AGUSTIN V. IACFACTS:

Private respondents, Maria Melad and Pablo Binuyag are among those who are occupying the western bank of the Cagayan River while on the eastern bank is owned by petitioner Eulogio Agustin.

From 1919 to 1968, the Cagayan river has eroded the lands on the eastern bank including Agustin’s Lot depositing alluvium on the land possessed by Pablo Binuyag.

In 1968, after a typhoon which caused a big flood, the Cagayan River changed its course and returned it to its 1919 bed and it cut through the lands of respondents whose lands were transferred on the eastern side.

To cultivate the lands they had to cross the river. When they were cultivating said lands, (they were planting corn) Agustin accompanied by the mayor and some policemen claimed the land and drove them away.

So Melad and Binuyag filed separate complaints for recovery of their lots and its accretions.

The Trial Court held ordered Agustin et. al to vacate the lands and return them to respondents.

On appeal, the IAC affirmed in toto the judgment thus the case at bar.

ISSUE: Whether or not private respondents own the accretion and such ownership is not affected by the sudden and abrupt change in the course of the Cagayan River when it reverted to its old bedHELD: YES

Art. 457 states that the owner of the lands adjoining river banks own the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the currents of the waters.

Accretion benefits a riparian owner provided that these elements are present:1) deposit be gradual and imperceptible2) it resulted from the effects of the current of the water and 3) the land is adjacent to the river bank. When the River moved from 1919 to 1968, there was alluvium deposited and it was gradual and imperceptible.

Accretion benefits the riparian owner because these lands are exposed to floods and other damage due to the destructive force of the waters, and if by virtue of law they are subject to encumbrances and various kinds of easements, it is only just that such risks or dangers should in some way be compensated by the right of accretion.

Also, respondent’s ownership over said lots was not removed when due to the sudden and abrupt change in the course of the river; their accretions were transferred to the other side. Art. 459 states when the current of a river x x x segregates from an estate on its bank a known portion of land and transfers it to another estate, the owner of segregated portion retains ownership provided he removes the same w/in 2 years.

And Art. 463 states that whenever the current of a river divides itself into branches, leaving a piece of land or part thereof isolated, the owner of the land retains ownership.

He also retains it if a portion of land is separated from the estate by the current.

GRANDE V CA

FACTS:

Ignacio Grande, et al were the owners of a parcel of land by inheritance fromtheir deceased mother.

When it was surveyed for purposes of registration, sometime in 1930, its northeasternboundary was the Cagayan River.

Since then, and for many years thereafter, agradual accretion on the northeastern side took place, by action of the current of theCagayan River.

So much so, that by 1958, the bank thereof had receded to adistance of about 105 meters from its original site and an alluvial deposit of 19,964square meters, more or less, had been added to the registered area.

Grande, et al, instituted an action against Domingo and Esteban Calalung, to quiettitle to said portion formed by accretion alleging that they and their predecessors-in-interest were formerly in peaceful and continuous possession thereof until Sept.1948, when the Calalung entered upon the land under claim of ownership.

TheCalalung, on the other hand, claim ownership in themselves, asserting that they havebeen in continuous, open, and undisturbed possession of said portion, since prior tothe year 1933 to the present.

ISSUE: WON the alluvial property in question can be acquired through prescription.HELD: YES

There can be no dispute that under Art. 457 of the CC, Grande et al, arethe lawful owners of said alluvial property as they are the registered owners of theland which it adjoins.

However, the accretion does not automatically becomeregistered land just because the lot which receives it is covered by a Torrens titlethereby making the alluvial property imprescriptible.

Ownership of a piece of land isone thing, and registration under the Torrens System of that ownership is quiteanother.T

he fact remain, however, that Grande et al never sought registration of said alluvialproperty up to the time they instituted an action in the CFI in 1958.

The increment,therefore, never became registered property, and hence is not entitled or subject tothe protection of imprescriptibility enjoyed by registered property under the Torrenssystem.

Consequently, it was subject to acquisition through prescription by thirdpersons

Art. 457 dictates that alluvium deposits on land belong to the owners of the adjacent land. However, this does not ipso jure become theirs merely believing that said land have become imprescriptible.

The land of the Grandes only specifies a specific portion, of which the alluvial deposits are not included, and are thus, subject to acquisition by prescription.

Since the Calalungs proved that they have been in possession of the land since 1934 via two credible witnesses, as opposed to the Grande’s single witness who claims that the Calalungs only entered the land in 1948, the Calalungs have been held to have acquired the land created by the alluvial deposits by prescription.

This is because the possession took place in 1934, when the law to be followed was Act 190, and not the New Civil Code, which only took effect in 1950.

DELBANCO V IACFACTS:

In a document executed in the Municipality of San Rafael,Bulacan, on February 11, 1859, three brothers, BenedictoPansacola, Jose Pansacola and Manuel Pansacola (known as Fr.Manuel Pena) entered into an agreement which provided, amongothers

1. That they will purchase from the Spanish Government the landscomprising the Island of Cagbalite which is located in the Province of Tayabas (now Quezon) and has an approximate area of 1,600 hectares;

2. That the lands shall be considered after the purchase as their commonproperty;

3. That the co-ownership includes Domingo Arce and Baldomera Angulo,minors at that time represented by their father, Manuel Pansacola (Fr.Manuel Pena) who will contribute for them in the proposed purchase of theCagbalite Island;

4. That whatever benefits may be derived from the Island shall be sharedequally by the co-owners in the following proportion: Benedicto Pansacola-1/4 share; Jose Pansacola-1/4 share; and, Domingo Arce and BaldomeraAngulo-2/4 shares which shall be placed under the care of their father,Manuel Pansacola (Fr. Manuel Pena)

On April 11, 1868, they modified the terms and conditions of theagreement:

1. The first one-fourth (1/4) portion shall belong toDon Benedicto Pansacola;2. The second one-fourth (1/4) portion shall belong toDon Jose Pansacola;3. The third one-fourth(1/4) portion shall henceforth belong to the children of

their deceased brother, Don Eustaquio Pansacola, namely:Don MarianoPansacola,- Maria Pansacola and Don Hipolito Pansacola;

4. The fourth and last one-fourth (1/4) portion shall belong to their nephews andnieces (1)Domingo Arce, (2)Baldomera Angulo, (3)Marcelina Flores,(4)Francisca Flores, (5)Candelaria dela Cruz , and (6)Gervasio Pansacola who, beingall minors, are still under the care of their brother, Manuel Pansacola (Fr. ManuelPena). The latter is the real father of said minors

About one hundred years later, on November 18, 1968, privaterespondents brought a special action for partition under theprovisions of Rule 69 of the Rules of Court, including as partiesthe heirs and successors-in-interest of the co-owners of theCagbalite Island.

The trial court rendered a decision dismissing the complaint. Butthe CA reversed the decision.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not Cagbalite Island is still undivided propertyowned in common by the heirs and successors-in-interest of thebrothers, Benedicto, Jose and Manuel Pansacola. YES

2. .Does prescription run in favor of a co-owner against his co-ownersor co-heirs so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership. NO

HELD:

1. YES. There is nothing in all four agreements that suggeststhat actual or physical

partition of the Island had really beenmade by either the original owners or their heirs orsuccessors-in-interest.

Although, some of the privaterespondents and some of the petitioners at the time theaction for partition was filed in the trial court have been inactual possession and enjoyment of several portions of theproperty in question, this does not provide any proof that theIsland in question has already been actually partitioned andco-ownership terminated.

It is not enough that the co-ownersagree to subdivide the property.

They must have asubdivision plan drawn in accordance with which they takeactual and exclusive possession of their respective portions inthe plan and titles issued to each of them accordingly.

Themechanics of actual partition should follow the procedure laiddown in Rule 69 of the Rules of Court.

2. NO. No prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner againsthis co-owners or co-

heirs so long as he expressly or impliedlyrecognizes the co-ownership. Co-owners cannot acquire byprescription the share of the other co-owners,

absent a clearrepudiation of the co-ownership clearly communicated to theother co-owners

An action for partition does notprescribe. Article 497 of the New Civil Code, provides that “the assignees of the co-

owners may take part in the partitionof the common property, and Article 494 provides that “eachco-owner may demand at any time the partition of thecommon property, a provision which implies that the action todemand partition is imprescriptible or cannot be barred bylaches” An action for partition does not lie except when theco-ownership is properly repudiated by the co- owner

PARDELL V BARTOLOMEFACTS:

Spouses Miguel Ortiz and Calixta Felin died in Vigan, Ilocos Sur, in 1875 and 1882, respectively. Prior to her death, Calixta, executed, on August 17, 1876, a nuncupative will in Vigan, whereby she made her four children, named Manuel, Francisca, Vicenta, and Matilde, surnamed Ortiz y Felin, her sole and universal heirs of all her property. Manuel and Francisca were already deceased, leaving Vicenta and Matilda as heirs.

In 1888, the defendants (Matilde and Gaspar), without judicial authorization, nor friendly or extrajudicial agreement, took upon themselves the administration and enjoyment of the properties left by Calixta and collected the rents, fruits, and products thereof, to the serious detriment of Vicenta’s interest.

Despite repeated demands to divide the properties and the fruits accruing therefrom, Sps Gaspar and Matilde had been delaying the partition and delivery of the said properties by means of unkempt promises and other excuses.

Vicenta filed a petition for partition with damages in the RTC. RTC decision: absolved Matilde from payment of damages. It held that the

revenues and the expenses were compensated by the residence enjoyed by the defendant party, that no losses or damages were either caused or suffered, nor likewise any other expense besides those aforementioned,

Counsel for Matilde took an exception to the judgment and moved for a new trial on the grounds that the evidence presented did not warrant the judgment rendered and that the latter was contrary to law.

That motion was denied by the lower court. Thus, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not Vicenta can collect rentals from Matilde who occupies and enjoy the property alone as a co-owner.HELD: No.

The law grants each co-owner the right to use the property for the purpose intended provided that the interest of the co-ownership must not be injured or prejudiced and the other co-owners must not be prevented from using it according to their rights.

Matilde occupied the property owned in common in accordance with the purpose for which it is intended

Records show no proof that she neither occasioned any detriment to the interest of the community property nor prevented her sister from utilizing the said property in accordance to her right as a co-owner thereof.

Matilde was excercising her right as a co-owner without being prejudicial to Vicenta who could have also occupied her property had she wanted to.

Each co-owner of a property has the right pro-indiviso over the whole property and may use and enjoy the same with no other limitation than that he shall not injure the interests of his co-owners, for the reason that until a division is made, the respective part of each holder of a right as a co-owner cannot be determined and every co-owner exercises joint ownership over the pro-indiviso property in addition to his use and enjoyment of the same.

AGUILAR v. CA- Co-ownershipFACTS:

Petitioner Vergilio and respondent Senen bought a house and lot in Paraňaque where their father could spend and enjoy his remaining years in a peaceful neighborhood. They initially agreed that Vergilio will get 2/3 and Senen will get 1/3; but later they agreed on equal shares. Senen was left in the said lot to take care of their father since Vergilio’s family was in Cebu.

After their father’s death petitioner demanded from private respondent that the latter vacate the house and that the property be sold and proceeds thereof divided among them but the latter refused.

Petitioner then filed to compel the sale of the property. The chunk of the issue tackled by the courts was regarding the pre-trial. Respondent filed a motion to cancel Pre-trial since the counsel had to accompany his wife in Dumaguete City where she would be a principal sponsor in a wedding.

CFI denied the motion; and the pre-trial proceeded on the scheduled date. The respondents did not appear thus they were declared in default. The trial went on ex parte without the respondent and held that the

property should be sold to a third party and that the proceeds be distributed to the parties; in addition respondent was made to pay rent from the time the action was filed.

Respondents appealed this and the decision was reversed by the CA saying that the TC erred in declaring respondents in default; the case was then remanded to the trial court.

Hence this appeal.

ISSUE: W/N trial court was correct with regards to the sale and rent?HELD: YES, with a few modification.

Petitioner and respondents are co-owners of subject house and lot in equal shares; either one of them may demand the sale of the house and lot at any time and the other cannot object to such demand; thereafter the proceeds of the sale shall be divided equally according to their respective interests.

Article 494 of the Civil Code provides that no co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership, and that each co-owner may demand at any time partition of the thing owned in common insofar as his share is concerned. Corollary to this rule, Art. 498 of the Code states that whenever the thing is essentially indivisible and the co-owners cannot agree that it be allotted to one of them who shall indemnify the others, it shall be sold and its proceeds accordingly distributed.

DOCTRINE: Any of the Co-owners may demand the sale of the house and lot at any time and the other cannot object to such demand; thereafter the proceeds of the sale shall be divided equally according to their respective interests.

SC held that ½ of the proceeds should go to the petitioner and the remainder to the respondent (1,200 each.) Also rent was awarded 1,200 pesos per month with legal interest from the time the trial court ordered the respondent to vacate, for the use and enjoyment of the other half of the property.

BASIS: When petitioner filed an action to compel the sale of the property and the trial court granted the petition and ordered the ejectment of respondent, the co-ownership was deemed terminated and the right to enjoy the possession jointly also ceased.

Roque v. Intermediate Appellate CourtFACTS:

Petitioner Concepcion Roque, on 6 December 1977, filed a Complaint for "Partition with Specific Performance" (docketed as Civil Case No. 5236-M) with Branch 2 of the then Court of First Instance of Malolos against respondents Emesto Roque and the heirs of Victor Roque. In her complaint, petitioner (plaintiff below) claimed legal ownership of an undivided three-fourths (3/4) portion of Lot No. 1549, by virtue of the 27 November 1961 "Bilihan Lubos at Patuluyan" executed in her favor by Emesto Roque and Victor Roque.

In support of this claim, petitioner also presented an undated and unnotarized "Kasulatang Pagkilala sa Bilihan Patuluyan ng Bahagui at Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman at Paghahati-hati at Abuyan ng Bahagui" said to have been signed by the respondents in acknowledgment of the existence and validity of the Bilihan in favor of petitioner.

Finally, petitioner alleged that, as a co-owner of Lot No. 1549, she had a right to seek partition of the property, that she could not be compelled to remain in the co-ownership of the same.

Respondents Ernesto Roque and the legal heirs of Victor Roque, however, refused to acknowledge petitioner's claim of ownership of any portion of Lot No. 1549 and rejected the plan to divide the land.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner can be compelled to remain in the co-ownership.HELD: No.

Article 494 of the Civil Code provides that "no co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership" and that "each co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the thing owned in common, insofar as his share is concerned."

The facts on record clearly show that petitioner Concepcion Roque had been in actual, open and continuous possession of a three-fourths (3/4) portion of Lot No. 1549 ever since execution of the "Bilihan Lubos at Patuluyan" in November of 1961.

The Court notes that it was only in their Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim filed with the trial court in December of 1977 — more than sixteen (16) years later — that respondents first questioned the genuineness and authenticity of the "Bilihan Lubos at Patuluyan."

Not once during those sixteen (16) years did respondents contest petitioner's occupation of a three-fourths (3/4) portion of Lot No. 1549.

Furthermore, if indeed it is true that respondents, as they claim, are the absolute owners of the whole of Lot No. 1549, it is most unusual that respondents would have allowed or tolerated such prolonged occupation by

petitioner of a major portion (3/4) of the land while they, upon the other hand, contented themselves with occupation of only a fourth thereof.

This latter circumstance, coupled with the passage of a very substantial length of time during which petitioner all the while remained undisturbed and uninterrupted in her occupation and possession, places respondents here in laches: respondents may no longer dispute the existence of the co-ownership between petitioner and themselves nor the validity of petitioner's claim of a threefourths (3/4) interest in Lot No. 1549, as they are deemed, by their unreasonably long inaction, to have acquiesced in the co-ownership.

Delima v. Court of AppealsFACTS:

Lino Delima acquired a lot from the friar lands. Later, he died, leaving as his only heirs three brothers and sisters namely: Eulalio Delima, Juanita Delima, Galileo Delima and Vicente Delima. Galileo was the caretaker of the property.

He was able to execute an affidavit adjusting to himself the parcel of land and was able to secure the issuance of a Transfer Certificate of Title in his name.

This prompted the heirs of his siblings to file a action for reconveyance.

ISSUE: Whether or not the property is subject to prescription.HELD: Yes.

From the moment one of the co-owners claims that he is the absolute and exclusive owner of the properties and denies the others any share therein, the question involved is no longer one of partition but of ownership.

In such case, the imprescriptibility of the action for partition can no longer be invoked or applied when one of the co-owners has adversely possessed the property as exclusive owner for a period sufficient to vest ownership by prescription.

It is settled that possession by the co-owner or co-heir is that of a trutee. In order that such possession is considered adverse to the cestui que trust

amounting to a repudiation of the co-ownership, the following elements must concur: 1) that the trustee has performed unequivocal acts amounting to an ouster of cestui que trust; 2) that such positive acts of repudiation had been made known to the cestui que trust; and 3) that the evidence thereon should be clear and conclusive.

When the co-owner of the property executed a deed of partition and on the strength thereof, obtained a cancellation of the title in the name of their predecessor and the issuance of a new title in his name as the owner, the statute of limitations started to run for the purposes of the action instituted by the latter seeking a declaration of the existence of the co-ownership and their rights thereafter.

The issuance of a new title constituted a clear act of repudiation of the trust and co-ownership.