professor steve roberts

Sensors in Future Air Applications

Steve Roberts

VP, Strategy

Airborne & Space Systems Division, Selex ES

& Visiting Professor in EW Systems

Cranfield University & UK Defence Academy

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© 2015 Selex ES Ltd – All rights reserved

Air and Space Power Doctrine

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Control of the Air

Offensive Counter-Air (OCA) Defensive Counter-Air (DCA)

Active Air Defence Passive Air Defence

Intelligence & Situational Awareness

Intelligence Surveillance

Targeting Reconnaissance

Attack

Deep Attack Counter-Land Operations Counter-Sea Operations Information Operations

Air Mobility

Air Lift Air-to-Air Refuelling Airborne Operations

Special Air Operations Aerial Delivery

Aeromedical Evacuation

© 2015 Selex ES Ltd – All rights reserved 3

SENSE Search Detect

Locate & Track

ATTACK Target Engage Assess

SURVIVE Detection Targeting

Engagement

ISR Direct Collect Process

Disseminate

INTEROPERABILITY Co-ordinate

Exchange Information

CORE Position & Time

Crypto Operator Interface

System & Data Management Mission & Resource Management

ID & ROE Record


Selex ES - Airborne & Space Systems Division

Key Capabilities

• Multi-platform surveillance systems

• Sensors and Electronics for fixed and rotary wing

• Avionics sub-systems for civil aircraft

• Complete, independent UAS capability

• Multi-mission, highly realistic training

• Earth-observation and positioning systems for satellites

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SELEX ES Capabilities on Fixed Wing & Rotary Wing Avionics Sensors Computers Cockpit Comms

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• The electromagnetic spectrum (or EMS) is the domain for collecting information, distributing information and for distorting information – it will also be a means of direct attack

– A future conflict could take place without physical contact between opponents

– The EMS is congested and contested and must be defended

– “Freedom to Manoeuvre” and “Operational Advantage” also apply to the EMS

• “Boyd’s OODA Loop (It’s not what you think)” • Chet Richards, J. Addams and Partners, Inc., March 2012

– “A lot has happened since Clausewitz in 1832 and Sun Tzu in 400B.C.” - Boyd

– “Doctrine is one small step away from Dogma” - Boyd

• Boyd’s OODA models are normally applied to Physical Domains of Land, Sea, Air and Space

• Can they be applied for sensors, information and achieving spectrum dominance?

What are sensors for and how should we use them? Time to assess the future

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• OODA is shown as sequential steps

– Observe, then

– Orient, then

– Decide, then

– Act

• You win by being faster round the loop - “Duelling OODA Loops” - “Quickest decision wins”

• BUT

– We do not always wait to complete the loop before acting effectively

– Sometimes, slowing down creates better effects

• What did Boyd actually draw for his OODA diagram?

The usual interpretation of OODA

Orient Observe

Decide Act

Commands

Information K

no

wled

ge

Effe

ct

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The original 4-phase OODA diagram “The essence of winning and losing” - Boyd, J. R. (1996) - Unpublished briefing

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Boyd put forward other ideas in “Patterns of Conflict” (1986) • “Operate inside opponent’s OODA loops” • “Observe, orient, decide and act more inconspicuously, more quickly, and with more irregularity …” • “Produce a period of shock, confusion, hesitancy until the opponent develops an understanding of what

has happened”


Boyd’s Diagram - 2015

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OBSERVE Observations

DECIDE (Hypothesis)

ACT (Test)

Outside Information

& Circumstances

Implicit Guidance & Control


Interaction with Environment

Feedback

Feedback

Feed Forward

Feed Forward

Feed Forward

Previous Experience

New Information

Analysis and Synthesis

Cultural Traditions

Genetic Heritage

ORIENT


The ‘popular’ OODA Loop is still there

OBSERVE

DECIDE

ORIENT

ACT

Outside Information

& Circumstances


Orient Observe

Decide Act

Commands

Information

Kn

ow

ledg

e

Effe

ct

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Electromagnetic and

physical environment

Sensors - The root source of Information

ES

Radar

EO

• Sensors make measurements and process these to derive information

• Information usually released to platform at track or plot level

OBSERVE

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‘Observe’ - The Internal OODA Process of a Sensor

Observe Physical

Phenomenon

Orientate by

Processing

Data

Decide what to

change based on

data collected

Act by modifying

sensor or moving

platform

Measurements

Information

Commands

Orient Observe

Decide Act

Commands

Information

Kn

ow

ledg

e Ef

fect

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The OODA Model applied to a Platform

• All sensors and many effectors are operating their own ‘autonomous’ OODA process

• The Orientation and Decision element on a platform is human

– Often, the human operator must observe the information output from the individual sensors on the platform

– Orientation may also require assessment of data from the network

Effectors

Sensors Platform

Orient Observe

Decide Act

Commands

Information K

no

wled

ge

Orient Observe

Decide Act

Orient Observe

Decide Act

Orient Observe

Decide Act

Orient Observe

Decide Act

Orient Observe

Decide Act

Information

from Network

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Previous Experience

New Information

Analysis and

Synthesis

Cultural Traditions

Genetic Heritage

The ‘Orient’ phase lies at the heart of the OODA concept

Orient – The most complex phase

OBSERVE

DECIDE

ORIENT

ACT

Outside Information

& Circumstances



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The ORIENT Phase • It is the ‘corporate culture’ • Doctrine and/or Dogma

• Also known as:

‘Situation Awareness’

• It shapes the way we understand the situation and the way we react

• Must be continuously updated, which relies on a learning process

• When all participants are aligned, we have:

Common understanding of mission intent &

Shared Situation Awareness


Previous Experience

New Information

Cultural Traditions

“Genetic” Heritage

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The “OO-OO” Loop is not always bad!


Outside Information

& Circumstances


Feed Forward

Previous Experience

New Information


Cultural Traditions

Genetic Heritage

ORIENT

• Experienced observers know when they need more time

• Taking extra time is not being passive nor giving up the initiative

• Applies to sensors as well as to humans “The 2nd Toyota Paradox:

How delaying decisions can make better cars faster” Ward, Liker, Cristiano, Sobeck (1995)

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Taking effective action “Plan what to do in advance”

OBSERVE

DECIDE ACT

Outside Information

& Circumstances



ORIENT

Previous Experience

New Information


Cultural Traditions

Genetic Heritage

• Implicit Guidance & Control for speed • Self-synchronising, flexible, agile groups

achieving the desired effects

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• Avoid the Formal Decision Phase (if possible) • “A non-aligned group often interacts to create

the wrong decision, or take the wrong actions, or act at the wrong time”


EXPLICIT guidance and command The “popular” OODA loop with feedback


DECIDE (Hypothesis)

ACT (Test)

Outside Information

& Circumstances


Feedback

Feedback

Feed Forward

Feed Forward

Feed Forward

Previous Experience

New Information


Cultural Traditions

Genetic Heritage

ORIENT

• Note the use of the words ‘Hypothesis’ and ‘Test’

• Note the feedback paths to the ‘Observe’ phase

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• The Implicit loops allow us to use our ‘proven repertoire’

– Fastest responses and the ones we have been trained to use

• The slower Explicit command and guidance loops are the way we build up the experience and knowledge that allows us to use the faster Implicit loops

• The DECISION & ACTION phases in the Explicit loops develop a ‘new repertoire’

– Trials, training and computer-based scenario modelling are the way of building up a set of plausible scenarios, information and a range of ‘hypothetical responses’

– This is an experimental approach, which takes time and needs data to be collected

• The ‘D-A’ loops are the heart of Innovation

– Investigation to build capability and understanding of the possible scenarios we may face

Experimentation using the EXPLICIT loops Developing new ideas, capabilities and doctrine

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e


The 6 key questions

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“What if?” should come first!

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Posing “What if?” questions should be the starting point that allows us to be ready to adapt to the unexpected


Known Knowns

Known Unknowns

R&D

Hypotheses and Experimentation The “Unknown Knowns” are the key

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Unknown Unknowns Donald Rumsfeld, 2002

Time

Unknown Knowns

The Unknown Knowns Slovoj Zizek – Slovenian Philosopher

“What we may not like to know”

or “The things we have forgotten”

Klein Heidelberg Elephant/Rüssel

Fritz-X

Counter-stealth?

Radio-controlled air vehicles?


Chain Home RDF The Transmitter

Klein Heidelberg The Receiver System

Omni to synchronise with Chain Home Directional Antenna for echoes

Klein Heidelberg – Bistatic “hitch-hiker” radar 1943-5 Expect and plan for the unexpected

• Ellipse formed by one Klein Heidelberg receiver using signals from one Chain Home transmitter

• Accuracy and resolution similar to Chain Home radar

• Disrupted by jittering Chain Home signals to break synchronisation

Klein Heidelberg – a WW2 bistatic radar system that was decades ahead of its time Klein Heidelberg – the world‟s first modern bistatic radar system‟, IEEE Trans. Aerospace and Electronic Systems Vol.46, No.4, October 2010. Hugh Griffiths and Nicholas Willis 23


• The UAV operates in the Observe and Act parts of the physical and electromagnetic OODA

• To maintain our operational advantage in the physical domains, we must protect freedom to manoeuvre in the EMS

– We rely on “MOTS” to provide navigation and the connectivity to the UAV

– The UAV is inherently “noisy” in the EMS

– Some of its sensors are vulnerable to relatively simple counters

– Many internet sources refer to “How to kill UAV”

• We need to develop “Protection of Information & Bandwidth”

– Possibly more important than “Protection of the Platform”

What if? – defending UAV

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What if? We implement NCW in the EMS

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System of Systems of Sub-Systems

• Network bandwidth limits data transfer to ‘information’ level

• Limited number of ‘trusted’ systems contributing to network

• Some examples of higher bandwidth cross-platform networking exchanging ‘measurement’ level information

Sensors and Effectors

(Sub-systems)

Platforms

(Systems)

Network

(System of Systems)

Orient Observe

Decide Act

Orient Observe

Decide Act

Orient Observe

Decide Act

Orient Observe

Decide Act

Orient Observe

Decide Act Orient Observe

Decide Act

Orient Observe

Decide Act

Orient Observe


Decide Act

Orient Observe

Decide Act

Orient Observe


Decide Act

Orient Observe

Decide Act

Orient Observe


Decide Act

Orient Observe

Decide Act

Orient Observe

Decide Act

Commands

Information

Kn

ow

ledg

e

Effe

ct

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First level of NCW integration

• Proven approach improves quality of information on platform and reduces workload

• Key is to retain and share data on platform for collaborative orientation and decision-making – e.g. ‘Directed Search’ and ‘Detection of Intent’

• Additional benefit is that more platforms are able to contribute high quality data to network

Platform Sensors

Orient Observe

Decide Act

Orient Observe

Decide Act

Orient Observe

Decide Act

Shared Data

Orient

Decide

Information

to Platform

Information

to Network

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Second-level of NCW Integration • Track level data from network would improve sensor operation

• Important contribution to the Orientate and Decide phases of OODA – e.g. ‘Dynamic Library’ & ‘Collaborative Sensing’

• Does not impact on bandwidth requirements of network

• Currently, there is reluctance to adopt this approach due to fear of ‘data incest’

Platform Sensors

Information

from Network

Orient Observe

Decide Act

Orient Observe

Decide Act

Observe

Decide Act

Shared Data

Orient

Decide

Information

to Platform

Information

to Network

Information

from Network

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Third-level of NCW Integration

• Exchange of data between sub-systems on platforms

• Enables distributed & diverse sensing and effects – ‘Networked location’ & ‘Co-ordinated sensing and effects’

• Needs higher bandwidth than available on current networks

Cross-platform communication

Platform Sensors

Information

from Network

Orient Observe

Decide Act

Orient Observe

Decide Act

Observe

Decide Act

Shared Data

Orient

Decide

Information

to Platform

Information

to Network

Information

from Network

Platform Sensors

Information

from Network

Orient Observe

Decide Act

Orient Observe

Decide Act

Observe

Decide Act

Shared Data

Orient

Decide

Information

to Platform

Information

to Network

Information

from Network

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Implications Meta-data Mega-data

Geo-spatial Reference Time Reference Covert datalinks

Protocols


Example - Typhoon in a network enabled EMS

Improved Situational Awareness

(Sensor Co-operation)

Distributed Sensing

Collaborative Effects

Co-operative effects

Interoperability for Complementary Effects

Enhanced Mission Support

Interoperability for Force Protection and Effectiveness

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Military Operational Networks

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Naval Battlegroup

UAS GCSTheatre HQ

GNSS

Communications

Satellite

Strategic

HQ

Base Station

Strategic UAS

Tactical UAS

ADS

TLB2011

Cyber domain opportunities and vulnerabilities apply not only to traditional network warfare and information warfare, but extend to all aspects of electromagnetic spectrum warfare. The latter encompasses certain aspects of electronic warfare, some of which in turn have close synergies with intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance and other operations in both the air and space domains.

USAF Technology Horizons


Orient

Electromagnetic Spectrum & Physics

Observe

Decide

Summary

The EMS OODA Model can be used to explore and define Sensor Performance

Act

Commands

Information K

no

wled

ge

Real World Data World Data World

Cognitive World

Manoeuvre

EW

Radar

EO/IR

EW

Weapons

Communications &

Information networks

Decision support

Picture compilation

Data fusion

Mission planning

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• “Our Strategic Aim is to improve our ability to shape and adapt to unfolding circumstances so that we can survive on our own terms” (Boyd – The Strategic Game – 1987)

– This applies to the EMS as well as to physical domains

• Operations in the total EMS Domain are often separately managed

– Radar, Communications, ISTAR, Electronic Warfare & Cyber, Land, Sea, Air and Space

• We must align and orient if we are to protect and dominate the EMS

– We need to develop a shared approach to ORIENT all EMS activities

– We need to experiment to develop our Implicit responses

– We need to record much more meta-data for analysis and synthesis

– We need to be ready to deploy or defeat novel ideas quickly

Protection of Information & Bandwidth = Protection of Platform & Force Effectiveness

Conclusion

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professor steve roberts

Presentations & Public Speaking

rights reserved air

rights reserved ooda

ooda diagram

phase ooda

distorting information

opponents ooda loops

ems boyds ooda loop

positioning systems