programme collaboratif de doctorat (cpp) en …
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CONSORTIUM POUR LA RECHERCHE ÉCONOMIQUE EN
AFRIQUE (CRÉA)
PROGRAMME COLLABORATIF DE DOCTORAT
(CPP)
EN ÉCONOMIE POUR L’AFRIQUE SUBSAHARIENNE
MICROÉCONOMIE
PLAN DU COURS
(Révisé en : février 2014)
Programme collaboratif de doctorat
Présentation du cours de Microéconomie du CPP 2
ECON 601 : MICROÉCONOMIE I
I. Théorie du consommateur (18 heures)
II. Théorie de la production et de l’offre (6 heures)
III. Théorie de la structure du marché (4 heures)
IV. Théorie de l’équilibre général (9 heures)
V. Choix économique dans un contexte d’incertitude (5 heures)
VI. Théorie des jeux (18 heures)
ECON 602 : MICROÉCONOMIE II
I. Économie de l’information (18 heures)
II. Économie du bien-être et choix social (11 heures)
III. Défaillance du marché (9 heures)
IV. La structure du marché revisitée (12 heures)
V. Autres sujets de microéconomie (10 heures)
Programme collaboratif de doctorat
Présentation du cours de Microéconomie du CPP 3
ECON 601 : MICROÉCONOMIE I
A. INTRODUCTION
L’objectif principal du cours est de fournir aux étudiants de troisième cycle qui y participent
une compréhension complète de la théorie microéconomique avancée afin qu’à la fin du
cours, ils soient familiarisés avec une analyse très pointue de la microéconomie. Les étudiants
seront bien armés pour appliquer les concepts et les outils microéconomiques dans le contexte
africain. Le cours est conçu pour un semestre et traitera des questions microéconomiques à un
niveau supérieur. Les sujets abordés comprendront : la théorie du consommateur ; la théorie
de la production et de l’offre ; la théorie de la structure du marché ; la théorie de l’équilibre
général ; le choix dans un contexte d’incertitude et la théorie des jeux.
Textes principaux :
Mas-Colell, A., M. D. Whinston, and J.R. Green (1995), Microeconomic Theory, New York,
Oxford University Press. (Désormais appelé MWG)
Jehle, G.A. and P. Reny (2011), Advanced Microeconomic Theory 3rd Edition, Prentice Hall
Inc. (Désormais appelé J & R)
Textes complémentaires :
Bowles, S (2003), Microeconomics: Behaviour, Institutions, and Evolution, Princeton: NJ.
Princeton University Press.
Eatwell, J., Milgrom, M. and P. Newman (1987), A Dictionary of Economics, MacMillan.
Cowell F. (2006), Microeconomics: Principles and Analysis, Oxford University Press, New
York.
Gravelle, H. and R. Rees (2004), Microeconomics 3rd Edition Prentice Hall.
Kreps, David, M. (1990) A Course in Microeconomic Theory Harvester Wheatsheaf New
York.
Varian, H. R. (1992), Microeconomic Analysis 3rd Edition, W.W. Norton and Company New
York.
Les ouvrages suivants couvrent les mathématiques figurant dan les conditions préalables
Programme collaboratif de doctorat
Présentation du cours de Microéconomie du CPP 4
pour suivre ce cours.
Beavis B. and I. M. Dobb (1990), Optimization and Stability Theory for Economic Analysis,
Ch. 1-4. Cambridge University Press.
Chiang, A.C. and K. Wainright (2005), Fundamental Methods of Mathematical Economics,
4th Edition, McGraw-Hill.
Dixit A.K (1990), Optimization in Economic Theory 2nd Edition, Oxford, Oxford University
Press.
Efe A.O. (2007), Real Analysis with Economics Applications, Princeton.
Rudin (1967), Real Analysis, McGraw-Hill.
Silberberg, E. and W. Suen (2002), The Structure of Economics: A Mathematical Analysis,
3rd Edition, McGraw-Hill/Irwin, New York.
Simon, C. and L. Blume (1994), Mathematics for Economists, New York, Norton.
Sydsaeter Knut, Peter Hammond J. & Arne Strom (2014), Further Mathematics for Economic
Analysis, Pearson Education/Prentice Hall
Takayama, A. (1993), Analytical Methods in Economics, Part 1-3, Ann Arbor: The University
of Michigan Press.
(+) ci-dessous indique les lectures obligatoires alors que les autres références sont
facultatives.
Programme collaboratif de doctorat
Présentation du cours de Microéconomie du CPP 5
B. PLAN DÉTAILLÉ DU COURS
1. THÉORIE DU COMPORTEMENT DES CONSOMMATEURS
1.1. Préférences, utilité et demande (4 heures)
+J & R Ch.1
+MWG Chapitres 1 et 3
Barten. A. and V. Bohm (1982), “Consumer Theory” in Arrow K. and Intrilligator M.D. eds.
Handbook of Mathematical Economics, Vol. II, pp. 381- 429. Amsterdam: North
Holland.
Deaton, A. and J. Muellbauer (1989), Economics and Consumer Behaviour 2nd Edition,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Chapitres 1-2.
Gravelle, H. and R. Rees (2004), Microeconomics 3rd Edition, Prentice Hall. Chapitres 2 - 3.
Liebenstein, H., (1970) “Bandwagon, Snob, and Veblen Effects in the Theory of Consumers’
Demand,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 64 (May): 183-207.
Phlips L. (1983), Applied Consumption Analysis 2nd Edition, Amsterdam; North Holland
Press. Chapitres 1-5
Simon, H. (1959), “Theories of Economic Decision-Making in Economics and Behavioural
Science,” American Economic Review, XLIV, 3, June.
Simon, H., (1973), “Rationality as Process and Product of Thought,” American Economic
Review, Papers and Proceedings, (May), p. 1-14.
Varian, H. R. (1992), Microeconomic Analysis 3rd Edition, New York: W.W. Norton and
Company. Chapitre 7
1.2 Utilité indirecte, fonctions des dépenses et théorie de la dualité (4 heures)
+ J & R Chapitres 1 et 2
+MWG Chapitre 3
Programme collaboratif de doctorat
Présentation du cours de Microéconomie du CPP 6
+Deaton, A. and J. Muellbauer (1989), Economics and Consumer Behaviour 2nd Edition,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Chapitres 1-2.
Varian, H. R. (1992), Microeconomic Analysis 3rd Edition, New York: W.W. Norton and
Company. Chapitre 7.
Strauss, J. (1986) “Estimating the Determinants of Food Consumption and Caloric
Availability in Sierra Leone,” Ch. 4 in Singh, I. L. Squire and J. Strauss eds.
Agricultural Household Models. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
Gravelle, H. and R. Rees (2004), Microeconomics 3rd Edition Prentice Hall Chapitre 4.
Barten. A. and V. Bohm (1982), “Consumer Theory” Ch. 9 in Arrow K. and Intrilligator M.D.
(ed.) Handbook of Mathematical Economics vol. II, pp. 381- 429. North Holland
Amsterdam.
Diamond, Peter and Dan McFadden (1974), “Some Uses of the Expenditure Function in
Public Finance,” Journal of Public Economics, 3, 3-21.
Diewert, W.E. (1993), “Duality Approaches to Consumer Theory,” Ch.12 in Arrow, K.J. and
M.D. Intriligator (eds.) Handbook of Mathematical Economics, 1, Amsterdam, North-
Holland.
Gorman, W.M. (1976), “Tricks with Utility Functions,” in Artis, M. and A.R. Nobay (eds.),
Essays in Economic Analysis, Cambridge University Press. pp. 211-243.
1.3 Préférence révélée (2 heures)
+ J & R Chapitre 2: 86-92
+MWG Chapitre 2
+Koo, A.Y.C. and Georg Haverkamp, “Structure of Revealed Preference: Some Preliminary
Evidence,” Journal of Political Economy, July/August 1972, 724-744.
Kreps, David, M., (1990) A Course in Microeconomic Theory Harvester Wheatsheaf New York.
Richter, M. (1966), “Revealed Preference Theory,” Econometrica 34, pp.635-45.
Samuelson, P. A., (1983), Foundations of Economics Analysis (enlarged edition). Cambridge,
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
Programme collaboratif de doctorat
Présentation du cours de Microéconomie du CPP 7
Samuelson, P. A. (1948), Consumption theory in terms of revealed preference, Economica 15,
pp. 243-53.
Samuelson, P. A. (1947), Foundations of Economic Analysis, Harvard Economic Studies
Springer Science and Business Media, Inc., 2005. Vol. LXXX, Cambridge: Harvard
University Press.
Varian, H. R. (1992), Microeconomic Analysis 3rd Edition, New York: W.W. Norton and
Company. Chapitre 8
1.4 Évaluation de l’évolution du bien-être (4 heures)
Surplus du consommateur, variation compensatoire et équivalente, indices de prix et de
quantité
+MWG Chapitre 3 (3.I)
+J&R Chapitre 4: 166-175
+ Gravelle, H. and R. Rees (2004), Microeconomics 3rd Edition Prentice Hall Chapitre 4.
+Willig, R. D. 1976 “Consumer Surplus without Apology.” American Economic Review 66,
pp. 587-97.
+ Diewert W.E. (1987), “Index Numbers,” In The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics,
edited by J. Eatwell, M. Milgate, and P. Newman. New York: Macmillan 2 pp. 767-
780.
Bacon R. (1995), “Measurement of Welfare Changes Caused by Large Price Shifts.” World
Bank Discussion Papers No. 273. The World Bank Washington D.C.
Braithwait, S.D. (1980), “The Substitution Bias of the Laspeyres Price Index: An Analysis
Using Estimated Cost of Living Indices,” American Economic Review (March): 64-77.
Caves, D.W., L.R.Christensen and W.E. Diewert (1982), The Economic Theory of Index
Numbers and the Measurement of input, output and Productivity,” Econometrica 50,
1393-1414.
Chipman J.S. and J.C. Moore (1980), “Compensating Variation, Consumer Surplus, and
Welfare,” American Economic Review, 70, 933-49.
Programme collaboratif de doctorat
Présentation du cours de Microéconomie du CPP 8
Deaton, A. (1997), The Analysis of Household Surveys: A Microeconometric Approach.
World Bank, Washington, D.C.
Deaton, A. and J. Muellbauer (1989), Economics and Consumer Behaviour 2nd Edition,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, chapitres 7 et 8.
Freeman, A.M. (1993), The Measurement of Environmental and Resource Values: Theory and
Methods. Washington: DC. Resources for the future. (Chapitre 3)
Varian, H. R. (1992), Microeconomic Analysis 3rd Edition, New York: W.W. Norton and
Company, chapitre 10.
1.5. Comportement des consommateurs en situation de rationnement
(2 heures)
+ Deaton, A. and J. Muellbauer (1989), Economics and Consumer Behaviour 2nd Edition,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, chapitre 4 (section 4.3)
+Deaton, A. (1981) “Theoretical and Empirical Approaches to Consumer Behaviour under
Rationing” Ch. 3 in Deaton. A. (Ed) Essays in the theory and measurement of
consumer behaviour. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
+Neary J. P. and K.W. Roberts. (1980) “The Theory of Consumer Behaviour under
Rationing,” European Economic Review, 13 pp. 25-42.
Bevan, D.L., A. Bigsten, P. Collier and J.W. Gunning (1987), “Peasant Supply Response in
Rationed Economies” World Development, 15(4), pp. 431-39.
Neary J. (1987), “Rationing,” In The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, edited by J.
Eatwell, M. Milgate, and P. Newman. New York: Macmillan. 4 pp. 92-96.
Saah Raaj K. (1987), Queues, Rations, and markets: Comparisons of Outcomes for the Poor
and the Rich,” American Economic Review, March. pp 69-77.
Tobin, J., and H.S. Houthakker (1950-51), “The Effects of Rationing on Demand Elasticities.”
Review of Economic Studies, 18, pp. 140-53.
1.6 Offre de travail et choix inter-temporel (2 heures)
+Becker, G. S.(1993), A Treatise on the Family, Chicago: IL. University of Chicago Press,
chapitres 2-4.
Programme collaboratif de doctorat
Présentation du cours de Microéconomie du CPP 9
+Bardhan, P and Udry, C (1999), “Interlinked transactions and rural development,” Ch 9 in
Development Microeconomics, Oxford University Press.
+Berndt, E (1993), “Whether and how much women work for pay? Applications of Limited
dependent Variable Procedures,” Ch 11 in The Practice of Econometrics, Addison-
Wesley Publishing Company Inc.
+Gravelle and Rees, chapitre 15.
Deaton, A. and C. Paxson (1994), “Intertemporal Choice and Inequality,” Journal of Political
Economy, 102.
Imai S. And Keane M. P. (2004), “Intertemporal Labour Supply and Human Capital
Accumulation,” International Economic Review, 45, pp 601 – 641.
Lovo S. (2012), “Market Imperfections, Liquidity, and Farm Household Labour Allocation:
The Case of Rural South Africa,” Agricultural Economics, vol 43, pp471 – 428.
II. THÉORIE DE LA PRODUCTION ET DE L’OFFRE
2. Ensembles de production, maximisation du profit et minimisation des coûts,
dualité, agrégation, efficacité (6 heures)
+ J &R, chapitre 3.
+MWG, chapitre 5
+Nadiri, M.I. (1982) “Producers theory,” Ch. 10 in Arrow and Intrilligator op. cit, pp. 431-
490
+Diewert, W.E. (1982) “Duality Approaches to Microeconomic Theory” Ch. 12 in Arrow K.
J. and M. Intriligator. Handbook of Mathematical Economics Vol 2 Amsterdam North-
Holland.
+Udry, Christopher (1999) Efficiency and Market Structure: Testing for Profit Maximization
in African Agriculture,” in Ranis and Raut eds. Trade, Growth and Development:
Essays in Honor of T.N Srinivasan, Amsterdam: Elsevier Science.
Varian, chapitres 1-6
Programme collaboratif de doctorat
Présentation du cours de Microéconomie du CPP 10
Blackorby, C., Primont, D. and R. Russell (1979), Duality, Separability and Functional
Structure: Theory and Economic Applications, Amsterdam, North-Holland.
Coelli, T.J., Rao, D.S.P., O'Donnell, C.J., Battese, G.E. (2005), An Introduction to Efficiency
and Productivity Analysis 2nd Edition. Springer Science and Business Media, Inc. 350
pp.
Fuss, M. and D. McFadden (eds)(1978), Production Economics: A Dual Approach to Theory
and Applications, Volumes 1 et 2, Amsterdam, North-Holland.
McFadden, D. 1978, “Cost, revenue, and profit functions,” In: Production Economics: a Dual
Approach to Theory and Applications, vol. 1, Fuss, M. and D. McFadden (eds).
Amsterdam: North Holland. pp. 3-109.
III. STRUCTURE DU MARCHÉ
3.1. Concurrence parfaite (1 heure)
+J&R, chapitre 4
+MWG, chapitre 10
Varian, chapitre 13
Mankowski Louis and Joseph Ostroy (2001), “Perfect Competition and the Creativity of the
Market,” Journal of Economic Literature. Vol. XXXIX (June) 479-535.
3.2 Monopole et concurrence monopolistique (3 heures)
Équilibre des monopoles, discrimination par les prix, bien-être ; concurrence
monopolistique
+J&R, chapitre 4: 158-165
+MWG, chapitre 12: 384-387
+Tirole, chapitre 1-3
Varian, chapitre 14
Programme collaboratif de doctorat
Présentation du cours de Microéconomie du CPP 11
Chamberlain, E. (1933), Theory of Monopolistic Competition, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard
University Press.
Tirole ,J. (1988), The Theory of Industrial Organization, Cambridge, Massachusetts,
Cambridge University Press, chapitres 1-3.
Varian, H. R. (1989) “Price Discrimination,” chapitre 12 in Schmanlese, R. and R. Willig
(ed.) Handbook of Industrial Organization, Amsterdam; North Holland.
IV. THÉORIE DE L’ÉQUILIBRE GÉNÉRAL
4.1 Économie d’échange pure, économie de production et bien-être (3 heures)
+J&R, chapitre 5
+MWG, chapitres 15-17.
Varian, chapitres. 17-18
Gravelle and Rees.
Eatwell, J., M. Milgate and P. Newman (ed.) (1987), General Equilibrium, Macmillan.
4.2 Existence, unicité et stabilité des équilibres (3 heures)
+J&R, chapitre 5
+MWG, chapitre 17.
+Debreu G. (1982), “Existence of competitive equilibrium,” in Arrow, K.J. and M.D.
lntrilligator (eds.), Handbook of Mathematical Economics, Vol. II, New York: North
Holland.
Varian Ch 17 and 18.
Gravelle and Rees Ch. 16.
Aliprantis, C.D., et al (1989), Existence and Optimality of Competitive Equilibria, New York
Programme collaboratif de doctorat
Présentation du cours de Microéconomie du CPP 12
and Berlin, Springer Verlag.
Arrow, K.J. and F.H. Hahn (1971), General Competitive Analysis, San Francisco: Holden
Day.
Debreu, G (1959), Theory of Value. New York: John Wiley & Sons
Grandmont, J.M. (1992), “Transformations of the commodity space, behavioural
heterogeneity, and the aggregation problem,” Journal of Economic Theory, 57, pp.1-35.
Hildenbrand W. and A. Kirman (1988), Equilibrium Analysis, Amsterdam, North Holland,
chs. 1, 2, 3*, 6 and Appendices.
Mackinnon, John (1998), “Food Storage, Multiple Equilibria and Stability: Why Stable
Markets May Become Unstable During Food Crises,” Centre for the Study of African
Economies WPS/99-1. Oxford University.
4.3 Noyau et équilibres (2 heures)
+J&R Ch 5
+MWG Ch. 18
+Hildenbrand, W. and A. Kirman (1988), Equilibrium Analysis, Amsterdam, North Holland,
chs. 4 and 5
Varian Ch. 21.
Anderson, R.M. (1978), An elementary core equivalence theorem,” Econometrica, 46, pp. 83-
87.
Hildenbrand, W. (1982), “Core of an Economy” in Arrow, K.J. and M.D. Intrilligator (eds.),
Handbook of Mathematical Economics, II, New York, North Holland.
Mas-Colell, A. (1989), “An Equivalence Theorem for a Bargaining Set,” Journal of
Mathematical Economics, 18, pp. 129-139.
4.4 Modèles d’équilibre général appliqués (1 heure)
+Shoven, J.B. and J. Whalley (1984), “Applied General Equilibrium Models of Taxation and
International Trade: An Introduction and Survey,” Journal of Economic Literature,
Vol. XXII pp. 1007-1051.
Programme collaboratif de doctorat
Présentation du cours de Microéconomie du CPP 13
Bédia, F. Aka (2006), “Poverty, Inequality and Welfare Effects of Trade Liberalization in
Côte D’ Ivoire: A Computable General Equilibrium Model,” AERC Publications, RP
160, October.
Chia N-C, S. Wahba and J. Whalley (1992), “A General Equilibrium-Based Social Policy
Model for Cote d’Ivoire.” Poverty and Social Policy Series, Washington D.C.: World
Bank.
Dervis, K.J., J. de Melo and S. Robinson (1982), General Equilibrium Models for
Development Policy, Cambridge.
Scarf, H. and J.B. Shoven (ed.) (1984), Applied General Equilibrium Analysis, Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge.
Shoven, J.B. and J. Whalley (1992), Applying General Equilibrium, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
V. CHOIX ÉCONOMIQUE DANS UN CONTEXTE D’INCERTITUDE
5. Utilité attendue, aversion au risque, théorie des perspectives, domination stochastique
et utilité dépendant de l’État (5 heures)
+J&R Ch 2
+MWG Ch 6
+Barberis, Nicholas C. (2013), Thirty Years of Prospect Theory in Economics: A Review
and Assessment, Journal of Economic Perspectives, Volume 27, Number 1, Winter, pp.
173-196.
+Dercon, Stephan and Pramila Krishnan (2000), “In Sickness and in Health: Risk Sharing
within Households. Journal of Political Economy. 108, pp 688-727.
+Fafchamps, M., C. Udry and K. Czukas (1998), “Drought and Saving in West Africa: Are
Livestock a Buffer Stock?” Journal of Development Economics.55 (2), pp. 273-306.
+Fafchamps, Marcel (1993), “Sequential Labour decisions under Uncertainty: An Estimable
Household Model of West African Farmers.” Econometrica. 61 pp. 1173-98.
Programme collaboratif de doctorat
Présentation du cours de Microéconomie du CPP 14
+Kahneman D. and A. Tversky (1979), “Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under
Risk,” Econometrica,XLVII pp. 263-291.
+Machina M. (1987), “Choice under Uncertainty: Problems Solved and Unsolved,” Journal
of Economic Perspectives, 1(1), pp.121-54.
Varian Ch 11:5-11:7.
Gravelle and Rees Ch 19-21.
Diamond P. and M. Rothschild (1989) (eds). Uncertainty in Economics: Readings and
Exercises (Revised edition), Academic Press, San Diego.
Hirshleifer, J. and J. Riley (1992), The Analytics of Uncertainty and Information. Cambridge
University Press, Chapitre 5.
Johanna Etner, Meglena Jeleva, Jean-Marc Tallon (2012), Decision Theory Under
Ambiguity, Journal of Economic Surveys, Volume 26, Issue 2, pp 234–270, April.
Rosenzweig, M. and H.P. Binswanger (1993), “Credit Market Constraints, Consumption
Smoothing and the Accumulation of Durable Production Assets in Low Income
Countries: Investment in Bullocks in India, Journal of Political Economy, 101(2), pp.
223-44
Rothschild, M. and J. Stiglitz, (1970), “Increasing Risk I: A Definition,” Journal of Economic
Theory, 2, pp.225-43.
Schoemaker Paul J.H (1982), “The Expected Utility Model: Its Variants, Purposes, Evidence
and Limitations. “Journal of Economic Literature. Vol XX (June) pp. 529-563.
Tversky, Amos and Daniel Kahneman (1992), Advances in prospect theory: Cumulative
representation of uncertainty, Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, October, Volume 5,
Issue 4, pp 297-323.
VI. THÉORIE DES JEUX
Abreu, D, D. Pearce, and E Stachetti (1990), “Towards a theory of discounted repeated games
with imperfect monitoring,” Econometrica 58, pp. 1041-64.
Bernheim, B. D. (1984), “Rationalizable Strategic Behaviour,” Econometrica 52, pp. 1007-
28.
Programme collaboratif de doctorat
Présentation du cours de Microéconomie du CPP 15
Binmore, K. (2007), Playing for Real - A Text on Game Theory. New York: Oxford
University Press.
Binmore, K. (2008), Game Theory: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford University Press.
Fudenberg, D and E. Maskin (1986), “The folk theorem in repeated games with discounting
or with incomplete information,” Econometrica 54, pp 533-56.
Fudenberg, D. and J. Tirole (1991), Game Theory, MIT Press. Cambridge Mass.Ch 1.1-1.2,
Ch. 6.1-6.5
Gibbons, R. (1992), Game Theory for Applied Economists, Princeton University Press. Ch. 1-
3
Gintis, H (2000), Game Theory Evolving, Princeton University Press; Chs 1-5.
Harsanyi, J. (1967-68), “Games with Incomplete Information played by Bayesian Players,”
Management Science, 14: 159-82; 320-34; 486-502.
Kreps, David (1990) Game Theory and Economic Modelling. Clarendon lectures in
Economics. Oxford: Calrendon Press.
Kreps, David, M., (1990), A Course in Microeconomic Theory Harvester Wheatsheaf New
York.
Osborne Martin J. (2000), Introduction to Game Theory, Oxford University Press.
Pearce, D. (1984), “Rationalizable Strategic Behaviour and the Problem of Perfection,”
Econometrica, 52, pp. 1029-50.
Rasmussen, E (2007), Games and Information: An Introduction to Game Theory 4th Edition,
Blackwell Publishers
Schultz, T. W. (1975), “The Value of the Ability to Deal with Disequilibria,” Journal of
Economic Literature, 13 pp. 827-847.
Von Neumann, J., and O. Morgenstern (1944), Theory of Games and Economic Behaviour
60th Edition (2012) Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press.
6.1. Jeux statiques à information complète (4 heures)
Programme collaboratif de doctorat
Présentation du cours de Microéconomie du CPP 16
Indépendance stratégique et concept de jeu ; joueurs ; règles du jeu ; gains ; résultats et
stratégies ; représentation de la forme stratégique (normale) ; dominance, choix aléatoires,
stratégie pure, stratégie mixte.
+Gibbons Ch. 1
+J&R Ch. 7
+MWG Ch. 7-8.
Gintis Ch. 1-4
Kreps Ch. 11
6.2 Jeux dynamiques à information complète (4 heures)
Représentation de la forme étendue ; induction à rebours, perfection du sous-jeu
+Gibbons Ch. 2
+J&R Ch 7
+MWG Ch. 9.
Gintis, H Ch. 6
Kreps Ch. 11-15
6.3 Jeux statiques à information incomplète (4 heures)
Règle de Bayes ; équilibre de Nash bayésien ; perfection de la main tremblante, mise à jour
bayésienne, perfection du sous-jeu.
+Gibbons Ch. 3
+J&R Ch 7
+MWG Ch. 8
Kreps Ch. 14
Programme collaboratif de doctorat
Présentation du cours de Microéconomie du CPP 17
6.4 Jeux dynamiques à information incomplète (4 heures)
Rationalité séquentielle, croyances raisonnables et induction vers l’avant, négociations,
enchères et jeux répétés.
+Gibbons 4
+J&R Ch. 7
+MWG Ch. 9
Kreps Ch. 15
6.5 Théorie évolutive des jeux (2 heures)
+Camerer, C. (2002), Behavioural Game Theory: Experimental Studies of Strategic
Interaction: Princeton: Princeton University Press.
+Carpenter, J. P. (2007), “The Demand for Punishment,” Journal of Economic Behaviour and
Organization. 62, pp. 522-542.
+Bowles, Samuel (2003), Microeconomics: Behaviour, Institutions, and Evolution.
Princeton: NJ. Princeton University Press.
Programme collaboratif de doctorat
Présentation du cours de Microéconomie du CPP 18
ECON 602 : MICROÉCONOMIE II
A. INTRODUCTION
L’objectif principal du cours est de fournir aux étudiants de troisième cycle qui y participent
une compréhension complète de la théorie microéconomique avancée afin qu’à la fin du
cours, ils soient familiarisés avec une analyse très pointue de la microéconomie. Les étudiants
seront bien armés pour appliquer les concepts et les outils microéconomiques dans le contexte
africain. Le cours est conçu pour un semestre et traitera des questions microéconomiques à un
niveau supérieur. Les sujets abordés comprendront : l’économie de l’information ; l’économie
du bien-être et le choix social ; les défaillances du marché ; la structure du marché et d’autres
sujets de la microéconomie.
Textes principaux :
Mas-Colell, A., M. D. Whinston and J.R. Green (1995), Microeconomic Theory Oxford
University Press. New York. (Désormais appelé MWG)
Jehle, G.A. and P. Reny (2011) Advanced Microeconomic Theory 3rd Edition, Prentice Hall
Inc. (Désormais appelé J & R)
Textes complémentaires :
Bardhan, P. and C. Udry (1999), Development Microeconomics. New York: Oxford
University Press.
Bowles, S (2003), Microeconomics: Behaviour, Institutions, and Evolution. Princeton
University Press.
Campbell Donald E. (2006), Incentives: Motivation and the Economics of information 2nd
edition. Cambridge University Press.
Gravelle, H. and R. Rees (2004), Microeconomics 3rd Edition, Prentice Hall Inc
Kreps, D. M., (1990), A Course in Microeconomic Theory. Harvester Wheatsheaf New York.
Tirole, J. (1991), The Theory of Industrial Organization. Massachusetts: MIT Press.
Varian, Hal. R. (1992) Microeconomic Analysis 3rd Edition, W.W. Norton and Company
New York.
Programme collaboratif de doctorat
Présentation du cours de Microéconomie du CPP 19
B. PLAN DÉTAILLÉ DU COURS
I. ÉCONOMIE DE L’INFORMATION
1.1 Asymétrie de l’information et marchés incomplets (2 heures)
+J&R, Ch 8
+MWG Ch. 13, 14
+Kreps Ch. 16-18
+Akerlof, G. (1970) “The Market for Lemons: Qualitative Uncertainty and the Market
Mechanism,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 84.
+Grossman, S and O. Hart, (1983) “An analysis of the principal-agent problem,”
Econometrica 51, pp. 7-45.
Bolton Patrick, and Mathias Dewatripont (2005), Contract Theory, MIT Press Massachusets.
Mankowski L. and J. Ostroy. (2001), “Perfect Competition and the Creativity of the Market.”
Journal of Economic Literature. Vol. XXXIX (June) 479-535.
Mookherjee, Dilip (1998), “Market Failure and Information,” Ch.2 of Dutta, B.(ed.). Welfare
Economics, Oxford India Paperback. Delhi. pp 28-100.
Stiglitz, J.E. (1998) “Distinguished Lecture on Economics in Government; The Private Uses
of Public Interests: Incentives and Institutions,” Journal of Economic Perspectives,
12, pp. 3-22.
1.2 Sélection adverse ; signal (2 heures)
+J&R, Ch 8
+MWG, Ch 13 A-C
+Kreps, Ch 25.9-11
+Bardhan and Udry, Ch 7
Programme collaboratif de doctorat
Présentation du cours de Microéconomie du CPP 20
+Bardhan, P., S Bowles, and H. Gintis, (2000) “Wealth Constraints, Credit Constraints, and
Economic Performance,” in Atkinson, A. and F. Bourguignon (eds.), Handbook in
Income Distribution, Dortrecht: North Holland.
+Riley, John H. (2001), “Silver Signals: Twenty Five years of Screening and Signalling,”
Journal of Economic Literature. Vol. XXXIX, No. 2, pp. 432-478.
+Spence, A.M. (1973), Job Market Signalling, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 87, pps 355-
74
Bolton Patrick, and Mathias Dewatripont (2005), Contract Theory, MIT Press Massachusets.
Milde, H and J.G. Riley (1988), “Signaling in Credit Markets” Quarterly Journal of
Economics 72, pp. 101-29.
1.3 Sélection adverse ; filtre (2 heures)
+J&R Ch 8.
+MWG, Ch 13 D.
+Kreps, Ch 17.2
+Bardhan, P., S Bowles, and H. Gintis (2000) “Wealth Constraints, Credit Constraints, and
Economic Performance,” in Atkinson, A. and F. Bourguignon (eds.), Handbook in
Income Distribution, Dortrecht: North Holland.
+Riley, John H. (2001) “Silver Signals: Twenty Five years of Screening and Signaling,”
Journal of Economic Literature. Vol. XXXIX, No. 2, pp. 432-478.
Bardhan and Udry (relevant chapitres)
Bolton Patrick, and Mathias Dewatripont (2005), Contract Theory, MIT Press Massachusets.
Rothschild M. and J. Stiglitz (1976), “Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An
Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information,” Quarterly Journal of Economics,
90 (4), pp. 629-649
1.4 Aléa moral (4 heures)
+J&R, Ch 8
Programme collaboratif de doctorat
Présentation du cours de Microéconomie du CPP 21
+MWG, Ch 14
+Kreps, Ch.16
+Alderman, Harold and Christen Paxton (1992), “Do the Poor Insure? A Synthesis of the
Literature on Risk Sharing Institutions in Developing Countries.” Policy Research
Working Paper No. 1008, World Bank Policy Research Department, Poverty and
Human Resources Division. Washington, D.C.
+Bardhan, P., S Bowles, and H. Gintis (2000), “Wealth Constraints, Credit Constraints, and
Economic Performance,” in Handbook in Income Distribution. Anthony Atkinson and
Francois Bourguignon eds. Dortrecht: North Holland.
+Besley, T. (1994), “Savings, Credit and Insurance,” in Behrman, J. and T.N. Srinivasan,
(eds.), Hand Book of Development Economics North Holland.
+Bowles, S (2003), Microeconomics: Behaviour, Institutions, and Evolution, Princeton
University Press Ch. 8 and 9
+Coate, S and M. Ravallion (1993), “Reciprocity without Commitment: Characterization and
Performance of Informal Insurance Arrangements,” Journal of Development
Economics 40 (1), pp. 1-24.
+Laffont, J-J. and M. Matoussi (1995), “Moral Hazard, Financial Constraints and
Sharecropping in El Oulja.” Review of Economic Studies. 62, pp. 281-99.
+Udry, C. (1994), “Risk Insurance in a rural credit market: An Empirical Investigation in
Northern Nigeria,” Review of Economic Studies 61 (3), pp. 495-526.
Bardhan and Udry. Ch. 7.
Binswanger, H.P. (1980), “Attitudes towards Risk: experimental measures in rural India,”
American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 62 (August). pp. 395-407.
Bolton Patrick, and Mathias Dewatripont (2005), Contract Theory, MIT Press Massachusets.
Cheung, S. (1969), “Transaction Costs, Risk Aversion and the Choice of Contractual
Arrangements,” Journal of Law and Economics, 12, pp. 23-42.
Deaton, A. (1992), “Saving and Income Smoothing in Cote d’Ivoire,” Journal of African
Economies, 1(1), pp. 1 - 24.
Doherty, N.A. and H. Schlesinger (1983), “Optimal Insurance in incomplete Markets,”
Programme collaboratif de doctorat
Présentation du cours de Microéconomie du CPP 22
Journal of Political Economy, 91, pp. 1045-54.
Fafchamps, M., J.W. Gunning and R. Oostendorp (2000), “Inventories and Risk in African
Manufacturing,” Economic Journal, 110 (2000), pp. 861-893.
Hart, O. and B. Holmstrom (1987), “The Theory of Contracts,” in T. Bewley (ed), Advances
in Economic Theory - Fifth World Congress, Cambridge University Press.
Hoff, K. (1996), “Market Failures and the Distribution of Wealth: A Perspective from the
Economics of Information,” Politics and Society, 24(4), pp. 411-32.
Newbery, D. (1989) “Missing Markets: consequences and Remedies,” in F. Hahn, (ed.) The
Economics of Missing Markets, Games and Information. Clarendon Press.
Pattillo, C. (2000) “Risk, Financial Constraints and Equipment Investment in Ghana: a Firm-
Level Analysis,” in P. Collier and C. Pattillo (eds.), Investment and Risk in Africa,
London: Macmillan, 2000, pp. 96-119.
Pauly, M. (1968), “The Economics of Moral Hazard,” American Economic Review, 58 (3),
pp. 531-537.
Rosenzweig, M. (1988), “Risk, Implicit Contracts and the Family in Rural Areas of Low
Income Families” Economic Journal, 98.
Shavell, S. (1979) “On Moral Hazard and Insurance,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 93,
pp. 541-62.
Stiglitz, J.E. (1990), “Peer Monitoring and the Credit Markets,” World Bank Economic
Review 4, No 3. pp.251-69.
Stiglitz, J.E. and A. Weiss (1981), “Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information,”
American Economic Review, 71 (3), pp. 393-410.
Udry, C. (1995), “Risk and Saving in Northern Nigeria,” The American Economic Review, 85
(5), 1287-1300.
1.5 Enchères et conception du mécanisme (4 heures)
+J&R, Ch 9
+Kreps, Ch 18
Programme collaboratif de doctorat
Présentation du cours de Microéconomie du CPP 23
+ MWG, Ch 23
+Bulow, J. and J. Roberts (1989), “The Simple Economics of Optimal Auctions,” Journal of
Political Economy. 97 (5), pp. 1060-1090.
+Klemperer, Paul (1999), Auction Theory: A Guide to the Literature, Journal of Economic
Surveys, 13 (3) pp. 227-86.
+Laffont, J-J and J. Tirole (1987), “Auctioning incentive contracts.” Journal of Political
Economy 95, pp. 921-37
+McAfee, R.P. and J. McMillan (1987), “Auctions and Bidding,” Journal of Economic
Literature 25, pp. 699-754.
+Milgrom, P., and M. Weber (1982), “A theory of auctions and competitive bidding.”
Econometrica 50, pp. 1089-1122.
Aron, Janine (1998) “Policy Rules and Bidding Behaviour in the Ethiopian Foreign Exchange
Auction,” Centre for the Study of African Economies WPS/98-11. (April) Oxford
University.
Bikhchandani, Sushil, (1988), “Reputation in repeated Second-Price Auctions,” Journal of
Economic Theory, 46, pp.97-119.
Bolton Patrick and Mathias Dewatripont (2005), Contract Theory, MIT Press Mass.
Dordunoo, C. K. (1994), “The Foreign Exchange Market and the Dutch Auction System.”
AERC Research Paper Series, RP 24, October
Krishna, Vijay (2002), Auction Theory. New York: Academic Press
Milgrom, P. (1989), “Auctions and Bidding: A Primer,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 3,
pp. 3-22.
Myerson, R. (1979), “Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem,” Econometrica.
47 (January) pp.61-73.
Myerson, R., and M. Satterthwaite (1983), “Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading,”
Journal of Economic Theory, 28, pp. 265-281.
Riley, J. and W. Samuelson (1981), “Optimal Auctions,” American Economic Review,
71:381-39.
Programme collaboratif de doctorat
Présentation du cours de Microéconomie du CPP 24
Tenorio, Rafael (1993), “Revenue Equivalence and Bidding Behaviour in a Multi-Unit
Auction Market: An Empirical Analysis,” Review of Economics and Statistics 75(2),
pp. 302-14.
1.6 Sujets liés à la théorie des contrats (2 heures)
Bolton Patrick, and Mathias Dewatripont (2005), Contract Theory, MIT Press Mass.
Salanie B. (1997), Contract Theory: A Primer, MIT Press Mass.
Schmitz Patric W (2001), The Hold-up Problem and Incomplete Contracts: A Survey of
Recent Topics in Contract Theory http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/12565/MPRA
Paper No. 1562.
Chiappori P.A. and B. Salanie (2003), “Testing Contract Theory: A Survey of Some Recent
Work” in Advances in Economics and Econometrics, Vol 1 M, Dewatripont, L.
Hansen and S. Turnovsky eds., Cambridge University Press.
II. ÉCONOMIE DU BIEN-ÊTRE ET CHOIX SOCIAL
2.1 Choix social (5 heures)
+J & R Ch. 6
+MWG Ch. 21
+Arrow, K.J. (1963) Social Choice and Individual Values, 2nd Edition New York: Wiley.
+Sen, A.K. (1995) “Rationality and Social Choice,” American Economic Review, 85, 1995,
pp. 1-24.
+Sen A. (1987), “Social Choice,” in Eatwell et al. A Dictionary of Economics. pp. 382-93.
+Yew-Kwang Ng (1990), Welfare Economics, London: Macmillan, Ch. 5.
Rawls, J. (1999), A Theory of Justice, Oxford University Press
Sen, A.K. (1970), Collective Choice and Social Welfare: North Holland.
Sen, A.K. (2000), “Distributive Justice” in Atkinson, A. and F. Bourguignon (eds.) Handbook
in Income Distribution, Dortrecht: North Holland.
Programme collaboratif de doctorat
Présentation du cours de Microéconomie du CPP 25
2.2 Préférences revisitées (4 heures)
+J & R Ch. 6
+MWG Ch. 21
+Bowles, S. (2003), Microeconomics: Behaviour, Institutions, and Evolution, Princeton
University Press Ch 3
+Camerer, C & Fehr, E “Measuring social preferences” http://www.unizh.ch/iew/wp
+Fehr, E. and S. Gächter (2000), “Fairness and Retaliation: the economics of reciprocity,”
Journal of Economic Perspectives, 14(3), pp. 159-81.
+Heinrich, J., S. Bowles, R. Boyd, C. Camerer, E. Fehr, H. Gintis, R. McElreath (2001), “In
Search of Homo-Economicus: behavioural experiments in 15 small scale societies”
American Economic Review, 91, pp. 73-78.
+Rabin, M. (1993), “Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory,” American Economic Review,
83:5, pp.1281-302.
+Thaler, R. (2001), “Anomalies.” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 15(1), pp. 219.
Becker, G. (1962), “Irrational Behaviour in Economic Theory,” Journal of Political Economy,
70(1), pp.1-13.
Becker, G. (1996), Accounting for Tastes. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press.
Becker, G. and G. Stigler (1977) “De Gustibus Non Est Disputandum.” American Economic
Review, 67(2), pp. 76-90.
Bowles, S. (1998), Endogenous Preferences: the Cultural Consequences of Markets and Other
Economic Institutions, Journal of Economic Literature, 36 pp. 75 -111.
Bowles, S. and H. Gintis (2000), “Walrasian Economics in Retrospect,” Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 115(4), pp.1411-39.
Camerer, C. (2002), Behavioural Game Theory: Experimental Studies of Strategic
Interaction: Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Crawford, V. (2002), “Introduction to Experimental Game Theory,” Journal of Economic
Theory, 104, pp.1-15.
Programme collaboratif de doctorat
Présentation du cours de Microéconomie du CPP 26
Eckel, C.C. and P.J. Grossman (1998), “Are Women Less Selfish than Men?: Evidence from
Dictatorship Experiments,” Economic Journal, 108, pp. 726-735.
Fehr, E. and S. Gächter (2002), “Altruistic Punishment in Humans.” Nature, 415, pp.137-40.
Hirschleifer, J. (1994), “The Dark Side of the Force,” Economic Inquiry, 32, pp.1-10
Kahneman, D. and A. Tversky (2000), “Choice, Values and Fairness,” Princeton: Princeton
University Press.
Lowenstein, G. (1999), “Experimental Economics from the Vantage Point of Behavioural
Economics.” Economic Journal. 109(453), pp. F23-F34.
Rabin, M. (1998), “Psychology and Economics,” Journal of Economic Literature. 36(1) pp.
11-46.
2.3 Mesure du bien-être (2 heures)
+Jha, R. (1998), Modern Public Economics. Routledge
+Slesnick, D. T. (1998), “Empirical Approaches to the Measurement of Welfare,” Journal of
Economic Literature. Vol. XXXVI, (December) pp.2108-65.
+Yew-Kwang Ng (1990), Welfare Economics, Macmillan, London Ch. 5.
Deaton A. (1986), “On measuring Child Costs: With Application to Poor Countries,” Journal
of Political Economy, 94, pp. 720-744.
Deaton, A (1997), The Analysis of Household Surveys: A Microeconometric Approach, World
Bank, Washington, D.C.
Lambert, P. J. (2001), The Distribution and the Redistribution of Income: Mathematical
Analysis. Manchester University Press.
III. DÉFAILLANCES DU MARCHÉ
3.1 Biens publics et externalités (7 heures)
+Bowles, S (2003), Chs 1&4
Programme collaboratif de doctorat
Présentation du cours de Microéconomie du CPP 27
+MWG Ch. 11.
Varian, Ch. 23-24
Bardhan and Udry, Ch 10
+Arrow, K.J. (1971), “Political and Economic Evaluation of Social Effects and Externalities,”
in Frontiers of Quantitative Economics. M.D. Intriligator ed. Amsterdam: North
Holland, pp.3-23
+Besley, Timothy (1994), “Do Market failures justify interventions in Rural Markets?” World
Bank Research Observer 9 (1), pp. 27-47.
+Jha, R. (1998) Modern Public Economics. Routledge.
Coase, R. (1960), “The Problem of Social Cost,” Journal of Law and Economics 11 (1), 67–
73
Cullis, J. and P. Jones (1998), Public Finance and Public Choice. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Lipsey, R.G. and K. Lancaster (1956), “The General Theory of Second Best,” Review of
Economic Studies, 24 (63), pp. 11-33.
Mookherjee, D (1998), “Market Failure and Information Dutta (ed.), Welfare Economics:
Themes in Economics, Oxford India Paperback pp. 28-100.
Pigou, A.C. (1932) Economics of Welfare, MacMillan, London.
3.2 Rendements croissants généralisés (2 heures)
+ Arthur W. B. (1989) “Competing Technologies, Increasing Returns, and Lock-in by
Historical Events.” Economic Journal 99: 116-131.
+Arthur, B. W. (1990), “Positive feedback in the economy,” Scientific American. 262, pp. 92-
99.
+David, P. (1989) “Clio and the Economics of QWERTY.” American Economic Review 75
pp. 332-337
+Young, H.P (1995), “The Economics of Convention,” Journal of Economic Perspectives.
10 (2) Spring, pp. 105-122.
Programme collaboratif de doctorat
Présentation du cours de Microéconomie du CPP 28
Durlauf, S and Young, P (2001), Social Dynamics, Brookings Institution
Sokoloff, K. and S. Engerman (2000), “Institutions, Factor Endowments and Paths of
Development in the New World,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 14(3), pp.217-
32.
Arthur, B. (1994), Increasing Returns and Path Dependency in the Economy. Annarbor:
University of Michigan Press.
IV. STRUCTURE DU MARCHÉ REVISITÉE
4.1 Les entreprises en tant qu’institutions (2 heures)
+Alchian, A. and H. Demsetz (1972), “Production, Information Costs and Economic
Organization.” American Economic Review, 62(5), pp.777-95.
+Williamson, Oliver (1989), “Transaction Costs Economics,” in Schmanlense, R. and
R.Willig (ed.) Handbook of Industrial Organization, Amsterdam; North Holland
+ Tirole, J. (1988), The Theory of Industrial Organization, MIT Press; pp. 15-60.
+Gravelle and Rees Ch 6 and 13.
+Holstrom B. and J. Tirole (1989), “The theory of the firm,” Ch. 2, in Schmanlense, R. and
R.Willig (ed.) Handbook of Industrial Organization, Amsterdam; North Holland.
+Coase, R (1937), The Nature of the Firm, Economica. 4, pp.386-405
+Milgrom, P. and J. Roberts (1988) “Economic Theories of the Firm: Past, Present and
Future.” Canadian Journal of Economics, August. Vol XXI No 3. pp. 444-458.
+Milgrom, P. and J. Roberts (1992), Economics, Organizations, and Management. Prentice
Hall: Chapitre 1.
Bigsten, A., P. Collier, S. Dercon, B. Gauthier, J.W. Gunning, A. Isaksson, A. Oduro, R.
Oostendorp, C. Pattillo, M. Soderbom, M. Sylvain, F. Teal and A. Zeufack (2000),
`Contract Flexibility and Conflict Resolution: Evidence from African Manufacturing’,
Journal of Development Studies, 36, pp. 1-37.
Dixit, A. and R. Pindyck (1994), Investment under Uncertainty, Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press.
Programme collaboratif de doctorat
Présentation du cours de Microéconomie du CPP 29
Hart, O. (1985), Firms, Contracts and Financial Structure. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Pindyck, R., (1988) “Irreversible Investment, Capacity Choice and the Value of the Firm,”
American Economic Review, 78, 1988, pp. 969-985.
Williamson, Oliver (1985), The Economic Institutions of Capitalism. Free Press: New York.
Ch 1-3.
4.2 Concurrence imparfaite (Oligopole) (5 heures)
+J&R Ch.3
+MWG Ch. 12
+Kreps Ch. 10-12
Varian Ch. 15 and 16
+Basu, Kaushik and Clive Bell (1991), “Fragmented Duopoly: Theory and Applications to
Backward Agriculture,” Journal of Developing Economies. 36, pp. 145-65
+ Tirole, J. (1988), The Theory of Industrial Organization, MIT Press. Ch. 5, 6, 7
Baumol, W, Binzar, J., and R. Willig (1982), Contestable Markets and a Theory of Industrial
Structure, San Diego: Harcourt-Brace Jovanovich.
Chamberlain, E. (1933), Theory of Monopolistic Competition, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard
University Press.
Friedman, J. (1982), “Oligopoly Theory,” Ch.11 in K. Arrow and M. Intriligator (eds)
Handbook of Mathematical Economics vol. II, North Holland.
Jacquemin, A. and M. Slade (1989), “Cartels, Collusion and Horizontal Mergers,” Ch.7, in
Schmanlense, R. and R. Willig (eds) Handbook of Industrial Organization,
Amsterdam; North Holland.
Shapiro C. (1989), “The Theory of Oligopoly Behaviour,” Ch. 6 in Handbook of Industrial
Organization Amsterdam; North Holland.
Sheperd, W.G. (1995) “Contestability vs. Competition - once more,” Land Economics, 71(3),
pp. 299-309.
Programme collaboratif de doctorat
Présentation du cours de Microéconomie du CPP 30
Stigler, G. (1960) “A Theory of Oligopoly,” Journal of Political Economy, 72, pp.44-61.
4.3 L’économie de la régulation et de la dérégulation (3 heures)
+Laffont, J-J and M. Meleu (1999), “A Positive Theory of Privatisation for Sub-Saharan
Africa.” Journal of African Economies, 8 (AERC supp.) pp.30-67
+Laffont, Jean-Jacques and Jean Tirole (1991), “The Politics of Government Decision
Making: A Theory of Regulatory Capture.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 104 (4).
+Stigler, G.J (1971), “The Theory of Economic Regulation,” Bell Journal of Economics. 2(1)
Spring pp. 3-21.
Beesley, Michael E. (1997), Privatisation, Regulation and Deregulation 2nd Edition,
Routledge.
Laffont, Jean-Jacques (1990), “The New Economics of Regulation Ten Years After.”
Econometrica. May, 62(3) pp. 507-37.
Laffont, Jean-Jacques and Jean Tirole (1993), A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and
Regulation. MIT Press.
Newbery, David M. (2000), Privatisation, restructuring and Regulation of Network Utilities.
Cambridge Massachusetts: MIT Press.
Peltzman S. (1976), “Towards a General Theory of Regulation,” Journal of Law and
Economics. 19 (2) August, 211-48.
Rees (1993), The Economics of Regulation and Public Enterprises, Harvester Wheatsheaf,
Oxford.
Vickers, John and George Yarrow (1989), Privatisation: An Economic Analysis. Cambridge:
MIT:Mass. Ch. 2-4.
Winston, Clifford (1993), “Economic Deregulation: Days of Reckoning for
Microeconomics,” Journal of Economic Literature. September.
4.4 L’économie des technologies de l’information (2 heures)
+Varian, H. (2001), Economics of Information Technology, Raffaele Mattioli lecture, Bocconi
Programme collaboratif de doctorat
Présentation du cours de Microéconomie du CPP 31
University. Mimeo
+Economides, N. (1996), “The Economics of Networks” International Journal of Industrial
Organisation. 16(4), pp.673-99.
+David, P. (2002) “Economic Forces in the Co-Evolution of Information Technology and
Intellectual Property Institutions,” Technical Report, Stanford University.
Armstrong, M. (1998), “Network Interconnection in Telecommunications” Economic
Journal. 108, pp.545-64.
Farrell, J. and C. Shapiro (1988), “Dynamic Competition with Switching Costs,” Rand
Journal of Economics. 19, pp.123-137.
Farrell, J. and C. Shapiro (1988), “Optimal Contracts with Lock-in,” American Economic
Review, 79(1), pp.51-68
Newbery, David M. (2000), “Privatisation, restructuring and Regulation of Network
Utilities.” MIT Press.
Programme collaboratif de doctorat
Présentation du cours de Microéconomie du CPP 32
V. AUTRES SUJETS DE MICROÉCONOMIE
5.1. Allocation des ressources au sein des ménages (4 heures)
+Alderman, H et al (1995), “Unitary versus Collective models of the Household: Is Time to
shift the Burden of Proof,” The World Bank Research Observer, 10(1), pp.1-19.
+Bardhan, P. and C. Udry (1999), Development Microeconomics. Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1999, chs. 2.
+Dasgupta, P. (1993), An Inquiry into Well being and Destitution. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
+Lundberg, S and R. Pollak (1993), “Separate Spheres Bargaining and the Marriage market,”
Journal of Political Economy, 101(6), pp. 988-1010.
+McElroy, M. and Horny, M. (1981), “Nash Bargained Household Decisions: towards a
generalization of the theory of demand,” International Economic Review, 22 pp. 333-
349.
+Strauss, J. and D. Thomas (1995), “Human Resources: Empirical Modeling of Household
and Family Decisions” in J. Behrman and T.N. Srinivasen (eds.) Handbook of
Development Economics: Volume 3A. Amsterdam: Elsevier Science.
Basu, K. and P.H. Van (1998) “The Economics of Child Labor,” .American Economic
Review, 88.
Bergstrom, T. (1997) “A Survey of Theories of the Family” in M.R Rosenzweig and O. Stark
(eds), Handbook of Population Economics, 1A, Amsterdam: Elsevier
Browning, M. and P.A. Chiappori (1998), “Efficient Intra-household Allocation: a General
Characterization and Empirical Test,” Econometrica, 66, pp. 1241-1278.
Chiappori, Pierre Andre (1992), Collective labour supply and welfare,” Journal of Political
Economy, 100(3), 437-67.
Fortin, B. and G. Lacroix (1997), A test of the unitary and collective models of household
labour supply. Economic Journal, 107(July), 933-55.
Haddad, Lawrence and Thomas Reardon (1993), “Gender Bias in the Allocation of Resources
within the Household in Burkina Faso: A Disaggregated Outlay Equivalent Analysis.”
Journal of Development Studies. 29 (20), pp. 260 – 276.
Programme collaboratif de doctorat
Présentation du cours de Microéconomie du CPP 33
Haddad, Lawrence, John Hoddinott, and Harold Alderman, (1997), Intra-household Resource
Allocation in Developing Countries: Models, Methods and Policy, Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press.
Hodinnot, John and Lawrence Haddad (1995), “Does Female Income Share Influence
Household Expenditures? Evidence from Cote D’Ivoire.” Oxford Bulletin of
Economics and Statistics.
Juster Thomas F and Frank P. Stafford (1991), The Allocation of Time: Empirical Findings,
Behavioural Models and Problems of measurement,” Journal of Economic Literature.
Vol. XXIX June pp. 471-522.
Mueller, Eva. (1984), “The Value and Allocation of Time in Rural Botswana,” Journal of
Development Economics, May/June15 (123) pp.329-60.
Rosenzweig, Mark (1986) “Program Interventions, Intra-household Distribution and the
Welfare of Individuals: Modelling Household Behaviour,” World Development 14(2),
February, special issue); 233-43.
Thomas, D. (1991), “Intra-household Resource Allocation: An Inferential Approach,” Journal
of Human Resources, 25.
Udry, C. (1996), “Gender, Agricultural Productivity and the Theory of the Household,”
Journal of Political Economy, 104, pp. 1010- 1046.
5.2 Risques, incertitudes et réseaux sociaux (3 heures)
+Besley, T. and S. Coate (1995), “Group Lending, Repayment Incentives and Social
Collateral.” Journal of Development Economics. 46(1), pp. 1-18.
+Dercon, S. and P. Krishnan (2000), `In Sickness and in Health: Risk-Sharing within
Households in Rural Ethiopia’, Journal of Political Economy, 108, pp. 688-727.
+Durlauf, S. and H.P. Young (2001), Social Dynamics. Cambridge: MIT Press.
+Fafchamps, M. (1992), “Solidarity Networks in Pre-Industrial Societies: Rational Peasants
with a Moral Economy,” Economic Development and Cultural Change, 41(1),
pp.147-74.
+Platteau, J.P. (1995), “A Framework for the Analysis of Patron-Client Ties in Agrarian
Programme collaboratif de doctorat
Présentation du cours de Microéconomie du CPP 34
Economies,” World Development, 23(5), pp.767-86.
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Hoff, K., Braverman, A. and J.E. Stiglitz (eds.) (1993) The Economics of Rural Organization:
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Programme collaboratif de doctorat
Présentation du cours de Microéconomie du CPP 35
Paxson, C., (1982) “Using Weather Variability to Estimate the Response of Savings to
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5.3 Économie comportementale (3 heures)
+Fehr, E. and S. Gächter (2000), “Fairness and Retaliation: the Economics of Reciprocity,”
Journal of Economic Perspectives, 14(3), 159-81.
+Heinrich, J., S. Bowles, R. Boyd, C. Camerer, E. Fehr, H. Gintis, R. McElreath (2001), “In
Search of Homo-Economicus: behavioural experiments in 15 small scale societies”
American Economic Review, 91, pp. 73-78.
+Rabin, Matthew, and Richard H. Thaler. 2001. "Anomalies: Risk Aversion." Journal of
Economic Perspectives, 15(1), pp. 219-232.
Banarjee A. V. and E. Dulfo (2009), “The Experimental Approach to Development
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Camerer C. (2003), Behavioural Game Theory: Experiments in Strategic Interaction,
Princeton University Press.
Chaudhury N.,J. Hammer, M. Kremer, K. Muralidharan and F.H. Rogers. (2006), “Missing
in Action: Teacher and Health Worker Absence in Developing Countries,” Journal of
Economic Perspectives 20(1) 91-116.
Crawford, V. (2002), “Introduction to Experimental Game Theory,” Journal of Economic
Theory, 104, pp.1-15.
Fehr, E. and S. Gaechter (2002), “Altruistic Punishment in Humans.” Nature, 415, pp.137-40.
Kahneman, D. and A. Tversky (2000), Choice, Values and Fairness, Princeton: Princeton
University Press.
Programme collaboratif de doctorat
Présentation du cours de Microéconomie du CPP 36
Lowenstein, G. (1999), “Experimental Economics from the Vantage Point of Behavioural
Economics.” Economic Journal. 109(453), pp. F23-F34.
Rabin, M. (1998), “Psychology and Economics,” Journal of Economic Literature. 36 (1), pp.
11-46.