DEWARA vs SPS. LAMELAG.R. No. 1790102011

DOCTRINE:Even after having classified a property as a conjugal it does not necessarily follow that it may automatically be levied upon in an execution to answer for debts, obligations, fines, or indemnities of one of the spouses. Before debts and obligations may be charged against the conjugal partnership, it must be shown that the same were contracted for, or the debts and obligations should have redounded to, the benefit of the conjugal partnership.

FACTS:Eduardo Dewara and petitioner Elenita were married before the enactment of the Family Code. Thus, the Civil Code governed their marital relations. Husband and wife were separated-in-fact because Elenita went to work in California, United States of America, while Eduardo stayed in Bacolod City. On January 20, 1985, Eduardo, while driving a private jeep registered in the name of Elenita, hit respondent Ronnie Lamela (Ronnie). Ronnie filed a criminal case for serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence against Eduardo before the MTCC in Bacolod City. The MTCC found Eduardo guilty of the charge and to pay civil indemnity P62,598.70 as actual damages and Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) as moral damages. On appeal, the RTCaffirmed the decision and it became final and executory. The writ of execution on the civil liability was served on Eduardo, but it was returned unsatisfied because he had no property in his name. Ronnie requested the City Sheriff to levy on Lot No. 234-C, Psd. 26667 of the Bacolod Cadastre in the name of ELENITA M. DEWARA. Ronnie then caused the consolidation of title in a

Cadastral Proceeding before the RTC, which ordered the cancellation of TCT No. T-80054 in the name of Elenita and the issuance of a new certificate of title in the name of respondent spouses. The levy on execution, public auction, issuance of certificate of sale, and cancellation of title of the lot in the name of Elenita were done while Elenita was working in California. Thus, Elenita, represented by her attorney-in-fact, Ferdinand Magallanes, filed a case for annulment of sale and for damages.

On the other hand, respondent spouses averred that the subject lot was the conjugal property of petitioner Elenita and Eduardo. They asserted that the property was acquired by Elenita during her marriage to Eduardo; that the property was acquired with the money of Eduardo because, at the time of the acquisition of the property, Elenita was a plain housewife; that the jeep involved in the accident was registered in the name of petitioner. RTC’s RULING: The RTC declared that said property was paraphernal in nature. It arrived at this conclusion by tracing how Elenita acquired the subject property. Based on the documentary evidence submitted, Elenitas grandfather originally owned Lot No. 234-C.

On appeal, the CA reversed the decision of the RTC. The CA elucidated that the gross inadequacy of the price alone does not affect a contract of sale, except that it may indicate a defect in the consent, or that the parties really intended a donation or some other act or contract. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: 

W/N the subject property is the paraphernal/exclusive property of Elenita or the conjugal property of spouses Elenita and Eduardo.

RULING:Conjugal property. All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife. Registration in the name of the husband or the wife alone does not destroy this presumption. The separation-in-fact between the husband and the wife without judicial approval shall not affect the conjugal partnership. The lot retains its conjugal nature. Moreover, the presumption of conjugal ownership applies even when the manner in which the property was acquired does not appear. The use of the conjugal funds is not an essential requirement for the presumption to arise. However, even after having declared that Lot No. 234-C is the conjugal property of spouses Elenita and Eduardo, it does not necessarily follow that it may automatically be levied upon in an execution to answer for debts, obligations, fines, or indemnities of one of the spouses. Before debts and obligations may be charged against the conjugal partnership, it must be shown that the same were contracted for, or the debts and obligations should have redounded to, the benefit of the conjugal partnership.

TUBOLA, JR. vs SANDIGANBAYANG.R. No. 1540422011

DOCTRINE:The failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public fund or property with which he is chargeable, upon demand by any

duly authorized officer, shall be prima facieevidence that he has put such missing funds or property to personal uses.

FACTS:Petitioner was the cashier of the National Irrigation

Administration (NIA)-Aganan, Sta. Barbara River Irrigation System in Iloilo City. On November 8, 1982, Commission on Audit (COA) State Auditing Examiners conducted an audit examination of petitioners account which indicated a shortage of P93,051.88.

The examiners thus sent a letter of demand dated to

petitioner directing him to account for the shortage. Petitioner refused to receive the letter, however, hence, Gotera and Cajita sent it by registered mail.

Petitioner was thereupon charged of committing

malversation of public funds before the Sandiganbayan to which he pleaded not guilty. By the account of Gotera, the lone witness for the prosecution, petitioner had an account balance of P30,162.46 prior to June 25, 1982; that from June 25 to November 8, 1982, the date petitioners account was audited, his cash collections totaled P347,995.64; that his remittances from June 25 to November 8, 1982 totaled P285,105.41; and that the total collections less total remittances amounted to P93,051.88 as of November 8, 1982. Petitioner, who claimed that he was assigned as cashier since 1978 and was also in charge of payment of salaries of more than 2,000 field employees in the NIA Jalaur Project, declared that his task of keeping the collected irrigation fees was temporarily assigned to Editha Valeria (Valeria) upon instruction of his superior, Regional Director Manuel Hicao, for he (petitioner) was also handling the payroll of around 2,000 employees.

Petitioner further declared that no accounting of the

collected fees was undertaken since he trusted Valeria, who directly remitted them to the bank, after he signed the statement of collection without reading the contents thereof. Sandiganbayan ruled that petitioner is guilty of malversation. Petitioner now posits that the Sandiganbayan was unsure whether he was guilty of malversation intentionally or through negligence. In fine, petitioner insists that as the primary task of collecting the irrigation fees was the responsibility of Valeria, he cannot be faulted for negligence.

The People goes on to contend that petitioner may still be

convicted of malversation by negligence even if the Information alleged the commission of intentional malversation since the dolo or culpa present in the offense is only a modality in the perpetration of the felony.

ISSUE:Whether or not petitioner is guilty of malversation

RULING:YES. In Cabello v. Sandiganbayan, the Court ratiocinated that:

On the other hand, petitioner contends that

the bulk of said amount represented "vales" he granted to the postal employees and the minor portion consisted of unremitted, unreimbursed or uncollected amounts. His very own explanation, therefore, shows that the embezzlement, as claimed by the prosecution, or the expenditures, as posited by him, were not only unauthorized but intentionally and voluntarily made. Under no stretch of legal hermeneutics can it be contended that these funds were lost through abandonment or negligence without petitioner's knowledge as to put the loss within a merely culpable category. From the

contention of either party, the misappropriation was intentional and not through negligence.

Besides, even on the putative assumption

that the evidence against petitioner yielded a case of malversation by negligence but the information was for intentional malversation, under the circumstances of this case his conviction under the first mode of misappropriation would still be in order. Malversation is committed either intentionally or by negligence. The dolo or the culpa present in the offense is only a modality in the perpetration of the felony. Even if the mode charged differs from the mode proved, the same offense of malversation is involved and conviction thereof is proper. A possible exception would be when the mode of commission alleged in the particulars of the indictment is so far removed from the ultimate categorization of the crime that it may be said due process was denied by deluding the accused into an erroneous comprehension of the charge against him. That no such prejudice was occasioned on petitioner nor was he beleaguered in his defense is apparent from the records of this case. Finally, petitioners claim of violation of his right to due

process vis--vis the Sandiganbayan Justices active participation during the trial fails too. For he has not specified any instance of supposed bias of the Justices, or cited what questions adversely affected him. That a magistrate may propound clarificatory questions to secure a full and clear understanding of the facts in the case is not proscribed.

MUNOZ vs YABUT, JR.G.R. Nos. 142676 & 1467182011(EJECTMENT CASE)DOCTRINES:

The rule is that: (1) a judgment in rem is binding upon the whole world, such as a judgment in a land registration case or probate of a will; and (2) a judgment in personam is binding upon the parties and their successors-in-interest but not upon strangers. A judgment directing a party to deliver possession of a property to another is in personam; it is binding only against the parties and their successors-in-interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action. An action for declaration of nullity of title and recovery of ownership of real property, or re-conveyance, is a real action but it is an action in personam, for it binds a particular individual only although it concerns the right to a tangible thing. Any judgment therein is binding only upon the parties properly impleaded.

There is forcible entry or desahucio when one is deprived of physical possession of land or building by means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth.  In such cases, the possession is illegal from the beginning and the basic inquiry centers on who has the prior possession de facto. 

FACTS:First Case

The subject property is a house and lot at No. 48 Scout Madrian St., Diliman, Quezon City, formerly owned by Yee L. Ching. Yee L. Ching is married to Emilia M. Ching (spouses Ching), Muozs sister. Muoz lived at the subject property with the spouses

Ching. As consideration for the valuable services rendered by Muoz to the spouses Chings family, Yee L. Ching agreed to have the subject property transferred to Muoz. By virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale, seemingly executed by Yee L. Ching in favor of Muoz. However, in a Deed of Absolute Sale dated December 28, 1972, Muoz purportedly sold the subject property to her sister, Emilia M. Ching. As a result, TCT No. 186306 was cancelled and TCT No. 186366 was issued in Emilia M. Chings name. Emilia M. Ching, in a Deed of Absolute Sale dated July 16, 1979, sold the subject property to spouses Go Song and Tan Sio Kien (spouses Go), hence, TCT No. 186366 was cancelled and replaced by TCT No. 258977 in the spouses Gos names.

On October 15, 1979, Muoz registered her adverse claim to the subject property on TCT No. 258977 of the spouses Go. The next day, on October 16, 1979, Muoz filed a complaint for the annulment of the deeds of absolute sale.

On July 19, 1991, RTC-Branch 95 rendered its Decision

against Emilia M. Ching, Yee L. Ching, and the spouses Go (Emilia M. Ching, et al.). It found that Muozs signature on the Deed of Absolute Sale dated December 28, 1972 was forged; that Muoz never sold the subject property to her sister, Emilia M. Ching; and that the spouses Go were not innocent purchasers for value of the subject property.

Emilia M. Ching, et al.s, appealed to the CA. In its

Decision] dated March 4, 1993, the appellate court not only affirmed the appealed judgment, but also ordered the spouses Go and their successors-in-interest and assigns and those acting on their behalf to vacate the subject property.

More than two months later, on September 20, 1993, the

RTC-Branch 95 issued a writ of execution.

The spouses Chan, who bought the subject property from BPI Family, then came forward and filed before the RTC-Branch 95 on October 22, 1993 an Urgent Motion to Stop Execution opposing the writ of execution. The spouses Chan asserted ownership and possession of the subject property on the basis of a clean title.

It was only at this point that Muoz, upon her own inquiry, discovered the cancellation on October 28, 1982 of her adverse claim and notice of lis pendens annotated on the spouses Gos TCT No. 258977, and the subsequent events that led to the transfer and registration of the title to the subject property from the spouses Go, to BPI Family, and finally, to the spouses Chan. Second Case

Pending resolution by the RTC-Branch 95 of the spouses Chans motion for reconsideration and notice of appeal, a Complaint for Forcible Entry with Prayer for Preliminary Mandatory Injunction against Samuel Go Chan and Atty. Yabut. Muoz alleged in her complaint that she had been in actual and physical possession of the subject property since January 10, 1994. She hired a caretaker and two security guards for the said property. On February 2, 1994, Samuel Go Chan and Atty. Yabut, along with 20 other men, some of whom were armed, ousted Muoz of possession of the subject property by stealth, threat, force, and intimidation. Muoz prayed for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction directing Samuel Go Chan and Atty. Yabut and all persons claiming right under them to vacate the subject property.

Samuel Go Chan and Atty. Yabut denied Muozs allegations, insisting that Samuel Go Chan is the valid, lawful, and true legal owner and possessor of the subject property. Samuel Go Chan and

In its Order dated June 10, 1994, the RTC-Branch 88 issued a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the implementation of the MeTC Order dated May 16, 1994.

RULINGS: Civil Case No. Q-28580 is an action for reconveyance of real

property. In Heirs of Eugenio Lopez, Sr. v. Enriquez, we described an action for reconveyance as follows:

An action for reconveyance is an action in 

personam available to a person whose property has been wrongfully registered under the Torrens system in anothers name. Although the decree is recognized as incontrovertible and no longer open to review, the registered owner is not necessarily held free from liens. As a remedy, an action for reconveyance is filed as an ordinary action in the ordinary courts of justice and not with the land registration court. Reconveyance is always available as long as the property has not passed to an innocent third person for value. A notice of lis pendens may thus be annotated on the certificate of title immediately upon the institution of the action in court. The notice of lis pendens will avoid transfer to an innocent third person for value and preserve the claim of the real owner.

The rule is that: (1) a judgment in rem is binding upon the whole world, such as a judgment in a land registration case or probate of a will; and (2) a judgment in personam is binding upon the parties and their successors-in-interest but not upon strangers. A judgment directing a party to deliver possession of a

property to another is in personam; it is binding only against the parties and their successors-in-interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action. An action for declaration of nullity of title and recovery of ownership of real property, or re-conveyance, is a real action but it is an action in personam, for it binds a particular individual only although it concerns the right to a tangible thing. Any judgment therein is binding only upon the parties properly impleaded.

Since they were not impleaded as parties and given the

opportunity to participate in Civil Case No. Q-28580, the final judgment in said case cannot bind BPI Family and the spouses Chan. The effect of the said judgment cannot be extended to BPI Family and the spouses Chan by simply issuing an alias writ of execution against them. No man shall be affected by any proceeding to which he is a stranger, and strangers to a case are not bound by any judgment rendered by the court.

G.R. No. 142676

G.R. No. 142676 is Muozs appeal of the dismissal of Civil

Case No. 8286, the forcible entry case she instituted against Samuel Go Chan and Atty. Yabut before the MeTC.

There is forcible entry or desahucio when one is deprived of

physical possession of land or building by means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth. In such cases, the possession is illegal from the beginning and the basic inquiry centers on who has the prior possession de facto. In filing forcible entry cases, the law tells us that two allegations are mandatory for the municipal court to acquire jurisdiction: first, the plaintiff must allege prior physical possession of the property, and second, he must also allege that he was deprived of his possession by any of the means provided for in Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of

Court, i.e., by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth. It is also settled that in the resolution thereof, what is important is determining who is entitled to the physical possession of the property. Indeed, any of the parties who can prove prior possession de facto may recover such possession even from the owner himself since such cases proceed independently of any claim of ownership and the plaintiff needs merely to prove prior possession de facto and undue deprivation thereof.

Title is never in issue in a forcible entry case, the court

should base its decision on who had prior physical possession. The main thing to be proven in an action for forcible entry is prior possession and that same was lost through force, intimidation, threat, strategy, and stealth, so that it behooves the court to restore possession regardless of title or ownership.

Based on the foregoing, we find that the RTC-Branch 88

erred in ordering the dismissal of Civil Case No. 8286 even before completion of the proceedings before the MeTC. At the time said case was ordered dismissed by RTC-Branch 88, the MeTC had only gone so far as holding a hearing on and eventually granting Muozs prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction.

STA. LUCIA REALTY & DEVELOPMENT, INC.G.R. No. 1668382011(BOUNDARY CASE)

DOCTRINE:A certificate of title is conclusive evidence of both its ownership and location.

FACTS:

Petitioner Sta. Lucia Realty & Development, Inc. (Sta. Lucia) is the registered owner of several parcels of land all of which indicated that the lots were located in Barrio Tatlong Kawayan, Municipality of Pasig.

The lot covered by TCT No. 38457 was not segregated, but a

commercial building owned by Sta. Lucia East Commercial Center, Inc., a separate corporation, was built on it.

Upon Pasig’s petition to correct the location stated in TCT

Nos. 532250, 598424, and 599131, the Land Registration Court, on June 9, 1995, ordered the amendment of the TCTs to read that the lots with respect to TCT No. 39112 were located in Barrio Tatlong Kawayan, Pasig City.

On January 31, 1994, Cainta filed a petition for the

settlement of its land boundary dispute with Pasig before the RTC, Branch 74 of Antipolo City (Antipolo RTC).

On November 28, 1995, Pasig filed a Complaint, against Sta. Lucia for the collection of real estate taxes, including penalties and interests.

Sta. Lucia alleged that it had been religiously paying its real estate taxes to Cainta, just like what its predecessors-in-interest did, by virtue of the demands and assessments made and the Tax Declarations issued by Cainta on the claim that the subject properties were within its territorial jurisdiction.

Sta. Lucia and Cainta thereafter moved for the suspension

of the proceedings, and claimed that the pending petition in the Antipolo RTC, for the settlement of boundary dispute between Cainta and Pasig, presented a prejudicial question to the resolution of the case.

The RTC denied this holding that the TCTs were conclusive

evidence as to its ownership and location.

The RTC granted Pasigs motion in an Order and modified its earlier decision to include the realty taxes due on the improvements on the subject lots. The Court of Appeals added that the boundary dispute case presented a prejudicial question which must be decided before x x x Pasig can collect the realty taxes due over the subject properties.

In affirming the RTC, the Court of Appeals declared that

there was no proper legal basis to suspend the proceedings. Elucidating on the legal meaning of a prejudicial question, it held that there can be no prejudicial question when the cases involved are both civil.

ISSUE:W/N the resolution of the boundary dispute between Pasig and Cainta would determine which local government unit is entitled to collect realty taxes from Sta. Lucia

RULING: YES.

The Local Government Unit entitledTo Collect Real Property Taxes

The Court of Appeals held that the resolution of the

complaint lodged before the Pasig RTC did not necessitate the assessment of the parties evidence on the metes and bounds of their respective territories. It cited our ruling in Odsigue v. Court of Appeals wherein we said that a certificate of title is conclusive evidence of both its ownership and location. Certificates of Title asConclusive Evidence of Location  While we fully agree that a certificate of title is conclusive as to its ownership and location, this does not preclude the filing of an action for the very purpose of attacking the statements therein. Although it is true that Pasig is the locality stated in the TCTs of the subject properties, both Sta. Lucia and Cainta aver that the metes and bounds of the subject properties, as they are described in the TCTs, reveal that they are within Caintas boundaries. 

CASTILLO vs REPUBLICG.R. No. 1829802011(LAND REGISTRATION CASE)DOCTRINE:The non-compliance with the requirements prescribed in Sections 12 and 13 of R.A. No. 26 is fatal. Hence, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the petition for reconstitution.

FACTS:Bienvenido filed on 7 March 2002 a Petition for Reconstitution and Issuance of Second Owners Copy of Transfer Certificate of Title

No. T-16755. (Facts of the case contain contents of petition (exhibits, etc.) The Trial Court’s Ruling On 3 October 2003, the trial court promulgated its Decision in favor of Bienvenido. The RTC ordered the Register of Deeds for the province of Bulacan, upon payment of the prescribed fees, to reconstitute the original copy of Original Certificate of Title No. 16755 and to issue another owners duplicate copy thereof, in the name of the registered owner and in the same terms and conditions as the original thereof, pursuant to the provisions of R.A. No. 26, as amended by P.D. No. 1529, in lieu of the lost original copy. The new original copy shall in all respects be accorded the same validity and legal effect as the lost original copy for all intents and purposes. Provided, that no certificate of title covering the same parcel of land exists in the office of the Register of Deeds concerned. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed its Notice of Appeal. The OSG stated that it was grave error for the trial court to order reconstitution despite absence of any prayer seeking such relief in the petition and on the basis of a mere photocopy of TCT No. T-16755. Counsel for Bienvenido filed a motion for early resolution on 25 January 2006. The Appellate Court’s Ruling On 23 October 2007, the appellate court rendered its Decision which reversed the 3 October 2003 Decision of the trial court. Bienvenidos counsel withdrew from the case on 11 October 2007 and was substituted by Mondragon and Montoya Law Offices. The appellate court ruled that even if Bienvenido failed to specifically include a prayer for the reconstitution of TCT No. T-

16755, the petition is captioned as In re: Petition for Reconstitution and Issuance of Second Owners Copy of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-16755, Bienvenido Castillo, Petitioner. The prayer for such other reliefs and remedies just and proper under the premises is broad and comprehensive enough to justify the extension of a remedy different from that prayed for. ISSUE: W/N the RTC’s order of reconstitution was valid

RULING:NO.The petition must fail. There can be no reconstitution as the trial court never acquired jurisdiction over the present case. Process of Reconstitution ofTransfer Certificates of Title under R.A. No. 26 Section 3 of R.A. No. 26 enumerates the sources from which transfer certificates of title shall be reconstituted Bienvenido already admitted that he cannot comply with Section 3(a) to 3(e), and that 3(f) is his last recourse. Bienvenido, through Fernandos testimony, presented a photocopy of TCT No. T-16755 before the trial court. The owners original duplicate copy was lost, while the original title on file with the Register of Deeds of Malolos, Bulacan was burned in a fire on 7 March 1987. The property was neither mortgaged nor leased at the time of Bienvenidos loss of the owners original duplicate copy.

The non-compliance with the requirements prescribed in Sections 12 and 13 of R.A. No. 26 is fatal. Hence, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the petition for reconstitution. We cannot stress enough that our jurisprudence is replete with rulings regarding the mandatory character of the requirements of R.A. No. 26. As early as 1982, we ruled: Republic Act No. 26 entitled An act providing a special procedure for the reconstitution of Torrens Certificates of Title lost or destroyed approved on September 25, 1946 confers jurisdiction or authority to the Court of First Instance to hear and decide petitions for judicial reconstitution. The Act specifically provides the special requirements and mode of procedure that must be followed before the court can properly act, assume and acquire jurisdiction or authority over the petition and grant the reconstitution prayed for. These requirements and procedure are mandatory. The Petition for Reconstitution must allege certain specific jurisdictional facts; the notice of hearing must be published in the Official Gazette and posted in particular places and the same sent or notified to specified persons. Sections 12 and 13 of the Act provide specifically the mandatory requirements and procedure to be followed. We cannot simply dismiss these defects as technical. Liberal construction of the Rules of Court does not apply to land registration cases. Indeed, to further underscore the mandatory character of these jurisdictional requirements, the Rules of Court do not apply to land registration cases.