prosocial attitudes, patriarchy and corruption in s. asia espec. india

Prosocial Attitudes and Corruption in S. Asia, Especially

In India and Bangladesh

FEB. 2015

Workshop on Trust and Prosocial Attitudes in EU and Beyond

Wendy Olsen

Social Mobility and Labour Markets Research Group

University of Manchester

Overview of Talk 1. Corruption Heavily Dominant in Six S.

Asian Countries

2. Transparency International’s approach ignores patriarchy Looking for prosocial behav solutions

3. Contrasts Within India Show Prosocial Attitudes Common Among Well Educated People

4. Against Simplistic Solutions Morphogenesis; retroduction.

5. Conclusions

2 Project: Gender Norms and Labour Supply in Comparative Context

The author, Wendy Olsen,works in social statistics at the University of Manchester.

Her writings can be found online at:

http://staffprofiles.humanities.manchester.ac.uk/Profile.aspx?Id=Wendy.Olsen%2&curTab=4

Quick access on twitter.com as:@Sandhyamma

Gender Norms and Labour Supply in Comparative Context

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Regulatory Quality Lower in S. Asia

http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home


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Source authors:The Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) project reports aggregate and individual governance indicators for 215 economies over the period 1996–2013, for six dimensions of governance:Voice and AccountabilityPolitical Stability and Absence of ViolenceGovernment EffectivenessRegulatory QualityRule of LawControl of CorruptionThese aggregate indicators combine the views of a large number of enterprise, citizen and expert survey respondents in industrial and developing countries. They are based on 32 individual data sources produced by a variety of survey institutes, think tanks, non-governmental organizations, international organizations, and private sector firms.

The WGI are produced by:Daniel Kaufmann, Natural Resource Governance Institute (NRGI) and Brookings InstitutionAart Kraay, World Bank Development Research GroupMassimo Mastruzzi, World Bank Institute

URL address

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width="940"

src="http://media.transparency.org/maps/cpi2014-

940.html"></iframe>


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Glimpse of the Literature Review

Della Porta and Vannucci


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Theory of corruptionMoral costs higher/lower

Resistance to corruption is a mutable moral wall.

Institutionalised loyalty norms support corrupt behaviour. These norms can create a feedback loop which is morphostasis.

The theory offered by Della Porta and Vannucci is a sociological theory

Morphogenesis

Agency is prominent in social change.

Patriarchal normsand family loyalty co-reinforce each other.

Inequality enhances their prevalence.

Loyalty serves to help ensure survival.

Questioning the behaviour of elders is punished and thus discouraged.

Compliance is valued in Asia.


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2. Transparency International’s approach ignores patriarchy

Patriarchal structures are reinforced through the rings of corrupt payments, as elite money is dominated by elder males and, in general, elders Bangladesh, Nepal, India, Sri Lanka, and

Pakistan

To capture cultural norms, King et al. argue that we need to use anchoring vignettes

The World Values Survey has mini-vignettes

This presumes a latent ‘thing’ which is the core attitude in question. WE CALL THIS A SOCIAL NORM

We measure the core attitude in question. One Example: The Justifiability of bribery

(WORLD VALUES SURVEY; EuroSocSurvey)

No one values corruption; no one in Bangladesh or India admits to valueing corruption.

8 Gender Norms and Labour Supply in Comparative Context

2nd Glimpse of the Literature Review

Empirical Papers - WVS


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Theory of corruption

Moral costs higher/lower to the cheater

Resistance to corruption is a mutable moral wall

Wang-Sheng Lee (IZA 2013) 20 Eurozone countries Microdata 43,300 cases “Important to seek

adventures” is an attitude that mediates the gendered outcome that one

“can justify bribes & cheating”

3. Contrasts Within India Show Prosocial Attitudes Common Among Well Educated People – Comparing Bangladesh / India


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Attitudes about corruption were analysed in the World Values Survey. The mean is the norm.

Corruption is anathema to the culture.

We combine answers to questions about: ‘whether it can be justified to claim government benefits to which

you are not entitled’ ‘whether it can be justified to avoid a fare on public transport’, 'whether it can be justified to cheat on taxes if you have a chance’ ‘whether it can be justified to accept a bribe’


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Mean Justifiability of Cheating

Standard Error of Estimate

Lower Confidence Interval Limit

Upper Confidence Interval Limit

Chhatisgarh 0.50 0.12 0.26 0.73

Uttar Pradesh 0.51 0.03 0.45 0.57

Madhya Prad. 0.61 0.05 0.52 0.70

Bihar 0.66 0.06 0.54 0.78

Jharkhand 0.84 0.09 0.65 1.02

Bangladesh -0.13 -.14 -.12

. Attitudes about bribery and cheating in Bangladesh and in 5 states of India (WVS data)

World Values Survey: Education & Anti-Corruption Are Not Linearly Related in India


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A stylized fact about India: Regional variations in campaigning against corruption. Court cases very different; eg. very few in Uttar Pradesh.

CONTROL CORRUPTION

Figure 1: Some Indian states with high corruption

UPU -0.03 4.91UPR -0.13 4.91DelU 0.04 4.96DelR 4.96TNU 0.08 5.09TNR 5.09HaryU 0.10 5.16HaryR -0.21 5.2JhaU 5.2JhaR 0.16 5.42RajR 0.05 5.43RajU 0.30 5.43KarnU 0.12 5.76KarnR 0.16 5.76MPU -0.03 5.84MPR -0.19 5.84BihU 0.13 6.95BihR 0.12 6.95

Sources


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Control: World Values Survey India, 2006 See http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSOnline.jsp

Corruption within India: www.transparencyinternationalindia.org Note: TII Board has no women on it

This could become illegal; a 2013 law makes all listed companies have at least one female on their board.

The states with high corruption also have high ‘control’


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Control A factor representing a social norm. The norm is that people think they have and

should have control over outcomes in their lives. It is also called efficacy. The person who feels efficacious does not believe in luck or fate as much as others. These ‘feelings’ are not personal, nor merely psychological. The range of ‘feelings’ and attitudes is culturally shaped through socialisation, habitus, doxa and norms.

The factor for control in WVS


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They agree that hard work brings success in the long run.

They often or sometimes (vs rarely or never) think about the meaning and purpose of life.

They disagree that “everything is determined by fate”, instead saying that “people shape their fate themselves”.

3 indicators; confirmatory factor analysis. We also measured women’s autonomy over household

decision making using the National Family & Health Survey

Urban and Rural India : Variations in the Mean of Several Factors… Not in Corruption


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X048 ruralnuminstate fsp justbrib fegal fcontrol fcomply risktake edyears wealth aufactor ti2005

356010. "IN: Kerala" 0 59 0.38 0.05 -0.08 0.01 -0.05 3.43 11.49 0.764 0.021 2.4

356006. "IN: Gujarat" 1 26 -0.91 -0.12 -0.73 -0.14 -0.22 4.00 4.04 -0.202 -0.010 4.17

356006. "IN: Gujarat" 0 76 -0.84 -0.14 -0.58 0.10 0.22 4.74 7.66 0.785 0.053 4.17

356001. "IN: Andhra Pradesh" 1 70 -0.59 -0.04 -0.06 -0.22 -0.19 4.33 4.56 -0.432 0.057 4.21

356001. "IN: Andhra Pradesh" 0 73 0.17 0.08 -0.02 -0.18 -0.33 2.72 5.49 0.611 -0.073 4.21

356012. "IN: Maharashtra" 1 71 -0.27 0.27 0.01 -0.11 -0.17 4.77 3.39 -0.464 0.015 4.33

356012. "IN: Maharashtra" 0 130 0.10 0.85 -0.10 -0.02 -0.15 4.75 7.77 0.786 -0.013 4.33

356004. "IN: Chhatisgarh" 0 33 -0.73 0.55 -0.01 -0.18 -0.22 2.80 5.42 0.328 -0.120 4.45

356004. "IN: Chhatisgarh" 1 11 -1.027 -0.107 4.45

356014. "IN: Punjab" 0 28 -0.22 0.41 0.15 -0.04 -0.04 3.43 8.50 1.089 -0.034 4.59

356014. "IN: Punjab" 1 25 -0.04 0.31 0.04 -0.01 0.03 3.18 9.36 0.366 -0.099 4.59

356018. "IN: West Bengal " 1 38 0.38 0.49 0.06 -0.24 -0.31 2.55 9.32 -0.833 -0.043 4.61

356018. "IN: West Bengal " 0 117 0.44 0.46 -0.04 -0.22 -0.38 3.04 11.46 0.591 -0.103 4.61

356013. "IN: Orrisa" 0 22 -0.17 0.19 0.23 0.00 -0.10 4.18 8.55 0.305 -0.113 4.75

356013. "IN: Orrisa" 1 53 0.15 -0.08 -0.08 -0.06 0.13 3.96 6.64 -0.840 -0.052 4.75

356017. "IN: Uttar Pradesh " 0 202 -0.30 0.56 -0.05 -0.03 -0.15 3.98 6.18 0.691 -0.051 4.91

356017. "IN: Uttar Pradesh " 1 99 -0.17 0.41 -0.04 -0.13 -0.19 3.57 5.31 -0.718 -0.093 4.91

356005. "IN: Delhi" 0 37 -0.13 0.25 0.20 0.04 0.15 3.74 10.84 1.018 -0.003 4.96

356005. "IN: Delhi" 1 1 0.652 -0.012 4.96

356016. "IN: Tamil Nadu " 0 160 0.23 0.89 0.29 0.08 0.17 4.86 10.76 0.430 0.128 5.09

356016. "IN: Tamil Nadu " 1 5 -0.470 0.109 5.09

356007. "IN: Haryana" 0 44 0.31 0.42 0.17 0.10 0.34 3.09 10.66 0.929 0.024 5.16

356008. "IN: Jharkhand" 1 38 -0.74 0.90 -0.27 -0.21 -0.20 3.60 1.37 -1.120 0.034 5.2

356008. "IN: Jharkhand" 0 14 0.506 -0.093 5.2

356002. "IN: Assam" 0 52 1.11 -0.03 -0.11 0.16 0.10 3.98 14.56 0.383 -0.099 5.42

356015. "IN: Rajasthan" 1 47 0.29 0.25 -0.11 0.05 0.34 3.42 2.28 -0.672 -0.080 5.43

356015. "IN: Rajasthan" 0 65 0.30 0.14 0.19 0.30 0.40 4.49 4.02 0.877 -0.043 5.43

356009. "IN: Krnataka" 0 70 0.13 0.29 0.32 0.12 0.03 3.95 5.53 0.483 -0.053 5.76

356009. "IN: Krnataka" 1 33 0.34 0.21 0.21 0.16 0.18 3.93 8.61 -0.554 -0.088 5.76

356011. "IN: Madhya Pradesh" 0 38 -0.02 0.37 0.19 -0.03 -0.19 3.97 7.89 0.747 -0.009 5.84

356011. "IN: Madhya Pradesh" 1 66 0.24 0.75 -0.39 -0.19 -0.41 3.91 3.15 -0.939 -0.031 5.84

356003. "IN: Bihar " 0 140 0.09 0.81 0.15 0.13 0.17 4.55 7.20 0.294 -0.104 6.95

356003. "IN: Bihar " 1 57 0.21 0.28 0.26 0.12 0.20 4.86 3.95 -0.750 0.026 6.95

India : Variations in the Mean of Several Factors… Higher Corruption…


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Fsp Justbrib fegal fcontrol fcomply risktake ti2005356005. "IN: Delhi" 4.96356016. "IN: Tamil Nadu " 0.23 0.89 0.29 0.08 0.17 4.86 5.09356016. "IN: Tamil Nadu " 5.09356007. "IN: Haryana" 0.31 0.42 0.17 0.10 0.34 3.09 5.16356008. "IN: Jharkhand" -0.74 0.90 -0.27 -0.21 -0.20 3.60 5.2356008. "IN: Jharkhand" 5.2356002. "IN: Assam" 1.11 -0.03 -0.11 0.16 0.10 3.98 5.42356015. "IN: Rajasthan" 0.29 0.25 -0.11 0.05 0.34 3.42 5.43356015. "IN: Rajasthan" 0.30 0.14 0.19 0.30 0.40 4.49 5.43356009. "IN: Krnataka" 0.13 0.29 0.32 0.12 0.03 3.95 5.76356009. "IN: Krnataka" 0.34 0.21 0.21 0.16 0.18 3.93 5.76356011. "IN: Madhya Pradesh" -0.02 0.37 0.19 -0.03 -0.19 3.97 5.84356011. "IN: Madhya Pradesh" 0.24 0.75 -0.39 -0.19 -0.41 3.91 5.84356003. "IN: Bihar " 0.09 0.81 0.15 0.13 0.17 4.55 6.95356003. "IN: Bihar " 0.21 0.28 0.26 0.12 0.20 4.86 6.95

Control is correlated with compliance


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Those who are compliant (behave, follow tradition, and being helpful to the people nearby) are also relatively tending to feel that they can control outcomes. On the other hand there is a contrasting group somewhere who are not compliant. These also feel that fate rules and they can’t control outcomes.

WORLD VALUES SURVEY 1981-2008 OFFICIAL AGGREGATE v.20090901, 2009. World Values Survey Association (www.worldvaluessurvey.org). Aggregate File Producer: ASEP/JDS, Madrid.

3. Against Simplistic Solutions

Morphogenesis; retroduction.

Both countries are high on

corruption, low on transparency.

Relative to Italy and UK, however,

Bangladesh & India have very strong honesty

norms

Thanks to Priyanka Vyas, who made our

maps.

Within India, high levels of everyday corruption affect

those living ‘Below the Poverty Line’, TI study, 2005 and

2008

A humanist agenda:

Key research question:

Could strong people act as agents to promote the reduction of corruption by challenging those who practice informal corruption? They would have to refuse to collude with informal norms,

Which through being informal, Are enforced with violence and strong

bullying. There is a class challenge here, too.

Agency: we need prosocial traits to challenge a social system that is doing harm.

21 Gender Norms and Labour Supply in Comparative Context

One has to encourage the prosocial attitudes as substantive values.

Challenging corruption is a strategic capability.

It is necessary as an enabling factor for other functionings.

Substantive Conclusions


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The pattern of disapproval of cheating the public sector, or paying bribes, was strong universal disapproval in Bangladesh, and nearly so in India.

Transparency International ranks both as highly corrupt in practice.

India had high rates of disapproval of cheating – higher than in EU.

Those who live in Kerala have high education, high GSP per capita, and low corruption. Nearly everywhere else in India, high corruption affects poor people badly.

Control and compliance are co-correlated, and they do not, in themselves, presently create a basis for anticorruption.

Belief in fate is however declining and agency is possible.

References


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Borsboom, Denny, Gideon J. Mellenbergh, and Jaap van Heerden (2003), The Theoretical Status of Latent Variables, Psychological Review, 110:2, 203–219, DOI 10.1037/0033-295X.

Della Porta, Donnatella, and Alberto Vannucci (2004*) The Hidden Order of Corruption: An Institutional Approach, London: Ashgate.

Della Porta, D., and A. Vannucci(2005), “Corruption as a Normative System”, CIES – ISCTE conference paper, May. URL http://home.iscte-iul.pt/~ansmd/CC-DellaPorta.pdf, Accessed Dec. 2014.

Farah Deeba Chowdhury (2013) Women’s Political Participation in Bangladesh: An Empirical Study, UPL Monograph Series, Dhaka: The University Press Ltd.

Kabeer, Naila, Lopita Huq, and Simeen Mahmud (2013) Diverging Stories Of “Missing Women” In South Asia : Is Son Preference Weakening In Bangladesh? Feminist Economics, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13545701.2013.857423, 1-26.

Khattak, Saba Gul, Kiran Habib, and Foqia Sadiq Khan (2008) Women and Human Security in South Asia: The Cases of Bangladesh and Pakistan, Dhaka: The University Press Ltd.

King, G., And J. Wand (2007), “Comparing Incomparable Survey Responses: Evaluating and Selecting Anchoring Vignettes”, Political Analysis, 15:46-66.

Lee, Wang-Sheng, and Cahit Guven (2013), Engaging in Corruption: The Influence of Cultural Values and Contagion Effects at the Micro Level, IZA Working Paper No. 7685.

Parboteea et al (2005), “Does National Culture Affect Willingness to Justify Ethically Suspect Behaviours?” , IntlJournCrossCulturalManagement, 5:2, 123-138.

Uberoi, P., ed., (1998*) Family, Kinship and Marriage in India, Oxford in India Reading,s. Delhi: OUP.

Acknowledgements


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Thank you to Mr. Nathan Khadaroo, Research Assistant; Nik Loynes, Research Associate; Prof. Simeen Mahmud, BRAC Institute for Government and Development, Dhaka; and Prof. Amaresh Dubey, JNU, Centre for the Study of Regional Development, Delhi and Indian Institute for Dalit Studies. This research was funded by the ESRC DFID Poverty Alleviation funds as a research grant 2014-2017.

Wendy Olsen Reader in Socio-Economics Social Statistics University of Manchester Manchester M13 9PL UK 0044 161 275 3043 EMAIL [email protected]

prosocial attitudes, patriarchy and corruption in s. asia espec. india

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