professor: dr. kazem akbari hamed pishvayazdi, autumn 1391 1

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Professor: Dr. Kazem Akbari Hamed Pishvayazdi, Autumn 1391 1

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Page 1: Professor: Dr. Kazem Akbari Hamed Pishvayazdi, Autumn 1391 1

Professor: Dr. Kazem AkbariHamed Pishvayazdi, Autumn 1391

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Page 2: Professor: Dr. Kazem Akbari Hamed Pishvayazdi, Autumn 1391 1

Cloud Definition

Page 3: Professor: Dr. Kazem Akbari Hamed Pishvayazdi, Autumn 1391 1

Cloud Characteristics

oOn demand

o Pay-per-use : less investmento Pay-as-you-go

oElastic Capacity & Infinite Resources & ScalabilityoSelf-Service Interface & ManageabilityoSeparating user applications from the underlying infrastructure (usually via virtualization)

Resources that are abstract and virtualizedoUtility ComputingoBetter resource utilizationoReduce power (Green IT computing)oUbiquity of access (anywhere, anytime, …)oEase of management & Self-serviceoCustomization: More in IaaS and less in PaaS and SaaS

Page 4: Professor: Dr. Kazem Akbari Hamed Pishvayazdi, Autumn 1391 1

Cloud Security: Advantages & disadvantages

Page 5: Professor: Dr. Kazem Akbari Hamed Pishvayazdi, Autumn 1391 1

General Security Advantages

Cloud homogeneity makes security auditing/testing simpler

Clouds enable automated security management

Redundancy / Disaster Recovery

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Page 6: Professor: Dr. Kazem Akbari Hamed Pishvayazdi, Autumn 1391 1

Cloud Security Advantages Dedicated Security Team Greater Investment in Security Infrastructure Fault Tolerance and Reliability Greater Resiliency Hypervisor Protection Against Network Attacks

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Page 7: Professor: Dr. Kazem Akbari Hamed Pishvayazdi, Autumn 1391 1

Cloud Security Advantages (Cont.)Simplification of Compliance AnalysisData Held by Unbiased Party (cloud vendor

assertion)Low-Cost Disaster Recovery and Data Storage

SolutionsOn-Demand Security ControlsReal-Time Detection of System TamperingRapid Re-Constitution of ServicesAdvanced Honeynet Capabilities

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Page 8: Professor: Dr. Kazem Akbari Hamed Pishvayazdi, Autumn 1391 1

“Ultimately, you can outsource responsibility but you can’t outsource accountability.”

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Page 9: Professor: Dr. Kazem Akbari Hamed Pishvayazdi, Autumn 1391 1

Companies are still afraid to use clouds

9[Chow09ccsw]

Page 10: Professor: Dr. Kazem Akbari Hamed Pishvayazdi, Autumn 1391 1

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Specific Customer Concerns Related to Security

Protection of intellectual property and data

Ability to enforce regulatory or contractual obligations

Unauthorized use of data

Confidentiality of data

Availability of data

Integrity of data

Ability to test or audit a provider’s environment

Other

30%21%15%12% 9% 8% 6% 3%

Source: Deloitte Enterprise@Risk: Privacy and Data Protection Survey, 2007

Page 11: Professor: Dr. Kazem Akbari Hamed Pishvayazdi, Autumn 1391 1

Lots of Governance Issues Cloud Provider going out of business

Provider not achieving SLAs

Provider having poor business continuity planning

Data Centers in countries with unfriendly laws

Proprietary lock-in with technology, data formats

Mistakes made by internal IT security – several orders of magnitude more serious

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Page 12: Professor: Dr. Kazem Akbari Hamed Pishvayazdi, Autumn 1391 1

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Page 13: Professor: Dr. Kazem Akbari Hamed Pishvayazdi, Autumn 1391 1

Problems Associated with Cloud ComputingMost security problems stem from:

Loss of controlLack of trust (mechanisms)Multi-tenancy

These problems exist mainly in 3rd party management modelsSelf-managed clouds still have security issues,

but not related to above

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Page 14: Professor: Dr. Kazem Akbari Hamed Pishvayazdi, Autumn 1391 1

Possible SolutionsMinimize Lack of Trust

Policy LanguageCertification

Minimize Loss of Control MonitoringUtilizing different cloudsAccess control managementIdentity Management (IDM)

Minimize Multi-tenancy

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Page 15: Professor: Dr. Kazem Akbari Hamed Pishvayazdi, Autumn 1391 1

Cloud Forcing Key Issues

Separation between data owners and data processors

Anonymity of geography Anonymity of providerPhysical vs virtual controlsIdentity management

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Page 16: Professor: Dr. Kazem Akbari Hamed Pishvayazdi, Autumn 1391 1

Key Problems of Tomorrow

Keeping pace with cloud changesGlobally incompatible legislation and policy

Non-standard Private & Public cloudsLack of continuous Risk Mgt & Compliance monitoring

Incomplete Identity Mgt implementationsResponse to security incidents

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Page 17: Professor: Dr. Kazem Akbari Hamed Pishvayazdi, Autumn 1391 1

© 2008 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. Cisco ConfidentialPresentation_ID

… and one other

Public Cloud

Private Cloud

Virtual Private

Cloud

Hybrid Cloud

Community Cloud

Cloud Deployment ModelPublic Cloud

Cloud infrastructure made available to the general public.

Private Cloud

Cloud infrastructure operated solely for an organization.

Virtual Private

Cloud

Cloud services that simulate the private cloud experience in public

cloud infrastructure

Hybrid Cloud

Cloud infrastructure composed of two or more clouds that interoperate

or federate through technology

Community Cloud

Cloud infrastructure shared by several organizations and supporting

a specific community

NIST Deployment Models 17

Page 18: Professor: Dr. Kazem Akbari Hamed Pishvayazdi, Autumn 1391 1

© 2008 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. Cisco ConfidentialPresentation_ID

Ownership

Control

Internal Resources

All cloud resources owned by or dedicated to enterprise

External Resources

All cloud resources owned by providers; used by many customers

Private Cloud

Cloud definition/governance controlled by enterprise

Public Cloud

Cloud definition/governance controlled by provider

Hybrid Cloud

Interoperability and portability among Public and/or Private Cloud systems

Enterprise Deployment ModelsDistinguishing between Ownership and Control

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Page 19: Professor: Dr. Kazem Akbari Hamed Pishvayazdi, Autumn 1391 1

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Amazon Virtual Private Cloud VPC (http://aws.amazon.com/vpc/ )

Page 20: Professor: Dr. Kazem Akbari Hamed Pishvayazdi, Autumn 1391 1

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We Have ControlIt’s located at X.We have backups.Our admins control access.Our uptime is sufficient.The auditors are happy.Our security team is engaged.

Who Has Control?Where is it located?Who backs it up?Who has access?How resilient is it?How do auditors observe?How does our security team engage?

Of enterprises consider security #1 inhibitor to cloud adoptions

80%

Of enterprises are concerned about the reliability of clouds48%

Of respondents are concerned with cloud interfering with their ability to comply with regulations

33%

Source: Driving Profitable Growth Through Cloud Computing, IBM Study, 2008 (conducted by Oliver Wyman)

Page 21: Professor: Dr. Kazem Akbari Hamed Pishvayazdi, Autumn 1391 1

governance structure of IT organizations

21From [6] Cloud Security and Privacy by Mather and Kumaraswamy

Page 22: Professor: Dr. Kazem Akbari Hamed Pishvayazdi, Autumn 1391 1

Assessment responsibility

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Password

SAML

KerberosPKI

Smart CardToken

LSPP/EAL4+ Digital CertificateThin Clients

Biometrics

HIPPA

VPN IPSEC

Accreditation

MILS

SSL

MLS

TCP Wrapper

Hardening

Cloud

XML Gateways

Secure Collaboration

Physical Access

Compliance

Secure Blades

H/W Crypto

SOX

Tripwire

Identity ManagementDAC

MAC

Cross Domain Systems

RSBAC

FIPS 140-2 PCIDSS

Trusted OS

Trusted Computing

GuardsSABI/TSABI

Cyber Security

SOA Security

SaaSLap

top Encryptio

n

Wireless

FederationFISM

A

* Not a complete collection

Page 24: Professor: Dr. Kazem Akbari Hamed Pishvayazdi, Autumn 1391 1

Security Implications of the Delivery Models

Service Security by Cloud Provider

Extensibility

SaaS Greatest Least

IaaS Least Greatest

PaaS Middle Middle

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The lower down the stack the cloud provider stops, the more security youare tactically responsible for implementing and managing yourself

Page 25: Professor: Dr. Kazem Akbari Hamed Pishvayazdi, Autumn 1391 1

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High-level cloud security concerns

ComplianceComplying with SOX, HIPPA

and other regulations may prohibit the use of clouds for some applications.

Comprehensive auditing capabilities are essential.

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Less ControlMany companies and governments are uncomfortable with the idea of their

information located on systems they do not control. Providers must offer a high degree of

security transparency to help put customers at ease.

ReliabilityHigh availability will be a key concern. IT

departments will worry about a loss of service should outages occur. Mission critical

applications may not run in the cloud without strong availability guarantees.

Security ManagementProviders must supply easy, visual controls

to manage firewall and security settings for applications and runtime

environments in the cloud.

Data SecurityMigrating workloads to a shared network and compute infrastructure increases the

potential for unauthorized exposure. Authentication and access technologies

become increasingly important.

Page 26: Professor: Dr. Kazem Akbari Hamed Pishvayazdi, Autumn 1391 1

Attack CategoriesUnsafe ProgramsMisconfigured ProgramsBuggy Programs

Buffer Overflows Parsing Errors Formatting Errors Bad input to cgi bin

Malicious Programs Trojans Virus Worms Rootkits Botnets

Identity Theft

Applications Cross site scripting Injection flaws Malicious file execution

EavesdroppingSpamming IP SpoofingDoS/DDoSPeople

Social Engineering Weak passwords

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Page 27: Professor: Dr. Kazem Akbari Hamed Pishvayazdi, Autumn 1391 1

Customer Pain PointsP - Privacy (Confidentiality)A - Authorization (Authentication)

I - IntegrityN - Non-Repudiation

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The fundamentals of security haven’t changed for a long time.However, in the last few years due to viruses, worms, intrusions & DDoSattacks, another one has been added called “Assured Information Access”.

Page 28: Professor: Dr. Kazem Akbari Hamed Pishvayazdi, Autumn 1391 1

Threat ModelRisk 1: Resource Exhaustion*Risk 2: Customer Isolation Failure*Risk 3: Management Interface CompromiseRisk 4: Interception of Data in TransmissionRisk 5: Data leakage on Upload/Download,

Intra-cloud

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Page 29: Professor: Dr. Kazem Akbari Hamed Pishvayazdi, Autumn 1391 1

Threat ModelRisk 6: Insecure or Ineffective Deletion of

Data*Risk 7: Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS)Risk 8: Economic Denial of Service*Risk 9: Loss or Compromise of Encryption

KeysRisk 10: Malicious Probes or Scans

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Page 30: Professor: Dr. Kazem Akbari Hamed Pishvayazdi, Autumn 1391 1

Threat ModelRisk 11: Compromise of Service

Engine/Hypervisor*Risk 12: Conflicts between customer

hardening procedures and cloud environmentRisk 13: Subpoena and E-Discovery*Risk 14: Risk from Changes of Jurisdiction*Risk 15: Licensing Risks*

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Page 31: Professor: Dr. Kazem Akbari Hamed Pishvayazdi, Autumn 1391 1

Threat ModelRisk 16: Network FailureRisk 17: Networking ManagementRisk 18: Modification of Network TrafficRisk 19: Privilege Escalation*Risk 20: Social Engineering Attacks

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Page 32: Professor: Dr. Kazem Akbari Hamed Pishvayazdi, Autumn 1391 1

Threat ModelRisk 21: Loss or Compromise of Operation

LogsRisk 22: Loss or compromise of Security LogsRisk 23: Backups Lost or StolenRisk 23: Unauthorized Access to Premises,

Including Physical Access to Machines and Other Facilities

Risk 25: Theft of Computer Equipment.*

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Page 33: Professor: Dr. Kazem Akbari Hamed Pishvayazdi, Autumn 1391 1

Overview

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Page 35: Professor: Dr. Kazem Akbari Hamed Pishvayazdi, Autumn 1391 1

Mapping the Model to the Metal

Physical Physical Plant Security, CCTV, Guards

Compute & StorageHost-based Firewalls, HIDS/HIPS, Integrity & File/log Management, Encryption, Masking

Network NIDS/NIPS, Firewalls, DPI, Anti-DDoS,QoS, DNSSEC, OAuth

Management

GRC, IAM, VA/VM, Patch Management,Configuration Management, Monitoring

Information DLP, CMF, Database Activity Monitoring, Encryption

ApplicationsSDLC, Binary Analysis, Scanners, WebApp Firewalls, Transactional Sec.

Trusted ComputingHardware & Software RoT & API’s

Security Control Model

Cloud Model

Compliance Model

PCI

HIPAA

GLBA

FirewallsCode ReviewWAFEncryptionUnique User IDsAnti-VirusMonitoring/IDS/IPSPatch/Vulnerability ManagementPhysical Access ControlTwo-Factor Authentication...

SOX

Find the Gaps!

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Page 36: Professor: Dr. Kazem Akbari Hamed Pishvayazdi, Autumn 1391 1

CSA Guidance Research

Governance and Enterprise Risk Management

Legal and Electronic Discovery

Compliance and Audit

Information Lifecycle Management

Portability and Interoperability

Security, Bus. Cont,, and Disaster Recovery

Data Center Operations

Incident Response, Notification, Remediation

Application Security

Encryption and Key Management

Identity and Access Management

Virtualization

Cloud ArchitectureCloud Architecture

Op

erat

ing

in t

he

Clo

ud

Go

vernin

g th

e Clo

ud

Page 37: Professor: Dr. Kazem Akbari Hamed Pishvayazdi, Autumn 1391 1

CSA Guidance Domains

Governing in the Cloud2. Governance & Risk

Mgt

3. Legal

4. Electronic Discovery

5. Compliance & Audit

6. Information Lifecycle Mgt

7. Portability & Interoperability

Operating in the Cloud2. Traditional, BCM, DR

3. Data Center Operations

4. Incident Response

5. Application Security

6. Encryption & Key Mgt

7. Identity & Access Mgt

8. Storage

9. Virtualization

1. Understand Cloud Architecture

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Page 38: Professor: Dr. Kazem Akbari Hamed Pishvayazdi, Autumn 1391 1

Legalbetween the laws the cloud provider must comply

with and those governing the cloud customerGain a clear expectation of the cloud provider’s

response to legal requests for information.Cross-border data transfers

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Page 39: Professor: Dr. Kazem Akbari Hamed Pishvayazdi, Autumn 1391 1

Legal IssuesLiability

Contractual responsibilityFinancial compensationnot meeting SLALegal requests for informationProhibit data use by providerRestrict cross border transfer

Intellectual PropertyAll data including copies owned by clientState data rights in SLA clearly

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Page 40: Professor: Dr. Kazem Akbari Hamed Pishvayazdi, Autumn 1391 1

Electronic DiscoveryOrganizations have control over the data they are

legally responsible for.Preserve data as authentic and reliable.

MetadataLogfiles

Mutual understanding of roles and responsibilities

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Page 41: Professor: Dr. Kazem Akbari Hamed Pishvayazdi, Autumn 1391 1

Compliance & Audit

Classify data and systems to understand compliance requirements

Understand data locations, copiesMaintain a right to audit on demandNeed uniformity in comprehensive

certification scoping to beef up SAS 70 II, ISO 2700X

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Page 42: Professor: Dr. Kazem Akbari Hamed Pishvayazdi, Autumn 1391 1

Information Lifecycle Mgtlogical segregation of information and

protective controls implementedUnderstand the privacy restrictions inherent

in dataData retention assurance easy, data

destruction may be very difficult.

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Page 43: Professor: Dr. Kazem Akbari Hamed Pishvayazdi, Autumn 1391 1

Information Lifecycle ManagementInformation must be managed throughout the life

of the data (creation to destruction)Data classification should be put in placeData confidentialityData integrity Provider access needs to be defined and enforcedData retentionData destruction (harder to prove by CP)Cross-jurisdictional issuesNegotiate penalties for data breachesRBAC required

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Page 44: Professor: Dr. Kazem Akbari Hamed Pishvayazdi, Autumn 1391 1

Portability & InteroperabilityUnderstand and implement layers of abstractionFor SaaS:

regular data extractions and backups to a usable formatFor IaaS:

deploy applications abstracted from the machine image.For PaaS:

“loose coupling” using SOA principlesUnderstand who the competitors are to your cloud

providers and what their capabilities are to assist in migration.

Advocate open standards.

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Page 45: Professor: Dr. Kazem Akbari Hamed Pishvayazdi, Autumn 1391 1

Traditional, BCM/DRGreatest concern: insider threat

Onsite inspections of cloud provider facilities whenever possible.

BCP/DRP

Identify physical interdependencies in provider infrastructure.

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Page 46: Professor: Dr. Kazem Akbari Hamed Pishvayazdi, Autumn 1391 1

Business ContinuityDisaster recovery plan

Is it comparable to client’s data center?

Can we do a BC audit?Location of recovery data centersSLA Guarantee Data Portability

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Page 47: Professor: Dr. Kazem Akbari Hamed Pishvayazdi, Autumn 1391 1

Incident ResponseAny data classified private:

should always be encrypted

Application layer logging frameworks to:granular narrowing of incidents to a specific customer.

Cloud providers and customers need defined collaboration for incident response.

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Page 48: Professor: Dr. Kazem Akbari Hamed Pishvayazdi, Autumn 1391 1

Application SecuritySecure software Development Lifecycle (SDL)

IaaS, PaaS and SaaS: differing trust boundaries for SDL

For IaaS, need trusted virtual machine images

Apply best practices available to harden DMZ host systems to virtual machines

Securing inter-host communications:no assumption of a secure channel between hosts

Understand malicious actors techniques

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Page 49: Professor: Dr. Kazem Akbari Hamed Pishvayazdi, Autumn 1391 1

Encryption & Key MgtApplication providers not controlling backend

systems:Assure data is encrypted being stored on the backend

Use encryption : separate data holding from data usage.

Segregate the key management from the cloud provider hosting the data, creating a chain of separation.

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Page 51: Professor: Dr. Kazem Akbari Hamed Pishvayazdi, Autumn 1391 1

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Page 52: Professor: Dr. Kazem Akbari Hamed Pishvayazdi, Autumn 1391 1

Identity & Access MgtRobust federated identity management

Insist upon standards : primarily SAML, WS-Federation and Liberty ID-FF federation

Validate that cloud provider support: strong authentication natively via delegation support robust password policies

Consider implementing Single Sign-on (SSO)

Using cloud-based “Identity as a Service” providers may be a useful tool for

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Page 54: Professor: Dr. Kazem Akbari Hamed Pishvayazdi, Autumn 1391 1

StorageStorage architecture and abstraction layers:

verify that the storage subsystem does not span domain trust boundaries

knowing storage geographical location is possible

Cloud provider’s data search capabilities

Storage retirement processes.

storage can be seized by a third party or government entity?

How encryption is managed on multi-tenant storage?

Long term archiving, will the data be available several years later?

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Page 55: Professor: Dr. Kazem Akbari Hamed Pishvayazdi, Autumn 1391 1

VirtualizationVirtualized operating systems should be augmented by

third party security technology

Risk of insecure machine images provisioning.

Virtualization advantages :creating isolated environments better defined memory space, :minimize application instability

and simplify recovery.

Need granular monitoring of traffic crossing VM backplanes

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Page 57: Professor: Dr. Kazem Akbari Hamed Pishvayazdi, Autumn 1391 1

Data Security in the Cloud Data will be

multi-tenant environments

Spanning multiple layers in the cloud stack

Accessed by various users, tenants, privileged cloud admins

various geographical locations

various contractual obligations/SLAs

various regulations and industry best practices

Secured by multiple technologies and services

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A Shared, multi-tenant infrastructure increases potential for unauthorized exposure

Page 58: Professor: Dr. Kazem Akbari Hamed Pishvayazdi, Autumn 1391 1

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Cyber Security (DPI) DPI refers to the ability to inspect all packet contents

Other packet processing models allow partial access (shown below) Full Layer 2-7 Inspection No inherent MAC or IP address: invisible on the network Real-time analysis with full packet & flow manipulation Create/remove packets High speed analysis (10 Gbits/sec)

MAC Header IP Header TCP/UDP Payload

DPI Access to all packet data, including Layer 7 applications such as VoIP, P2P, HTTP, SMTP

Switch

Servers

MAC Header IP Header TCP/UDP Payload

Router MAC Header IP Header TCP/UDP Payload

Firewall MAC Header IP Header TCP/UDP Payload

MAC Header IP Header TCP/UDP Payload

Traditional Network Devices

Page 59: Professor: Dr. Kazem Akbari Hamed Pishvayazdi, Autumn 1391 1

Governance & Enterprise Risk ManagementCSPs accept no responsibility for data they store in their

infrastructureBe clear on who owns the data SLAs include

availability service quality resolution times critical success factors, key performance indicators, etc.

Regular 3rd party risk assessments Require listings of all 3rd party relationshipsFor mission critical situations & PII examine creating a

private or hybrid cloudRisk Management

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Page 60: Professor: Dr. Kazem Akbari Hamed Pishvayazdi, Autumn 1391 1

Physical/Personnel SecurityProtection against internal attacks

Ensure internal people can’t exploit the information to their gain

Restricted & Monitored access 24x7Background checks for all relevant

personnelAudit privileged users?Coordination of Admins (Hybrid Cloud)

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Page 61: Professor: Dr. Kazem Akbari Hamed Pishvayazdi, Autumn 1391 1

PrivacyPrivate data

What is collected?Where is it stored?How is it stored?How is it used?How long is it stored?

Tagging of PII dataAccess control of PII dataProtection of digital identities & credentialsAccess policy for 3rd parties (e.g. Govt.

agency)How will 3rd parties protect my privacy?

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Page 62: Professor: Dr. Kazem Akbari Hamed Pishvayazdi, Autumn 1391 1

Infrastructure Security

Network LevelHost LevelApplication Level

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Page 63: Professor: Dr. Kazem Akbari Hamed Pishvayazdi, Autumn 1391 1

The Host LevelSaaS/PaaS

Both the PaaS and SaaS platforms abstract and hide the host OS from end users

Host security responsibilities are transferred to the CSP (Cloud Service Provider) You do not have to worry about protecting hosts

However, as a customer, you still own the risk of managing information hosted in the cloud services.

63

From [6] Cloud Security and Privacy by Mather and Kumaraswamy

Page 64: Professor: Dr. Kazem Akbari Hamed Pishvayazdi, Autumn 1391 1

The Host Level (cont.) IaaS Host Security

Virtualization Software Security Hypervisor (also called Virtual Machine Manager (VMM))

security is a key a small application that runs on top of the physical machine

H/W layer implements and manages the virtual CPU, virtual memory,

event channels, and memory shared by the resident VMs Also controls I/O and memory access to devices.

Bigger problem in multitenant architecturesCustomer guest OS or Virtual Server Security

The virtual instance of an OS Vulnerabilities have appeared in virtual instance of an OS e.g., VMWare, Xen, and Microsoft’s Virtual PC and Virtual

Server Customers have full access to virtual servers.

64From [6] Cloud Security and Privacy by Mather and Kumaraswamy

Page 65: Professor: Dr. Kazem Akbari Hamed Pishvayazdi, Autumn 1391 1

What Are the Key Privacy Concerns?Typically mix security and privacySome considerations to be aware of:

StorageRetentionDestructionAuditing, monitoring and risk managementPrivacy breachesWho is responsible for protecting privacy?

65From [6] Cloud Security and Privacy by Mather and

Kumaraswamy

Page 66: Professor: Dr. Kazem Akbari Hamed Pishvayazdi, Autumn 1391 1

Network levelConfidentiality and integrity of data-in-transitLess or no system logging /monitoringReassigned IP address

Expose services unexpectedly Spammers using EC2 are difficult to identify

Availability of cloud resources Some factors, such as DNS, controlled by the cloud

provider. Physically separated tiers become logically

separated E.g., 3 tier web applications

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Page 67: Professor: Dr. Kazem Akbari Hamed Pishvayazdi, Autumn 1391 1

Host level (IaaS)Hypervisor security

“zero-day vulnerability” in VM, if the attacker controls hypervisor

Virtual machine securitySSH private keys (if mode is not appropriately

set)VM images (especially private VMs)Vulnerable Services

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Page 68: Professor: Dr. Kazem Akbari Hamed Pishvayazdi, Autumn 1391 1

Thank you !!!

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