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Project Culture and Turkish CivilSocietyDaniella Kuzmanovic aa Institute for Cross‐cultural and Regional Studies ,University of CopenhagenPublished online: 21 Sep 2010.

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Turkish StudiesVol. 11, No. 3, 429–444, September 2010

ISSN 1468-3849 Print/1743-9663 Online/10/030429-16 © 2010 Taylor & FrancisDOI: 10.1080/14683849.2010.506730

Project Culture and Turkish Civil Society

DANIELLA KUZMANOVIC

*

Institute for Cross-cultural and Regional Studies, University of Copenhagen

Taylor and FrancisFTUR_A_506730.sgm10.1080/14683849.2010.506730Turkish Studies1468-3849 (print)/1743-9663 (online)Original Article2010Taylor & Francis1130000002010DaniellaKuzmanovicdaniella@hum.ku.dk

A

BSTRACT

Influenced by international donors and policy institutions, civic activism inTurkey has increasingly become synonymous with carrying out projects. Project culture isreshaping what civil society is, and what civic activism means. By showing how civil societyis changing due to the integration of Turkey with the outside world, particularly with the EU,this article aims to move beyond the prevalent approaches to the study of Turkey-EU rela-tions, which emphasize macro-policy issues and most often discuss pros and cons regardingTurkish EU-membership or evaluate how far Turkey is from fulfilling various criteria.Instead, this paper argues for an increased focus on how Turkey-EU relations reshapeTurkish political culture.

Civil society in Turkey has become center of attention in academia and amongpolicy makers throughout the past decades.

1

Among other issues brought about byTurkey’s EU rapprochement, discussions on the growth of civil society, both qualityand quantity-wise, and its potential role in the democratization and socio-politicalreform efforts have become prominent. The debates have often turned into questionsof how or how not civil society can play a role as a democratizing force; and why orwhy not civil society can play such a role.

2

However, such considerations shiftattention away from how Turkey’s EU rapprochement reshapes practices andperceptions of civil society among civic activists in Turkey. This article analyses thesocial dynamics of Turkey-EU relations by investigating the various ways in whichTurkey’s integration with the outside world has reshaped civic activism in Turkey.It does so by focusing on how the introduction of a particular social technique,namely that of introducing projects as currently the dominant option within theinternational community, has had implications for perceptions of civil society andpractices of civic activism.

As the article shows, the emerging project culture has resulted in the professional-ization of civic activism, the introduction of new civic actors, the reshaping ofstratifications and hierarchies among civic activists, and the forging of new relationsbetween civic actors. Civic activists in Turkey are aware of the increased signifi-cance of the project culture for civic activism, but evaluate its effects differentlydepending not least on ideological stance and their subsequent various views oncivil society. Hence, projects become part of a local struggle for authenticity

*

Correspondence Address

: Dr. Daniella Kuzmanovic, Institute for Cross-cultural and Regional Studies,University of Copenhagen, Denmark. Email: daniella@hum.ku.dk

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expressed as a question of who is a genuine and sincere (in Turkish

samimi

or

gerçek

) civic activist.

The New History of Civil Society in Turkey

Since the late 1980s, following the collapse of the communist regimes in EasternEurope, there has been a global revival of civil society.

3

A range of policy-makersand academics present a flourishing civil society as a bulwark against authoritarian-ism, and a prime means to active citizenship.

4

This notion has become dominant tothe extent that supporting the right civil society (NGOs) is today an integrated andcentral part of Western governments’ attempts to support democratization effortsworldwide.

5

The global upsurge regarding civil society has not gone unnoticed in Turkey.Indeed, this is the very same period where Turkey has intensified its relations withthe world of international donors and policy agents, such as World Bank, IMF, UNand the EU. Also, in Turkey the revival of civil society has been accompanied by theappearance of a range of new civil society organizations in the form of NGOs, aswell as an upsurge in the academic interest in mapping civil society and studyingvarious issues regarding its role in relation to political culture in Turkey.

6

Thenumber of civil society organizations in Turkey and their range of activities haveincreased since the mid-1980s.

7

Moreover, the role of civil society as an actor inrelation to social change has been redefined by external forces as well as by theactors themselves. This is due to a conflation of the revival of civil society in aglobal political sphere, which made it an available means of organizing resistance tostate authoritarianism, with an attempt on behalf of various civic forces in Turkey tocarve a space for civic participation in the years following the military coup onSeptember 12, 1980 and the subsequent shut down of virtually all civil politics.

Civil society, it has been argued, has become central after the mid-1980s inTurkey, because it was an available idiom of political expression that could be usedby civic forces to curb military influence on politics and dissociate from statepower.

8

This is not to say that civil society has not been subject to strict state controlafter 1980. But relative to political parties, associations (

dernek

) and foundations(

vakıf

) were slightly less discredited in the eyes of the public—although associationswere more discredited than foundations— and the establishment of such organiza-tions was never prohibited, although restricted and controlled by the state authoritiesto avoid direct involvement in political life by civil society.

9

This “new history of civil society”

10

in Turkey from the mid-1980s onwards thushas the perceived emergence of new socio-political actors and an autonomous polit-ical sphere outside the realm of the authoritarian state as pivotal points.

11

It is inter-locked with and to a large extent shaped by the increased integration of Turkey withthe outside world. Turkey’s intensified relations with the IMF and the World Bank,due to its economic restructuring towards export-orientation in the mid-1980s, and anumber of structural adjustment programs aimed at recovering a crisis-riddenTurkish economy during the 1990s, have been substantial during this process. These

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changes simultaneously implied increased attention towards good governance.Apart from a range of economic recommendations, IMF and World Bank have putgrowing emphasis on ethics and good governance epitomized by notions of trans-parency and underpinned by ideals of a democratic polity.

12

Secondly, the UN cameto play a significant role with regard to defining civil society in Turkey as a socialactor. This is epitomized by the Habitat II Conference held in Istanbul in 1996.Many civil society organizations single out their participation in the NGO andFoundations Forum at the Habitat II as a context which enabled them to establishthemselves as significant social actors in Turkey. The conference initiated aprocedure in which the civic societies found it necessary to mobilize in order toparticipate in the conference, which in turn gave them a sense of participating in alarger civic movement.

13

Two additional examples of UN influence can be seen in relation to women’s issuesand the environment. The work of several women’s organizations on the shadowcountry reports in relation to the Committee on the Elimination of Discriminationagainst Women (CEDAW)

14

have brought a range of organizations together under acommon umbrella with the explicit aim of correcting the official report by the Turkishgovernment. The possibility to present their conclusions in an official UN forum inNew York enhanced a sense of influence on a domestic policy agenda among the civicactivists. Regarding the environmental issue, the pivotal role played by civil societyorganizations with regard to preparing the official country report of Turkey for theUN World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg 2002 also contrib-uted to establishing the civil society organizations and activists involved as significantsocial actors.

15

However, in the latter case, some of the influence of civil society wassubsequently undercut due to administrative restructurings.

16

Last but not least, Turkey’s EU rapprochement has created new legal and institu-tional frameworks supporting a role for civil society for socio-political developmentand democratization in Turkey.

17

The EU has explicitly directed attention towardsTurkish civil society as a partner to bring about social and political change, and tobuttress the development of participatory democracy. NGOs in particular are seen asprime local agents of change to implement the strategies of the international donors.As stated by the EU delegation to Turkey:

The inclusion of non-governmental actors in the implementation of EUprograms promoting democracy and human rights is a manifestation of thenotion that human beings have inalienable rights as individuals. The EUupholds the universality and indivisibility of human rights, be they civil, polit-ical, economic, social or cultural. In that respect, civil society organizationshave a lot to offer as

initiators of change

and

implementers of reforms

. Theycan be seen as a corollary to traditional state-centric approaches to promotionof a culture of human rights and democratization.

18

Involving local actors is seen as an important step in “developing citizenship,”

19

which then is perceived as the first step of paving the way for a democratic polity. In

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a similar vein, the UN has promoted local forms of participation, such as through theLocal Agenda 21 program, aimed at local incorporation in decision-makingprocesses and empowerment.

The international donors see civic activists in Turkey as prime local agents inrelation to creating social change. Equally important, though, the civic activists havesimultaneously become the objects of agency of international donors, who seek tomake sure they are able to function as local agents of change. Thus, the attempts ofinternational donors at civil society capacity-building in Turkey implies a range ofactivities directed particularly at civil society organizations, such as project-cycleand project-management seminars, technical training of staff and volunteers, andassistance with horizontal and vertical network-formation. The first comprehensiveEU program supporting civil society in Turkey (1996–99) had a budget of 8 million.The latest program, “Strengthening Civil Society in the Pre-accession Process”, waslaunched in 2006 and has a budget of

€

10.5 million.

20

Civic Activism as Project-Making

One rational behind the support for civil society capacity building is a perceptionthat not all organizations are able “initiators of change and implementers ofreform.”

21

The organizations ideally need to display democratic and good gover-nance-related values, master particular skills, and possess certain knowledge. Notleast they need to master the art of undertaking projects. Project developmentconstitutes a central means through which the international donors engage withTurkish civic actors. From an analytical vantage point, project can thus be seen as aparticular technique through which social change is brought about by funds flowingto countries, from international donor agencies.

22

Funds for project activitieschange in accordance with the scope of the assignment. For example, small-scaleprojects that assist a particular local target group, be they small-scale entrepreneurs,women and children or youth in a particular area of Turkey, require less ambitiousbudgets compared to large-scale projects to get illiterates in Eastern Turkey toattend school.

As can be discerned, funds for civic activism do not just flow into Turkey. Itflows in particular institutionalized forms such as projects. In two articles on theexport of civil society to the Balkans, social anthropologist and consultant StevenSampson

23

draws attention to the need for understanding the phenomenon of transi-tion not just as something taking place somewhere, but as a

strategy

which ispursued by a range of international policy actors and donors, including the EU, toinduce their notion of social change.

24

As a strategy, transition implies the definitionof new agents of social change, and a range of new social practices, cultural notionsand abstract knowledge stemming from the international actors, but which localactors relate to. The latter not least given that it can provide access to desirablefinancial, technical and social resources. With regard to civil society in particular,Sampson points to the prominence of projects. In the context of transition as astrategy, he argues, civil society activists have become key agents of social change,

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and civic activism has simultaneously been reshaped to become a “world ofprojects.”

25

Also, the notion of civil society itself has been redefined. As Sampsonargues, “the notion of ‘civil society,’ once conceived as the social organization ofpeople to solve problems, has become a funding category.”

26

Being able to positiononeself as the kind of civil society organization which could potentially function aslocal partner in projects is thus a means to access resources. Sampson additionallypoints out to, how the social practices, cultural notions and abstract knowledge ofthe international agents are transformed as they move from donor to local contexts.They become part of local moral fabric in which various actors are involved in astruggle for dominance and legitimacy. This article will show how that is also thecase among civic activists in Turkey.

Proje

and

projecilik

, the Turkish terms forproject and project-making, have become central part of a struggle for dominance,access to resources, and authenticity among civic activists.

The increased significance of what they refer to as project culture (

proje kültürü

)has been noticed among civic activists in Turkey. In 2002 the Türkiye Ekonomik veToplumsal Tarıh Vakfı (The Economic and Social History Foundation of Turkey)held its twelfth symposium on civil society issues under the heading “Projeler,Projecilik ve Sivil Toplum Kurulu

[scedil]

ları” (Projects, Project-Making and Civil SocietyOrganizations). As the publication reporting the discussions at the symposiumstates:

When we decided “Projeler, Projecilik ve Sivil Toplum Kurulu

[scedil]

ları” should bethe topic of the 12

th

symposium, we predicted that there was going to be anintense interest. However, the interest exceeded our expectations; and amongthe twelve symposiums, which have been held until present, this has been theone with the most participants. […] To begin with, the notion of

proje

and allthe practices surrounding it is a new notion in the sphere of civil society.Besides, in our country, particularly during the last couple of years, foreignfunds have begun to be used by civil society organizations to make projects.This has put new debates on the agenda.

27

The quote illustrates the central role

proje

and

projecilik

have come to play withregard to shaping civic activism in Turkey. It also indicates how the disseminationof the notion of project is intimately linked to a particular integration of Turkey intovarious Western political and economic contexts. As can moreover be discerned thecivic activists seem well aware of the links between Turkey’s integration with theoutside world and shifting practices of civic activism. This also became evidentamong the more than 50 representatives from various civil society organizations,whom I interviewed during my fieldwork on perceptions on civil society inTurkey.

28

The activists clearly identify

proje

and

projecilik

to be associated withthe way in which civil society activism is performed in a Western context, whilerecognizing that such practice has gained global dominance. However, as theremaining part of this article will reveal, they assess the prevalence of a projectculture differently.

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New Alliances, New Agendas, New Actors

Many civic activists in Turkey are eager to work on a project, to take part in aproject or simply to design a project.

Proje

governs the activities of those whoprepare and partake in them.

Proje

offers a sense of direction and purpose of civicactivism. At the same time, it is a frame for social interaction. But

proje

is also ashining beacon to yet many more, who all strive to become part of one. The projectculture thus institutes a particular form of acting together both within organizations,but also to some extent across organizations.

Civil society in Turkey is traditionally heavily stratified both with regard to thecharacter of activities (political, charity, social clubs, mosque-building, etc.), as wellas along ideological (leftist, right-wing nationalist, Kemalist, liberal, pro-Islamicetc.), culturalist (Alevi, Sunni, Kurdish, Turkish, women etc.), and social (class,location) lines. Barriers between activists and organizations are often insurmountableand information-sharing limited. The members of different organizations usually donot meet, and often do not even know each other, although they may refer to eachother using various stereotypes. Formalized horizontal networks are thus weak.

29

The civic activists themselves recognize this. In a survey where various partici-pants from civil society organizations were asked to assess the level of communica-tion between civil society actors, eight percent described it as insignificant, while anadditional 73 percent described it as limited.

30

Women’s organizations are oftenpresented by activists as the exception to this rule. These groups have attempted toperform issue-based activism with regard to influencing national legislation andwith regard to promoting Turkish women’s issues in domestic and internationalpolitical spheres. However, project culture has gradually introduced considerationson just when ideological-culturalist markers should hold a prominent place. Someactivists maintain an emphasis on ideological-culturalist battles, reject the legiti-macy of other activists, and refuse to have anything to do with them. Others aremore inclined to want to put differences aside and join forces with so-called oppo-nents in order to appear stronger in unison, obtain funds and get more influence. The“world of projects” has entailed various activities where civic activists whoformerly had little to do with each other interact. It produces citizenship training,“get to know the EU” seminars, or project-cycle management and fund-raisingcourses in small conference rooms of local NGOs. Moreover, this entails large semi-nars with hundred or more participants in university conference halls or in star-ratedhotels on how to improve the social conditions for vulnerable children, women’sreproductive health initiatives in Eastern Turkey, and the implementation processesof human rights charters. Such initiatives, in combination with the requirements inproject applications for several project-partners, do bring civic activists together.This is not to say that traditional cleavages has lost significance, it is rather to saythat new spaces for civic activism has opened up where the prominence of suchcleavages can under particular circumstances recede into the background.

These new considerations and means of organizing are also linked to thepresence of new civic actors. Like any other social technique, the ability to master

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project-making requires particular skills and possessing the right social and culturalcompetences. A project has a premium on abstract knowledge.

31

It is a time-structuredpractice with fixed duration, and entails a special project-language with categoriessuch as “project cycle”, “mission statement”, “needs”, “target-group”, “stakehold-ers”, and “monitoring.” A case in point are the complicated application forms whichhave to be filled out, procedures that have to be followed, and rules of governancethat have to be incorporated in order to apply for funding and become eligible to carryout a project. Hence, local brokers who master this abstract knowledge of projects,while also having knowledge and networks at the local level, are needed. This hasaccentuated the privilege of formal university education, the mastering of foreignlanguages), computer access and skills, and international networks and experienceamong the civic activists. At the same time, however, local contacts with potential“target groups” and “stakeholders” have also become a valuable for such brokers. Inaddition, a small support sector has appeared in Turkey in the form of private consult-ing companies, who attempt to develop projects, put together partners and handle thecomplex application procedures, or who act as civil society experts.

The boundaries between being a civic activist, a civil society expert and aprofessional working in the field are flexible. Most professionals have been civicactivists or are still civic activists on the side. This also indicates how civic activismhas, in the wake of the introduction of a project culture, become a means to create acareer. It is something to put on the CV, and a way to expand one’s professionalnetworks. Project-making has become a means to upward social mobility by way ofproviding job opportunities or better income. In a Turkish context, this cannot beunderestimated given the high unemployment rates even among well-educatedyouth. Younger activists are very well aware of the opportunities this new form ofcivic activism offers. During a conversation with a male activist in his early 20s, Iasked him why he believed it was significant for him to participate in the project hewas volunteering in. He started out by explaining how the project would raiseawareness of Turkey to outsiders. This is important in his view, since he believesTurkey and Turks are misunderstood by foreigners. Then he added more personalgains:

For me it will be very good too. Because I will be able to say that I have madea project, and that I have contacts abroad. I think it will improve my chances offinding a job. Of course I also think about that. Who doesn’t? We have to. Lifeis difficult, I mean. I know so many who are unemployed or don’t get paidregularly but work a lot and so for nothing. I really want a regular job.

32

The notion of civil society as possible means for social mobility is also used toappeal to potential activists. In an attempt to attract new male and young activists,head of the Türk Kadın Birli

[gbreve]

i (Turkish Women’s Union, a Kemalist civil societyorganization),

[Scedil]

ermin Akman, stated: “We call on men and the youth to becomemembers. They need to spend only an hour a day to resolve the country’s problems.Currently, most members are pensioners.” She also noted that young Turks who

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went to Europe were asked which nongovernmental organizations they wereinvolved in.

33

Working for the Turkish nation, she thus acknowledges, is no longer enough toattract new activists. This, moreover, comes from an organization which is skepticalof the professionalization of civic activism in Turkey and of foreign influence.

The Professionalization of Civil Society

A concern often raised by civic activists regarding the spread of a project culture isthat it entails a professionalization (

profesyonelle

[scedil]

me

) of civil society. Activists,who want civil society to become an effective counter-balance mechanism vis-à-visa strong state tradition, recognize that this professionalization is necessary in orderto gain strength. However, too much professionalization is seen as problematic. Anexpert on civil society who is also a civic activist, not an altogether unusualcombination, told me the following during an interview, when we discussed theconsequences of the professionalization:

It is not only in Turkey. Everywhere there is a professionalization (

profesy-onelle

[scedil]

me

) of civil society organizations. Some become more like companies(

[scedil]

irket

). They are constantly looking for new funding, and they hire experts(

uzmanlar

) who can help them. Many of them can afford this, and of coursetheir applications are much better, so they attract more funding… Look at[name omitted] organization for example. They have just started, and the firstthing they did was to host a big reception at the Hilton with a lot of journalistspresent. Is this civil society? Who knows these days? But they can buy theexperts and have the capacity to do really good project applications. Well,guess who gets the funding then?

34

Professionalization is associated with a loss of focus on the activities that areclassified as “core activities” by the organization. For example, some activistsbelieve that a number of organizations have come about only in order to get projectfunding and have no social roots. Underlying such critical assessments is a notion ofsome forms of activism as more sincere and genuine (

samimi

or

gerçek

) than others.According to the activists, whether an organization is only in it for the money is,

among other factors, discernable from the number and scope of projects an organiza-tion undertakes. Skeptical activists clearly disapprove of undertaking projects, whichare seen as outside the scope of the main agenda of an organization, or having toomany projects at once. If an organization does projects for women, children, democ-racy, human rights and all the other buzzwords of the international donor agencies atthe same time, this is cause for suspicion as to its true motives. An informant let mein on some of her objections, when we were talking about a particular organization:

They hired Z. you know, and she is really good at developing projects. I meanall she does every day is sit in front of the computer and browse the net andcome up with ideas for projects. They sound really good and have all the issues,

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human rights, poor women, empowerment… Yeah, you know. They pay herwell too, of course… And now they have money. In a way it is really not fair.

35

The various objections to professionalization indicate how the introduction of projectsis believed to have altered power relations between local organizations. The skills andexpertise of Z. can make an organization significant even though they may not havethe experience in working with the subjects they have gotten funds for. In short, fundsdo not necessarily flow to those who already have something “to show for it.”

Another significant power relation that is challenged pertains to seniority. Wherethis used to be important for an activist in order to have status and power within anorganization, some of the older activists complained to me about how the youngerones no longer showed them respect. As one of them stated, when I asked her aboutthe relations between older and younger activists in her organization:

It is nice to have older and younger working together. We [the older] have expe-rience. We have been involved for a long time. They have energy. They reallybring life to an organization like ours. I am learning things from them. But someof them think they do not need to take advice from us at all. They know betterhow things are done, how to use the Internet and so on. What is this?

36

The discussion as to whether the hallmark of a genuine activist is that he or she is

gönüllü

(a volunteer), is central with regard to the issue of seniority.

Gönüllü

isdefined as opposed to professionalism. Job opportunities and income-seeking are anaspect of projects that many activists are very well aware of. However, many senioractivists oppose the way in which such interests have become part of civic activism.They uphold the ideal that being a genuine civic activist equals to being

gönüllü

. Asone of my younger informants pointed out, though, the senior activists seldom havethe same stakes as they do. We were discussing why senior activists keep underlin-ing that being a

gönüllü

is the hall-mark of a true activist: ‘Why are they so obsessedwith

gönüllülük

(voluntarism)? What’s it to them if you get paid to do projects?There is nothing bad about that. You still do the activities, don’t you?’

37

Hence, healso commented on the ongoing challenges of traditional hierarchies within organi-zations, in which seniority, among other things, has previously been a determinantfor status.

Some activists, particularly conservative Kemalists and right-wing nationalists,go as far as considering the introduction of professionalism and the funds that comewith it as “immoral.” This is not least tied up with a critique of the EU, … in whichthe EU is perceived as encouraging people in Turkey to participate in civic activismon the basis of the prospect of getting a salary. This, they believe, implies that activ-ism is no longer performed in order to contribute to the well-being of the Turkishnational collective, but rather with personal goals and ambitions in mind. During aseminar I attended on the EU and civil society, this critique was articulated by oneof the participants: “People working on the EU projects earn a huge salary. I reallythink that is immoral/dishonest (ahlaksız). What is our purpose? To serve the

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people, isn’t it?”38 The criticism of being immoral/dishonest was refuted by severalother participants. They obviously needed to defend themselves against this attackon their legitimacy as civil society activists. Since the attack was based on the issueof income, the speaker defended herself by pointing out that her impression of thesize of the salaries was all wrong. “I have worked for many years in this sector and Ihave never heard of the kind of salaries you mention. Not even half as much,” one ofthe other participants stated, in order to convey that she was not in it for the money.What is nevertheless at stake, I hold, is a challenge of various activists’ legitimacyas genuine by reference to the purpose of genuine civic activism. In the eyes of thisparticular Kemalist activist, sincerity is very much related to serving the people andthe national collective. Being a professional compromises such ideals by puttingemphasis on individual gains with regard to activism. Such gains are incompatiblewith those of the collective.

In discussions on the professionalization of civil society, civic activists oftendistinguish between genuine civil society and [scedil] irketler, companies, masked as civilsociety organizations but seen as in reality established to attract funding. The lattermight call themselves civil society organizations, but according to those deemingthem [scedil] irketler, their practices reveal their “true” nature. A well-known Turkish civilsociety organization is constantly accused of being a [scedil] irket by its critics. One criticput it this way to me when I pushed for a reason why this particular organizationwas seen as a a [scedil] irket: “Look at the number of employees. I mean how many areworking in their office? [a high number of employees is seen by activists as anindication that an organization is more concerned with getting funding than withcivic activism] And if there is an important seminar they are for sure participating.They always make sure to be there if they can get publicity.”39 When I later askedthe head of the organization accused of being a [scedil] irket about this, she confirmed thatthe organization had such an image:

Yes, we are established as a “non-profit company” […] We discussed variousways of setting up the organization when we started. When we set it up it waseasier to establish a “non-profit company.” Setting up a vakıf [foundation]requires a lot of money. And a dernek [association] was legally complicatedand with heavy public control. I guess it was when we grew bigger, and the EUand so started paying attention to us. We got known abroad. Then some startedto say that we are a company. But I don’t pay too much attention to this. I havealways considered myself an activist…40

The leader thus sees these accusations as part of a competition between various civilsociety organizations, among other having to do with who gets listened to and whofeatures prominently as representatives abroad.

What is partly at stake when talking about professionalization and evoking thecategory of company is a challenge of the individual activists’ motives for engagingin civic activism. Are they really involved for altruistic reasons or are theymotivated by personal gains? Also, when it comes to the leaders of civil society

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organizations, the distinction between those who are genuine activists and thosewho are suspected of having put their personal agendas first is noticeable. During aconversation where we discussed a particular leader of a newly established civilsociety organization, my informant conveyed to me that this kind of leader was whatthe Turks call a “tatlı su lider” (lit. a sweet water leader). The term, he explained, isused with regard to political leaders first and foremost. It designates the kind ofleaders, who are only in the sector due to the money they will be able to make andthe personal prestige they can get. ‘Right now there are obviously possibilities forthat in civil society,’ my informant went on, ‘but as soon as the good times end theymove to another field. They are no better than politicians.’41 Again this points athow the professionalization of civil society in the wake of the introduction of aproject culture has implied the need for striking a balance between an obligation to asocial collective ingrained in the notion of voluntarism as ideal, and personalambitions that can be fulfilled by the project world.

Projects: A Form of Neo-Imperialism?

The increased significance of a project culture is also evaluated in reference to theideological-culturalist stances of the activists. Quite a few activists, regardless oftheir ideological stances, recognize that project culture entails certain dangers. Theyexpress concerns that local forms of activism will disappear and local actors who donot possess project skills will be left out. There is thus awareness of project-makingas more than a technical issue of know-how and capacity, even though the interna-tional donors present project-making in a technified, rational language throughproject manuals and application procedures.42 Instead such activists view proje aspart of a process of foreign political domination. Most then state how project culturehas come to stay, how it offers the possibility of making civil society a strongerforce in Turkish social and political life, and that it does benefit people in need. Butsome continue to put emphasis on their resistance towards projects, by arguing thatproject is a form of Western imperialism, and as such a threat to “authentic”, “local”forms of civic activism.

Whether an activist will opt for resistance depends on the ideological and cultur-alist positions of the activist regarding the question of Turkey’s integration with theWest more generally. An emphasis on the political ideological aspect of civil soci-ety capacity-building comes from organizations which are critical of Western inte-gration, either because they renounce Western values, or because they hold strongnationalistic opinions on Turkey’s need to find its own way and not be an imitationof the West. The group is varied, but this kind of argument can be found both amongsome pro-Islamists, who wish to renounce Western cultural influence, right-wingnationalists and conservative Kemalists, who wish to accentuate Turkish sover-eignty and the superiority of Turkish culture; and radical leftists, who hold an anti-imperialist stance.

Pro-Islamists can articulate strong ideological opposition to project culture. In arecent book, which contains interviews with different civil society organizations,

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Hidayet Tuksal, the former head of an Ankara-based Islamic women’s organization(Ba[scedil] kent Kadın Platformu), states her reluctance to accept to use proje as a mode ofcivic activism. She sees proje as a Western cultural form associated with a particularlifestyle and ideological-cultural outlook, to which she is opposed. She relates hercritique explicitly to the issue of who are genuine and sincere (samimi). If she andother activists were to undertake projects, they would stand out as not being samimiboth in their own eyes and potentially also in the eyes of others:

“It was essential to us [Ba kent Kadın Platformu] to draw on our experiencesfrom various parts [of civil society], and from pious women. To start a debate.To enhance women’s sensitivity and awareness of their own problems was anobvious choice of agenda. We acted on the basis of our own experiences. Butwe did not make a proje. We showed reluctance towards projects. We did notconsider it appropriate to receive funds from outside. It was not right given ourposition in a Turkish context. Particularly since we are an oppositionalwomen’s voice within the religious segment, our views and attitudes could beinfluenced by such money if we take money from all sorts of places [i.e. theycould come under suspicion as to who they were representing and their legiti-macy could be challenged]. Besides, when it comes to issues we can handle byourselves, I personally do not find it right to receive financial support from anysort of organization in Europe. But there are friends in the organization, whothink otherwise. Until now we have not undertaken projects. Our activities andagendas have been defined by our own resources. We have thus experiencedthat we are able to carry out a lot of activities without taking money fromanyone. If people are samimi they can struggle and carry out activities usingtheir own scarce resources. It is wrong to think that if money comes fromEurope I can carry out activities and if not I cannot carry out activities. Onemust not think like that.”43

The reflections show the significance given to economic independence from foreignfunding as a symbol of not succumbing to the dominant Western values and policyinstitutions. Tuksal represents herself and her organization as genuine and sincereby being independent, and by having to struggle in order to maintain their principlesin a situation where it would have been easier to succumb and do projects. Projethus becomes opposed to kimlik (identity). Tuksal, in addition, represents the reluc-tance of herself and the activists to undertake projects as a form of empowerment.They are able to carry out various organizational activities despite scarce resources,and they do not feel completely constrained by considerations of the availability ofresources, when they make plans for new activities. Her reply, moreover, revealshow she does not perceive Europe to be the source of the agency for civic activistsin her organization.

Reluctance to embrace “project culture” can also be identified among right-wingnationalist and conservative Kemalist organizations. Also among such activists thequestion of being independent of foreign funding is a crucial symbol of not having

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succumbed to foreign imperialism. At the same time they of course argue some-what differently from pro-Islamists like Tuksal, in the sense that they do not rejectan adherence to Western values. Activists from such organizations are keen tostress how civil society activism and activities in Turkey are not the result of ordependent upon the increased integration between Turkey and the outside world.Like Tuksal, they also hesitate to define the West as the source of their agency, andemphasize how civic activism in Turkey should not be molded by Western projectculture. Instead, the unique civic culture believed to exist in Turkey should besupported.

Such concerns with the prevalence of the project culture are often expressed byreference to a notion of renk (color). Activists hereby articulate a perception ofproje as involving a standardization of civic activism. By renk the civic activistsrefer to the many colors, that is to say the many organizational forms and ways ofpracticing civic activism that can be found in Turkey. In an interview with the headof a conservative Kemalist civil society organization we discussed the impact of theproject culture. The informant expressed his regrets that projects are gradually push-ing aside existing forms of civic activism:

A.D.: There are local forms of activism you must remember. Somethingunique to us and our situation. You see, civil society has adapted to theneeds of the people (halk). We have developed hand in hand. This hasmade civil society very diverse (renkli). That is a very positive thingactually, because we are close to the people and know what their needsare. We listen to them. Projeler are carried out for the benefit of thosewho do the proje, not the people. And they all have to look a certainway. So where is the flavor/color (renk)?

Q.: Don’t you think the renk will persist?A.D.: I hope so, but in reality I doubt it. Everywhere you go now people are

talking about proje. Also among us. And I do understand. I mean, youare able to get new funds and start new activities for more people. Thatis a good thing. But you have to do proje. I am just not convinced thatprojecilik is the activity best suited to our needs.

Q.: How do you mean? That you no longer develop hand in hand?A.D.: I think there is a very special relationship in Turkey where we in civil

society can sustain the reformism (inkılâp) because we are close to thepeople (halk). It has been so ever since the founding of the republic andthe foundation of the republican civil society organizations. We havebeen able to move forward since then, and made great achievements.Why should we all of a sudden change our way of doing things now?Because of projeler? You tell me…44

Numerous issues and themes come across in the statement of the informant. First, heregrets the gradual erosion of a unique Turkish civil society culture, which inhis view dates back to the founding of the republic. This culture has a strong

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relationship between the Kemalist state, civil society and the people at the core,expressed in his emphasis on civil society as sustaining reformism (i.e., Kemalistprinciples) and as close to the halk (the term for people used by Kemalists). Hemoreover directly relates civil society to republican civil society organizations,which were founded by the Kemalists after the establishment of the republic. Herecognizes the supremacy of this civic culture. But at the same time he thinks thatproject culture will nevertheless be a stronger force, since it entails funds. Hence,the renk will gradually lessen. By renk he refers to what he perceives as the manyindigenous forms of civic activism unique to Turkey, and thereby expresses how theparticular Turkish civic culture as he defines it is threatened by the foreign projectculture. In that sense the informant can also be said to convey a notion of how genu-ine and sincere civil society is gradually disappearing in Turkey.

Conclusion

This article rests on an analytical notion of project as a dominant social techniquethrough which Western international donors and policy institutions attempt to asserta particular idea of social change. Civil society is assigned a significant role asimplementers of reforms and agents of such a social change. This is also the case inTurkey, where civil society has enjoyed intense attention from international donors.One of the implications of the increased integration of Turkey with the outsideworld is the introduction and spread of project culture among civil society. Asshown, this has reshaped practices of civic activism and notions of what civil soci-ety means among civic activists in Turkey. Moreover it has altered relationsbetween civic activists and introduced new ways of claiming and challengingauthenticity as genuine and sincere activists. Tracing such changing practices andperceptions of civil society from the perspective of the introduction of new socialtechniques is an attempt by the article to analytically approach the social dynamicsof Turkey’s integration with the outside world, not least Turkey-EU rapprochement.We still need to move away from the analytical tendencies to focus on advantagesand disadvantages of Turkish EU-membership, and to discuss to what extent Turkeyfulfills various criteria for membership. Rather we should also pursue just how rela-tions between Turkey and the outside world alter political culture and civic practicesin Turkey.

Acknowledgements

The author is indebted to several colleagues for their careful reading and remarks.She is also grateful to the anonymous reviewer for insightful suggestions.

Notes

1. Nilüfer Göle, “Toward an Autonomization of Politics and Civil Society in Turkey,” in Metin Heperand Ahmet Evin (eds.), Politics in the Third Turkish Republic (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994);

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Binnaz Toprak, “Civil Society in Turkey,” in A.R. Norton (ed.), Civil Society in the Middle East,Volume 2 (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1996); Stefanos Yerasimos, Günter Seufert and Karin Vorhoff (eds.),Civil Society in the Grip of Nationalism: Studies on Political Culture in Contemporary Turkey(Istanbul: Orient-Institut, 2000).

2. Sefa [Scedil] im[scedil] ek, “New Social Movements in Turkey since 1980,” Turkish Studies, Vol. 5, No. 2 (2004),pp. 111–139.; Sefa [Scedil] im[scedil] ek, “The Transformation of Civil Society in Turkey: From Quantity toQuality,” Turkish Studies, Vol. 5, No. 3 (2004), 46–74.

3. Jean L. Cohen and Andrew Arato, Civil Society and Political Theory (Cambridge, MA: The MITPress, 1992), p. 29; Michael Edwards, Civil Society (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004), pp. 11–12.

4. Björn Beckman, “Explaining Democratization: Notes on the Concept of Civil Society,” in ElisabethÖzdalga and Sune Persson (eds.), Civil Society, Democracy and the Muslim World (SwedishResearch Institute in Istanbul, Transactions, Vol. 7, 1997), p. 4; Hakan Seçkinelgin, “Civil Society asa Metaphor for Western Liberalism”, (Civil Society Working Paper Series, no. 21, 2002, http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/CCS/pdf/CSWP21.pdf, p. 1

5. Seçkinelgin, “Civil Society as a Metaphor for Western Liberalism” Marina Ottaway and ThomasCarothers (eds.), Uncharted Journey: Promoting Democracy in the Middle East (Washington, DC:Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005)

6. See note 1 for selected references7. TÜSEV, Civil Society in Turkey: An Era of Transition. CIVICUS Civil Society Index Country Report

for Turkey (Istanbul: TÜSEV, 2006).8. Toprak, “Civil Society in Turkey”, p. 95; Jeanne Hersant and Alexandre Toumarkine, “Hometown

Organisations in Turkey: An Overview,” European Journal of Turkish Studies, Vol. 2, No. 2. (2005),http://ejts.revues.org/index397.htm/.

9. There are two main legal forms through which civil society is organized in Turkey. One is founda-tion (vakıf) thus referring to the laws on foundations, the other is association (dernek) thus referringto the Associations Law (Dernekler Kanunu). Foundations pertain to the General Directorate ofFoundations in Turkey, whereas associations are governed by the Ministry of the Interior. Founda-tions are funded by way of an endowment allocated for a particular purpose other than personalbenefit. Associations are legal entities set up by a number of individuals acting on their own privateinitiative and with a specific objective other than profit-making in mind.

10. TÜSEV, Civil Society in Turkey, p. 35. The “new history of civil society” is here by TÜSEV deemed“new” by setting it off against “a long history of civil society as an associational life” reaching backto the religious foundations (vakıf) in Ottoman times and an established tradition of philanthropy,and reaching back to a number of Kemalist associations established in the 1920s (ibid).

11. Göle, “Toward an Autonomization of Politics and Civil Society in Turkey,” p. 21312. Seçkinelgin, “Civil Society as a Metaphor for Western Liberalism”, p. 2; Edwards, Civil Society,

p. 1513. Also TÜSEV considers the Habitat II conference one of three important events with regard to

strengthening the role of civil society in Turkey. The other two are the earthquakes and the EUcandidacy process. See TÜSEV, Civil Society in Turkey, p. 36

14. See, for example, http://www.iwraw-ap.org/resources/turkey_WWHR-New_Ways(Eng).pdf15. See http://smap.ew.eea.europa.eu/media_server/files/V/p/rapor1_1_.pdf; http://www.un.org/jsum-

mit/html/prep_process/national_reports/turkey_natl_assess.pdf.16. OECD, Environmental Performance Reviews – Turkey (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2008) , pp. 22,

121–122.17. E. Fuat Keyman and Ahmet Içduygu, “Globalization, Civil Society and Citizenship in Turkey:

Actors, Boundaries and Discourses,” Citizenship Studies, Vol. 7, No. 2 (2003), p. 22418. Website of the EU delegation to Turkey, http://www.avrupa.info.tr/EUCSD.html, (accessed

February 5, 2008), my emphasis added.19. Ibid.20. EU-Turkey Review, Issue 9 (Fall 2007), p. 10.21. Website of the EU delegation to Turkey, http://www.avrupa.info.tr/EUCSD.html.

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22. Steven Sampson, “The Social Life of Projects: Importing Civil Society to Albania,” in Chris Hannand Elizabeth Dunn (eds.), Civil Society: Challenging Western Models (London: Routledge, 1996),p. 122–123.

23. Sampson, “The Social Life of Projects;” Steven Sampson, “Weak States, Uncivil Societies andThousands of NGOs: Western Democracy Export as Benevolent Colonialism in the Balkans (2002),http://www.anthrobase.com/Txt/S/Sampson_S_01.htm.

24. Sampson, “The Social Life of Projects”, p. 12125. Ibid.26. Sampson, “Weak States, Uncivil Societies and Thousands of NGOs”, p. 527. Tarıh Vakfı, Projeler, Projecilik ve Sivil Toplum Kurulu[scedil] ları (Istanbul: Tarıh Vakfı, 2003), p. v, my

translation from Turkish28. From August 2005 until the end of June 2006.29. Günter Seufert, “The Impact Of Nationalist Discourses on Civil Society,” in Yerasimos et. Al, Civil

Society in the Grip of Nationalism, p. 26.30. TÜSEV, Civil Society in Turkey, p. 53.31. Cf. Sampson, “Weak States, Uncivil Societies and Thousands of NGOs”, p. 5.32. Interview, Ankara, September 29, 2005. Due to requests of anonymity on behalf of a number of

informants, none of the interviewees are mentioned by name or defined as to their particular organi-zational affiliation in this article.

33. Akman as quoted in Turkish Daily News online edition, November 19, 2007. (http://www.hurriyet-dailynews.com/h.php?news=women8217s-organizations-looking-for-men-2007-11-19).

34. Interview, Ankara, September 30, 2005.35. Conversation, Istanbul, March 4, 2006.36. Conversation, Istanbul, March 4, 2006.37. Conversation, Ankara, September 26, 2006.38. Seminar, Istanbul, March 3, 2006.39. Interview, Ankara, May 9, 2006.40. Interview, Ankara, May 13, 2006.41. Conversation, Ankara, October 12, 2005.42. Seçkinelgin, “Civil Society as a Metaphor for Western Liberalism”.43. [Scedil] eyhmus Diken, Türkiye’deki Sivil Hayat ve Demokrasi: Sivil Toplum Sorunlarını Tartı[scedil] ıyor

(Ankara: Dipnot Yayınları, 2006), pp. 64–65, my translation from Turkish, my emphasis added.44. Interview, Ankara, June 11, 2006.

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