkish Sultan resulted in
the slow amputation of the Ottoman Empire in the hands of European imperial powers.
President Andrew Jackson came to power in Washington in 1830. He wanted to win the
same “trading and other privileged for the US as other European powers did enjoy in
Ottoman Empire. Finally, in May 1830, a Treaty of Navigation and Commerce between
the US and the Ottomans was concluded. The treaty granted “trading facilities” to the US
in the Black Sea region of the Ottoman Empire. In reciprocity, the US pledged to supply
weapons to Sultan on discounted prices. The Senate ratified the treaty. However, it
objected to the sale of “warships” to Ottoman. President Jackson ignored US Senate and
fulfilled his treaty obligations.159
From the US standpoint the treaty was a “turning point” in its relations with the
Middle East. America got “legal and commercial rights” in the Ottoman Empire at par
with other European powers. A precedent was established to sell “American weapons” to
the region. To sum up, the treaty increased American commercial and naval activity
along with expanded influence and presence in the Middle East. The President appointed
David Porter as the first American diplomat in Istanbul in 1831. Ultimately, Porter was
157 John Gaddis. Surprise, Security, and the American Experience. (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 2004), 15
158 Samuel F. Bemis. John Quincy Adams and the Foundations of American Foreign Policy. (N.Y.: Knopf, 1956), 388
159 Donald B. Cole. The Presidency of Andrew Jackson. (Lawrence: Univ. press of Kansas, 1993), 128
80
raised to the status of an ambassador, the first of its kind to the Middle East. In the year
1840, Porter intervened in an incident in Syria where Jews were allegedly being tortured
by the Ottoman Administration. Thereby Porter established a tradition of extending
“protection” to the Jews in the Middle East.160
The American missionary activity had grown greatly in the Middle East since
1820’s. Their special focus was on education. The US missionary activity had been
extended as far as Kurdish Mesopotamia. Near about 1840, the American Board of
Commissioners dispatched a missionary group to as far as Mosul.161 In the year 1840,
European powers forced Egypt’s forces out of Syria and Palestine. In reciprocity, Sultan
Abdul Majid permitted “foreign nationals” to settle “permanently in Jerusalem”. The
decade of 1840’s saw coming of the idea of Manifest Destiny in America as a pretext for
the US continental westward imperialist expansion. The concept suited well with the
missionaries objectives. Consequently, the US missionary activity in the Middle East
greatly increased. The new US ambassador to Istanbul in 1842, Mr. Dabney Carr
“promised the US government’s protection” to the missionaries in the region. There was
one thing special with American missionaries in the Middle East. Unlike their European
counterparts, American missionaries had no hidden imperialist agenda. Consequently, the
number of missionaries greatly increased and so did the annual budget of America’s
Board of Missionaries.162
American missionaries built a school at Babek in 1842, just five miles away from
Istanbul which became Turkey’s first modern university in the times to come. 163 A large
number of students might be in thousands, coming from Muslim, Christian and Jewish
background were studying in these missionary schools throughout the Ottoman Empire.
In this regard, the US appointed agents (consuls) in six major cities of Palestine. Palestine
became the most “Western represented territory” in these times in the Middle East.
Beirut, Smyrna and Palestine became the major centers of American missionary activity
in the region.
160 Tibawi. American Interests, 3161 Ibid, 79162 Field, America and the Mediterranean World, 210, 250, 351163 David H. Finnie. Pioneers East: The Early American Experience in the Middle East.
(Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1967), 99-109
81
Dr. Anderson, a surgeon by profession, under the aegis of the American
Geographical and Statistical Society, George Bush, a New York University Professor of
Hebrew, Joseph Smith, a restorationist, and Warder Cresson among other Americans
gave a great speed to the “restorationist movement” in America during 1840’s. They
wanted the restoration of Palestine to the Jews.164 A number of American restorationists
took residence in Palestine. The main theme of the American restorationists was to help
Jews recover Palestine/ Israel second time.165
The Mediterranean was no longer a problem for American visitors to the Middle
East. The number of American visitors increased with every passing day. The tourists
included missionaries, engineers, doctors, educators and politicians alike. The American
visitors to the Middle East had, more or less one thing in common, that in the future the
region would be “remodeled” after the US.166
Then, America plunged into Civil War. During the period of American Civil War
the Ottoman King, Sultan Abdul Aziz, took important steps by renewing the 1830
Ottoman – US Treaty banning the “Confederate” citizens from operating in Ottoman
seas.167 Then in 1865, the US joined hands together with other nine European powers in
establishing a lighthouse on Tangier. It was the first US multinational treaty.168 Taking
the advantage of the US Civil War French Emperor, Napoleon III, tried to create an
empire in Mexico in January 1863. Sa’id Pasha, the Egyptian ruler, supported French
effort to carve out an empire in Mexico and contributed a battalion of five hundred
Egyptian soldiers for the French cause.
The Lincoln Administration severely protested the French adventure in Mexico. It
was a violation of the Monroe Doctrine of 1823. The Monroe Doctrine had prohibited
future European interference in the affairs of the Western Hemisphere. The Egyptian
ruler had expelled Robert Wilkinson, a confederate, from Egypt and had extended help to
the widows and orphans of the Union. Some Egyptian volunteers had fought for the cause
164 Andrew C.A. Jampoler. Sailors in the Holy Land: The 1848 American Expedition to the Dead Sea and the Search for Sodom and Gomorrah. (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2005), 60,142
165 Henry L. Feingold. Zion in America: The Jewish Experience from Colonial Times to the Present. (N.Y.: Twayne, 1974), 199
166 Finnie, Pioneers East, 155167 Benjamin P. Thomas. Abraham Lincoln: A Biography. (N.Y.: Random House, 1968), 281-283,
360168 Jay Monaghan. Diplomat in Carpet Slippers: Abraham Lincoln Deals with Foreign Affairs.
(Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1945), 215-217
82
of the Union. America could not ignore such a highly objectionable role on the part of
Egypt. America threatened retaliation. Sa’id Pasha refrained from sending further
military forces to Mexico. Eventually, French were defeated.169
During the US Civil War period cotton got great boast in Egypt. Cotton acreage in
Egypt increased greatly. Egyptian cotton exports skyrocketed from $ 7 million in 1861 to
77 million in 1865. It was a huge increase. Ismail, the grandson of Mohammad Ali, used
this import money to Europeanize Egypt, especially his military forces.170 The US
missionary activity specially targeted Syria and Palestine. Traditionally Egypt had never
been a focal point of American activity. Despite some problems with Egypt, President
Lincoln informed the US Congress in 1864, that American relations with Egypt were
satisfactory.
In the year 1868 Ismael, the Egyptian ruler entrusted Thaddeus Mott, a former
American military officer, the task of modernizing Egyptian military. Mott was offered
Generalship in Egypt. He recruited a band of former American military officers to do the
job. In turn, the officers did their job well. By 1873, these officers had done their job.
They laid down the foundations of modern Egyptian army.171 Consequently, Egypt’s
foreign debt skyrocketed. The income from mere cotton or Suez Canal revenue was
insufficient to perform such a big job. The Egypt’s foreign debt increased to $500
million. Ismail was forced to sell Egypt’s shares in Suez Canal Company to Britain.
Resultantly, the military schools were closed down. The US advisers were retired.
However, whatever its debit side might be, they helped to become Egypt the most
powerful and modern in the Middle East.172
American missionary activity greatly expanded in the Middle East. The US
missionary activity in Syria did not make conversions but thirty only. Henry Field, a
historian, observed that Christian missions had very little impression on Islam in the
Middle East. Syrus Hamlin built “Robert College” in 1863, on Bebek Hills near
Bosphorous in Turkey. It was the first of its kind in the Middle East. Robert College
169 Thomas A. Bryson. American Diplomatic Relations with the Middle East, 1784-1975. (Metuchen, N.J.: Scarecrow, 1977), 25-26
170 E.R.J. Owen. Cotton and the Egyptian Economy, 1820-1914. (London: Oxford Univ. Press, 1969), 89, 105
171 William Dye. Moslem Egypt and Christian Abyssinia. (N.Y.: Negro Universities Press, 1969), 38-46
172 Bryson. American Diplomatic Relations, 27
83
successfully introduced Western ideas to its students in Turkey. Five future Prime
ministers of Turkey were the graduates of the college.173
Another university was built in Beirut by Daniel Bliss named “Syrian Protestant
College”. The college helped creating a modern Syria by indoctrinating ideas of
patriotism and republicanism among its graduates. An Arab historian, George Antonius
(The Arab Awakening, 1938, London) commented that the College provided a big
contribution to “Arab revival” in the region.174
Two years after Lincoln’s murder, the American consul in Jerusalem, noted that
five-hundred American restorationists entered the city in a short span of 18 months. An
influential newspaper, New York Times (editorial), observed that Jerusalem belonged to
Jews.175 The number of American visitors to the Middle East increased manifold in post-
Civil War decades. The first important political figure to travel the region was William
Henry Seward, the former US Secretary of State. He ultimately reached the “Holy Land”.
He visited Jerusalem. The next person in the trail of important Americans was General
Sherman to visit Jerusalem in 1872. Modern science came to the forefront to break the
traditional barriers between the West and the Middle East. However, the most important
US public figure to travel to the Middle East was the ex-chief of Union forces and the
former President of the US, Ulysses S. Grant. In the Middle East, Grant went to the Holy
Land-Palestine. Here in Palestine Grant visited Jerusalem.176
Though the record on the incident is ambiguous, however, the first abortive
American move to help Arabs achieve independence from the Ottoman Empire occurred
in Syria in the year 1868, claimed historian Michael B. Oren.177 The Baha’is of Baghdad
asked for American help in saving their leader Baha Ullah from exile. However, the
President Rutherford B. Hayes remained more interested in protecting Jews in the Middle
East – in Palestine, Persia and North Africa.178 It was in August 1873, the Turks
established their first embassy in Washington. The mutual trade continued to flourish. It
173 Field, America and the Mediterranean World, 355-356174 Bernard Lewis. The Arabs in History. (London: Hutchinson’s Univ. Library, 1950), 173-174175 Lester I. Vogel. To See a Promised Land: Americans and the Holy Land in the Nineteenth
Century. (Univ. Park: Pennsylvania State Univ. Press, 1993), 125-126176 Geoffrey Perret. Ulysses S. Grant. (N.Y.: Random House, 1997), 454177 Michael B. Oren. Power, Faith, and Fantasy: America in the Middle East, 1776 to the Present.
(WW Norton & Company, 2007), 247178 Bryson. American Diplomatic Relations, 29, 47
84
was December 1879, when the USS Ticonderoga, the first US warship navigated Strait of
Hormuz and passed on to the Persian Gulf. It was to be remembered that traditionally the
Persian Gulf had been the exclusive British area.
Egypt’s foreign debt condemned it into insolvency. This in turn fueled nationalist
movement in Egypt under Col. Urabi Ahmad. In July 1882, the British attacked and
occupied Alexandria. Thus began seventy – two years of the British occupation of Egypt.
France followed into the footsteps of Britain and they both together, in an imperial drive,
occupied some seven million miles of the Middle East. Americans, in general, supported
this European imperialism.179 Understandably, American Presidents from Grant to
Garfield did not pay any heed to repeated Egyptian appeals for help against British
imperialism.180
The US-Middle East policy was torn between two opposing forces–allegiance to
Western civilization and anticolonial tradition. After the British occupation all American
citizens left Egypt. The American approach to the Middle East had produced a model for
the expansion of the US dominance overseas. The model was three pronged–supported
missionaries, helping tourism and stationing permanent warships to protect its
international commerce. America saw imperialism as a force initiating a positive change
in the Middle East.181 America had established a tradition of appointing American Jews to
diplomatic assignments in the Middle East.182
American missionary activity in the Middle East increased manifold. So did the
restorationist movement. Even some important American citizens such as T. De Witt
Talmage went to so far declaring that America should lead the world in taking forcibly
Palestine from the Muslims. Followers of two faiths Judaism and Christianity–persons
like John D. Rockefeller, Charles Scribner, Pierpont Mogan, Supreme Court Chief Justice
Melville W. Fuller and Congressman McKinley supported the idea of restorationism.183
At least since 1890, the US had been asking Ottoman Emperor to open Palestine to
Jewish immigration. However, the Presidents Harrison, Cleveland and McKinley did not
179 Eric J. Hobsbawm. The Age of Empire, 1875-1914. (N.Y.: Pantheon, 1987), 59 180 Oren, Power, Faith, and Fantasy, 261181 Ibid, 271182 Elbert Farman. Egypt and Its Betray. (N.Y.: Grafton Press, 1908), 286-290, 302-303183 Vogel, Promised Land, 228-229
85
entertain the idea of naked use of force in this connection.184 From 1885 to 1895, the
budget for American missionary activity in the Middle East increased sevenfold.
The term “Middle East” was coined in the year 1902 by Alfred Thayer Mahan, an
American working for Britain. He wrote a classic book titled “Sea Power and America”
(1897). In this book he emphasized the “inseparable link between great-power status and
the control of international commerce” by powerful navy. Mahan’s argument was that the
great powers had to control “the neck that connects together adjoining areas of Africa and
Asia”. These areas included Turkey, Iran, Egypt, the East Mediterranean basin. He
collectively named this huge area the “Middle East”. His main argument was that the
nation that “controls the Middle East controls the world”.185
With the coming of the 20th century, the US surpassed Europe in two ways-in her
national consumption of energy and production of industrial products collectively.
America, now, was ready to challenge “Europe’s dominant position” in the Far East and
in the Middle East.186 By the dawn of 20th century, the US exports to the Middle East
were fourteen times more than its imports. By the year 1900 A.D., America had become
world power.187 After Westward expansion and industrial revolution in the 19 th century,
America had become world power. President Theodore Roosevelt was the real
embodiment of this change. His policies such as “Open Door” to China and “Gunboat
Diplomacy” reflected this change in the US foreign policy.
Theodore Roosevelt successfully intervened in Ottoman territories four times
from Bulgaria (in a ransom case) to Morocco crisis where a contest was going on
between Germany and France for supremacy. The crisis was dragging the entire Europe
into war. Roosevelt co-sponsored major-powers conference on the Middle East in Spain
in 1906 and successfully helped diluting the crisis. During this conference the US
supported the Imperial principles of Anglo–French alliance as well as freedom for the US
trade. This remained the basic US policy toward the Middle East for next fifty years.188 It
184 Regina S. Sharif. Non-Jewish Zionism: Its Roots in Western History. (London: Zed Press, 1983), 92-93
185 William D. Puleston. The Life and Work of Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan. (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1939), 41-42
186 Fareed Zakaria. From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America’s World Role. (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1996), 46, 127
187 Field, America and the Mediterranean World, 327, 388188 Frederick W. Marks. Velvet on Iron: The Diplomacy of Theodore Roosevelt. (Lincoln: Univ. of
Nebraska Press, 1979), 69
86
could be safely argued that Theodore Roosevelt supported imperialism as a legitimate
instrument for expanded American influence in the Middle East.
3.2 Second Phase (1900 – 1980):Present Iraq has total area of 434, 128 square kilometers and is bordered by Turkey in the
north, Iran in the east, Syria and Jordan in the west and Saudi Arabia and Kuwait in the
South. The coastline of Iraq is just 19 kilometers along the northern end of the Persian
Gulf. During ancient times, it was called Mesopotamia, “land between the rivers”. The
rivers were Euphrates and Tigris. The classical Arab geographers used the term Iraq for
the first time in the 7th century for this region. However, the region had no definite
boundaries. On the advent of Islam, Mesopotamia was a province of Persian Empire. In
the year 637 A.D., the famous Muslim General Sa’d Ibn Abi Waqqas defeated the
Sasanian army at the battle of Al-Qadisiya and decided Iraq’s fate.
By the end of the next year, the Muslims occupied almost all of Iraq. The
“Abbasid Revolution” uprooted Ummayad dynasty. In the year 762 AD, al-Mansur
founded Iraq’s new capital, Baghdad. It remained the Abbasid Capital till 1258, when
Mongol invasion, in a bloody war, overthrew the dynasty. This initiated a process of
centuries of external invasion and internal strife in Iraq. Passing through a long historical
process, finally current Iraq became a part of Ottoman Empire in the year 1534 and
continued as such until the First World War.189
British influence in Baghdad increased since 1798. In this fateful year, Suleyman
Pasha allowed the appointment of a permanent British agent in Baghdad. In the last days
of Ottoman rule, the contemporary Iraq was divided into three separate provinces –
Basra, Mosul and Baghdad. It had been a historical fact that Iraq had never been a single
political entity. Iraq never had been a nation- state as well or an empire before the British
carved it on the foot-steps of WWI. There had been the provinces/ Vilayets of Basra,
Baghdad, and Mosul.190 The British interests in the Persian Gulf and Euphrate–Tigris
region had grown slowly since the later years of 18th century.
On the eve of WWI, there had been close ties between Berlin and Istanbul. For
the British it was troublesome. Ottoman rulers had given Germany a concession to build
189 The New Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc. (15th Eds). Vol. 21, Macropaedia, (USA, 2005), 972-988
190 Ibid, 988
87
a railway line through Anatolia to Baghdad. For London, it was fearful to see such a
development. London strongly protested against this rival German penetration.
Meanwhile the Anglo–Persian Oil Company had started its production in Iran. At the
same time, there were great indications about the presence of oil in Iraq as well. Due to
the above cited reasons a British military force entered Basra in November 1914 and
occupied Baghdad in March 1917. The oil factor was important in the creation of current
Iraq within its present borders after WWI.191
During WWI, Britain and France had secretly agreed upon the partition of the
Middle East region into their respective spheres of interests in what is known as Sykes-
Picot Agreement of 1916. As a result of this agreement Iraq had become exclusive British
sphere192. Just before the 1919 Paris Peace Conference, Clemenceau, the French premier
met Lloyd George, the British Prime Minister in London. It was here in London that
Clemenceau ceded French claim to Mosul in favor of Britain. The quid pro-quo was a
French share in Mesopotamian oil. In this way present boundaries of Iraq were
determined and Iraqi oil was the central factor to shape borders of the country.193
It was in the San Remo Treaty in 1920 that the final borders of Iraq were created
and the treaty also formalized British mandate over Iraq and Palestine. Meanwhile, Iraqis
were simmering for independence.194 Interestingly, the British declaration made by
General Maude in Baghdad in March 1917 was drafted by Sir Mark Sykes and posed
British as “Liberators” not conquerors.195 However, in Iraq the nationalists were strongly
asking for freedom. In the year 1921 at the Cairo conference Faisal, son of Sharif
Hussain, was decided to be the future King of Iraq. Monarchy was established by the
British as the future political system for the country. Faisal was enthroned in August
1921 as the monarch. The Anglo – Iraqi Treaty of Alliance replaced the mandate of the
League of Nations. Iraq ratified the treaty in October 1922. The treaty actually
incorporated basic elements of the mandate system of League of Nations. It guaranteed
security of British interests in the newly established state of Iraq. However, in 1923, the
191 Rashid Khalidi. Resurrecting Empire: Western Footprints and America’s Perilous Path in the Middle East. (London: I. B. Tauris, 2004), 92-93
192 David E. Long, and Bernard Reich. The Government and Politics of the Middle East and North Africa. (Colorado: Westview Press, Inc. 1980), 110
193 Khalidi, Resurrecting Empire, 94194 Long, and Reich, Middle East and North Africa, 110-112195 Khalidi, Resurrecting Empire, 97
88
treaty was revised and its period was reduced from twenty to four years. According to the
terms of the treaty British were to offer advice to Iraqi government on both foreign affairs
as well as domestic matters such as military and financial etc.196
The League of Nations assigned Mosul to Iraq in December, 1925. A treaty was
signed between Britain, Iraq and Turkey in 1926 confirming thereby “the final frontiers”
of Iraq as definitive. Iraq was to pay “ten percent of its oil royalties” to Turkey for the
next 25 years. A new treaty was signed between Britain and Iraq in June, 1930. The
treaty, among other things, provided for a “close alliance” between Iraq and Great
Britain. The treaty concluded in 1930 was to last for 25 years from the date of
independence of Iraq.
The year of “independence of Iraq” had already been agreed upon in 1929
between Britain and Iraq. Iraq was to get independence in 1932. Among other things, Iraq
gave bases to Britain. The treaty though opposed by Iraqi nationalists was ratified by the
Assembly in November, 1931. Ultimately, Iraq got independence in October 1932.197 The
British–Iraq relations were to be governed by the treaty of 1930, which made an
“obligation for Iraq to accept the advice” of the British High Commissioner, especially if
it was related to the discharge of “British economic and international obligations.”198
There had been a substantive rise in Turco-American bilateral trade since the
beginning of 20th century. By the beginning of WW1, Turkish exports to America had
been 23% of all its exports. Meanwhile domestic production of oil in the US was
insufficient to meet its growing demand. Consequently, after knowing about the oil
deposits in the Middle East, the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey started exploration
in Mesopotamia in 1910. On the eve of WWI, oil of the Middle East had become an
American obsession. No sooner Turks entered WWI they outlawed English as an “enemy
language.”
The US missionaries in the Middle East asked Washington for help. The US
missionaries wanted protection against Turkish excesses. In response, President Wilson
asked the USS North Carolina and Tennesse, the two warships, to provide help to the US
missionaries. Till the end of 1914, America remained “neutral in the war in the Middle 196 The New Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc., 988197 Peter Mansfield (Ed). The Middle East: A Political and Economic Survey. (Oxford: Oxford
Univ. Press, 1980), 326198 Joe Stork. Middle East Oil and the Energy Crisis. (N.Y.: Monthly Review Press, 1975), 16
89
East.”199 In February 1917, in the Laconia incident two American citizens lost their lives
as a result of unrestricted German submarine warfare. America declared war on Germany
in April. As a reaction Turkey broke off relations with the US. Along with the majority of
Congress, the ex-President Theodore Roosevelt put great pressure on President Wilson to
declare war on Turkey. For whatever reasons, President Wilson never declared war on
Turkey.200
The US remained neutral in the Middle East region. The Ottoman rule in the
Middle East collapsed. The Middle East was divided between Britain and France into
their respective spheres of control. Palestine and Iraq became a part of British share. 201
The Federation of American Zionism was created in the year 1897. However, the US as
per policy never promoted Jewish emigration to the Holy Land. Actually, Zionism was
Europe centered movement with its headquarters in Berlin. On learning about Sykes-
Picot secret treaty, President Wilson remarked that the US would not fight for such
“selfish clandestine” imperial interests of others. America rejected all such “secret”
attempts aiming at partitioning the Middle East.202
On the other hand, in September 1918, President Wilson expressed “satisfaction”
on Balfour Declaration related to the establishment of “Jewish national home” in
Palestine.203 America did not participate in WWI in the Middle East. The European
victors of WWI, during Paris Peace Conference in 1919, simply refused to apply
Wilson’s fourteen points on the Middle East. For whatever reasons, Wilson had
supported the mandate system and the “British policy in Palestine” what came to be
known as Balfour Declaration. Finally, in November 1920, American Senate rejected
American membership of League of Nations. America also refused to play an important
role in reshaping the Middle East. In post-war treaties, from San Remo (Italy) in April
1920 to Lausanne (Switzerland) in July 1923, the US goal had been “ensuring the policy
199 Arthur S. Link. Wilson: The Struggle for Neutrality. (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1960), 68-69
200 David E. Cronon (Ed.). The Cabinet Diaries of Josephus Daniels, 1913-21. (Lincoln: Univ. of Nebraska Press, 1963), 246
201 Oren, Power, Faith, and Fantasy, 352-355202 Yaakov Ariel. On Behalf of Israel: American Fundamentalist Attitudes toward Jews, Judaism,
and Zionism, 1865-1945. (Brooklyn: Carlson, 1991), 45 203 Elizabeth Monroe. Britain’s Moment in the Middle East, 1914-1956. (Baltimore: John Hopkins
Univ. Press, 1963), 44-45
90
of open door” to the Middle East region. The main objective of the policy was ensuring
“American business” in the Middle East.204
By 1900 A.D., in the decades after US civil war, America had become the most
industrialized country of the world. The US industrial status greatly increased her
dependence on oil. At the same time in the year 1901, William D.’Arcy, a British
businessman had got a sixty-year concession from the Iranian government for exploration
of oil in the country. Oil production in Iran began in 1908. The next year Anglo-Persian
Oil Company was formed. In a great development, near WWI, Winston Churchill, then
lord of Admiralty, in an innovative move ordered production of new oil-powered ships.
This new generation of ships had great leverage over coal-powered ships in terms of
speed and destructive capability. This made Britain profoundly dependent on petroleum.
Oil became crucial to Britain’s “world dominance”. It greatly enhanced the “strategic
importance” of the Middle East. This opened the way for repeated major power’s
intervention in the Middle East.205 Britain and the US were fated to become rivals in the
Middle East.
The US companies became desperate in their search for overseas sources of
petroleum. However, Iran, then the largest producer of oil was a British monopoly. The
other “potential reservoirs” of the region – Iraq, Syria, and Palestine etc., were under
Franco – British mandate. The European imperial powers were determined to keep the
US out of the scene. However, on the other hand, America was also determined to rupture
European monopoly over Middle Eastern Oil resources. It was for the first time that the
US government became actively involved in the “oil business” in the Middle East.
In the year 1921, Herbert Hoover, the US Secretary of Commerce, rallied together
the seven most important American oil companies and formed an “oil consortium” of
them. The US companies included – New Jersey, Texas, Sinclair, Mexican, Atlantic, Gulf
and New York. This united front of the US companies forced their European rivals to
conclude a bargain with them. Consequently, the US oil companies and their European
counterparts joined hands and formed a new cartel – the Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC).
204 Oren, Power, Faith, and Fantasy, 394205 Khalidi, Resurrecting Empire, 83-87
91
America received 23.75% share from the entire Middle East Oil extracted. The agreement
was concluded in 1928.206
Oil was not the only American interest in the Middle East. The great US concern
was the rapid British decline and exit from the region. America feared that the vacuum of
power created by shrinking British empire in the region could be filled in by the rival
communist power–USSR. America wanted to keep USSR out of the Middle East. It is to
be noted that by 1950, Middle Eastern Oil producer countries were paid only nominal
royalties by the British.207 For example Britain paid Iran only 10 to 12 percent royalties
till 1950.208 Similarly, the initial royalties given to Iraq were at the rate of 4s. gold for per
ton crude petroleum exported from the country.209
The biggest US success in the Middle East came in the year 1933, when Ibn-e-
Saud awarded oil exploration rights to the US Company–Standard Oil of California
(SOCAL). Three years later, Texaco joined SOCAL which was renamed as ARAMCO,
and in 1947, they were joined by SOCONY (Standard of New York) making ARAMCO
consortium. It brought together three of the main elements of J.D. Rockefeller’s oil
empire. It made America the “dominant force” in the Middle East oil world.210
By 1939, the US was an oil exporter. However, by the end of WWII, the US had
started importing foreign oil to meet her ever-increasing need. By 1950, the Middle East
proven petroleum reserves were rather equal to the rest of the world total. However, till
1950, most of the Middle East was a British preserve. The Middle East had become a
“key to the future of the petroleum industry” of the world. The 1933 US–KSA agreement
was a “turning point” in the US – Middle East relationship.211
The dominant theme of the US foreign policy from 1790 to 1941 had been what
was known as isolationism. During these years the US avoided making “entangling
alliances” with European powers. However, owing to its great importance, the Middle
East had become the bone of contention among European colonial powers. The American
206 Oren, Power, Faith, and Fantasy, 410-411207 The New Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc., 991208 Gabriel Kolko. The Age of War: The United States Confronts the World. (New Delhi: Viva
Books Pvt. (Ltd), Raj Press, 2007), 42209 Mansfield, Middle East, 348210 Daniel Yergin. The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money, and Power. (N.Y.: Simon and
Schuster, 1991), 283-289211 Oren, Power, Faith, and Fantasy, 414
92
policy toward the issue of Palestine in the first half of 20 th century, especially during the
interwar period was one of neutrality. In the year 1942, President Roosevelt said that if
we support either of the two groups we will create trouble.212
Later on, after the Pearl Harbor incident, America entered WWII in December
1941. However, during WWII, the basic US concern was Europe and Pacific not the
Middle East. The Roosevelt Administration established two bases in the region – Basra
and Cairo for the provision of supply deliveries to the allies in the region. It was for the
first time that in 1945, both houses of Congress, Democrats and Republicans alike,
adopted “pro-Zionist stance” by demanding that “Palestine must be opened for free entry
of Jews” and also asked for the establishment of a “Jewish state” there.213
President Truman, in the year 1945, urged the British Prime Minister Clement
Attlee to “open Palestine” for the “immigration and settlement” of 100,000 Jews and lift
the ban on the Jewish land purchases.214 The US also supported UN plan proposing
“partitioning plan for Palestine” into two independent states. Truman told Weizman in
March 1948, that “I am for partition”. Ultimately, Jews declared Israel as an independent
state on May 14, 1948. The news reached the US at six O’clock and America recognized
the newly independent state at eleven minutes past six.215
The destruction wrought by the two World Wars had very important
consequences. The multipolar Eurocentric world political system was replaced by bi-
polar world political system. The allies had great differences on two different ways of life
based on antithetic ideologies – capitalism and communism. Consequently, post-WWII
era was characterized by what was known as “Cold War” period. The world was divided
into two blocs – capitalist block headed by the US and communist bloc headed by the
USSR. They were locked up into an eternal struggle for survival as well as dominance.
Soviet Union embarked on a worldwide revolutionary struggle based on communist
doctrine and the US followed what was known as Policy of Containment on the advice of
212 David Shapiro. From Philanthropy to Activism: The Political Transformation of American Zionism in the Holocaust Years, 1933-1945. (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1994), 71, 84
213 Oren, Power, Faith, and Fantasy, 468214 David Schoenbaum. The United States and the State of Israel. (N.Y.: Oxford Univ. Press,
1993), 44215 Oren, Power, Faith, and Fantasy, 499
93
George F. Kennan. The entire world remained in the grips of Cold War from 1945 to
1991.216
The period from 1945 to 1991, in relation to world politics, could be properly
understood in the Cold War perspective only. Similarly, the US foreign policy toward the
Middle East in general and toward Iraq in particular during the same period could be
understood in the cold war perspective. In the post-WWII era, the basic US interests in
the Middle East were the control over its oil, checking Soviet penetration, fill the power
void created by retreating British imperial power, and supporting establishment of
Israel.217
The first active theatre of the Cold War was the Middle East. Stalin made some
demands on Turkey – joint Soviet – Turkish control of the Turkish Straits, provision of
naval bases in the Dardanelles, cession of some Turkish territory etc. The demands were
made in 1945. Stalin put great “pressure on Turkey” to succumb to Soviet demand.
Meanwhile, Soviet Union refused to withdraw Red Army from Iran. The USSR wanted
to convert Iran into a “Soviet Satellite”. After great pressure from Washington and
London, Stalin withdrew from Iranian Azerbaijan in 1946. Iraq shared her borders with
Turkey and Iran. In both cases the US put pressure on Moscow to back out from her
demands.218
In the post–WWII era, the US also replaced British power in the region. The CIA
used General Naguib to overthrow Egyptian monarch Farouk in 1952, who was a British
puppet in the region. Ultimately, Col. Gamal Abdul Nasser came to power as a result of
this coup. Again the factors of “oil and fear of Soviet penetration in Iran” were the causes
behind the CIA and MI-6 secret alliance against nationalist government of Mossadegh.
Under the tacit approval of President Eisenhower, both CIA and MI-6 staged a
“successful coup” against Mossadegh in 1953.
The five US companies that owned 40% of AIOC, suddenly dominated and
started production of petroleum. The US had intimacy with Mohammad Reza Shah and
CIA used him. America had agreed on “50-50 split” formula with Saudi Arabia in 1950.
216 William R. Keylor. The Twentieth-Century World: An International History. (N.Y.: Oxford Univ. Press, Inc., 1984), 262-273
217 Kolko. Age of War, 40-41218 Steven W. Hook and John Spanier. American Foreign Policy since World War II. (5th Ed.).
(Washington D.C., CQ Press, 2000), 37-38
94
However, UK paid only nominal royalties 10–12% to Iran. The US was fated to dominate
Iran and totally relied on Shah.219 A similar split formula was followed in Iraq in 1952
and consequently, government’s income from oil in Iraq rose steeply from £32.6 million
in 1951 to £74 million in 1955.220
After its independence, Iraq went through a period of political instability. From
1932, the year of Iraq’s independence, the country had more than fifty Cabinets. The first
military coup in Iraq was affected in 1936. Since then military forces dominated politics
in Iraq. A non-aggression pact known as “Sa’adabad Pact” was concluded between Iraq,
Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan in the year 1937. Then, during WWII, British occupied
Iraq.221
Meanwhile, Nasser became head of state in Egypt in 1954. He emerged as a
symbol of Pan-Arabism, anti-imperialism, and Arab nationalism in the Middle East.
Nasser recognized communist China in 1956. In its reaction, Washington backed down
from its commitment to finance the construction of Aswan Dam. Nasser retaliated
immediately and nationalized the Suez Canal in July 1956. Suez Canal and Persian Gulf
was Britain’s lifeblood. The Western stakeholders retaliated culminating into tripartite
invasion of Suez Canal by Britain, France and Israel, in October 1956. The US President
Eisenhower put great pressure on Britain and France to end the hostilities and withdrew
from the canal.
Ultimately, they succumbed to US and Soviet combined pressure in December,
the same year. President Eisenhower saved the honor of Nasser. After this crisis Nasser
emerged as a powerful votary of Pan-Arabism and anti-Imperialism. President
Eisenhower did not want Soviet penetration in the Middle East on behalf of the Arab
world. The British eclipse in the Middle East produced a vacuum of power in the region.
The US filled that vacuum. The creation of Israel and the tripartite invasion of Suez
Canal produced great reaction in the Middle East. This straightway led to a chain of
military revolutions in the Arab world in the Middle East.222
219 Kolko. Age of War, 41-42220 Mansfield, Middle East, 348-349221 The New Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc., 989-990222 William R. Keylor. The Twentieth-Century World: An International History. (N.Y.: Oxford
Univ. Press, Inc., 1984), 313-314
95
In January 1957, Eisenhower Doctrine was announced to the world. The Doctrine
was region specific and was linked to the future US policy toward the Middle East.
Henceforth, the US would extend military protection to the country asking for help
against “overt armed aggression”. If such an attack came from “international
communism.”223 After Suez Canal crisis of 1956, Nasser became popular in the Arab
World. He also became a symbol of Pan-Arabism, anti-West, anti-Israel, and Arab
resistance to the West. The political atmosphere in the Middle East was ripened for
revolutions. Iraq became the first country where such a pro-Nasser coup was affected in
1958. Iraq had been a British client state since 1932, the year of its independence. Under
the cover of Eisenhower Doctrine in 1958, Anglo–American troops intervened and saved
Jordan and Lebanon from Pro-Nasser revolutions.224
In Iraq an anti-West regime had already come to power under an army General,
Abdul Karim Qasim. An intense struggle for dominance between the two superpowers
was going on in the Middle East. Since 1955, Iraq had been a member of US sponsored
anti-Soviet military alliance called Baghdad Pact. After the revolution of 1958 Iraq left
Baghdad Pact.225 The 1958 coup in Iraq presented a greater danger from America-British
standards. It was the danger of losing one of the most important strategic regions of the
world. It would be a greater loss than China.226
The decades of 1960’s and 1970’s were turbulent for the Middle East. The regime
of Abdul Karim in Iraq was toppled, once again, in 1963 coup. This coup was a result of
secret bargaining between military and Ba’ath party. President Arif, the new Iraqi ruler,
suppressed the Ba’ath leaders in 1964. However, Ba’ath Party leadership was able to
stage a coup against Arif in 1968, as usual with the help of military officers. Within
months after the coup, Ba’ath consolidated her strong control over the country. Saddam
Hussain was the strongman behind this consolidation of Ba’ath power in Iraq. The US
support to Israel in 1967 Arab-Israeli war further estranged the Arab world from the US.
Ba’ath party came to power in Iraq and Syria, on the pro-Nasser agenda – Arab unity,
freedom and socialism. While Egypt, Iraq, Syria became Soviet clients in the Middle
223 Hook and John Spanier, American Foreign Policy, 108224 Keylor, The Twentieth-Century World, 362225 Ibid, 309226 Abraham Ben-Zvi. Decade of Transition: Eisenhower, Kennedy, and the Origins of the
American-Israeli Alliance. (Columbia University Press, 1998), 76
96
East. The US heavily relied on Iran and KSA in the region. Arab nationalism and anti-
Americanism gradually intensified.227
There had been another interesting part of the CIA – Saddam Hussain
relationship. Saddam Hussain joined Ba’ath party in 1957 when he was just twenty years
old. He became an agent of the CIA within no time. At the same time he became a
member of Ba’ath Party. After the 1958 coup, Saddam Hussain took an active part in the
abortive attempt to assassinate Abdul Karim Qasim in 1959, possibly with the help of
CIA. General Qasim was anti-West and had withdrawn Iraq from Baghdad Pact after he
successfully seized power. During this failed attempt to assassinate General Qasim,
Saddam Hussain sustained bullet injury but was lucky to escape from the scene. In the
opinion of Eric Black, both Ba’athists in Iraq and CIA had one commonality. Both
wanted to get rid of Qasim–a pro-Moscow ruler. Saddam Hussain helped CIA and
Ba’athists to affect and coordinate military coup against Qasim.228
After the failed attempt on Qasim, Saddam Hussain fled from Iraq. For the next
four years he stayed in neighboring countries – Syria, Lebanon and Egypt. During these
years of exile, CIA sponsored him and paid for his accommodation. He went through a
training program while he was staying in Beirut. The CIA took him to Cairo where he got
law education. It was here in Cairo that he made frequent visits to the US Embassy. In
Iraq the Ba’athist activists in cooperation with military personnel overthrew Qasim and
killed him in a coup in 1963. In the aftermath of this successful coup, Saddam Hussain
came back to Iraq. This was a CIA sponsored coup. CIA monitored the coup through its
command centre in Kuwait, Vassilis K. Fouskas and Bulent Gokay had cited Richard
Sale, Sean Mac Mathuna, and David Morgan confirming their claim.
The authors wrote that after the 1963 coup, CIA supplied the list of “active
communists” to the conspirators who killed four thousand communists in Iraq in the
immediate aftermath of the coup. The same authors also cited Saddam Hussain’s
biographer, Said K. Aburish, author of Saddam Hussain: The politics of Revenge in
which the biographer confirmed that the relationship between CIA and Ba’ath were “very
close” at that time. In this connection a recent confirmation came from Roger Morris.
227 The New Webster’s International Encyclopedia. Florida: Trident Press International, 1994: 552228 Eric Black. “A History of Iraq, the Cradle of Western Civilization”, Star Tribune. (February 2,
2003)
97
This gentleman was a member of the US National Security Council during the
presidencies of Johnson and Nixon. Morris confirmed that CIA was well connected and
chose anti-communist Ba’ath as its puppet and instrument.229
In this whole episode, CIA was supported by MI-6, the British intelligence. The
1963 Coup in Iraq was the worst bloodbath in the modern history of the country.230 Sir
Roger Allen, the British ambassador to Iraq, wrote to the British foreign office that the
new regime in Iraq was doing well and we should support it. The regime would “purge
communists” and, the communist threat in Iraq would vanish. Not surprisingly,
Washington and London immediately recognized the new regime.
In this new regime, after his return to Iraq from exile, Saddam Hussain was
appointed head of the Al-Jihaz al-Khas, the secret Ba’ath intelligence. Consequently,
Saddam Hussain was involved in the killing of about 5000 Iraqi communists. Again in
the year 1968, another “CIA sponsored coup” was affected in Iraq. This time, Saddam
Hussain became vice president to Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr. Ultimately, in the year 1979,
owing to complex reasons, Ahmed Hassan was forced to resign and Saddam Hussain
immediately assumed presidency of Iraq with a US blessing. There had been no doubt at
all that Saddam Hussain was first recruited by the CIA in 1958 during his stay at Cairo.231
Similarly, Roger Morris also acknowledged that the CIA had a secret hand in
making both the coups of 1963 and 1968 in Iraq.232 How and when did the CIA establish
close relations with Saddam Hussain? CIA over the decades helped Saddam Hussain to
grow as an “absolutist ruler” of Iraq.233 A classic story of Saddam Hussain’s secret
connections with the CIA giving valuable information could also be found yet in another
book. How did the CIA use Baa’th regime and Saddam Hussain to pursue US interests in
Iraq for more than three decades?234 From these credible sources of information it could
229 Vassilis K. Fouskas, and Bulent Gokay. The New American Imperialism: Bush’s War on Terror and Blood for Oil. (Westport, Conn.: Praeger Security International, 2005), 195
230 Ibid, 101231 David Morgan. “Ex-US Official Says CIA Aided Baathists: CIA Offers No Comments on Iraq
Coup Allegations”, Reuters. April 20-21, 2003232 Roger Morris. “A Tyrant 40 Years in the Making”. New York Times, March 14, 2003, A27
233 David Wise, and Thomas B. Ross. "The Invisible Government." Phil. LJ 39, 1964: 478
234 Andrew Cockburn, and Patrick Cockburn. Saddam Hussein: An American Obsession. (UK: Verso, 2002)
98
be safely argued that Ba’ath regime in Iraq was thoroughly supported by the CIA. The
CIA used Saddam Hussain as a “policy instrument” for about 40 years.
Second phase of the US–Iraq relationship was important from many aspects. By
1900, the US had become a world power and now it was impossible to stick to her
traditional policy of isolationism, as her interests had grown worldwide. President
Woodrow Wilson had supported the 1917 “Balfour Declaration” for the creation of
Jewish homeland in Palestine but practically did nothing to implement that program. It
was in the post-World War II era, the US started playing increasingly important role in
the Middle East security issues. The US major interests during this phase had been the oil
of the region, checking communist penetration in the region, ever-increasing involvement
in the Arab-Israeli conflict, replacing Britain and France as the Western imperial power
of the region, and giving support to authoritarian regimes in the Middle East especially –
KSA, Iran and Gulf Oil monarchies.
After 1967 Arab-Israeli war, the US role in the Middle East heavily tilted in favor
of Israel. During these years Iraq had been active, though for a brief period, in the anti-
Soviet Baghdad Pact from 1954 to 1958. The CIA had played determining role in the
1963 and 1968 military coup in Baghdad. At the same time, CIA had engaged Saddam
Hussain and exploited him as a “policy instrument”. On the other hand, the US total
support to Israel, at least after 1967 Arab- Israeli war produced serious repercussions for
the US interests in the region. Arab nationalism and anti-Americanism intensified. From
1970 to 1980, oil prices raised to about twenty times. Arab States used oil as a political
weapon during 1970’s. The US policies toward the region alienated the Arab world.
3.3 Third Phase (1980–1990):No advanced economy could survive without petroleum whatsoever. Since 1920, oil had
been the central focus of major powers dealing with the Middle East. The US fulfilled
about its 70% oil needs from domestic production in the year 1970, however, the figure
reduced to 38% by 1996. Within 35 years from 1960 to 1996, the US oil imports
increased at least “fourfold”. In the year 1983, the Persian Gulf region fulfilled about 9%
of the US oil needs while the figure had increased to 22.1% by 2000.235
235 Kolko. Age of War, 40
99
Since 1953, America in the Middle East had heavily depended on Iran, K.S.A.
and Gulf oil monarchies. However, during the same period Iran and Iraq– the two
powerful countries of the region had been victim of mutual distrust and rivalry. The US
had gone closer to Iran in opposing Iraq during 1970s. The reason was that Ba’athist
regime in Baghdad had signed a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with the USSR in
1972, as a reaction to the US support to Israel in the 1967 Arab – Israeli War. Iraq had
also “broken off its diplomatic relations with Washington” for the same reason.
Supported by the US, the Shah of Iran embarked upon a process of regional primacy
during 1970’s. Consequently, Shah not only seized islands in the Hormuz straits belonged
to Iraq, but also stirred revolt among the Kurds in Iraq.236
Hard pressed by the Shah of Iran, Baa’th regime in Baghdad relinquished its
historical claim to entire Shatt-al-Arab, the estuary of the two powerful rivers of Iraq,
Euphrates and Tigris in the 1975 Algiers Treaty and, accepted a boundary in the middle.
In the year 1978, to please Iran, Iraq expelled Ayatollah Khomeini, an arch opponent of
the Shah. The cleric had lived in exile in Iraq for 14 years. In return, the Shah cut off his
support to Kurdish rebels in northern Iraq. The US had not only given “substantial
support to Iran” against Iraq to check Soviet influence in the region but President Nixon
also had ordered the CIA to provide $5 million secretly to the Kurds.237
Then things changed suddenly in the Middle East in 1979. Iran went through an
anti-monarchy popular revolution in 1979 while Saddam Hussain became president of
Iraq in the same year. Iranian Revolution of January 1979 provided Saddam Hussain an
opportunity to pursue the “goal of regional primacy” in the wake of turmoil in Iran. In
September 1980, Saddam Hussain “abrogated” the Algiers Treaty of 1975 and attacked
Iran. Iraq declared its “sovereignty” over the entire Shatt-al-Arab.238
Iranian Revolution brought an “anti-America” Islamist government headed by
Imam Khomeini to power. The Iranian Revolution was a failure of the US Iran policy. In
an immediate u-turn, the Reagan Administration started giving “support” to Saddam
regime in Iraq against Iran, often cited as the US obsession with post-Revolution Iran.239
During the 1970’s, the US sold more than $20 billion in weaponry to Iran. After Iranian 236 Kees Van der Pijl. Global Rivalries: From the Cold War to Iraq. (New Delhi: Vistaar
Publications, 2006), 337 237 Woodward, Plan of Attack, 69-70238 Pijl, Global Rivalries, 337
100
Revolution the “US armed both the warring states” during Iran-Iraq war. America did not
want any victor in this war. This US policy during 1980’s was termed as “dual
containment”.240
The Reagan Administration gave extensive support to Iraq during eight year Iran
– Iraq war. The US became concerned about Iranian successes in the war in 1982 and,
saw in the war an opportunity to serve her two important objectives. By supporting Iraq
the US could move Iraq away from its close alliance with the USSR, and could also use
Iraq to “replace eroded alliance” with Iran for protecting “US interests” in the Persian
Gulf.241 In the year 1982, CIA began providing “satellite and field intelligence” to
Saddam Hussain against Iran and in 1983 the Reagan Administration signed a security
directive to extend “every type of support” to Iraq to save it from losing the war against
Iran.242
In the year 1983, Reagan sent Rumsfeld as a special US emissary to Iraq with the
task to reestablish diplomatic relations with the country. Rumsfeld met with Saddam
Hussain and discussed America’s and Iraq’s common interests such as “common
antipathy” for Iran and Syria. President Reagan reestablished diplomatic relations with
Iraq in 1984, despite the fact that world knew about “the use of chemical weapons” by
Saddam Hussain against Iran in 1983. In the year 1984, the UN Secretary – General
submitted an expert’s report to the Security Council about the use of chemical weapons
by Iraq against Iran. The US did not “condemn” the resolution on this serious matter.
Whereas at the UN Human Rights Commission, the Reagan Administration “opposed a
condemnation resolution” against Iraq on this issue.243
Ronald Reagan removed Iraq from the list of the terrorist countries. The Reagan
Administration provided “guarantees” for Iraqi purchases of US agricultural products and
in the year 1984, extended “bank credits to Iraq” for imports. Not surprisingly, by the
239 Noam Chomsky. Hegemony or Survival: America’s Quest for Global Dominance. (London: Penguin Group, 2003), 111
240 Stephen Zunes. Tinderbox: US Foreign Policy and the Roots of Terrorism. (US: Common Courage Press, 2003), 67
241 Peter W. Galbraith. The End of Iraq: How American Incompetence Created a War Without End. (N.Y.: Simon and Schuster, 2006), 17
242 Anthony Sampson. The Seven Sisters: The Great Oil Companies and the World They Shaped. (Bantam, 1991), 361-363
243 Galbraith, End of Iraq, 18-19
101
year 1988, the “US subsidies” to Iraq had increased to $ one billion annually. 244 It was in
the year 1983, that President Reagan ordered CIA to share “battlefield intelligence” with
Iraq against Iran during the war. Iraq used that information aggressively against Iran
especially by attacking Iranian troop concentrations by chemical and biological
weapons.245
The Reagan Administration had vital interests linked with Iraq. If Iraq would lose
the war to Iran, it would make Iran the “preeminent power” in the region (Persian Gulf),
putting vast petroleum resources at its disposal. It would make Iran a nucleus of Shiites
from the entire Arab world. Actually, Reagan found in Saddam Hussain a potential ally in
the region.246 There was a big shift in the US policy toward Iran in 1985. The whole affair
would be notoriously known as “Iran–Contra Scandal”. Al-Shiraa, a Lebanese
newspaper, exposed the scandal in November, 1986.
Hizbollah, the Iran backed Lebanon’s Shiite group, had taken some Americans as
hostages. Washington decided to get the release of these hostages in a “secret” manner by
“selling the arms to Iran through Israel” (otherwise an illegal deal). Robert McFarlane,
Oliver North, William Casey traveled to Iran secretly in 1986, to finalize the details of
this “illegal secret arms deal” with Iran. D. Kimche, a former high official of “Mossad”
was at the centre of this secret deal.247 The funds generated by this secret supply were
transferred to Contras, who were fighting against “Nicaragua’s Sandinsita
government”.248
To finance his war against Iran, Saddam Hussain borrowed about $95 billion in
loans mostly from Kuwait and KSA. During these years, Saddam imported weapons,
mostly from the “US and her Western allies” of worth $42 billion. The US also supplied
Iraq with “battlefield intelligence”. Saddam Hussain used mustard, cyanide, and nerve
gases both against Iran and Kurds (Iraqi Kurds). Kuwait had been funding Iraq’s war
against Iran. In reaction, Iran began targeting Kuwaiti oil tankers. These tankers had been
transporting Iraqi oil. The Reagan Administration, in the year 1987, allowed Kuwaiti oil
244 Ibid245 Ibid246 Ibid, 19-20247 William S. Cohen, and George J. Mitchell. Men of Zeal: A Candid inside Story of Iran-Contra
Hearings. (U.S.: Penguin Group, 1989), 79248 Sampson. Seven Sisters, 349-353
102
tankers to “reflag as the US tankers” and escorted them through the Persian Gulf. This led
to the increased presence of “US warships in the Persian Gulf” from six to at least
forty.249
It was in October 1989, the war with Iran was over and Saddam had gassed his
own people, the Kurds. President Bush senior issued a national security directive. In this
directive the President declared that normal diplomatic relations with Iraq would serve
the “longer-term” US interests in the region. It would also furnish regional stability, in
both the Persian Gulf and the Middle East.250 The Presidents Reagan and Bush Senior
“secretly armed Iraq” for a decade both directly and indirectly.251
The US Western allies also had been arming Iraq during 1980’s. The Thatcher
government allowed Iraq to purchase “tools” from the UK which could be used in its
“nuclear program”.252 British arms companies built an important nuclear – capable
missile production complex in the vicinity of Baghdad.253 South Africa also did the same
job and supplied the US and British military technology to Iraq.254
West Germany, a US alley and NATO member, was the “main supplier” of
chemicals which could be used as “weapons” after conversion. In addition, German
companies assisted Iraq in its nuclear program.255 The US directly supplied Iraq with
“dual-use” materials. They could be used for military purposes. Surprisingly, from 1985
to 1990, the US companies provided Iraq with dual-use materials worth $782 million.
The US government indirectly sold conventional and chemical weapons to third parties
which were then transferred to Iraq.256 In the year 1988, Bechtel concluded an agreement
with Saddam Hussain to manage “PC-2 chemical complex” near Baghdad. A salient
feature of PC-2 project was manufacturing of ethylene oxide which could in turn be used
to produce mustard gas. This industrial complex near Baghdad was later on known as
249 Kolko. Age of War, 50250 Chomsky, Hegemony or Survival, 111-112251 Juhasz, Bush Agenda, 167252 Pijl, Global Rivalries, 338253 Gerald.James. “In the Public Interest.” London: Little, Brown and Company. 1996: 86254 Ibid, 193-196255 Sampson. Seven Sisters, 364-365256 Bruce Jentleson. With Friends like These: Reagan, Bush, and Saddam, 1982-1990. (N.Y.:
W.W. Norton, 1994), 44-46
103
part of the “smoking gun” and was used as a proof that Iraq was pursuing WMD
program.257
President Bush senior and his secretary of State James A. Baker played important
role in “courting” Saddam Hussain after Iran-Iraq war. In the wake of Halabja massacre
(Halabja-a Kurd town in northern Iraq), the US Congress imposed restrictions on the U.S.
Export–Import Bank to finance Iraq. President Bush used his “veto power” and annulled
the prohibition declaring that it was not in the American “national interest”.258
It was during this period that Iraq became the second biggest trading partner of
the US in the Middle East. The US import of Iraqi oil in the year 1990 had increased
“eight times” since 1987. The US policy toward Iraq was influenced by her national
interests.259 President Bush sent a delegation of US Senators to Iraq under the headship of
Bob Dole in April 1990. Dole assured Iraqi regime that the US government had no
problem with Saddam Hussain. The Senator also told Saddam Hussain that the
commentator on V.O.A. who was critical of Saddam Hussain, had been fired.260
Iraq had accumulated a great debt during Iran-Iraq war. The creditors were
demanding back money. For whatever reasons, Kuwait seemed an easy prey to Saddam
Hussain. In an aggressive military posture, Saddam Hussain deployed his military forces
on the border with Kuwait in July, 1990. On July 25, April Glaspie, the US Ambassador
to Iraq, met Saddam Hussain and delivered an “infamous” message. She said that she was
under direct instructions by the President Bush, to seek better relations with Iraq. She
further said, the “US government had no opinion on the Arab-Arab conflicts” like Iraq-
Kuwait border dispute.261 A few days later, President Bush sent a “personal message” to
Saddam Hussain that Bush Administration wanted to inculcate “good relations” with
Baghdad.262
A large number of scholars extended the argument that the US and her Western
allies gave great amount of aid to Saddam Hussain which enabled him to build a
257 Alan Friedman. Spider’s Web: The Secret History of How the White House Illegally Armed Iraq. (N.Y.: Bantam Books, 1993), 117
258 Friedman, Spider’s Web, 157259 James Mann. Rise of the Vulcans: The History of Bush’s War Cabinet. (New York: Viking,
2004), 183260 Miron Rezun. Saddam Hussein’s Gulf Wars. (Westport: Praeger, 1992), 587261 Bob Woodward. The Commanders. (N.Y.: Simon and Schuster, 1991), 211262 Friedman, Spider’s Web, 166
104
“formidable military” capacity.263 When Senator Caliborne Pell introduced (1988)
Prevention of Genocide Act to put pressure on Iraq in the backdrop of Iraq’s use of
chemical weapons against Iraqi Kurds, President Reagan “killed” the move. Galbraith264,
Stephen Zunes265, and Noam Chomsky266 extended the opinion that the US-Iraq policy
during 1980’s, could safely be termed as “policy of appeasement”. This policy of
appeasement since Iranian Revolution in 1979, combined with American stated neutrality
in Iraq-Kuwait border dispute perhaps misled Saddam Hussain to go for an invasion of
Kuwait on August 2, 1990. By occupying and annexing Kuwait Saddam was now master
of about “20% of world’s oil reserves”.
Scholars had been sharply divided on the issue as to why America did not stop
Saddam Hussain’s invasion of Kuwait. One group of scholars argued that President Bush
did not really believe that Saddam Hussain would invade and occupy Kuwait,
notwithstanding the US vital interests in the region. They further argued that Saddam
Hussain, on his part did not believe that President Bush would stop him if he decided to
invade Kuwait. Both misconceived each other. But once Saddam Hussain did that
President Bush could not tolerate the ownership of Iraq of about “20% of global oil
reserves” and threaten K.S.A. Saddam “must go”.
Other group of scholars argued that Saddam Hussain was “intrigued into
invading” Kuwait. This would provide a “lame pretext” to remove Saddam Hussain from
power. Furthermore, this would provide an excuse to the US for a significant increase in
US military presence in the Persian Gulf. Whatever might be the case, once Saddam
Hussain invaded and occupied Kuwait, President Bush, for multiple reasons, used it as an
“excuse of war” and established greater military presence in the Middle East. Saddam
Hussain had “outlived his usefulness for America” and now he must be stopped. In
January 1991, just a day before the US declaration of war on Iraq, President Bush senior
signed NSA (National Security Directive) 54. The NSA-54 directive argued about the
vital US interests in the region. It wrote that America had “two vital interests” in the
263 See Mark Phythian, and Nikos Passas. Arming Iraq: How the U.S. and Britain Secretly Built Saddam’s War Machine. (Boston: Northeastern Univ. Press, 1996)
264 Galbraith, End of Iraq, 25265 Zunes, Tinderbox, 75266 Chomsky, Hegemony or Survival, 111-112, 141
105
region, access to Persian Gulf oil and the security of US friendly states. The US was
“committed to defend” both of them.267
Here arose a formidable question. Why did President Bush Sr. leave Saddam
Hussain in power after he was defeated in the First Gulf War? Perhaps the answer had
been that President Bush Sr. firmly but erroneously believed that Saddam Hussain, after
his defeat would be “dislodged from power” by domestic pressure. The White House
instructed CIA to do the job and look for an alternative leader. President Bush Sr. did not
want to do that directly because he feared that K.S.A. would not approve it. The “real
factor was Iran”.268 Dick Cheney, the defense secretary of Bush Sr. reasoned in April
1991, Iraq would have plunged into civil war after Saddam’s defeat, and it was
undesirable to engage US military forces into such a quagmire.269 The UN mandate was
the expulsion of Iraqi military forces from Iraq and not occupation of the country. If
occupied, Iraq might have become American responsibility.270
3.4 Fourth Phase (August 1990 - March 2003):Saddam Hussain invaded and occupied his weak neighbor Kuwait on August 2, 1990.
The US, KSA and Kuwait’s policy of backing Saddam Hussain against Iran during
1980’s had backfired and ended in a political disaster. Saddam Hussain misunderstood
that the major US concern in the Persian Gulf was Iran and that the US was his ally
against Iran. President Bush Senior believed that it was the question of “US vital
interests” and credibility, both to the US friends and allies alike, in the region. During
1980s, Washington had “promoted Iraq as a counterweight to Iran” in the region. Now
the US military action against Iraq created “political vacuum” in the Persian Gulf to be
filled in by Iran. The US policy had met a “disastrous failure” in the Persian Gulf.271
The real aim of Saddam Hussain to invade Kuwait was to make Iraq “dominant
power” in the Persian Gulf region.272 The United Nations Security Council immediately
condemned the invasion and demanded withdrawal through its resolution 660. The
267 Robert Bryce. Cronies: Oil, the Bushes, and the Rise of Texas, America's Superstate. Public Affairs, 2004: 161-162
268 Mann, Rise of Vulcans, 192269 Christian Parenti. The Freedom: Shadows and Hallucinations in Occupied Iraq. (N.Y.: New
Press, 2004), 15270 Mann, Rise of Vulcans, 190271 Kolko, Age of War, 65272 Jentleson, American Foreign Policy, 361
106
UNSC resolution 660 also imposed “economic sanctions” against Iraq. Under the US
leadership, on November 29, 1990, the UNSC passed important resolution 678 in which
the UNSC authorized to use “all necessary means” to expel Iraqi military forces from
Kuwait and restore Kuwait’s independent and sovereign position.
In this regard, the deadline given to Saddam Hussain for withdrawal from Kuwait
was January 15, 1991. President George Bush (Sr.) was not ready to give any concession
to Saddam Hussain whatsoever. The US President assembled a “37-nations formidable
international military coalition” to perform this task.273 Under the code name “Operation
Desert Storm”, Iraqi forces were quickly defeated by the international coalition. The
defeated Iraqi military forces pulled out from Kuwait in a great panic, suffering heavy
losses. Iraq lost about 150,000 soldiers. Thousands of retreating soldiers were mercilessly
slaughtered as they tried to escape northward. American killers named it as a “turkey
shoot”.274
Iraq’s infrastructure was totally destroyed in what was known as the “heaviest
bombing” campaign in the history of war, man had ever seen. It was a “deliberate
destruction” of Iraq’s industrial base.275 Kuwait was liberated but coalition forces did not
occupy Iraq. The coalition forces did not even advance into the heartland of Iraq after its
defeat.276 The First Gulf War (of 1991) ended with the UNSC ceasefire resolution 687
after the war. The Security Council ordered the destruction of Iraq’s WMDs, and any
facility if any, to produce them.277
Due to certain reasons the UN efforts to finish the task of disarmament of Iraq
remained unfinished. The reasons could be found on both sides- the aggressive US way
of finishing the job and Saddam Hussain’s delaying tactics. Whosoever was responsible
would be discussed in the next chapter. Richard Butler, the head of UN disarmament
inspection team left Iraq and reported back to the UNSC at the end of 1998. His
273 Jentleson, American Foreign Policy, 361274 Jensen, Jon A. The Effect of Operational Deployments on Army Reserve Component Attrition
Rates and Its Strategic Implications. Army Command and General Staff Coll. Fort Leavenworth KS School of Advanced Military Studies, (2002)
275 Gellman, Barton. “Air War Struck Broadly in Iraq.” Washington Post. (1991)276 Colin Powell. My American Journey. (N.Y.: Ballantine, 1995), 508277 David Cortright, and George A. Lopez. The Sanctions Decade: Assessing UN Strategies in the
1990s. (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000), 42
107
conclusion was that Iraq had not fully cooperated and in the “absence of full cooperation”
the mission was unable to perform the task mandated by UNSC.278
Finally, it was in November 2002, the UNSC passed a fresh Resolution 1441, in
which Iraq was strongly criticized for its “non-compliance” and demanded that the UN
weapons inspectors be allowed to return to Iraq and perform the unfinished agenda of
disarmament of Iraq.279 No sooner Iraq was defeated in 1991 than the US, UK, and
France unilaterally established two “no-fly zones” in Kurdish north and Shia South. Just
after the end of First Gulf War both Kurds Shias in Iraq rose in rebellion against Saddam
Hussain’s regime. They were encouraged by the US President in a worldwide VOA
broadcast to rise in rebellion against Saddam Hussain. However, once they did, the US
did not come to their rescue and Saddam Hussain’s forces slaughtered them in hundreds
of thousands.280
What was the rationale? Why did the US allow Saddam Hussain to slaughter
these post-war rebellions? The answer could be found in the explanation that the Bush
Senior Administration feared that the victory of Iraqi Kurds would have greater regional
implications. It would encourage Kurdish uprising in neighbouring Turkey, a US NATO
ally. By the same token a Shia victory in the south could have serious implications for the
US allies in the Middle East in general and in the Persian Gulf in particular.281
These “no-fly zones” were not sanctioned by the UN and as such had no
precedent in international law. They were established to extend protection to the rebelled
people. They failed to achieve their objective.282 Subsequently, France did not cooperate
in the implementation of these zones. The economic sanctions imposed on Iraq were
having deadly effects. World Health Organization reported that the infant mortality rate
from 1989 to 1994 had become doubled. Just to cite one UNICEF Report, 2003 on the
State of the World’s Children. The report inter alia said that the child death rate in Iraq
over the past decade had increased from 50 to 133 per 1000 live births. The two military
278 Richard Butler. Saddam Defiant. (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 2000), 222279 Hans Blix. Disarming Iraq: The Search for Weapons of Mass Destruction. (New York:
Pantheon Books, 2004), 248280 Zunes, Tinderbox, 84281 Ibid282 Zunes, Tinderbox, 86
108
analysts observed that economic sanctions imposed on Iraq might have killed more
people in Iraq than have been slain by all WMDs in human history.283
Denis Halliday and Hans Von Sponeck, the two UN diplomats and chief
humanitarian coordinators in Iraq, resigned in protest against the “genocidal” character of
the economic sanctions. Their conclusion was that the “sanctions played havoc” with the
common people in Iraq whereas at the same time the common man’s dependency on the
regime had been increased.284 The effects of the sanctions were “catastrophic” for the
common man in Iraq.
The UN reversed her Iraq policy. It established, in the year 1995, the “Oil-for-
food” Program. As usual the implementation was closely watched by US–UK
partnership. According to the UNSC Resolution 986, some humanitarian relief was
provided to the Iraqi people.285 The US was part of the UN Committee that supervised the
economic sanctions and Oil-for-Food Program. Under this program, “Billions of dollars
were being earned” by a number of US companies including Haliburton, Chevron and
Exxon Mobil.286 Actually, reported Financial Times, Halliburton, when Dick Cheney was
its CEO, did more business with Iraq by selling its oil industry products than any other
US company doing the same business.287
By 1997 Saddam Hussain, once again, had consolidated his hold over Iraq
offsetting the implications of his defeat in 1991. However, he was in “dire need” of
money. He started negotiations with non-Anglo-American companies for the
development of new oil-fields in Iraq. The new contracts went to Lukoil (Russian), China
National, Total (France), Ranger Oil (Canada) and two Indian companies and so on and
so forth. None of the “contracts was awarded” to the any US Company. This was an
intolerable situation for the US business community. Saddam Hussain was becoming
more unacceptable to the US. Disagreement among the UNSC permanent members on
the issues of sanctions and oil became intensive. Russia, France and China were on the
283 John Mueller, and Karl Mueller. "Sanctions of Mass Destruction." Foreign Affairs (1999), 43-53
284 Danis Halliday, and Hans Von Sponeck, “The Policy of Punishment”. Al-Ahram Weekly. (26 Dec. 2002)
285 Cortright and Lopez. Sanctions Decade, 37286 Juhasz, Bush Agenda, 175287 Carola Hoyos. “A Discreet Way of Doing Business with Iraq”, Financial Times. November 3,
2000
109
one side while the US and UK on the other. In the year 2000, France used the words
“unnecessary and murderous” for the “no-fly-zones”. Before coming to Clinton era an
important question needed some explanation. Why did President George H.W. Bush
leave Saddam Hussain in power in Baghdad even after Saddam’s defeat in 1991?
President Bush (senior) had written a joint memoir with his National Security
Adviser, Brent Scowcroft. Scowcroft, in his part of the memoir, provided a deep insight
into the President’s thinking. He wrote that we believed a coup or a popular revolt should
have toppled Saddam. The US was mainly concerned with the maintenance of long-term
“balance of power in the Persian Gulf” region. Nobody, neither the US nor the Arab
allies, would have tolerated breakup of Iraq. Disintegration of Iraq would have led to
creating instability in the region. Both Turkey and Iran could not “accept an independent
Kurdish” state. The principle of self-determination for Kurds and Shiites alike was good.
However, the political pragmatism dissuaded the US to help the uprisings. In short
“geopolitics took precedence over humanitarian concerns”. Consequently, President
Bush decided to “keep Saddam in power.”288
On the other hand, the Bush (Sr.) Administration Principals – Bush, Scowcroft,
Powell, and Cheney had extended another argument for not toppling Saddam Hussain.
They were of the view that occupation of Baghdad would have “exceeded the mandate”
given by UNSC. The mandate was limited to the liberation of Kuwait. If we had occupied
Baghdad, we would have been bogged down there for a prolonged period of time in a
quagmire and Iraq would have become our responsibility as well.289 Saddam Hussain’s
“genocidal” character was buried under the debris of imperative of stability.290
There had been writers who were of the opinion that global system of the US
military bases [from Pacific to Azores] was primarily framed for operations in the
“Persian Gulf” region. It had been further argued that since the Carter era, the main
“American interventionist military forces” had been deployed for intervention in the
Middle East.291 The major US interest in the Persian Gulf region during the decade of
288 Galbraith, End of Iraq, 58289 Ibid, 59-60290 Thomas Friedman, “NATO Tries to Ease Security Concerns in Eastern Europe.” New York
Times. June 7, 1991 291 Noam Chomsky. Power and Terror: Post 9/11 Talks and Interview. (New York: Vanguard
Books, 2003), 162
110
1990’s was to “maintain stability” in the region to ensure the continuity of dependable oil
supplies to the world economy.292 President Bill Clinton pursued what had been called
policy of containment of Iraq. President Clinton had two basic objectives to fulfill. He
ensured that Saddam Hussain must not be able to threat his neighbors and also must not
be able to restart his pursuit of WMDs.293
It was late in the year 1991, President George H.W. Bush, authorized a CIA
program to extend “covert assistance” to the opposition in Iraq. President Clinton
continued this program. The central idea was to give support to the London based Iraqi
National Congress (INC), an umbrella organization of opposition parties of Iraq. Ahmad
Chalabi, an exiled opposition leader of Iraq was the real activist. This program of “covert
assistance to Iraqi opposition” to overthrow Saddam Hussain did not work. And Saddam
remained intact in power in Baghdad.
It was in the year 1997 that corporate America launched “USA – Engage” an anti-
sanctions pressure group. Dick Cheney, CEO of Halliburton since 1995, was the active
supporter of the USA – Engage. Interestingly, it did not disclose its membership lists.
However, it was clear from its documents that at least in the first decade of twenty first
century, Halliburton, Lockheed Martin, Bechtel and Chevron were all its members.294
Persons like Dick Cheney and alike at the USA – Engage platform were
“connived” that Saddam Hussain was not going to sign agreements/ contracts with the
“US companies” even if Iraq would be made a sanctions free country. Now what was the
way out of this unfavorable situation? The solution was to overthrow Saddam regime.295
It is to be noted that a person of the stature of Henry Kissinger supported this idea in
March 1998. America could not negotiate with the dictator. America must try, if possible,
to overthrow Saddam Hussain.296
There was an important aspect of the US Iraq policy during 1990’s. No
explanation of the US Iraq policy during this decade was complete without understanding
this aspect. The aspect was related to the activities of neoconservatives during the decade
292 Gilles Kepel. The War for Muslim Minds: Islam and the West. (Cambridge: The Belknap Press, 2004), 63
293 Galbraith, End of Iraq, 67294 Juhasz, Bush Agenda, 177295 Ibid, 178296 Henry Kissinger. “Our Shilly- Shally Strategy on Saddam”, Washington Post. March 23, 1998
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of 1990’s. By the mid1990s neoconservatives had strongly advocated use of force to
overthrow Saddam Hussain from power. They believed this would “benefit Washington
and Tel Aviv” alike.297 In June 1996, Richard Perle, Douglas Feith and Marc Zell, wrote
an important strategy document titled “A Clean Break” for the guidance of incoming
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.
The document was written for a Jerusalem institute. The document recommended
overthrow of Saddam regime in Baghdad replacing it with Hashmite monarchy, deposed
in a military coup in 1958. The new monarch would come from Hashmite family still in
power in Jordan. This would put Shia religious centre Najaf under Hashmite control. The
Shiite community of South Lebanon would be taken away from the influence of Iran and
Syria. By so doing the “geostrategic environment of Israel” would be greatly improved.
The argument traveled from Chalabi to the writers. Chalabi enjoyed good relations with
Hashmite family of Jordan. Once in power, Chalabi promised his neoconservative friends
to make peace with Israel.298
The neoconservatives launched Project for New American Century in 1997. Their
ideas were written in the mission statement of PNAC (a think tank). They advocated that
being its predominant position in global politics, America had unique role to play in
maintaining peace and security in the world. They also advocated “increased defense
spending for the US” and challenging regimes hostile to the US global interests and
political values. The signatory to the mission statement of PNAC were famous
neoconservatives, numbered twenty five, including Elliott Abrams, Dick Cheney Francis
Fukuyama, Lewis Libby, Donald Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz and others.299
On January 26, 1998, neoconservatives wrote a letter to President Bill Clinton in
which they demanded Saddam’s “removal from power” in Baghdad. This was an open
letter to the President. They asked for the “use of military force” to overthrow Saddam
Hussain. The letter was signed by eighteen neoconservatives including Elliott Abrams,
Donald Rumsfeld, Richard Perle, Paul Wolfowitz, William Kristol, among others. The
letter was written under the auspices of PNAC.
297 Michael Elliot, and James Carney, “First Stop, Iraq”, Time. March 31, 2003 298 Kepel, War for Muslim Minds, 65-66299 Soros, Bubble of American Supremacy, 4-8
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The second letter was written to the President on February 19, 1998. The letter
was written to President Clinton with the same objective and under the influence of the
Committee for Peace and Security in the Gulf (CPSG). The CPSG was founded by
Richard Perle, Ann Lewis and Stephen J. Solarz (former Congressman) in 1990. Its
founding objective was lobbying for the First Gulf War. The signatories were almost the
same persons who had written the first letter. The letters called on President Clinton to
“use military forces to oust Saddam Hussain” from power.300
It was on October 31, 1998 that under the great pressure by PNAC, CPSG and
others (neoconservatives), Congress passed the Iraq Liberation Act. The Act called on
President Clinton to use force to topple Saddam regime in Iraq replacing it with a
democratic government.301 The regime change in Iraq became the “official policy of the
US” since October 1998. Under this act the US government allocated $97 million to Iraqi
opposition parties committed to the overthrow of the dictator. The main group they had in
mind was the INC headed by Ahmad Chalabi. President Clinton held a low view of
Chalabi and did little to enforce the act. President Clinton did not use force to topple
Saddam Hussain from power.302 However, the neoconservatives succeeded in making
regime change in Iraq an official US goal.
Then came the turn of President George W. Bush Jr., the neoconservatives occupied
important positions in the George W. Bush Administration, still they were unable to
convince the President to use force to overthrow Saddam Hussain. Actually, they were
losing the ground to overthrow Saddam regime in the beginning of his term.303 The two
principals of the Administration, Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz wanted to topple Saddam
regime from power. They had promised that in pre-election campaign.
There had been a sharp controversy among scholars and political authors alike on
the issue whether President George W. Bush (Jr.) and his Vice President Dick Cheney,
had decided to invade Iraq to overthrow Saddam Hussain from power as soon as they
took the oath. The basis of this controversy could be found in the two important books
published in 2004–Richard Clarke’s Against All Enemies: Inside America’s War on
300 Mearsheimer and Walt, Israel Lobby, 243-244301 Mearsheimer and Walt, Israel Lobby, 243-244302 Robert Litwak. Rogue States and U.S. Foreign Policy. (Washington, D.C: Woodrow Wilson
Centre Press, 2000) 303 Packer, Assassin’s Gate, 41
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Terror and Ron Suskind’s The Price of Loyalty. The two authors floated the view that
President George W. Bush had decided to “invade Iraq from the moment he took oath” of
the President. This view was wrong and did not withstand the test of empirical
verification before the sorry incident of 9/11.
However, this must be understood that President George W. Bush, during his
election campaign in 2000, never promised or advocated the use of force against Saddam
Hussain. That was what President Bush Jr. made clear in his interview to Bob
Woodward. He categorically said that he was not thinking about using force against
Saddam Hussain before 9/11.304 It had been on record that his principal foreign policy
adviser in the election campaign of 2000, Condoleezza Rice, wrote an important article in
Foreign Affairs in the early months of 2000 arguing that the US had “no problems with
nuclear Iraq”. The US could accept Iraq armed with nukes. Saddam’s nukes would be
“unusable” because any attempt on the part of Saddam to use them meant “total
annihilation” of Iraq.305
Dick Cheney, the Vice President had advocated throughout 1990’s that invasion
and occupation of Iraq would be a “strategic blunder”. He did not sign either of the two
letters sent to President Clinton in 1998 for using force against Saddam Hussain. In the
election campaign of 2000, Cheney defended the 1991 Bush Sr. Administration’s
decision not to occupy Baghdad. In the Bush Sr. Administration, Mr. Dick Cheney was a
defense minister and he played an important role in making that decision.306 It could
safely be argued that there was “no empirical evidence” to suggest that President Bush
had decided to take military action against Saddam Hussain before 9/11. Before 9/11, the
neoconservatives were largely alone and had no active support in the US.307
The neoconservatives needed an opportunity to implement, if possible, their world
view. 9/11 was a “turning point” and provided neoconservatives with a golden
opportunity to drive forward. President Bush was a different man now. Three neocons-
304 Woodward, Plan of Attack, 12305 Condoleezza Rice. “Promoting the National Interest,” Foreign Affairs 79, no 1, (January/
February, 2000), 60-62306 Elliott and Carney, Stop Iraq307 Mearsheimer and Walt, Israel Lobby, 245
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Scooter Libby, Paul Wolfowitz and Bernard Lewis played pivotal role in changing the
minds of the President and Vice President to go for an invasion of Iraq.308
Woodward had written an interesting story about Wolfowitz in his Plan of Attack.
Wolfowitz had been consistently advocating to the President about invading Iraq since
9/11, notwithstanding the lack of piece of evidence about Saddam’s “involvement” in
9/11.309 Now, invasion of Iraq was a “foregone conclusion” and it was on November 21,
2001 that the President ordered US military Generals to develop “concrete plans for the
US military invasion” of Iraq.310. It had been part of the historical record that Dick
Cheney, the Vice President “convinced” the President by early 2002 that America would
use force to overthrow Saddam regime from power in Baghdad. There was no alternative
to that.311
After 9/11, the neoconservatives lost no time in making a case that military
invasion of Iraq was an essential condition of winning the war against terror. On
September 20, they (12 signatories) wrote a letter to the President asking him for invasion
of Iraq. It was on September 28, a well-known neocon, Charles Krauthammer, reasoned
that after Afghanistan, Syria would be the next target to be followed by Iran and Iraq turn
by turn. The central theme of Charles Krauthamer’s article was that the “war against
terror would end in Baghdad” and nowhere else. He argued that Saddam was the most
dangerous absolutist ruler.312
In the coming months till March 2003, the neoconservatives waged an “unending
campaign in favor of war” against Saddam. In April 2002, the neoconservatives wrote
still another open letter to the President for invading Iraq. The letter reasoned that the
“US and Israel” were fighting the same war against the “same common enemy”. For
moral and strategic rationale the US must stand with the Jewish state of Israel in this war
on terror. The letter was signed by a large number of prominent neoconservatives.
The case for Iraq war was strongly advocated in 2002 by Kenneth Pollack’s
important book in which he argued for a “preventive war” against Iraq as the only
308 Packer, Assassin’s Gate, 38309 Woodward, Plan of Attack, 25-26310 Ibid311 Ibid, 27-30312 Charles Krauthammer. “The War: A Road Map”, Washington Post. September 28, 2001
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realistic option to oust Saddam from power.313 Notwithstanding much dissimilarity, the
US war hawks were comparing “Hitler with Saddam” and opponents of war as
“appeasers” like Chamberlain. It was interesting to quote a columnist from the New York
Times. The columnist argued that Iraq was the “center of world terror.”314
There was another thread of the story which needed explanation. The Committee
for the Liberation of Iraq, established in 2002 was only an extension of the PNAC. The
founding objective of the CLI was to “replace Saddam regime with a democratic set” up
in Baghdad. The CLI claimed that Saddam regime had made and assembled WMDs.
George Shultz, Ronald Reagan’s Secretary of State was an important member of the CLI.
George Shultz in September 2002 wrote an important essay wherein he argued that
Saddam Hussain was an imminent danger and recommended to the Bush Administration
that he must be overthrown immediately. His main argument was that Saddam Hussain
had “acquired WMD” and posed an immediate threat to the US security and had links
with the international terrorists.315
It seemed interesting to note that war hawks “manipulated the intelligence” to
achieve their objective of painting Saddam regime as an immediate threat to the US
national security. Scooter Libby, a war hawk and neoconservative and an official of the
Bush Administration was the “central figure” to play this role.316 The story unfolded that
Israeli intelligence played a hidden role in convincing Paul Wolfowitz not to trust in CIA.
Ahmad Chalabi was trustworthy for this purpose. Intelligence reports were “maneuvered”
and President Bush was provided with alarming information on Iraq.317
Actually, the neoconservatives, both in the White House and Pentagon, depended
on Ahmad Chalabi and his INC for intelligence gathering about Iraq and promoted him as
a “new leader of Iraq” after Saddam’s ouster from power. However, today the world
knew the fact that Ahmad Chalabi disseminated, might be intentionally, “false
information” to the US.318 There is an important question here that why did the neocons
313 Kenneth M. Pollack. The Threatening Storm: The Case for Invading Iraq. (N.Y.: Random House, 2002)
314 William Safire. “Saddam and Terror”, New York Times. August 22, 2002315 George Shultz. “Act Now”, Washington Post. September 7, 2002316 James Bamford. A Pretext for War: 9/11, Iraq, and the Abuse of America’s Intelligence
Agencies. (N.Y.: Doubleday, 2004)317 Julian Borger. “The Spies Who Pushed for War”, Guardian. July 17, 2003318 Mearsheimer and Walt, Israel Lobby, 252
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trust in Chalabi? A person like Max Singer, related to Hudson Institute, described
Chalabi as a rare found deeply related to the Arab world. Chalabi was a “Westernized”
man having close links with the West. That was why Chalabi should replace Saddam
Hussain after the ouster of the latter from power.319
In reciprocity, Ahmad Chalabi pledged, once he would be installed in power in
Baghdad, he would establish good diplomatic relationship with Tel Aviv. He also
promised to reconstruct the “oil pipeline” as a good will gesture and a proof of his
commitment, from Haifa (Israel) to Mosul (Iraq) as the beginning of a “new era” in Arab
– Israeli relationship.320 Both for Israel and America the fulfillment of these
commitments, if possible, would be a welcome development.321
Before closing this chapter, I would like to give the last testimony of a person not
less than the stature of George Tenet, director of the CIA at the time of 9/11. He testified
that it was just eighteen hours after 9/11 incident, he happened to see Richard Perle in the
White House. Richard Perle was head of Defense Policy Board and a godfather of
neoconservatives, passed by him and then suddenly turned back and said that Iraq would
have to “pay the price” for 9/11 happening. Saddam was “responsible”. George Tenet
wrote that he was stunned by these remarks. In his final conclusion, Tenet testified that
“intelligence” then and now, showed no empirical evidence of Saddam Hussain’s
“involvement” in the happenings of 9/11.322 The CIA never found any link whatsoever
between Saddam Hussain and 9/11.323
As had already been written that 9/11 played the central role in changing the mind
of the President and the Vice President. 9/11 provided them with the golden opportunity
to use force for “regime change” in Iraq. Afghanistan war delayed the invasion of Iraq
but it was a settled fact. President George W. Bush made it clear beyond any doubt in his
January 29, 2002 State of the Union Address. He used the much cited “Axis of Evil”
phrase for North Korea, Iran and Iraq. He said in unequivocal terms that he could not
wait for the events “while dangers gather”. He further declared that these “axis of evil”
states were actively “seeking WMD” and were presenting an ever-growing danger to the
319 Bernard Lewis. “Put the Iraqis in Charge”, Wall Street Journal. August 29, 2003320 Mearsheimer and Walt, Israel Lobby, 252321 Bamford, Pretext For War, 293322 Tenet and Harlow, Centre of Storm, xix-xx323 Ibid, 341
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peace of the world. This State of the Union Address decided the “fate” of Iraq. The
speech was about Iraq, commented Charles Krauthammer, a neoconservative columnist
for the Washington Post.324
In April 2002, President Bush while talking to a British reporter Trevor
McDonald in Crawford said that he had finally decided “Saddam needs to go... The
policy of my government is that he goes.”325 Dick Cheney, Colin Powell, Rice, Rumsfeld
all followed the line of the President in their speeches and interviews thereafter. It was on
September 19, 2002, while talking to the House members the President said that Saddam
Hussain and his WMD were the most dangerous threat. Saddam could “burn Israel”. This
would, in turn, degenerate into a world conflict.326 It was in October 2002, both the House
and the Senate “authorized” the President to “use force” against Iraq. Finally, America
invaded Iraq in March 2003 under the pretext of WMD. However, after the war was over
and Saddam defeated, as was expected, nothing was found in Iraq as WMD.
To begin with, in the early phase the US predominantly was an isolationist power
having little political, strategic or ideological interest overseas. During this period
Mesopotamia had been a province of Ottoman Empire since 1534. The term Middle East,
as the region came to be known, was coined by an American in the first decade of the 20th
century. During the early phase, the US relationship with the Middle East was determined
by the nature of the over-all US relationship with the Ottoman Empire. The US
interaction with the region mainly was restricted to the philanthropic activity followed by
some bilateral trade. The first challenge to the US economic interests in the region came
from “Barbary” pirates. America resorted to the use of her military forces to protect her
economic interests in the region against these pirates in what was known as “Barbary
Wars”. The pirates were eliminated once for all. It was the first use of US military forces
in the region.
The second phase of US policy toward the Middle East was important in the sense
that it was during this phase that important developments happened both in the US as
well as in the Middle East. The US became a global power and with it her interests as
well. A number of new countries created in the Middle East in the aftermath of WWI & II
324 Woodward, Plan of Attack, 92-95325 Ibid, 119326 Ibid, 186
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especially KSA, Kuwait, Iraq and Israel. Oil was discovered in the region in the first
decade of the 20th century. Oil was known as the lifeblood of modern industrial societies.
The discovery of oil intensified the major power’s rivalry for supremacy in the region.
The creation of Iraq by the British was heavily shaped by the fact of presence of oil in the
country. Iraq contained, and still it did, the second largest oil reserves in the region.
Owing to its geostrategic importance and oil wealth the Middle East became a
major theatre of Cold War politics. During this phase, the US replaced Britain as a new
Western imperial power and successfully checked Soviet penetration in the region.
Without any doubt, the US rose to the position of primacy in the region with expanded
military and political role. The US started providing unflinching support to Israel after
1967 Arab – Israeli war.
Another aspect of the US policy was to provide support to the oil rich
authoritarian regimes in the Middle East. Stability got precedence over other
considerations in the Middle East. The US Iraq policy was conducted in the broader
aspects of regional developments, oil flow and cold war rivalries etc. During this period
(1900 to 1979), especially in the post-World War II era, the US Iraq policy had certain
distinct features. They included the CIA’s involvement in the 1963 and 1968 coups in
Iraq, and simultaneously its establishment of secret relations with Saddam Hussain
starting in the late 1950’s.
After Iranian Revolution in 1979, the US Iraq policy was heavily shaped by two
factors. The major US policy goals were the containment of Iran through Saddam
Hussain and courting Iraqi oil. Immediately, after the revolution in Tehran, the US
established close relations with Saddam Hussain and removed Iraq from the US list of
terrorist states. The US wanted to make Iraq a new Iran. The entire West under the US
leadership supported Iraq during the eight year Iran – Iraq war.
They provided Saddam with every thing ranging from political support to “dual-
use” technology. So much so, America turned a blind eye to the Saddam Hussain’s
human rights violations and use of chemical weapons first against Iranian forces and then
against his own Kurdish population. America helped Saddam Hussain to develop one of
the most formidable military forces in the Persian Gulf region. The overall US policy
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toward Iraq during 1980s could safely be categorized as policy of appeasement
particularly in the backdrop of containment of Iran.
The last phase of US Iraq policy in historical perspective ended with the US
invasion of Iraq in 2003. We should understand the context of US-Iraq policy during
1990s. The new context came from four sources–Mackinder theory, rise of
neoconservative movement in America in 1990s, end of the Cold War and disintegration
of the USSR, unipolarity, and major power behavior in world politics (offensive realism).
Saddam Hussain’s conquest and annexation of Kuwait in August 1990, initiated a
new era of US-Iraq policy. It triggered immediate US response and degenerated into First
Gulf War under the UN mandate. The UN forces under the US leadership defeated and
expelled Iraqi forces from Kuwait. The US with the support of her two European allies
created and administered two “no-fly zones” in Iraq. However, the US did not protect the
rebels – Kurds and Shias, from the aggressive backlash of Saddam regime.
America exploited this whole affair to justify her expanded military presence in
the Persian Gulf region. Throughout 1990s, the UN sanctions did not work properly.
Meanwhile, there was a rise in the neoconservative activity in America in 1990s. The
neoconservatives wanted to “reshape the critical regions” of the world, most importantly
the Middle East, according to the “US interests and values”. However, regime change in
Iraq had become an official US policy since 1998.
The US policy towards the Middle East and Persian Gulf regions in 20th century in
general and towards Iraq during the last four decades was not without debits. Most
importantly, it had generated intolerance, extremism, and anti-Americanism in the
Persian Gulf region in particular. The anti-Americanism in the Middle East culminated
into 9/11 and provided President George W. Bush with a golden opportunity to enforce
his agenda, according to the assumptions of offensive realist model, starting from regime
change in Iraq, without UN mandate. The rationale for the preemptive and unilateral
military invasion of Iraq in March 2003 had been constantly debated since the invasion
among politicians and scholars throughout the world. There had been a sharp controversy
among them on the rationale of the invasion. The US unilaterally, ignoring UN and
important NATO and Arab allies, invaded Iraq under false pretexts. This constituted the
topic of the next chapter.
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Chapter Four
US Invasion under False PretextsIn this chapter the basic argument was in line with the logic of offensive realism
involving lying and cheating on the part of Bush Administration. This chapter is an
important part of this study. There is an established principle of offensive realism that
great powers, in their pursuit of power maximization and hegemony within the system,
cheat and lie. The theme of this chapter was that the declared objectives of the US
unilateral and pre-emptive invasion of Iraq in 2003 did not withstand the test of empirical
verifiability. Even before the invasion took place, the rationale of the invasion was
questioned by a large number of world renowned scholars. After the invasion, it was
established that the declared causes of the war were used as a mere pretext as a sellout
case of the war. In the subsequent investigations by the different US commissions, all the
three declared objectives were discredited. Through an intense propaganda campaign, the
American peoples were misled into believing that the Saddam regime possessed WMD.
This type of great power behavior involving cheating and lying closely fitted the theory
of offensive realism. The US invaded Iraq under “false pretexts”. Later on, in an
interview, Paul Wolfowitz provided the testimony.
The basic question was that why did the US invade Iraq in March 2003? George
Packer in The Assassin’s Gate: America in Iraq wrote that “it still isn’t possible to be
sure, and this remains the most remarkable thing about the Iraq War”. Interestingly,
Packer quotes Richard Haas, the director of policy planning in the State Department
when America invaded Iraq, saying that he would “go to his grave not knowing the
answer.”327 George Tenet, the CIA Director when the US invaded Iraq, writes in his
memoirs that “one of the great mysteries to me is when the war in Iraq became
inevitable.”328
The uncertainty of George Packer, Richard Haas and, George Tenet was
understandable because the use of military force to overthrow Saddam Hussain in March 327 Packer, Assassin’s Gate, 46328 Tenet and Harlow, Centre of Storm, 301
121
2003 seemed difficult even today in 2016. It was beyond any doubt that he was an
absolutist dictator with dangerous ambitions. His ambitions included a deep desire to
acquire WMD. But the world knew that his military forces had been destroyed in the First
Gulf War in 1991. He was further weakened by a decade of UN sanctions. After the First
Gulf War, the tough UN inspections deprived Iraq of its nuclear program and forced
Saddam Hussain to destroy his “biological and chemical weapons” as well.329 At the time
of 9/11, Osama bin Laden was in Afghanistan under the protection of Taliban regime and
not in Iraq. After 9/11 happening, instead of focusing solely on al-Qaeda, President Bush
opted for a unilateral invasion of Iraq, already a thoroughly decaying country that had no
links with 9/11 tragedy. If we approached the US decision of invasion of Iraq from this
angle it was puzzling.330
Militarily, America was unchallengeable and could overthrow Saddam Hussain, if
it did choose. For America, it was a period of great shock and American leaders feared
that what would happen if terrorists might obtain WMD. In short, the US military was
very powerful and deeply apprehensive and fearful about its national security. It was a
fearful combination. However, war hawks had been demanding ouster of Saddam
Hussain since 1998. The Bush Administration exploited the opportunity provided by the
9/11 and took the step. It was under these circumstances that the US went to war against
Saddam’s Iraq in 2003. The war hawks believed that removal of Saddam Hussain from
corridors of power in Iraq would benefit “America and Israel” alike and would also
improve their strategic position in the region. The war hawks in the Administration, also
believed that ousting Saddam Hussain would force other “rogue states” to change their
behavior as they would be convinced that America was too powerful to be challenged.331
Since then, the rationale of the Iraq war had been hotly debated not only among
scholars and politicians alike over the world but also among American people. A number
of reasons had been put forward which contributed in making the US decision to go to
war on Iraq in March, 2003. Critical evaluation of all the three stated causes of invasion
followed, one by one. President George W. Bush cited three major reasons for the US
unilateral and preemptive invasion of Iraq in 2003. They included the threat from Saddam
329 Jentleson, American Foreign Policy, 380330 Mearsheimer and Walt, Israel Lobby, 220331 Mearsheimer and Walt, Israel Lobby, 230
122
Hussain’s WMDs, terrorist coalition between Iraq and al-Qaeda, and promotion of
democracy in Iraq. Combining the first two reasons together, what would be the result if
Iraq were to secretly supply WMD to its terrorist ally al-Qaeda? While talking to the
United Nations General Assembly on September 12, 2002, President George W. Bush
said that under such a situation 9/11 seemed “a prelude to far greater horrors.”332
4.1 Al-Qaeda-Iraq Terror Link:The Bush Administration repeatedly claimed that al-Qaeda had close and
operational links with Saddam Hussain and 9/11 was the result of that close complicity
between them. The President said “that Iraq has trained al-Qaeda members in bomb
making and poisons and gasses.”333 The President talking to Richard Clarke on
September 12, 2001 said: “…see if Saddam was involved. I want to know any shred …”
The President further said, “…look into Iraq, Saddam… The President said testily and
left us.”334
On September 26, 2002 while talking to 18 House members in the Cabinet Room
at the Saddam’s links with al-Qaeda the President said, “Saddam Hussain is a terrible guy
who is teaming up with al-Qaeda…”335 While making an indirect reference to Saddam-al-
Qaeda coalition, President George W. Bush on September 20, 2001 in his address to the
joint session of Congress remarked, “Our enemy is a radical network of terrorists, and
every government that supports them”. He further declared “and we will pursue nations
that provide aid or safe haven to terrorism.”336
In the final days of run-up to Iraq war, two high profile cases facilitated the US
decision establishing a possible linkage between 9/11 and Iraq. In the first case it was
alleged that one of the 9/11 hijackers, Muhammad Atta, met with Ahmad Khalil al-Ani,
an official from Iraqi intelligence in Prague. The accused meeting took place few months
before 9/11 happening. The second case was related to Shakir, an Iraqi citizen who
worked at the Kuala Lumpur airport. He worked as a facilitator for Arab nationals. He
got this job with the help of an employee of Iraqi Embassy. It was alleged that Shakir
332 George W. Bush. “Remarks at the United Nations General Assembly”, September 12, 2002333 George W. Bush. “Remarks on Iraq at Cincinnati Museum Center –Cincinnati Union Terminal,
Cincinnati, Ohio”, October 7, 2002334 Clarke, Against All Enemies, 32335 Woodward, Plan of Attack, 188336 George W. Bush. “Address to Joint Session of Congress”, September 20, 2001
123
helped Khalid al-Mihdhar in January 2000 to escape through the airport.337 The Saddam-
al-Qaeda connection controversy continued even well after the US invasion of Iraq in
2003. Now critical evaluation of the alleged al-Qaeda-Saddam connection leading to 9/11
followed.
4.1.1 Critical Analysis:
The CIA produced a paper on the subject in June, 2002 titled, Iraq and al-Qa’ida:
Interpreting a Murky Relationship. The regional analysts of the CIA who focused on the
Middle East and Persian Gulf believed that there was a “fundamental ideological distrust”
between Saddam Hussain and al-Qaida Chief, Usama bin Ladin. Saddam feared the
potential danger of Islamic extremism to Iraq. They concluded in unequivocal terms that
there was no “conclusive proof of Iraq-al-Qaida complicity” leading to 9/11. The CIA
published its second paper on Iraq-al-Qaida linkage in September 2002. The second
paper was revised by CIA by December the same year and titled Iraqi support of
Terrorism. The paper was sent to the White House. From the White House, Scooter
Libby, asked CIA for more revisions or withdrew the paper. The CIA’s response to
Scooter Libby’s pressure was no. Jami Miscik categorically refused to make more
revisions and stood firm, wrote George Tenet in his memoirs. Jami Miscik did not write
anything not supported by “intelligence evidence”. Jami threatened to resign rather than
“succumbing to pressure” for any more revision of the report from Steve Hadley from the
NSC. On this situation, George Tenet himself intervened and made it clear to Steve
Hadley that the paper had been done and that there could be no more changes in it. The
second paper supported the conclusion of the first paper.338
Mus’ab al-Zarqawi, a senior al-Qa’ida operative arrieved in Baghdad in May,
2002 for supervising camps in northern Iraq run by Ansar al-Islam. Ansar-al-Islam, a
radical Kursidh militant organization, had close links with al-Qa’ida. Both organizations
in collaboration had established a safe haven for al-Qaida in 2000 in northeastern Iraq.
The area was not under Saddam regime control. The rationale for establishing this safe
haven for al-Qaida could be found in the possible exit of the organization after its loss of
sanctuary in Afghanistan. The camps became a hub for al-Qaida activity after the US
attack on Afghanistan. George Tenet was of the opinion that Zarqawi’s presence in 337 Tenet and Harlow, Centre of Storm, 355338 Tenet and Harlow, Centre of Storm, 344-350
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northeastern Iraq was not a sufficient proof of Iraqi complicity with al-Qaida. However,
the area was not under Saddam regime control. Tenet wrote that Iraqi government did not
even know about the presence of these terrorists in Baghdad. Baghdad had “no control
over Zarqawi” whatsoever.339
A senior al-Qaida prisoner told CIA in 2002 that Bin Ladin would not make an
alliance with Saddam Hussain. If he did, it would amount to making “compromise” on al-
Qaida’s “mission and independence”. Saddam Hussain showed interest in al-Qaida, if
any, only after the incidents of East Africa and Cole bombings. By then, al-Qaida had
been well established in “Afghanistan sanctuary”. Another senior al-Qaida operative, ibn
Sheikh al-Libi told CIA, his captor in 2001, that between 1997 and 2000 al-Qaida sent
Muhammad Atef and Abu Abdullah three times to Iraq to get training in poisons and
mustard gas. George Tenet was of the opinion that “al-Libi lied in order to get human
treatment and to avoid physical torture.”340
There was another high profile case in late 2001. It was alleged that Muhammad
Atta, one of the hijackers of 9/11, had met Ahmad Khalil al-Ani, an Iraqi intelligence
personnel in Prague in 2001 before 9/11 happenings. The CIA never found any “reliable
evidence” that the visit was actually made. Both CIA and FBI concluded that such an
alleged meeting in Prague was unlikely. The meetings did not happen. A second possible
connection between 9/11 and Saddam regime was related to Shakir, an Iraqi national,
working at Kuala Lumpur airport as facilitator for Arab tourists. Shakir, it was alleged,
helped Khalid al-Mihdhar, a 9/11 hijacker, to escort through the airport in January 2001.
Shakir left the airport after one week. Despite its exhaustive work, CIA failed to
prove that he was an Iraqi agent. Then the US invaded Iraq in March, 2003. The invasion
was followed by an exhaustive search to find the Iraq-al-Qaida linkage. CIA worked with
other US secret services and “checked and rechecked the Iraq intelligence documents”
and interviewed former Iraqi intelligence personnel. Interestingly, the documents that
were supposedly produced during the 1990’s were found to be forgeries. And the former
Iraqi intelligence personnel also did not confirm and authenticated the documents.341
339 Ibid, 351340 Tenet and Harlow, Centre of Storm, 353341 Ibid, 356
125
The best source of information about Iraq-al-Qaida complicity leading to 9/11
was a paper produced by the CIA in January 2003 as the final NIE on the subject. The
paper concluded with the remarks that Iraq had no “authority, direction, or control over
al-Qaida.”342 George Tenet was of the opinion that he was “misquoted” by the Bush
Administration officials. In his final conclusion, George Tenet, the CIA Chief at the time
of 9/11 and the subsequent US invasion of Iraq on March 19, 2003, wrote that “let me say
it again: CIA found absolutely no linkage between Saddam and 9/11.”343
On the issue of Iraq-al-Qa’ida complicity leading to 9/11, Ron Suskind gave the
following version. In order to prove this operational link between al-Qaida and Iraqi
regime, the White House concocted a fake letter backdated to July 2001. The letter said
that Atta Muhammad, a senior al-Qaida operative, was actually trained in Iraq to
implement the mission which culminated into 9/11. The letter finally was meant to
establish secret operational connection between Iraq and al-Qaida. Dick Cheney, the US
Vice President, was leading the whole movement to justify the US invasion of Iraq. The
idea was to take the letter to Habbush, the Chief of Iraqi intelligence the Mukhabarat
since 1999. He would write the letter in his own handwriting on a paper taken out of Iraqi
official stationery.
Then the CIA would transport the letter to Baghdad and had it released to the
media through some trusted hand. The Vice President’s office played the central role in
this concocted story. Ron Suskind cited Rob Richer the head of CIA’s Near East Division
and unfolded the whole story. Richer narrated the whole story. The important figures who
played central role in this fake letter story were Rob Richer, Michael Shippter, the
Mideast intelligence chief for SIS, British intelligence, Saad Khayr, the chief of GID,
Jordan’s intelligence, Habbush, Maguire, the Chief of CIA’s Baghdad station, George
Tenet, the Vice President’s office and the White House.
The other figures in this long story were Con Coughlin, a journalist, and Ayad
Allawi, the Iraqi exile and destined to become post-Saddam Iraq’s first head of
government. Con Coughlin had written extensively on Saddam regime and his WMD
program. The letter was silently shipped to Con Coughlin by a trusted official from
Allawi. The Daily Telegraph published the whole story of “the letter with authenticity” 342 Tenet and Harlow, Centre of Storm, 358343 Ibid, 341
126
on 14 December, 2003. Interestingly, on the same day, a few hours later, even more
important and bigger news exploded. The news was of the capture of Saddam Hussain.
Looking back, Richer said, “It’s called lying”, wrote Suskind.344 The letter, among other
things, related a concocted story and clandestine operational linkage between Mohammad
Atta, al-Qa’ida and Saddam Hussain.345
On September 14, 2001, the principals of Bush Administration met at Camp
David to discuss about the first target of the US War on Terror. Cheney, Rumsfeld,
Powell, Andrew H. Card and Tenet agreed not to make Iraq as the first target. Paul
Wolfowitz disagreed with them and insisted on making Iraq the first target. On the very
next day President Bush told Rice that Iraq would not be the first target. Iraq was being
put off. But eventually we would have to return to Iraq.346 Brent Scowcroft, President
Bush (Senior’s) national security adviser and a towering figure in the US intellectual and
political circles wrote on August 15, 2002 in the Wall Street Journal titled, “Don’t Attack
Iraq”. Scowcroft was disturbed to see that Cheney and Rumsfeld were so “focused” on
Iraq. He argued, among other things, that Saddam Hussain had “no links with terrorist
organization al-Qaida and was not involved” in 9/11 happenings.347
Senator Bob Graham was critical of Iraq war. He was of the opinion that Iraq War
was one of the most intriguing mistakes of the US foreign policy in post WW-II era.348
Karl Rove also shared the same opinion, wrote Woodward. There were deep-rooted
ideological differences between Saddam Hussain and al-Qaida. Saddam Hussain was
“secular and nationalist” while bin Laden deeply religious and believed in the
“universality of Islamic faith” and rated Saddam’s regime as “corrupt” one. By making
an alliance with al-Qaida Saddam Hussain would have put his fate in Bin Laden’s hands.
The politicized US intelligence could not produce even a shred of empirical evidence
linking al-Qaida with Iraq that could have been accepted as a proof. There was nothing to
establish that Mohammad Atta ever visited Prague.349
344 Suskind, Way of the World, 361-380345 Ibid, 375-376346 Woodward, Plan of Attack, 25-26347 Woodward, Plan of Attack, 159-160348 Ibid, 427349 Galbraith, End of Iraq, 79-80
127
The key players of the Project for the New American Century were bent to prove
that Iraq had links with al-Qaida even if it involved “deliberate deception and lying.”350
The US war on terror was based on “false pretenses”. There was absence of any reliable
evidence linking al-Qaida with Iraq.351 There were no proven ties between al-Qaida and
Iraq.352 The Bush Administration’s charge of Iraq al-Qaida complicity leading to 9/11
remained “unsubstantiated or downright false.”353
Immediately after 9/11, President George W. Bush declared in very clear terms
that the countries that supported terrorism were enemies of the US. It was an illusion to
Iraq. The war hawks in the Administration wanted to invade Iraq first, despite the fact
that no evidence whatsoever existed of connecting fundamentalist al-Qaida with secular
Iraq.354 Muhammad Atta’s meeting with an Iraqi intelligence official in Prague was being
cited as a proof of al-Qaida-Iraq connection. However, CIA, FBI and Czech Intelligence
refuted any such meeting whatsoever.355 Turki bin Faisal, a Saudi Prince and former
Chief of Saudi intelligence, said that bin Laden viewed Saddam Hussain as an “apostate”
who was not a Muslim even.356
Fifteen out of the nineteen hijackers hailed from Saudi Arabia and none from Iraq.
Saudi Arabia had been the main financier of al-Qaida. George Tenet testified before
Congress that there was “no direct link between al-Qaida and Iraq”. There could be only
tactical cooperation between the two. Abu Nidal was murdered in Baghdad in August
2002. A 2002 CIA report indicated that Saddam Hussain intentionally avoided any
actions against the US.357 The US Department of State could not provide any proof where
Iraq sponsored any active international terrorism. It might have been a mistake for the
Bush Administration to try to establish a “collaborative operational linkage between Iraq
and al-Qaida” leading to 9/11 tragedy.358
350 Soros, Bubble of American Supremacy, 25351 Ibid, 28352 Ibid, 41353 Ibid, 58354 Kolko, Age of War, 103355 Robert Scheer. “President Bush’s Way-the-Dog Policy on Iraq”, Los Angeles Times. May 7,
2002356 Ibid357 Zunes, Tinderbox, 98358 Shawcross, Allies, 69
128
President Bush wrongly put Iraq in the context of US war on terror, despite the
fact that he had been told about the non-existence of operational links between al-Qaida
and Iraq. Iraq had no connection with 9/11 tragedy. It was rather an act of “imperial
arrogance.”359 While writing on al-Qaida–Iraq connections Mel Gurtov argued, President
George W. Bush actually misread about the Saddam-al-Qaida secret connections. He
even argued that bin Laden and his al-Qaida never really were the main American
concerns during his Presidency.360
Richard A. Clarke, one time head of counter-terrorism during Bush
Administration gave a grim picture while writing in his memoirs. America was doing
something else than getting on al-Qaida. He realized with pain that Rumsfeld and
Wolfowitz had their own agenda about Iraq. They were exploiting this “national tragedy
for their own Iraq agenda”. Since the beginning of the Bush Presidency they had been
pressing for war on Iraq.361 In fact all the branches of the US intelligence concluded that
no such ties existed between al-Qaida and Iraq. CIA was also convinced that Saddam
Hussain never handed over biological or chemical weapons to al-Qaida or other terrorist
organizations.362 An official from FBI said that we “tried hard for more than an year” to
find any presumed operational link between al-Qaida and Iraq. There was nothing like
that.363 Richard Clarke reveals an important thing about the US war on Iraq. According to
him it was a “decision which had already been made” and nothing could change it.364
Rashid Khalidi was of the opinion that in the post invasion environment it was
now an established fact beyond any doubt that there did not exist ties between Iraq and
al-Qaida.365 Immediately after 9/11, an offensive propaganda campaign was launched
against Saddam Hussain to portray him as a serious threat to the US. He was further
indicated as a party to 9/11. It was clear from the very beginning that the allegations
against Saddam Hussain “lacked credibility”. No evidence existed to prove these
359 Jonathan Steele. Defeat: Why They Lost Iraq. (New York: I.B Taurus, 2008), 255360 Gurtov, Superpower on Crusade, 61361 Clarke, Against All Enemies, 30362 James Risen. “Terror Acts by Baghdad Have Waned, US Aides Say”, New York Times.
February 6, 2002363 James Risen, and David Johnston. “Split at CIA and F.B.I on Iraq Ties to Al Qaeda”, New York
Times. February 2, 2003364 Clarke, Against All Enemies, 265365 Khalidi, Rusurrecting Empire, ix
129
allegations.366 On the topic of al-Qaida Iraq complicity leading to 9/11, B.W. Jentleson
gave an interesting account of President Bush with Richard Clarke, his antiterrorism head
on September 12, 2001. The President asked Mr. Clarke, time and again, to find any
piece of evidence against Saddam Hussain’s links with al-Qaida…“ see if Saddam was
involved… I want to know any shred.” None of the two “compelling reasons” (WMD &
Terrorism) of War on Iraq “proved valid.”367
Interestingly, war hawks had been pressing since long for regime change in Iraq.
Paul O’ Neill, secretary of treasury during Bush Administration, gave a testimony to this
effect, that “a plan to invade Iraq” was discussed at the “first meeting” of the Bush
Administration’s principals on 30 January, 2001.368 President George W. Bush’s senior
staff members such as Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz and Vice President Dick Cheney,
advocated “military invasion of Iraq” just after the 9/11 happenings. Similar testimony
had also been documented by Bob Woodwind in his Bush at War. Richard A. Clarke in
his Against All Enemies gave the same testimony.369 Not surprisingly, the White House
conceded in September 2003 that Saddam Hussain was “not involved in 9/11” tragedy.370
Noam Chomsky was of the opinion that the real reasons for the invasion of Iraq had
nothing to do with the stated rationale. And it was the “oil factor not Iraq’s WMD” or
presumed links with al-Qaida.371
General Tony Zinni and Tony Koltz drew an interesting analogy. American
leaders used the Gulf of Tonkin incident to justify the US War in Vietnam. In the same
way, President George W. Bush Administration used Iraq’s presumed collaboration with
al-Qaida to justify US invasion of Iraq in 2003. America might suffer the same fate as we
did in Vietnam.372 After 9/11, there had been intensive investigation to prove, if any, Iraqi
complicity in 9/11. However, there was no hard empirical evidence to prove Iraq-al-
Qaida nexus leading to 9/11 happening.373
366 Chomsky, Power and Terror, 18-19 367 Jentleson, American Foreign Policy, 380368 Paul O’ Neill cited in Ron Suskind. The Price of Loyalty. (Simon and Schuster, 2013)369 Fawn and Hinnebusch, Iraq War, 2370 Ibid, 7371 Chomsky, Power and Terror, 130-131372 Tony Zinni, and Tony Koltz. The Battle for Peace: A Frontline Vision of America’s Power and
Purpose. (New York: Palgrave, 2006), 89373 Vincent M. Cannistraro. “Keep the Focus on Al Qaeda.” New York Times. December 3, 2001
130
Interestingly, Richard Crockatt had given an important piece of the charged
political environment after 9/11. He cited Richard Perle, a well known neoconservative
and assistant secretary of defense under President Reagan. Richard Perle wrote that “the
US must strike at Saddam Hussain…” because America could not “win war on terror” if
Saddam Hussain’s regime continued to reign in Baghdad.374 Richard Perle believed that
there was an operational connection between al-Qaida and Iraq. Saddam Hussain praised
9/11 attacks.375
Despite the repeated warnings from George Tenet since the beginning of Bush
Presidency that al-Qaida was a serious threat, no attention was paid on the issue. Rather
the primary focus was on Iraq. In the first NSC meeting in January 2001, Condoleezza
Rice made Iraq the total focus. The title was, “How Iraq is destabilizing the region,” and
how he could be removed. Since inauguration of President George W. Bush till 9/11,
dozens of reports and documents were produced inside the Defense and State
Departments about the possible military invasion of Saddam Hussain’s regime in
Baghdad. However, Iraq and al-Qaida were two separate and naturally hostile entities.
As cited above, Richard A. Clarke’s encounter with the President on September
12, 2001 was well known. And then came the turn of Mohammad Atta’s presumed
Prague meeting with Iraqi intelligence officials. After intense investigation George Tenet
refuted this meeting. Both FBI and CIA concluded that Atta was in “Virginia during the
period under investigation.”376 According to Dick Cheney, even if there were one percent
chances of Saddam’s involvement in 9/11, that was very low probability of Iraq’s
complicity with al-Qaida, it “must be treated as a certainty” in US reaction to 9/11.377
On June 17, 2004 President Bush insisted that there was a complicity between
Iraq and al-Qaida which led to 9/11 happenings.378 The theme of the first was also
discussed in the US. That war should be for a just cause, by a legal authority and not as a
first but last resort. The argument was evoked by the Christian leaders in the US. Bob
374 Richard Crockatt. America Embattled: September 11, anti-Americanism and the Global Order. (London: Routledge, 2003), 157
375 Richard Perle. “The US Must Strike at Saddam Hussein”, New York Times. December 29, 2001376 Ron Suskind. The One Percent Doctrine: Deep inside Americas Pursuit of Its Enemies since
9/11. (London: Simon and Schuster, 2006), 22-23377 Ibid, 213378 “President Discusses Economy, Iraq in Cabinet Meeting”, White House Press Release, June 17,
2004
131
Elgar, Secretary General of the National Council of Churches and a representative of 50
million American Christians, while talking on the Iraq war argued that “I do not” find it
as such a just war.379 The Iraq War of 2003 did not meet the criteria set by the UN.380
The US attacked Afghanistan, the al-Qaida sanctuary, was understandable
because there was no other way to attack al-Qaida and the Taliban regime. The Taliban
protectors of al-Qaida were not ready to handover Osama bin Laden to the US. However,
the US war on Iraq did not make it a just and “legal war under international law.”381
Gilles Kepel had given a worth reading account on the issue of Iraq al-Qaida
complicity leading to 9/11. He had cited an interview by Paul Wolfowitz after the US
invasion had occurred. Paul Wolfowitz was deputy secretary of defense when the
decision was made. In the interview, Wolfowitz said that on the issue of Iraq–al-Qaida
complicity, there was a sharp division within the Bush Administration bureaucracy. This
answer in itself was questionable. Who opposed in clear terms going after Iraq within the
bureaucracy? Only Colin Powell had been cited as a reluctant warrior by some writers.
However, he was the one who defended the case before UN. Ultimately, however, in June
2004, a US Bipartisan Commission was established to investigate the 9/11 tragedy. The
Bipartisan Commission reported back that presumed Prague meeting of Mohammad Atta
never happened. The Prague rumor was false; Mohammad Atta was in Florida, the US,
on the day of the presumed meeting.382
Kepel cited Richard Clarke’s testifying statement before 9/11 Commission.
Clarke testified that the “overthrow of Saddam regime” in Baghdad had been a “priority”
for the US Administration since January 2001. He went on saying, so far as, that
unfortunately the advisers to the Bush Administration exploited the 9/11 “national
tragedy” and used it as a tragic opportunity to start a war against terror in which the hunt
for al-Qaida was not a priority. It was a secondary goal. The primary goal was the
destruction of Saddam regime in Iraq and plant a pro-American democracy there.383
379 David Masci, and Kenneth Lukas. Ethics of War, Global Issues. (Washington: CQ Press, 2005), 275
380 “The UN report on providing a secure world”, available at www.un.org/secureworld381 Robert J. Jackson, and Philip Towle. Temptations of Power: The US in Global Politics after
9/11. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 173-176382 Kepel, War for Muslim Mind, 205-207383 Kepel, War for Muslim Mind, 207
132
America went to war mainly on the issues of WMD and Iraq-al-Qaida nexus.
Later on, both were discredited. America went to war “under false pretexts”. It raised the
issues of “mistakes, myths, and misjudgment” that led to the US involvement in Indo-
China.384 The US Grand Strategy of unilateral invasion of Iraq despite the opposition
from UN and two important European allies, France and Germany, was unjustified. This
preventive military intervention was mainly made for three reasons–WMDs, links with
al-Qaida and, Americans as liberators. All the three reasons were discounted.385 President
George W. Bush put Iraq on the top of his list of security issues and by doing that he
discarded the effective system of containment of Iraq. He went to war against Iraq on the
basis of wrong assumptions and questionable intelligence. He launched a “preventive
war” against Iraq.386
The initial war aims in Iraq did not include promotion of democracy. The stated
reasons were three-WMDs, terrorism and Saddam. They were discounted later on.387 The
US went to war against Iraq under misperceptions and even used deliberate exaggeration
and deception. By doing that the Bush Administration made it difficult to assess its true
aims of war.388 The US war on Iraq did not fall under the category of preemption. It was
like the American war on Mexico in 1847–premeditated and unprovoked. There was a
word for such an adventure called “militarism.”389
In summing up the issue of Iraq – al-Qaida complicity, leading to 9/11, it might
be said that Bush Administration’s claim mainly rested on a questionable source. It was
based on an al-Qaida detainee “identified as a likely fabricator” by the two important US
intelligence agencies CIA and DIA. But the Office of Special Plans (OSP) established in
the Pentagon after 9/11, really was a bastion for war hawks. The OSP provided their own
analysis of the intelligence coming to them. The OSP continuously insisted that al-Qaida
terrorists and Iraq were teaming up. They took it for granted. The war hawks at the 384 Robert K. Brigham. Is Iraq another Vietnam? (New York: Persus Books Group, 2006), x385 Sergio Fabrinni (Ed.). The United States Contested: American Unilateralism and European
Discontent. (London and NY: Routledge, 2006), 6386 Richard Lock Pullan. US Intervention Policy and Army Innovation: From Vietnam to Iraq.
(London: Routledge, 2006), 181387 Jeremy Jones. Negotiating Change: The New Politics of Middle East. (London and NY: I.B.
Tauris, 2006), 232388 Jeremy Black. Great Powers and Quest for Hegemony: The World Order since 1500. (London
and N.Y: Routledge, 2008), 210389 Anonymous (Micheal Scheuer). Imperial Hubris: Why the West is losing the War on Terror.
(Dulles, VA: Potamac Books, 2004), xvi-xvii
133
Pentagon, Vice President’s office, and National Security establishment played with the
intelligence on the issue. They maneuvered the “normal interagency process” on the topic
in such a way so that others might not be able to raise the objections.390
In short, the 9/11 Bipartisan Commission reported back in June, 2004. The
commission findings ended the controversy, if any, on the al-Qaida – Iraq collaboration.
On the Prague affair the commission concluded, “it was false”. Nothing happened like
that. Atta was in “Florida” on the day of accused meeting. However, the commission
offered a devastating conclusion “ to date we have seen no evidence that these or the
earlier contacts [between Iraq and Al-Qaida] ever developed into a collaborative
operational relationship. Nor have we seen evidence indicating that Iraq cooperated with
al-Qaida in developing or carrying out attacks against the United States.”391 Richard A.
Clarke, another primary source, about the US war on Iraq in 2003, concluded that it “was
an idee fixe, a rigid belief”. The “decision to invade Iraq had already been made and
nothing could change it” whatsoever.392 (Clarke: 2004: 265).The Bush Administration
had already decided to make a military invasion of Iraq.393
4.2 Iraq: A Rogue State with WMDs:The second stated reason given by the Bush Administration that received the most
emphasis was the Saddam Hussain’s WMD threat to the US and the world at large. In his
State of the Union Address on January 29, 2002 President George W. Bush said that
among his great objectives was the “elimination of threats to the US security” posed by
“international terrorists” and by the “absolutist regimes” that were relentlessly seeking
weapons of mass destruction. He cited Iran, Iraq and North Korea as such states. His
central sentence in this connection was that “states like these, and their terrorist allies,
constitute an axis of evil.” They were acquiring WMD to “threaten the peace of the
world.” These states posed “a grave and growing danger.” He pledged before Congress
and the American people, “I will not wait on events while dangers gather.”394
390 Packer, Assassin’s Gate, 107391 9/11 Commission. "Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the
United States." (Retrieved September 2004), 97392 Clarke, Against All Enemies, 265393 Interview with Dr. Noman O. Sattar (Director, Dept. of American Studies, Quaid-i-Azam
University, Islamabad) by the Researcher. (Islalmabad. July 22, 2016)394 Woodward, Plan of Attack, 92
134
President Bush, while delivering his Graduation Speech at West Point, the US
Military Academy, New York, on June 1, 2002 said, containment of dictators possessing
WMD was impossible if they acquired delivery system. They could deliver these lethal
weapons directly through missiles or could secretly provide them to the terrorists with
whom they had alliances. In the same speech, the President also declared the US strategy
in war on terror. The US military forces, without any reservation “must be ready for
preemptive action” against such rouge states to defend American lives. Without any
exaggeration, the President referred to Iraq and its WMD program.395
In his interview with the ITV Television Network, UK, reporter Trevor
McDonald put tough questions to the President on Iraq. While responding to the reporter
the President said that “the policy of my government is that he goes”. It’s the worst
development if America “allow Saddam Hussain to develop WMD… I am not going to
let that happen.”396 President Bush hosted Tony Blair in Crawford on the weekend, April
6-7, 2002. Addressing to the United Nations General Assembly on September 12, 2002
President George W. Bush remarked that Saddam Hussain could supply WMD to al-
Qaeda terrorists. In this scenario the 9/11 tragedy would be “a prelude to far greater
horrors.”397
While talking to the 11-House members on September 19, 2002, the President
remarked that the war against terror was going well. But the real and biggest threat was
“Saddam Hussain and his WMD.”398 Similarly, the President remarked at the Cincinnati
Museum Center that there existed empirical evidence that Saddam Hussain was
“reconstituting” his nuclear weapons program. The US Administration learned through a
reliable source that Saddam Hussain attempted to buy high-strength “aluminum tubes”
and other related equipment that were required for “gas centrifuges” which in turn were
used for “uranium enrichment” to produce nuclear weapons.399
In his State of the Union Address in January 2003, President George W. Bush
made startling announcement. By quoting the British government the President said,
395 George W. Bush. “West Point Graduation Speech”, June 1, 2002396 “George W. Bush’s Interview with the United Kingdom's ITV Television Network (By Trevor
McDonald)”. April 4, 2002397 Woodward, Plan of Attack, 119-120398 Woodward, Plan of Attack, 186399 Bush, “Remarks on Iraq at Cincinnati Museum Center”
135
“The British government had learned that Saddam Hussain recently sought significant
quantities of uranium from Africa.”400 In the buildup to Iraq war Vice President Dick
Cheney said, there was “no doubt” that Iraq had WMD. He would use them against “US
friends, allies, and against the US.”401 George Tenet, the CIA Director, while talking to
the President in the Oval Office on the issue of Iraq’s WMD assured the President,
“Don’t worry, it’s a slam dunk.”402
Condoleezza Rice, National Security Advisor, while delivering a speech in
February 2002 to the Conservative Political Action Conference said that America would
do everything in its power to “prevent the world’s most dangerous countries to possess
most dangerous weapons.”403 Colin Powell, Secretary of State, in his speech at the UN
said that the facts indicated the Saddam regime was concealing their weapons of mass
destruction. Saddam regime was putting big efforts to produce more WMD. Iraq had not
been cooperating with the UN inspectors. He further claimed that whatever he said today
was backed by “solid intelligence” sources. He, further said, these were “not just
assertions”. Whatever he shared were “facts” and based on “credible intelligence”.404
The Bush Administration gave various reasons for going to war against Iraq. Of
these reasons Iraq’s WMD and its secret links with al-Qaeda were the most compelling. I,
being a researcher, after going through many sources, both primary and secondary, am of
the opinion that the main declared reason which led to the Bush Administration to war on
Iraq was the issue of WMD. Whether Saddam really possessed WMD?
4.2.1 Critical Analysis:
First of all I would like to give George Tenet’s point of view on the issue of Iraq’s status
of WMDs on the eve of US invasion of Iraq. He had given the following analysis.
America did not invade Iraq in 2003 solely because of WMD. In his view “WMD was
not even the principal reason” of invasion. George Tenet quoted Paul Wolfowitz’s article
in Vanity Fair in May 2003, wherein Wolfowitz said that the Bush Administration
400 George W. Bush. “State of the Union Address”, January 28, 2003401 Dick Cheney. Speech to the Council on Foreign Relations, quoted in David E. Sanger, “Allies Hear Sour Notes in ‘Axis of Evil’ Chorous”, New York Times. February 17, 2002
402 Woodward, Plan of Attack, 249403 Woodward, Plan of Attack, 95404 Collin Powel. “UN Presentation”, CNN. February 5, 2003
136
Principals “settled on” WMD because it was “the one issue that everyone could agree
on.”405
The National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) of September, 2002 wrote in its key
judgments that Iraq had not only “chemical and biological weapons” but also missiles to
deliver them in access of ranges prescribed by UN sanctions. Iraq, if unchecked, might
also produce a “nuclear weapon by the end of the current decade”. Baghdad was
following what was known as “denial and deception” strategy. The notorious piece of bad
information came from Bonn known as “Curve Ball”. This source provided “fabricated
information” about Iraq’s mobile biological weapons production facility on trailers. The
information was included both in the NIE and Colin Powell’s speech to the UN on
February 5, 2003. However, the information provided by Curve Ball was not validated by
other sources.406
Martin Indyk, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, and George
Tenet were operating from the mind-set of mid-1990s. They believed that Saddam
Hussain possessed WMD. In reality, Saddam Hussain was bluffing. They could not
believe he was bluffing. To begin with, Martin Indyk was convinced that Saddam
Hussain had WMD. Later on, after his capture, they got the answer. Why did Saddam
Hussain bluff about WMD? He had “rough neighborhood of Iraq” in mind. He was
genius in “denial and deception” strategy. Saddam Hussain led US to believe the things
that were untrue.407 The intelligence used over the years on the issue of Saddam Hussain’s
WMD was flawed. The NIE never became the basis of US invasion of Iraq, and, in the
opinion of George Tenet, the US decision to invade Iraq was “not solely made” on this
basis.408
It was accused that George Tenet’s use of the phrase “slam dunk” played the
central role and “intrigued” the President’s decision to invade Iraq to remove Saddam
Hussain from power. According to George Tenet, facts did not support this charge. The
meeting in which this phrase used was held in December, 2002 in the Oval Office of the
President. Actually, the decision to invade Iraq had “already been made”. That meeting
was held ten months after President George W. Bush saw the first plan to invade Iraq; 405 Tenet and Harlow, Centre of Storm, 321406 Tenet and Harlow, Centre of Storm, 324-328407 Ibid, 330-333408 Ibid 337
137
four months after the vice president Dick Cheney delivered his Veterans of Foreign Wars
speech wherein he alleged that there was “no doubt” that Iraqi regime had WMD; three
months after the President strongly warned Iraqi regime in the UN that it should
“immediately and unconditionally destroy its all WMD”; two months after the US
Congress authorized President George W. Bush to use force against Iraq.409
On that fateful day of December 21, 2002 in the Oval Office, everybody who
participated in the meeting “already believed” that Iraq had WMD.410 Later on, George
Tenet wrote that he used the alleged phrase in that meeting, however, in a different
context. Actually George Tenet told the President that strengthening the “public
confidence” was a “slam dunk”. The phrase was later on taken completely “out of the
context” and was “intentionally misused” to mislead American public.411 George Tenet
sorrowfully regrets that Bush Administration principals found a “scapegoat” in him in the
form of “slam dunk” phrase and he believed that it never shaped the “timing and
legitimacy” of Iraq invasion in March 2003.
Bob Woodward’s book, Plan of Attack, on the run-up to the Iraq invasion caused
a media bonfire. The Oval Office “deliberately fed the slam dunk” scene to Woodward to
shift the blame from the White House to CIA. The “rationale of Iraq” War had been a
“failure” and White House needed a scapegoat. George Tenet provided the one. The trust
had been broken down between the White House and CIA’s Director George J. Tenet.
Consequently, George Tenet resigned in July 2004 within a couple of months after
coming of the book.412
The reports of IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) and UNMOVIC
(U.N. Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission) were of special importance.
After an interval of about four years, IAEA and UNMOVIC, once again, had been
working on the ground situation in Iraq from November 25, 2002 to March 17, 2003.
They submitted their several respective reports between January 27 and March 7, 2003.
Mohammed El-Baradei, the Director of IAEA reported to the UN Security Council that
“no nuclear production facilities” or activity were found in Iraq. Hans Blix, the Director
of UNMOVIC reported to the UN Security Council on February 14, 2003. His central 409 Tenet and Harlow, Centre of Storm, 359410 Ibid, 361411 Ibid, 362412 Tenet and Harlow, Centre of Storm, 479-487
138
conclusion was that Iraq did not “possess WMD”. The testimony of IAEA and
UNMOVIC was rejected by the Bush Administration.413
The same author further alleged that after one year of the US invasion of Iraq in
March, 2003, it became clear that President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Tony
Blair “deliberately used” the issue of Iraq’s WMD. Their objective in doing so was to get
support for Iraq War from their respective people and among their Western allies. For the
first time, the evidence came to surface from a BBC reporter in May 2003. The reporter
cited David Kelly, a Ministry of Defense specialist of Great Britain on issues of nuclear
proliferation. Using the source cited above, the BBC reporter alleged that Blair
Government ordered its intelligence services to “sex up” the issue of Iraq’s WMD. After
the disclosure, Blair Government “denied the report” and on July 17, under pressure,
David Kelley committed suicide.414
On January 28, 2004, David Kay who had just resigned as head of the Iraq Survey
Group gave his statement before the US Senate Armed Services Committee that, “we
were almost all wrong”. He had been working as head of American inspectors in Iraq.
There were no WMD stockpiles in Iraq and he further declared that it was “intelligence
failure” on WMD in Iraq and it needed an inquiry to investigate the issue.415 David Kay
actually confirmed the conclusions already made by the IAEA and UNMOIC.
About fifty days after the US invasion of Iraq, Paul Wolfowitz explained to
Vanity Fair’s Sam Tannenhaus that why did the Administration put the issue of WMD at
the center of the war campaign in the US? Answering a question about the war strategy
meeting held at Camp David immediately after 9/11, Paul Wolfowitz Deputy Secretary of
Defense, said that there was a long discussion about the US strategy in war on terror.
There was agreement about action against Iraq that it “should be”. The question debated
was not about whether but about when. Answering another question, the Deputy
Secretary of defense said that the truth of the matter was that for “bureaucratic reasons”
the participants agreed on the one issue. The participants agreed on the WMD as the
“core reason”. It means the issue of Iraq’s WMD was used purely for political reasons as
a case of public sell out.416
413 Kepel, War for Muslim Mind, 204414 Kepel, War for Muslim Mind, 204415 Woodward, Plan of Attack, 434
416 Kepel, War for Muslim Mind, 204-206
139
Richard Clarke, former head of antiterrorist coordination at the National Security
Council, declared before 9/11 Commission (investigatory commission) that “removal of
Saddam regime from power” had been the “top priority” of President Bush as early as
January, 2001. He further said that some important officials of the Bush Administration
used 9/11 happenings as a tragic opportunity to initiate the US war against terror. In this
war on terror the pursuit of al-Qaida was a “secondary” goal. The basic objective was the
removal of Saddam regime from power, install in its place a pro-American democracy.417
After fall of Saddam regime, no stockpiles of WMD were found in Iraq. It proved
policy failure in Iraq. Then in June 2004, President Bush appointed a Bi-partisan
Commission (Robb-Silberman Commission) to investigate the matter. On the issue of
Iraq’s WMD as a core cause of war, the commission submitted its report to the President
in March, 2005. The report, among other things, concluded that the “assessments about
the Iraq’s WMD” were “riddled with errors”. And the assessment about Iraq’s nuclear
program was “almost completely wrong.” Similarly the assessments about biological and
chemical weapons were “also wrong”.418
Similarly, the report of the “US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on the
US Intelligence Community’s Pre-war Intelligence Assessments on Iraq” came to the
same conclusion. The report of the Senate Committee concluded intelligence provided in
the case of Iraq’s WMD was “flawed and rich in errors”.419 The Comprehensive Report of
the Special Adviser of the CIA to the DCI on the status of the Iraq’s WMD known as
Duelfer Report also concluded the same. That the Iraq war was an “intelligence failure”
and the information provided in this regard was “faulty”.420
In this regard, as cited above, the report of the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence was of special importance. The committee found that the analysis, in a large
number of cases, based largely on their expectations rather than objective empirical
evidence of the information provided to them. Mostly, the analysts expected to see
empirical evidence on WMD coming from Iraq after the fall of Saddam regime. That Iraq
417 Ibid, 207418 “Report of the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction (Robb-Silberman Report)”, March 31, 2005, 8-9
419 “Report of The US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence”, July 9, 2004, 18420 “The Comprehensive Report of CIA’s Special Adviser to the DCI (Duelfer Report)”,
September 30, 2004
140
retained prohibited weapons and would resume banned activities regarding Iraq’s
WMD.421
The basis of this bias could be found in “group think” behavior. It meant selective
gathering of information, looking for no or few alternatives, and withholding critical
analysis etc. The main sources of information on Iraq’s WMD was an Iraqi defector
code-named “Curveball” the man who had undergone nervous breakdown and was a
habitual drinker. His credibility as a source of information, on such an important issue
was not questioned. Similarly, the dissenting voices of the State Department Bureau of
Intelligence and Research (INR) and the Energy Department were summarily ignored.
They had questioned the claims about “Iraqi purchases of uranium in Africa and of
aluminum tubes”. Their opinion was that these claims were “highly dubious”.422
There were distortions at the highest political level as well. The President and the
Vice President made unequivocal claims about Iraq’s WMD. On this process, George
Packer wrote that there was “deliberate slanting” of ambiguous facts.423 The author
recounted an incident. Richard Haas, State Department Policy Planning Director, while
talking to the National Security Adviser, Condoleezza Rice, was told by the adviser in
June 2002, the President George W. Bush had already decided and “made up his
mind”.424
There was another thread of the story of Iraq’s WMD. Rob Richer was at the
centre of that story. It was in the first-week of December, 2002 Rob Richer, the newly
appointed head of CIA’s Near East Division held a meeting at the agency’s office in
London. Richer, CIA’s station chiefs from ME to London introduced Michael Shipster,
the Middle East intelligence Chief for SIS, the British intelligence Service. Richer and
Shipster knew each other over the years and both had worked in the Mideast and Persian
Gulf regions. The US had some assumptions on Iraq’s WMD and lacked hard evidence to
prove the case for invasion of Iraq. For Richer the absence of hard evidence was a failure
of intelligence community. Shipster agreed with Richer. Shipster had a plan in his mind.
421 Report US Senate Intelligence Committee, 18422 Murray Waas. “What Bush was Told About Iraq”, National Journal. (March 2, 2006)423 Packer, Assassin’s Gate, 62424 Ibid, 45
141
Shipster had a credible source inside Iraq-Habbush, the head of Iraqi intelligence service-
the Mukhabarat.425
After getting permission from Dear Love, George Tenet, the heads of SIS and
CIA respectively, Richer and shipster decided to work collectively. Richer telephoned
Saad Khayr, the head of Jordon’s General Intelligence Department (GID). Richer had
helped Saad to get this job in 1999. Saad Khayer actively cooperated and a secret meeting
was planned for January, 2003, in Amman. Habbush secretly came to Amman but to the
prior knowledge of his boss, Saddam Hussein. On the appointed date the meeting was
held in Amman. Saddam Hussein did not know about all the agenda items of the meeting
between Shipster and Habbush. During the meeting, Habbush told Shipster in clear terms
that Iraq had “no WMD”.426
The information was passed on to George Tenet. Richard Dear Love flew to
Washington to pass on the information to Tenet. Dear Love personally reported to
George Tenet what Habbush had said. Saddam Hussain had finished Iraq’s nuclear
program in 1991. He also destroyed his chemical weapons the same year. Same was true
for biological weapons. Since 1996, Iraq had no biological weapons facility. The
presence of WMD did not constitute a justification for the invasion of Iraq. For the
Administration Iraq was an outstanding issue. They wanted to resolve it. The real reason
was the regime change.427 The Administration used the issue of WMD to invade Iraq.428
Tenet digested the report and then briefed the President and Rice. The report
contradicted the convictions of the Bush Administration. The White House rejected and
buried the Habbush report. President Bush wanted to invade Iraq since the beginning of
his Presidency and nothing could stop him. By the end of 2003, it became clear that
Habbush was right and there were no WMD in Iraq.429 America had gone to war under
“false pretenses” for Tahir Habbush was paid handsomely by the CIA ($5million) and
resettled in Amman.430 Finally, it was on February 8, 2004, that President George W.
425 Suskind, Way of the World, 361-362426 Suskind, Way of the World, 363-364427 Interview with Dr. Noman428 Interview with Dr. M. Riaz Shad Awan (Head, Dept. of International Relations, National
University of Modern Languages, Islamabad) by the Researcher. Islalmabad. July 18, 2016429 Suskind, Way of the World, 365-369430 Ibid, 373
142
Bush made an acknowledgement on NBC’s Meet the Press, that “I expected” there would
be “stockpiles of weapons” in Iraq, and “we thought” that Saddam Hussain had WMD.431
4.3 Promotion of Democracy in Iraq:Promotion of democracy in Iraq was the third declared objective of the Bush
Administration in Iraq. Removal of Saddam Hussain from power was a first step to
introduce a larger scheme of regional transformation in the Middle East in ways that
would benefit long-term US interests in the region. Iraq would be turned into a functional
democracy and would become a “model democracy” in the Arab world. Democracy in
Iraq would trigger democratic revolutions in the region. Once democracy got roots in the
region, then the democratic governments in the Middle East would be friendly to
America and Israel alike. As a result, Israeli and Palestinian conflict would be
“transcended”. The two most important problems of the Middle East, terrorism and
nuclear proliferation, would be largely eliminated.432
Vice President Dick Cheney was the first person to unfold this vicious scheme of
democratic regional transformation in his speech to the VFW (Veterans of Foreign Wars)
convention in August, 2002. This was the opening speech to sell the idea of Iraq war. Mr.
Vice President said that after the gravest threats in the region would be eliminated, then
people would have opportunity to promote democratic values in the region, Moderates
would take roots in the region. The US would have opportunity to advance the
Palestinian-Israeli Peace Process. He repeated these arguments many times till the US
invasion of Iraq.433
President George W. Bush spoke the similar language about regional
transformation in run-up to war against Iraq. It was on February 26, 2003, while
delivering a speech at AEI (American Enterprise Institute), the President said that the
basic objective of my administration was to “cultivate liberty and peace in the Middle
East”. He further said that we had great interest in the promotion of democracy in the
region because democracy did not breed violence and extremism. Democracy means
431 Woodward, Plan of Attack, 424432 Mearsheimer and Walt, Israel Lobby, 255433 Dick Cheney. “Remarks by the Vice President to Veterans of Foreign Wars 103rd National
Convention”, August 2002
143
better life for the people. The US success in Iraq would pave the way for a “truly
democratic Palestinian Peace.434
Undoubtedly, it was a departure from the traditional US Middle East policy.
There had been no empirical evidence to prove that either George W. Bush or Dick
Cheney entertained this idea of regional transformation before 9/11. President Bush, Vice
President Cheney and National Security Adviser Rice were opposed to this scheme of
regional democratization. It’s on record that President Bush strongly criticized Bill
Clinton’s program of nation building in the Middle East-in 2000 election campaign. How
did these changes in US Middle East policy occur? The important forces behind this
major change were Israel and the war hawks in the Bush Administration.435 According to
Charles Krauthammer, this program of democratization of the Middle East was the
brainchild of Natan Sharansky, an Israeli politician whose writings had great effect on
President George W. Bush’s mind.436
Ephraim Halevy, National Security Advisor of Prime Minister Ariel Sharon
delivered a speech at Munich in February 2003, wherein he said that the post-Saddam
Middle East would have great effects in Tehran, Damacus and Ramallah. He envisioned a
domino effect in the Middle East region.437 By 2002, when the US invasion of Iraq had
become a burning issue in US foreign policy, democratization of the Middle East had
also become neoconservative’s regional agenda. The neoconservatives sitting in Bush
Administration helped make it the centerpiece of American Middle East policy.438 It
could be said that the Bush Administration, neoconservatives and Israeli leadership saw
removal of Saddam Hussain as the beginning of an ambitious program of democratic
regional transformation of the Middle East.439
4.3.1 Critical Analysis:
While writing on promotion of democracy abroad as the US Foreign policy rationale,
Amitai Etzioni declared that our next leaders would have to make compromise on this
434 “In the President’s words: Free People Will keep the Peace of the World”, New York Times. February 27, 2003
435 George Packer. “War after the War”, The New Yorker. November 24, 2003, 58-85436 Charles Krauthamer. “Peace through Democracy”, Washington Post, June 28, 2002437 Bennet, James “Israel Says War on Iraq Would Benefit the Region”, New York Times, February
27, 2003438 Halper and Clarke, America Alone, 76-90439 Mearsheimer and Walt, Israel Lobby, 259
144
issue. It had become clear without any doubt that democracy could not be promoted
abroad by force of arms, particularly in “poorly prepared countries”.440 He further wrote
that “Security First Rationale might replace democratization” as the basis for US foreign
policy. The security of life was more fundamental than all other rights. For a
comprehensive understanding of human security we could see Roland Paris’s work which
simply defined human security as “physical safety of life, freedom from killing and
torture.”441 In Countries like post-Saddam Iraq, democratization must be preceded by
security first foreign policy. Democratization of such a people would never end their
aggressive attitude. The US should leave “coercive regime changes” as policy option. In
these countries, process of political development should be led by “internal forces”
themselves and not by foreigners.442
Liberals and Neo-Cons concept of world political reality had one basic flaw: they
grossly “overestimated the capacity of the US to reengineer” the governments of other
countries such as Iraq. Particularly, neoconservatives shared one fundamental belief that
democracy could be “imposed by force of arms” as attempted in Iraq. Similarly, liberals
also believed in the “transformative ability” of soft power. The tragedy was that both
approaches had failed in most places in international realm.443 It was clear from the
historical record that democracy was a “delicate plant” and it grew “slowly and steadily”
but for its growth there must be favorable conditions it needed to be cultivated by the
“indigenous people themselves” who wanted to live under it and not the foreigners.444
If foreign powers imposed regime changes in the name of spreading their own
political values, it would start bleeding the target people. International politics was
ruthless. In international political system choices had often been difficult and outcomes
were often imperfect, dissimilar to the role these values played in domestic affairs.445
Historical evidence showed that democratic governments were undermined by their 440 Amitai Etzioni. Security First: For a Muscular Moral Foreign Policy. (New Haven and
London: Yale University Press, 2007), 1441 Roland Paris. “Human Security: Paradigm Shift on Hot Air?” International Security 26, no 2,
(Fall 2001), 87-102442 Etzioni, Security First, 2443 Kurt M. Campbell, and Michael E.O Hanlon. Hard Power: The New Politics of International
Security. (New York: Basic Books, 2006), 238-246444 Claude Ake. “The Unique Case of African Democracy”, International Affairs 69, no 2, (April
1993), 239-244445 Michael Lind. The American Way of Strategy: US Foreign Policy and American Way of Life.
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2006)
145
failure to “address basic human needs” for example security of life, and not by other
factors. The case of Weimar Republic was in reference. It had been concluded that
Weimar Republic, as a liberal democracy, lost its legitimacy because of its failure to meet
peoples needs, particularly physical security.446
Akbar Ganji, an Iranian journalist argued that they were only Iranian people who
could plant “liberal democracy” in Iran. No foreigners could ever do that.447 Similarly,
it’s on record, CIA met an utter fiasco in its struggle against Islamists for Mogadishu in
2006.448 It did not matter how much money the US spend, the US could not evolve them
as liberal democracies. The US easily overthrew Saddam Hussain from power, however,
could not establish “liberal democracy in Iraq”.449
By December 2005, it had become clear that the world was not undergoing the
process of democratization. Democratic–peace theory might have been true for well
established liberal democracies but not for the people who were democratizing – usually
(usually) through a painful, bloody and unstable process.450 Iraq taught US the basic
lesson that the establishment of “human security was the prerequisite for planting
democracy” there and not vice versa. This was exactly the pattern followed in Germany,
Japan and Italy.451 By December 2006, America had lost three thousand soldiers in
violent insurgency. Insurgency in Iraq “intensified” with every passing day since 2003. It
could be safely said that democracy preceded security thesis failed in Iraq.452
The first American civilian, L. Paul Bremer, the appointed head of CPA
(Coalition Provisional Authority) took certain steps which greatly affected Iraq. These
steps created power vacuum in Iraq that negatively affected both security and
democratization. Paul Bremer permanently dismantled the entire Ba’ath Party apparatus
in Iraq, thereby removed one hundred and twenty thousand personnel, including mostly
professionals like doctors, engineers and teachers. They were cast out of their jobs.453 In 446 Amitai Etzioni. How Patriotic is the Patriotic Act? (New York: Routledge, 2004), 12-14447 Akbar Ganji. “Money cannot Buy US Democracy”, New York Times. August 1, 2006448 Anothony Barnett, and Patrick Smith. “US Accused of Covert Operations in Somalia”, The
Observer (U.K.). September 10, 2006449 Etzioni, Security First, 14450 Edward D. Mansfield, and Jack Snyder. Electing to Fight: Why Emerging Democracies Go to
War. Cambridge Mass: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 2005451 Etzioni, Security First, 19452 Ibid, 22453 David Philips. Losing Iraq: Inside the Postwar Reconstruction Fiasco. (New York: Westview
Press, 2005), 145
146
total disregard of the US military advice, Bremer also disbanded four hundred thousand
Iraqi soldiers by the single stroke of the pen.454 De-Baathification apparently was
modeled on de-Nazification, however, this policy failed in Iraq. Allies had left many low
level Nazis in power and hence avoided “power vacuum” in Germany. This could not
happen in Iraq. Another issue was the “lack of sufficient manpower” on the ground to
maintain order.455
There was violence and chaos in Iraq in the post-Saddam period. They lost their
confidence on imposed democracy. The violence drove many middle-class families out
of Iraq, thereby removed one main factor of democratization.456 America took certain
wrong decisions in Iraq. Ahmad Chalabi was the first Iraqi expatriate promoted to the
position of power in Iraq. He was widely viewed as an “American puppet”. The
American “advisers were appointed to oversee the Iraqi ministers” who often used their
veto power in the provision of funds, the main source of revenue for these ministries. It
was seen as America’s “unwarranted intrusion” in domestic politics of Iraq. Local
politicians were left with “no free choices” in their own politics.457
Paul Bremer rejected repeated Iraqi requests for a constitution to be framed by an
elected assembly. Instead, Bremer framed the constitution through handpicked personnel
of Iraqi Governing Council. Moreover, Bremer objected to declare Iraq as an “Islamic
State and Islam as a source of legislation.”458 American interference in Iraqi politics
continued unabated. The elected Prime Minister al-Jaafari was forced to resign and
replaced by Nouri al-Maliki in May 2006. Both major groups of Iraqi population Sunnies
and Shias criticized this interference. Al-Jaafari asked the US to end its interference in
Iraq’s internal politics.459
In disregard of nature of Iraqi society America imposed a “highly unitary
constitution” rather than a federated one. Security situation had been improved if
454 Eric Schmitt. “US Generals Fault Ban on Hussain’s Party”, New York Times. April 21, 2004455 Etzioni, Security First, 23456 Sabrina Tavernise. “As Death Stalks Iraq, Middle Class Exodus Begins”, New York Times. May
19, 2006457 Yochi J. Dreazen. “Tough Love in Baghdad”, Wall Street Journal. April 1, 2006458 Philips, Losing Iraq, 186459 Edward Wong. “Beleaguered Premier Warns U.S. to Stop Interfering in Iraq s Politics”, New
York Times. March 30, 2006
147
America would have accorded regional autonomy to all the eighteen provinces of Iraq.460
It had been claimed by critics and proved by empirical evidence on ground that the
project of regime change in Iraq turned it into a breeding place for terrorists. The
National Intelligence Estimate of 2006 assessed that the Iraq war created more terrorists
than it eliminated.461
Both America’s political reputation and military credibility suffered greatly in the
aftermath of removal of Saddam Hussain from power.462 America must realize that
international political system was brutal and the capacity of the US, even as a
superpower, was limited to reshape it, particularly through the force of arms. Democracy
could not be “imposed” upon others. It must be cultivated directly by the people
themselves and “largely homegrown”.463
The Neo-Cons came to the surface in response to “US democratic experiments in
social engineering” in the decade of 1960s. Then, their central theme was that social
engineering, specifically undertaken by the US government was destined to fail. The
Kennedy and Johnson administrations failed to deliver. During 1960s, the Neo-Cons
were convincing that the experiments in social engineering undertaken by the US federal
government often did not work. Surprisingly, some of the same Neo-Cons, in the decade
of 1990s “advocated social engineering” by the US federal government around the world
under “unfavorable conditions” than those at home in America.464 Democratization had
been the major form of long distance social engineering (LDSE) in Iraq. In this process of
democratization “no distinction was made between forced democratization and
persuasive” one. The US experimented with forced democratization in Iraq
notwithstanding the “local culture” of Iraq. The same attempts had also been made earlier
from Haiti to Congo.465
What made a democracy? Some scholars had made extensive studies on the
subject. Important among them were Thomas Carother’s “Critical Mission: Essays on
460 Joseph Biden, and Leslie Gelb. “Unity through Autonomy in Iraq”, New York Times. May 1, 2006
461 “Declassified Key Judgements of the National Intelligence Estimate on Global Terrorism”, New York Times. September 27, 2006
462 “US Image Up Slightly, but Still Negative”, Pew Global Attitudes Project Report, June 23, 2005. Available at http:// pewglobal/ repors/ display
463 Etzioni, Security First, 36464 Ibid, 40-41465 Etzioni. Patriotic Act, 1-17
148
Democracy Promotion”466, Robert A. Dahl’s Polyarchy467 and most importantly Adeed
and Karen Dawisha, “How to Build a Democratic Iraq”468. Drawing on the works of these
scholars a list of the factors required to make a democracy could be made. There were
two types of factors that make a democracy – facilitating and constituting factors.
First group of factors referred to “democratic infrastructure” while second group
of factors factors meant the basic building blocks of democracy”. These factors had been
far from complete. They were nothing more than an approximation. First group included”
law and order, literacy, level of economic development, presence of middle class, rule of
law and presence of civil society while second group included true political parties, merit
system for public offices, free and fair elections, a constitution vested with sharing as
well as separation of powers and theory of checks and balances, low level of corruption
in the given society, protection of minority rights in the given society, freedom to make
association, free press, and guarantee of rights against government”. It was clear from the
above cited list that developing these factors were a slow and cumbersome process,
specifically impossible for foreign powers.469 It took several generations for Britain and
America to develop liberal democracy there especially under favorable conditions.470
America faced multiple difficulties in democratization drive in Iraq. During
twentieth century, America made sixteen attempts at nation-building through forced
democratization, from Cuba (1898 – 1902) to Haiti (1994 – 1996). Out of these sixteen
cases of forced democratization, America suffered failure in eleven to establish a
“functional democracy”. The US succeeded in only four cases – Japan, Panama, Grenada
and West Germany. Grenada was a tiny Island and Panama was also a tiny state with its
population less than three million.471
Japan and West Germany presented the only two examples of US successful
democratization in large and complex societies. The important factors which made these
466 Thomas Carother. “Critical Mission: Essays on Democracy Promotion”. Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, (2004)
467 Robert A. Dahl. Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971), 3
468 Adeed Dawisha, and Karen Dawisha. "How to build a democratic Iraq." Foreign Affairs 82, no 3, (2003), 36
469 Etzioni, Security First, 43470 Ibid, 44471 Minxin Pei, and Sara Kasper. “Lessons from the Past: The American Record on Nation
Building”, Carnegie Endowment Policy Brief. no.24, (April 2003)
149
two examples successful were missing in other societies – for example “high level of
education, ethnic homogeneity and large middle class.”472 The concept that there was a
small hidden democracy in every society just waiting to be released was untrue.473
American policy to direct the course of “internal politics” in other societies was
“unjustified”.474
The case of “reconstruction and democratization” of Japan and Germany were
special one. Under special conditions which could not be produced everywhere. They had
surrendered and were defeated. The occupation lasted longer. There was full control of
allies over every walk of life from foreign relations to foreign trade. Military security
rested with the allies till 1955. There was no danger that they, unlike Iraq, would break
up due to civil war, there was no civil war, unlike Iraq, among different ethnic groups and
above all there was strong national unity in both the nations. The presence of transparent
governments was among other factors.475 Some writers attributed to “technical and
financial expertise, well developed political parties, visionary leadership, well-educated
people and strong national feelings” as the other factors.476
The conditions were different in case of US invasion of Iraq in 2003. George
Packer quoted John W. Dower on the subject. Dower had compared the difference
between two US occupations – Japan and Iraq. He argued that “America lacked moral
legitimacy” in Iraq that she had in Japan.477 Another factor had been the “higher US level
of commitment” for democratic reconstruction of Germany and Japan. That spirit was
missing in case of Iraq. The year 1948 was the first year of Marshall Plan and the US
spent thirteen percent of its entire budget for reconstruction and democratization while in
case of both Afghanistan and Iraq it was just one percent.478
Despite this all, the Neo-Cons in the Bush Administration made promotion of
liberal democracy a central theme of US foreign policy and President George W. Bush
472 Ibid473 George Packer. “Dreaming of Democracy”, New York Times Magazine. March 2, 2003474 F.Gregory Gause. “Can Democracy Stop Terrorism?” Foreign Affairs 84, no 5,
September/October (2005), 62475 Marina Ottaway. “Nation Building”, Foreign Policy 132, (September/October 2002), 17476 Robert A. Packenham. Liberal America and the Third Worlds. (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1973), 34-35477 Packer, Dreaming of Democracy, 2003478 Karin Von Hippel. Democracy by Force: U.S. Military Intervention in the Post-Cold War
World. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 187
150
made it a post- hoc reason for the US invasion of Iraq in 2003.479 Critics even wrote that
President Bush and the Neo-Cons “knew very well that democratization of Iraq was
impossible” still they used it as a “fig leaf” to justify their run for power and oil.480
Amitai Etzioni was of the opinion that the US decision makers had different goals
to serve. Their main concern was to show American military resolve and take “control of
oilfields of Iraq” from the other contenders such as France and Russia.481 In the footsteps
of Iraq Study Group’s Report, Roger Cohen wrote that Iraq badly needed Iraqis,
nationalist in their feelings and not citizens of a tribe. After decades of dictatorship Iraq
needed “generational commitment to become a functioning democracy.”482 There had
been writers who were of the opinion that given the present scenario, democratization of
the Middle East would bring, for many reasons, Islamists to power. They had referred to
the cases of Hamas, Egypt, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and Kuwait etc.
Democratization in those lands was against US interests. The developments in Iraq had
proved that anarchy, the alternative of Saddam Hussain regime, was worse than Saddam
regime.483
Authors, from right to left, expressed their concern about the promotion of
democracy in the Middle East. While commenting on the situation in the region,
Washington Post editorial wrote that three principles had emerged. There could be no
“forced democratization” without a mature civil society in place. Secondly, America
should not put pressure for holding elections. America was better off with absolutist
rulers such as Mubarak and Musharraf. Anarchy, terrorism, and religious extremism were
the worst alternatives of these dictators.484 Elections alone did not make a democracy.
Elections were just one of the nine constituting factors of a democracy.485
By December 2006, more than four hundred contractors had lost their lives in
violence in Iraq. No American contractor could move, even inside Green Zone, without
security details. By April 2006, according to Stuart Bowen Jr, no big reconstruction
479 Etzioni, Security First, 46480 Kevin Philips. American Theocracy: The Peril and Politics of Radical Religion, Oil and
Borrowed Money in the 21st Century. (New York: Viking, 2006)481 Etzioni, Security First, 46482 Roger Cohen. “Iraq’s Biggest Failing: There is no Iraq”, New York Times, December 10, 2006483 Shibley Telhami. “The Return of the State”. The National Interest 84, (Summer 2006), 113484 “The Case for Democracy”, Editorial, Washington Post. March 5, 2006485 Etzioni, Security First, 51
151
projects in Iraq would stop insurgency.486 At about the same time testimony also came
from a former USAID Director Andrew Nations. He said, without the provision of basic
security, no reconstruction work was possible in Iraq.487
Etzioni argued, American foreign policy suffered from one problem which he
called “Multiple Realism Deficiency Disorder (MRDD)” or simply speaking “realism
deficiency.” By this term author meant the US foreign policy was based on certain
assumptions whether stated or otherwise, that America was omnipotent, that American
society had reached the final form of political organization- achieved liberal democracy,
that America was too powerful to effect the desired changes in the world and, that
America had the right and ability to remake the world in accordance with American
values. The “unrealism” had reached to great heights among war hawks in Washington.
Furthermore, Etzioni had quoted Charles Krauthammer’s speech at American Enterprise
Institute, Washington, D.C., 10 February 2004, titled “Democratic Realism.” In his
speech, Krauthammer criticized war hawks concept of “democratic globalism”
specifically their attempt to democratize the “Islamic crescent” as “highly unrealistic”
mission.488
Etzioni had published another work, (From Empire to Community) in which he
concluded that Iraq, in coming days and years, would become second Vietnam for the
US.489 John Kerry, on the issue of democratization of Iraq wrote, that American soldiers
could not bring democracy to Iraq as Iraqi leadership was “unwilling to make the
compromises” which were hallmark of democracy.490 Francis Fukuyama, once a Neo-con,
departed from them and criticized “democratic globalism” the ideology of Neo-cons. He
asked for a different approach rather than forced democratization.491
America must acknowledge that democracy could not be imposed specifically
through the force of arms on the people with no tradition of free press and civil liberties.
Democracy promotion in such societies like Iraq must be preceded by two conditions.
486 Stuart W. Bowen. “Hearing to examine Iraq Strategization and Reconstruction”, testimony before Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, February 8, 2006
487 Joel Brinkley. “Give Rebuilding Lower Priority in Future Wars State Department Spurning Iraq Strategy”, New York Times, April 8, 2006
488 Etzioni, Security First, xiv489 Amitai Etzioni. From Empire to Community: A New Approach to International Relations. (New
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004)490 John F. Kerry. “Two Deadlines and on Exit”, New York Times. April 5, 2006491 Fukuyama, America at Crossroads, 9-10, 186
152
One was the provision of basic security. Other was a stable government.492 Not only
American policy of “democratic globalism failed” but with it global respect for US also
decreased.493
Open society and democratization had been most difficult to establish in a
country. There had never been democracy in Iraq. The country was ridden with ethnic
and religious strife and, introduction of democracy there could have easily led to
disintegration of Iraq. That was why President Bush senior did not overthrow Saddam
Hussain in the First Gulf War. The promotion of democracy in Iraq was not the top
priority of President George W. Bush.494
Both USA and Britain had their negative image in the minds of Iraqis. The reason
was their special relationship with Israel, Britain was related to the creation of Israel and
America became its protector after 1967. Due to this reason Iraqis were not ready to see
the two invading powers as liberators.495 The original goals of democracy, stability and
pro-West government had not been achieved and, perhaps, they would never be.496
Introduction of democracy in Iraq was beyond the US reach and America could not do
that. The culture in Iraq was “democracy deficit” and the biggest hurdle.497
The problem was that the US imposed regime in Iraq would be undemocratic. Iraq
was a Shia majority state. If there would be democracy in Iraq, the country definitely
would move toward Iran. That was against American interests in the region.498 The
American idea of promoting democracy in the Middle East was not workable because
there were twenty two Arab – states. Out of them none was a functioning democracy.
Majority of Arabs saw America as an empire that supported “absolutist rulers” in the past
and pursued her economic interests in the region.499
Elie Kedourie, a historian on Iraq, argued that overwhelming population of Iraq
came from tribal origin. They were uneducated, illiterate, and did not understand alien
ideas such as elections and parliamentary democracy. They were accustomed to obey
492 Etzioni, Security First, x 493 Ibid, ix494 Soros, Bubble of American Supremacy, 59495 Steele, Defeat, 251496 Ibid, 9497 Noam Chomsky. Imperial Ambitions: Conversations on the post 9/11 World. (New York:
Henry Holt and Company, 2005), 117498 Chomsky, Power and Terror, 132499 Jackson and Towle, Temptations of Power, 38-39
153
their tribal chiefs and government officials. Shias of Iraq were also deeply had great
religious. They had great respect for their religious divines living in Najaf and Karbala.
Iraqi society was beset with such defects.500 Iraq feared domination of “Western cultural
imperialism”. For them, they were being asked to relinquish their fundamental identify –
social, political and religious and instead. They were adamant to relinquish their old ways
of life and embrace alien concept of liberalism.501
Regime change in Iraq had met a dead end. It had degenerated into a simple moral
issue of good and bad. Remove the age old local bad and replace it with an alien good.
That was a gamble the US played over Iraq and lost it. Now Iraq was paying the heavy
price. Regime change in Iraq resulted into a failure.502 Change in the Middle East would
only be negotiated when the West would be ready to talk directly with Hamas, Hizbollah,
Muslim Brotherhood and the Iranian government. For, somebody might like it or not, but
it was these organizations that currently represented mainstream opinion in the Middle
East.503
The Governing Council of Iraq had serious flaws from the very beginning. It
faced image problem due to the inclusion of controversial Iraqi exiles, especially persons
like Ahmad Chalabi. Secondly, CPA delayed the creation of popular representation and
legitimate body. Thirdly, its members (GCs) failed to develop their constituencies.
Mostly, they remained out of Iraq.504 Paul Bremer never met Ayatollah Ali Sistani, the
most respected Shia religious leader in Iraq. Sistani asked Bremer not to appoint
members of the governing council. Rather they must be elected through general elections
by the free will of the people. Bremer rejected Sistani’s call and appointed governing
council instead, in utter violation of principles of democracy. This non-elected body
framed the future constitution of the country against the wishes of the Iraqi people. It was
against basic principles of democracy. Sistani did not endorse such a rule as legitimate
and democratic.505 There was a widely held belief among Iraqis that governing council
500 Elie Kedourie. Democracy and Arab Political Culture. (Washington DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1992), 29
501 Jones, Negotiating Change, 9502 Ibid, 8503 Ibid, 9504 Larry Diamond. “What Went Wrong in Iraq”, Foreign Affairs. (September/October, 2004)505 Larry Diamond. Squandered Victory: The American Occupation and the Bungled Effort to
Bring Democracy to Iraq. (New York: Time Books, 2005), 40
154
was actually composed of “US puppets”. It eroded its credibility. Yet governing council
members formed “core” of the successive government. Thus foundations of Iraqi
democracy, if any, were extremely deficient as it did not reflect popular feelings.506 The
promotion of democracy in Iraq remained rhetoric only. The declared causes were not
real.507
On the basis of above cited empirical evidence, it could be safely said that the
compelling reasons of US war on Iraq, WMDs and Iraq’s links with terrorism, lacked
empirical evidence. Particularly, the rhetoric of promotion of democracy in Iraq was a
post-hoc rationale. None of the three stated reasons of US invasion of Iraq in 2003 proved
true. They mainly remained rhetoric and part of Bush Administration propaganda
campaign in the run-up to war. The Administration had hidden agenda to pursue (Amin,
2016). Now the question arose, if there had been a contradiction between stated
objectives of invasion and US operational policy in Iraq, then what was the explanation
of Iraq War? What were the operational objectives of the US invasion of Iraq? This
constituted the most important part of this dissertation and subject of the next chapter.
Chapter Five
The Operational Objectives5.1 Offensive Realist Model:This chapter constituted the second most important part of this dissertation in line with
the logic of offensive realism. The argument built in this chapter was that the operational
US-Iraq policy, particularly from 2003-2008, fitted the assumptions of offensive realism.
Empirical evidence in detail had been provided to prove the case. The US policy during
the period under study was one of “power maximization” in accordance with theory of
offensive realism, and if possible, the establishment of “global hegemony”. In an era of
uni-polarity, 9/11 provided a big opportunity to the Bush Administration. The
administration successfully exploited the opportunity to increase its “share of world
power” and, as an offshore balancer, to remove its rival from power in the Middle East.
506 Jones, Negotiating Change, 252507 Interview with Dr. Tahir Amin (Ex. Head, Dept. of International Relations, Quaid-i-Azam
University, Islamabad) by the Researcher. Islamabad. June 16, 2016
155
The unending cycle of wars would continue in the new millennium. The basic
reason for this was that great powers that shaped world political system lived under an
environment of mutual fear and distrust. There had been continuous competition for
power among them. The ultimate objective of a great power had been to attain the
position of a hegemon in the international political system. For the dominance
guaranteed its survival. Consequently, great powers were “fated to clash” because they
always competed for a comparative advantage at the cost of others.508
Great powers, with no exception, always competed for “power maximization”.
Simply speaking they had been “power maximizers”. Their overriding objective had been
to maximize their “share of global power” at the cost of other states. Their final objective
had been to attain the position of a “hegemon” within the international political system.
Great powers had never been “status quo” powers and they were always dissatisfied with
the current configuration of power in the world political system. They always cherished
“revisionist” intentions. They used force to alter the contemporary balance of power in
their favor, most specifically, if practically possible, at a payable price.509
Sometimes, for great powers, the revisionist moves were too risky entailed by
high costs. Under such situation, they waited for favorable circumstances to come. They
constantly scan the horizon and looked for “opportunities” to increase their “share” of
global power. This endless pursuit of power never ended, unless, they achieved their
ultimate goal of a “hegemon” within the contemporary international political system.
Since none of the great powers was likely to attain that position, however, the
international political system was condemned to “permanent great power competition.”510
In other words “great powers are primed for offense.” Great powers perform two
functions. They exploited opportunities to increase their own share of world power. They
also checked rival powers to gain the same advantage.511
Within the international political system “fates” of all states, irrespective of their
power fundamentally depended on the “decision and actions” of great powers. In this
nuclear age, a great power must be armed with nuclear weapons and powerful
508 Mearsheimer, Tragedy of Great Power, xi-xii509 Mearsheimer, Tragedy of Great Power, 2510 Ibid511 Ibid, 3
156
conventional forces.512 It had been a distinctive character of great powers that they
miscalculated, time and again, and their decisions were based on “wrong judgments”.513
Great powers, as regional hegemons, did not like peer competitors and at the same time,
acting as offshore balancers, prevented potential regional hegemons to achieve that status
in other regions of the globe. Such aspirants, from the stand point of great powers, could
be potential trouble makers. Great powers could go to great lengths to safeguard current
configuration of power in other regions of the world.514
Offensive realism consisted of five basic assumptions. Firstly, international
political system was based on “anarchy” as an “ordering principle”. It meant international
political system consisted of sovereign states having no supra-state controlling authority
over them. Secondly, some “inherent offensive military capability” was wedded in great
powers. They were mutually dangerous competitors. Great powers could “hurt each
other” and at the same time, if possible “destroy each other”. Thirdly, states could never
trust in other states “intentions”.
States never cherished fixed intentions and they could be changed overnight. The
most important thing about intentions was their uncertainty. There had been number of
causes of aggression among states. Rival states could be motivated by any of them at any
given time. Fourthly, like all states existence was the “top most priority” of great powers.
Survival dominated other interests of a great power. Other interests become meaningless
if existence of a great power was jeopardized. Fifthly, like all the states at a given time,
major powers, with no exception, behave in international system as “rational” actors.
They thought strategically about the priorities of rival states. They also rationally thought
about the “outcomes” of their actions and their rival’s actions. Taken together, these five
assumptions created “formidable external environment” of great powers wedded with
great incentives to think and act offensively in relation to each other. Under such
conditions “international political environment” was characterized by “fear, self- help
and power maximization.”515
On the basis of these five assumptions we could understand great power behavior
in international politics. Great power relationship was characterized by fear and 512 Mearsheimer, Tragedy of Great Power, 5513 Ibid, 38514 Ibid, 41515 Mearsheimer, Tragedy of Great Power, 30-32
157
suspicion. There was no room for mutual trust. They always anticipated war. Fear had
been the real motivating force in international politics. It led to dangerous competition
among states. States had to ensure their own existence. They were vulnerable to dangers
in world politics as there was “absence of central authority” to ensure their survival. The
system was based on “self-help. States made alliances, though temporarily, for their
survival. Great powers almost always acted in self-interest. It “pays to be selfish” in
international politics. Great powers feared their rival power’s intentions. In the self-help
system, great powers quickly understood that their survival could be guaranteed only
after gaining “hegemony” in the system. Consequently, they pursued “hegemony” in the
system.516
They constantly scan the horizon and looked for opportunities to change the world
balance of power in their own favor at the expense of their rival powers. Simply
speaking, great powers cherished “aggressive and offensive” intentions (Ibid: 34). John
Mearsheimer, the offensive realist, was of the opinion that only a “misguided great
power” would lose opportunities to become “hegemon” within the system. They did not
behave as “status quo powers” unless they became predominant power in the system. In
this process they even “lie and cheat” and use naked force, if necessary, to gain the
advantage over others in their favor. For them, their “best defense lay in a good
offense.”517 It was clear, Mearsheimer argued, that great powers were “power
maximizers” and with no doubt it was the only “currency of survival in an anarchic
world.”518 Comparatively, powerful great powers behaved more aggressively in the
international political system as they had more military capability to gain advantage.519
The assumptions of offensive realism were “equally true for all great powers.”520
As was the case with all social science theories, there were limits to offensive
realism. Social science theories suffered from anomalies as, for practical reasons, they
simplified complex social phenomenon in two ways. They emphasized some factors,
while at the same time, omitted others. One of the basic principles of offensive realism
was that “systemic factors” shaped the behavior of states. Offensive realism emphasized
516 Ibid, 32-33517 Mearsheimer, Tragedy of Great Power, 36518 Ibid519 Ibid, 37520 Ibid, 54
158
“anarchy and distribution of power” within international political system as the most
important factors to explain international politics. While it paid little consideration to
individual decision makers and domestic politics. Sometimes, the omitted elements,
played central role in decision-making process of states. The factor of “indeterminacy of
offensive realism” was another problem of the theory. It did not answer all the questions
arising in international politics. Under such conditions, other theories supplemented it.
The theory explained how great powers conducted their foreign policy in the past, and
how would they behave in future.521
America had been a “liberal” state. American leadership always presented conflict
and war as a “moral crusade”. Most people in America disliked realism because realism
was at odds with fundamental American values known as American Creed. Most
Americans tended to see America as a benign force in world politics. For rival powers,
American leadership used derogatory terms like “evil empire” and “axis of evil”. The
pronouncements of American decision makers had been always “heavily couched in
liberalism”. However, in privacy, without any exception, they always spoke in “realist”
language. They thought and acted according to realist principles.522 American foreign
policy usually followed realist logic. There had been a “discernible gap between
leadership rhetoric and real policy”. The United States spoke in liberal language but acted
according to realist dictates. Intelligent observers, the worldover, understood this
tendency in US foreign policy.523
The US imposed unilateral and preemptive war on Iraq in March 2003, ignoring
UN. Later on, on the basis of empirical evidence, the stated reasons of the war were
discredited. On the eve of US War on Iraq in March 2003, the US context consisted of
three elements. America was “too powerful, confident of its military capability, and also
worried about its national security”. It was a fearful context. It was a dangerous
combination of “hubris and anxiety” that led to Iraq war.524 Iraq became a case study of
the application of offensive realism.525
521 Mearsheimer, Tragedy of Great Power, 10-11522 Ibid, 22-25523 Ibid, 26
524 Ari Shavit. “White Man’s Burden”, Ha’aretz, May 4, 2003525 Interview with Dr. M. Islam
159
It was under this context that US invaded Iraq in March 2003. The following
factors, in combination, made the US war on Iraq in 2003 an excellent case study of
offensive realist model. The US conduct in war on terror, especially in case of Iraq, could
be analyzed according to the principles of offensive realism. The US unilateral and
preemptive invasion of Iraq was made under “The US Grand Strategy”- the new
theoretical foundations for conducting US foreign policy in war on terror. The new
offensive theoretical foundations were laid down in this respect. This chapter analyzed
these new theoretical foundations along with the operational objectives of the US war on
Iraq.
5.2 The US Grand Strategy: The Bush Administration introduced new theoretical basis in its conduct of war on terror.
It worked as a blueprint for over- all US foreign policy. These offensive principles were
as followed:
5.2.1 Maintenance of Unipolarity:
To begin with the US wanted to keep its predominant position in the post-Cold War
period. The US wanted a world without competitors in 21st century. The US also wanted
to keep military predominance beyond challenges. The President made this point in his
West Point speech in June, 2002. In 21st century the US would maintain “unchallengeable
military forces” to manage world order.526
5.2.2 New Analysis of Global Threats:
In the contemporary world “new type of global threats” had emerged. They were coming
from small groups of international terrorists. In some cases, perhaps, they were in
collusion with outlaw states. These terrorists might acquire WMD. The terrorists could
not be appeased. They could not also be deterred. The Bush Administration believed
there was no other way to deal with them but only their elimination.527
5.2.3 Irrelevance of Theory of Deterrence:
In this age of terrorism, theory of deterrence had become irrelevant believed the Bush
Administration. The theory was no more viable. The new threats were coming from
terrorists who had no home addresses. The threat was coming from non-state actors. They
526 Ikenberry, America’s Imperial Ambition, 44-60527 Ibid, 50
160
could not be deterred either because they were willing to die. The only effective strategy
against them was “offensive”.528
5.2.4 Recasting the Terms of Sovereignty:
The terrorists did not respect international borders and sovereignty of states. There were
countries that harbored these terrorists. They did so either by consent or they were too
weak to take actions against these terrorists. These states “forfeited their right to
sovereignty” believed President Bush. If possessed, these “rogue states” might deliver
WMD to terrorists. America had the right to take action against these states. These
countries would be held responsible for the developments within their borders. The Bush
Administration decided to apply this provocative principle on global level.529
5.2.5 No Room for Multilateral Institutions:
For the Bush Administration, multilateral institutions like UN had outgrown their utility.
They had become outdated and obsolete. They were obstructionist. The US would
operate on its own terms in the system.530
5.2.6 The Bush Doctrine-A Blueprint for Dominance/ Hegemony:
The Bush doctrine fundamentally consisted of three elements.
(i) Preemption
(ii) Unilateralism
(iii) Regime Change
In his state of the Union Address on January 29, 2002, about fourteen months before the
US war on Iraq, President George W. Bush said that his great objective was the
elimination of threats coming from terrorists and absolutist-dictators that pursued
weapons of mass destruction. These absolutist regimes and terrorists constituted what he
termed as “axis of evil”. Iraq was hostile to the US interests and supported international
terrorists. He included Iran, Iraq, and North Korea in his “axis of evil”.531
The President further said, grave dangers were gathering around America and we
could not wait for them to strike on America.532 Bob Woodward cited Charles
528 Ibid, 51529 Gaddis, Grand Strategy in Second Term, 2-15530 Meena Bose, and Rosanna Perotti. From Cold War to New World Order: The Foreign Policy of
George HW Bush. Vol. 393. Greenwood Publishing Group, 2002531 George W. Bush. “President’s State of the Union Address”, U.S. Capitol, Washington D.C.:
January 29, 2002532 Bush, State of the Union Address, 2002
161
Krauthammer’s comments on President’s address in the Washington post. Krauthammer
commented that “the speech was all about Iraq”. There had been “serious discussion” in
the Bush Administration on what to do about Iraq. That discussion was over now. The
address was but just short of a “declaration of war” on Iraq.533
In the following days, it became clear that America was developing plans for a
war on Iraq in 2003.534 To the “axis of evil” speech Europe reacted immediately. The
Europeans were worried about the possible extension of the war against terror. Chris
Patten, European Union Commissioner for international relations commented on the
speech as “absolutist and simplistic”.535 A British columnist, Hugo Young, called the
speech as American “triumphalism”.536
There was big criticism in Europe. Colin Powell reacted negatively to this
European criticism. Reacting to European criticism Richard Perle wrote that America
would protect herself against terrorism. We would, if necessary, “leave friends and go
alone”. Richard Perle also argued in New York Times that America could not win war on
terror if Saddam Hussein continued to rule Iraq. The US “must overthrow” him.537
Daalder and Lindsay in their book, America Unbound: The Bush Revolution in
Foreign Policy argued that President Bush came to power with a clear concept of use of
hard power through unilateralist approach in foreign policy.538 Condoleezza Rice, the
National Security Advisor criticized Clinton Administration’s internationalist agenda and
asserted that the new Administration would start from the firm grounds of the US
national interests.539 The essence of the matter was that the challenges were essentially
military in nature and that only a military power could resolve them.540
With the coming of unipolar world, Samuel Huntington argued that the US
needed new strategic doctrine in accordance with the new international political
environment. Mel Gurtov citing Charles Krauthammer wrote, about Saddam Hussein
533 Woodward, Plan Of Attack, 95534 Thom Shanker, and David E. Sanger. “US Envisions Blueprint on Iraq Including Big Invasion
Next Year.” New York Times. April 28, 2002, A1535 Jonathan Freedland. “Patten Lays into Bush’s America.” The Guardian. February 9, 2002
536 Hugo Young. “Only American National Interest Counts Now.” The Guardian. January 31, 2002537 Crockatt, America Embattled, 157-158538 Ivo H. Daalder, and James M. Lindsay. America Unbound: The Bush Revolution in Foreign
Policy. (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institute, 2003)539 Rice, National Interest, 60-62 540 Daalder and Lindsay, America Unbound, 2, 31-35
162
after First Gulf War, America squandered away unipolar moment to oust Saddam from
power in Baghdad. The US should have done that.541
A radical version of realism was emerging that it was the proper time for the US
to impose its power as well as its values on the world.542 The Bush Administration
developed a new doctrine regarding the use of US military forces based on fear after
9/11.543 David Dunn argued about the Bush Doctrine that it was a combination of four
elements “realism, American exceptionalism, unilateralism and threat inflation.”544
(Dunn, 2003). For the first time the Bush Doctrine was enunciated in President Bush’s
speech at West Point in June, 2002. Later on, the doctrine was incorporated in the
National Security Strategy President Bush of September 2002. The doctrine was based on
two pillars. Firstly, America would maintain its military supremacy at any cost; secondly,
America arrogated the “right to preemptive action” under the cover of self defense.545
Taken together, the doctrine carried two implications. First, American sovereignty
took precedence over international obligations and treaties. Second, sovereignty of all
other states on the globe was subject to the Bush doctrine.546 Spreading democracy
worldwide was one of the stated objectives of the National Security Strategy. In reality it
meant America would prevail.547 The key threats were seen coming from terrorists, weak
states, and rogue states. The US administration decided to counter them through a
combination of two factors, strong military forces and American values and. For the
President Bush the threat was unprecedented and so was the American response.548 The
basic thinking enshrined in the Bush doctrine was that the US would act before enemies
did.549
541 Gurtov, Superpower on Crusade, 27542 Ibid543 Randeep Ramesh (Eds.). The War We Could Not Stop: The Real Story of Battle of Iraq.
(London: Faber and Faber, 2003), 3-22544 David H. Dunn. “Myths Motivations and Misunderestimations: The Bush Administration and
Iraq”, International Affairs 79, no 2, (2003), 279-297545 Soros, Bubble of American Supremacy, 11546 Ibid547 Ibid548 Jeffery Record. Dark Victory: America’s Second War against Iraq. (Annapolis, MD: Naval
Institute Press, 2004), 32-44549 The National Security Strategy of United States of America. (Washington D.C.: GPO,
September 2002), iii, 1
163
Another policy tied to the Bush doctrine was outlined in the 2001known as policy
of regime change.550 The Bush doctrine did not emphasize on immediate threat. The
doctrine emphasized on action rather.551 The problem with the controversial doctrine was
that the US made two separate standards of conducting foreign policy. One was for the
US. Other for rest of the world.552 The expression “axis of evil” was deliberately used
equating Iraq with Axis Powers of WWII.553 The underlying objective was to mobilize
public support for Iraq war.554 President Bush put Iraq on the top of his security agenda.
In case of Clinton it was in the last of his list.555
Washington destroyed dual policy of containment and deterrence as being
outdated. President Bush invaded Iraq on the basis of “faulty intelligence and
questionable assumptions”. America imposed “preventive war” on Iraq.556 The Bush
Doctrine mainly consisted of three elements preemption, unilateralism, and regime
change.557 In an era of unipolarity, being a great America tried to restructure international
political system in accordance with its values and interests by the use of military force.
President Bush took it as a US right. Iraq became first victim of the doctrine.558 The Bush
doctrine made Iraq a case study of the application of offensive realism.559
i) Preemption:
In his address to the graduating cadets at West Point, New York, on June 1, 2002,
President Bush announced his “doctrine of preemption” for the first time. Later on, the
doctrine was incorporated in his National Security Strategy of September the same year.
The State of the Union Address 2002 identified the possible targets. The President was
worried about the grave dangers being presented from a fatal combination of religious
“radicalism and modern technology” of warfare. The cold war strategies of “deterrence
and containment” were no more viable in this age of terrorism.
550 Quadrennial Defense Review. (Washington D.C.: GPO, 2001)551 Lawrence Freedman. Deterrence. (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004), 94552 Ibid, 84-108553 David Frum. The Right Man: An Inside Account of the Surprise Presidency of George W. Bush.
(London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 2003), 224-245554 Pullan, US Intervention Policy, 181555 Bill Clinton. My Life. (USA: Vintage Books, 2005), 935556 George A. Lopez, and David Cortright. “Containing Iraq: Sanctions Worked”, Foreign Affairs
83, no 4, (2004), 103557 Gurtov, Superpower on Crusade, 2558 Soros, Bubble of American Supremacy, 13559 Interview With Dr. Noman
164
Containment had outlived its utility because absolutist regimes secretly could
deliver WMD to the terrorists. America could not win war against terror “on the
defensive”. America had no choice but to become “forward-looking and resolute”. The
President said, America must be “ready for preemptive action” to defend our sovereignty.
In the speech, President warned the rogue states. They would “pay dearly”.560
The doctrine of “preemption” was “a shift with profound implications”. It was a
“dangerous example”. The new doctrine poised for unilateral invasions of other
countries.561 The doctrine declared US intention to “maintain its hegemony”, certainly by
using powerful US military forces.562 John Ikenberry argued about the doctrine and NSS
as the “basis for maintaining US unipolarity”. America wanted a world with no “peer
competitor”. The doctrine disregarded multilateral institutions. Now they carried “little
value”. It presented US as a revisionist state. It left the US less secure.563 The doctrine
was a blueprint for “preventive not preemptive war”. The concept of preventive war was
actually a war crime.564 President Bush pursued policy of “anticipatory self-defense”. It
was a policy similar to the policy of “imperial Japan” which Japan employed at Pearl
Harbor. Then Japan lived in infamy. Today, America lived in infamy.565
Historian Arthur Schlesinger further argued that the “global wave of sympathy”
for the US after 9/11 had ended. It had been replaced by a “global wave of hatred” for the
US. It was the result of American “arrogance and militarism” argued the historian on the
eve of Iraq war.566 Richard Falk, an international law expert argued that Iraq war was just
like German attack which started WWII in 1939. That was the crime under “international
law” for which German leaders were indicated and punished at Nuremberg trials.567
It became clear that Washington was determined to maintain US world primacy
ignoring the UN. Later on, rationale of the war was discounted. Then, the Bush
Administration revised its basis of engagement in Iraq. The new rules, though self made,
560 Bush, West Point Speech, 2002561 Woodward, Plan of Attack, 133562 Chomsky, American Power, 11563 Ikenberry, America’s Imperial Ambition, 44-60564 Noam Chomsky. “Preventive War: The Supreme Crime”, Z Net Interactive. (August 11, 2003) 565 Arthur Schlesinger Jr. “Good Foreign Policy a Casualty of War.” Los Angeles Times. March 23,
2003, M1566 Schlesinger, Good Foreign Policy, 2003567 Richard Falk. “Resisting the Global Domination Project.” Frontline 20, no. 8, (2003), 12-25
165
would give the right to the US to act against a hostile regime that was intended to develop
WMD. Only the US would decide about the potential intentions of such a regime.568
The US would rule the world through the naked of use of her military forces.
Henceforth the US would have the right to strike preemptively.569 It meant preventive
action and not preemptive.570 The US preemptive war on Iraq was interpreted as the US
“right to aggression”.571 The doctrine of preemption was a fundamental departure from
traditional US policy. It unleashed a new era in international relations with profound
implications on war and peace.572 The preemptive wars had been a “practice” in US
foreign policy for a century in the “Western Hemisphere.”573
What Bush Administration advocating was, in fact, preventive war, an offensive
war fought to destroy enemy. The US Department of Defense defined “preventive war”
as a war though not “imminent but inescapable”. The delay would be dangerous.574 The
doctrine strongly implied the concept of “limited sovereignty” even for unfriendly
countries.575 Lemann interviewed Richard Haas in the first term of President Bush. In
response to a question Haas said in US war on terror, the states that “failed to meet their
obligations forfeited their right to sovereignty”. He further said that under these
circumstances other sates, including America, retained their “right to preventive self-
defense”. America could act in anticipation. It was a question of “when not if.”576
9/11 initiated a fundamental revision in the US national security strategy. The
underlying belief was that contemporary international norms did not protect US interests.
The new approach was followed by a “preemptive” policy. America, in reality, followed
“preventive war strategy” in invading Iraq in March, 2003.577 The Iraq war was imposed
on the basis of false intelligence. The war reinforced great concerns of the world related
to the use of US military power without restraints. The doctrine made it clear that 568 Guy Dinmore, James Harding, and Cathy Newman, “Iraqi Arms Finds Not Likely, Says US
Official”, Financial Times (London), (May 3, 2003), 1569 Chomsky, Imperial Ambition, 2570 Ibid571 “The Bush Administration's Doctrine of Preemption (and Prevention): When, How,
Where?”CFR.org. Council on Foreign Relations, 1 Feb. 2004572 Kolko, Age of War, 129573 Ibid, 126574 DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated terms. Department of Defense, April 12, 2002, in
Jeffery Record Bounding the Global War on Terrorism, 49575 Gurtov, Superpower on Crusade, 41576 Ibid577 Walt, Taming American Power, 58-59
166
America would “impose preventive war” whenever it decided, most importantly, on the
basis of its own interpretation of empirical evidence not with standing concerns of the
world.578
The US preventive invasion of Iraq did more “harm than good.”579 Lawrence
Freemand, a British Scholar argued about the ambiguity of situations on which doctrine
of preemption could be applied. Other states might use the doctrine as “rationalization for
aggression.”580 Critics raised three main objections on preemption; the doctrine was used
against Iraq in violation of international law and norms, preemptive action required that it
must be taken after reliable intelligence, and thirdly, the world had ended up as a more
dangerous place. Still the US applied that doctrine in the name of its own security, on the
basis of its own threat perception, and its own choice of time and decision.581
The “doctrine of preemption” reflected American strategy for 21st century, the
“US imperialism” which other nations could not accept for being dangerous. Dan Plesch
argued, Iraq was the first target and China the last one.582 The National Security Strategy
of President Bush based on preemption was a blueprint for spreading American values.583
The doctrine and its application on Iraq created greatest divide between the US and its
NATO allies since the end of WWII. It was a big disaster.584 Peter Boenisch, Helmut
Kohl’s press secretary, called doctrine of preemption a “crime”.585
The war marked a major change in the behavior of the US, the “world hegemon”
and in the international norms that dealt with world politics since the end of WWII. The
US war on Iraq adversely affected war on terror and the relevance of international law
and UN. It also negatively affected NATO, the stability of the Middle East region, and
the Persian Gulf. It also affected role of oil in the international political economy.586
The war initiated a “qualitative change in the coercive methods of American
foreign policy” in the Middle East. The doctrine of preemption invoked the “US right to
use military forces” to overcome the resistance, if any, in the way of hegemony through
578 Walt, Taming American Power, 59-60579 Jackson and Towle, Temptations of Power, 1580 Freedman, Deterrence, 4581 Jentleson, American Foreign Policy, 370-371582 Woodward, Plan of Attack, 203583 Black, Great Powers, 209584 Shawcross, Allies, 72-73585 Ibid, 103586 Fawn and Hinnebusch, Iraq War, vii
167
preventive wars. It is important to note that some authors had cited Paul O’ Neil,
Treasury Secretary and Richard Clarke, Bush advisor on terrorism, saying that an attack
on Iraq was discussed in the “first-meeting of National Security Council” in the aftermath
of 9/11 tragedy.587
The Iraq war was illegal. It was illegal because it was not supported by UN.588
The words preemptive actions were carefully chosen. The application of the word
preemptive had been driven by solid empirical evidence. The missiles in Cuba could be
cited as reference to preemptive. But here the use of the word preemptive was very close
to the concept of prevention. Here in case of Iraq real basis of prevention was
“suspicion”.589 There was only, if any, just one percent probability of hard evidence. The
Cheney doctrine stated it must be treated as certainty in the US reaction. The war was
launched from the brain of the Vice President.590
General Tony Zinni ® wrote that he was known as “outspoken” in US military
force. He further said that many of our Generals did not speak the truth. In the US war on
Iraq he saw “negligence and irresponsibility” on the part of decision makers; at worst he
also saw it was “lying and corruption”. We went to Iraq under “false rationales”…there
was lack of planning as well as alienation of American allies. All these things forced me
to speak the truth.591 Since September 20, 2002, the Bush Administration officially
adopted a new approach to “global governance” an “imperial posture” known as the Bush
Doctrine. The US invasion of Iraq in March, 2003 was an “unprovoked” war against
Iraq.592 Bob Woodward quoted Senator Edward Kennedy saying that it was nothing less
than “21st century American imperialism”. The world could not and should not accept
it.593
The policy which President Bush followed in Iraq war was more than preemption.
In reality it was prevention. The difference between preemptive war and preventive war
was one of legality. First was legal war while second one, an illegal act of aggression. A
587 Ibid, 290-292588 Steele, Defeat, 6589 Suskind, One Percent Doctrine, 150590 Ibid, 213591 Tom Clancy, Gen Tony Zinni (retd) and Tony Koltz, Battle Ready. (New York: G.P.Putnam’s
Sons, 2004), 426-427592 Fouskas and Gokay, New American Imperialism, 3593 Woodward, Plan of Attack, 203
168
preemptive war was legal under international law under the special set of circumstances.
International law did not recognize preventive war.594 This policy could be a greater
threat to the US national security than the actual use of WMD by any of the so called
rogue powers. This was “preventive war” as well.595The most important question was
whether America was more secure after two wars-Afghanistan and Iraq?
The US war on Iraq under the cover of the Bush doctrine of “preemption” was
illegal. This was a view given by overwhelming majority of international lawyers. In the
view of Ed Firmage, professor of law, university of Utah College of Law, that this war
was “unconstitutional” that it was imposed in gross violation of international law, and
greatly threatened US national security. America was not attacked by Iraq. The “war
constituted a war crime.”596 The late US supreme Court Justice Robert Jackson, who
acted as prosecutor at Nuremberg trials said whatever might be the case an “aggressive
war was illegal act” come what may.597
(ii) Unilateralism:
Unilateralism was a condition which referred to “go-alone” approach in foreign policy of
a state. It also referred to a situation where a state acted with other states but on its own
terms.598 States acted alone because they did not want to bind themselves by the
standardized principles of conduct. For them such principles might be inimical and
against their national interest.599 During 19th and early 20th centuries, Britain was the
dominant power on world political stage. In post-WWII era, the US replaced Great
Britain as a dominant power in international political system.600
George W. Bush’s approach to foreign policy, especially during his first term,
was largely unilateralist, if the President could afford.601 The unilateralist foreign policy
strategy of the US was mainly rooted in the following six bases. With the end of the cold
war and subsequent disintegration of USSR, the bipolar system also ended. The US
594 Juhasz, Bush Agenda, 44-45595 James H. Lebovic, Deterring International Terrorism and Rogue States: US National Security
Policy after 9/11. (London: Routledge, 2007), 9-10596 Geoffrey Leslie Simons. Future Iraq: US policy in reshaping the Middle East. (New Dehli: Viv
Books, 2006), 16-17597 Ibid598 Jentleson, American Foreign Policy, 259599 Malone and Khong, Unilateralism and US, 2-5600 Viotti and Kauppi, International Relations Theory, 231 601 Jentleson, American Foreign Policy, 259
169
remained the sole superpower. To borrow Charles Krauthammer’s words, it was the
“unipolar moment”. America possessed powerful military and globally domineering
economy. Democracy was in progress around the globe.602
No country in the world history ever dominated international political system of
sovereign states the way America did.603 Indeed some authors called it an age of
“American empire”. Richard Perle advocated unilateralist approach in the US foreign
policy in war against terror. He cited two reasons for this approach-price of a collective
judgment in an alliance and collective decision making. Coalitions and alliances
restrained US freedom of action. He delivered this speech in November, 2001 about
eighteen months before the Iraq war.604
The first basis of the US unilateralism was unipolarity. Condoleezza Rice argued
during 2000 election campaign that power was the most important ingredient of the
national interest. Majority of Americans were not “comfortable with the concept of
power politics” and great power behavior.605 Clinton administration was criticized for its
inaction. “American power” was the “inescapable reality” of contemporary era.606
American foreign policy should reflect and sustain this “primacy”.607 Some realists
opposed US war on Iraq as it was against the logic of power politics. John J.
Mearsheimer argued that states always pursued and would always continue to seek
opportunities at the cost of other states. They also tried their best to deny any comparative
advantage to other states.608 The US needed to seek and maintain its primacy in
international political system but in ways that were acceptable to other states.609
The third basis of US unilateralism was that the US democracy at home was being
undermined by the multilateral institutions and international agreements. The decisive
issue which America faced was how to protect US sovereignty against the onslaught of
602 Krauthamer, Charles. “The Unipolar Movement Revisited”, The National Interest. 70, 2002-03: 5-17
603 Brooks and Wohlforth, American Primacy, 2002604 Perle, US Must Strike, 2001605 Rice, National Interest, 2000606 William Kristol, and Robert Kagan. “The Present Danger”, National Interest 59, (Spring 2000),
67607 Christopher Layne. “From Preponderance to Offshore Balancing: America’s Future Grand
Strategy after the Cold War”, International Security 22, no 1, (summer 1997), 86-124608 John J. Mearsheimer. “The False Promise of International Institutions”, International Security
19, no 3, (winter 1994-95), 12609 Walt, Taming American Power, 217
170
multilateralism?610 The issues mostly debated in America were about the jurisdiction of
International Criminal Court over American soldiers, or American soldiers operating
under UN in peace-keeping missions. The debate was not only about the foreign policy. It
was about the US constitutional limitations. Historian Arthur Schlesinger argued that
unilateralism was the oldest tradition of US foreign Policy.611 Unilateralists took their
concept from “American exceptionalism”. It was neither good for the US nor for the rest
of the globe. They constituted “conservative wing” of the Republican Party.612
Inefficacy of multilateral institutions was the fourth basis of opting for
unilateralist approach in US foreign Policy. If going through multilateralist way, the US
would face loss of freedom of action in vital foreign policy issues. UN would get veto
power over US interests. Mearsheimer was of the view that multilateral institutions
carried little weight, if any, on the conduct of states. Thus they would not promote
stability in international political system, during post-Cold War era. This was one of the
principal reasons that President Bush opted for unilateralist-invasion of Iraq in 2003.613
So many countries with diverse national interests participated in the process jointly.
Mainly they hindered quick action. The decisions were made on the basis of one-country,
one-vote. The US carried equal weight with Luxemburg and Ecuador. The problem with
international law was that it was deeply flawed.614
The fifth basis of US unilateralist policy was the concept of US national interest.
Much emphasis on global interests actually relegated national interest to a second-order
level, argued Rice.615 In reality, global interest, as such, could not make justification for
major foreign policy decisions and action.616 That was what on the basis of which
unilateralists criticized Clinton Administration for its policy on global issues such as the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the Kyoto Protocol on global warming, and
International Criminal Court. These were not in American interest.617 In run-up to Iraq
610 Jentleson, American Foreign Policy, 263611 Ibid612 Ibid613 Mearsheimer, False Promise, 1994-95614 John R. Bolton. “Unilateralism is Non-Isolationism in American Foreign Relations” In Gwyn
Prins (ed.), Understanding Unilateralism in American Foreign Relations. London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2000: 81
615 Rice, National Interest, 2000616 Ibid617 Ibid
171
war Bush Administration criticized humanitarian military interventions as “social work”.
In these cases vital US national interests were not-involved. America could not commit
US troops for social work.618
The concept of the US as a “benevolent hegemon” was the last basis of US
unilateralism. The US occupied unprecedented powerful position, both in strength and
influence, the human history had ever seen. This position must be used for the “spread of
American values.”619 The US must use its dominant position to expand liberal world
order.620 The US had to play the “unique role of spreading American values across the
globe” through the use of American military force.621 Some war hawks held powerful
positions in the Bush Administration. Others influenced through media and think tanks.
The result was American unilateral invasion of Iraq in 2003.
President George W. Bush’s foreign policy was a big departure from previous US
administrations. He was “skeptical of multilateral institutions” such as cold war alliances.
The president followed “go alone” foreign policy.622 In his drive to unilateralism,
President Bush formally removed his Bill Clinton’s “signature” from International
Criminal Court treaty and put great pressure on some other nations to reject the
international treaty on international criminal court.623
By September 2001, the President had already rejected Kyoto Protocol on global
warming, actively campaigned against international criminal court, also did the same to
Biological Weapons Convention, and also strongly opposed international convention on
landmines. On this unilateralist approach, Economist commented…which treaty did the
President like? In reality, the President opposed “multilateral” approach.624 9/11 tragedy
made President Bush a “War President” overnight and it strongly reinforced his
unilateralist approach to the US foreign policy.625
618 Micheal Mandelbaum. “Foreign Policy as Social Work”, Foreign Affairs 75, no 1, (January/February 1996), 16-32
619 National Security Strategy, 2002620 Richard K. Betts, “The Soft Underbelly of American Primacy: Tactical Advantages of
Terrorism”, Political Science Quarterly 117, no 1, (2002), 21621 Andrew J. Bacevich. The New American Militarism: How Americans Are Seduced by War.
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 75 622 Walt, Taming American Power, 31623 Ibid, 56
624 “Can Sanctions Be Smarter?” The Economist. May 26, 2001625 Walt, Taming American Power, 58
172
In his drive to unilateralism, President Bush even abrogated ABM Treaty of 1972
despite opposition from the US allies626 Condoleezza Rice, the National Security Advisor,
later on confirmed that the decision to enforce war on Iraq was made even before the US
went to UN for consultation. Failure to get fresh UN stamp did not slow the US drive to
war.627 The unilateralist turn in US foreign policy was, in fact, the result of some internal
developments in the US, which led to the electoral success of a political and ideological
coalition known as neoconservatives. This coalition had an overriding vision of a distinct
cultural tradition in America. This vision was based on a new “American nationalism”.
This type of nationalism emerged whenever Americans perceived themselves as a
universal nation, a people with a special mission to perform. American interests were
identified with the interests of the world.628
In its unilateral drive, Congress held back American dues to UN and imposed
unilateral measures over IMF, World Bank and WTO.629 The Republican President and
the Republican majority in the Congress after November 2002, the midterm elections,
took an activist global perspective and left the multilateral approach in favor of
unilateralism in American foreign policy to pursue national interests.630 With little regard
to the opposition coming from majority of the UNSC, particularly from France and
Germany the US decided to invade Iraq unilaterally.631 The unilateralism in American
foreign policy since 2000 was the outcome of a “complex process of redefinition of
political and cultural identity” of America.632
There had been a big increase in US defense budget after 9/11. In the year 2000,
the US defense budget was $295 billion. For the same year the combined respective
figure for both Russia and China was $100 billion. America spent $310 billion in 2001,
more than the sum total of next nine countries of the world. In the year 2005, the US
military spending had risen to $440 billion. The same expenditure for the year 2007 was
626 Walt, Taming American Power, 97627 Nicholas Leman. “How it came to War: When Did Bush Decide That He Had to Fight
Saddam?” The New Yorker. March 31, 2003: 36628 Fabrinni, United States Contested, 3-4629 Ibid, 10630 Ibid, 12-13631 Ibid632 P.T. McCartney. “American Nationalism and US Foreign Policy from September 11 to the Iraq
War”, Political Science Quarterly 119, no 3, (2004), 399-423
173
over $500. Such was the US unilateral drive after 9/11 tragedy.633 In its turn to
unilateralism President Bush departed from President Clinton who saw China as a
“strategic partner”. President Bush now saw China as a “rival rather than a partner.” 634
The doctrine asked for an unrestrained use of military force.635 Even friendly countries
were not immune from the doctrine.636
(iii) Regime Change:
The Bush Administration was unable to make a case for regime change in Iraq. The
Administration concocted a story about Iraq being an “imminent” threat. The
Administration became selective in picking the facts. In reality, Iraq had abandoned
WMD programs, and as a devastated country Iraq was not an imminent threat. The
intelligence agencies exaggerated Iraq’s military capabilities especially WMD. The
invasion was deliberately exaggerated on the basis of Saddam’s intentions. The war on
Iraq started unraveling immediately after the invasion by some personnel who were under
pressure to make the case of WMD possession.637 Two reporters concluded after
interviewing some important officials of the Bush Administration that “selective
information was deliberately floated” in media. The White House did not correct this
situation.638
Allegations on Iraq about aluminum tubes, yellow cake, and revelations from
Iraqi defectors were exaggerated. Joseph Wilson visited Niger on CIA’s behalf to
investigate about the “Yellow cake” issue, who wrote later on in New York Times and in
his memoirs. He criticized Administrations rationale about Iraq war.639 George Tenet
ultimately accepted blame for the “failure of intelligence” community.640 Ultimately, the
White House acknowledged failure of incorrect story about the “yellow cake”.641 The
administration claims about Iraq’s WMD, later on were discredited.642
633 Black, Great Powers, 209 634 Soros, Bubble of American Supremacy, 37-38635 Ikenberry, America’s Imperial Ambition, 44-60636 Gurtov, Superpower on Crusade, 42637 Nicholos D. Kristof. “Save our Spooks”, New York Times. May 30, 2003638 Barton Gellman, and Walter Pincus. “Depiction of Threat Outgrew Supporting Evidence”,
Washington Post. August 29, 2003639 Joseph Wilson, The Politics of Truth: Inside the Lies That Put the White House on Trial and
Betrayed My Wife's CIA Identity. Public Affairs, 2005640 Ibid641 David Sanger. “Bush Claim on Iraq Had Flawed Origin”, New York Times. July 8, 2003
174
Similar developments were going on in Great Britain. The BBC reported that intelligence
officials were compelled by the Blair government to “sex up” a report on the status of
Iraq’s WMD. The report said, among other things, that Iraq’s WMD could reach Britain
within a short span of “forty five minutes” only. Blair government used this report to
invade Iraq along with the US.643 The subsequent Parliamentary inquiries established that
the Blair government “ignored contradictory evidence and exaggerated the threat” of
Iraqi WMD. Blair participated in the war just to satisfy Bush Administration. In protest
Robin Cook, a cabinet member, resigned in March 2003. Later on, Cook wrote in his
memoirs that Blair participated in the war just to please President Bush.644
Blair government, in an utter deceit, kept dissenting opinion out of place and did
not make it available to the House of Commons committee on intelligence.645 Saddam
regime did not use WMD against the invading forces. It was a “big surprise”. On the
other hand, the invading forces did not find any WMD. The Bush Administration was
simply wrong about Saddam regimes intentions.646 It seemed, as if, the administration
“intentionally” kept the relevant information about the presumed al-Qaeda-Saddam
regime link out of place. The information given by high level al-Qaeda captives was
“deliberately kept out of the public reach.”647
The Al-Qaeda captives summarily rejected the hypothesis about al-Qaeda links
with Iraq. Osama bin Laden had “rejected collaboration” with Iraq, said the captives. The
US administration knew this information about “a year before the war” on Iraq. The
administration deliberately did not share the information with the public at large. The
administration knowingly did that. The careful and cautious language of NIE of 2002 was
ignored.648 This fictitious link between Iraqi regime and al-Qaeda was kept alive in public
statements as a rationale of war. President Bush told American people in September 2003
about the operational collaboration between Iraqi regime and al-Qaeda. Colin Powell, in 642 Judith Miller, and William J. Broad. "Some Analysts of Iraq Trailers Reject Germ Use." New York Times, 2003: A1
643 Sarah Lyall. “Blair Denies Distorted Reports on Iraq Weapons”, New York Times. May 31, 2003
644 Warren Hoge. “Inquiry Shows How Blair’s Inner Circle Made Case for Iraq War”, New York Times. August 24, 2003
645 Ibid646 James Conway, cited in James Dao, and Thom Shanker. "After the War: Evidence; Powell
Defends Information He Used to Justify Iraq War." New York Times. 2003, A6647 James Risen. “Captives Deny Al-Qaeda Worked with Baghdad”, New York Times. June 9, 2003648 Walter Pincus. “Bush Overstated Iraq-al-Qaeda Link”, Washington Post. June 23, 2003
175
his address to the UNSC in February 2003, alleged about the “sinister nexus” between
“Iraq and al-Qaeda” in terrorism.
After fall of the Saddam regime, the US weapons inspection team, after spending
two months in searching WMD in Iraq, returned empty handed.649 They were followed by
a bigger US inspection team consisted of 1400 experts headed by David Kay rather than
UN weapons inspectors. The US inspection team was known as Iraq Survey Group. The
team spent four months in Iraq in searching WMD.650 Ultimately, David Kay resigned.
Kay insisted that Iraq did not “possess WMD on the eve of war” due to UN inspections in
Iraq.651 Charles Duelfer reported back after extensive survey with the ISG. The result was
the same. No WMD were found in Iraq. The last weapons inspector left Iraq in early
2005.652
Both, Hans Blix and his successor, Demetrius Perricos, criticized US and Britain
for their culture of “hyping” in the run-up to Iraq war in relation to WMD issue. Hans
Blix compared the search for Iraq’s WMD with medieval “witch hunt”. Perricos came to
the same conclusion about the possession of WMD’s. It was hard to believe about the
presence of stockpiles in Iraq.653 Both, Hans Blix and David Kay argued that Iraq was not
an imminent threat on the eve of war. The Administration’s stand on Iraq’s WMD as
imminent threat was “fatally flawed”.654 Kay and George Tenet, the CIA director argued
before Congress that Iraq did not present an “imminent threat” and Tenet insisted that
CIA never saw Iraq as an imminent threat to the US, and its neighbors. However, both
agreed that the Administration’s decision to go to war against Iraq on the basis of
Saddam’s presumed intentions was right. Powell also agreed with this conclusion.655
However, Tenet resigned in June, 2004.
Everything taking into account, the presence of WMD in Iraq was a false issue.
The Bush Administration was not satisfied short of “regime change” in Iraq. The
administration “twisted the intelligence” even “lied” to the people about its real
649 Barton Gellman. “Frustrated US Arms Team to Leave Iraq”, Washington Post. May 11, 2003650 James Risen, and Judith Miller. “No Illicit Arms Found in Iraq, US Inspector Tells Congress”,
New York Times. October 3, 2003651 Richard W. Stevenson. “Iraq Illicit Arms Gone Before War, Inspector Insists”, New York
Times. January 24, 2004652 Gurtov, Superpower on Crusade, 84653 “Blix Decries Spin and Hype of Iraq Weapon Claims”, Reuters (London), September 18, 2003654 Gurtov, Superpower on Crusade, 84655 Gurtov, Superpower on Crusade, 84
176
objectives in Iraq war, and used the issue of presence of WMD in Iraq. Finally the theme
of spreading democracy in Iraq and the region was presented to manipulate public
opinion. The worst case scenario suited Bush Administration’s ambitions in the Middle
East region and the world at large. Mel Gurtov cited Ron Huisken, an Australian, who
contended that the Bush Administration went beyond “misusing the intelligence”.
Regime change in Iraq was part of a broader project. The Administration wanted to
project America’s unique position as the most powerful state in the world.656
Paul Wolfowitz conceded in an interview that the issue of Iraq’s WMD was used
for bureaucratic reasons “as it was the issue on which everyone could agree on.”657 Dick
Cheney, the Vice President, Rumsfeld, Rice and the President all were determined to
impose war on Iraq. The opposition was dubbed as “revisionist historians”.658 On the
basis of above cited empirical evidence it could safely be said that the Bush
Administration was determined to go to war against-Iraq for regime change. The
Congress hearings on Iraq started in August 2002. By then the US military forces were
actively involved in war planning on Iraq. The question was about the reason? By then, at
least, if not before, the President had finalized the decision to go to war. The empirical
evidence had been provided by a “secret memorandum” of July 23, 2002. The
memorandum was leaked to the British print media, and known as the Downing Street
Memo.
The memo provided irrefutable evidence that President Bush had decided about
the war about “eight months before” the actual invasion took place in March, 2003. The
memo was classified as “Secret and Strictly Personal UK Eyes only”. It was further
marked as “extremely sensitive”. The memorandum was related to a meeting between
Prime Minister Tony Blair and his top aides. The text of the memo said that Sir Richard
Wilson, the head of British intelligence, reported about his recent talks with the Bush
Administration officials. The war was seen as inevitable. President George W. Bush had
decided to topple Saddam regime in Iraq, through the use of military forces. The
conjunction between terrorism and WMD provided the sufficient justification for regime
change, and the “decision to invade Iraq had already been made”. Now facts and
656 Ibid, 85657 Paul Krugman. “Waggy Dog Stories”, New York Times. May 30, 2003658 Gurtov, Superpower on Crusade, 85
177
intelligence would be fixed around the decision. The Administration did not want to go
through UN route. They were least concerned about the aftermath of the war.659
The memorandum testified about the Bush policy on Iraq. The Administration
was committed to war. Nothing was going to divert or stop it. The memo further stated
that the US decision of regime change in Iraq was not legal. Iraqi regime was no more a
threat to its neighbors. The memo also stated that “the accounts of O’Neill and Richard
Clarke were correct”. These two men testified that the decision to go to war was made at
about “mid-2002”.660 The most important accusation President Bush put on Iraq in his
State of the Union Address was known as “sixteen-word fiasco”. The President accused
Saddam Hussein of buying significant quantities of uranium from Africa known as
“Yellow Cake”. The main theme presented in his speeches was that Iraq made a direct
threat to US security and interests.661
There were other important personnel of the Bush Administration who overstated
the Saddam threat. Powell in his speech to UNSC on February 5, 2003 accusing Iraqi
regime of having large amounts of chemical and biological materials and an active
nuclear weapons program. Dick Cheney followed the same line of argument. Cheney’s
sources of evidence were Iraqi exiles on US payroll. These exiles had their own political
ambitious. Ahmad Chalabi, as a source of information, was worthless.662 The Vice
President, Dick Cheney insisted that they had “irrefutable evidence” that Iraq was
actively pursuing its nuclear weapons program. Rice was also telling CNN the same
story.663
About two years later, the US Senate Committee on Intelligence criticized
intelligence agencies for “overstating Iraq’s WMD threat” in the NIE, October 2002. The
intelligence agencies “misinformed” national leadership by ignoring the country
evidence. The intelligence agencies were guilty of “group think”.664 Top officials of the
Bush Administration surely knew that General Hussain Kamel, incharge of Iraq’s WMD
659 “The Downing Street Memo”. Available at www.downingstreetmemo.com660 The Downing Street Memo661 Bush, UN Speech, September 12, 2002662 Douglas Jehl. “Agency Belittles Information Given by Iraq Defectors”, New York Times.
September 29, 2003663 David Barstow. “How the White House Embraced Disputed Iraq Arms Intelligence”, New York
Times. October 3, 2004664 “Report of The US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence”, July 9, 2004
178
program before defecting, had told UN Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM) in 1995
that he ordered the destruction of Iraq’s all WMD. It was done.665
Saddam regime ordered UNSCOM to leave Iraq in 1998. A US Navy intelligence
officer headed the UNSCOM. By 1998, said the official, what was left in Iraq was
nothing but only some documents and scraps of material which could not be used to
reconstitute a WMD program.666 Charles Duelfer, head of Iraq Survey Group (ISG)
submitted his report in October 2004, concluded, that it was during 1991-92, Saddam
regime decided to leave its “WMD pursuit” in order to end the UN sanctions. Ending the
UN sanctions was Saddam Hussain’s most important objective.667
Later on, George A. Lopez and David Cortright, reported on Iraq’s WMD status,
wherein they concluded that intelligence community and US policymakers deliberately
discarded available evidence regarding the destruction of Iraq’s WMD program.668 It was
not later than April 6-7, 2002, when President Bush invited Tony Blair at his ranch,
Crawford. On this occasion, in his interview to the British ITV Television Network
reporter Trevor McDonald, President Bush said that he had “made up his mind” that it
was the policy of his administration “Saddam goes”… Saddam “needs to go.”669
5.3 The Operational Objectives:5.3.1 The Neocons/ War Hawks Iraq Agenda:
With the end of the Cold War and subsequent disintegration of USSR, the era of
unipolarity replaced bipolar world with the US as the remaining sole superpower. It was
in the year 1992, during the presidency of Bush Senior (1989-1993), six men produced
what was known as Defense Planning Guidance (DPG). They included – Dick Cheney,
Colin Powell, Paul Wolfowitz, Scooter Libby, Zalmay Khalilzad, and Eric Edelman. The
DPG had been a classified document and was regularly produced after every two years.
665 Rolf Ekeus. “General Hussain Kamal interview, head of UNSCOM,” on August 22, 1995666 Scott Ritter. Endgame: Solving the Iraq Problem, Once and For All. (Diane Publishing
Company, 1999), 127, 219667 The Duelfer Report, September 30, 2004 668 Gurtov, Superpower on Crusade, 72669 Woodward, Plan of Attack, 119
179
The DPG, actually, was a blueprint of US military strategy in the 21st century.670 The
authors of the document asked for expansion of American military abroad. The
documents envisioned unchallengeable “US military supremacy in the world.”671
The DPG 1992 envisioned unipolarity.672 The basic theme of the document was
that the US did not want “peer competitor” in international political system.673 The
authors of the document made it clear in no ambiguous words that their top most
objective was “to prevent the re-emergence of new US rivals” on the world political
map.674 The document drafted by Wolfowitz and Lewis Libby was a “radical” one. The
document called for “global US military dominance” preemptive strikes, if necessary,
especially against the nations involved in the development of WMD. It also asked for
steep increase in “US defense budget” to achieve the ends provided in the document. The
document was leaked to New York Times.675
The war hawks envisioned and worked for the strategy of unipolarism.676 With the
end of the Cold War and subsequent disintegration of Soviet Union, to borrow Charles
Krauthammer’s phrase, the US found itself in a “unipolar moment”.677. The overall
objective of the US, according to the 1992 DPG, was to remain “predominant power in
the Middle East” and ensure US and its Western Allies access to the oil. It also asked for
policy of “unilateralism” in the US foreign policy.678
The DPG draft of 1992 was meant for asserting US global supremacy. It asked for
the use of American military power wherever US vital interests were challenged. The
supply of oil from the Middle East and “security of Israel” were at the top of the list.679
By the mid 1990’s, the top most priority of war hawks agenda in the Middle East, was
attacking Iraq and perhaps other states in the region as well, to create more “congenial
environment for Israel” in the region.680 After fall of the USSR, wrote Weekly Standard,
670 Juhasz, Bush Agenda, 28671 Ibid, 33672 Gary Dorrien. “Benevolent Global Hegemony: William Kristol and the Politics of American
Empire”. Logos 3, no. 2 (2004)673 Mearsheimer, Tragedy of Great Power, 46674 Ibid675 Shawcross, Allies, 53-54 676 Charles Krauthammer. “The Unipolar Moment”, Foreign Affairs. (Winter 1990-91), 22-33677 Ibid678 Juhasz, Bush Agenda, 33679 Kepel, War for Muslim Minds, 58680 Kolko, Age of War, 96
180
the post-WWII institutions had become “irrelevant”. It was time for “realignment”. It was
time for the promotion of American interests and values worldwide.681
The leading neoconservatives, William Kristol and Robert Kagan, argued in their
book titled Present Dangers that the victory over communism and communist bloc could
be repeated. The reason they gave was only one. If America could use its military might
to fashion its foreign policy. They also argued that regime changes in absolutist states
were possible. It was a realistic policy. Following Kristol and Kagan’s reasoning,
Wolfowitz believed that it could be done in Iraq. Regime change could be effected in
Iraq. It was just possible.682
The President George Bush Administration appointed war hawks at high
positions, especially the drafters of the DPG, 1992. They held important positions in the
Bush Administration.683 It is beyond any doubt that NSS of President Bush of September
2002 was rooted in DPG, 1992. President Bush clearly accepted and adopted Paul
Wolfowitz’s world view as sketched in DPG, 1992.684
On the footsteps of 9/11, President Bush declared war against terror. Under the
guise of this war President Bush implemented a “radical foreign policy agenda”. This
agenda predated 9/11 tragedy. The basic principles of this agenda could be summed up as
under: International relations were based on power not law; it was power which prevailed
first and law legitimized achievements of power later on; after disintegration of USSR
and end of the Cold-War, the US was the only predominant power in the international
political system; the American position of predominance on the globe fitted it to impose
its interests and values on the globe; the world could benefit from American values.
America was under obligation to impose its supremacy on the world.685
The war hawks formed a powerful group within the Bush Administration. The
neocons ideas were stated in the mission statement of the PNAC.686 The PNAC was
founded in the year 1997 by William Kristol and Robert Kagan. The PNAC was a
681 Kepel, War for Muslim Minds, 60682 Brigham, Iraq another Vietnam, 27683 Melvin Gurtov, and Peter Van Ness (Eds). Confronting the Bush Doctrine: Critical Views from
the Asia-Pacific. Routledge, 2004, 9684 Dorrien, Global Hegemony, 2004685 Soros, Bubble of American Supremacy, 3-4
686 “Project for the New American Century Report”, 2000. Available at http://www.newamericancentury.org
181
neoconservative think tank. According to them America must perform its global
responsibilities. America was to maintain peace and security in Europe, Asia, and the
Middle East. If America did not, it would jeopardize its own fundamental interests. The
PNAC recommended four policy options: Significant increase in defense spending to
carry out global military responsibilities; powerfully challenge the regimes that cherish
hostile policies against US interests and values; promotion of American variant of
democracy and capitalism abroad; and finally restructure international political order
according to the US interests and values. There was no escape to this reality. It was
necessary if the US wanted to ensure its security and greatness in the 21st century. The
mission statement was signed by 25 neoconservatives.687
It was in the year 1998, many out of the twenty five signatories of PNAC mission
statement wrote an open letter to President Bill Clinton wherein they argued the
overthrow of Saddam regime in Iraq.688 The neocons shared one predominant objective:
the “overthrow of Saddam regime” in Iraq. Several of the neocons were in close
association with Israel. They considered the defense of Israel as the litmus test of
American foreign policy. They believed that Israel could achieve peace through
restructuring its regional environment, predominant military force, and through daring
initiatives. They wanted democratic transformation of the Middle East. But they laid
down one precondition for this all: It must start with overthrowing the absolutist regime
in Iraq.689
They also shared certain other common threads, among them a grand strategy to
assert Pax Americana, maintenance of unipolar world, dislike of permanent alliances, and
follow unilateral foreign policy, if necessary, to protect US core interests such as access
to oil, and prevention of proliferation of chemical and biological weapons and also
nuclear weapons.690 President George W. Bush appointed some neoconservatives to high
positions such as Lewis Libby, Paul Wolfowitz, Douglas Feith, Richard Perle, Eliott
Abrams, and John Bolton among others. Vice President Dick Cheney and Secretary of
687 Project for the New American Century, Statement of Principles”, June 3, 1997688 Soros, Bubble of American Supremacy, 8689 Shawcross, Allies, 55-56690 Ibid, 57-58
182
Defense Rumsfeld were sympathetic to neoconservative’s worldview and thinking. 9/11
provided neocons the “big opportunity” to implement their worldview.691
The PNAC was founded for the promotion of US world leadership. They wanted
to create a world political order based on “American military supremacy”. The
neoconservatives constituted the backbone of Bush Administration’s foreign policy
agenda.692 Neoconservatives got role in the decision-making process in the Bush
Administration.693 They exploited President Bush to translate their own ideas into foreign
policy. They also shared President Bush’s emphasis on rebuilding American military
might.694
The PNAC’s report of September 2000 was important; titled as Rebuilding
America’s Defenses: Strategy, Forces and Resources for a New Century. According to
this report the primary strategic objective of America in the unfolding century would be
to “preserve Pax Americana”. The term Pax Americana was used nineteen times in the
report.695 A number of core aspects of Bush agenda were found in the above report, for
example-overthrow of Saddam regime, maintaining permanent military in the Middle
East region, and American policy of acting preemptively, if necessary, to defend US
interests especially with respect to the Middle East.696
The advocates of PNAC called for regime change in Iraq even if it involved
“deception and lies.”697 Sympathizers of the neocons like Dick Cheney and realists like
Rice along with President Bush were hegemons. They believed in “American Century”
and 9/11 provided them the common ground. They believed in US global supremacy
through military might, regime change, unilateralism, and considered rogue states as
major threat to US survival and security.698
Dick Cheney, as Vice President possessed the largest national security staff in US
history.699 Neoconservatives were changing US politics.700 During the Presidency of 691 Ibid, 63692 Stelzer, Neoconservative Economic Policy, 5693 Halper and Clarke, America Alone, 38694 Ibid, 113695 Juhasz, Bush Agenda, 37696 PNAC Report, 2000697 Soros, Bubble of American Supremacy, 25698 Ibid, 34-35699 David J. Rothkopf. “Inside the Committee that Runs the World”, Foreign Policy. (March-April
2005), 37700 Halper and Clarke, America Alone, 41
183
George W. Bush, neoconservatives got influence. They wanted the overthrow of Saddam
regime from power and initiate a process of restructuring the Middle East, among other
objectives.701
Neocons influence increased after 9/11 in the Bush Administration.702 They
played a “key role” in invading Iraq in March, 2003.703 Some neocon members of the
Bush Administration believed that the US had the divine mission to remake the world.
Neocons exploited 9/11 tragedy in a way to constitute an aggressive foreign policy
favorable to the interests of Israel in the region.704 The neocons agenda included, among
other things, US world hegemony, military supremacy, support to Israel and above all,
the “centerpiece” of their agenda was the ouster of Saddam Hussain from power even in
the absence of empirical evidence to link Saddam to 9/11 happening.
Richard Perle argued that the US must overthrow Iraqi regime. He further
contended that America could not win war against terrorism if Saddam regime continued
to rule in Iraq.705 President Bush adopted Perle’s assessment and translated it into an
operational policy and invaded Iraq in 2003.706 Neocons thought that America had
become too powerful and could act unilaterally and preemptively, if necessary, to
maintain its preeminence.707 They encouraged President Bush to link Saddam regime with
9/11 tragedy despite the contradiction of the evidence.708
William Kristol and Robert Kagan argued that in order to achieve real world
security and peace, Saddam regime must be removed from power in Iraq. It would
entirely change the political environment of the Middle East.709 It was at Camp David on
September 15, 2001, Paul Wolfowitz advocated military invasion of Iraq and won the
day.710 Consequently, permanent military dominance and preventive war became official
policy of the Bush Administration.711 The Bush Administration issued its “war strategy”
701 Fabrinni, United States Contested, 48702 Kolko, Age of War, 96703 Ibid, 97704 Ibid705 Perle, US Must Strike, December 29, 2001706 Crockatt, America Embattled, 157707 Jackson and Towle, Temptations of Power, 31708 Ibid, 32709 Robert Kagan, and William Kristol. “What to Do About Iraq”, Weekly Standard. January 21,
2002710 Bob Woodward. Bush at War. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2002), 83-84711 Jackson and Towle, Temptations of Power, 37
184
known as NSS of September 2002. The document called for maintenance of American
supremacy and adoption of doctrine of preemption, if necessary, among other things. It
was a neoconservative strategy.712 The goal of this document was the “Americanization of
the world through US variant of democracy and capitalism.”713 It could be safely argued
that NSS of September 2002 was an “updated version” of DPG. Neocons successfully
translated their agenda into national security policy of the Bush Administration.
5.3.2 Arrogance of power: Sidelined UN, NATO, and Traditional Muslim Allies:
According to article 51 of the UN Charter, it was fundamental and inherent right of states
to act in “self-defense” but with one condition, “if an armed act occurs” against them.
Some experts extended this argument to include situations where such a threat was
imminent and certain. But under this extended argument only UN had the right to act.
This right to action could not be extended to an individual country. Taken from this
standard, the preemptive US invasion of Iraq in March 2003, constituted a case of
violation of international law. Secondly, the preemptive action must be based on “reliable
intelligence” where enemy was certain to act “preemptively” and attack before you did.
The US preemptive action against Iraq did not fulfill this criterion.714
Lawrence Freedman, a British scholar argued that the US invasion of Iraq up-
graded “doctrine of preemption to a security doctrine”. The US created opportunities for
other states to use this doctrine for their old-fashioned aggression against their enemy
states.715 The Bush Administration initially decided to go through UN route and got it
passed into a unanimous UNSC resolution 1441, saying therein that Iraqi regime was still
in “material breach” of Resolution 678 of 1990 and subsequent resolutions as well. Iraq
must cooperate with inspectors and prove Iraq did not possess WMD.716 Within a week,
Iraq had to make a “declaration” of full acceptance of the resolution. Hans Blix was
appointed as Chief of UNMOVIC (UN Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection
Commission) and Mohammad El-Baradei of IAEA. Iraq did not give any new evidence
712 Max Boot. The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power. (N.Y.: Basic, 2002), 21
713 Juhasz, Bush Agenda, 43714 Jentleson, American Foreign Policy, 370-371715 Freedman, Deterrence, 4716 Shawcross, Allies, 118
185
to the UN inspectors. By December 19, the US and Britain accused Iraq of “material
breach” of the resolution.717
From the very beginning, France was opposed to war against Iraq. It was no more
a secret. On January 22, 2003, Germany also sided with France. Now on the issue of Iraq,
the differences between these NATO allies became inescapable718 France and Germany
joined hands against the US. The entire Europe was divided on this issue. France,
Germany, Luxembourg and Belgium opposed US while Great Britain, Italy and Spain
supported Bush.719 On January 27, 2003, Hans Blix presented his report to the UNSC and
so did El-Baradei. Blix was critical of Iraq for being “non-compliant” while El-Baradei
presented a positive picture and appealed to the UNSC for a “few more months” to finish
his work positively to divert war. It was on February 9, 2003, Russia joined hands with
France and Germany as well in opposing US attack on Saddam regime to implement the
UNSC resolution 1441.720
There was much wrangling in UNSC between pro-war and anti-war groups. Hans
Blix and ElBaradei submitted their final reports to the UNSC on March 7, 2003. Both
men told UNSC about the improved position of Iraqi cooperation. But completing the
process of inspections of weapons would take months. Chirac, the French President
finally made his position on March 10. In a television interview the President declared
that France would oppose a new UNSC resolution, through thick and thin. On 17th March,
the US and UK withdrew the resolution and decided to invade Iraq unilaterally and
preemptively.721
In the last few weeks, tensions mounted in the UNSC. Russia and France, along
with some nonpermanent UNSC members resisted Washington to take military action
against Iraq. Finally, US decided to launch war on Iraq unilaterally without a fresh UNSC
vote on Iraq. The US claimed that America had sufficient legitimacy to invade Iraq in
self-defense, under the doctrine of preemption, under UNSC resolution 1441. France,
717 Ibid, 122718 Ibid, 125719 Shawcross, Allies, 127720 Ibid, 137721 Ibid, 147-149
186
Russia, Germany, and Egypt opposed the attack.722 The US had decided to take military
action against Iraq.723
The Iraqi regime was offering full cooperation to the UN inspections. With the
coming of 2003, there was a pressure on the US for second UNSC resolution before
military action against Iraq. The key Muslim allies, like Turkey and Saudi Arabia, whose
territories were to be used for invasion, demanded fresh UNSC resolution before
extending their cooperation. Many countries of the world waited empirical evidence of
Iraqi defiance of Resolution 1441. Even London asked Bush Administration for a second
UNSC resolution.724 Hans Blix, despite his relentless struggle, was unable to find any
signs of WMD. Blix was getting least cooperation from the US intelligence.725
Colin Powell gave his presentation to the UNSC on February 5, 2003. Later on,
he admitted that it was totally unsubstantiated.726 In their reports on February 14, 2003,
Blix and El-Baradei gave contradictory opinion against Powell’s assertions. Meanwhile,
Tony Blair had already agreed with President Bush for a second UNSC resolution. The
draft to the second resolution was submitted to the UNSC. According to Washington and
London, Iraq had failed to comply with the resolution 1441. On the other hand, Blix and
El-Baradei were confirming, contrary to the official opinion, ever increasing cooperation
from Iraq. Even then, Washington insisted that the US had war powers under UNSC 687.
Ultimately, the US decided for unilateral, without a second UNSC resolution, invasion of
Iraq.727 Kofi Annan said the invasion was against the provisions of UN charter.728
Hans Blix and El-Baradei worked in Iraq since November 25, 2002. They did not
detect any WMD or nuclear program in Iraq. The testimony of both men was not only
disregarded but also “ridiculed”. Washington and London complained of the
incompetence of UN and unilaterally invaded Iraq. Both Washington and London
deliberately exploited the situation and used the invented threat of WMD to extract
support at home and among European allies.729 President Bush rejected Kofi Annan’s
722 Jentleson, American Foreign Policy, 375723 Fawn and Hinnebusch, Iraq War, 260724 Ibid, 261725 Blix, Disarming Iraq, 248, 265-266726 Fawn and Hinnebusch, Iraq War, 262727 Fawn and Hinnebusch, Iraq War, 263728 Ibid729 Kepel, War for Muslim Minds, 204
187
proposal for a clear cut UN mandate for invasion of Iraq. President’s position was that the
US already had one under the UNSC past resolutions, 678 and 1441.730 Such a view was
against international law governing the use of force. NATO allies wanted multilateralism
and collaboration among themselves and the US were disappointed.731
The European NATO allies did not understand that America was
“indispensable”.732 Dick Cheney made it clear in his speech that it was only America who
was to lead in this cause to victory.733 Fifteen members of the European Union fully
supported working through the UN route to disarm Iraq.734 Similarly there was a strong
criticism among the Middle East countries. Despite the fact that Saudi Arabia remained
the most important Arab ally of America. Crown Prince Abdullah was blunt in his
remarks. In the present circumstance it was hard to defend the US. America was under
moral obligation to end repression against Palestinians. France threatened to use veto
power to kill second US sponsored resolution to get tacit approval of the UNSC to invade
Iraq. Russia, Germany and China strongly backed this French movement. America
withdrew the resolution and unilaterally invaded Iraq.735
The United Nations recently laid five conditions for the use of force as followed:
First, if the threat was serious enough and certain that could justify the use of force.
Second, the primary objective of the use of force must be to halt or avert the imminent
threat. Third, the force must be used as a last resort. Fourth, the force used must be of
minimum strength just to avert the threat and, lastly, the consequences of use of force
would not be worse than the relevant consequence of inaction.736
The US war on Iraq did not meet UN criteria.737 France, Russia, and China had
economic interests to serve in Iraq. They opposed unilateral overthrow of Saddam
regime.738 France, Germany and Russia were debating in the UN. They wanted to give
730 Elaine Sciolino and Steven Lee Myers, “Bush says ‘Time is Running Out’ as Forces Move into Place”, New York Times. October 7, 2001
731 Patrick E. Tyler. “European Split with US on Need for Iraq Attack”, New York Times. July 22, 2002
732 Gurtov, Superpower on Crusade, 65733 Cheney, Speech to Veterans, August 2002734 Blix, Disarming Iraq, 248, 265-266735 Blix, Disarming Iraq, 248736 The UN Report on Secure World737 Jackson and Towle, Temptations of Power, 176738 Woodward, Plan of Attack, 222
188
extended time to UN inspectors to complete their work.739 President Bush was clear in his
conviction. America could not avoid this war. The UN was obstructionist. Powell was of
the view that Saddam regime could be effectively contained. Saddam was depressingly
isolated and friendless.740 On February 10, 2003, Chirac, Schroeder and Putin issued a
joint statement asking for giving more time to UN weapons inspectors.741 On March 12,
2003, President Bush strongly criticized the UN. For him, UN was a “ridiculous”
organization.742
All the following authors/scholars, more or less gave the same arguments: (Pijl:
2006: 364-366); (Soros: 2004: 49, 24,55-57); (Fabbrini eds.: 2006:13); (Brigham:
2004:12-13); (Chomsky: 2003: 11, 32-33, 242); (Simons: 2006: 273-288); (Clancy,
Zinni, and Koltz: 2004:1-7); (Kolko: 2007:125-129).)
The summary of these arguments followed: For the US, UN was an aimless
organization; UN was nothing more than a debating society; America did not need UN
permission when the issue of US security was involved (Chomsky).743 President Chirac
threatened the use of veto power against a new UNSC resolution to use military force
against Iraq. The US decided to go ahead without UN authorization (Soros).744 The US
military predominance justified its unilateralism ignoring UN, NATO allies. The US
treated its European allies with disdain and indifference (Kolko).745 Colin Powell said that
the UN had become irrelevant (Brigham, 2004)746.It could safely be argued that due to its
military predominance in the world, America sidelined the UN, NATO, and its Muslim
allies such as Turkey and Saudi Arabia and unilaterally and preemptively invaded Iraq in
March 2003, without UN authorization.
5.3.3 Violation of International Law and Norms:
739 Ibid, 226-227740 Ibid, 271-272741 Ibid, 315742 Woodward, Plan of Attack, 342743 Chomsky, Hegemony or Survival, 11, 32-33, 242744 Soros, Bubble of American Supremacy, 24, 49, 55-57745 Kolko, Age of War, 125-129746 Brigham, Iraq another Vietnam, 12-13
189
The UN charter, article 51, recognized state’s right to self defense. According to this
article it is the fundamental right of all member states, without any exception, to act in
self-defense, only after fulfilling two preconditions written in the UN charter. A state
could act in self–defense only, if there was an “armed aggression” committed against it.
The right to self defense was also qualified with the condition through the UN Security
Council only (UN Charter). There were writers who extended this right to act in self-
defense to include situations where threat of armed aggression was so imminent and
certain. But the decision about such an extended situation would be made by the UN, not
by an individual state alone. The US preemptive action against Iraq did not even conform
to this standard as it was taken and acted upon unilaterally. The US invasion of Iraq
violated both international law and norms.747
The US invasion of Iraq put big question mark on the relevance of international
law and the UN.748 The war on Iraq was a violation of the norms the US and UK wanted
to advance.749 The US administration justified war on the basis of three norms. First was
the democratic reconstruction of Iraq. America was the sole protector of international
political system against dangers coming from terrorism and nuclear proliferation. The
defiant states would be considered as “rogue states” and could face imposition of
sanctions including “regime change” through the use of military force. These three norms
were advanced to mobilize support in favor of Iraq war but it was loaded with risks for
American national interests.750 The above cited three norms served as counter norm to
defeat international law and UNSC procedures. The UNSC might have successfully
restrained the US invasion.751
The US legal justification of Iraq war was based on two rationales: preemptive
self-defense and Iraq’s non-compliance with UNSC resolutions. The UN charter, article
51, included two conditions where use of force was allowed under international law. Self-
defense was one of them. The use of force in self-defense under international law was
allowed only “if an armed attack occurs.” In simple words, international law prohibited
747 Jentleson, American Foreign Policy, 370748 D. Hiro. Secrets and Lies: The True Story of the Iraq War. Politico's, (2005), xx749 Fawn and Hinnebusch, Iraq War, 270750 John J. Mearsheimer, and Stephen M. Walt. “An Unnecessary War”, Foreign Policy. 134,
January-February 2003, 56-57, 59751 Fawn and Hinnebusch, Iraq War, 272
190
the use of force until a state had been physically attacked.752 Prior to the UN Charter
framed in 1945, there were prohibitions on the use of force in world politics. Those
prohibitions never allowed use of force in “anticipatory self-defense” or preemption.753
The right to anticipatory self-defense was strongly questioned in the “Caroline” case
where Canadian soldiers attacked American sailors in 1837. The reason given for the
attack was that Canadian soldiers were under threat of attack. Daniel Webster, the US
council argued that such a preemptive self-defense was justified with the fulfillment of
four conditions: if the threat was” instant, overwhelming and exhausted other means and
no time left for deliberation.”754
In its NSS of 2002, Bush Administration made clear the preemptive use of force.
In this document, the Bush Administration argued that the international law related to the
use of force must take into account two new factors: New technologies and new extremist
groups. This was a dangerous combination. Saddam regime fulfilled these criteria.
Saddam could attack the US without warning. Despite this all, the US asked for
“preventive use of force and not preemptive” action. Iraq was not an imminent or instant
threat to the US sovereign territory on March 19, 2003, the date of attack on Iraq. It could
be said the war was preventive and illegal.755
The second legal justification the US and UK sought for war was Saddam
regime’s non-compliance with the UNSC resolution 1441 of November 2002. The
resolution 1441 alleged that Iraq was in “material breach” to discharge its legal
obligations under the previous UNSC resolutions 678 of November 1990 and 687 of
April 1991. These resolutions required Iraq to disarm itself completely and give tangible
evidence thereof. Iraq had destroyed its WMDs, missiles and missile technology which
could act as missiles carriers over distances greater than 150 kilometers. The UNSC
resolution 1441 gave Iraq exactly one month for compliance with the previous UNSC
resolutions 678 and 687. In case of non-compliance within the required timetable Iraq
was threatened with “serious consequences.” The UNMOVIC was to supervise this all.
Hans Blix headed UNMOVIC.
752 Ibid753 Louis Henkin. International Law: Cases and Materials. Vol. 1. (West Publishing Company,
1980), 927754 Ibid, 872755 Fawn and Hinnebusch, Iraq War, 273
191
Hans Blix gave his larger report on March 6, 2003 known as “Cluster Report”
titled Unresolved Disarmament Issues: Iraq’s Proscribed Weapons Program.
UNMOVIC never said that Saddam regime in Iraq was in material breach of its legal
obligations under UNSC resolutions 687 and 1441.756 The Hans Blix reports were subject
to multiple interpretations. France, Russia and China, the three UNSC permanent
members strongly objected unilateralist invasion of Iraq. They also advocated the
continuity of inspection process by UNMOVIC and IAEA. However, Bush
Administration rejected this demand and went ahead alone. Under these circumstances it
could be said with certainty that the war on Iraq was illegal.757
The Anglican Church in America and Britain also opposed the Iraq war on the
same grounds. The Anglican Church issued a statement to parliament in October 2002
opposing a preventive war against Iraq. The Episcopal Church of America also opposed
the war. The Church wrote a letter to the members of the US Congress. The use of force
against Iraq would not be according to the standards of the just war tradition.758
The leaders of the Roman Catholic and Anglican Church questioned “self-
defense” as a just cause of war. Michael Walzer, a theorist of the just war tradition, called
this war unjust. Walzer asked international community to disarm Iraq through better ways
by involving other world powers such as France, Germany and Russia. Former President
Carter argued that ever increasing “unilateral and domineering policies” of Bush
Administration had created a trust deficit between international community and America.
The US status would be further eroded if America launched war on Iraq without UN
authorization in clear defiance of the organization.759
Some scholars like John Ikenberry in Foreign Affairs, (September, 2002); Noam
Chomsky in Hegemony or Survival (2003: 12); Schlesinger in Los Angeles Times (23
March, 2003); and Kegley Jr. and Gregory A. Raymond in Preventive War and
Permissive Normative Order (pp. 385-94), clearly argued that it was a “preventive war
not a preemptive” one. The war was also a violation of international law.
756 Ibid, 274757 Fawn and Hinnebusch, Iraq War, 275758 “A Letter from the house of Bishops of the Episcopal Church”, Episcopal Church of the US,
October 2, 2002759 Jimmy Carter. “Just War or a Just War?” New York Times. March 9, 2003
192
5.3.4 Weak Saddam Regime: An Opportunity to Increase US Share of World
Power:
For the Bush Administration, Iraq was a weak and easy target.760 A major part of Iraq’s
military equipment already had been destroyed during the Gulf War and continuous air
strikes subsequently. Iraq had no access to military hardware and spare parts as it had
been under strict sanctions since 1990. Iraq’s military forces remained just one third of its
pre-war position. The destruction of Iraq’s WMD under the UN resolution 678 and 687
was complete. Its economy was also destroyed. Iraq’s navy was actually nonexistent and
air-force just a fraction of its prewar position of First Gulf War. Its military budget had
been reduced to ten percent (10%) of its prewar level.761
Iraq did not possess a system of support and supplies for its military forces other
than the one under sanctions.762 There was no reason to believe that under such conditions
Iraq posed a threat to its neighbors in the foreseeable future.763 In the year 1991, Iraq was
defeated and forced to leave Kuwait. Since then, Iraq remained under UN sanctions and
“no fly zones” imposed by the US and Britain. Bush (senior) and Clinton Administrations
continued ongoing bombing of Iraq ever since 1991.764 US Secretary of State, Madeleine
Albright, once said that the US would act against Iraq unilaterally, if necessary. She
further said that Middle East was a region vital to American interests.765
The continued UN sanctions on Iraq killed many more people in Iraq. The
mortality rate among children was doubled.766 According to a FAO report (UN-FAO)
about one-fifth of the total population of Iraq severely suffered from starvation. Children
were the worst sufferers. Kofi Annan, the UN Secretary General, put serious accusation
on America for blocking and preventing Oil-For-Food program for Iraq. It was an issue
of survival of millions of Iraqis.767
760 Khalidi, Resurrecting Empire, x761 Zunes, Tinderbox, 47762 Les Aspin. “Gulf Diplomacy Needs Arms Threat to Succeed”, Centre for Strategic and
International Studies. (December 21, 1990)763 Zunes, Tinderbox, 47764 Ibid, 89765 Madeleine Albright. cited in Anoushiravan Ehteshami. From the Gulf to Central Asia: Players
in the New Great Game. (University of Exeter Press, 1994), 198766 “Iraq Survey Shows Humanitarian Emergency”, UNICEF. August 12, 1999767 Colin Lynch. “Humanitarian Goods Are Being Blocked, U.N. Chief Charges”, Washington
Post. October 25, 1999
193
As Colin Powell came to power he imposed new set of sanctions, through the UN,
called “smart sanctions,” on Iraq. These sanctions imposed strict control over Iraqi trade
and finance.768 The same magazine noted that Iraq intensely required massive investment
to rebuild its infrastructure such as industry, power grids and schools. Nothing would
happen under smart sanctions.769
The First Gulf War and the ongoing sanctions on Iraq put Iraq under a situation
termed as “impoverished isolation.”770 Iraq was a minor power severely damaged by
sanctions. The Bush Administration knew that Iraq remained one of the weakest nations
in the Persian Gulf region. Iraq’s economy and budget were hopelessly less than
Kuwait’s. However, Kuwait had just 10% of the Iraqi population.771 The US policy
makers knew well that Iraq did not pose any threat to its neighbors whatsoever in 2002.
To argue contrary to the ground reality was dishonest.
Noam Chomsky argued, Iraq was targeted for some reasons. It was a weak
country. It was easily conquerable. Iraq was a good opportunity to make it a precedent.772
Michael Howard argued in Foreign Affairs that Iraq was chosen because it was both an
easily identifiable target as well as allegedly a hostile state.773 Bob Woodward cited Paul
Wolfowitz, Deputy Secretary of Defense, in an important strategy meeting on September
15, 2001, saying that in contrast to Afghanistan, Iraq was an easy target. In the words of
Wolfowitz, it was “easily doable”. America could easily defeat Saddam Hussain. There
were 10 to 50 percent chances of al-Qaeda-Iraq nexus culminating into 9/11 tragedy.
Wolfowitz argued further that America could not win war on terror if did not pursue
oppressive Saddam regime. Sooner or later, America would have to do that.774
Now Iraq was not a threat at all. His military forces were too weak. The US was
successfully pursuing policy of containment. Under these conditions there were nearly
zero percent chances that Saddam would ever attack his neighbors in near future. Saddam
also could not attack America whatsoever.775 The opponents of US war on Iraq
768 “Can Sanctions Be Smarter?” The Economist. May 26, 2001769 “Smart Exit: The End of the Smart Sanctions”, The Economist. July 7, 2001770 Zunes, Tinderbox, 95771 Chomsky, Preventive War, August 11, 2003772 Chomsky, Preventive War, August 11, 2003773 Michael Howard. “What’s in a Name? How to Fight Terrorism”, Foreign Affairs 81, no 1,
(January/February 2002), 9774 Woodward, Bush at War, 83775 Clancy, Zinni, and Koltz, Battle Ready, 21
194
consistently argued that the US invasion of Iraq in March 2003 was not necessary. As
Saddam regime in Baghdad was no more a threat to its neighbors and that his WMD had
already been destroyed.776
While writing this dissertation, almost all the sources I studied, which ran into
hundreds, invariably argued that the war hawks played important role in George W. Bush
Administration’s decision making establishment in war on terror. They found 9/11 as an
opportunity for the US to “remake critical areas” of the world, especially the Middle East,
according to the US vision. In the preceding pages of this dissertation I quoted these
sources with references. Just to mention a few of them as followed: (Woodward: 2004:
25-27); (Walt: 2005: 23); (Kepel: 2004: 58-63); (Kolko: 2007: 95-98); (Fawn and
Hinnebusch: 2007: 33, 309); (Soros: 2004: 34-35); (Black: 2008: 210); (Jentleson: 2007:
360); (Jackon and Towle: 2006: 37); (Gurtov: 2008: 1); (Halper and Clarke: 2004: 17,
44, 66); (Boot: 2004: 21); (Fukuyama: 2006: 32-33); (Simes: 2003: 95); (Dorrien: 2004:
1); (Mearsheimer: 2001: 46); (Stelzer: 2004: 17); (Rothkopf: 2005: 39); (Gurtov: 2005:
9); (Gaddis: 2002: 50); (Ferguson: 2004: 20). In short, the US did not act as a status quo
power. Rather the US used its militarily predominant position in a unipolar world to
change the status quo in its favor and increase its world influence and its share of global
power and position.777
5.3.5 Disregard of World Public Opinion:
On the eve of US invasion of Iraq in March 2003, opinion polls in Great Britain,
Germany and other European Union countries clearly indicated opposition to US war on
Iraq. Tony Blair, the British Prime Minister, supported the US war on Iraq. A large
number of persons within his party did not. Even Kuwait royal family opposed the war.
King Abdullah II of Jordan commented scornfully on potential US invasion of Iraq. The
King visited Britain in July 2002. He gave an interview to the London Times, the King
said that the US invasion of Iraq would “destabilize US interests” in the Middle East.
And he refused to give permission to allow Jordanian territory to be used as “launching
pad” for such an eventuality.
776 Steele, Defeat, 254777 Walt, Taming American Power, 23
195
Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia took the same line and strongly opposed the
invasion.778 General Pervez Musharraf, the military ruler of Pakistan, also opposed the
invasion. Similarly, Turkish Parliament did not permit Turkish territory to be used for an
invasion of Iraq.779 West European countries did not appreciate the US Middle East
policy. They accused it of being favorable to Israel. The opinion poll in France and
Germany in May 2002 disapproved the US Middle East policy. Whatever the reasons
Russia, France, and Germany did not support the US war on Iraq. Approximately 11%
French and 12% Germans approved the US unilateral invasion of Iraq.780 An opinion poll
in August 2002 in Britain showed that approximately above 50% Labor voters opposed
the US invasion of Iraq.781
London saw the largest demonstration there had ever been. There was also a full
scale debate in House of Lords on the legality of the war. The majority of British legal
experts opposed the war. In the run-up to war, the British deputy legal adviser in the
Foreign and Commonwealth Office resigned in protest against the war attacking it as a
“crime of aggression”.782 It’s on record that 120 Members of the Parliament belonging to
Labor Party voted against the war on February 26, 2003.783
A number of retired British diplomats such as Sir Harold Walker, the former
ambassador to Iraq, Sir Patrick Wright, former head of the British Diplomatic Service, Sir
Brian Barder, Sir Alan Munro and Sir Nicholas Barrington, among others, publically
opposed the war.784 During the US war on terror, world public opinion turned sharply
against the US as the war progressed. Surveys were conducted world over. A British
survey conducted in November 2002, showed that about 33% Brits saw President George
W. Bush as a “greater threat to global peace and security” than Iraqi dictator.785
It is on record that a large majority of the people in the world opposed the US war
on Iraq in March, 2003. About fifteen lac people protested against the war in mid-
778 Thomas Ricks. “Military Trying to Head Off Iraq Strike”, International Herald Tribune. May 25-26, 2002
779 Gurtov, Superpower on Crusade, 80780 The Guardian, February 11, 2003781 Jackson and Towle, Temptations of Power, 50782 “Revealed: The Rush to War”, The Guardian, February 23, 2005
783 “Labor MPs Revolt Over Iraq”, The Guardian, February 26, 2003784 Wright, Barder and Munro Letter”, The Times. March 23, 2003785 Wintour Patrick, and Ewen MacAskill, “1 in 3 Say Bush is Biggest Threat,” The Guardian,
November 14, 2002
196
February 2003 to express their opposition to the imminent US invasion of Iraq. Gerhard
Schroeder was reelected in Germany in September 2002 largely because he refused to
become a party in US war against Baghdad. Similar developments happened in South
Korea.786 Public opinion in the world deeply resented the US unilateral invasion of Iraq in
March, 2003.787
It meant in mid-February 2003, the anti-war protests were made throughout the
world; millions of protestors took to the streets. In an unprecedented anti-war protest one
million protesters came out in London.788 Turkish parliament democratically rejected
cooperation with the US in war on Iraq. So did France where Chirac called it a
“dangerous precedent” that would unleash a “clash of civilizations”.
Even in Latin America public opinion went against Washington. Opinion polls in
many states like Japan, Philippines, Germany, Pakistan, Turkey, Italy and Great Britain
etc. showed that the US “image” had fallen in these countries. Public opinion in Muslim
world became “highly critical” against the US unilateral war against Iraq. Consequently,
America became isolated.789 While talking in a prime-time news conference just one
month after 9/11 happenings, President George W. Bush complained, he did not
understand the reason of widespread “citriolic hatred” of America in the rest of the world.
For the President this psychological process feeling was a result of misunderstanding
about the US.790
The percentage of foreign people living in their own countries having a
“favorable” image of America had been on the decline since turn of the century. The US
attack on Iraq in March 2003 speeded up this declining trend. The Pew Research Center
conducted different surveys in this regard. The surveys gave empirical evidence of this
declining global trend. The US image declined in the West in Britain, Italy, France, and
Germany in 2002 to 2003, approximately from 73 to 45, 68 to 31, 61 to 29, and 59 to 24
respectively. Same was the case with the Muslim world. Approximately it was 31 to 13,
24 to 1, unknown to 12, unknown to 11, and 60 to 13 for Turkey, Jordan, Pakistan, Egypt,
786 Soros, Bubble of American Supremacy, 23-24787 Ibid, 50788 Fawn and Hinnebusch, Iraq War, 6789 Kolko, Age of War, 127-128790 President Bush’s Prime time News Conference”, October 22, 2001
197
and Indonesia respectively.791 Similarly, in another research project by the same research
organization in 2004, majority of the people around the globe attributed GWOT to US
self- interest.
Similarly, in the year 2003, barely 30% people of Europe approved President
George W. Bush’s foreign policy.792 The American image was negative in Muslim
heartland, the Middle East. A survey was conducted in June 2004 in six Muslim
countries. Just about 10% of the respondents surveyed in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, United
Arab Emirates, Morocco, Lebanon and Jordan had a positive view of the US Iraq
policy.793 Such a negative US image was not confined to Arab World only. Economist,
reported in February 2003, in a run-up to war on Iraq that there existed a big gap on US
foreign policy between Europe and the US.794 In short, it could be safely said that the US
disregarded world public opinion and invaded Iraq in March, 2003.
5.3.6 American Refusal to Give More Time to UN Inspectors:
The UN inspectors returned to Iraq in November, 2002 after the UNSC Resolution 1441.
The resolution declared that the Iraq was in “Material breach” of the past resolutions of
the same body. The inspectors found nothing which constituted an imminent threat form
Iraqi WMD. Mohammad El-Baradei, head of the IAEA, in his January 27, 2003 report to
the UNSC declared, till today they had found no evidence about the “revival of Iraq’s
nuclear program” since its elimination in 1990s.795 Hans Blix, head of the UNMOVIC in
Iraq, reported back to the UNSC on Iraq’s attitude. There was absence of “active and
unconditional cooperation” on the part of Iraq.
However, Blix also disputed Bush Administration’s allegations on Iraq about
WMD status and its links with al-Qaeda. Blix enlisted possible reasons why did Iraq give
impression that Saddam regime possessed WMD despite its contrary status. The enlisted
reasons included that full cooperation with inspectors in the past did not end sanctions on
Iraq, Saddam took it as “insult to his pride and the deterrent effect from the enemies in
791 “Views of a Changing World”, The Pew Research Centre for the People and the Press, 3 June 2003
792 Transatlantic Trends 2003793 mpression of America 2004794 “How Deep Is the Rift?” The Economist. February 15, 2003795 “The Status of Nuclear Inspections in Iraq”, IAEA Report on January 27, 2003
198
the neighborhood.”796 His main conclusion was that “disarming of Iraq was possible
through UN inspections.”797
Some top American military Generals also opposed war on Iraq.798 While talking
on the eve of Iraq war an American General said that why there was so urgency? It was
not an urgent issue. There was nothing to indicate whether the US or the US allies in the
Middle East were under an imminent threat of nuclear attack. There was nothing like that.
General John M. Shalikashvili, the former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was
another example who warned Bush Administration against being too quick.799
Secretary General Kofi Annan asked time and again to follow the path of UN for
war on Iraq. There was no substitute for the UN. Kofi Annan, in his interview on BBC
after the war said, it was an “illegal” war waged by the US.800 It was in December, 2002
Saddam regime ordered Iraqi officials to extend their full cooperation to UN inspectors.801
The Bush Administration willfully held certain intelligence from the UN inspectors
working in Iraq, to be used later on for an attack on Iraq. The CIA withheld intelligence
about 21-sites in Iraq. The Bush Administration did not want the “success of UN
inspectors” in Iraq. The Administration wanted to clear the way for war on Iraq.802
Douglas Jehl and David Sanger later on wrote, CIA admitted for not giving entire data to
the UN inspectors.803
Under pressure, Saddam regime once again, extended invitation to the UN in July
2002, for renewed consideration on UN inspection in Iraq. In the next month, August
2002, Saddam regime extended invitation to the US Congress to send its delegations
along with experts to find WMD in Iraq. Saddam regime, in December 2002, opened Iraq
for inspections “without any conditions”. Iraq offered to provide every access to every
place hitherto kept secret. Nothing satisfied the US short of attack on Iraq.
796 Blix, Disarming Iraq, 265-266797 Judith Miller, and Julia Preston. “Blix Says He saw Nothing to Prompt a War”, New York
Times. January 31, 2003798 Ricks. Iraq Strike, May 25-26, 2002799 Ibid800 Gurtov, Superpower on Crusade, 78801 Duelfer Report, September 30, 2004802 Gurtov, Superpower on Crusade, 79803 Douglas Jehl, and David E. Sanger. “CIA Admits It Did Not Give Weapon Data to the UN”,
New York Times. February 21, 2004
199
In submitting unconditionally in September 2002, Iraqi dictator tried his best to
avert war. Iraq submitted 12,000 pages printed material on the issue of WMD. One Iraqi
General declared Iraq without WMD. Saddam Hussein extended his televised apology for
Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990. Hans Blix, the chief inspector, submitted his report in
December 2002 saying that there was little new information about the matter. In
response, Washington said that Iraq was in “material breach” of Resolution 1441. Iraq
responded with a new proposal to CIA to search Iraq from the alleged WMDS the way it
liked. However, the UN inspectors were complaining for receiving little cooperation from
Western intelligence.804 Iraqi cooperation was forthcoming. At the same time US military
encirclement around Baghdad continued.
In his State of the Union Address, on 28 January 2003, President Bush talked
about the “Yellow Cake” which Iraq had recently got from Africa. Later on, this claim
was used to justify the war on Iraq. There were sweeping assertions substantiated with no
material evidence.805 Colin Powell, the US foreign secretary, presented his case against
Iraq to the UNSC on February 5, 2003. According to Powell, Iraq was deceiving UN
inspectors on many aspects of Iraq’s WMD. Later on, Powell admitted that his
presentation relied on “bad information” provided by intelligence agencies.806 However,
the very next day after Powell’s presentation, UN inspectors gave “favorable” report of
Iraqi cooperation.807
The France-German proposal on February 9, 2003 to speed up the inspection
process by increasing number of inspectors infuriated the US administration. The next
day Belgium joined alliance. It created serious crisis in the NATO. Rumsfeld called this
development “inexcusable”.808 By mid February 2003, Hans Blix, reported back to the
UNSC about Iraq’s good behavior and complete compliance with the inspectors. Some
177 inspections were conducted taking 300 samples from 125 different sites. There was
nothing like that in Iraq.809
804 Hiro, Secrets and Lies, 111, 113, 115805 Todd S. Purdum, “As Bush Prepares Public for War, He covers His Domestic Flank”, New York
Times. January 29, 2003806 Kessler, Glenn. “Analyst Questioned Sources' Reliability”, Washington Post. July 10, 2004807 Suzanne Goldenberg, Ed Vulliamy, Jason Burke and Helena Smith. “Hope As Iraq Gives
Ground over Arms”, The Observer. February 9, 2003808 The Guardian, 2003809 Hiro, Secrets and Lies, 143
200
On March 7, 2003, Hans Blix and El-Baradei finally reported to the UNSC. They
concluded that Iraqi cooperation had “increased” since January 2003, and declared
further that full inspection of Saddam regime would require “several months” to search
on the WMD status of Iraq. On March 10, 2003 Chirac, the French President, went on air
and declared that there did not exist, any cause to invade Iraq unilaterally. If it was done,
it would begin a “clash of civilizations” and would constitute a dangerous precedent.
Chirac proposed 120 days for extended WMD inspection in Iraq to finish the task.810
At Azores Summit on March 15-16, 2003, President Bush, Tony Blair (British
P.M.), and the Prime Ministers of Spain and Portugal gave a 24-hour ultimatum to the
UN to disarm Iraq or face a war on Iraq. Ultimately, the US and its allies launched war
against Iraq on March 19, 2003, on the basis of “alleged possession of WMD” and
“Iraq’s connections with al-Qaeda” culminating into 9/11. After war, all the three causes
of invasion were discredited. Later on, Hans Blix said that the US tried to undermine
honest conduct of the inspections.811
It was a year after the war, it became clear to the world that President Bush and
Prime Minister Tony Blair “intentionally exploited” the situation and deliberately used
the fake threat of WMD to maneuver support both at home and across the globe.812
Similar explanations to the run-up to war had been provided by the following scholars as
well (Woodward: 2004: 293, 317); (Shawcross2003: 131-155); (Steel: 2008: 6-7);
(Jackson and Towle: 2006:174); and (Soros: 2004:55-57). These scholars invariably gave
the following arguments on the US war against Iraq.
The US bypassed the UN and ridiculed the evidence coming from the UN
inspectors in Iraq. The UN inspectors had just begun their work in Iraq when US
provided the questionable evidence of presence of WMD in Iraq and its alleged
connections with al-Qaeda. The US did not give proper time for extended inspections in
Iraq, and that all the claims the US made for an invasion of Iraq proved wrong. Now the
question arose what was the explanation of US Iraq policy? Why did the US sideline UN,
NATO, and its Muslim allies? The answer to this question could be found in the declared
810 Shawcross, Allies, 149 811 Fawn and Hinnebusch, Iraq War, 7812 Kepel, War for Muslim Minds, 204
201
US policy toward Iraq known as policy of “regime change” under cover of the
application of Bush Doctrine of preemption under the guise of self-defense.813
The US war on Iraq was actually an operational part of US policy of “regime
change” in Iraq. It was motivated by what was known as US policy of “energy security
and interventionism”. It was in November 2001 that President George W. Bush asked
Rumsfeld about the status of war plan for Iraq. By December 2001, a preemptive
invasion of Iraq was planned and was ready for execution within a couple of months. It
was to be a unilateral invasion of Iraq.814
President Bush turned up with the theme of “Axis of Evil”. Iraq was connected
with Iran and North Korea. The US war against terrorism was not to be confined to
Afghanistan only but was being extended to “rogue states” as well. President Bush made
this all the central theme of his State of the Union Address in January 2002. The “regime
change” in Iraq constituted the heart of this theme.815 In the back drop of 9/11, the US
invoked doctrine of preemption to deal with the new emerging threats to US security. For
the US, the terrorist organizations and rogue states were the epicenter of these threats.
The doctrine of “regime change” was tied to the Bush Doctrine of preemption. It was
outlined in the Year 2001 in Quadrennial Defense Review. These were controversial
issues in world politics. However, they constituted a new political reality in global
political system.816
Different scholars had given explanations of the US war on Iraq. Bruce W.
Jentleson had argued that the war hawks in the Bush Administration were putting
pressure for “regime change” in Iraq even before 9/11.817 Similarly, Rice, the national
security advisor of President Bush told Richard Haas, Policy Planning Director of State
Department, in June 2002 that “Save your breath”. President Bush had “already decided”
on the issue of invasion of Iraq and had made up his mind for a “unilateral” attack on
Iraq.818
813 Simons, Future Iraq, 272814 Woodward, Plan of Attack, 1, 83, 54-60815 Woodward, Plan of Attack, 86-87, 90, 93816 Quadrennial Defense Review, 2001817 Jentleson, American Foreign Policy, 363818 Packer, Assassin’s Gate, 45
202
Nothing could have satisfied the Bush Administration short of regime change in
Iraq. President Bush was determined to overthrow Saddam regime in Iraq. The issue of
Iraq’s WMD could be resolved through continued inspections but that was not the US
policy under Bush Administration.819 Whatever the reasons, Iraq’s case of possession of
WMD was a “false” one. The Bush Administration would be never satisfied short of
“regime change” in Iraq. The Bush Administration not only “twisted the intelligence” but
also lied to the Americans. To achieve its end the Administration used the issue of “Iraq’s
WMD” to influence public opinion. President Bush and his Administration assumed
worst-case scenario about Iraq as it suited best to their intended ambitions in the Middle
East and elsewhere on the globe. Ron Huisken went further saying the issue of WMD
was even more than the “misuse of intelligence”. The regime change in Iraq was taken to
project America’s unique position in world history as the most predominant power since
the fall of Roman Empire.820
5.3.7 Israel Factor:
The pro-war group in Washington had been asking the US government for regime change
in Iraq since 1998. They believed that overthrow of Saddam Hussein from power would
benefit both America and Israel. They also wanted democratic transformation of the
region.821 Israel also supported these efforts as Saddam Hussein was the man who
launched Scud missiles at Israel in 1991 during First Gulf War.822 The objective of the
war was to make Israel safe.823 Philip Zelikow, a member of US President’s Foreign
Intelligence Advisory Board, executive director of the 9/11 Investigatory Commission
and one of the principal architects of the NSS of September 2002, while talking to the
University of Virginia students in September 2002 said, Saddam regime was a direct
threat to Israel and not the US.824
General Wesley Clarke, the (Retd.) NATO commander argued in August 2002,
Iraq was not a threat to the US. The pro-war faction in Washington feared that Iraq was
819 Soros, Bubble of American Supremacy, 56820 Gurtov, Superpower on Crusade, 85821 Interview with Dr M. Islam, August 17, 2016822 Mearsheimer and Walt, Israel Lobby, 230 823 Ibid, 231
824 Emad Mekay. “Iraq was Invaded ‘to Protect Israel’-US Official”, Asia Times Online. March 31, 2004
203
making one.825 On the eve of Iraq war, journalist Joe Klein argued, the war was being
fought to make Israel stronger. The war hawks in the Bush Administration wanted war.826
Some important Americans supported the concept that war hawks in the administration
wanted war. Just a few to be cited here (Patrick J. Buchanan, “Whose war?” American
Conservative March 24, 2003);(Arnaud De Barchgrave “A Bush-Sharon Doctrine?”
Washington Times, February 14, 2003); (Ami Eden “Israel’s Role: The ‘Elephant They’re
Talking About,” Forward, February 28, 2003); (Spencer S. Hsu, “Moran Said Jews Are
Pushing War,” Washington Post, March 11, 2003); (Lawrence F. Kaplan, “Toxic Talk on
War, “Washington Post, February 18, 2003); and (Robert Novak, “Sharon’s war?” CNN.
com December 26, 2002) and others.
On the eve of the war, Bill Keller, the executive editor of the New York Times
argued that the war was about Israel.827 Haaretz reported in 2001, for Sharon, Saddam
regime was a greater threat to regional stability than Iran.828 Israel joined hands with the
pro-war faction in selling the war to the Bush Administration and American society.829 In
May 2002, Shimon Peres the contemporary foreign minister of Israel said that Saddam
was building nuclear weapons and the US could not wait. The US should overthrow
Saddam.830 Ehud Barak, the former Prime Minister of Israel, the US should overthrow
Saddam from power. After him Arab world would be different.831 Doctor Noman Sattar,
current head of department of American Studies, Quaid-I-Azam University Islamaadid,
Pakistan said in his interview with the researcher that “ Israel was not a factor” because it
did not improve Israel’s position in any way.832
In August 2002, Sharon, the Prime Minister of Israel said that Iraq presented the
“greatest danger” to the existence of Israel.833 Israeli politicians, both former and current
office holders, such as Peres, Sharon and Ehud Barak were silently putting pressure on
Washington not to wait for nuclear Iraq to challenge US interests in the Middle East.
825 “US Assumes UK Help in Iraq, Says General”, Guardian. August 20, 2002
826 Joe Klein. “How Israel is wrapped up in Iraq”, Time. February 10, 2003827 Bill Keller. “Is it Good for the Jews?” New York Times, March 8, 2003
828 Aluf Benn. “Sharon shows Powell His Practical Side”, Ha’aretz. February 26, 2001829 Mearsheimer and Walt, Israel Lobby, 234830 Price, Joyce Howard. “Peres Encourages US Action on Iraq”, Washington Times. May 12, 2002831 Ehud Barak. “No Quick Fix”, Washington Post. June 8, 2002832 Interview with Dr. Noman, July 22, 2016833 Nina Gilbert. “Iraq Poses Greatest Threat”, Jerusalem Post. August 13, 2002
204
Delay to topple Saddam regime could be fatal.834 After the US invasion of Iraq no WMD
were found in Iraq. Then Senate Intelligence Committee issued a report wherein the
Committee wrote that most of the intelligence Israel provided to the US Administration
was “false”.835
Israel portrayed Saddam Hussein as a new Hitler. Israeli leadership claimed that
history would repeat itself if Saddam Hussein was not overthrown.836 Netanyahu further
wrote that the only solution to the Saddam’s nuclear program was a “pre-emptive strike”
against it.837 An opinion poll conducted in Israel on the eve of the war showed that 77.5
percent respondents (Israeli Jews) wanted war on Iraq and removal of Saddam Hussein
from power.838 They favored the use of predominant American military force to
“restructure critical areas of the world” especially the Middle East.839
They included Paul Wolfowitz, Douglas Feith, Richard Perle, Kenneth Adelman,
John Bolton, Elliott Abrams, Scooter Libby, James Woolsey, and David Wurmser. They
also included journalists such as William Kristol, Robert Kagan, Charles Krauthammer
and William Safire. For his distinguished services to Israel, JINSA awarded Wolfowitz
Henry M. Jackson Distinguished Service Award and the Jerusalem Post titled him as
“Man of the Year” in 2003.840 Douglas Feith, Perle and Wurmser were the co-authors of
“Clean Break” report of 1996. The report was written for Netanyahu, the incoming prime
minister of Israel. The report, recommended to Netanyahu, among other things, the
overthrow of Iraqi dictator from power in Iraq.841
George Packer argued, Feith and Wurmser supported the Iraq war due to “Israeli
security interests.”842 James Woolsey, former CIA Director, along with Dick Cheney
834 Jonathan Steele. “Israel Puts Pressure on US to Strike Iraq”, Guardian. August 17, 2002835 Molly Moore. “Israel Shares Blame on Iraq Intelligence, Report says”, Washington Post.
December 5, 2003836 Benjamin Netanyahu. “The Cause for Toppling Saddam”, Wall Street Journal. September 20,
2002837 Ibid838 Ephraim Yaar, and Temar Hermann. “Peace Index: Most Israelis Support Attack on Iraq”,
Ha’aretz. March 6, 2003839 Micheal Hirsh. “Hawks, Doves and Dubya”, Newsweek. September 2, 2002840 Bret Stephens. “Man of The Year”, Jerusalem Post. September 26, 2003841 “A Clean Break: A New Strategy for Securing the Realm”, prepared for the Institute for
Advanced Strategic and Political Studies, Jerusalem: June 1996842 Packer, Assassin’s Gate, 32
205
invoked “Prague Affair” to advocate the war on Iraq.843 Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt
argued that the Jewish Organizations in 2002 supported the US war on Iraq.844
Mortimer Zuckerman, the Chairman of the Conference of Presidents, one of the
outspoken advocates of the US attack on Iraq, frequently made pro-war public
statements. He supported “preventive attack” on Iraq.845 The political leadership of Israel,
the neoconservatives, and majority of Israel Lobby in the US wanted the US to invade
Iraq. However, Iraq war mainly was the function of neoconservatives.846 The
neoconservatives (Israel Lobby in America) wrote two letters to President Clinton on
January 26, 1998 and February 19, 1998, wherein they demanded ouster of Saddam
regime from power in Iraq. Then they lobbied Congress for passing “Iraq Liberation Act”
of October, 1998, which made, henceforth “regime change” in Iraq “official US Iraq
policy” since 1998.847
Then 9/11 came as a turning point to US Iraq policy. The neocons in the Bush
Administration started pushed the President for an invasion of Iraq.848 Some members of
Israel lobby (Neocons) were obsessed with the idea of ousting Saddam Hussein from
power. Bob Woodward cited Colin Powell coming back from the White House meetings
saying “what a fixation about Iraq.”849
A few days after 9/11 tragedy, important neocons wrote an open letter to the
President asking him to overthrow Saddam regime from power even if Saddam Hussein
had no established links with al-Qaeda. America could not win war on terror without
toppling Saddam Hussein. Israel was the most important ally against the US war on
terror. Twelve neocons singed the letter. They included William Bennett, Eliot Cohen,
Robert Kagan, Jeane Kirkpatrick, William Krtistol, Perle, and Norman Podhoretz among
others.850
843 R. James Woolsey. “The Iraq Connection”, Wall Street Journal. October 18, 2001844 Mearsheimer and Walt, Israel Lobby, 241845 Mortimer B. Zuckerman. “Clear and Competing Proof”, US News and World Report. February
10, 2003846 Mearsheimer and Walt, Israel Lobby, 243847 The first letter could be seen on the website of PNAC, www. newamericancentury. org/
iraqclinton/letter.htm (Jan. 26); second letter could be found on the Iraq Watch website, www. iraqwatch. org/perspectives/Rumsfeld-openletter.htm
848 Jacob Weisberg. “Are Neo-cons History”, Financial Times. March 14, 2007849 Woodward, Plan of Attack, 410850 The PNAC letter, 2001
206
Charles Krauthammer argued that Afghanistan would be followed by other rogue
states like Syria, Iran and Iraq. The war on terror would be concluded in Iraq. Robert
Kagan and William Kristol asked for immediate regime change in Iraq after
Afghanistan.851 The neoconservative wing of Israel lobby wrote yet another letter to the
President in April, 2002, wherein they linked Israeli security with the overthrow of
Saddam regime. They also wrote That Israel’s fight against terror was the American
fight.852
The neoconservatives used the same language and the arguments that Israeli
political leadership used against Saddam regime. They argued that Saddam Hussein
would use WMD against the US and Israel. They further argued that he would pass
WMD to terrorists.853 The neoconservatives also manipulated the intelligence for their
cause. In this sense the role of the OSP (The Office of Special Plans) was especially
questionable. The OSP was created after 9/11 with the objective to sell the Iraq war to the
public. The OSP trusted in Ahmad Chalabi for information. Ahmad Chalabi, an exile
Iraqi, was infamously incredible for the State Department and CIA. Expectedly, Chalabi
provided “false information” to the Bush Administration through OSP.854 In this run-up to
war, Ahmad Chalabi “promised” to the Israel lobby to build “good relations with Israel.”
In short, the Israeli leadership, the Israel lobby, especially the neoconservative
pro-war hawks and the international political environment created by 9/11 led the US to
wage a war against Saddam regime in Iraq. The following authors took the same line of
argument. They argued about the regime change in Iraq. The regime change in Baghdad
was the non-compromising objective of the Bush Administration in war on terror. The
war on terror could not be won without removing Saddam from power: (Soros: 2004: 53-
54); (James Risen: 2006: 72-73); (Gurtov:2008:64); (Clarke: 2004: 129-131);
(Walt:2005:209); (Clarke: 2004); (Kolko:2007:96-97); (Suskind: 2004); (Fouskas and
Gokay:2005:134-139); (Packer: 2005: 32,38); (Pijl: 2006:363-365); (Pollack and
Rose:1999); (Pollack: 2002); (Khalidi: 2004:124-137); (Zunes:2003:24); (Young:2006:
851 William Kristol, and Robert Kagan. “The Right War”, Weekly Standard. October 1, 2001852 The PNAC letter, 2002853 Robert Kagan, and William Kristol. “Remember the Bush Doctrine”, Weekly Standard. April
15, 2002854 Franklin Foer. “Founding Fakers”, New Republic, August 18, 2003
207
440-46); and (Pillar, F.A. (March/April2006). Woodward cited President Bush saying
that Saddam Hussein would “use WMD against Israel” and it would be a disaster.855
5.3.8 Oil Security:
In the last century, oil became the important determinant of contemporary world’s
balance from military to economics. All the aspects of oil, especially its production,
refining, and distribution had been dominated by few corporations. Out of these oil
businesses five corporations belonged to America and two to Europe. By 1950, the
Middle East approximately held 49% of global proven oil reserves. By 1990s the
corresponding figure approximately rose to 66% and by 2002 declined to about 64
percent.
A large number of scholars and commentators alleged that energy consideration
was one of the major driving forces behind the US aggression against Iraq. The Middle
East was a huge source of petroleum wealth and Iraq was central to this position. Iraq
was blessed with the “second largest energy reserves” on the globe after Saudi Arabia.
The invasion of Iraq was all about to have strong “control over the oil” the strategic
wealth.856 American presence in Iraq was not due for getting oil. America would get oil,
this way or that way. However, the US wanted “control over the oil” and it was a
different thing.857 The presence of corporations like Halliburton in Iraq was to keep
control over energy resources of Iraq in future.
There were important geopolitical considerations that led to the overthrow of
Saddam regime. The most important one was the “US dependence on foreign oil”. Saudi
Arabia was a treacherous country. It had kept stability within the country but had
supported fundamentalism abroad. In the aftermath of 9/11, Saudi regime was in danger.
It could become a second Iran. It could become unstable the way Iran did in 1979. Iraq
possessed great energy reserves in the world. The Occupation of Iraq removed American
military bases from Saudi Arabia and established in Iraq. Iraq was secure alternative to
Saudi Arabia’s oil in the unstable circumstances after 9/11. The oil supplies were
becoming ever difficult. Reopening of Iraqi oil was a matter of time only. Saddam regime
was dangerous and could not be trusted in. Saddam had to be overthrown. There was no
855 Woodward, Plan of Attack, 186, 188, 320 856 Chomsky, Imperial Ambitions, 6857 Chomsky, Imperial Ambitions, 112
208
other way around. Saddam must go. Control over Iraqi oil and security of Israel
constituted the two basic reasons for the US invasion of Iraq.858
Petroleum had been the life blood of advanced economies. It carried great weight
in the eyes of all nations dealing with the Middle East. In the year 1970, America
produced about 69% of its domestic need while it had been reduced just only to 38% in
1996. American oil imports, from 1960 to 1996, increased about four fold. The oil supply
to the US, from the Persian Gulf was 8.8% in 1983 while the same figure rose to 22.1%
in 2000-mostly from Saudi Arabia. The region carried even great significance for Europe
and Japan in terms of oil supply. The region possessed round about 65% of the global
reserves of petroleum and 35% of natural gas.859 The US consumption from 2000-2020
was approximately expected to rise from about 19 to 26 million barrels daily. The 7
million barrels of oil increase for daily consumption must be imported. However, the
world competition for oil imports was getting intense. The leverage of the Persian Gulf
oil producers was likely to increase in coming days and decision makers in Washington
knew more than others did.860
The US move in Iraq was motivated by its desire to have “control over world’s
greatest petroleum reserves”. About 25% of US petroleum consumption was supplied
from the Gulf.861 Today America controlled Iraq. Iraqis knew it and we also knew it. Iraq
was a country with lot of oil and America needed the oil.862 The US invasion of Iraq in
2003 had its one of the basic motives to establish control over the world’s great
petroleum reserves.863
It might be argued that control over oil was the prime motive of US invasion of
Iraq in 2003. In the year 2003, some high-ups in the Bush Administration believed it was
vital to the US national interest. President Bush and the Vice President, Dick Cheney
came from “oil industry” background and they knew the “centrality of oil” in industry in
the US.864 America was the “biggest consumer of oil” in the world.
858 Soros, Bubble of American Supremacy, 52-54859 Kolko, Age of War, 40860 Ibid861 Zunes, Tinderbox, 102862 William Loonay. Defence Week. November, 1998863 Kepel, War for Muslim Minds, 69864 Jackson and Towle, Temptations of Power, 40
209
9/11 provided the US with an opportunity which could be exploited to change the
situation. Consequently, America used its military forces to transform the entire Muslim
Middle East. At the same time America would get control of Iraqi oil. Control over oil
certainly was one of the major reasons of US attack against Iraq.865 Iraq was situated in
the Middle East. That was the central reason of its invasion. It was invaded to secure
“control of its oil” reserves, among other things, to dominate the region.866 People in Iraq
thought that it was an “imperial project” to get control over the Muslim oil in the Middle
East and to protect Israel.867 Gunter Grass, a German novelist, alleged that the Bush
Administration invaded Iraq for oil. That was the only real interest of Washington in
Iraq.868
Cheney Commission gave its report on the US energy situation in 2001. The
report said that the First Gulf War returned the Western oil companies in the field which
were ousted by a wave of nationalization in 1970s. The sanctions imposed over Iran, Iraq,
and Libya restored US hegemony in international markets which it had lost to OPEC in
1970s, argued Peter Odell, an oil expert. The European oil companies suffered severely
as a result of these sanctions. America threatened Saudi Arabia in 2000, for the
application of US anti-trust laws on OPEC making it illegal if it did not increase oil
production.
In May 2001, the Cheney Commission said that the US level of dependence on oil
imports would increase to “66% by 2020” from its current 52%. To ensure increased
supply, Washington would ask producers to produce more and sell it to the international
consumers including the US. The five OPEC members of the Middle East-Saudi Arabia,
Iran, Iraq, Kuwait and UAE, owned “66% of World’s petroleum reserves but produced
only 27%” of the world production in 1997. In order to realize Cheney Commission
projection, there must be a major political restructuring of the Middle East region. The
US war on Iraq for “regime change” was motivated by energy security in the Persian
Gulf region.869
865 Jackson and Towle, Temptations of Power, 40866 Steele, Defeat, 250 867 Ibid, 4868 Shawcross, Allies, 90869 Pijl, Global Rivalries, 363
210
The US domestic production of oil hit its peak in 1970. Then it started declining,
and 1970 was the year when the US dependence on imported oil started. It was in the
backdrop of 1973 Arab-Israeli war that the Arab OPEC members used oil as a weapon
and imposed oil embargo on the US in October 1973. From 1970 to 2005, there had been
a “468% increase in oil prices.”870 Since then oil became a weapon of war. The US
secretary of defense, Harold Brown, testified before Congress in 1977 that the most
serious threat to the security of the US was the deficiency of secure energy resources. In
1980, President Carter explained US interests in Persian Gulf in what was known as “the
Carter Doctrine.” The President said that there was an overwhelming dependence of the
Western industrialized nations on oil supplies from the Persian Gulf region. We would
not allow any outside power to change the status quo in the Middle East. For the US, it
would an assault on our “vital interests” in the region. The US would use force to repel
such an eventuality.871
President Carter ordered the World Bank to invest in search of and find more
resources of oil.872 In 1979, Revolution in Iran changed a lot. America lost Iran, its
dependable source of oil in the Persian Gulf. Now the US needed another country in the
region to replace Iran and ensure supply of oil to the US. After the loss of Iran, Iraq was
the best option in the region. It had “second largest oil reserves” in the world. Whatever
his demerits but Saddam Hussain was a potential ally.873 For the Bush Administration,
war hawks, and the US Corporations, the three interlocking groups and policy makers,
Iraq represented three things “oil, wealth and power”. After 9/11, Iraq presented them
with a big opportunity for their imperial ambitions. Consequently, they invaded Iraq and
got access to the Iraqi oil.874
In the 2000 Bush/Cheney Presidential election campaign, the oil and gas industry
donated 2 million dollars – a big amount. In 2004 campaign they donated even more
money. It was for the first time in US history that the President, Vice President, and
secretary of state belonged to one sector. All the three were former energy sector
officials. The big US oil and gas companies, twenty nine in number, earned $43 billion in
870 Juhasz, Bush Agenda, 65871 Ibid872 Yergin, The Prize, 625873 Juhasz, Bush Agenda, 156874 Ibid, 183-184
211
profits in 2003 and the corresponding figure rose to $68 billion in 2004. In 2005, the
three top companies–Exxon–Mobil, Chevron, and Conoco Philips, earned about $64
billion from oil profits. More than half of this oil profit went to Texas-based Exxon-
Mobil. Exxon-Mobil profits represented the “highest figure” in world history in both
2004 and 2005.875
The new laws of Iraq favored the “US corporate control” of Iraqi oil. In one year
only 2003-2004, the value of American petroleum imports from Iraq increased by “86
%”.876 The US used 9/11 as a pretext to impose war on Iraq to restore “US hegemony
over Persian Gulf oil”. Some factors were behind this decision. There was a recent
increase in US petroleum imports from the Persian Gulf region. The US share of Gulf oil
import was 8 percent in 1985 but it had become 21 percent in 2003. According to the
studies conducted by the Center for Global Energy Studies, the US dependence on Gulf
oil would go upto 43 percent in 2000s. If the US domestic production would not increase,
rather would be reduced further, then the US dependence level on “Gulf oil” might
increase to “57 percent”.877
Traditionally, the US oil hegemony depended on Saudi Arabia. The alliance was
in doubt now. Saudi Arabia was birthplace of the founder of al-Qaeda and majority of
9/11 hijackers. Due to bin Laden movement the “US dependence on Saudi oil” faced an
uncertain future. The US occupation of Iraq provided a replacement of Saudi Arabia,
among other things.878 There was a strong evidence to prove that the decision makers in
the Bush Administration got lucrative profits in Iraq. The president, of course, included
and got reelected.879 Robert Fisk, a journalist, argued from Amman in January, 2003, that
it was all “about oil”.880 In January 2003, the US Department of Energy declared that by
2025, the US oil imports for its domestic consumption would increase to 70 percent.
Again in January 2003, wrote Michael Runner of the World Watch Institute that the “US
875 Tom Petruno. “Taking Aim at Oil’s Riches”, Los Angles Times. October 26, 2005876 Juhasz, Bush Agenda, 8877 Fadhil Jafar Al-Chalabi. “Comment”, Energy Studies Review 4, no 1, (1992), 40-44878 Fawn and Hinnebusch, Iraq War, 255879 Jan Nederveen Pieterse. Globalization or Empire? (Routledge, 2004), 47-54880 Robert Fisk. “This Looming War is not about Chemical Warheads or Human Rights: it’s about
Oil”, The Independent, January 18, 2003
212
oil reserves were depleting”. A large portion of the future supply would come from Gulf
region.881 The US could not take control of Iraq’s oil.882
Anthony Sampson, while writing in August 2002, observed that the US oil
companies were in “danger of running short” in supplies. They were looking on Iraq as
an alternative to Saudi Arabian oil. In the run-up to war, there was widespread view that
the US was worried about oil supplies from Saudi Arabia, and wanted to get control over
Iraq’s oil. The US was contemplating three alternatives. First, there was a secret plan to
partition Saudi Arabia leaving holy places to Saudi Arabia while capturing oil fields.
Now it was time to end the US reliance on Saudi oil.883 The US simply desired to replace
Saudi Arabian oil supplies with Iraq.
Dan Morgan and David B. Ottaway argued that overthrow of Saddam regime
from power in Baghdad would “open a bonanza for the US oil companies” that were
replaced by French and Russian oil companies since First Gulf War.884 The US needed 20
million barrels oil daily. It had to import half of this need. For the US it was a matter of
life and death and could not be ignored. However such things were not generally said on
media. Paul Wolfowitz said in a summit in Singapore that America had “no choice in
Iraq” whatsoever. The US invasion of Iraq in 2003 was about oil. Oil was its primary
consideration.885 Scholars in Pakistan whom the researcher personally interviewed like
Dr. Noman Sattar, Dr. Riaz, Dr.Tahir Amin believed that oil was one of the factors in
making US decision to invade Iraq.
5.3.9 The Leverage against Rival Powers:
It had been a characteristic feature of great powers that they acted as offshore balancers
in other regions of the world. They exploited an “opportunity to increase their share of
world power”. As offshore balancer they also denied the benefits to rival powers. Noam
Chomsky wrote that the US did not care much about terror. The decision makers knew
very well that the attack on Iraq was likely to increase terrorism.886 Chomsky cited
Chalmers Johnson’s view that it was good to have military bases in the heart of the
881 Fisk, Loomin War, January 18, 2003882 UNSC Resolution 986, 1995883 Irwin Stelzer. Sunday Times. August 11, 2002884 Dan Morgan, and David B. Ottaway. “In Iraqi War Scenario, Oil is Key Issue”, Washington
Post. September 15, 2002885 Simons, Future Iraq, 263886 Chomsky, Imperial Ambitions, 112
213
Middle East, the largest oil producing region of the world. It was important. It was not
important because the US wanted oil supply for its domestic consumption but because it
wanted “control over oil”. It was entirely a different matter. The “control over oil” had
been a big leverage against the enemy powers since 1940’s. Europe and Asia had been
the US rival powers. Europe and Asia could move toward independent policies spinning
out of US control. The control over the “oil leverage” would prevent that keeping the
leverage with itself.887
The Middle East carried great strategic importance on the globe. It remained a
source of contest among great powers for more than 4000 years. It was located at the
interjection of three continents and source of big oil reserves. The US State Department
declared that the Middle East was one of “the greatest material prizes” in human history,
a great “economic prize” on the globe for investment abroad.888 President Eisenhower
while talking about the importance of the Middle East said that the Middle East was the
region that carried “greatest strategic importance” on the globe.889
The Gulf monarchies were allies of the US. These monarchies owned big oil
reserves and the US needed its access to these reserves. Some scholars argued that the US
wanted to use their oil as a leverage against oil hungry/dependent Europe and Japan.890
Some scholars correctly observed that the US was less dependent on the Middle Eastern
oil than “Europe and East Asia”. The control over Iraq was important. Iraq was the
country that possessed “second largest oil reserves in the world”. It also was bordered by
three of the globe’s five largest petroleum producers-Saudi Arabia, Kuwait etc. If
America would successfully establish its hold over Iraq and permanent military bases
there, it would give her an important leverage over Europe and Japan. The US could use
Gulf oil as a “trump card against Europe and Japan in future trade wars”. Same was right
about China. In a sense, it was a repetition of nineteenth-century “great power politics” to
establish control over key economic resources of the world.891
887 Ibid888 “Foreign Relations of the US, 1945, Vol. viii” cited in Joyce and Gabriel Kolko, The Limits of
Power. New York: Harper and Row, 1972: 45889 Steven Spiegal. The Other Arab-Israel Conflict. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985),
51890 Noam Chomsky. Towards a New Cold War. (New York: Pantheon Books, 1982), 97-98891 Fawn and Hinnebusch, Iraq War, 29
214
Geoff Simons gave the same argument as above. The oil supply to the US from
Saudi Arabia had uncertain future due to “rise of Islamic fundamentalism” in that
country. American military presence in Iraq, heart of the Middle East, would remove
uncertainties about oil supply to the US. Additionally, America would get “great leverage
over other nations around the globe”, the nations that mostly depended on Arab oil,
particularly Japan, the trade rival of the US. Moreover, the increased leverage of the US
on the other oil producers of the Middle East would provide US another additional
benefit to extract maximum advantages from Iraqi Oil. For example, America might force
Kuwait and Iran to give up their compensation claims against Iraq, a country with
destroyed oil industry.892
James Woolsey, former CIA Director, gave a vivid picture of the US position.
The issue was straightforward. Russia and France had oil interests in Iraq, the two
countries whose oil companies had been working in Iraq since the aftermath of First Gulf
War. They had oil contracts in Iraq. If Russia and France cooperated with the US in
invasion of Iraq then they would be rewarded, otherwise they would be exiled form
Iraq.893 If there would be an invasion of Iraq, then the existing oil contracts would end.
Russian President Putin was worried about the situation and wanted financial and oil
guarantees from the US.894
In January 2003, New York Times argued that war planners in Washington were
prepared to takeover oilfields of Iraq quickly. The report of “The Oil Depletion Analysis
Centre” declared that the Britain’s domestic oil production in the North Sea region had
been under decline since 1999. It had increased British dependence on imported oil. It
meant that Blair government also wanted share in post-Saddam Iraqi oil. Jack Straw, the
British foreign minister, while addressing a meeting of 150 British ambassadors in
London, declared that security of energy sources was the top priority of this
government.895
The American control of oil at source, as much as possible, would give a great
leverage to the US around the globe. Anglo-American military adventure in Iraq was for
892 Simons, Future Iraq, 255893 Ibid, 260894 Carola Hoyos. “Putin Drives Hard Bargain with US over Iraq’s Oil”, The Financial Times.
London, October 4, 2002895 Simons, Future Iraq, 263
215
control over oil supplies the world-over. Sanctions had been a common feature of the US
foreign policy. Washington used economic coercion against its rival powers. Having
largest petroleum reserves on the globe under its security, and protection in the Middle
East in a post-Saddam world and flanked by the US role in Central Asia could be a big
feast. It meant, America would be in a position to switch off, if possible, the current
economic boom of China. And so could happen with Japan and India as well.896
5.3.10 Intense Propaganda Campaign:
In September 2002, President Bush and his administration announced the new NSS based
on Bush Doctrine of preemption, unilateralism and regime change. Again it was in
September 2002, the administration launched a propaganda campaign against Saddam
regime in Baghdad. Saddam regime was depicted as an imminent threat to the US
national security at home and its global interests abroad. The most important feature of
this propaganda campaign was to establish operational link between Saddam Hussain and
al-Qaida culminating into 9/11. It was also accused that Saddam regime was planning
more attacks against the US. The campaign equated with mid-term Congress elections in
the US. The campaign was successful with high approval rates of policy on terror and
also won the election targets.897
It was clear from the start that the propaganda offensive against Iraq “lacked
credibility”. The administration even resorted to plain “lies” to achieve its objectives in
Iraq.898 Washington opposed UN inspections. The underlying reason was that the
Administration already knew nothing would be found in Iraq. It would discredit the
Administration’s stand. The propaganda campaign was meant to seduce American people
to support the Administration’s war plan in Iraq.899
The anti-Saddam propaganda campaign bore fruit. Within a couple of weeks,
about 60 percent American people saw the Iraq regime as a “looming threat” to the US.
Consequently, Saddam must be overthrown immediately under the right of self-defense.
About 50 percent American population believed that the dictator was “personally
896 Mark Almond. “It’s All about Control, Not the Rise of Petrol”, The New Statesman. April 7, 2003
897 Chomsky, Power and Terror, 3898 Blitzer. “Interview of Rice”, CNN. September 8, 2002899 Mearsheimer and Walt, Unnecessay War, 56-57
216
involved” in the 9/11 tragedy. Jim Rutenberg and Robin Toner also confirmed this
baseless propaganda offensive against Saddam regime.900
The Propaganda campaign within domestic environment of America succeeded in
establishing links between 9/11 and Iraqi dictator. About 90 percent Americans believed
that Saddam Hussain was aiding and abetting international terrorists who were actively
planning terrorism against the US. The propaganda campaign involved “systematic
mendacity” to discredit Saddam regime. The campaign worked with Congress which
granted President Bush authority to invade Saddam regime.901
The propaganda offensive was led by the President, Vice President and Rumsfeld.
All the three persistently made unequivocal statements about presence of WMD in Iraq.
This campaign against Saddam regime proceeded by “rhetorical hyperbole and involved
deliberate twisting of facts.”902 There were important reasons for the invasion of Iraq but
they, expectedly, remained undeclared. They included oil and Israel. The war on Iraq had
to befitted in the context of 9/11 happening and the US war against terror. The
propaganda offensive based on “misinformation” was led by the President himself. In so
doing, he might have been deceived by the neoconservatives around him. The issue of oil
supply was not debated at all.903 The Western propaganda campaign geared up in
September 2002. Saddam Hussain’s past activities were especially focused to malign him
and to prepare ground for an invasion of Iraq.904 Notorious impressions like “Axis of
Evil” and “new Hitler” were used against Saddam.
5.3.11 Invasion of Iraq under False Pretexts:
The US invasion of Iraq proved to be an incredibly questionable affair. The declared
rationale of this war included two objectives/ causes – Iraq’s WMD and links with al-
Qaeda leading to 9/11. In retrospective, both proved wrong. The rationale of invasion was
seriously questioned in the run-up to war. The invasion of Iraq was a predetermined
affair, at least since 9/11 tragedy. Ron Suskind gave a vivid account of “false pretexts”
leading up to war. He argued nothing could stop President Bush short of war on Iraq. 905
900 Jim Rutenberg, and Robin Toner. “A Nation at War”, New York Time. March 22, 2003901 Chomsky, Power and Terror, 19902 Packer, Assassin’s Gate, 62903 Soros, Bubble of American Supremacy, 25-26904 Simons, Future Iraq, 273905 Suskind, Way of the World, 367
217
He had written a long story about the involvement of intelligence of the US,
Britain, Jordan and Iraq. A senior official of the British intelligence Shipster,
manoeuvered a contact with Iraqi intelligence Chief Habbush, through Saad Khayr,
Jordanian intelligence chief. In the run up to war, Habbush met Shipster in Jordan.
Habbush told Shipster in plain words that Iraq had no WMD. Richard Dearlove, the chief
of British Intelligence, himself flew to Washington and told Bush Administration’s high
ups about this fact. But Bush Administration disregarded this disclosure and rejected it
summarily. Consequently Iraq was invaded and nothing as WMD was found there. The
author ended his account with the remarks that the US invaded Iraq “under false
pretenses.”906 Actually, Habbush undercut the US declared justification of war. Ron
Suskind even argued that many personnel in intelligence – CIA, believed it was just
“denial and deception strategy” the Administration followed.907
The US Administration saw in 9/11 a big opportunity to mobilize public opinion
in support of war against terror. The Administration had other projects to perform and
other motives to achieve. After 9/11 President Bush said this was the “great opportunity.”
Rumsfeld declared it a “great opportunity to restructure” the world.908How this war
against terror could turn on Iraq? The Bush Administration wanted to extend war on
terror to Iraq. For the end to achieve, President Bush linked Iraq with al-Qaeda. And
Saddam regime was actively involved in the development of WMD. Iraq was an
“imminent threat” to the US security. Later on, all those claims of Bush Administration
were discredited. There was almost conclusive evidence that the decision makers
“deliberately exaggerated” unreliable claims. The war party knew that Iraq was not a
threat to the US security. It was a “false pretext” they used to wage war against Iraq.909
The above cited report concluded that the Iraq’s WMD were no more a threat to
the US. The nuclear program of Iraq had been suspended over the years and production
capabilities for chemical weapons were also destroyed. Furthermore, Iraq had been under
sanctions over the years. Consequently, Iraq was no more an “immediate threat” to the
US security. There was no functional linkage between Saddam regime and Osama bin
906 Suskind, Way of the World, 361-373907 Ibid, 365908 Woodward, Plan of Attack, 32-37909 Joseph Cirincione, Jessica Mathews and George Perkovich. WMD in Iraq. The Report of the
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 2004, 291
218
Laden.910 The report finally concluded that CIA’s “NIE of October 2002 was
intentionally misrepresented”. The Bush Administration knowingly did that. None of
Colin Powell’s claims before the UNSC stood the test of verification.911 The “Duelfer
Report” prepared by special adviser to the CIA, after pain-taking work for 15 months
involving 1200 CIA inspectors, finally concluded that Iraq was in no more possession of
WMD but it had destroyed them all after First Gulf War.912
“The Kean Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks” also gave
the same conclusion that there was no functional “linkage” between Saddam and Osama
bin Laden.913 After investigation, the “US Senate Intelligence Committee” finally
declared in July, 2004, that “unqualified claims” about “Iraq’s nuclear status” must not
had been extended as a proof and included in NIE of October, 2002.914 Scott Ritter argued
that a large number of former weapons inspectors who worked in Iraq refuted the case of
immediate threat from Iraq in the run-up to Iraq war.915
George Tenet, the contemporary head of CIA, in his statement before Congress
testified in February 2001 that Iraq was “no imminent threat to American security” and
CIA had no clear evidence that Iraq was making a nuclear bomb. Despite this all the CIA
reviewed its stance on Iraq’s WMD in NIE of October, 2002. The NIE of October 2002
played a decisive role in Congress authorizing the administration to invade Iraq.916
Sheldon Rampton and John Stauber argued that the Bush Administration deceived on the
issue of Iraq’s WMD. The authors gave a list of deceptions. The important deceptions
included the deception on aluminum tubes, deception on drones that could reach
America, deception on yellow cake, deception on Atta affair.917
The following authors gave empirical evidence that the Bush Administration
“deliberately distorted facts and misled public opinion” in America about Iraq, al-Qaeda
and WMDs: (Colonel Karen Kwiatkowski, “The New Pentagon Papers,” ; (David Corn, 910 Cirincione et al, WMD in Iraq, 2004911 Ibid912 Hiro, Secrets and Lies, 507913 Ibid, 505914 Ibid, 504915 Scott Ritter. “Not Everyone Got it Wrong on Iraq's Weapons”, International Herald Tribune.
February, 6, 2004916 Jason Leopold. “CIA Intelligence Reports Seven Months Before 9/11, said Iraq Posed No
Threat to US”, September 21, 2005917 Sheldon Rampton, and John Clyde Stauber. Weapons of Mass Deception: The Uses of
Propaganda in Bush's War on Iraq. Penguin, 2003: 79-99
219
“Willful Ignorance”, Tompaine.com); (John B. Judis and Spencer Ackerman, “The
Selling of the Iraq War,” New Republic, 30 June , 2003); (Seymour Hersh, “Selective
Intelligence,” New Yorker, 12 May, 2003); (Julian Borger, “The Spies Who Pushed for
War,” Guardian, 17 July 2003); and (Jason Leopold, “CIA Probe Finds Secret Pentagon
Group Manipulated Intelligence on Iraqi Threat,”).
Most importantly, Paul Wolfowitz admitted in an interview, though after the war,
the issue of Iraq’s WMD was used to mobilize public support in America for US war on
Iraq.918 George Tenet argued about the issue of “Curve Ball,” possibly a fabrication in the
custody of BND, the German intelligence. The invasion of Iraq was a settled fact.919 The
CIA permitted “flawed information” about the WMD issue. The Congress, the Bush
Administration, the UN and the world at large got that “flawed information” and
“believed” in it. It must not have happened like that.920 Our “judgments on Iraq proved
wrong” argued Tenet.921
In addition to the above cited empirical evidence the following authors also made
the same argument. That the declared reasons / rationale of war – WMD and al-Qaeda
links with Iraq proved discredited. There was intentional distortion of facts, maneuvering
of intelligence and exaggerations involving even selective citations of facts and outright
deceptions: (Soros: 2004: 54, 58); (Packer: 2005: 62); (Suskind: 2006: 243); (Peter
Galbraith: 2006: 84); (Gurtov: 2008: 80-83); (Walt:2005: 59); (Black: 2008: 210);
Brigham: 2006:X); and (Blix: 2004: 232-34).
5.3.12 Control over the New Epicenter of World Politics:
With the end of the Cold War and disintegration of the USSR, era of bipolar world ended.
So did stability of the Cold War. The era of unipolarity started with the predominant
position of the US, the only superpower left on the world political stage.922 The
geopolitical and geo-economic environment of the world underwent radical
transformation. There were major regional powers in the new unipolar world. However,
none of these powers militarily matched with the US, economically and in technological
918 Paul Wolfowitz. Guardian. June 4, 2003919 Tenet and Harlow, Centre of the Storm, 383920 Tenet and Harlow, Centre of the Storm, 383921 Ibid, 493922 Eric J. Hobsbawn. The Age of Extremes: A History of the World, 1914-1991. (New York:
Vintage, 1994), 9-11
220
advancement. Relatively, the US was left free to use its military strength to dominate the
world and also to use it as a political leverage to dominate major natural resources on the
globe.
There emerged a fierce competition among major powers of the post-Cold War
world-the US, Russia and China, to exploit the natural resources of Eurasia, the land that
stretched from Germany to China. Eurasia had been a super-continent with huge natural
resources.923 America was in the leading role in this competition with huge military
spending. The persistent use of its military might in international arena was a witness to
its declinist position in the post-Cold War world. Critics argued that predominant military
power of the US was a “trump card” in the US hands to prevail over US rivals on the
world political landscape in this drive for resources.924
The American global hegemonic status rested on three elements. Firstly, control
over the resources of oil; secondly, monopoly over transport routes for energy supply,
and thirdly other strategic resources supply the other industrial powers needed. Access to
oil resources was the prime and vital interest of the US. America predominated control
over energy resources of Eurasia, most specifically Central Asia and the Middle East.925
Oil constituted, without any exaggeration, the lifeblood of world economy. The life and
death struggle had been going on to establish control over the energy resources among
the major powers of the world. The US superpower status was dependent on the control
of oil resources. America was the largest oil consumer in the world. America needed
control over the oil reserves/fields of the world. Approximately, American energy
expenditure in 2000 was $558 billion, one-fourth of the world total. Industrial sector was
the largest consumer.926 American military supremacy was unprecedented in world
history in the post-Cold War world.927
After the removal of Saddam regime from power, America did not choose early
with-drawl from Iraq. The neoconservative hawks in the Bush Administration wanted
“prolonged occupation” of Iraq. The presence of US occupation forces in Iraq would
923 C. Clover. “Dreams of the Eurasian Heartland”, Foreign Affairs. 78, (March/April 1999), 9924 Andre Gunder Frank. “NATO, Caucasus/ Central Asia Oil”, World Socialist Web Site. June 16,
1999 925 Z. Brzezinski. “A Geostrategy for Asia”, Foreign Affairs. (September/October 1997)926 “Energy Highlights of the US”, Energy Policy Division, April 2002927 P. Beaumont, and E. Vulliamy. “Armed to the Teeth”, The Observer. February 10, 2002
221
develop a new pressure on Iran and Syria. It would also develop the US military bases in
Iraq.928 In May 2007, Robert Gates, the US defense secretary, said that America wanted a
“long and enduring presence” in post-Saddam Iraq. The US occupation forces would
withdraw to the military bases recently established in Iraq. For majority of Iraqis it meant
Washington deliberated “imperial ambitions” in Iraq to control oil of the country.929 For
the multiple reasons America was not going to withdraw her military forces soon from
the Middle East. There was a crisis situation in the region. It would not be a smart
move.930
In March 2007, the Saudi Monarch went public on the US-Iraq policy. The king
called American military presence in Iraq as “illegal foreign occupation”. The next
month, Rice sent David Satterfield met Saudi Monarch, king Abdullah of Saudi Arabia
remained the most trusted ally of America in the region for more than 50 years. Saudi
Arabia was a Sunni Muslim State. Saudi Monarch wanted a Sunni ruler in Iraq who
would not be a tyrant like Saddam. Shia dominated government in post-Saddam Iraq was
nightmare for Saudis and Satterfield understood king Abdullah’s concern on “Shia
crescent” from Iran to Syria.
King Abdullah’s meeting with Satterfield remained “uncomfortable”. King was
angry. America had handed over Iraq to Iran, said the king. A Shia led government in
Baghdad would never be “independent” of Iran. On this, Satterfield’s reply was a true
reflection of US policy in Iraq. On this issue Satterfield replied that “America was here”.
The US had been here in the Middle East for more than 50 years. “America was not
going anywhere”. Satterfield further said that President Bush was committed to Iraq. So
did to the region, America would remain here. America was not going anywhere.931
General (Retd) Jack Keane had an important assignment in Iraq to perform. He
went to see General David Petraeus, the field commander in Iraq, at his residence. While
discussing the situation in Iraq General (Retd.) Keane said to Petraeus that the Middle
East was “The center of gravity for international security and strife in the world”. In the
last century “It had been Europe”. Two world wars were fought in Europe. In the 21 st
928 Steele, Defeat, 9929 Robert Gates. “US looking to long term presence in Iraq”, Agency France Press. June 1, 2007930 Interview with Dr. Noman, July 22, 2016931 Woodward, War Within, 347-348
222
century, “It would be the Middle East”. America “will fight other wars in the Middle
East.”932
Keane visited Iraq for the second time in March, 2008, to discuss next assignment
of General Petraeus. During the discussion with Petraeus, Keane said important things
about the Middle East. Bob Woodward quoted those words. The “global center of
gravity” was in the Middle East now. The US was going to stay in the Middle East “for
50 years” at least. During this stay America would do a number of things. America would
“fight other wars” in the region. America would “militarily confront radical Islam” and
that America would protect its “economic interests in the region” as well. America would
formulate a national military strategy for the Middle East. America was “going to do it”
at any cost and “anyway”. The US had “no choice”. The US military forces did not want
to do that. They wanted “to end war and go home”. Without any doubt that was “not
going to happen.”933
Condoleezza Rice, the US Secretary of State, chaired a meeting in the State
Department in May, 2008. She discussed many things at length in the meeting. Her words
were thought provoking and reflected US future policy in the Middle East. The important
ideas she uttered were as follows: The “real battlefield against al-Qaeda” was the Middle
East. America was to defeat it there. She maintained that America had got a “better
posture in the Middle East as a result of Iraq” war. On Iran, she talked in plain words.
Iran was a “challenge to US interests in the Middle East” and America would not “let
Iran to become nuclear power” anyway. Nuclear status would make Iran “dominant
regional power”. For sure, Iran would be either “transformed or defeated.”934 Rice
declared further that “the center of American power” had moved from “Europe to the
Middle East”. In post-WWII era “the epicenter of American military might” had been in
“Europe” however, it had now “shifted to the Middle East”. America did not intervene in
Iraq to continue the status quo. A “historical change” had started and America was there
to “supervise” it.935
Bob Woodward conducted a number of interviews with President George W.
Bush from December 2001 to May 2008. The last interview was conducted on May 21, 932 Ibid, 392-393933 Woodward, War Within, 410934 Ibid, 421-423935 Ibid, 423
223
2008. The last interview carried special importance for this thesis. Woodward asked the
President about the US national security. What worried the President most? The answer
was the “rise of radical fundamentalism” in the Middle East. The most thematic question
Woodward put was about the region. Was there any “recentering of American might” in
the Middle East? The President replied, “Absolutely”. The President explained there were
multiple reasons: 9/11 emanated from the Middle East. More attacks were expected. A
“nuclear Iran” was a dangerous idea. Woodward asked did it mean “the US military
hegemony” in the Middle East ? President’s answer was a classic replied America had
“freedom hegemony” in the region. Wherever American forces had been deployed in the
region, they had been positioned there on the “invitation of respective governments to
protect them” to give them security.936
5.3.13 Prolonged US Military Presence in Middle East:
The US world system of “military bases from the pacific to the Azores” was established
for military operations in the “Middle East” particularly in the “Persian Gulf” region.
Since 1976, President Carter’s period, the “Persian Gulf region” had been the main target
of the major “US intervention forces.”937 One consequence of the US war on Afghanistan
was the establishment of military bases in Afghanistan and Central Asia with two basic
objectives to achieve. One was to establish control over Central Asian resources. Other
was “encirclement of the Persian Gulf”. The Iraq war also left bases in Iraq, the heart of
the Middle East.938 Diego Garcia was the only reliable military base until recently nearby
the Middle East.939
It had been argued that America long wanted to establish permanent military
bases in the Persian Gulf region. The US conquest of Iraq in 2003 fulfilled this desire.940
In 2004, the Bush Administration announced a plan for the redeployment of troops,
mainly from Germany and South Korea. These troops were to be redeployed mainly in
Caucasus, the Middle East, and Central Asia.941 After First Gulf War in 1991, the US
military presence in the Persian Gulf region became permanent. The underlying concern
936 Woodward, War Within, 425937 Chomsky, Power and Terror, 162938 Thorn Shanker, and Eric Schmitt. “Pentagon Expects Long-Term Access to Four Key Bases in
Iraq,” New York Times. April 20, 2003939 Ibid940 Cirincione et al, WMD in Iraq, 2004941 Gurtov, Superpower on Crusade, 46
224
was the ever present danger to the allied Arab countries from Iraq and Iran. The US
asserted that she was under an “obligation to safeguard the security” of six allied Arab
monarchies, the GCC.942
Tom Vanden Brook citing official sources from the Defense Department argued
in July 2014 about the presence of 35,000 US troops in the Middle East. Mainly, the
troops had been deployed in Kuwait and Jordan along with destructive military
weaponry. Along with the troops, there were about 90 air force fighters and more than 50
ships in the region.943 David Martosko wrote in June 2014, citing Commander Bill
Speaks, US Central Command Spokesman, that America maintained 35000 troops in the
Middle East and a combined Air Operations Center in Qatar. The US navy’s 5 th fleet was
also stationed in Bahrain. The spokesperson further said that the US had “significant
military presence” in and around the Middle East.944 In June 2014, there were
approximately 10,000 US troops deployed in Kuwait and the sme number in Jordan.945
The number of US troops deployed in each country in the Middle East based on
information from US Department of Defense as late as June 30, 2014.The deployment
was as followed: (Iraq-2350, Kuwait-13021, Bahrain-3227, Qatar-592, Saudi Arabia-332,
Turkey-1539, Egypt-267, and UAE-313).946 There was an increase in number of US
troops in Iraq owing to the activities of ISIS in Iraq. Now the number arose to about
3100.947
5.3.14 Drive for Global Hegemony:
The historians especially from the US argued that America had become an empire, much
like the great empires of history such as the Greek, the Roman, and the British. Some
historians even argued that America always aspired to be an “imperial power”. Historian
Richard Van Alstyne called America, by the standard of its very policies, an “imperial
power” not different from the empires of the times passed. It grew like Roman Empire.948
942 Zunes, Tinderbox, 64943 Tom Vander Brook. “U.S. Troops Won't Fight in Iraq Battles, Hagel Says”, USA TODAY, July
3, 2014944 David Martosko. The US is Armed to the Teeth in the Middle East: What Are the Options?
Mail Online. June 12, 2014945 Ibid946 “United States Military Deployments”. Wikipedia.947 “American Troops”. BBC. November 10, 2014948 Richard Warner Van Alstyne. The American Empire: Its Historical Pattern and Evolution. No.
43. (Historical Association, 1960), 10-11
225
Similarly, Gore Vidal wrote, since its inception America entertained imperial
ambitions.949 William Appleman, much like Alstyne called America “an empire” that
evolved like Roman Empire of the past.950 The imperialist policy adopted by Presidents
Mckinley and Theodore Roosevelt in the last decade of 19th century and first decade of
20th century respectively became the defining feature of the US foreign policy since
then.951
He further wrote that American empire was not a result of deliberate planning, it
was a “benevolent empire.”952 Furthermore, overwhelming majority of writers saw
America as an “informal empire” and not a formal one. America sought “economic
control” rather than “political and military” control.953 By about 1930 A.D., the US
industrial production had increased greatly, equal to the combined production of
Germany, France, UK, Russia, Italy and Japan.954 America acquired overseas territories
for the first time after Spanish -American War of 1898. It was an imperial war which
America imposed over Spain. The US got Philippines, Puerto Rico, Guam, and Hawaii as
a war prize. The US also became a Pacific power.955
Petras and Morley wrote in 1995 that as American empire expanded, the US as a
republic receded.956 Woodrow Wilson won elections in 1916 for keeping America out of
WWI. Franklin Delano Roosevelt won elections in 1940 by promising not to send “our
boys overseas” to fight. Lyndon Johnson won elections in 1964 as a “peace candidate”
and, Bill Clinton won in 1992 to direct the US energy to be focused on “internal affairs”
of the country. All the four Presidents, contrary to their election promises, sent American
troops abroad. Wilson and Roosevelt entered in two World Wars respectively, Johnson
sent American troops to Vietnam, and similarly Clinton made military interventions in
Bosnia 1995, and in Kosovo in 1999.957
949 Gore Vial. Armageddon: Essays 1983-1987. (London: Andre Deutsch,1987), 118950 William Appleman. Tragedy of American Diplomacy. (WW Norton & Company. 1959), 59951 Appleman, Tragedy of American Diplomacy, 59952 Ronald Steele. Max Americana. (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1968), 15953 Geir Lundestad. The American Empire and Other Studies of US Foreign Policy in a
Comparative Perspective. (Oxford University Press/Norwegian University Press, 1990), 37-39954 Paul M. Kennedy. The Rise and Fall of Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict
1500-2000. (London: Unwin Hyman, 1988), 200-202955 Walter LaFeber. The American Search for Opportunity, 1865-1913. (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1993). Chap 5, 7956 James Petras, and Morris Morley. Empire or Republic? American Global Power and Domestic
Decay. (London and New York: Routledge, 1995), xv957 Crockatt, America Embattled, 34
226
Generally, as a rule, American Presidents exaggerated the contemporary issues to
get public support. They, in fact, “manufactured the US vulnerability” argued British
historian John Thompson. President Lyndon Johnson manufactured the same sense of the
US vulnerability on the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution of 1964 and got support from the
Congress. Similarly, Richard Nixon’s secret bombing of Cambodia in 1969 and Ronald
Reagan’s “Iran-Contra Affair” of 1980’s were just to cite only two examples. They
constituted the cases of “imperial presidency”- the “willful aggrandizement” of executive
power.958
After 9/11, President Bush declared war on terror and compared it with moral
struggle between good and evil. The linkage of war on terror with moral struggle was a
move to deflect the connection of 9/11 tragedy with specific American policies toward
the Middle East in the preceding decades.959 Since WWII, the US had been active in the
Middle East. Basically, American national interest had three elements in the Middle East-
continuity of oil supplies, protector of Israel, and checking USSR influence in the
region.960 Due to its strategic importance, America evolved Iran as a “regional stabilizer”
in the Middle East.961
After Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979, America became preoccupied with
“Islamic fundamentalism” in the region and exploited to increase American political
power.962 America wielded disproportionately larger military power vis-à-vis other
powers of the world. American military might have its own justification.963 US after 9/11,
in the words of Geoff Simons, followed new “colonial policy” toward the Middle East.
America wielded predominant military power in the world without any counterweight
empire on the globe. The US would continue to shape the parameters of world politics in
21st century, especially in the Middle East. America would continue to reshape, till
foreseeable future, the Middle East region according to the US national vision.964
958 Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr. The Imperial Presiding. (New York: The Popular Library, 1974)959 Hugo Young. “We Are Good At Getting In, Not So Good At Getting Out.” The
Guardian. October 8, 2001960 H.W. Brands. Into the Labyrinth: The United States and The Middle East, 1945-1993. (New
York: McGrawHill, 1994), xi-xiii961 Ibid, 125, 153-155962 Gerges, America and Political Islam, 42 963 Crockatt, America Embattled, 161964 Simons, Future Iraq, 22
227
General Tony Zinni and Tony Koltz argued in The Battle for Peace that America
was an “empire” now, “the indispensable nation” that carried power every-where on the
globe.965 Another historian wrote that America had a war plan for Iraq but no
reconstruction plan for the war ravaged country. It was December 7, 1941, when Japan
attacked Pearle Harbor. That put America into the global role. 9/11 enhanced that role. In
this era of imperialism, America had no choice but to be actively engaged in world
politics. America could not withdraw from world politics.966
He had been criticized for speaking the truth, argued General Tony Zinni.
America invaded Iraq “under false” rationales.967 The authors further wrote that America
was “an empire now”. It was an “empire of influence not of conquest”. The US had been
reluctant to deliver as a hegemonic power.968 President George W. Bush, in the aftermath
of 9/11 used US military might to implement Neo-Cons Agenda of imperial ambitions.969
The Bush Administration pursued Pax Americana much like Pax Romana. President
Bush pursued “an empire of oppression” based on US economic interests.970
The following scholars/ authors invariably discussed, in their respective books/
articles, the “theme of US hegemony” in the international political system. More or less,
they agreed on a broader theme that America was a hegemon/empire, a predominant
military/ economic power within the system and the invasion of Iraq was, in reality, an
imperial project undertook by the George W. Bush Administration. They were being
enlisted below: (Chomsky: 2003:11, 162-165); (Gurtov: 2008: 37-48, 100); (Waltz: 2005:
19, 31-32); (Haas: 2002, a lecture, Foreign Policy Association, April 22, 2002); (Brooks
and Wohlforth, Foreign Affairs, (July/ August 2002); (Posen, International Security,
(Summer 2003); (MIT Technology Review, at www.technologyreview/scorecards, 2004);
(The Military Balance: 2004: 354-358); (The Military Balance: 2003); (Johnson: 2004:
132); (Williams: 2002: 244-246); (Stephen Fielder, Financial Times, December 8-9,
2001); (Hirsh: 2003: 42); (George H.W. Bush and Brent Scowcroft: 1998: 542-43); (A
National Security Strategy, for a New Century: 1998: 23); (Fabbrini eds: 2006: 8-14);
965 Zinni and Koltz, Battle for Peace, 4966 Ibid, 8-12967 Clancy, Zinni and Koltz, Battle Ready, 426968 Clancy, Zinni and Koltz, Battle Ready, 431-432969 Juhasz, Bush Agenda, 18 970 Ibid, 22-23
228
(Fouskas and Gokay: 2005: 1-6); (Brzezinski, New York Times, 9 January 2002);
(Woodward: 2002: 32-37); (Fukuyama: 2006); (Kennedy: 1993: 19); (Bacevich: 2002);
and (Fergusson: 2004).
5.3.15 Maintenance of US Unipolarity in 21st Century:
Since 1989, the first year of Bush senior’s Administration, when Dick Cheney was
Secretary of Defense, Colin Powell, head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Wolfowitz,
under-secretary of defense, worked actively as a team to make responses, in military
terms, regarding “weakening of Soviet global” presence. The answer to this question
came from neoconservative’s camp in 1992. The answer could be found in the “Defense
Planning Guidance,” produced by Paul Wolfowitz and Lewis Libby. The draft was a
guide for the US Administration. The document consisted of neocons recommendations
in the field of foreign policy. It was the first blueprint for “maintaining the US
unipolarity” in the 21st century.971
The central objective of the DPG 1992 was that the US did not want “peer
compititor”.972 The draft DPG was leaked to New York Times in March 1992. According
to the DPG the US wanted “global hegemony”. The document recommended “strategy of
unipolarity” for the US to achieve the objectives.973 William Kristol, editor Weekly
Standard, wrote about the document that it was prophetic in nature. It was prophetic
because President George W. Bush adopted the same policy recommendations in his
foreign policy.974
The DPG 1992 and the PNAC 1997 provided the answer, in the form of neocons
agenda to respond to the post-Cold War realities. 9/11 marked the beginning of a new era
of world politics based on unipolarity.975 The neocons agenda consisted of three basic
objectives. First, checking the emergence of a rival superpower on the world stage;
second, the US must use this opportunity, provided by 9/11, to fashion the world
according to the US interests and values and third, America must use, if need be, the US
military forces unilaterally, preemptively, and for regime change.
971 Dorrien, Imperial Designs, 4972 Mearsheimer, Tragedy of Great Power, 46973 Krauthammer, Unipolar Moment, 1990-91974 Fouskas and Gokay, American Imperialism, 58975 Fouskas and Gokay, American Imperialism, 61
229
In June 2002, President Bush announced his Bush Doctrine of preemption at West
Point, Naval Academy, New York. The Bush doctrine made it clear that the US reserved
the right, if need be, to use its military forces preemptively to destroy an “imminent
threat” to the US security. The National Security Strategy of September 2002 provided a
blueprint for US hegemony in the world.976 The NSS of 2002 translated neoconservative
ideas into reality.977 America wielded the strongest military forces on the face of the
earth. It had evolved into an empire. It could impose its will over others.978
The neoconservative ideology wanted the US, among other things, maintenance
of unchallengeable military superiority in the 21st century.979 The 1992 DPG draft was
slipped to media and ultimately Bush (senior) Administration repudiated the draft but it
revealed, without any exaggeration, the US goals in 21st century. The document wanted
the world in 21st century without any challengers to the US. The revised draft contained
most of the same “policy recommendations” as did the original document, argued James
Mann.980
The end of Cold War and subsequent disintegration of USSR started a new debate
in the US about its role in the post-USSR world. It was an unprecedented opportunity, the
unipolar moment. America should use its “predominant military forces” to keep the
world unipolar. Maintenance of “unipolarity” was the most suitable and desirable policy
for the US in 21st century. Unipolarity would ensure restructuring of the international
political system according to American interests and values in 21st century. Zalmay
Khalilzad gave the same recommendations about the US foreign policy. Like other
neocons he also supported DPG 1992 recommendations for the US foreign policy.981
The NSS was announced in September 2002. It declared in plane words that the
US would “maintain its hegemony” within the international political system through the
use of military forces.982 John Ikenberry, argued that NSS was committed to “maintain
unipolarity” in world political system and ensured a world without “peer competitor” to
976 Gaddis, A Grand Strategy, 2002977 Gurtov, Superpower on Crusade, 9978 Henry Kissinger. “Henry Kissinger at Large, Part Two”, Think Tank with Ben Wattenberg, February 5, 2004979 Mann, Rise of Vulcans, 208-215
980 Mann, Rise of Vulcans, 208-215981 Zalmay Khalilzad. “Losing the Moment? The US and the World after the Cold War”,
Washington Quarterly 18, no 2, (Spring 1995)982 The National Security Strategy, 2002
230
the US. The scholar further wrote that “international law” and “institutions” like the UN
carried “little value” in the eyes of this new national strategy.983
In short, the proponents of DPG 1992 and founders of the PNAC argued that with
the end of Cold War the US was left as the only surviving superpower in the world. The
US possessed superior military forces and a powerful economy. The US ideology was
spreading around the globe. The US was the predominant power on the world stage.984
The theorists of unipolarity and American primacy argued that these very characteristics
made the world politically stable.985 William Wohlforth also extended the same argument
as did Lieber.986 In the words of Michael Mandelbaum, America was a “Goliath”.
American military might was the distinctive and salient feature of world politics today.
America was a “Goliath” but a “benign Goliath”.987
5.3.16 Sharp Increase in US Defense Budget in post 9/11 Era:
During a couple of years preceding 9/11 from 1995 to 2000, the US defense expenditure
was 37 percent of the total world military expenditure.988 The US defense budget in 2000
was $ 295 billion. In 2001 the corresponding figure was $ 310 billion. 9/11 gave Bush
Administration blank cheque for military expenditure. In 2003, the figure rose to $ 417
billion.989 In 2005, the US defense expenditure was $ 440 billion.990 The US defense
expenditure for 2007 would be more than $ 500 billion.991 It was a huge increase in the
US military expenditure in post- 9/11 era.
5.3.17 Reasonable Cost of the War:
The war hawks in the Bush Administration had established good relations with Ahmad
Chalabi, an exiled dissident from Iraq. Ahmad Chalabi had convinced them that the
revenue coming from Iraqi oil would be sufficient for the reconstruction of Iraq.
983 Ikenberry, Imperial Ambition, 2002984 Jentleson, American Foreign Policy, 260985 Robert J. Lieber. The American Era: Power and Strategy for the 21st Century. (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2005), 5986 William Wohlforth. “The Stability of the Unipolar World”, International Security. 24, no 1,
(summer 1999), 5-41987 Jentleson, American Foreign Policy, 310988 “SIPRI Figures”, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), 2000989 “SIPRI Military Expenditure Database”, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
(SIPRI) 2003990 Black, Great Powers, 209991 Ibid
231
Whatever the cost of war in terms of money, the war would not be a financial burden for
the US. It would be self-financed by Iraqi oil sources.992
5.3.18 Warning for Iran and Syria:
President George W. Bush also included Iran in his “axis of evil” speech in January 2002.
The origin of US-Iran hostility started with Iranian Revolution of 1979. For Washington,
Iran had been a “serious strategic challenge” at least since 1979. Tehran, like Damascus,
had been supportive of Hezbollah, Hamas, and Islamic Jihad, the avowed enemies of
Israel in the Middle East. Iran had also been seeking “nuclear capability.”993 Iran had the
capacity to deliver nuclear warheads against Israel. Iran was the most powerful state in
the Gulf region. Powerful Iran was not in American interests in the Middle East. That
was why Reagan Administration supported Saddam against Iran during Iran-Iraq war.994
Washington wanted Iran, for multiple reasons, keep in check.995
For the last 50 years, the US-Syria relationship had been problematic. Damascus
was an ally of Moscow during the Cold War years. President Bush did not include Syria
in his list of “axis of evil” states, however, considered it a “rogue state.” In the aftermath
of 9/11, the US policy toward Syria became more hostile. In the aftermath of US invasion
of Iraq in 2003, and initial victory, it seemed as if Iran and Syria, the two rogue states in
American eyes, would suffer the same fate as did Iraq.996
5.3.19 No Regard for Geneva Convention:
The US established and maintained a military base at Guantanamo Bay since Spanish-
American war a century ago. The US used this base as a prison for suspected terrorists
after 9/11. The Bush Administration maintained, as the base was not located at the
sovereign territory of the US, the prisoners encamped there were not entitled to the right
of habeas corpus and other laws applied within its own borders. The Administration
further maintained that there was a limited applicability of international laws as well,
specifically the applicability of 1949 Geneva Conventions about the protection of
992 Galbraith, End of Iraq, 84 993 Mearsheimer and Walt, Israel Lobby, 280 994 Ibid, 281995 Ibid, 282996 Ibid, 263
232
prisoners of war. For that America was strongly criticized throughout the world for
maintaining “legal black hole”.997
In a test case Hamdan V. Rumsfeld, American Supreme Court ruled that for the
prisoners of Guantanamo Base, and the military tribunals established there were
“unconstitutional and violated international law” regarding protection of rights of
prisoners of war as declared in Geneva Convention of 1949.998
5.3.20 None of 9/11 Hijackers Came from Iraq:
None of the nineteen hijackers identified, who were involved in 9/11 tragedy was an
Iraqi. America did not take any action against Saudi Arabia. Fifteen hijackers of 9/11
belonged to Saudi Arabia. Rest of the four belonged to Egypt. Still America decided,
against empirical evidence, to wage war on Iraq. It was a big question mark.
The truthfulness of the rationale of US invasion of Iraq in 2003 was seriously
questioned by scholars; even before the invasion. That was disregarded by Bush
Administration. As expected, the rationale of the US war on Iraq was discredited after
investigations. Then what was the real rationale of the preemptive and unilateral invasion
of Iraq? This chapter answered this question in detail. It explained the factors that made
the US war on Iraq an excellent case study of offensive realist model. The factors
discussed above clearly showed that there was a close fit between offensive realist model
and the US war on Iraq in 2003. The factors discussed above increased US share of world
power. The factors proved that US being the great power was “power maximiser”. These
factors in combination made Iraq a case study of offensive realist model.999 The US also
sought global “hegemony” if possible. The US occupation policy in Iraq constituted the
next chapter of this dissertation. The US occupation policy in Iraq 2003-2008 further
substantiated the main argument of this dissertation.
997 “Guantanamo Bay: A Human Rights Scandal”, Amnesty International998 Jentleson, American Foreign Policy, 401999 Interview with Dr. Tahir Amin (Ex. Head, Dept. of International Relations, Quaid-i-Azam
University, Islamabad) by the Researcher. Islamabad. June 16, 2016
233
Chapter Six
The Occupation Policy in IraqThe main theme in this chapter was that the US occupation policy in Iraq from 2003-
2008 further substantiated the empirical verification of the main argument of this
dissertation. Instead of early withdrawal from Iraq after removal of Saddam regime, the
US decision of prolonged occupation of Iraq exactly was in accordance with the
principles of offensive realism. This decision was made to consolidate the gains of the
invasion. In retaliation, insurgency started in Iraq. The insurgency was used as a pretext
for a big and prolonged US military presence in Iraq and the Persian Gulf region.
America invaded Iraq unilaterally and preemptively in March 2003 under “false
pretexts”. The US operational policy was contradictory to the Bush Administration’s
declared objectives in Iraq. The US policy in Iraq, in reality, reflected great power
behavior according to the assumptions of offensive realist model. A close look on the US
occupation policy in Iraq from 2003 to 2008 made clear that there was close fit between
the occupation policy and assumptions of offensive realism. The invasion was not
followed up by any serious plan of reconstruction of Iraq. Rather, it seemed, as if the
invasion was made to increase the US share of world power in multiple ways and to
establish its unchallengeable predominance in the Middle East, in general and, the
Persian Gulf region in particular.
6.1 The Occupation of Iraq:The planners of invasion in Washington underestimated the resistance in Iraq. On the eve
of war, in February 2003, US Army Chief General Eric Shinseki, during a Senate
hearing, made it clear that we needed “several hundred thousand soldiers” to maintain
security and law and order in post-war Iraq. Other assessments also concluded the same.
They concluded that occupation forces needed not less than twenty security personnel per
234
thousand populations, under Saddam regime it was 43.1000 It meant the number of
occupation forces must be between 400,000 and 500,000 to maintain law and order in
post-Saddam Iraq.1001 However, the civilians working on the top position in Pentagon did
not agree with these assessments and provided low number of troops to the field
commanders in Iraq. They presumed, a coup would “overthrow” Saddam regime.1002 The
top officials in Pentagon believed that in case of absence of a coup, the Iraqi forces would
surrender to allied forces (in thousands) as they did in 1991.1003
Donald Rumsfeld, the secretary of defense, asked General Tommy Franks to
keep number of troops as low as possible while invading Iraq. Resultantly, the US
deployed only 116,000 troops on the ground. The total number of personnel involved in
the invasion was 310,000. It should have been 500,000.1004 Rumsfeld was criticized even
by Republican members of Congress for his “failure” to provide sufficient troops to
maintain law and order situation in post-Saddam Iraq.1005
The neoconservatives simply rejected General Shinseki’s proposal about large
number of troops for such a task. Paul Wolfowitz had assured Congress that the
campaign would be “cheap and self-financed” {Iraq’s oil}.1006 From the very beginning it
was clear that the number of troops being provided for such a formidable task was
insufficient. The field commanders were asking for more troops but the same was
dismissed by civilians in the Pentagon.1007 On March 16, 2003, Vice President Dick
Cheney, during his interview on NBC’s Meet the Press Program, with reference to
General Shinseki’s testimony before Congress about a higher number of troops argued
that it was not “accurate” assessment. It was an overstatement.1008
1000 Faleh A. Jabar. Post Conflict Iraq: A Race for Stability, Reconstruction and Legitimacy. Special Report no.120. (Washington D.C.: US Institute of Peace, May 2004), 6
1001 James Dobbins, et.al. America’s Role in Nation Building: From Germany to Iraq. (Santa Monica: Rand, 2003)
1002 Alan George, Raymond Whitaker and Andy McSmith. “Revealed: The Meeting That Could Have Changed the History of Iraq”. The Independent of Sunday. 17 October, 2004
1003 Lawrence Freedman, and Efrain Karsh. The Gulf Conflict, 1990-1991. (London: Faber and Faber, 1993), 307
1004 Woodward, Plan of Attack, 3, 6, 8, 4061005 Gurtov, Superpower on Crusade, 1141006 Kolko, Age of War, 1421007 David E. Sanger, and Douglas Jehl. “Generals in Iraq Consider Options For More Troops”,
New York Times, April, 20041008 Bob Woodward. State of Denial. (London: Simon and Schuster, 2006), 151
235
The National Security Directive 24 of January 20, 2003, issued by President
Bush, authorized Donald Rumsfeld to “manage” war on Iraq and also follow-up of the
war.1009 The Pentagon officials favored Ahmad Chalabi, the head of INC (Iraqi National
Congress). INC was created through the efforts of Richard Perle and American Enterprise
Institute. Chalabi had left Iraq in 1958.1010 However, Chalabi as a choice of Pentagon was
“rejected” by the State Department and CIA.1011 The Pentagon managed the appointment
of Chalabi as an interim oil minister in transitional government in Iraq.
The decision of “de-Baathification” of Iraq was also taken by Rumsfeld. The
decision of “dissolution of Iraqi army” also took its origin from Pentagon. These
decisions of de-Baathification and dissolution of army, proved disastrous for establishing
law and order and internal security of the country. These decisions were taken “against”
the desires of the State Department. The State Department had started the “Future of Iraq
Project” involving a number of agencies and dissident Iraqi exiles including
professionals. The Future of Iraq Project started as early as April, 2002.1012 The “Future
of Iraq Project” study was important as it was related to the specific problems emanating
form above cited decisions such as looting, weak civil services, elimination of academics
etc. However, this study was ignored summarily.1013
The Pentagon, in reality, wanted reconstruction of Iraq under its own man,
Douglas Feith; he was special to Rumsfeld. Rumsfeld ordered General Garner, the State
Department appointee, to ignore the recommendations of “Future of Iraq Project”
study.1014 The same theme was also extensively discussed in David Rieff’s article
“Blueprint for a Mess” cited above.1015 Like the State Department, the CIA also warned
about the problem the aftermath of the war related to reconstruction. It seemed, as if, the
officials in the Pentagon had planned the wrong war.1016 The State Department had its
own reservations about the security and domestic resistance in post-Saddam Iraq. It was
1009 Peter Slevin, and Dona Priest. “Wolfowitz Concede Iraq Errors”, Washington Post. July 24, 2003
1010 David Rieff. “Blueprint for a Mess”, New York Times Magazine. November 2, 2003, 311011 Seymour M. Hersh, “The Debate Within”, The New Yorker. March 11, 2002: 34-391012 State Department Documents released to the National Security Archive on 17 August, 20051013 Eric Schmitt, and Joel Brinkley. “State Dept. Study Foresaw Trouble Now Plaguing Iraq”, New
York Times. October 19, 20031014 Packer, War after War, November 24, 20031015 Rieff, Blueprint for a Mess, November 2, 20031016 Schmitt and Brinkley, State Dept. Study, October 19, 2003
236
an issue of foreign occupation.1017 Later on, Wolfowitz conceded that “serious errors”
were committed under the Pentagon. Those errors could have been easily avoided.1018
In the year 1991, Dick Cheney opposed “deposing” Saddam regime for right
reasons. However, in 2003 he did not oppose that.1019 President Bush did not remember
two important rules of war. They included a peace plan and an exit strategy. The
Pentagon spent much resource on the war than on reconstruction. Rebuilding of state
after removal of Saddam regime was important but was mostly ignored.1020 Iraq was
going to be an occupied country for years to come under the occupiers coming from a
different world view and culture. Rebuilding and reconstruction required people from
different culture.1021 Christopher H. Varhola was a US Army reserve major. He served in
Iraq and wrote his observations.
Even the US military forces warned, time and again, about the big difficulties
lying ahead in reconstructing Iraq but the US administration did not pay any heed to
those warnings. They continued to make “simplistic comparisons” between Japan and
Germany of post-WWII era and Iraq of post-9/11 era.1022 The US followed top-down
approach to reconstruction and unrestrained private investments in Iraq. The Iraq
opposition criticized US officials for dictating terms about post-Saddam political set up in
the country.1023
The US had ratified Article 43 of the Hague Regulations. The article required,
among other things, that the occupation forces would establish law and order and ensure
safety of human life. The provision number 363 of the US Army’s Law and Land
Warfare had repeated the Article 43 as such with no changes whatsoever. The US
administration “failed” to meet the requirements of the article and provision #363.
Rather, in contrary to the above cited article and provision, the US changed existing laws
1017 Rieff, Blueprint for a Mess, November 2, 20031018 Ibid1019 George F. Will. “What to Ask the Nominee”, Washington Post. November 17, 20041020 John Paul Lederach. Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies.
(Washington D.C.: US Institute of Peace Press, 1997), 74-751021 Varhola, Christopher H. “American Challenges in Post Conflict Iraq”, Foreign Policy
Research Institute. May 27, 20041022 Conard C. Crane, and W. Andrew Terril, Reconstructing Iraq: Insights, Challenges and
Missions for Militancy Forces in a post Conflict Scenario. Charlisle, Pa: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, February 2003
1023 Judith Miller, and Lowell Bergman. “Iraq Opposition Is Pushing Ties with Iranians”, New York Times. December 13, 2002
237
of Iraq dealing with economy of the country. Till mid 2005, there was a great dearth of
basic services in Iraq such as water, electricity, hospitals, and schools.1024
General Jay Garner was nominated as head of the Office of Reconstruction and
Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) on January 20, 2003. The ORHA had to operate under
the US Ministry of Defense. According to the original plan the occupation set up in Iraq
would not last for more than three months. General Garner, as head of the ORHA,
reached Iraq on April 21, 2003. On the very first night in Iraq, General Garner received a
telephone call from Rumsfeld telling the General that he would be replaced by Paul
Bremer in less than one month.1025 In an interview to BBC reporter Greg Palast, General
Garner said that he wanted “elections” and put Iraqis in-charge of their country as soon as
possible. It was necessary to make Iraqis in-charge of their own destiny.1026
General Garner believed that prolonged occupation of Iraq would create “hatred”
against US. He also disagreed with the proposal of “privatization” of 192 state-owned
enterprises of Iraq. He was of the opinion that Iraqis should be the in charge of their
country. The General was fired out of Iraq.1027 The fall of Saddam regime in Baghdad was
followed by widespread looting and chaos in Iraq. Even weapon installations were also
looted.1028 The military success in Iraq was swift. At the same time there was “absence”
of any planning of post-Saddam rehabilitation in Iraq. One of the reasons was that the
occupation policy was an exclusive domain of the Pentagon. The Pentagon deliberately
ignored preparation about post-war Iraq done by State Department under the ‘Future of
Iraq Project’. Moreover, Rumsfeld deliberately refused to deploy more troops necessary
for the maintenance of post-Saddam security in Iraq.1029
The planners of regime change in Iraq “underestimated” the security challenges in
post-Saddam Iraq. It led to lack of forces to cope with the situation.1030 There was
widespread looting in Iraq immediately after the fall of regime. Neither the US military 1024 Jowan Masum. “The Iraqi development Programme”, June 28, 20051025 David Leigh. “General Sacked by Bush Says He Wanted Early Elections”, Guardian, March
18, 20041026 Greg Palast. “Iraq for Sale”, BBC Television Interview with Jay Garner, March 14, 20041027 Juhasz, Bush Agenda, 1901028 James Glanz, and William J. Broad. “Looting at Iraqi Weapons Plants Was Systematic,
Official says”, New York Times. March 13, 20051029 Fawn and Hinnebusch, Iraq War, 81030 Bethsheba N. Crocker, “In Iraq: Going it Alone, Gone Wrong”, in Robert C. Orr (ed.),
Winning the Peace: An American Strategy for Post-Conflict Reconstruction. (Washington D.C.: Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 2004), 267-268
238
forces nor civilians had any plan for post-war reconstruction in Iraq.1031 President Bush
during his election campaign in 2000 said that he opposed to nation-building as a basis of
US foreign policy. Then he was criticizing President Clinton for these activities.
President Bush and his administration made “no plans for rehabilitation and
reconstruction” of post-war Iraq. He also refused to increase troop levels in chaotic Iraq
to establish and maintain law and order in the country.1032 Paul Pillar argued in 2006 in
Foreign Affairs that in the run-up to war intelligence community warned the Bush
Administration about the messy aftermath of the war and make preparations accordingly.
The administration paid no heed to these warnings.1033
Richard Perle was of the opinion that the State Department and the CIA were the
real culprits of democratization of Iraq. They felt some relief when Bremer replaced
General Garner. Now Bremer was the proper man.1034 The Bush administration neglected
to establish law and order in post-Saddam Iraq as well as to repair its war torn social
fabric. The 135,000 Us troops in Iraq were not trained for peace keeping, and at the same
time they were too few in numbers to perform the job-provision of security to the
people.1035
On the post-conflict conditions in Iraq the Economist in September 2003 wrote
that it was a story of incredible failures on the part of American administration. They had
not prepared, it seemed, for the worst-case scenario.1036 There was a lack of post-Saddam
preparation in Washington. Same was true about stability and security as well.1037 There
is a common misunderstanding about lack of planning for post-war Iraq. It led to triple
failure in Iraq. There were too few troops available for peacekeeping, no provision of
security against looting, and non-provision of basic human services-water and electricity
etc. it was not the case. The failure was more significant. Both the US and Britain could
not comprehend the political and cultural forces in post-regime Iraq that would play
central role in the country. Jonathan Steele wrote that he served eight assignments in Iraq
1031 Ibid, 2661032 Brigham, Iraq Another Vietnam, 691033 Ibid, 70-711034 Ibid, 721035 Kepel, War for Muslim Minds, 1991036 How Deep Is the Rift? February 15, 20031037 Eric Schmitt. “Iraqis Not ready to Fight Rebels on Their Own, US Says”, New York Times.
July 21, 2005
239
on behalf of Guardian from 2003 to 2007. His observation was that there was an “ever
widening gulf” between Iraqis and the occupiers.1038
The US policy of “prolonged presence” in Iraq was intentional. The Bush
Administration, especially the neoconservatives, did not want early withdrawal from Iraq.
By mere presence of US troops in Iraq, the US would put pressure on Iran, Syria, develop
military bases there, and also would give a message of “US predominance” in the
region.1039 Andrew Card was the White House chief of staff of President Bush. He
resigned in 2006. He recognized American “failure” in Iraq. After he stepped down as
chief of staff, Card said that “alternative solutions” in Iraq were never entertained. There
had never been a serious discussion on Iraq for alternatives to staying in post-Saddam
Iraq. What could be the alternative “exit” strategy from Iraq? It was never deliberated
upon.1040
Later on, Richard Perle a war hawk regretted on CNN in April 2007. Perle told
CNN that the “biggest folly” US committed in Iraq was not to “transfer political power”
to the people in Iraq immediately after fall of the regime.1041 Aftermath of the war was a
dismal failure. On the part of the Bush Administration there was little preparation for the
aftermath. There were warnings from US European allies and the managers of First Gulf
War. The warnings were “dismissed arrogantly” especially by the Pentagon.1042
Washington allocated little resources for reconstruction of Iraq.1043
Tom Clancy wrote in the backdrop of Iraq war that he was known as outspoken in
military. Majority of our senior commanders were step-ford soldiers and they failed to
speak the truth. The US Army chief testified before Congress that US needed 300,000
troops to pacify Iraq in the aftermath of removal of Saddam regime. However, Pentagon
did not agree with the General and sent just half of the required number in the field. The
administration had no proper “strategy and planning.”1044 Clancy believed that such a
1038 Steele, Defeat, 61039 Steele, Defeat, 7-81040 Woodward, State of Denial, 4551041 Roger Cohen. “The Failure Of Iraq Captured in a Sentence”, International Herald Tribune.
April 28-29, 20071042 Soros, Bubble of American Supremacy, 601043 Shawcross, Allies, 1651044 Clancy. Zinni and Koltz, Battle Ready, 438
240
situation would not be repeated in future wars.1045 General Tony Zinni argued that the US
had a war plan but “no plan of reconstruction.”1046
6.2 Paul Bremer-The US Administrator in Iraq:America invaded Iraq on 20th March, 2003. General Garner took charge of Iraq on 21st
April 2003. As head of ORHA, Rumsfeld told General Garner that he would be replaced
by Paul Bremer not later than one month. Why did this happen? ORHA was created for
three months; whereas, it was being closed just within one month. According to the
General, the reason for early closure of the ORHA could be found in the
interdepartmental rivalry, specifically between Colin Powell and Rumsfeld. However, the
real reason could be found in two “competing” visions about the future of Iraq. It was
actually about the method and magnitude of “political and economic dominance” over
Iraq.1047
L. Paul Bremer III replaced General Garner as administer of CPA (Coalition
Provisional Authority) Iraq, just two weeks after his appointment on May 6, 2003.
Bremer continued as head of the CPA till 28 June, 2004. For about 13 months, Bremer
had full authority over the CPA. In turn, during this period, the CPA had “total control”
over Iraq-Legislative, executive, and judicial.1048 Bremer was not an expert on Iraq. Still
he was selected for such an important job. The reason was unknown. It might be his
charming personality.1049
However, Bermer had other qualifications with him, though he had no experience
in Iraq. His most important qualification was his long-time political and corporate
linkage, for about four decades. He served as a State Department official for 23 years
after graduating from school. His first assignment was in Kabul, Afghanistan. It was
during this period that he developed good relations with Rumsfeld. He also served under
Henry Kissinger and George Shultz when they were Foreign Secretaries. These two
persons were powerful voices as representatives of “corporate America” in Iraq. Bremer
1045 Clancy. Zinni and Koltz, Battle Ready, 4381046 Zinni and Koltz, Battle for Peace, 81047 Juhasz, Bush Agenda, 1891048 The Coalition Provisional Authority, CPA Official Documents, 20031049 Barbara Slavin. “U.S. New Transition Chief Brings Lot to the Table”, USA Today. May 13,
2003
241
left the State Department and joined Kissinger Associates in 1989. There he provided
advice to the largest multinational corporations of the US. He served there for 11years.1050
In November 2001, Bremer wrote a paper titled, “New Risks in International
Business”. He argued about the risks the multinational corporations faced due to
“corporate globalization” policies. Whatever Bremer argued in the paper was
implemented in Iraq later on during Bremer era.1051 Globalization caused “socio-political”
unrest argued Bremer. He knew well that his policies in Iraq would cause “unrest” and
would also reduce provision of basic services. This in turn would give support to foreign
business in Iraq vis-à-vis the local business. Chris Foote, one of Bremer’s associates in
Iraq, departed company with Bremer just after two months and returned to America.
After his return, Foote wrote about the US “predominated political and economic” grip
on Iraq. He argued that America followed “unpopular” economic policies in Iraq. The
policies were benefiting big “US corporations” rather than Iraqis.1052
It’s a rare phenomenon that we got a chance in our lives to see a country with
such great “oil reserves” but with no civilian commercial infrastructure to manage it,
wrote Stephen Thomas from Baghdad.1053 The Bush Administration, at least, had an
economic plan for Iraq. The Administration signed three-year contract with Bearing
Point, Inc., Virginia. The Bearing Point was to provide technical assistance to the USAID
for “restructuring” Iraq’s economy in accordance with the objectives of the
administration in Iraq.1054 Paul Bremer stayed in Iraq for about fourteen-months. During
his stay from 16 May 2003 to 28 June 2004, he enacted “hundred” orders. Those orders
gave birth to new laws in Iraq that, later on, continued to govern Iraq.
Paul Bremer, as administrator of CPA in Iraq, enacted CPA Regulation # 1 on 16
May, 2003, whereby he defined his powers as head of the CPA. His “orders” had the
effect of laws and as such, were binding on Iraq.1055 Both, his “Regulations and Orders”
1050 Juhasz, Bush Agenda, 1911051 Bremer, L. Paul. "New Risks in International Business." Viewpoint: The Marsh and McLennan
Companies Journal 2. (2001)1052 Chris Foote. “Reviving the Iraqi Economy in the Aftermath of the War”, Regional Review Q3,
13, no 3, (2003)1053 Dan Baum. “Nation Builders for Hire”, New York Times. June 22, 20031054 Iraqi Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Programme. Contract No. DASW01-
03-P-0366, Ronco Consulting Corporation and Defense Contracting Command, Washington: 20031055 L.Paul Bremer. “Coalition Provisional Authority Regulation #1,” CPA. CPA/REG/ 16 May
2003/ 01
242
took precedence over contemporary laws of Iraq. Bremer was all powerful in Iraq. He
made laws. He wrote them. The US military forces implemented those laws. Bremer was
too powerful in Iraq. It was due to this all powerful position, Lakhdar Brahimi, the UN
Special Envoy in Iraq called Bremer the new “Dictator of Iraq.”1056
Bremer’s Regulations and Orders “failed” to provide basic services to the people
such as water, electricity, and health care. They also changed the fundamental “structure
of Iraqi economy” according to Bush Administration’s economic model. He ensured
increased access of US corporations to Iraqi economy. He implemented “corporate
globalization” agenda of the Bush Administration. He patronized Americans in Iraq.1057
Before 1991, Iraq stood at 15 out of 130 states, enlisted in the 1990 United
Nations Human Development index. The index, as usual, measured national achievement
of states in “socio-economic” sectors such as education, health, etc. The index also
measured per capita income for the states. Iraq ranked at “medium human development
category” of states with respect to the provision of basic social services to its citizens.1058
Similarly, Iraq topped the last of college-educated citizens in the Middle East region.
According to W.H.O. prior to 1991, about 90% Iraqi people had access to safe drinking
water.1059
During his 14-months stay as CPA administrator in Iraq, Bremer passed 100
orders. Out of them, sixteen orders carried special weight and reflected big significance
for Iraq and the Middle East. They also reflected American method of governance in Iraq.
They are discussed below. Order No.1, De-Ba’athification.1060 By passing this order
Bremer dismissed all the Ba’ath Party members from the top three layers of management
in Iraq. The experienced and high ranking civil servants such as doctors, engineers,
scientists, professors, administrators and others indiscriminately were fired out of their
jobs. By this order 120,000 personnel became jobless. The order eliminated remnants of
Saddam Hussain’s regime. During Saddam era Ba’ath Party membership was a
1056 Tom Lasseter. "UN’s Brahimi: Bremer the ‘Dictator of Iraq’in Shaping Iraqi Government." Knight Ridder News. 2004
1057 John Barry, and Evan Thomas, “The Unbuilding of Iraq”, Newsweek. October 6, 20031058 “Report on Development in Iraq, UNICEF, 20021059 United Nations Annex II of S/ 1999/ 356, 30 March, 1999, report of the second panel
established pursuant to note by the president of Security Council of 30 January 1999(S/ 1999/100) concerning the current humanitarian situation in Iraq
1060 Bremer, CPA order 1, 2003
243
precondition for employment in Iraqi public sector. It was the only route to enter into
public sector jobs.1061
David Philips, author of “Losing Iraq: Inside the Postwar Reconstruction Fiasco”
argued order No.1 removed the personnel who opposed “liberalization of Iraq
economy.”1062 Bremer passed Order #2 on 23 May, 2003. The order dissolved/disbanded
Iraqi army along with its intelligence department among other things. The strength of
Iraqi army was more or less 500,000 troops. It was a huge figure. The consequent
unemployment rate in Iraq rose to somewhere between 50 and 70 percent. The disbanded
army “inflated” the number of insurgents in Iraq. They had lost their jobs and with it the
life blood of their families. It was a drastic step and the disbanded army had gone
“desperate”. It was not a part of initial plan.1063
A retired DIA (Defense Intelligence Agency) official, Patrick Lang said that Iraqi
units after proper and careful screening would do better job under US control. They were
knowledgeable personnel about Iraq. They could do much better job against the enemy
than the US troops.1064 Despite this, Bremer disbanded the entire military structure
making it unemployed. Private US contractors were hired to do the “work of
reconstruction”. The security of Iraq was the duty of US military. Bremer also stopped
social security benefits to widows even. Ronco Consulting Corporation of Washington
DC was hired for this job on 14 March, 2003, the company was to develop plan to
“disarm” and demobilize military forces of Iraq.1065
The CPA Order No.12, 7 June 2003 was replaced with CPA order No.54, 24
February, 2004. These orders introduced “Trade Liberalization Policy” in Iraq. Under
these orders tariffs, customs, import duties and many other duties were suspended. The
contemporary local laws in Iraq protected “domestic industry” against foreign
competition. The CPA orders No. 12 and 54 eliminated all the “protective barriers” in
Iraq. The local producers and sellers in Iraq were unable to compete with the global
1061 Ibid1062 Juhasz, Bush Agenda, 2011063 L.Paul Bremer. “Dissolution of Entities”, Coalition Provisional Authority Order# 2, CPA/
CRD/ 23 May / 021064 Peter Slevin. “Wrong Turn at Postwar Crossroads?” Washington Post. November 20, 20031065 Juhasz, Bush Agenda, 202
244
competitors. It was “disastrous” for local industry.1066 For Iraqis this transition was
problematic.1067
The CPA Order No. 14, 10 June 2003, was related to media control. The order
prohibited media to incite violence against the occupying forces. It also banned
advocating alternatives in Iraq and advocating return of Ba’ath to power structure
whatsoever. In case of any violation of the order, the office of the offender would be held
responsible.1068 This order was used against al-Arabiya and al-Hawza newspapers in
Baghdad. Both were closed. Al-Hawza was the newspaper of Muqtada al-Sadr. The
closure of al-Hawza led to country wide protest by the followers of Muqtada al-Sadr in
April 2004. Al-Sadr asked his followers to “terrorize” the occupying enemy forces.1069
The CPA Order No.17, revised Order, 27 June 2003, granted full “immunity” to
occupiers from laws of the land including military forces, foreign contractors, even
security firms doing private security activity. The order extended to the personnel of
corporations sub-contractors of corporations, and their employees and so on and so forth.
The grievances of the Iraqis against occupiers could be addressed in the “foreign courts”
only. The order actually provided “diplomatic immunity” to all the occupiers.1070 It was
why the offenders of “Abu Ghraib Scandal” could not be tried in Iraq under Iraqi laws.1071
The order No. 17 would remain in effect till the last soldier left Iraq. The order remained
in effect even after the end of the formal occupation.
The CPA order No. 37, September 19, 2003 amended with Order 49, February 19,
2004. The order dealt with US tax policy in Iraq. The order imposed flat tax rate up to 15
percent, for both individuals and corporations. Whereas according to contemporary Iraqi
tax laws, the flat tax rate was 40 percent.1072 The order no.40 dealt with the establishment
of foreign banks in Iraq. Before the invasion it was a “closed” sector. Now foreign banks
1066 L.Paul Bremer. “Trade Liberalization Policy”, Coalition Provision Authority Order No 54, CPA/ ORD/ 7 June 2003/ 12 and CPA/ ORD/ 24 February 2004/54
1067 Ariana Eunjung Cha. “Iraqis Face Tough Transition to Market–Based Agriculture”, Washington Post. January 22, 2004
1068 L. Paul Bremer. “Prohibited Media Activity”, CPA Order No 14, CPA/ORD/ 10 June 2003/141069 Nimroa Raphael. “Understanding Muqtada al-Sadar”, Middle East Quarterly. Vol.II, no.4,
(Fall 2004)1070 L. Paul. Bremer. “Status of Coalition Provisional Authority”, CPA Order No. 17, CPA/ ORD/
27 June 2004/ 171071 Kamal Ahmed. “Iraqis Lost Right to Sue Troops over War Crimes”, Observer. May 23, 20041072 L. Paul Bremer. “Tax Strategy of 2004”, CPA Order No. 49, CPA/ ORD/ 19 February 2004/
49
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could purchase up to 50 percent of Iraqi banks. The limit was extended to 100 percent
later on. They could also establish branches within the country.
The order No.62 determined the “qualifications” for Iraqis to hold public offices.
Bremer could “disqualify” any person from participating in an election. For elections,
Bremer could nominate candidates of his own candidates. The Order no.65 established a
Communications and Media Commission in Iraq. The commission could issue licenses to
the media for operations in Iraq and could also control media. The orders number 57 and
77 placed US personnel on important top positions of “decision-making” in Iraq. They
would last for five years starting from 2006, when the elected government would start its
term. These two orders were the repetition of the British “imperial laws” imposed on
Iraq in the aftermath of WWI.1073 According to Order no.57, Bremer appointed an
Inspector General on the top of all the departments to supervise them. He would have
total control over the entire department. These Inspector Generals, on the top of every
Ministry, were to remain there for 5-years.1074
The Order nos. 80, 81 and 83 replaced existing patent, trademarks, and copyright
laws of Iraq before a couple of weeks to handover Iraqi government to Iraqis. These
orders were imposed to ensure the “unhindered access” and protection to foreign products
whatsoever. This was done in the name of transition of centrally planned economy to free
market one. Order no. 97, established a commission with the power to debar any political
party from elections if they did not follow the rules and code of conduct given by the
occupiers.1075
The last Order no. 100 transferred Iraqi authority to an interim Prime Minister,
Dr. Iyad Allawi. The powers related to the above orders were an exclusive preserve of the
occupiers themselves and did not transfer those powers to the interim prime minister.
They were inserted as laws in the constitution of Iraq of October, 2005.1076
The CPA Order number 39 dealt with foreign investment in Iraq. The order
consisted of six provisions regulating foreign investment in Iraq. Henceforth the state
owned economic enterprises were open for “privatization”. Now the foreigners could
have 100 percent ownership of business in Iraq, there would be no preference of local 1073 Phebe Marr. The Modern History of Iraq. (2nd ed.). (Boulder, CO: West view Press, 2004), 271074 Juhasz, Bush Agenda, 2091075 Ibid, 2111076 Juhasz, Bush Agenda, 211
246
business over foreign business in Iraq, this led to a US “corporate invasion” of Iraq, there
would be unrestricted and tax-free transfer of profits out of Iraq, the licenses would be
issued for 40 year ownership to foreign investment in Iraq and the foreign investors
would have the right to take legal disputes in “international tribunals” out of Iraq.1077
The order 39 actually was a blueprint for the “privatization” of 192 state owned
large enterprises. They included a wide range of enterprises from all walks of life related
to diverse fields of life such as electricity, water, schools, hospitals, TV Stations, food,
housing programs, newspapers, factories, and airlines etc. The articles 13 and 16 of the
Iraqi constitution prohibited the private ownership of natural resources of Iraq and basic
means of production in Iraq under Saddam regime. The CPA announced the first list of
enterprises to be put for privatization in October 2003 which included fertilizers, cement
plants, sulpher and phosphate mines. The list also included pharmaceutical factories as
well as airlines of Iraq.1078
At that time the unemployment rate in Iraq was somewhere between 50 to 70
percent. The resistance from Iraq’s labor was but natural under such conditions. The
inflation rate was at about 36 percent. Paul Bremer slowed down the privatization of state
owned enterprises. By April 2004, even water sector was under consideration for
privatization, said minister of public works in Iraq.1079 A conference was organized in
London in the early months of 2005 for the privatization of Iraq’s telecommunication
sector.1080
Halliburton, Chevron, and Bechtel topped the list of big profits in Iraq.1081 These
big US corporations returned their political patrons in 2004 with big bounties in
presidential elections. Halliburton, Chevron and Bechtel heavily contributed to
Republican candidate as their donations 85%, 83percent, and 53percent respectively.1082
The Bremer orders seriously damaged Iraqi economy. The Iraqi companies, both private
and public, were excluded form reconstruction works. An Iraqi woman wrote that the
1077 Ibid, 211-2121078 David Bacon. “Um-Qasr From National Pride to War Booty”, Corp Watch. December 15,
20031079 Clayton Hirst. “Iraqis Investigate Halliburton over Allegations of Bribery”, Independent. April
25, 20041080 Masum, Iraqi Develoment Programme, June 28, 20051081 Sheila McNulty. “Working in Iraq Boosts Income at US Group,” Financial Times. April 29,
20041082 The Centre for Responsive Politics. www.opensecrets.org
247
military invasion was followed up by a large number of foreign companies in Iraq. They
were earning billions of dollars. However, local work force and professionals were kept
out of jobs. She wrote in the name of “Riverbend.”1083
Iraqi workers were also put out of jobs. At the time of handing over state authority
to Iraqis in June 2004, approximately there were two million unemployed Iraqis and only
25000 locals had jobs in the post-Saddam Iraq.1084 It is to be remembered Halliburton
brought 500 US workers to Iraq per week and paid them “four times” more wages than
the local workers/regional workers in Iraq.1085 Even by March 2005, shortage of
electricity was one of the big issues in Iraq. As occupiers, the US should have provided
the basic needs of human life. However, the US did not.1086
Bechtel was given contract for the provision of electricity in Iraq. However, the
company provided neither spare parts nor money to manage this failure.1087 The story of
the provision of water and sewage was not different form electricity. There remained
shortage of water and sewage facilities.1088 American companies did nothing to help
Iraqis. The issue of the provision of basic human services continuously haunted Iraqis
throughout the years of occupation.
Stephen C. Pellectiere, a former CIA official, wrote that America could do big
things in the Middle East. The US could control its “oil” as well as water. Ouster of
Saddam from power would benefit American “companies” in a lucrative way.1089 A group
of citizens from Bolivia, who had bitter experience of Bechtel’s working there, wrote an
open letter to Iraqis wherein they warned Iraqis about their sufferings in the hands of
Bechtel. They apprehended the replay of story of Bolivia in Iraq about the provision of
water.1090
Paul Bremer opened Iraq for privatization to Western buyers. Iraqi politicians
summarily rejected this move. Bremer made it clear in unequivocal terms that America, 1083 Riverbend Baghdad Burning: Girl Blog From Iraq. (New York: Feminist Press, 2005), 361084 James Glanz, and Erik Eckholm, “Transition in Iraq: Bricks, Mortar and Money; Reality
Intrudes on Promises in Rebuilding of Iraq”, New York Times. June 30, 20041085 Russel Gold. “The Temps of War: Blue Collar Workers Ship Out for Iraq”, Wall Street
Journal. February 25, 20031086 “Poll”, International Republic Institute (IRI), February 27 to March 5, 20051087 Pratap Chatterjee. Iraq Inc.: A Profitable Occupation. (New York: Seven stories Press, 2004),
681088 James Glanz. “New Election Issues: Electricity and Water”, New York Times. January 26, 20051089 Stephen C. Pelletiere. “A War Crime or an Act of War?” New York Times. January 31, 20031090 David Baker. “Bechtel in Iraq”, San Francisco Chronicle. December 26, 2003
248
for whatever reasons, could not delay this privatization process.1091 The Iraqi Governing
Council (IGC) was created in July 2003. Paul Bremer concluded an agreement with the
IGC in November 2003 whereby the authority would be handed over to an “unelected”
interim government in Iraq. In June 2004, the unelected government would write a
constitution for Iraq. Noah Feldman, an advisor to Bremer in Iraq, gave the explanation
for this step. If America moved fast, the “unwanted” people might be elected.1092
The reverend Shia leader of Iraq, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani opposed that
development and demanded instead the direct election of the interim government in Iraq.
However, his proposal was rebuffed. Ultimately, Iyad Allawi was “selected” as Prime
Minister of Iraq unanimously by the IGC. Allawi was a former Ba’athist who went into
exile before Saddam Hussain took power in Iraq. Allawi enjoyed good relations with
CIA. On his part, Allawi opposed US policies in Iraq including de-Ba’athification and
dissolution Iraqi army.1093 The power was transferred to an unelected interim government
on June 28, 2004. Like the IGC members, 2/3 members of the interim government
possessed either American or British nationality.1094
Before leaving Iraq in 2004, Bremer passed an order that the newly created Iraqi
army would be commanded by an American General. Pentagon also ordered the
construction of “fourteen military bases” for staying US military forces in Iraq.1095 The
war planners in Washington expected an easy situation in Iraq after fall of the regime.
However, it did not turn up like that. The occupiers took residence in the “Green Zone” in
Baghdad and had little information and knowledge, if any, of Iraq. They were dependent
upon a small group of personnel, Iraqi exiles, who were not intimately connected to the
society in Iraq since long. The main exile group, Iraqi National Congress, did not have
proper understanding of domestic settings in Iraq. They saw Iraq as a divided and
sectarian society. The ground situation in 2003-2004 was different.1096
1091 Fawn and Hinnebusch, Iraq War, 91092 Hiro, Secrets and Lies, 4351093 James Drummond, and Roula Khalaf, “Iraq Council Backs Former Exit with CIA Links as
Interim Leader,” Financial Times. May 29, 20041094 Hiro, Secrets and Lies, 484-4851095 Hiro, Secrets and Lies, 458-4591096 Isam Al-Khafaji. “A Few Days After: State and Society in a Post-Saddam Iraq”, in Toby
Dodge and Steve Simon (eds.), Iraq at the Crossroads: State and Society in the Shadow of Regime Change. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003
249
The constitution of Iraqi Governing Council was based on sectarian divide. It was
criticized such a political discourse was alien to Iraq during Saddam regime.1097 Whereas
the question of number of Iraqi deaths was concerned, from all war-related causes in Iraq,
the occupation powers deliberately played with the information. However, British
medical journal, The Lancet estimated the figure at 98,000 persons in October, 2004.1098
Stuart Bowen, special Inspector General for the reconstruction of Iraq, issued a
report on January 30, 2005 about the financial corruption in Iraq. He had conducted
audits in Iraq. He reported back to state Department and Pentagon on the issue. He placed
the charges of “incompetence, embezzlement, and outright fraud” on the part of those
Americans working in reconstruction projects in Iraq. He also cited widespread
corruption in the new Iraqi ministries. Bowen asked the US Army, in November 2004,
not to pay $90million to Halliburton as it already had not justified the large sums of
money paid to it. Bowen’s final conclusion was that CPA could not keep track of
“approximately $ 9 billion” a huge amount of money. The money was collected from
Iraq’s “oil sales” or sold out assets of Saddam regime.1099
Similarly, the Observers also talked about widespread corruption in Iraq during
years of occupation.1100 Bob Woodward in his State of Denial disclosed that first two
orders of Bremer De-Ba’athification of Iraqi society and Disbanding of entire Iraqi
military forces were carried out on the clear cut instructions from the President. The
President was determined to do De-Ba’athification of Iraq even at the cost of
administrative problems.1101 For General Jay Garner, the first two orders of Paul Bremer
were a “disaster” for Iraq.1102 Now the US had, at least, 350,000 more deadly enemies in
Iraq than the days before, argued General Garner.1103 Bremer’s policy of de-
1097 Rend Rahim Francke. “On the Situation in Iraq”, Iraq Democracy Watch. Report no.1, September 2003
1098 Les Francke, Riyadh Lafta, Richard Garfield, Jamal Khudhairi, and Gilbert Burnham. Morality Before and After the 2003 Invasion of Iraq. The Lancent, October 29, 2004
1099 Yochi J. Dreazen. “Former Bush Aide Turns Critic As Iraq Inspector”, Wall Street Journal, July 26, 2005
1100 Ed Vulliamy, and Richard N. Taylor. “Millions Embezzled at Iraqi Ministry”, The Guardian. August 22, 2005
1101 Woodward, State of Denial, 1961102 Ibid, 1941103 Ibid, 200
250
Ba’athification and dissolution of Iraqi army created more enemies for Americans
working in Iraq under any position.1104
De-Ba’athification and dissolution of Iraqi army was a gamble which the Bush
administration played. Jeffrey Record, a historian, commented on the US decision of
dissolution of Iraqi army a “tragic mistake”. It adversely affected both Iraq and the
occupation powers.1105 In the views of Sunnis of Iraq the newly established NIA (New
Iraqi Army) was “Shiite-Kurdish militia” breathing on American “steroids.”1106 Whatever
standard might be used, the American occupation of Iraq had been a failure. The failure
in Iraq led to ever-increasing insurgency in the occupied country.1107
The Governing Council of Iraq was established in July 2003. It was constituted in
an undemocratic way. It was selected rather than elected. In the establishment of IGC, the
“sectarianization” of Iraqi politics was legally institutionalized.1108 By doing that, the US
committed the same mistake in Iraq in 2003 which British did in 1920’s. The US
succumbed to “Primordializtion” in Iraq. The representation in 25-member IGC was on
the bases of ethnicity and sect. It did not discover the “essence” of Iraq.1109 It was a
common practice for majority of the IGC members to remain absent out of Iraq at any
given time during its tenure. The IGC failed to mark a distinction for itself.1110
Paul Bremer remained in Iraq for about 14-months and issued exactly 100 orders.
The orders established “total US control” over Iraq. For the US policy makers Iraq
represented three things “oil, wealth, and power”. For these policy planners 9/11
provided them with a big opportunity to pursue their “imperial” ambitious. The US
unilaterally invaded Iraq and got control of the second largest oil reserves of the
world.1111 Michael Scheuer, the former CIA official, wrote in his book “Imperial Hubris”
(with the name of Anonymous) that the US war on Iraq in 2003 was not a preemptive
war. Rather it looked like the US war on Mexico in 1846; an “unprovoked” war. Iraq did
1104 Shawcross, Allies, 1691105 Brigham, Iraq Another Vietnam, 801106 Ibid, 811107 Kolko, Age of War, 1481108 Jones, Negotiating Change, 246-2471109 Toby Dodge, and Steve Simon (eds.), Iraq at the Crossroads: State and Society in the Shadow
of Regime Change. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 1591110 Diamond, What Went Wrong in Iraq, September/October, 20041111 Juhasz, Bush Agenda, 183-184
251
not constitute an imminent threat to the US security. Saddam’s ouster, in reality, offered
“economic benefits.”1112
6.3 Insurgency in Iraq- Reaction to Prolonged Occupation:Three consecutive developments, Iran-Iraq War, the First Gulf War, and imposition of
“sanctions” on Iraq in the aftermath of the First Gulf War had severely affected Iraqi state
and society. The period between 1991 and 2003 created hyperinflation, poverty, and
other socio-economic problems in Iraq. During these years the middle class was
impoverished. Iraq suffered a lot, specifically macroeconomic problems.1113 The
Administration erroneously thought that the institutions would remain intact even after
the defeat of Iraqi army.1114
The civil servants did not return to their duty after the end of the war. Their
offices suffered from widespread looting and burning especially in Baghdad.1115 The war
planners at Pentagon believed falsely that there would be a coup against Saddam regime
on the entry of US forces in Iraq. The governing institutions would remain as such. 1116
Saddam regime faced with powerful US military forces ran short of options to defend
Iraq. Saddam Hussain had learned from his mistakes in the past and decided to
decentralize command and control structure of the army to the low level so that the
resistance could continue after the fall of Baghdad.1117
However, the resistance in Iraq was strong and widespread against the
assumptions of Pentagon especially in southern Iraq.1118 The real motivation behind this
resistance was the presence of militant Iraqi nationalism. The nationalism was the
creation of three wars in the recent times followed by punitive sanctions led by the US in
1112 Anonymous (Michael Scheuer), Imperial Hubris, xvi1113 Peter Boone, Haris Gazdar and Athar Hussain. “Sanctions Against Iraq: Cost of Failure”, paper
presented at the Conference, Frustrated Development: The Iraqi Economy in War and Peace. University of Exeter Centre for Gulf Studies, in collaboration with the Iraqi Economic forum, 9-11 July, 1997
1114 Micheal Gordon. “Catastrophic Success: The Strategy to secure Iraq did not Foresee a 2nd War”, New York Times, 19 October, 2004
1115 Mark Boone, Robin Wright and Doyle McManus. “Washington Battle Plan: Preparing for War, Stumbling to Peace”, Los Angeles Times. July18, 2003
1116 George, Whitaker and Smith, Revealed, October 17, 20041117 Stephen Biddle, et al. Toppling Saddam: Iraq and American Military Transformation.
(Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 2004)1118 Ibid, 6,9, 10
252
1990’s. The widespread opinion in Iraq was that the real driving force for the occupiers in
Iraq was “oil” and none else.1119
The occupation policy in itself was responsible for creating insurgency. The
peacekeeping experiences in post-Cold War era had made clear that establishment of law
and order within 6 to 12 weeks of occupation was seen crucial in establishing the
legitimacy and credibility of the occupation forces.1120 The speed with which regime
change in Iraq was effected was certainly impressive for the people of Iraq. In April
2003, regime change in Iraq was followed by three weeks of uncontrolled looting and
violence especially in Baghdad. The occupation forces seemed either unable or unwilling
to establish control especially in the capital city.
That was a message for the potential insurgents that the US forces could not
control Iraq. It created a “security vacuum” in Iraq. It also diffused, to some extent, the
concept of US omnipotence and helped in turning the criminal violence and looting into
an insurgency. This political vacuum in Iraq resurrected the conditions which had
historically been shaped by Islam, Arab nationalism and Iraqi nationalism. These forces
motivated the insurgents to fight and free Iraq from foreign occupation forces.1121
The insurgency in Iraq evolved from different sources and multiple causes.
Firstly, the criminal gangs present, especially in the urban centers like Baghdad, Basra,
and Mosul, constituted about 80 percent of violence in Iraq.1122 These criminal groups
came to surface in mid 1990’s with the weakening of the state caused by First Gulf War
and continued sanctions. In the aftermath of the war, widespread chaos and lawlessness,
availability of weapons, absence of efficient police structure, and the little intelligence of
the occupation forces revitalized those gangs. Secondly, a group of the remnants of
Ba’ath regime’s security personnel, loyalists of the Ba’ath party, and Saddam Hussain’s
loyalists carried responsibility of about 60 percent political violence in Iraq.1123
1119 Fawn and Hinnebusch, Iraq War, 2171120 Simon Chesterman. You, the People: the United Nations, Transitional Administration, and
State-Building. (Oxford University Press on Demand, 2004), 100, 1121121 Isam Al-Kafaji. “War as a Vehicle for the Rise and Decline of a State-Controlled Society: The
Case of Ba’athist Iraq”, In Steven Heydemann (ed.), War, Institutions and Social Change in the Middle East. Berkley: University of California Press, 2000
1122 Eric Schmit, and Thorn Shanker. “US says Resistance in Iraq up to 20,000”, The Guardian. October 23, 2004
1123 Fawn and Hinnebusch, Iraq War, 215
253
This second group of insurgents started following hit-and-run tactics against
occupying troops in May 2003 and increased in frequency, skill and territorial scope. The
insurgency started with reactive and was localized in nature. Toby Dodge conducted
interviews from Saddam loyalists in Baghdad in the summer 2003. On the basis of these
interviews, Toby Dodge concluded that it was a “spontaneous and fractured” rebellion
against occupation forces.1124 Another important work on insurgency in Iraq came to the
same conclusion as cited above by Toby Dodge.1125
Whatever the reasons, de-Ba’athification and the dissolution of the Iraqi army in
May 2003, made a large number of unemployed personnel available for the increasing
insurgency.1126 At the end of 2003 and beginning of 2004 a new organization of Iraqi
Ba’ath Party came into existence. Both the military and civilian wings were represented
in the new organization. Thirdly, Iraqi Islamism, representing both Sunni and Shia wings
of Muslims in Iraq. The nationalist and Islamic tradition in Iraq combined and gave rise
to an ideology to defend mother land. In 2004, this group constituted the fast growing
wing of insurgency in Iraq. This group approximately shared 20 percent violence against
the occupation forces.1127
Fallujah, a city of 300,000 inhabitants situated in the west of Baghdad. Fallujah,
along with a town named Ramadi had been famous for Sunni traditions in Iraq. The city
became a hotbed of violent resistance against occupation forces. The US forces made
some search operations against the hidden members of the former regime. Resentment
grew against the arrest of two imams. The US forces opened fire against the people who
were protesting against these arrests. The gunfire killed 17 and injured 70. That created a
spiral of violence and strong feeling of revenge among the inhabitants of the city. In
retaliation, they killed four US private guards. The resistance seized the city as well. The
US marines took it back, after a bloodbath. The incidents in Fallujah increased the
magnitude of insurgency in Iraq.1128
1124 Fawn and Hinnebusch, Iraq War, 2151125 Ahmed S. Hashim. “The Sunni Insurgency”, Middle East Institute Perspective, (August 2003),
31126 Phyllis Bennis, et.al. A Failed Transition: The Mounting Cost of The Iraq War. (Washington
D.C.: Institute for Policy Studies and France Policy in Focus, 2004), 371127 Fawn and Hinnebusch, Iraq War, 2161128 Jonathan Steele. “To the US Troops It Was Self-Defence. To the Iraqis It Was Murder.” The
Guardian. April 30, 2003
254
Fifthly, Muqtada al-Sadr, a prominent political-cum-religious figure of Iraq,
represented one of the nationalist and Islamic forces in Iraq. His following consisted of
poor Shia sections of “Sadr City” nearby Baghdad. The occupation forces failed to
deliver. In turn, Sadr’s popularity increased. He wanted a share in the post-Saddam Iraqi
political organization, however, the CPA wanted to exclude him from such a political
arrangement. Sadr deployed his “Mehdi Army”- his militia in Southern part of the
country along with some parts of Baghdad slums. The CPA struck back and closed down
Sadr’s newspaper and arrested Sheikh Mustafa al-Yacoubi, Sadr’s deputy at Najaf. This
step drew Sadr into open conflict with the occupation forces. The cities in South of Iraq
such as Basra, Karbala, Kufa, Najaf, Ammara, Nasiriya, and Kut, along with Baghdad
itself, rose in revolt. The US used its air force to quell this revolt especially in Sadr City
and Najaf. The revolt was suppressed but only after widespread causalities. The
suppression left great resentment against the US.1129
Sixthly, another constituent factor in the origin of insurgency in Iraq was the
presence of foreign fighters in Iraq, particularly, the al-Qaida fighters such as Abu Musab
al-Zarqawi, a Jordanian Islamist. These foreign fighters played important role in
insurgency and suicide bombings. They moved into Iraq in the aftermath of the US
invasion. According to US Army’s sources, their strength varied from 500 to 2000. In
initial months of 2004, there were only less than 150 prisoners of non-Iraqi origin under
the custody of US Army in Iraq.1130 The revolt, in reality, was homegrown.1131
There was a crucial thing to understand, there was initial support for the invasion,
especially from the oppressed and persecuted sections of Iraqi society. It did not mean
prolonged support for occupation. In Northern Ireland, the Catholics initially welcomed
British troops in 1969. The Catholics hoped that British troops would protect them from
Protestants.1132 Similarly, the Shia community of southern Lebanon welcomed Israeli
invasion of 1982, against PLO. As Israeli occupation prolonged, they went against Israel.
The Israeli occupation played important role in creating Hizbollah. The US repeated the
same story in Iraq. It created “militant Islamist-cum-Nationalist” movements in Iraq. The
1129 Fawn and Hinnebusch, Iraq War, 217-2181130 James Drummond. “A Year After The Invasion the Specter of Murderous Civil War Still
Hangs Over Iraq”, Financial Times. March 20, 20041131 Fawn and Hinnebusch, Iraq War, 2181132 Chris Ryder. “Joe Cahill”, The Guardian. July 26, 2004
255
Mehdi Army was non-existent before the invasion. However, by mid 2005, the Sunni
insurgency approximately killed 2000 American troops.
In the year 2004, one could get a DVD from Iraqi markets praising those
inhabitants of Fallujah who did not surrender to the occupation forces.1133 Interestingly, it
was in 2003, the US troops interrogated an imam from Ramadi for his objectionable
sermons. The imam had been imprisoned by Saddam regime for 3 years. The imam asked
the interrogators, “Will you not resist if Germans or Fiedel Castro occupied America?”1134
David Hawkins, a CBS reporter, reported in July 2003 after interviewing few Iraqis, who
remained a part of insurgency in Iraq. Hawkins asked the interviewee that why did they
attack American troops? The answer was because they “occupied our country”. They just
wanted America to leave Iraq. They were happy that Saddam was no more. Ahmed
Manajid gave the same answer in August 2004 in Athens Olympics.1135 The Mehdi
Army of Muqtada al-Sadr and like minded repeatedly confront occupation forces in 2004
and 2005. Sadr declared in March 2003 that we, the Iraqis, would never accept whatever
the price might be “subjugation” and occupation of our motherland.1136 During American
siege of Imam Ali Mosque at Najaf, a member of Mehdi Army gave reference that
President Bush called this war on terror a “crusade”. They attacked Iraq due to “oil”.
They wanted control over oil, the wealth of Iraq. They were occupiers. Iraqis had no
other option but to resist the occupiers.1137
In August 2004, during the US siege of Najaf, a young member of Mahdi Army
said that Iraq was their country. We would fight till end to protect our country and our
religion. They were not afraid of the US.1138 The important point to understand was that
the Iraqi people fighting against the Western occupation forces were Islamists. At the
same time they were Iraqi nationalists. The US occupation of Iraq forced them to fight.
Just as the “Vietcong” did during the occupation of Vietnam. The US failed to 1133 Melinda Liu. “War of Perceptions”, Newsweek. April 29, 20041134 Jonathan Steele, and Micheal Howard. “US Confused by Iraq’s Quiet War”, The Guardian.
July 18, 20031135 “Unwilling Participants: Iraqi Soccer Players Angered by Bush Campaign Ads”. August 19,
20041136 Sabrina Tavernise. “British Army Storms Basra Jail to Free 2 Soldiers from Arrest”, New York
Times. September 20, 20051137 Saad Sarhan, and Doug Struck. “To Mehdi Militiaman, Firing on Americans Is Act of
“Patriotism”, Washington Post. August 15, 20041138 Orly Halpern. “A New Iraqi Army Takes Aim at US led Coalition”, Globe and Mail. August
11, 2004
256
understand. Same was the case in Iraq. A US-led invasion of an Arab state followed by
occupation was bound to create reaction in the form of “resistance” not only in the Arab
world but also among the Muslims the world over. President George H.W. Bush clearly
understood this point and, therefore, intentionally refrained form “occupation” of
Baghdad during First Gulf War.1139
The Shiite Muslims constituted 60 percent of Iraqi population- a majority as such.
Kurds in Iraq might be politically insignificant but Shiite was not. For them the removal
of Saddam regime was an end of Sunni oppression and in new Iraq they had the right to
govern. However, Arab nationalism had always Sunni Muslim Coloration. Expectedly, in
January 2005, after elections in Iraq, Al-Dawa and SCIRI (Supreme Council for the
Islamic Revolution in Iraq) emerged as the dominant political forces in Iraq. These
organizations were Shiite and had close ties with Tehran. The Bush Administration did
not foresee this dimension of the invasion.1140
Richard A. Clarke, Served as national security official under four US Presidents
from Reagan to George W. Bush argued that America attacked, conquered, and occupied
Iraq, a country with “big oil reserves” that was no more a threat to the US security.
America did not pay any attention to Israeli- Palestinian problems. America, through its
policies especially in Iraq, provided a fertile ground to al-Qaida for recruitment
propaganda.1141 The occupation of Iraq strengthened and increased “militancy” in Iraq.1142
In fact, the Bush Administration “underestimated” post-Saddam resistance in Iraq.
Major part of the resistance originated form former Ba’athists and Sunnis of Iraq. The
Bush administration attributed resistance in Iraq to “international terrorism” whereas the
US field commanders attributed it to local elements. The foreign fighters in Iraq
constituted a “low percentage of the resistance” in numerical terms not more than 1000
out of 16000 insurgents.1143 Most of the violent attacks on occupation forces in Iraq were
coming from former Saddam loyalists and indigenous people.1144 As the occupation
1139 George H. Bush, and Brent Scowcroft. A World Transformed. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 1998: 489-490
1140 Richard A. Clarke. “Is a State Sponsor of Terrorism Winning?” New York Times Magazine. March 27, 2005
1141 Clarke, Against All Enemies, 263-2641142 Jessica Stern. “How America Created a Terrorist Heaven”, New York Times. August 20, 20031143 “Brookings Institution: Iraq Index”, New York Times. September 9, 20051144 Joel Brinkley. “US Officers in Iraq Find Few Signs of Infiltration by Foreign Fighters”, New
York Times. November 19, 2003
257
prolonged, so did the daily number of attacks on US forces. Nothing deterred attackers,
neither the killing of Saddam Hussain’s two sons or the capture of Saddam himself. With
the passage of the time the US occupation of Iraq seemed in tatters. The cost of
occupation approximately increased form $2.1 billion per month to $4 billion by January
2003.1145
The number of US soldiers killed in unfolding insurgency by the end of August
2003 had increased the number of killed during the initial phase of the war. Whatever the
reasons the psychological impact of insurgency was great. As the number of US
causalities increased, so did the political troubles for the Bush Administration. The
President had two options now. Either to opt for a major troop surge in Iraq to improve
post-war security or involve the UN in Iraq and open the door to deployment of non-US
military forces in Iraq. The field commanders on the ground situation in Iraq assessed
that the US needed to commit 300,000 to 500,000 soldiers to maintain law and order in
the country.1146
The Bush Administration ignored the warnings of the field commanders in Iraq.
Paul Bremer regretted later on for not asking for more troops while taking charge of the
occupation.1147 For the Bush Administration, a major troop surge and troop commitment
in Iraq meant creating a new “Vietnam” there. To counter increasing insurgency, the US
commanders in Iraq asked for a prolong presence of US military forces there.1148 Thirty
countries had sent their soldiers in Iraq as a symbol of their support to US. Out of them
about 50% had withdrawn their military forces from Iraq by early 2005. Others were also
preparing for their withdrawals in 2005 or early 2006. Italy was scheduled to withdraw
by September 2005. The governments of Japan, India, and Pakistan, for their own
reasons, were not ready to send troops in Iraq without a UN route. So did Turkey.1149
The UN endorsed the US occupation of Iraq under the UNSC Resolution 1511 of
October 2003. In pursuit of UN recognition of occupation, US put pressure on other
1145 David Firestone, and Thom Shanker. “War’s Cost Brings Democratic Anger”, New York Times. July 11, 2003
1146 John P. Abizaid. “The US Commander in Iraq”, New York Times. August 29, 20031147 Elisabeth Bumiller, and Jodi Wilgoren. “Bremer Critique on Iraq Raises Political Furor”, New
York Times. October 6, 20041148 Abizaid, US Commander in Iraq, August 29, 2003 1149 Eric Schmitt. “Commander does not Expect More Foreign Troops in Iraq”, New York Times.
September 26, 2003
258
member states to help reconstruction of Iraq. In response, the US got $2 billion only from
world community for such an important task. France and Germany did not contribute
anything at all. Iraq’s neighboring states were not even ready to send their ambassadors
to Baghdad due to decaying security situation in Iraq.1150
In November 2003, there started a phenomenal increase in the activities of
insurgents; killing 39 US troops in four separate helicopter gunship-incidents. The US
administration got under big pressure. It shifted its occupation. Now formation of self-
government would precede the writing of the new constitution for Iraq. The resentment in
Iraq, due to prolonged occupation, must be quelled. The post war chaos was a fertile
ground for thriving nationalist’s resentment in Iraq and so did the chances for al-Qaida
recruitment there. Iraq was becoming a real battle ground of al-Qaida operations rather
than Afghanistan.1151 Paul Bremer himself admitted that the presence of coalition troops
in Iraq was a cause of insurgency. Now the views of Iraqis were changing. For them,
foreign troops were “occupiers” not liberations.
In the last days of 2003, General Ricardo Sanchez, the commander of coalition
forces in Iraq declared that the US forces would stay in Iraq for a “couple of more years”
might be till December 2005. In the follow up statement Rumsfeld declared that the
“insurgency” was increasing day by day killing more people. It might take even “10 to
12” years to subdue insurgency.1152 With each passing day, Insurgents were getting
stronger and stronger and the security situation was continuously deteriorating. Sunnis
were “dissatisfied” with their share in the new governmental set-up and in the
constitution-making process. Same was true for Kurds. They were also dissatisfied about
their future role in Iraq.1153
In the mid-2005, the indicators about “quality life” showed high rate of
“unemployment, high infant mortality rate” and there was also lack of infrastructural
facilities such as electricity and drinking water. People in Iraq were suffering a lot. 1154 In
June 2005, President George W. Bush told Americans that the US government was not
1150 Steven R. Weisman. “Rice Urges Arab States to Send Envoys to Baghdad”, New York Times. June 26, 2005
1151 Brace Hoffman. “Saddam Is Our: Does Al Qaeda Care?” December 17, 20031152 Brian Knowlton. “Rumsfeld Certain But Cautious.” New York Times. June 27, 2005: 181153 Edward Wong. “Kurds Vow to Retain Militia as Guardians of Autonomy”, New York Times.
February 27, 20051154 Brookings Institution: Iraq Index, September 9, 2005
259
eager to give a “timetable” of withdrawal of US forces from Iraq. America would “stay
the course.”1155
Richard Armitage visited Iraq in late 2004. After his return, President Bush asked
his opinion about the situation in Iraq. His answer was classic. He told the President that
America was “neither winning in Iraq nor losing” there. He further said, while agreeing
with CIA and DIA analysis, that the enemy in Iraq was “mainly” indigenous. Syria and
Iran, the external factors, were also playing their role in insurgency.1156 In another move,
Condoleezza Rice sent Zelikow to Iraq in order to get firsthand information about the
state of insurgency in Iraq. He reported back in February, 2005. Zelikow reported back to
Rice, at the current stage Iraq was a “failed state”. There was constant violence in Iraq.
The life was “insecure” there. The immediate cause was the political dominance of
Shiites and Kurds in the elections of January, 2005. The Sunnis were marginalized and
consequently were dissatisfied with the emerging domestic power structure in Iraq. They
had, for their own reasons, boycotted the elections.1157
The level of violence in Iraq insurgency was increasing. The frequency of terrorist
attacks on US forces in Iraq in April 2005 was 1700, causing 52 American deaths; while
the corresponding figure for May were 2000 and 82 dead respectively. The insurgency
had taken a “dangerous” turn. Mike Gerson met Henry Kissinger in September 2005 and
asked him why did he support Iraq war? Kissinger answered that the West was in conflict
with Islam. The insurgents wanted to “humiliate the West” particularly the US and vice
versa. America’s clear message to “radical Islamists” was that the West would not live in
a world dominated by them.1158 Kissinger saw war on Iraq in terms of power politics.
The violence in Iraq touched its peak in October, 2005. There were 3000 terrorist
attacks in one month. President George W. bush finally released his National Strategy for
Victory in Iraq in November 2005. This national strategy declared, among other things,
that the US “goal” in Iraq was to “win” war against terrorism. The US soldiers would be
returning home only after achieving their target.1159 General Chiarelli, made commander
1155 Schmitt, Iraqis Not Ready, July 21, 20051156 Woodward, State of Denial, 3731157 Ibid, 3881158 Woodward, State of Denial, 4091159 Ibid, 429
260
of the US troops in Iraq in January 2006. He declared that the Iraqi population had been
alienated due to unwanted civilian killings in Iraq in the hands of occupying forces.1160
In May 2006, in the words of Casey report, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General
Pace’s intelligence, and CIA’s SECRET Assessment of May 24, 2006 (NIE), all
categorically declared that insurgency in post-Saddam Iraq was getting “intensified” and
gaining strength.1161 With every passing day, insurgency intensified in Iraq. With this
nature of the conflict was also changing from “terrorist insurgency” having its al-Qaida
and Saddam loyalist variants to sectarian violence.1162 In September 2006, the Bush
Administration gave its new National Strategy for Combating Terrorism. President Bush,
meanwhile, had decided for a troop surge in Iraq.1163 In December 2006, Iraq Study
Group stated that the conditions in Iraq were worsening. Iraq presented a “grave and
deteriorating” situation.
There were 1550 terrorist attacks on coalition forces and civilian targets per week
in June, 2007. It represented a new peak. By now, the US had lost 3562 soldiers in Iraq.
By the end of summer 2007, the level of troops in Baghdad had increased to 40,000 from
17,000. By the end of 2007, the number of US troops present in Iraq was 157,000
supported by more than 180,000 contractors and 1000 officials of the State
Department.1164 The two security related ministries of Iraq-defense and interior were
crowded with 2500 American advisers. By mid 2008, America had lost approximately
4100 troops in Iraq with 30,000 seriously injured. America retained 140,000 US military
forces in Iraq.1165 After ordering an invasion of Iraq, President George W. Bush
approximately spent three years in denial strategy.1166 He did not share with Americans
the on ground reality about Iraq.
The concentration of all political and administrative powers in Paul Bremer rather
than handing it over to the Iraqi people was perhaps the fateful decision. This decision
changed American position from a liberator to an occupier and post-Saddam situation in
1160 Ibid, 4441161 Ibid, 4841162 Woodward, War Within, 1881163 Ibid, 2351164 Woodward, War Within, 4081165 Ibid, 4341166 Ibid, 436
261
Iraq.1167 General Jay Garner had assembled professionals like Barbara Bodine, Tim
Carney, Robin Raphel, Ryan Crocker, and Bill Eagleton to run Iraq after fall of the
Saddam regime. However, the White House substituted these professionals with
Republicans. As soon as Bremer stepped in he replaced them all.1168 As soon as
insurgency unfolded itself in Iraq, Donald Rumsfeld dismissed it as nothing more than a
bunch of “former-regime dead enders”. The insurgency-led violence killed at least 2000
Americans in two years after the fall of Baghdad as an answer to Rumsfeld’s challenge to
insurgents in Iraq.1169
The Sunni Arab insurgency might have developed in response to the US actions
against Dulaym tribe and Fallujah, a result of bad intelligence and mismanagement. The
Sunni Arab insurgency and Ba’athists were as anti-American as anti-Shiites. They had
different goals. The Ba’athists wanted to revive the old regime type while the Sunnis, if
got an opportunity, might have evolved a variant of Taliban.1170 In January 2003,
intelligence warned the Bush Administration about the risk of insurgency. In case of an
invasion, the risk of insurgency could be reduced if the administration did certain things-
restoration of necessary human services and early transfer of authority to Iraqis.
Otherwise, most probably, the invasion would lead to nationalist backlash even if the
regime was unpopular in Iraq. The warnings went unheeded.1171
By October 2004, some twenty two cities fell under insurgent’s control.
According to Pentagon sources, there were 2700 insurgent attacks in August 2004.
Foreign Secretary, Colin Powell, admitted that the insurgency was worsening day by day.
Insurgent fighters mostly were locals. There were, at least, 35-organiztions involved in
violent insurgency in Iraq after the fall of Baghdad. They were united under the banner of
Iraqi nationalism. They shared hatred for the US. They were coming from diverse origin
such as tribal warriors, criminals, religious extremists and orthodox, and the revenge
seekers whose families were killed by the US forces.1172
1167 Galbraith, End of Iraq, 1251168 Ibid1169 Galbraith, End of Iraq, 1251170 Ibid, 1801171 Kolko, Age of War, 1471172 Ibid, 152
262
Two factors helped grew resistance. One was Washington’s “arrogance” to give
no time limit of occupation; and, the other was its domination of post- Saddam political
set-up in Iraq. Majority of Iraqis believed that open-ended policy of occupation was, in
fact an imperial project to control Iraq’s oil. The big mistake the administration
committed in Iraq was the failure to give a “timetable” for early US exit strategy from
Iraq.1173 Invasion of Iraq was a risky business. Arab World, actually, resented West’s
contempt for Arab culture and religion. Western media played central role in this
movement of cultural contempt. Arabs had long memories of West’s intervention, both
military and political, in the Middle East. They deeply suspected the motives of invasion.
They saw the invaders, Britain and the US, as creator and protector of Israel
respectively.1174
The other reasons included the methods of operating in Iraq. The occupiers
created resistance. They committed excesses such as breaking down doors at nights,
arresting people in front of their families handcuffing, breaking furniture’s, arresting
thousands of innocents, and abusing them. It was against their sense of human dignity.
Air strikes on villagers also aggravated the situation. They saw this all as against their
honor and looked for revenge against Americans. Such acts of high handedness turned
neutral Iraqis into US enemies. They started supporting insurgency. The prison scandal at
Abu Ghraib represented West’s enmity of Islam. That added to the revenge of Iraqis.1175
Many factors created insurgency in Iraq. The most important reason was Paul
Bremer’s decision to disband and disarm Iraqi army of 400,000 strong military
personnel.1176 Foreign fighters also came around in Iraq intensifying the insurgency
there.1177 The rules related to the regular warfare were not applicable in the post-conflict
environment in Iraq. This was not the culture of occupation.1178 There had been changing
nature of warfare. The military forces needed to address this new nature of warfare.
American Marine General, Kraulak called it the “Strategic Corporal” and “Three bloc”
1173 Steele, Defeat, 2501174 Ibid, 251-2521175 Ibid, 252-2531176 Pullan, US Intervention Policy, 1811177 “Iraq is Al Qaeda Battleground”, BBC News. July 29, 20041178 Rod Thornton. “The British Army and the Origin of its Minimum Force Philosophy”, Small
Wars and Insurgencies 15, no 1, (2004), 83-106
263
war. Actually, the ground forces simultaneously had to deal with three aspects of a war-
fighting, peacekeeping, and humanitarian assistance to the war affected people.1179
The Pentagon did not have any organization to coordinate against such
insurgency. It was only in 1998 that the US military forces initiated such a program
related to urban insurgency threats and the tactics to cope with them.1180 The US Army
lacked conceptual understanding to deal with asymmetric threats; especially how to deal
with the violent threat of IEDs (Improvised explosive devices). The IED-related violence
emerged as the particular problem in Iraq.1181 The Pentagon got guidance from Tel Aviv’s
experiences and practice.1182
The former Ba’athists, foreign fighters, and Iraqi nationalists constituted three
different strands of insurgency in Iraq. Primarily, they all came from Sunni origin, mainly
of Saudi Arabia. De-Baathification and disbanding of Iraqi army fed insurgency with new
recruits. Robert A. Pape conducted a study of 315 suicide bombers the world over during
2003-2004, and “concluded” that suicide bombing was more a phenomenon of foreign
occupation. To a lesser extent, it was also caused by “Islamic fundamentalism”. In case
of Iraq, both the variables inter-merged.1183 Citing a British source, Washington Post,
wrote in October 2004 that approximately 100,000 Iraqis had been perished in
insurgency. Susan Rice quoted George Marshall, the US foreign Secretary in post-WWII
era saying that it was not business of America to design a reconstruction plan for Europe.
It was business of Europeans. It was exactly what happened in Europe. But in case of
Iraq, none of the three stake-holders-Sunnis, Shiites or Kurds- designed reconstruction
plan for Iraq.1184
Britain had successfully ended insurgencies. Sir Charles Gwynn’s Imperial
Policing could be cited as a reference text book. Gwynn’s principal reasons for ending
insurgency were as followed. The mixing of fighters with a neutral people added to the
1179 Charles C. Kraulak. “The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in Three Block War”, Marine Corps Gazette 83, no 1, (1999), 18-22
1180 Alice Hills. Future War in Cities: Rethinking a Liberal Dilemma. (London: Frank Cass, 2004), 42-47
1181 Elaine M. Grossman. “Army to Create Asymmetric Warfare Group to Prepare for New Threats, Inside the Pentagon” July 8, 2004
1182 Marcus, Jonathan. “Analysis: US 'Emulates' Israeli Tactics.” BBC. April 14, 20041183 Robert A. Pape. Dying to Win: The Strategic ‘logic of Suicide Terrorism. New York: Random
House, 20051184 Susan E. Rice. Herald Tribune. October 25-26, 2003
264
problems of the occupiers. Excessive severity on the part of occupation forces
antagonized the neutral element of the population. It created bitterness and resentment.
Mistakes of judgments added to the difficulties and frustrated the end results. Population,
in general, must not be antagonized and authority of the sitting government also must not
be seriously injured by the occupation. If not taken care of all these things, it might lead
to a long period of insurgency. The key to victory, according to Gwynn, was “winning
over” potential supporters of the fighters.1185
America did not follow these guidelines in Iraq, and consequently ever-increasing
violence continued in Iraq especially till 2007. Sir Robert Thomson, in 1974 wrote a book
Defeating Communist Insurgency closely studied the problem and prescriptions thereof.
Thomson gave certain important principles to confront insurgency. Important, among
these principles were the government must start with a clear objective to gain, the
government must act according to law and there must not be any excuses to bulldoze the
due processes of law, and finally confronting and defeating political suppression was far
more important than taking aim at terrorists. For the US it was more important to win the
Muslim world. The “mistreatment” of Iraqi prisoners at Abu Ghraib, holding them
without trials, and employment of “torture” against them were among the few examples.
The US did not follow the policy prescriptions of Thomson in war on Iraq.1186
The biggest error, US committed in Iraq was the absence of any practicable and
viable plan for ending the war.1187 In the past, America did not use enough troops in
Vietnam. She did not also follow an effective counter-insurgency plan and also did not
win the support of the local population and, ultimately lost Vietnam. America repeated
the same mistakes in Iraq.1188 The most important mistake of the US and her allies
committed in Iraq was that they “underestimated the strength of Iraqi nationalism” The
phenomenon of Iraqi nationalism, in fact, was a fusion of nationalist feelings and
religious sentiment.1189
1185 Sir Charles Gwynn. Imperial Policing. (London: MacMillan, 1934), 71186 Robert Thompson. Defeating Communist Insurgency: Experiences from Malaya and Vietnam.
(London: Chatto and Windus, 1974), 511187 Jackson and Towle, Temptations of Power, 1881188 Ibid, 1891189 Ibid, 192
265
In Iraq, the US failed to “penetrate” the terrorist’s organization to frustrate their
operational plans.1190 Insurgency in Iraq was like a hydra-headed monster, we killed many
terrorists and insurgents but they had quick replacements, told a military officer to New
York Times. About the nature of insurgency in Iraq, The International Institute for
Strategic Studies reported that the “strength” of National Guard and the armed forces was
too short of the required international standard.1191
James Dobbin and Edward Luttwak in their two different articles in Foreign
Affairs in came to the same conclusion. They gave the opinion that on the footsteps of US
withdrawal from Iraq, sooner or later, Iraq would “sink into chaos”. The private militias
would rule Iraq making their own spheres of influence and dominance.1192 Peter W.
Galbraith argued in 2006 that TAL was written secretly by Americans. It undermined the
legitimacy of TAL. Such a development had ever been unheard in framing a modern
constitution in the world. It angered majority of Iraqis.1193
Whereas the question of legality of Bremer’s 100 orders, TAL, and Iraqi
constitution was concerned, the laws made during the occupation of foreign forces, under
international law, were not valid in post-occupation era in Iraq. They must have been
endorsed by the United Nations Security Council. But it was not done.1194 Paul Bremer
admitted in his letter written to Chief Justice of Iraq, for transferring sovereignty to
Iraqis, that America “failed” to create and maintain a “secure environment” in Iraq.1195
The US government badly mishandled the post-Saddam situation in Iraq. The CIA
gave repeated warnings to the decision makers on Iraq about the growing insurgency
there. They went unheeded. The Bush Administration was not serious enough to tackle
the on ground conditions and seemed either “unable or unwilling” to cope with the
insurgency in Iraq. The insurgency in Iraq had domestic roots and it worsened with every
passing day. The military conditions in Iraq, in reality, went out of hands.1196
6.4 Civil War in Iraq:1190 Philips, Losing Iraq, 145, 1861191 The Military Balance 2004-2005. (London: IISS/ Oxford University Press, 2004), 126, 354-
3581192 James Dobbin. “Winning the Unwinnable War”, Foreign Affairs 84, no 1, (January/ February
2005), 16-251193 Galbraith, End of Iraq, 1401194 Ibid, 1451195 Ibid, 1461196 Tenet and Harlow, Centre of Storm, 493
266
Iran converted to Shiism in the 15th century. The Safavid Dynasty adopted Shiism as the
state ideology of Persia as opposed to Sunniism of Ottoman Empire. The Iranian people
following their rulers adopted the same. The Arabs in Iraq followed Iranian example even
more recently, in the 19th century. Some Pastoral Sunni tribes, after wandering for
centuries, settled in Mesopotamia and converted to Shiism. Najaf and Karbala, the two
most sacred cities of Shia Imams, Hazrat Ali (AS) and Hazrat Imam Hussain ibn Ali (AS),
provided these converts with religious comforts and social regulations.1197
Najaf and Karbala carried great sanctity in Shia Islam. The martyrdom of Hazrat
Imam Hussain ibn Ali (AS) has been commemorated since his martyrdom at Karbala in the
year 680 AD at the hands of Yazid, the second Ummayad absolute monarch, Muawiya
being the first one. The commemoration of ceremony of Ashura continued at Karbala
since the martyrdom till 1977. However, in the year 1977, after some sectarian riots at
Karbala, Saddam Hussain banned the ceremony of Ashura there. Saddam Hussain being a
Sunni resorted to harsh crackdown against the Shia population at Karbala. The Shiite
leaders, coming from Najaf, were arrested and tortured to death. The executed leadership
did not cherish political motives. The ceremony remained banned until April 2003. The
US invasion uplifted the ban and there came about three million pilgrims to Karbala to
commemorate the ceremony.1198
General Qassem affected a coup in Iraq in 1958. He was born to a mixed marriage
between a Shiite woman (his mother) and a Sunni father. General Qassem relied on
Communist Party for support. The Communist party of Iraq extracted its support from
poor Shia classes in Baghdad and the south. The secretary general of the Communist
Party was a Sayyid from the Holy Prophet’s (PBUH) descendants at Najaf. General
Qassem did not discriminate between a Shia and a Sunni. A successive coup in Iraq in
1968 affected by Baa’th Party consolidated Saddam’s power and “marginalized” the Shia
community. The Shiites of Iraq got little or no representation among Saddam’s officer
class. The nationalization policy of Baa’th regime in Iraq also impoverished Shiite
Community of Iraq. The leader of Islamic Revolution of Iran, the Ayatollah Khomeini,
remained at Najaf between 1963 and 1977, during his exile from Iran.1199
1197 Kepel, War for Muslim Minds, 2241198 Kepel, War for Muslim Minds, 2251199 Ibid, 226-227
267
The Islamist Shiite political party “Dawa” (the call to Islam) was founded in Iraq
in late 1950s when the monarchy was overthrown. Baqir al-Sadr wanted Dawa to
spearhead the Islamic movement in Iraq and wanted to convert Iraq into an Islamic state.
The religious leadership of Dawa opposed Baa’th regime in Iraq. The Baa’th regime
repressed the movement and its leadership. Baqir al-Sadr was forced to leave his Dawa
and retired to his family. Consequently, the Shiite religious movement in Iraq since 1960s
had been divided into two factions-the religious and political. In 1970, the Grand
Ayatollah Mohsin al-Hakim died his natural death. The deceased was succeeded by Abu
Qasim al-Kohoei, who in turn was succeeded by Ali Sistani in 1992 after Khoei’s
death.1200 Khoei and Sistani were of Iranian origin.
Abu Qasim al-Khoei and Ali Sistani were opposed by Shiite Iraqi leadership,
Baqir al-Sadr and his cousin Sadiq al-Sadr. Owing to their opposition to Saddam regime,
they were murdered by Saddam’s secret service; Baqir in 1980 and Sadiq in 1999. They
were succeeded by Sadiq al-Sadr’s son, Moktada al-Sadr, the youngman who represented
Shia opposition to the US occupation of Iraq. Saddam Hussain’s secret service kidnapped
Baqir al-Sadr and his sister Bint al-Huda in 1980 and, they were found dead in Najaf.
Saddam invaded Iran in September 1980, to capture Shatt-ul-Arab. At the same time, the
exiled Shia leadership in Iran in 1982 founded the Supreme Council of the Islamic
Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), under the leadership of Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim, a scion
of respected family of Najaf. The party raised a militia known as Badr Army.1201
In the aftermath of First Gulf War, after the defeat and expulsion of Saddam’s
military forces from Kuwait, the Shiite after their encouragement from Washington,
raised revolt in southern Iraq. Saddam Hussain’s Republican Guard butchered these
helpless Shia folk in hundreds of thousands. However, the US watched silently. Iraqi
Shiism went through continuous repression with the coming of Baa’th regime to power in
Iraq in 1968. In April 2003, Moktada al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army took Abd al-Majid al-Khoei
to hostage, escorted him to nearby Sadr’s residence and killed him. That represented an
“intra-faction struggle for power” among Shiite of Iraq. Al-Khoei was a pro-West, liberal
Shia. On the other hand, Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim was killed in August in Najaf in a
1200 Kepel, War for Muslim Minds, 2281201 Ibid, 229-230
268
bomb explosion, most probably by Sunni extremists. His brother, Abd al-Aziz, succeeded
him as a new head of SCIRI.1202
Different ethno-religious communities of Iraq showed different reactions to the
invasion and occupation of Iraq. Kurds and Shiites, generally speaking, were happy on
the ouster of Saddam Hussain. They were oppressed people especially under Saddam
regime. Shiites and Kurds approximately constituted 60 percent and 20 percent of the
population respectively.1203 For the Shiites, the removal of Saddam regime signified the
end of their oppression and subjugation by the minority, the Sunnis. Shiites saw
themselves as the new rulers of Iraq. On the other hand, the Sunnis of Iraq considered
themselves as the real rulers of Iraq. Furthermore, the Sunnis had a negative perception of
Shiism in Iraq and they saw it as a primitive and Persian variant of Islam.1204
For the Sunnis, Shiites were barbarians and savages and they did not understand
true religion of Islam. For the Sunnis, Shiism was the twisted form of Islam.1205 Fouad
Ajami wrote that in Islamic political and religious history, Arab-Ajam divide was deep-
rooted. Ajami in Arabic is used for Persian. A Shia religious leader/scholar with black
turban on his head was seen as a threat to the true Arabs and true Islamic faith. That was
a paradox for Fouad Ajami which he could not resolve.1206 The main “beneficiaries” of
the US war on Iraq were “Shiites” of Iraq as well as Iran. The January, 2005 elections in
Iraq, made it clear that the al-Dawa and SCIRI, the two Shiite parties of Iraq, were the
dominant political forces of future in Iraq. Kurds were the other people who emerged as
important political player in Iraq. Kurds wanted an independent state.1207
Both SCIRI and al-Dawa had been closely associated with Iran. For Iran it was a
big positive development, the Bush Administration never intended that.1208 However,
most Sunni Islamist parties condemned the US war on Iraq as opposed to the Shiites and
Kurds of Iraq. For the two communities of Iraq, Shiites and Kurds,` the war was a
blessing. For the Shiites, Saddam Hussain was an oppressive despot. Furthermore Musab
1202 Kepel, War for Muslim Minds, 231-2361203 “Ansar-ul-Islam in Iraqi Kurdistan”, Human Rights Watch Briefing, February 5, 20031204 Fawn and Hinnebusch, Iraq War, 2411205 Neil Mac Farquhar. “Iraqi’s Anxious Sunnis Seek Security in the New Order”, New York
Times. August 10, 20031206 Fouad Ajami. The Vanished Imam: Musa al-Sadr and the Shia of Lebanon. (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1986), 111207 Juan Cole. “The Shiite Earthquake”, February 20051208 Clarke, State Sponsor of Terrorism, March 27, 2005
269
al-Zarqawi, a Sunni militant from Jordan and an al-Qaeda activist, killed many Shia in
Iraq for nothing. Zarqawi’s militant activities against Shia of Iraq further aggravated the
Shia-Sunni tension in Iraq.1209
There had been a deep distrust between Shiites and Sunnis, ethnically both Arabs.
In the aftermath of WWI, Iraqi Shia saw Sunnis as traitors and collaborators with the
British imperialist forces in Iraq. Shias boycotted the British in Iraq while the Sunnis
found it as an opportunity, and exploited it to consolidate their minority rule over whole
of Iraq. That position was undone in 2003 with the US take over of Iraq. In 1991, Sunnis
supported Saddam’s repression of Shiites in which thousands of innocent Shiites lost
their lives. However, in 2003, the conditions in Iraq were ripened for a civil war. Sunnis
were bitter on the overthrow of Saddam regime. They had lost their position of power and
prestige. They were apprehensive about their uncertain future. The Shiites had majority
and now wanted to rule over Iraq. Now the Sunnis believed that Shiites of Iraq were
traitors and had collaborated with the invaders.1210
In August 2003, Ayatollah Bakir al-Hakim, a leader of SCIRI was killed on the
door of Hazrat Imam Ali (AS) mosque in Najaf along with 94-followers. In March 2004, on
the day of Ashura, near the Shrine of Hazrat Imam Hussain at Karbala, some 180 Shiites
were killed in suicide attacks. In mid 2004, 37 killed in Hillah in June, 70 in Baghdad in
July, 45 in Kufa in August, in October 52 army recruits; in 2005, an ambulance used for
suicide attack killed 11, 135 in Hillah, 50 at a funeral in Nineveh, 98 in Musayib in a
truck explosion, 99 in Balad in a car bomb explosion, and 111 in Baghdad in a minibus
explosion. All the above cited examples were where all the dead belonged to the Shiite
community. On August 31, 2005, some 965 Shiite victims lost their lives near the Shrine
of Imam Musa Kadhim (A.S).1211
The Shiites of Iraq retaliated in deep revenge. They picked up a large number of Sunnis
and killed them. The Sunni dead included Baa’thists and former police and army officers.
The destruction of Samarra’s Askariya Shrine in February, 2006 escalated this civil war.
The Shiites blamed Sunnis for the sorry incident. In November 2005, the US troops found
a secret prison. The troops found there some 169 half-starved Sunnis in that secret prison
1209 Fawn and Hinnebusch, Iraq War, 2421210 Galbraith, End of Iraq, 1751211 Ibid, 175-176
270
run by Interior Ministry of Iraq. Mr. Bayan Jabr, the Interior Minister, was blamed for
running this secret prison. Jabr headed the Badr Corps, the militant wing of SCIRI, before
getting the portfolio of Interior Ministry. Mr. Bayan inducted his Badr activists to the
security wings of new Iraq.1212
The main centers of Iraq’s civil war were Babil, Diyalas, Nineveh, Kirkuk, and
Baghdad Governorates. Here, in these Governorates, all the three communities, Sunnis,
Shiites and Kurds, were mixed. From 2003 to 2005, in Baghdad Governorate only, some
14,829 civilians and 453 policemen were killed. Just in one month only, in July 2005, the
Baghdad obituary got more than one thousand murder cases. They were overwhelmingly,
the sectarian killings. The Sunnis suffered mainly in Basra and Baghdad. The two
communities, both Shiites and Sunnis, left their residences due to security reasons and
settled into their respective secure regions. In the initial four months of 2006, some
100,000 persons left their homes for security reasons.1213
There had been a peculiar characteristic of both civil war and insurgency in Iraq.
The Baa’thist activists and al-Qaida operatives in Iraq considered the Shias of Iraq as the
most dangerous enemy in the “struggle for power” in Iraq. For Salafis, a Sunni orthodox
school of thought, the Shiites were “apostates”. The Salafis constituted an important
element of violence in Iraq. The Baa’thists saw them as hostile to Arab nationalism. For
both Baathists and Salafis (both Sunni Muslims), civil war might be the only workable
strategy to recapture power in Baghdad, once again.1214
The Kurds of Iraq mainly remained in the sidelines of Sunni-Shia civil strife.
Arabs and Kurds clashed in Mosul, Iraq’s third largest city. America called in the
Peshmerga which “intensified” the civil strife between Arabs and Kurds in Mosul.
Kirkud had been the other city where Kurds clashed with Arabs. Kurd nationalist leaders,
Massoud Barzani and Jalal Talbani, called Kirkuk the “heart of Kurdistan.” Kirkuk
carried special importance in Iraqi politics due to its “oil”. Kirkuk possessed one of the
largest oil reserves of Iraq. It was oil that attracted Arabs to Kirkuk. They changed its
demographic structure. In the decades of 1980’s and 1990’s, Saddam regime followed
what was called policy of “Arabizing” Kirkuk. Kurds, the natives of Kirkuk were
1212 Galbraith, End of Iraq, 1761213 Iraq Body Count, available at www.iraqbodycount.net1214 Galbraith, End of Iraq, 181
271
systematically expelled from there. However, after the fall of Saddam regime, Kurds
started returning to Kirkuk. They did the same to the Arabs in Kirkuk.1215
Civil war in Iraq was caused due to multiplicity of reasons. At the root of these
reasons were the “clumsy” policies of the CPA. The other reason was the activities of
American Embassy in Iraq. The activities of al-Qaida in Iraq also played important role
in provoking civil strife there. Al-Qaida wanted to make Iraq ungovernable. Many Iraqis
had warned Washington about the possibility of drifting Iraq into a “civil war” as a result
of the invasion. However, their opinion was summarily rejected.1216 The US invasion of
Iraq ended Saddam regime and so did the Baa’th party. The Shiite majority of the country
stepped into the “power vacuum” in Iraq.1217
It came as a surprise for Washington. Under the regional political context in the
Persian Gulf, Washington never wanted that: American assumption was that the coalition
forces would assume that role.1218 Iraqi population was ethnically and religiously diverse
and divided. The Shiites constituted 62 percent of the population while Sunnis were 33
percent. The Sunnis consisted of three ethnic groups – Arabs, Kurds and Turkmen.
Ethnically Arabs constituted 79 percent and Kurds 16 percent of the population. In the
aftermath of WWI, British vested power in the Sunni Minority. After the overthrow of
monarchy in 1958, the Sunnis consolidated their power and ruled Shiites with ruthless
repression.1219
In post-Saddam Iraq, the Shiite organization and political parties quickly setup
armed militias to prepare themselves for the future “struggle for power.”1220 They did not
want to repeat the mistake their forefathers committed in 1924. In that year they
boycotted the elections which resulted in their exclusion from power for eight decades
and during this period they suffered brutal treatment especially under Saddam regime.1221
The Baa’thist regime, especially under Saddam, suppressed Shiite opposition through the
use of force.1222
1215 Galbraith, End of Iraq, 182-1841216 Steele, Defeat, 253-2541217 Fouskas and Gokay, American Imperialism, 1931218 Lewis, Iraqis in Charge, August 29, 20031219 David Hirst. “As Shiites Inherit Iraq, the Arab World Trembles”, Daily Star. January 27, 20051220 “Shiite Power in Postwar Iraq”, CBS News. April 24, 20031221 “Press Anxiety over Post Election Iraq”, BBC News. February 14, 20051222 I.M. Lapidus. A History of Islamic Societies. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990),
656-658
272
The Askariya shrine was destroyed on 22 February 2006, most probably by the
Mesopotamia wing of al-Qaida. Al-Qaida wanted to restore Sunni Caliphate in the
Middle East. In retaliation, the Mahdi Army went wild and three Sunni Imams
mercilessly were killed in Baghdad. Not surprisingly, both the US and Iraqi troops did
not intervene to restore law and order. Basra saw a different type of violence. A violent
Shiite mob broke into the jail and killed 10 foreign Arab prisoners. The next day Sunnis
reacted by killing 47 Shiites in Baquba. Curfew was imposed on Baghdad. However, 29
dead bodies were found around the cities. The dead were handcuffed and shot in their
heads. It meant the dead were Sunnis and picked up by the Shiite dominated police or
militia – and killed them.1223
In the next week, 184 Sunni mosques were destroyed. The violence left one
thousand plus dead; both Sunnis and Shiites. Atwar Bahjat, the child of a mixed
marriage, and reporter of al-Arabiya the Dubai based T.V. network, was abducted during
a live broadcast and later on found dead. In the coming month civil war accelerated. For
the Iraqi leadership it was a “civil war”. The leadership used that phrase in their
conversation with Peter W. Galbraith. After the US war on Iraq, in July 2004, the
National Intelligence Estimate prepared by the CIA warned the Bush Administration
about the danger of potential civil war in Iraq. However, the President did not take it
seriously.1224
Deadly sectarian violence was going on in Iraq, particularly Sunnis killing Shiites
and vice versa. The “sectarian violence” was coming down lower into the different
sectarian groups. That was startling. After the Askariya mosque destruction in Samarra,
there occurred more than 450 violent incidents, mostly around Samarra and Baghdad,
killing approximately 1800 Iraqis.1225 Iraq was on the brink of “civil war.”1226 By mid
2008, when the presidential elections in America were approaching, Baghdad was far
from a normal city, concluded Satterfield after his visit to Baghdad. American withdrawal
from Iraq in haste would give rise to a new phase of “struggle for power” in Iraq among
1223 Galbraith, End of Iraq, 1-21224 Ibid, 2-51225 Woodward, State of Denial, 4771226 Ibid, 445
273
different ethno-religious communities.1227 By July 2008, the sectarian violence in Iraq
was going on but at a lower pitch.1228
6.5 The Economic Agenda in Iraq- Corporate Globalization:
For many Americans, Iraq was the test case for Bush Administration whether America
could introduce capitalism in the Middle East.1229 Just within a month of “Mission
Accomplished” in Iraq, President Bush proposed MEFTA (Middle East Free Trade
Area). The “economic invasion” of Iraq was to engulf the entire Middle East. The US big
corporations like “Halliburton, Chevron, Bechtel, and Lockheed Martin have vital
interests in the region”. They had made big investments in the region. These corporations
made a business lobby in the form of MEFTA. Amanda Martin, with over 150 other
students, did not join graduation ceremony of the University of South Carolina in May,
2003 where President Bush was the Chief Guest. When a reporter asked about the cause
of her protest, she replied that in South Carolina alone some 70,000 labor had lost their
jobs because of free trade agreements.1230
The reasons of the “US invasion of Iraq and corporate globalization” of the
Middle East mostly overlap. Approximately “20 percent of the oil the US consumed” was
imported from the Middle East. In this connection, Iraq remained at the second place
after Saudi Arabia. The “MEFTA and US oil corporations” wanted their control over the
oil of the Middle East. The five top most oil-rich countries of the globe accounted for 54
percent of the oil reserves were enlisted in MEFTA. They included Saudi Arabia, Iraq,
Kuwait, Iran, and the UAE. With the exception of Iran, the other four countries had been
actively involved in the MEFTA.1231
Robert Zoellick wrote in January, 2000 several important pieces while advising to
George W. Bush as presidential candidate, about his economic agenda. He wrote that
“corporate globalization” was an instrument related to the pursuit of national security
strategy and Pax Americana. He was of the opinion that the “US military and economic
predominance” could be expanded through “corporate globalization”. The 21st century
1227 Woodward, War Within, 4081228 Ibid, 4191229 Neil King Jr. Wall Street Journal. May 1, 20031230 Jacob Jordan. “Some South Carolina Grads Forego Ceremony in Protest of Bush”, Savanah
Morning News. May 10, 20031231 Juhasz, Bush Agenda, 264-265
274
was the proper time to assert the US predominance on the globe he argued also. He
further argued that the US should overthrow Saddam regime as it threatened “vital
interests” of America. At the top was American access to oil in the Persian Gulf.1232 Later
on, Zoellick became trade representative of America. Iraq was granted Observer status in
WTO in February, 2004 even without an elected government in Iraq.1233 In reality, that
was “economic imperialism” in essence. It would increase subservience of the Middle
East to the US corporations.1234
CIA conducted a study in 2000. These studies were conducted every five years to
determine the most serious threat to US interests, particularly security. The conclusion of
the study was worth quoting. The study put the blame at the principles of “corporate
globalization”. It would create winners and losers. The gap would be sharpened. The
result would be deepening economic stagnation, and political instability. The policies of
corporate globalization would give rise to political, ethnic, and religious extremism
accompanied by violence.1235 CIA conducted a similar study in 2005 as well. The study
repeated the results of previous study even by 2020.1236
Paul Bremer, as the head of CPA, had an ambitious economic agenda about Iraq.
The key to his reconstruction plan was the “privatization of a large number of state-
owned enterprises.”1237 Peter W. Galbraith wrote that under international law an
occupying power could not privatize the enterprises of an occupied country, still the US
did that.1238 Bremer sold state-owned “economic enterprises” of Iraq to Halliburton,
Bechtel and other American corporations. By doing that America became an occupier
rather than a liberator. Corporations got big profits.1239 Dick Cheney, as Secretary of
1232 Robert Zoellick. “Campaign 2000: A Republican Foreign Policy”, Foreign Affairs. (January/ February 2000)
1233 Guy de Jonquieres. “Brussels Resists Demand for Iraq WTO Seat”, Financial Times. January 2004
1234 Juhasz, Bush Agenda, 2901235 “Global Trends 2015: A Dialogue About the Future with Nongovernment Experts”, approved
for publication by the National Foreign Intelligence Board under the authority of the director of Central Intelligence, NIC 2000-02, December 2000
1236 “Report of the National Intelligence Council’s 2020 Project,” Global Trends 2020: Maping the Global Future,” NIC 2004-13, December 2004
1237 Paul Bremer. Wall Street Journal, June 20, 2003, an op-ed piece1238 Galbraith, End of Iraq, 1261239 Michael R. Gordon. “Debate Lingering on Decision to Dissolve the Iraqi Military”, October
21, 2004
275
Defense, opposed occupation of Baghdad in 1991 for the right reason.1240 It might be for
hegemonic ideology.1241
6.6 The US-Iraq Policy in Muslim Eyes:The Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, released a survey report on 3 June
2003, after the fall of Saddam regime titled “Views of a Changing World”. The report
said that there had been a “phenomenal increase in Muslim hostility” toward America
from 2002 to 2003. Among the countries included were the traditional Muslim allies of
America as well. The survey included nearly 16,000 individuals in 21 countries. The
survey was conducted from 28 April to 15 May, 2003. The results of the survey were
supplemented from an earlier survey conducted in 44 countries of the world in 2002. The
number of individuals included in the earlier survey was 38,000. In mid 2002, 61 percent
Indonesian people entertained favorable American view. However, by June 2003, the
percentage had been dropped to 15 % only. For Turkey and Jordan the corresponding
figures had been dropped from 30 percent to 15 percent and from 25 percent to 1 percent
respectively.1242
The US invasion of Iraq had “intensified Muslim hostility” toward America. The
US policy under President George W. Bush had been cited as the major cause of that
shift. The report also founded, among other things, that only a little percentage of the
Muslims worldwide supported the US war on terror the way it was being waged by the
Bush Administration. Only 23 percent Indonesians, 22 percent Turkish, 16 percent
Pakistanis, and 2 percent Jordanians supported the war on terror as waged by America
under President George W. Bush.1243 The above cited percentage had been dropped from
31 percent, 30 percent, 30 percent, and 13 percent for Indonesia, Turkey, Pakistan and
Jordan respectively from mid 2002 to mid 2003.1244 For the overwhelming majority of the
Muslims worldwide the US attack on Iraq was an “imperial invasion”.
Similarly, a Zogby International Poll conducted in six Muslim countries Egypt,
Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Jordan and UAE between February 19 and March 11,
2003. The survey concluded that overwhelming majority of Arab Muslims believed that
1240 Will, Ask the Nominee, November 17, 20041241 Gurtoc, Superpower on Crusade, 1141242 Pew Research Report, June 3, 20031243 Ibid1244 Ibid
276
America invaded Iraq to ensure “security and control of oil” in the Middle East. They
also believed the other US objective was to help “Israel by eliminating a deadly enemy of
Israel.”1245 The overwhelming majority of the Arab Muslims rejected the view that the US
invaded Iraq out of humanitarian motives. So much so, even in Iraq where the Shiites and
Kurds generally welcomed removal of Saddam regime, just 5 percent of Iraqis believed
that the American invasion was intended out of humanitarian concern to help out Iraqis.
Gallup Survey was conducted in Iraq from 28 August to 4 September 2003.1246
America invaded Iraq unilaterally and preemptively in March 2003, under “false
pretexts”. It was an act of “deliberate deception” to the American people.1247 A part of
accusation of that “deliberate deception” lay with the CIA.1248 The distortions also came
at the highest political level of the White House. President and Dick Cheney made
unequivocal statements about the presence of biological and chemical weapons in Iraq.1249
However, the operational US policy was contradictory to the Bush Administration’s
declared policy objectives in Iraq. The operational policy in Iraq, in fact, reflected
offensive realist model.
A close look to the US occupation policy in Iraq, particularly during George W.
Bush Presidency, made it clear that the policy fitted the assumptions of offensive realism.
The invasion of Iraq was not followed-up by any serious plan of reconstruction of post-
Saddam Iraq. After the fall of Saddam regime, Iraq was left to looters for a couple of
weeks. Paul Bremer’s “policy of de-Baathification and disbanding” of the army created
more problems than solving them. There was no provision of basic services, such as
electricity and water for years under occupation. The open-ended occupation, without
giving any timetable for military withdrawal, initiated insurgency against the occupiers
and “struggle for power” among different stakeholders leading to civil war in Iraq.
On the other hand, America did not provide sufficient economic resources for the
reconstruction of the country. Instead, the big US corporations entered into Iraq earning
1245 Shibley Telhami. “Arab Public Opinion Survey”, Anwar Sadat Chair for Peace And Development at the University of Maryland, in Cooperation with Zogby International, 19 February- 11 March 2003
1246 Walter Pincus. “Skepticism about US Deep, Iraq Poll Shows”, Washington Post. November 12, 2003
1247 Soros, Bubble of American Supremacy, 25-261248 Jentleson, American Foreign Policy, 4101249 Ibid
277
super profits from contracts. The security of Israel had been ensured for the foreseeable
future, through the elimination of its arch enemy, Saddam Hussain. It goes without saying
that the neoconservatives, in Bush Administration, intended for a long-time presence in
Iraq in order to exert more pressure on Syria and Iran. They also wanted to establish
military bases in Iraq. Without any exaggeration, they also wanted to send a message of
the “US hegemony” in the Middle East.1250
In short, it could safely be argued that the invasion of Iraq was intended to
increase the “US share of world power” and to establish its “hegemony” in the Middle
East. The control over the Middle Eastern oil (especially Persian Gulf region) constituted
the important instrument of “US hegemony” in the region. The US occupation policy in
Iraq under President George W. Bush reinforced the theme of this dissertation. It
constituted an excellent case study of the application of offensive realism. The US-Iraq
policy created diverse consequences and implications for the international political
system, the UN, the NATO, the Middle East, and the US at large. They constituted the
next chapter.
Chapter Seven
Consequences and ImplicationsThe consequences and implications of the policy also were in line with the assumptions
of offensive realism as they constituted an acceptable cost of the policy. There was no
major upset for the US at any level as the cost of the policy. The dividends offset the cost.
This chapter discussed in detail the consequences and implications of the policy from
2001-2008. The consequences and implications fitted the offensive realist model. On the
credit side (as discussed in detail in chepter-5) it led to the big US military presence in
the region. It uprooted the main US rival in the Middle East. It benefitted the US in
multiple ways including the increased pressure on Iran, the improved US strategic
position in the region, the increased US control over the oil in the region etc. On the debit
side, whatever the direct cost for the US might be, as discussed in this chapter, however,
it did not exceed the reasonable limits as the theory of offensive realism had predicted.
7.1 Implications on IR Theory:
1250 Steele, Defeat, 9
278
7.1.1 Hegemonic Stability Theory:
The basic thing about the US war on Iraq in 2003 was that already Iraq was a destroyed
country, specifically since the First Gulf War and successive UN sanctions since 1991. In
2003, Iraq did not constitute an imminent threat to the US. The war was a result of the US
determination to “play the role” of the “World hegemon.”1251 The war proved a watershed
in the US role as a “global hegemon”. Instead of stability, the hegemon became a source
of “global disorder”.1252 The concept of a hegemon existed in all the three major schools
of thought in IR liberalism, realism and structuralism. Despite the merits of the existence
of a hegemon in all the three schools of IR, the US war on Iraq exposed the weakness of
all the three variants of “hegemonic stability theory” as a hegemon, instead of being a
source of “stability” might become a source of “world disorder”. All the above cited three
variants of “hegemonic stability theory” failed to appreciate this fact.1253
Contrary to liberalist version, all the realist versions of “hegemonic stability
theory” had been of the view that the “hegemon” always pursued “self-interests” and the
hegemon “taxed” the beneficiaries of the system for the service it rendered.1254 In an era
of unipolarity, there had been an absence of any powerful rival power that could check
militarily predominant America from degenerating into a “predatory hegemon”. America
was no more willing to accept restraint on its foreign policy pursuits.1255 Which factors
made a hegemon benign or malign? The US war on Iraq under President George W. Bush
had turned the “US hegemony into a coercive empire.”1256
The US war on terror, particularly against Iraq, made it clear that “self-restraint
and multilateralism” were no more relevant. America had already become a partisan
player in the Middle East and through “coercive hegemony” had created “instability” and
terrorism in the region. As was the case of great powers of the past, America was
dissatisfied with the power configuration in the world and in order to increase its own
“share of world power” by invading Iraq risked “global instability” instead. America
1251 Michael C. Hudson. “To Play the Hegemon: Fifty Years of US Policy in the Middle East”, Middle East Journal 50, no 3, (1996)
1252 Fawn and Hinnebusch, Iraq War, 2841253 Ibid1254 Robert Gilpin. War and Change in World Politics. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1982), 153-1561255 Fawn and Hinnebusch, Iraq War, 2851256 Ibid, 287
279
acted as a “revisionist power” in the Middle East in 2003.1257 The Iraq war also suggested
that in an era of unipolarity, the excessive power America wielded made it malign.1258
Waltz further argued that power in itself was a threat particularly “if unchecked”
it did not matter who possessed that.1259 The US-Iraq policy had created more “terrorists”
in the Middle East.1260 The US squandered away much soft power in the Middle East in a
short time.1261 The US did not use its predominant military power in Iraq in a “stabilizing”
way. It had been a big question. The answer could be found in the offensive realist
model. The great powers were not “status quo” oriented. They always looked for
“opportunities” to “increase their share of world power”.
7.1.2 Theories of Imperialism:
America had become an “empire”. According to Chalmers Johnson, America was an
empire of “clients and military bases” over the world. It depended on its “control of
strategic territories” such as a territory “swimming in oil”. It was a big benefit rather than
a liability to control such a territory.1262 The US war on Iraq also made it clear that
military was “central” to the maintenance of empire.1263 Michael Klare’s concept of
empire basically was concerned to the “resource wars” waged America to control the
resources weak third world countries owned. Great powers waged wars for the
exploitation of these resources. The US war on Iraq validated Michael Klare’s theory
where an imperial power exploited oil.1264
Benjamin Barber gave a different concept of the US Empire. It was a function of
Bush Administration to exploit American people’s “fear” of terrorism generated by
9/11.1265 Roger Burbach and Jim Tarbell argued about the US invasion of Iraq that, in
reality, it was to establish “control over oil” of the Middle East. Personally, it was also a
source of big profits for the US decision makers of the war.1266 The war might be 1257 Anatol Lieven. “The Empire Strikes Back”, The Nation. July 7, 20031258 Waltz, International Relations, 12 1259 Ibid, 271260 Pieterse, Globalization or Empire, 26-291261 Ibid1262 Chalmers Johnson. Blowback: The Costs and Consequences of American Empire. (Macmillan,
2004)1263 Ibid1264 Michael T. Klare. “Oiling the Wheels of War”, The Nation. October 7, 20021265 Benjamin R. Barber. Fear’s Empire: War, Terrorism and Democracy. (New York: W.W.
Norton, 2003)1266 Roger Barbach, and Jim Tarbell. Imperial Overstretch: George W. Bush and the Hubris of
Empire. (London: Zed, 2004)
280
counterproductive. A report of experts led by Paul Wilkinson, UK, made it clear that,
among other things, the war on terror boosted “al-Qaeda” in terms of “recruitment,
funding and propaganda”. It would also affect new generation of terrorists.1267
From Samuel Huntington’s point of view, the US drive for empire apprehended
“clash of civilizations”. The US war against Saddam regime fueled a violent clash
between Muslims on the one hand and Jews/ Christians on the other.1268 Some writers
were of the view that American use of militancy force for “imperial ambitions” not only
created but also increased level of “resistance” among the targeted countries.1269 Iraq had
become a test case for Bush Administration’s concept of American empire. Certainly, the
President hoped Iraq would be done at a low cost but things did not turn-up that way.
7.1.3 Theories of World Order:
Stephen Krasner, a realist, gave the view that in the absence of a powerful “world
Judiciary” great powers would use international norms which well suited to their
“national interests” and ignore others that constrained their foreign policy.1270 Liberals
failed to prevent the US invasion of Iraq in March, 2003. Domestic constraints on the
Bush Administration were easily sidelined and so were the UN and international law as
external constraints in case of Iraq. The Bush Administration invented a new doctrine of
“preventive” war and justified on the basis of “self-defense”. A number of scholars
observed that Bush Administration, in fact, pursued a “Machiavellian” model of politics,
in which the administration justified the use of violence and “deliberate deception” to
achieve its end.1271
7.1.4 Implications for State Sovereignty Theory:
Since the Vietnam War, America lost its goodwill as a global player. The end of the Cold
War and 9/11 had made standard concepts of international relations inadequate in an era
of terrorism and “US unipolarity”. The world had become too complex and too diverse
1267 “UK’s Preparedness for Future Terrorist Attack”, report of St. Andrews/ Southampton Universities ESRC Project. Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence and the Mountbatten Centre for International Studies, 2004
1268 Glenn Perry. “Huntington and His Critics”, Arab Studies Quarterly 24, no 1, (Winter 2002)1269 Michael Mann. Incoherent Empire. (New York: Verso, 2003)
1270 Stephen Krasner. “Rethinking the Sovereign State Model”, in M. Cox, J. Dunne, and K. Booth (eds.), Empires, Systems and States. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 191271 Danny Postel. “Noble Lies and Perpetual War: Leo Strauss, the Neo-Cons and Iraq”, November 17, 2004
281
since 1990s. The new global order, specifically exhibited some new characteristics –
America had become a “hegemon” in an era of unipolarity, assertiveness of political
Islam taking a militant turn, foreign military interventions in weaker states were justified,
and American claim that “preventive war” was justified and legal under the cover of
“self-defense”. Such a world order was dangerous.1272
In the new era of “unipolarity and terrorism” the traditional concept of “state
sovereignty” had undergone a marked decline. Many of the military actions in this new
era had been taken in violation of traditional concepts of state sovereignty and
international law. These concepts in their traditional sense had become “confused”.1273 In
the post-Cold War era, a new practice of “military intervention” in the internal affairs of
weaker states had been developed, however, there had been an absence of parallel
development in international law.1274 Boutros Boutros-Ghale, former UN Secretary
General, observed on the subject of sovereignty that it was no more “absolute.”1275
John Mearsheimer, the offensive realist, argued that all the great powers had been
“power maximizers” and would continue to be, all the time. By doing that they would
cause strife in international political system. The ways and methods of doing that carried
central place in any interpretation. The role of political circumstances was also important
in doing that.1276 President Bush initiated an open ended war in Iraq as the cardinal
principle of US war on terror. He opted for “coalition of the willing” support.
Consequently, America was caught in strategic overextension and, in the process, was
relatively isolated.1277
America confronted a situation in Iraq about which Theodore Roosevelt already
had a warned. If the US would use its military power to overthrow a medieval kind
tyranny just to replace it with anarchy; it was advisable for the US not to do that job.1278
The US invaded Iraq in 2003, and within a short span of time, just within 18 months, the
US became a “chief destabilizer of global political system.”1279
1272 Jackson and Towle, Temptations of Power, 4-51273 Ibid, 81274 Ibid, 91275 “Agenda for Peace”, UN. January 31, 19921276 Black, Great Powers, 191277 Fabrinni, United States Contested, 67 1278 J. Judis. The Folly of Empire. (New York: Scribner, 2004), 62 1279 Gaddis, American Experience, 101
282
Many realists believed that new conflict would act as a check on US power. Two
scholars, Robert Jackson and Philip Towle argued that some realists saw 9/11 as the
proof of coming conflict between, in the words of Huntington, the Islamic world on the
one hand and the West on the other. They also believed that the resistance in the targeted
societies would increase with the every US action taken under the logic of Iraq war.1280
7.2 Rise in anti-Americanism: There was an important question about the rise of anti-Americanism in the Muslim
Middle East, culminating into 9/11. Historically, America had been supporting
“absolutist regimes” in the Middle East in the countries like Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan,
and Kuwait etc. for many decades. That was a leading cause of origin and increase in the
phenomenon of anti-Americanism in the Middle East. Terrorism was a reaction to US
historical policies in the Middle East, argued Noam Chomsky with reference to an
Egyptian scholar. The reaction culminated into 9/11.1281 The US invasion of Iraq
intensified feelings of “Islamic fundamentalism” throughout the Muslim world, however,
the US allies in the Muslim world in general and the Middle East in particular did not
trust in American intentions and policies. There existed a deep mistrust about.
Overwhelming majority of people in the Middle East believed that US was the
source of “evil” on this globe. So did the professors, officials, and businessmen in the
Arab world. The policies pursued by the Bush Administration led to the further growth of
“anti-Americanism” in the Middle East.1282 A research on this issue about public opinion
in the 21 Muslim countries in June 2003 was released. The survey concluded a
“phenomenal increase in anti-Americanism” and hostility toward America in the Muslim
world. The results of this survey were compared to an earlier survey conducted in
summer 2002. According to these surveys, 61 percent Indonesians, 30 percent Turkish,
and 25 percent Jordanians had favorable image of America in summer 2002. But the
same corresponding figure dropped to 15 percent, 15 percent, and 1 percent respectively
in those countries.1283
1280 Jackson and Towle, Temptations of Power, xii1281 Chomsky, Power and Terror, 2151282 Jentleson, American Foreign Policy, 3701283 Pew Research Center Report, June 3, 2003
283
As for reasons about this hostility, Osama bin Laden frequently gave, included,
presence of American forces in Saudi Arabia, the US support to Israel over the decades,
and America’s Iraq war. Al-Qaida issued a policy declaration in 1998. The statement,
among other things, declared that it was the individual duty of every Muslim to kill
Americans and their allies, no matter whether civilians or military.1284 In December 2001,
Al-Qaida released a video tape which confirmed the involvement of the organization in
9/11.1285 In American and coalition response to 9/11, they tried to shift the connection
between 9/11 and the past US-Middle East policy. America actively remained involved in
the Middle East since 1950s. The rationale of US involvement mainly was related to four
areas including oil supply, protection to Israel, support to authoritarian regimes, and
checking USSR’s increased involvement in the Middle East.1286
There had been a phenomenal increase in “anti-Americanism” in the Middle East
since the beginning of Intifada (uprising) in Palestine, September 2000, reported Al-
Ahram. “Anti-Americanism” increased in intensity in the region following a halt in the
peace process the following year.1287 The roots of “anti-Americanism” could be found in
the “heart of resentment” to the US foreign policy toward the Muslim world.1288 There
had been an increased “anti-Americanism” around the globe caused by the US policies.
The interventionism of President George W. Bush was at the heart of the present global
anger. His policies had little international support.1289
The Bush Administration, perhaps intentionally, did not understand that the US
aggressive foreign policy was leading to the intensification of the phenomenon of “anti-
Americanism” around the globe.1290 Two authors argued about the “militaristic” foreign
policy of George W. Bush that the policy was provoking phenomenon of “anti-
Americanism” around the world, specifically among Muslim countries.1291 Egyptian 1284 Fred Halliday. Two Hours That Shook the World: September 11, 2001, Causes and
Consequences. (London: Saqi Books, 2002), 2191285 Laurie Goodstein. “Some Muslims Say Tape Removes Previous Doubt”, New York Times.
December 15, 20011286 Brands, Into the Labyrinth, xi-xiii1287 Thomas Gorguissian. “A Valid Fear”, Al-Ahram Weekly, Online, October 26 to November 1,
20001288 Mushahid Hussain. “Anti–Americanism Has Roots in US foreign Policy”, Inter Press Service.
October 19, 20011289 Black, Great Powers, 2151290 “US Image Up Slightly, but Still Negative”, Pew Global Attitudes Project Report, June 23,
20051291 Jackson and Towle, Temptations of Power, 17
284
President, Hosni Mubarak, warned President Bush not to invade Iraq. Israel already had
been killing Palestinians. Now America would kill Iraqis. This would lead to outbursts of
uncontrollable protesters. The spokesman from Riyad, Saudi Arabia was even more
critical. The spokesman said that the US was threatening “stability” of the region not only
of Iraq.1292
Similarly, according to the result of a poll conducted in May 2002, before the US
invasion of Iraq in March 2003, majority of French and German citizens clearly opposed
the US policy toward the Middle East.1293 The US war on Iraq in March, 2003, sparked a
“global” movement of protest. The movement took anti-America tone. Since long anti-
American feelings had been a part of European culture particularly in post-WWII period.
However, things were different now. European mistrust of America increased
significantly.1294
The US unilateralist and preemptive move against Iraq provoked a global reaction
in Europe, Latin America, and the Muslim countries. The justification of the invasion
provided was discredited.1295 An opinion survey was conducted in January 2005.
According to the opinion poll a “wide majority” of citizens throughout the world
considered President Bush’s re-election as a “negative factor for global security and
peace”. They included approximately 75 percent Germans, 76 percent French, 63 percent
Brits, 53 percent Italians, 80 percent Argentines, 77 percent Brazilians, and 67 percent
Indonesians.1296
What might be the explanation of this European discontent with America? The
answer could be found in the presence of a new American nationalism known as
“conservative nationalism.”1297 This new “conservative nationalism” in America
expressed itself in a Universalist turn in its foreign policy since 1990s. It was this
nationalism that provoked resistance/reaction around the globe, particularly in Europe.1298
1292 Scheer, Bush Policy, May 7, 20021293 Tyler, European Split, July 22, 20021294 Fabrinni, United States Contested, 31295 Timothy Garton Ash. Free World: America, Europe, and the Surprising Future of the West.
(New York: Random House, 2004)1296 Fabrinni, United States Contested, 61297 Anatol Lieven. America Right or Wrong: An Anatomy of American Nationalism. (Oxford
University Press, 2004)1298 J. Peterson and Pollack M.A (eds.), Europe, America and Bush. Transatlantic Relations in the
Twenty First Century. (London: Routledge, 2003)
285
Such a “Universalist nationalism” America wielded as a “hyper-power” constituted a
threat to the rest of the world by its very nature. This process already had set in motion
“supra-nationalism” in Europe.1299
Woodward had quoted former US President Bill Clinton as saying that by waging
a war on Iraq and its subsequent deterioration, America “alienated” itself around the
world. Now everybody “hated America.”1300 German leadership, particularly Schroeder,
wanted to build reunified Germany as a leader of “new Europe”. Anti-Americanism
became his rallying cry. Even a German minister compared President Bush to Adolf
Hitler.1301 Hundreds of thousands of Germans, in an utter show of “anti-Americanism”
protested around the country.1302
There was an ever increasing “gulf of mistrust” between US and the People of
Europe. It was intensified by George W. Bush’s policies.1303 It was in November 2003
that 53 percent peoples of Europe said that America had a “negative role” to play in
global peace.1304 Some observers commented on the origin of this anti-Americanism in
the world. They linked it with the “US global policy” and the aggressive way the US
military power was being used in the world. September 11 was a direct response to a
world’s self-proclaimed superpower, a result of US actions worldwide.1305
For General Tony Zinni and Tony Koltz, the “root cause” of this worldwide
“mistrust” was that American political leadership lacked understanding of the
complexities of the world, and conditions on the ground thereof.1306 However, George
Tenet, referring to the opinion given by scholars, attributed this phenomenon of anti-
Americanism, particularly in the Middle East to the “arrogance and incompetence” of
American political leadership.1307
7.3 Future of Iraq:
1299 C.A. Kupchan. The End of the American Era. U.S. Foreign Policy on the Geopolitics of the Twenty-First Century. (New York: Alfred A. Knopt, 2002)
1300 Woodward, War Within, 2281301 Shawcross, Allies, 102-1031302 Ibid, 1231303 “How Deep is the Rift”, February 15, 20031304 Standard Euro barometer, November 20031305 Susan Sontag. “Reflection on September 11”, The New Yorker. September 24, 20011306 Zinni and Koltz, Battle for Peace, 2231307 Tenet and Harlow, Centre of Storm, 492
286
Critics of the new constitution of Iraq had argued that it was nothing short of a blueprint
for the political disintegration of Iraq. Kurds did not, for their own reasons, whether valid
or otherwise, want a united Iraq. They intensely hated united Iraq. The post-Saddam Iraq
had recognized their de facto independence under the new constitution. It seemed as if
they were waiting for the politically favorable circumstances to declare their
independence. On the other hand, religion had moved to the “center-stage” of post-
Saddam Iraq. The Shia-Sunni divide had become unbridgeable. The civil war in Iraq,
particularly between Sunnis and Shiites had further estranged these two people away
from each other. The new constitution of Iraq had established a system of “loose
federalism” that allowed each of the three communities of Iraq to develop its institutions
the way it liked.1308
This three-state solution of the historical problem of Iraq, imposed from above on
post-Saddam Iraq, might culminate into the political fragmentation of Iraq. There would
be nobody to mourn on the dissolution of Iraq. Iraq had given “non-stop misery” to
eighty percent of its population since 1920s. At least, the full independence of Kurdish
autonomous region just was a matter of time. The top US-decision makers in Washington
had been committed to Iraq as a single political entity. Exactly in the way the US was
committed to the political sovereignty of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia in the last
quarter of 20th century. Historically, the political unity of Iraq had been held together by
coercive security apparatus of the country since 1920s to 2003. On the basis of their
historical experience the people of Iraq had concluded that a united Iraq was no
possibility but in name only. They had settled for a three-state solution into the
constitution. Last, but not least, the Sunnis did not approve at all the newly framed
constitution of Iraq.1309
The US military invasion of Iraq in 21st century was a risky business. People in
the Arab lands deeply resented the continuous onslaught of the contempt and negative
depiction of their religion and culture in Western media. For the Arab world, the issue in
Palestine was land, however, in case of Iraq it was one of control. For the Arab Muslims,
both issues had one commonality. In both cases, Western armed forces invaded and
occupied Arab lands. Arab world still remembered that America supported military coup 1308 Galbraith, End of Iraq, 2051309 Ibid, 206-207
287
in 1963 that empowered Baath Party in Iraq. American delay in transferring sovereignty
to the people in occupied Iraq created there insurgency. By 2007, the insurgency along
with its attendant violence intensified. Islamism also was on the rise. It was a new
political force to reckon with in Iraq.1310
Sectarianism and al-Qaida also were heavily “taxing” and preying on Iraq. Al-
Qaida acted as a magnet for terrorists in Iraq.1311 President Bush’s Iraq policy was a
combination of “imperial arrogance and lying” argued Jonathan Steele, which in turn
created more terrorists.1312 Roberts Gates, the US Secretary of Defense, quoted in
Jonathan Steele through Agency France-Presse saying in June 2007, that America wanted
a prolonged and “enduring presence” in Iraq. American forces would go back to the
“military bases” it had established in Iraq.1313 The US war on Iraq turned out to be a
bloody war of attrition. Feeding Iraqi quagmire with more troops did not change the
ground reality after April 2003.1314
7.4 Coercive Hegemony and Invasion of Iraq:President Bush marked a “qualitative” change in the “coercive” character of American
foreign policy toward the Middle East. For the Bush Administration, the Middle East
region was a key to the sustenance and extension of “US global hegemony”. At the same
time, it also was a major threat to that. The Bush Doctrine was at the “center” of this US
drive for hegemony. The doctrine also retained the right to cope with the resultant
“resistance.”1315 As had already been written in this dissertation, supported with empirical
evidence, that Bush Administration invaded Iraq under “false pretexts”. Later on, Paul
Wolfowitz admitted it. Why did America target Iraq and not North Korea? An
interviewer asked him. Wolfowitz answered, because Iraq was “swimming in oil.”1316
The US “dependence” on imported oil was continuously increasing. In 2002, just
before the Iraq invasion, America imported 53 percent of its domestic need. By 2004, the
oil imported from the Gulf constituted 20 percent of the US need. Any disruption in the 1310 “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq”, Department of Defense Qarterly Report. March
20071311 Steele, Defeat, 253-2541312 Ibid, 2551313 Ibid, 2571314 Ibid, 2581315 Edward Rhodes. “The Imperial Logic of Bush’s Liberal Agenda”, Survival 45, no 1, spring
20031316 Paul Wolfowitz. Guardian. June 4, 2003
288
smooth supply of oil from the Middle East might have resulted into an oil shock. An
American diplomat told an interviewer that Iraq was the only substitute to “Saudi
Arabia.”1317 In the words of Michael Klare, an expert in oil-geopolitics, the country that
would control Iraq oil would exert great “leverage over the oil politics” of the 21st
century.1318
Due to a number of factors, the US oil hegemony was also threatened since First
Gulf War when Russia, France and Saudi Arabia opposed sanctions over Iraq. Iran and
Iraq were demanding their oil payments in Euros rather than Dollars. The War hawks in
Washington believed that relaxations of “sanctions regime” on Iraq would provide Iraq
an opportunity to recover its “military strength.”1319 The US Administration never wanted
Saddam regime to recover from that position.
As for as the consequences of this policy were concerned, the invasion and
occupation of Iraq became the test case of the Bush Doctrine and of the
neoconservative’s belief that predominant military power could be converted into
“hegemony” in the Middle East. The results were exactly in accordance with the
assumptions of offensive realist model. The consequences constituted purge of Baath
party, bureaucracy, and public sector layoffs.1320 About 100,000 people suffered death,
mostly civilian, since the invasion of Iraq in March, 2003.1321 America established
permanent military bases in Iraq; US also made attempt to sale out oil of the country to
Western buyers. This led to insurgency in Iraq.
The US started using anti-insurgency tactics, borrowed from Israel, including
bombing of the cities, destruction of homes of the people, inflicting collective
punishments to the populace, and putting people into detention camps.1322 It was also
accompanied by occasional brutalities of occupation forces. An year after occupation,
Western polls conducted in Iraq showed that 82 percent Iraqis did not like occupation at
all and were opposed to it, and more than 50 percent people supported, at least morally,
1317 Trevor Royale. “The World’s Petrol Station: Iraq’s Past Is Steeped in Oil and Blood”, Sunday Herald. October 6, 2002
1318 Michael T. Klare. Resource Wars. (London: Pelgrave Macmillan, 2002)1319 Pollack, Threatening Storm, 1671320 “Continuing Collateral Damage: The Health and Environmental Costs of War on Iraq”. Iraq
Faces Severe Health Crisis”, BBC News. November 11, 20031321 Les Francke, et al. Morality. The Lancet. October 29, 20041322 Tony Karon. “Learning the Art of Occupation from Israel and Israel Trains US Assassination
Squads in Iraq”, Time Magazine. December 8-9, 2003
289
insurgent attacks on occupation forces. For them these attacks were justified.1323 The
magnitude of insurgency continuously increased. It proved to the world that “asymmetric
warfare” could check the most powerful “military forces” on the globe. In the year 2004,
opinion polls conducted in Iraq concluded that 92 percent Iraqis saw the US as
“occupier” and just 2 percent as “liberator.”1324
The US did not want to withdraw her military forces from Iraq. However,
borrowing from earlier British experience of occupation, US retreated to newly establish
“permanent military bases” and a huge American embassy in Baghdad. In the post-
Saddam Iraq the US started playing Kurds against Arabs. An America dictated
constitution was imposed under pressure. The US was granted privileges and also made
permanent “sectarian divide” in Iraq. The vote on the constitution was delayed due to
differences among Iraqis on the nature of the constitution. Zalmay Khalilzad was
American ambassador to Iraq. He was a member of PNAC. He was playing the “big role”
in framing of the constitution argued Negus and Rasan.1325
Iraq was created into a “loose confederation” which deprived Iraq of its collective
identity so that it could not reemerge, in future as a harbinger of “Arab nationalism.”1326
A UN report on the new constitution of Iraq called it a “blueprint for political
disintegration” of Iraq into mini-states. An undeclared civil war was ravaging Iraq.
Nobody could impose “liberal order” if any, on gunpoint and it would be entailed by
continuing “military intervention” in Iraq.1327
The costs of war started rising up. The “deliberate deceptions” of the Bush
Administration came to surface as well. The public in the US turned against the war. In
America, the public support for the war fell from 65 percent in 2004 to 44 percent in
2005. Iraq became a test case for “US hegemony and preventive war”. In February 2003,
in the run-up to war, the UNSC asked UN member states to give their opinion on the
1323 Thomas Melia, and Brian Katulis, “Iraqis Discuss their Country’s future: Post War Perspectives from the Iraqi Street”, National Democratic Institute. July 28, 2004
1324 Hiro, Secrets and Lies, 486-4881325 Steve Negus, and Dhiya Rason. “Iraqi Parliament Delays Constitution Vote”, Financial Times.
August 23, 20051326 Pieterse, Globalization or Empire, 551327 Rhodes, Imperial Logic, 2003
290
impending war on Iraq. Some 64 delegates of diverse origin gave their opinion; they all
opposed war.1328
According to one reliable account, Prime Minister Tony Blair sided with the US
because he feared, if left alone, the US being a hyper power, would become more
dangerous and “destabilizing.”1329 America coerced UNSC in getting post facto
recognition of the war. The main security fear in Europe was that America would
destabilize Middle East and initiate “clash of civilizations between the West and
Islam.”1330 Europe also worried that the war on terror in Iraq had “intensified
terrorism.”1331 The Bush Administration had sacrificed “trust for remaking” the Middle
East.
American “militarism and arrogance” created a “global wave of hatred” for the
US and world saw President Bush as a greater threat to world peace than Iraqi regime.1332
In an opinion poll conducted some 84 percent people in Europe said that America was the
“major threat” to global peace.1333 So was the case in the Muslim world. America eroded
the concept of inviability of sovereignty of states.
Kofi Annan, the UN Secretary General, declared the war “illegal” with dangerous
precedent of unilateral and lawless use of force. Evidence suggested that Russia, China,
and India joined hands to oppose imposition of further sanctions against Iran in 2005, on
the issue of its nuclear program. Similarly, China and South Korea joined hands to stop
US actions against North Korea.1334 The US attempt to remake the “Middle East
according to its interest and values” was nothing more than “hypocrisy and double
standards” argued Samuel Huntington. This exactly was in accordance with the
assumptions of offensive realism. The great powers pursuing “hegemony” were “fated to
clash” because they try to achieve a comparative advantage over others. That was a
“tragic situation” argued the theorist.1335
1328 Hiro, Secrets and Lies, 1501329 David Marquand. “Why Blair Dressed Up War Realpolitik in Dodgy Moralistic Rhetoric”,
Guardian. February 21, 20041330 Clyde Prestowitz. “America the Arrogant: Why Do not we listen anymore?” Washington Post.
July 7, 20021331 The National Intelligence Council Report, 20051332 Schlesinger, Good Foreign Policy, March 23, 20031333 International Herald Tribune, 20031334 Fawn and Hinnebusch, Iraq War, 3041335 Mearsheimer, Tragedy of Great Power, xi-xii
291
7.5 Implications for the UN and International law: In run-up to war against Iraq, the Bush Administration rejected Kofi Annan’s proposal.
The UN Secretary General advised US for “UNSC authorization” to invade Iraq, if
invasion was necessary Washington “rejected” the proposal of the UN Secretary General
saying that Washington already had that authorization under the previous UNSC
resolutions.1336 Such an opinion of Bush Administration about war was contrary to
international law. Fifteen member statement of European Union asked the US to “use
force” only as a last resort.1337 Washington saw UN as an “incompetent organization” that
had outlived its utility and had become outdated.1338 Colin Powell, the US Secretary of
State, warned the UN, in his February 5 speech to the UN, for not passing a second
UNSC resolution. It would make UN an irrelevant international body. Otherwise, the US
was poised to “go alone.”1339
The US exploited, even humiliated, the UN during run-up to Iraq war.1340 In his
speech to the UN General Assembly on 12 September, 2002, Collin Powell put pressure
on the UN to cooperate with the US in attacking Iraq otherwise it would become
“irrelevant”. He gave UN the last chance. In reality, President Bush “bullied” the UN
over Iraq issue.1341 The headlines of the three London based dailies read as followed,
“The UN challenged”, “The Bush gives UN last chance” and “Bush bullies UN over
Iraq” respectively.1342
Kofi Annan, on March 10, 2003 clearly mentioned in his official statement that
the war on Iraq would be “illegal under international law” without UN authorization.
Mark Littman argued that in the absence of a fresh UNSC resolution the war on Iraq
would be an “international crime.”1343 A big majority of international law experts
declared that the US war on Iraq was “illegal” in the eyes of international law. Tam
1336 Serge Schmemann. “America Urges New Method to Fight Terrorism”, New York Times, September 25, 2001
1337 Text of the 15 EU countries was available in New York Times, 18 February 20031338 Kepel, War for Muslim Minds, 2041339 Brigham, Iraq Another Vietnam, 131340 Simons, Future Iraq, 2691341 Bush, Remarks at UNGA, September 12, 20021342 Ibid1343 Mark Littman. A Supreme International Crime. March 10, 2003
292
Dalyell called Tony Blair a “war criminal” on the basis that the war was initiated without
any “specific UNSC authorization.”1344
Article 51, UN Charter, allowed war under international law only in “self-
defense”. However, the right to “self-defense” had been qualified by one condition. A
state had the “right” to wage war only if it was physically attacked. Simply speaking, the
UN Charter prohibited the “use of force” until it was physically attacked.1345. However,
the Bush Administration was unable to “legally justify” war on Iraq in March, 2003.1346
Preventive wars were to be avoided as they threatened “global political systems”.
Preventive wars, is any, would be followed by “chaos”.1347 Later on, Condoleezza Rice
acknowledged that the decision to wage war on Iraq “already” had been made before the
Administration went to the UN for authorization.1348
7.6 Implications for Nuclear Regime: Iraq did not possess WMD. Still it was invaded and occupied. The US was deeply
involved in Iraq. However, Iran and North Korea became free from pressure exerted from
Washington. North Korea expelled UN nuclear inspectors from its soil. North Korea also
“withdrew from NPT” and restarted “plutonium reprocessing.”1349 Similarly at the
beginning of 2006, Iran restarted its uranium enrichment program.1350 There had been a
structural flaw in the NPT. America along with other members of the nuclear club
possessed nuclear weapons. However, at the same time, they preached tirelessly against
the spread of nuclear weapons. On this basis, Tehran called America a “hypocritical
power.”1351
Iran began enrichment of uranium in the aftermath of invasion of Iraq. It was
sovereign right of Iran.1352 Despite pressure coming from Washington, North Korea tested
her nuclear device and Tehran refused to stop “enrichment of uranium”. It was a
“dangerous” development.1353 America, along with Iraq, included both Iran and North 1344 Tam Dalyell. “Blair, The War Criminal”, The Guardian. March 27, 20031345 Fawn and Hinnebusch, Iraq War, 2721346 Woodward, State of Denial, 5811347 Chris Brown. “Self Defense in an Imperfect World”, Ethics and International Affairs 17, no 1,
(2003)1348 Leman, How It Came to War, March 31, 20031349 Galbraith, End of Iraq, 10 1350 Ibid1351 Suskind, Way of the World, 1231352 Suskind, Way of the World, 1221353 Ibid , 124
293
Korea as well into “axis of evil” states. They very well knew the fate of Iraq. They
apprehended the same fate. That was why they opted, if possible, for “nuclear”
capability.
7.7 Favorable Outcome for Israel: The US war on Iraq created favorable strategic regional environment for Israel. Since its
creation in 1948, external security environment of Israel had been its biggest problem.
Comparatively, it was favorable now. With the demise of Saddam regime, few states in
the Middle East could challenge Israel’s military dominance. Under US umbrella, Israel
concluded peace treaties with Egypt and Jordan in 1979 and 1994 respectively. Libya was
also neutralized after its surrender of nuclear program. Fall of Saddam regime removed a
big enemy of Tel Aviv. Bashar al-Asad was under great pressure due to big US presence
in the region and the fate Saddam Hussain met.1354
Under the new strategic environment created in the Middle East due to the ouster
of Saddam regime, Damascus also was under great pressure. Damascus proposed renewal
of dialogue with Tel Aviv over the future of Golan Heights. It was in this new strategic
context in the Middle East General Moshe Yaalon said in August 2004, the Israel’s
security would not be jeopardized even if the Golan Heights be returned to the
sovereignty of Damascus. Now the Syrian security was mainly linked to the US policy in
the region. However, reconciliation of Damascus with Washington was necessary.
However, without any misconception, the road to Washington passed through Tel
Aviv.1355
Israel enjoyed good relations with Ankara since mid-1990. In May 2004,
Abdullah Gul, the Turkish foreign minister asked Turkish ambassador to Tel Aviv to
revive the peace process with Israel that was halted due to multiple reasons along with
Israel’s policy of targeted killings in occupied territories.1356 Clive Jones argued that
Israel was the Major beneficiary of the war.1357
1354 Fawn and Hinnebusch, Iraq War, 1901355 Eyal Zisser. “What’s Behind Bashar al-Assad’s Peace Offensive?” Tel Aviv Notes 9. January
11, 20041356 Neill Lochery. “Israel and Turkey: Deepening Ties and Strategic Implications”, Israel Affairs
5, no 1, autumn 19981357 Fawn and Hinnebusch, Iraq War, 187
294
It was in March 2007, Israeli Prime Minister Olmert and foreign minister Tzipi
Livni addressed the annual conference of AIPAC in the US. During his address, Livni
said that in a volatile region like the Middle East, countries (the US and Israel) must not
show any sign of weakness.1358 Prime Minister Olmert went a step further, that the US
success in Iraq was a must. It was linked with Israel’s security. Olmert ended his address
with the remarks, after American success in Iraq; Israel would be “safer”. The Israeli
friend knew it.1359
Bradley Burston became angry with Olmert’s remarks for becoming a part of the
US debate on Iraq. For him Olmert had committed a mistake. Bradley Burston had been a
regular writer for Haaretz.1360 Prime Minister Olmert visited the White House in
November 2006. He supported American invasion of Iraq. American Invasion of Iraq had
brought stability in the Middle East, said Olmert during his visit.1361
7.8 Consequences for Al-Qaeda and Terrorism:In 2000, Eqbal Ahmad wrote that America sowed “poisonous seeds” in the Middle East
and South Asia. They were to germinate now. Why did America do that? The use of
missiles against Sudan and Afghanistan would not solve the problem.1362 Later on, Jason
Burke confirmed what Eqbal Ahmad had predicted in 2000. He was a Brit doing
investigative journalist.1363 The bombings in Sudan and Afghanistan made Osama bin
Laden a symbol. The subsequent invasion of Afghanistan, in the aftermath of 9/11,
increased “recruitment and financial support for Al-Qaeda” and similar groups.1364 Burke
observed that use of force added to the victory of bin Laden every time. The US war on
Iraq exactly did the same.1365 Exactly same were the consequences in case of Iraq.1366
The US State Department admitted in June 2004, they were “wrong” in their
conclusion when they presented their report on “Patterns in Global Terrorism”. In this
1358 Shmuel Rosner. “Livini to AIPAC: US cannot Show Weakness on Iraq, Iran”, Ha’aretz. March 12, 2007
1359 Hilary L. Krieger. “PM’s AIPAC Talk Surprises Delegates”, Jerusalem Post. March 13, 20071360 Bradley Burston. “Israel Must Stay the Hell Out of US Debate on Iraq”, Haa’retz. March 13,
20071361 President Bush Welcomes to Prime Minister Olmert of Israel to the White House”, White
House, Office of the Press Secretary, November 13, 20061362 Eqbal Ahmad. Confronting Empire. (South End Press, 2000), 1351363 Jason Burke. Al- Qaeda. I.B Tauris, 20041364 Chomsky, Imperial Ambitions,1111365 Burke, Al-Qaeda, 2391366 Chomsky, Imperial Ambitions,111
295
report the State Department had concluded that policies of the Bush Administration had
reduced terrorism.1367 However, in reality, it had increased.1368 The increase in terrorism
mainly was due to US invasion of Iraq in March 2003. It was exactly according to the
predictions of intelligence agencies. Another scholar argued, the neoconservatives
invaded Iraq knowingly that it would increase terrorism. They did not care about. It was
the question of priorities because they wanted “military bases” in Iraq.1369
As a result of US war on terrorism, al-Qaeda had grown into an organized
“movement”. To begin with, al-Qaeda was an organization of loose network, however,
US strategies of anti-terrorism grew it into a movement.1370 In Iraq the terrorist attacks
tripled in 2004 over the previous year. They were followed by violent terrorist attacks in
London, Madrid, Amman and Egypt. There also grew new terrorist groups. In short, there
occurred a “phenomenal growth in terrorism” as well as terrorist groups and networks,
particularly in the Muslim world.1371
In January 2007, Amatzia Baram, an Israeli citizen and expert on Iraq argued that
he was wrong in supporting US war on Iraq. Saddam Hussain was less dangerous.
Furthermore, he admitted that the war had created more terrorism. In February 2006,
Yuval Diskin, the head of Shin Bet, a security agency of Israel responsible for domestic
security admitted the same.1372 In the view of George Tenet, the CIA chief at the time of
invasion of Iraq “peace was hell” in Iraq in the aftermath of invasion of 2003.1373
7.9 Problems in U.S. Relations with NATO:On the issue of Iraq war, Europe was divided, in the words of Donald Rumsfeld, into the
“Old Europe” and the “New Europe”. Germany and France made the nucleus of “Old
Europe” with majority of populations opposing the war while the governments of “New
Europe” supported US was on Iraq. The Europe based former Communist states joined
US war on Iraq. Their leaders declared themselves what came to be called “New
1367 Barry Schweid. Associated Press. June 11, 20041368 Max Boot. “Bush's team is dysfunctional, not duplicitous”, Financial Times. June 17, 20041369 Chomsky, Imperial Ambitions, 1121370 Zinni and Koltz, Battle for Peace, 114 1371 Jentleson, American Foreign Policy, 3701372 Chris McGreal. “Israelis May Regret Saddam Ousting, Says Security Chief”, Guardian.
February 9, 20061373 Tenet and Harlow, Centre of Storm, 399
296
Europe”. These leaders asked the UNSC to make sure the “full compliance” of its
resolutions about Iraq.1374
The criterion of this divide in Europe was who supported or opposed the war on
Iraq. These were the former East European communist countries who supported the US,
despite Germany and France, the two importance NATO allies of the Cold War, did
not.1375 Governments of Italy and Spain sided with Washington despite their popular
majorities opposing the war. They were praised for being leaders of “New Europe”. The
percentage of support in the former USSR satellite countries ranged from 4 percent in
Macedonia to 11 percent in Romania. The former foreign minister of Latvia said that they
were to please Washington at any cost.1376 In reality “Old Europe” included countries
where overwhelming popular majorities opposed war while “New Europe” consisted of
few leaders who supported Washington.1377
The NATO countries who wanted genuine collaboration with Washington were,
in reality, disappointed (Patrick Tyler, New York Times, 22 July 2002). The old
Europeans had forgotten that Washington was indispensable. Only America had the right
to lead. America would lead this coalition to victory. Only the US could do that,
reminded Cheney.1378 Old NATO allies saw the world differently as did the US on issues
such as nuclear testing, global warming (Kyoto Protocol) etc. It was Iraq that pushed the
tensions to the peak. Fifteen members of European Union officially supported disarming
Iraq but only through the UN route.1379
The French Foreign Minister was even more critical of Washington’s new
“simplistic” approach to confront terrorism.1380 There occurred a big rift between
Washington and the “Old Europe” on the issue of Iraq. In the words of George Soros,
Washington demanded subservience from NATO allies of the US. That created rift.1381
1374 Steven Weisman. “Threats and Responses: Timetable; US Demands Iraq Show Cooperation by this Weekend”, New York Times. February 10, 2003
1375 Ibid1376 Andrew Higgins. “New Europe' Is as Skeptical Of Iraq War as Old Europe”, Wall Street
Journal. March 18, 20031377 Chomsky, Power and Terror, 1321378 David E. Sanger. “Allies Hear Sour Notes in ‘Axis of Evil Chorous”, New York Times.
February 17, 20021379 Text of the 15 EU countries, New York Times, 18 February 20031380 Suzanne Daley. “French Minister Calls US Policy’ Simplistic”, New York Times. February 7,
20021381 Soros, Bubble of American Supremacy, 14
297
There had been empirical evidence that no US President in 20 th century was so poorly
regarded in European continent as did President George W. Bush.1382 In short, the Old
Europe (Western Europe) was divided on the issue of Iraq war, in March 2003. The
dissident states were led by Germany and France in Europe to be followed by Belgium
and Luxembourg and others while Britain, Spain and Italy became part of “coalition of
the willings.”1383
Colin Powell called this opposition as “betrayal of trust”. America became
annoyed. Donald Rumsfeld divided Europe into “Old Europe” (bad) and “New Europe”
(good). He further said France and Germany were the problem.1384 While outpouring his
displeasure on the attitude of Schroeder, President Bush remarked that it was an act of
“personal betrayal.”1385
7.10 Power Vacuum and Emergence of ISIS:American military invasion of Iraq destroyed political and social institutions of the
country without replacing them with the new and viable ones. The invasion was followed
by political chaos and violent insurgency. The Sunni led insurgency culminated into civil
war between Sunnis and Shias in Iraq. Thousands of innocent people perished in it. This
created vacuum of power in Iraq. Out of this scenario emerged a fundamentalist and
violent movement in Iraq known as ISIS-or the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria.1386 The
power vacuum in Iraq was filled by ISIS.1387 Hussain and Smith called ISIS a “state-
building organization” under the leadership of Ibrahim Awwad al-Badri, commonly
known Abu-Bakr al-Baghdadi- a Sunni from Samarra-Iraq. The ISIS expanded to Syria
after crisis there. Today the Islamic State shared its presence in Iraq and Syria on large
tracts of land.1388
7.11 Implications for Clash of Civilizations Thesis: In the post-Cold War era, the world political order entered into a new phase. A group of
scholars, led by Samuel P. Huntington, showed up with the opinion that the new “global
1382 Galbraith, End of Iraq, 111383 Shawcross, Allies, 1271384 Ibid, 1261385 Shawcross, Allies, 1041386 Interview with Dr. Noman, July 22, 20161387 Interviw with Dr. Riaz, July 18, 20161388 Abdul Hussian Hussain, and Lee Smith. “On the Origin of ISIS”, The Weekly Standard.
September 8, 2014
298
conflict” would be “cultural rather ideological.”1389 Samuel P. Huntington presented this
argument in a classic way. According to this perspective, the highest cultural grouping of
the people on this earth was the civilization. These civilizations were differentiated in
many ways such as religion, language, and history.1390
Huntington rejected the concept of universal values leading to global ambitions.
Such belief in the universality of particular culture was dangerous, argued Huntington.
Imperialism would be the ultimate end of such a belief. As such it would initiate an inter-
civilizational war.1391 Huntington predicted the conflict between Western civilization on
the one hand and the Muslim and Confucious civilizations on the other hand. The
terrorist incidents of 1990s, the tragedy of Septemebr11, 2001, and the subsequent US
wars on Afghanistan and Iraq testified to the truthfulness of Huntington’s claim; though
not at a great level. The two regional wars, in the name of US war on terror, underpinned
those principles which the US Administration wanted to pursue in the world. Franklin
Graham, a Christian evangelist and pro war supporter of Bush Administration, among
some other church leaders, categorically denounced Islam and supported efforts to defeat
it.1392
7.12 Other Consequences and Implications: America had become more vulnerable to nuclear weapons of Iran and North Korea as a
consequence of this war.1393 (Galbraith: 2006: 11). The US invasion of Iraq made
Islamists more powerful, especially in the Middle East. Hamas won elections in
Palestine.1394 On September 20, 2001, while addressing the American people, President
Bush “globalized” the war against terror. In his address the President argued that it would
be a “civilizations” war and warned the whole world that “either you are with us” or with
the “terrorists”. President Bush repeated the same theme time and again.
In contradiction to historical and traditional record, President Bush ceased talks
with “rogue-states”. His position was that these states/leaders lacked “legitimacy” and 1389 Samuel P. Huntington. The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. Penguin
Books, 19971390 Samuel P. Huntington. “If Not Civilizations, What? Paradigms of the Post-Cold War World”.
Foreign Affairs, (1993), 186-1941391 Jackson and Towle, Temptations of Power, 191392 Gustav Niebuhr. “Muslim Groups Moves to Meet Billy Graham’s Son”, New York Times.
November 20, 20011393 Galbraith, End of Iraq, 111394 Galbraith, End of Iraq, 11
299
had no right to sovereignty.1395 Francis Fukuyama also opposed US war on Iraq. Iraq
became the “new magnet” for terrorists. The war also distracted US decision maker’s
attention from other parts of the world. Fukuyama argued that the policy of regime
change was “obsessive” in nature.1396 America could not withdraw from Iraq in haste.
Here was the issue of American dependence on oil. American invasion of Iraq also did
“radicalization of Islam.”1397 Iraq became an example of “strategic overextension” of the
US. It adversely affected the US ability to project power in other parts of the world.1398
The consequences of the war proved “disastrous” both for American economy and
“global military predominance.”1399
The US attack on Iraq fuelled terrorism and extremism in the Middle East and
South Asia. It was exactly what al-Qaida hoped for.1400 Now some of the cities used the
term “hyper power” for the US.1401 Other nations of the world had resented about the US
behavior when it acted hypocritically, applying two different standards of international
conduct, and one for itself and a different for others. Numerous examples of US
“hypocrisy” could be cited. For instance, the US had conducted approximately more than
one thousand nuclear tests and had in its ownership more than 7000 nuclear weapons.
However, at the same time, the US had tried hard to deny the same nuclear weapons to
others. This inconsistency was a big question.1402
Similarly, America supported absolutist dictators like Saddam Hussain when it
suited to US geopolitical interests in the Middle East. Stephen Walt used the phrase
“double standards” for such a behavior of America in world politics.1403 Such US
behavior did not go unnoticed in the world. It remained the key theme of Osama bin
Laden’s many denunciations he made.1404 Such a foreign policy created several problems
for America on the world political stage. It cost doubts on American credibility abroad.
1395 Gurtov, Superpower on Crusade, 411396 Fukuyama, America at Crossroads, 1397 Soros, Bubble of American Supremacy, 62 1398 Ibid, 641399 Ibid, 741400 Suskind, Way of the World, 2351401 Black, Great Powers, 1991402 The Military Balance 2003-2004. London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2003,
214-2151403 Walt, Taming American Power, 98 1404 Ibid, 100
300
To the foreigners, it seemed unfair. It also meant that the US was unwilling to observe
restraint in the use of force.1405
Regrettably, Condoleezza Rice’s answer to a question was a classic example of
the inconsistency in the attitude of US Administration. She was asked, why in her
opinion, France and Germany opposed US-Iraq policy leading to invasion of the country
in March 2003? She answered, we “did not understand.”1406 America invaded Iraq under
“false pretexts”. Expectedly, there were no WMD in Iraq. For America, that was a sad
turn of history. America had lost its “moral authority.”1407
America also did not talk to Iran and Syria, the two stakeholders in the region, on
the issues created in post-Saddam Iraq. On account of this situation, both Iran and Syria
became determined to resist the US in the region. Such US policy not only isolated Iraq
but also isolated the US in the Middle East.1408 Consequently, the post-Saddam Middle
East had become less stable.1409 Due to US attack and occupation, Iraq had entered into
the politics of religious and ethnic identification. Sectarian violence in Iraq became a
regular fashion of Iraqi political life. The future of Iraq seemed uncertain. Whether there
would be reconciliation in Iraq or not was the question which only future could
address.1410
Criticizing US Iraq policy, John Kiesling, a US career diplomat, wrote in his
resignation letter in February 2003, that America started destroying the international
political system that world had ever made.1411 Condoleezza Rice, in May 2008, in an
important meeting of the State Department said that Iran had increased its involvement in
Arab world politics, from Lebanon to Palestine. Iran was a “challenge to the US
interests” in the region. Furthermore, she said Iran wanted to become a “dominant
player” in the regional politics. Iran had been continuously improving its nuclear
capability. America would not allow this to happen. Iran’s claim to a “major power status
in the Middle East” went through its becoming a nuclear power. America would not
1405 Ibid1406 How Deep is the Rift, Ecomist, February 15, 20031407 Suskind, Way of the World, 141408 Tenet and Harlow, Centre of the Storm, 4941409 Ibid, 4911410 Ibid, 4951411 Simons, Future Iraq, 21
301
allow that.1412 Brookings scholar, Kenneth Pollack observed that the US policy of “dual
containment” adopted by President Bill Clinton was, actually, in response to “Israel’s
security” needs.1413 The war against Iraq strengthened Iran in the Persian Gulf region. In
the post-Saddam era, Israel had become increasingly concerned with the growing power
of Iran.1414
All these consequences and implications were in line with the principles of
offensive realism. On the debit side, the US- Iraq policy adversely affected the
international political system, the UN, international law and norms, future of Iraq, the
concept of state sovereignty and hegemonic stability theory etc. the US advantages of the
policy, discussed in detail in chapter five, far exceeded the debit side as a reasonable cost
of the US-Iraq policy.
ConclusionPresident George W. Bush pursued power politics paradigm in his war on terror,
particularly, in the preemptive and unilateral invasion of Iraq in 2003. In this era of
unipolarity, the US as a great power, attempted to restructure international political
system according to American interests through the offensive use of her military might.
Since the times of Thucydides, nothing had changed in world politics and states had been
pursuing their self-interests in an anarchic world. Historically, the fates of all states,
invariably, had been dependent on their power. For all strands of realism, all states
irrespective of their size must pursue power as there had been no guarantee of their
1412 Woodward, War Within, 420-4221413 Pollack, Persian Puzzle, 261-2651414 Orly Halpern. “Israeli Experts Say Middle East Was Safer with Saddam in Iraq”, Forward.
January 5, 2007
302
existence in a system where wars had remained a legal instrument of statecraft and
international political system.
Whether it was classical or modern realist tradition, power played central role in
determining nature of contemporary world politics, and international politics had been
identified as a “struggle for power” among states. Classical realism further argued,
powerful states had always remained imperialist in the conduct of their foreign policy.
Thucydides argued, justice in world politics was different from the concept of justice in
domestic politics which was based, at least theoretically, on rule of law. In international
environment based on anarchy, justice was the function of a state’s military might. It was
equivalent to a state’s military capability. States were unequal in their power. It was a
natural reality. Leadership of a state must adapt to this reality. Fate of a state depended
on the decisions of its leadership.
Machiavelli introduced element of deception in inter-state relationship. Moral
values had no room in international politics. It was the end which justified the means.
Doctrine of preemption was also another addition of Machiavelli to international politics.
Foreign policy of a state was the best combination of power and deception. Thomas
Hobbes linked power politics among states with human nature. The pursuit of power was
wedded in human nature. This pursuit of power was the predominant character of man.
For Hobbes man was also selfish. These characteristics of man were translated into
foreign policy of a state. E.H. Carr identified relative role of power and morality in
international politics. He identified power as the central theme of world politics. Power
was the real currency of international political system. Wars in world politics were the
outcome of unequal distribution of power in the system.
Hans J. Morgenthau became the first theorist of the field of international relations.
He identified the concept of national interest in inter-state relationship. For him, foreign
policy of a state was the reflection of its national interest. He linked this concept of
national interest with the pursuit of power. For him international politics was “struggle
for power” among states. States were “magnified” individuals. States “pursue” power.
Historically, with no exception, powerful states always preyed on weaker states. Modern
realists argued that international political system was based on global power structure.
Most importantly, the centrality of power continued in modern realist tradition. Classical
303
and modern realism identified the “central role” of power in international political
system. The modern realist tradition explained US global role in power politics paradigm.
For Kenneth Waltz, great powers always tried to remake international political system
suitable to their security needs and accumulated power as a systemic requirement.
Theory of offensive realism explains great power behavior in world politics. They
were power maximizers and their real objective was to gain hegemony within the system.
Great powers wanted to achieve predominant position in the system. That was the central
theme of great power conduct in world politics. That exactly was what the Bush
Administration pursued in preemptive and unilateral invasion of Iraq. The US-Iraq policy
from 2001 to 2008 fitted offensive realist model. The empirical evidence had proved the
main argument of this study. There was contradiction between stated and operational
objectives of the invasion of Iraq. This had also been verified. The promotion of
democracy in Iraq remained rhetoric only. The Bush Administration used the issue of
Saddam regime’s WMD to get support from American people. America behaved as a
revisionist power.
Role of neo-conservatives in making and implementing US Iraq policy during the
period under study had been exaggerated. They played only circumstantial role in
invading Iraq in 2003. If there had been no 9/11 there would have been no invasion of
Iraq, at least in 2003. 9/11 put neo-conservatives in the circumstantial role. Michael
Harland concluded that none of the neo-conservatives was a member of “decision
making” team of President George W. Bush. The neo-conservatives wanted removal of
Saddam from power. However, it was exaggeration they were masters of “decision
making” process of Bush Administration. They might have sympathy with Israel.
However, Israel factor was not the only US interest in the Middle East. Social scientist
Rosenau (1966, 1980) had summarily rejected monocausal explanations of US foreign
policy. The explanation for the partial failure of US-Iraq policy in post-invasion period
could be found in the general limitations of theories of social sciences.
Historically, the US pursued economic interests in the Middle East since her
independence in 1776. The US involvement in the Middle East slowly happened in the
last decade of 18th century. The US economic interests in the region were the real
incentive. Generally, during 19th century, America followed policy of political and
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military disengagement from world politics called Isolationism. However, economic
interests brought US to the region. The US pursuit of economic interests was entailed
with military challenge. The Barbary pirates were the challenge. The US must protect her
economic interests in the region. The Barbary pirates had to be defeated. The US did the
job. The US used her military forces against the pirates. America established the tradition
of “use of force” in this distant region in the early years of 19th century to protect her
interests against the regional challenges. America removed the challenge through
“Barbary Wars”. The US Middle East policy in the early period of her independence
fitted power politics paradigm. America used her military forces in the first quarter of 19 th
century to protect her interests in the region. America established a tradition of use of
military forces to protect her interests in the Middle East.
By the beginning of 20th century America had become a great power. The US
interests also had become global. The US policy of isolationism was no more viable.
With the coming of 20th century, active US involvement in the Middle East started.
Discovery of oil in the region became the real source of power struggle among great
powers. Oil became the life-blood of industrialized West. It became an important factor
for the continuity of dominance of the West in the international political system. The
Communist Revolution of Russia of 1917 intensified great power struggle in the Middle
East. Ottoman Empire, due to its medieval character, was unable to withstand the
Western challenge. The two World Wars were a watershed in the political power
equation of the region. America replaced Britain as a great power not only in
international political system but also in the Middle East in post-WWII scenario.
During cold war years Middle East was one of the important strategic regions of
the world. Western world under the US leadership became dependent on oil. Geostrategic
theorists like Mackinder had argued about the world role of the Middle East. The power
that controlled Middle East controlled the world. Middle East occupied great importance
in world politics. It also became a source of major conflict among regional power
contenders-Arabs and Israel. Iraq was created in the footsteps of WWI. Oil played central
role in its origin. Iraq was created artificially. Britain was the main player in its creation.
Britain got mandate over Iraq under League of Nations charter. Presence of oil was the
305
main factor in its artificial creation under the Sykes-Picot secret agreement between
Britain and France.
In 1956 war, America saved Nasser by putting pressure on Britain and France to
withdraw from Suez Canal. After the war, under Eisenhower Doctrine, the US and British
troops saved pro-West regimes in Jordan and Lebanon. In the footsteps of 1956 Middle
East crisis, CIA’s involvement intensified in Middle East politics. Against Western
excesses Middle East was boiling for revolutions. Iraq became the first one to suffer a
coup in 1958. Iraq left Baghdad Pact, an America sponsored anti-USSR military
agreement. CIA managed another coup in Iraq in 1963. CIA established good relations
with Saddam Hussain during the decades of 1950s and 1960s. Saddam was made head of
intelligence in Iraq. He killed thousands of pro-Soviet personnel in Iraq. It was the first
use of Saddam by CIA. During Cold War period, the US policies in the Middle East were
in line with the logic of offensive realism. They were mainly concerned with the
protection of pro-US regimes, ensuring oil supplies to the US and her Western allies,
protection of Israel, and checking Soviet penetration in the region. America successfully
achieved them all.
After popular revolution in Iran in 1979, US supported Saddam’s war against
Iran. Containment of Iran became major US concern in the region. During 1980s,
European NATO allies of the US supplied “dual use” technology to Baghdad. America
also ignored Saddam’s use of WMDs against his own population. These US policies
fitted realist logic especially the offensive realistic model. They were aimed at increasing
US share of world power in the system. They also fitted offensive realist logic. Acting as
offshore balancer in the Middle East, America also denied USSR, Iran, and Saddam
regime the same benefits. America pursued policy of “dual containment” of Iran as well
as Iraq. During 1990s, America as an offshore balancer in the Middle East, denied Iraq
an opportunity to increase its share of power in the system and to become a regional
power. It could be safely said, the US-Iraq policy in historical perspective fitted realistic
logic especially offensive realism as it was aimed at two things. One was the increase in
its share of world power by immediately courting Saddam as a new source of oil after the
loss of Iran. Other was, acting as offshore balancer, denied Iran, Iraq, and Soviet Union
any benefit of the loss of Iran.
306
In the year 1990, Saddam regime occupied Kuwait. It greatly added to the power
of Saddam regime. Kuwait was one of the five big producers of oil in the world. It
disturbed regional balance of power. For the US, it was against the logic of power
politics. Saddam regime could aspire to be a regional hegemon in the Persian Gulf region.
It could have been great disadvantage for the US. Saddam was defeated in Kuwait mainly
due to US resolve. His military forces were destroyed. However, he was left to power in
Baghdad. His removal from power could have resulted into Iran’s advantage. It could
have also disturbed regional balance of power. Brent Scowcroft gave the testimony to this
reality. The realist logic was at work in dictating this decision. Once again, acting as
offshore balancer, America denied any advantage to Iran as well as Iraq.
The US invaded Iraq in 2003 under false pretexts. All the three declared causes of
preemptive and unilateral invasion of Iraq were discredited in post-invasion
investigations. The post-invasion investigations proved the authenticity of another
principle of offensive realism. Great powers cheat and lie in the conduct of their foreign
policy. They were mainly concerned with their objectives to achieve. The objective was
of increasing their share of world power. In this pursuit of increase in relative power, US
ignored everybody UN, NATO allies, and the traditional Muslim allies in the Middle
East. Iraq was under UN sanctions since 1990. Iraq was accused of having WMDs.
However, America denied UN inspectors a fair opportunity to conduct inspections. Once
again, the US was mainly preoccupied with her objective to achieve. All these
developments fitted the assumptions of offensive realism. Later on Paul Wolfowitz
admitted in an interview. Iraq was “simmering in oil”. Oil was the life-blood of the US.
The US operational objectives in Iraq were multifaceted and complex. They
greatly increased US “share of world power”. Saddam Hussain, being a dictator in one of
the geo-strategically most important regions of the world did not fit into the 21 st century
US agenda. The 21st century was known as the “New American Century”. For the US,
Middle East represented the “new center” of global politics and also remained center of
the new threat-political Islam, to Western dominance in the system world. The new
center of world politics had been shifted to the Middle East. As a great power there must
be big US military presence in 21st century in the Middle East mainly to ensure two
307
things, containment of the new threat of political Islam to the West and US dominance of
the region.
The US occupation policy in Iraq also was in line with the logic of offensive
realism. There was lack of any serious plan of reconstruction of Iraq. America eliminated
traditional political, economic, and social structure of Iraq without any functionally
viable structural replacement. The Bush Administration was not serious to reconstruct
Iraq. The Bush Administration did not pump into enough money in Iraq which was
required for such a serious task. The Bush Administration also destroyed traditional
tribal, ethnic, and sectarian balance in post-Saddam Iraq. This led to steep rise in violence
culminating into sectarian civil war in Iraq between Sunnis and Shias. Post-Saddam Iraq
presented a politically and socially fractured structure just waiting for a proper time to be
divided into three states. It seemed a matter of time. The new Iraqi constitution was a
superimposed political arrangement by an alien power under force of the arms. America
was not ready to pay the price of reconstruction as it might have exceeded the reasonable
limits of the cost of war. Efforts to serious reconstruction were against the logic of
offensive realism. It could have created a stable Iraq. At the same time it would deny the
US its rationale of military presence in the region.
The policy under study had created certain negative implications for international
political system. The stability of the Middle East had also been adversely affected. The
effects on nuclear regime were also negative. By eliminating Saddam regime in Iraq the
US created vacuum of power in Iraq. No stable political structure replaced Saddam
regime. US policy created crisis situation in the region. Arab spring followed US
invasion of Iraq. Since then, the entire Middle East region had been burning in instability
from Libya to Syria. The power vacuum in Iraq was being filled by ISIS. The ISIS
expanded to Syria. The US policy also disturbed regional balance of power in the Middle
East, especially in the Persian Gulf region in favor of Iran. Iraq was now a Shia
dominated state.
Whatever the consequences and implications of US-Iraq policy from 2001 to
2008, the US cost of the policy did not exceed the reasonable limits of the policy. By the
end of second term of President Bush the US had lost about 3500 soldiers in violence in
Iraq. It was not a big cost the US paid in Iraq as compared to the US cost of wars in
308
Korea and Vietnam which was 33,000 and 58,000 dead respectively. The US constructed
military basis in Iraq. The cost in money also was not much. The US oil corporations
like Halliburton, Bechtel, and Chevron had been earning trillions of dollars since the
invasion. Most importantly, the policy under study did not create any serious/major upset
for the US at any level whether domestic, global, or regional. The policy also facilitated
the US pursuit of global hegemony. The policy not only increased US control over
Middle Eastern oil but also on the region as well.
This dissertation critically answered in detail all the central questions of this study
one by one. The main argument of this dissertation proved true. The empirical evidence
provided in the dissertation through chapter three to seven proved the authenticity of the
main argument of this dissertation that the US-Iraq policy 2001-2008 was a case study of
the application of theory of offensive realism. The second main argument had also been
proved true. The contradiction in the stated causes of invasion and operational causes had
also been proved. The 9/11 Commission concluded that there were no WMDs in Iraq, the
main cause of invasion. Similarly, the introduction of democracy in Iraq mainly remained
rhetoric and did not withstand the test of empirical verifiability. The policy under study
increased US share of world power in multiple ways. It could be safely said that there had
been a close fit between offensive realism and US – Iraq policy 2001-2008 and it
constituted an excellent case study of the application of offensive realism. The renowned
experts of American Studies in Pakistan- Dr. Tahir Amin, Dr. M. Islam and Dr. Noman
O. Satttar- had also been in agreement with the main aurgument of this study that the
U.S.- Iraq policy 2001-2008 constitued a case for application of offensive realism.
309
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