Policy Studies Review, February 1985, Vol. 4 , No. 3

Ualtmr L. Balk - - - - - - - -. - - - - - PRODUCTIVITY IMPROVM€NT IN GOVERNMENT

AGENCIES: AN ETHICAL PERSPECTIVE

Productivi ty has entrancing, almost mystical qualities. Since it i s often used in a very loose sense to encompass any type o f well-perceived outcome, poets as well as politicians may be called productive. Bu t such broad references to high qualities o f desirable activi t ies mask the truly narrow and technical essence o f the word's meaning.

In this paper some broad cultural aspects o f the product iv i ty vision w i l l be discussed w i t h an emphasis on i t s genesis as an economic Inst i tut ional model. This model wi l l then be applied to political inst i tut ions, thereby demonstrating some logical limitations to adoption in the public sector. The analysis also helps explain the ethical ambivalence o f policymakers who call for product iv i ty improvement as well as some o f the paradoxes faced by public administrators.

The core assumptions o f product iv i ty improvement stem from economic thought, wherein conditions o f scarcity are seen as inescapable to human life. From this evolves a series o f scientific beliefs about cause and effect in obtaining better yield out o f scarce resources.

It is when we develop attitudes, o r predispositions to act wi th in the context o f our beliefs, that ethical considerations regarding the good and the moral emerge (Stevenson, 1966). Visions o f increased product iv i ty are enormously engaging since they focus on improving human comfort and happiness by raising material living standards. Traditionally, product iv i ty ef for ts have been associated w i th a host o f cul tural ly valued orientations such as conservation, survival, national welfare. hard work, and wealth, a l l o f which can be viewed as essential to human progress. Thus the symbolic and ethical appeal o f product iv i ty improvement i s a powerful source o f legitimation for pr ivate and public sector policy.

A t the same time, however, product iv i ty improvement i s associated with harmful social effects, fo r the benign vision is often accompanied b y anguish and waste. Worker exploitation, mind-numbing routine, a diminished sense o f p r ide in one's craft--all are pa r t o f the history o f product iv i ty improvement. There exist also chains o f events and adverse ethical consequences. For example, high product iv i ty, a t present, may encompass the spewing fo r th o f harmful, even deadly products that can threaten essential forms o f l i fe in the future.

Others may wish to pursue the broad ethical questions inherent in these general means and outcomes, but my objective is limited to discussing the theoretical nature o f product iv i ty beliefs and the i r connection w i th publ lc agency policy actions. For analytical purposes, the f i r s t step is to sepa- rate economic inst i tut ional from political inst i tut ional perspectives, even though in real i ty the inst i tut ions interact in a symbiotic and overlapping manner.

The association between a business corporation's product iv i ty improve- ment actions, operating controls, and the economic consequences o f these

47s

476 Policy Studies Revlar, February 1985. 413

actions has persuasive social scientific theoretical in tegr i t y ( Fabricant, 1969). More yield from resources a t the corporate organizational and suborganizational levels results in a greater capacity to compete for and capture market populations because product iv i ty increases resuit in lower consumer costs. Improvement actions revolve around the technical abi l i ty o f corporate designers to adjust input mixes, revise throughput processes, and measure outputs in order to attain desired goals. Concomitantly, another source o f improvement is that o f increased employee motivation. Both classes o f action are supported by a body o f generic organizational and behavioral scientific knowledge formulated mainly by studies o f pr ivate sector corporations.

below. The basic construct of economic inst i tut ions is depicted in Figure 1

This elementary perspective shows the direct effect o f organizational action on resource inputs guided by a centralized source o f policy direc- t ion and control. It is a machine metaphor, based on information feedback loops, wherein organizations are perceived as having direct control over their fate. Efflciency, o r the relationship o f outputs to inputs i s the major emphasis. Quality, as a systemic variable (i.e., the relationship of outputs to desired standards o f shape, function, and lo r u t i l i t y ) , i s con- trolled by line operations and the workings o f the marketplace (e.g., poor qual i ty products are avoided by buyers o r returned for rework). The organizational production process is represented by the sequence

I - T - 0 + I + S

This means that resource inputs (I) are changed throughput operations (T ) that convert resources into outputs ( 0 ) . These outputs are matched with desired standards o f performance ( 5 ) . Such matching actions are the

Belk/Productivity Improvement i n C o v a r m n t Agencies: An Ethical Perspective 47 7

source o f controls that can prompt revisions o f input mixes, throughput operations, and lo r standards (Balk, 1975, pp. 11-13).

Economists are able to aggregate the performance o f individual corpo- rations Into sectoral and national indicators by relat ing purchases o f goods and services (Gross National Product) to labor inputs subject to various statistical adjustments. Thus product iv i ty t rends can be analyzed along w i t h the effects o f policy action in an interconnected manner between small uni ts and large economic systems (Kendrick and Crossman, 1980).

The economic inst i tut ional model and i t s seamless interaction between micro- and macrolevels o f activities and consequences is, o f course, open to serious challenge as the major basis for comprehensive social policy. There Is, for example, a fundamental ethical tension between corporate efficiency and social equity. A t the theoretical level, exogenous influ- ences, such as government regulation and intercorporation market-rigging can affect the purity o f application of the machine model. Also, services present vexing theoretical challenges as organizational outputs since they are immediately consumed when produced, thus obviat ing any possible inventory and in-process controls (see Stanback, 1979). Bu t mainly, product iv i ty improvement theory makes a logically consistent fit between corporate goals and the national ethical aspirations o f those wedded to society's economic institutions. In a way, the theory is a functional myth, but few can deny i t s appeal as a motivational ideology for policymakers in the pr ivate sector as well as the public sector.'

What happens when we superimpose the machine model of corporate product iv i ty improvement upon public agencies? Again, it is theoretically sound to perceive a government organization as an input-throughput-out- put process model a t the microlevel. Intui t ively there st i l l exists the ethical advantage o f get t ing more yield from agency resource inputs, since the savings can be diverted to other publ ic welfare needs or, perhaps, used for reduction o f taxes. But beyond this, the connection between activi t ies a t the microlevel and consequences a t the macrolevel i s not as theoretically neat as it is for the economic inst i tut ional model. The con- nections are shown in Figure 2 below.

The organizational production process, as explained in the discussion o f Figure 1, remains the same. Agencies convert resource inputs into out- pu ts and match these with desired standards o f performance. For exam- ple, an agency dealing w i th retardation depends on budgeted resources ( input ) In order to bring therapy ( throughput) to clients in the form o f discrete service activi t ies such as transportat ion to special schools [out-

Rather than the pure economic-rational consequences o f the corporate machine model, what occurs here is a transformation o f economic service activities a t the agency level into political consequences that have taken on value-based o r affect ive characteristics a t the broader o r macrolevel. These consequences are matched w i th expectations based direct ly on pol i t i - cal needs for social order and power.

Following the example through Figure 2, the executive arid other impor- tant political actors expect adequate transportat ion o f the mentally retarded to special schools. The abi l i ty o f the agency to provide this service has political consequences. However, these ve ry consequences are also affected by the political actors who hold expectations. For instance, the abi l i ty o f agencies to bus clients can depend on such things as facilitating laws,

put).

478 Policy Studlea Revfar, February 1985, 4:3

publ ic support, adequate executive/legisiative budgetary allocations, and family support through social services.

- PRESSURE i ' QRC!UPS

OTHER MENCIES

- I I

I 1 1 f I \ I . : EXPECTATIONS

I t T

Svarr .kWun - I-m

I I

To continue w i t h Figure 2, the match between political expectations and consequences affects the deliberation o f policy groups that consider bud- getary support for the mental retardation unit. Meanwhile the executive provides official direction to the agency; technical product iv i ty control data may, but rarely does, affect th is direction.

Evidently, only part ial aspects o f the consequences o f agency actions may be evaluated by rational economic reasoning (e.9.. cost benefi t analy- sis). Policy direct ion is no longer centralized as in Figure 1; in fact, the regular activities o f the policymaking bodies themselves have a direct impact upon and help shape political consequences as well as expectations. Thus the relatively simple theoretical cause and effect relationships so clearly present in economic inst i tut ions are lost.

The substantive gap between agency activi t ies and social consequences exists because the economic perception o f agency operations is but one aspect o f the job o f public administrators and employees ( the resource management element). There are two additional general purposes for gov- ernment agencies aside from resource management: the second, to impie- ment laws; the third, to be politically responsive. Frequently, these three purposes are in conflict, thus explaining the reason fo r inherent role tensions w i t h i n agencies as well as a high degree o f organizational per- meability by various outside influences (Rosenbloom, 1983). Consequently, economic-rational agency management activi t ies are not as highly regarded nor as central ly directed by political inst i tut ional policymakers as they are by those in business.

Bslk/Productivlty lmprovaant i n Government Agencies: An Ethical Perapective 479

This comparison between inst i tut ional sett ings supports the argument that useful product iv i ty concepts are logically limited to agency activities. it makes l i t t le theoretical o r pragmatic sense to use an unbroken economic line o f reasoning to extend the method o f product iv i ty analysis to political consequences. Fundamentally, pr ivate sector economists deal wi th output markets that generate resource inputs to corporations. in the public sector, budgets (resource inputs) are generated by input markets less subject to economic reasoning than to political p r i o r i t y Consequently economists have abandoned inductive approaches to measuring aggregate public sector product iv i ty. As Fabricant (1969) states "rather rough and therefore uncertain ...Im estimates are made (p. 20).

To summarize, even this most elementary analysis o f the dynamics o f publ ic agency service activi t ies shows that they are p a r t o f a political inst i tut ion created to control power rather than obtain maximum yield out o f resources. The general metaphor i s one of social influence and ex- change incorporating elements o f economic rationality. Several functional myths are involved, the f i r s t being that the process o f balancing needs and influence from various sources wil l always resul t in socially effective policy. Another i s that executives (e.g., presidents, governors, mayors) have total direct ive control over agencies. Yet another i s that major political actors in policy formulation, agency direction, and budget formu- lation have a natural and deep-seated interest in the eff icient and effective usage o f budgeted resources once they are allocated. The last two func- tional myths are the ones closest to the concerns o f th is paper.

Systematic programmed ef forts to bring about product iv i ty improvement wi th in publ ic agencies have had mixed reactions from career c iv i l servants. A t one end o f the spectrum, a small number have responded with burs ts o f enthusiasm and vigor, A t the other end, an equally small number have questioned the motives o f policymakers while actively resist ing improvement efforts. Bu t the great majority o f government supervisors and employees have passively pursued their working lives in the glum hope the movement will, l ike PPBS, quiet ly fade away. The record o f abandoned ef for ts and spotty advances support th is impression. While a small number of agencies a t various levels have made headway, a major publ ic sector product iv i ty improvement transit ion is no t in evidence. The progress that has occurred has been mostly in measurement research, basic training, and documenting case histories (Productivi ty Symposium, 1972, 1978; Hayes, 1977).

A fundamental reason, in my opinion, i s that policymakers have not thought through the theoretical basis nor the pragmatic consequences o f t ransferr ing economic inst i tut ional models in to political inst i tut ional con- texts. Unlike the pr ivate sector, there is a lack o f a direct connection between the visions o f increased product iv i ty and the actions o f policy- makers. This fact i s not publicized because the national cul tural predis- position is toward the inst i tut ional model of economic rat ional i ty w i th i t s simpler cause and effect structure and all-inclusive functional myths. For th is reason, candidates for political off ice have increasingly and succcss- fully run against the government bureaucracy by promising more busi- ness-like product iv i ty from government agencies. The implication is that agency managers can pull themselves up by the bootstraps once they use the right business techniques and acquire the energy and motivation to improve. Also associated w l th such exhortation and over-simplification are att i tudes toward those in the public service that frequently border on

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contempt. It i s d i f f i cu l t t o believe that these conditions do not have an enduring negative motivational impact on public employees.

It is essential for executive, legislative, and even judicial policymakers to recognize that their perceptions and practices wil l have to undergo a good deal o f change if product iv i ty improvement i s to become a normal government act ivi ty.

Recognizing inst i tut ional differences in purpose as well as the theoret- ical limltations of product iv i ty concepts would do much to clear the a i r o f the unfair rhetoric centered on the supposedly infer ior capabilities o f those In the public service. Simplistic statements such as "running government l ike a well-managed business1' would be minimized if It were recognized that the effects o f institutionalized separation o f political powers are a real i ty that i s fe l t a t al l levels of public agency operations. In this manner it would become apparent that product iv i ty improvement is in competition wi th powerful pr ior i t ies within political institutions.

The technical dif f icult ies o f measuring organizational performance o f publ ic agencies should be more formally acknowledged. These revolve around the inabi l i ty to aggregate product iv i ty measurements because o f (a) agency organizational structural phenomena, ( b ) the nature o f government service activities, and (c) the necessity for controlling the qual i ty as well as the number o f un i ts o f output. For example, there is no theoretically logical way to aggregate mental health agency product iv i ty measures be- cause o f the disparate nature o f internal act ivi t ies and the logical inabi l i ty to rely solely on efficiency measures while ignoring quali ty indicators. The motivational consequences o f technical measurement complexity are profound. Continuing w i t h the example, agency product iv i ty improvement i s often more dependent on internal ly generated innovation by discrete uni ts within the mental health agency rather than top-down forceful direc- t ion by agency executives.

Figure 2 shows some o f the realities of government policymaking and agency direction. What Is lacking, in comparison w i th the corporate world, i s an institutionalized way t o provide visible and concrete recogni- t ion by chief executives, legislators, and other inf luential policymakers o f agency resource management progress and accomplishment. There are numerous barr iers to and complexities in sett ing up responsive public agency reward systems. Not the least o f these is the legal and tradit ional direct ion o f c iv i l service procedures wherein--among other di f fer- ences--management positions are not as clearly dif ferentiated as they are in the pr ivate sector. This means that there is a need for innovation grounded in the real i ty o f the political Inst i tut ional agency context. Some o f the more recent shi f ts toward power-sharing and decentralized control may permit the generation o f new approaches toward recognizing accom- plishment, but to date l i t t le progress in these directions has occurred.

For a forceful, meaningful agency product iv i ty ethic to emerge, sizeable changes in chlef executive, legislative, and constituency behavior wi l l have to occur. As stated, simplistic notions centered on equating agency operations to business administration must be abandoned. The f ield o f public administration has struggled fo r many years w i th the politics/ad- ministration dichotomy (Waldo, 1980. ch. 5, pp. 65-77). Budget and c iv i l service practices need revision in order to permit more agency f lexibi l i ty to increase the yield from budgeted resources. The ambiguities o f govern- ment performance measurement call fo r a higher degree o f cooperation and t rus t between agencies and outside policymakers than presently exists. Agency heads wil l have to be selected as much for their organizational expertise as for their political acumen. A l l these examples demonstrate a

B.lk/Productlvlty Improvaamt i n Governmnt Agencies: An Ethlcal Perspective 481

need for policymakers to give more care, time, and attention to agency support and operations that facilitate improvement action.

It is an open question whether grappling w i th the complexities and paradoxes involved in these shi f ts wi l l be seen as suff iciently worthwhile by those who shape the destiny of public agencies. For th is means facing knotty problems of policy revision and the investment o f long-term, incre- mental, painful political effort. Perhaps the greatest bar r ie r i s the cumulative processes o f product iv i ty improvement which usually extend beyond the time in office o f any part icular set o f elected officials. Straight cost cut t ing through reduced budgets i s more expeditious and more rewarding politically than incremental cost reductions brought about through product iv i ty improvement approaches. Costs cuts sometimes result in increased productivi ty. Bu t more often than not they do l l t t le to change agency habits, instead they do much to curtai l services and have a highly demoralizing effect upon employees, usually w i th adverse effects on motivation and innovation. Basically, the political ethical question Is this: Are career publ ic service employees to continue to be exploited for immedi- ate political strategic gain, o r wi l l government policymakers share the burden o f get t ing more yield ou t o f allocated resources?

Given these unresolved matters o f orientation, action, and ethics, It should not be surpr is ing to find sizeable pockets o f low product iv i ty In public agencies. Even in the 1980s era o f tight resources, individuals in one agency are l ikely to be overworked while those in an adjacent orga- nization wil l not have enough to do.

i f encouraged by a more responsive political ethical environment, a wide range o f actions is open to publ ic administrators. Many o f these are generic to business and government organizations. For instance, not only can routine, repeti t ive transactions, as well as communications be compu- terized, but work flow can be rearranged, procedures improved, and group performance data systems established. Some advances have been made and are well documented. The Public Productivity Review, a journal devoted to the public sector, is a good source for contemporary perspec- tives; the specialized publications by the Urban Inst i tute and Washnls (1980) are also excellent technical references.

Less understood is the fact that government services are, on the whole, not highly repetitive. Therefore innovations are less l ikely to be generated by conventional approaches wherein top managers and specialized staf f act as expert shapers and motivators o f employee behavior, thereby acting as the only source o f meaningful change. A large group o f nonmanagement and lower supervisory professional employees is in a position to Identi fy needs for improvement and contr ibute toward the design o f resolutions. A t present such lower-level innovations are d i f f i cu l t to come by because of classical management att i tudes and technical communications problems.

Internal improvement actions have consequences. Positions become redundant and their ski l ls outdated; thus a number o f policy and ethical concerns emerge. Employees wi l l understandably resist product iv i ty im- provement i f i t pu ts the i r job a t r isk. Computerization advances wil l not be well received if they are used to enforce unreasonable domination over personal needs for self-control. Therefore, more is required than conven- tional notions o f technical management competence. For example, practical means o f t ransferr ing retrained employees from one agency t o another wil l have to be devised. Group performance cr i ter ia should be designed and interpreted by nonmanagement people doing the more ambiguous tasks. If management experts are to be perceived as no longer the sole source of influence and control over improvement changes, then a good deal of

W h a t can be done within agencies?

482 P o l i c y Studier b v i e w . February 1985. 4:3

thought has to be put toward the design o f new managerial and staf f roles in the public service.

It is evident that internal agency product iv i ty improvement actions such as those discussed above, cannot be effectively carr ied ou t in a political vacuum. The necessary organizational change processes are incremental. They require consistent strategic and ethical support from those in the agency environment.

I have restr icted this discussion to some fundamental theoretical aspects and ethical consequences o f publ ic agency product iv i ty improvement action. The technical nature o f product iv i ty thought limits i t s utility to discrete organizational un i ts in the public sector. Most policymakers do not clearly understand the implications o f t ransferr ing an economic inst i tut ional model to a political inst i tut ional agency context. Therefore they contr ibute toward grave misperceptions concerning the abi l i ty o f agency civil servants to improve operations. High-level managers wi th in public agencies do not fully recognize that their conventional approaches to product iv i ty improve- ment must be tempered by new approaches to power-sharing. In general, neither politicians nor agency management have seriously gappled with such basic needs as strategic workforce planning for retraining and inter- agency transfers. New York State and a handful o f other governments, however, have shown signs o f nascent act iv i ty through employee-manage- ment committees on quali ty o f work l i fe and continuity o f employment.

Faced with these unresolved dif f icult ies and the vast a r ray o f competing social needs, should it become a political p r io r i t y to encourage and nur tu re a realistic product iv i ty ethic in government? On balance, a qual i f ied 8tyes88 appears t o be in order. Not only Is there the economic-rational potential o f greater yield out o f publ ic resources, but what i s also a t stake is the meaning o f work to great numbers o f publ ic employees. Work is commonly a crucial way to define one's self, to find a meaning for existence, since it Is closely connected w i th feelings o f being influential. o f doing things that matter In life. Untold numbers o f government agency people are caught In a vlclous circle. They come to the agency workplace and perform mean- lnglass tasks, o r have to act busy when there is l i t t le to do. They know o f product iv i ty improvements but choose t o withdraw because neither society, policymakers, nor agency management wi l l encourage meaningful participation. In fact, exist ing procedures are frequently puni t ive toward product iv i ty innovators. For example, when an agency spends less than i t s allocated budget, the tendency is to reduce the next yearly projection by a proportionate amount. Also, publ ic recognition o f surplus employees due to productivity improvement can easily become a political embarrass- ment; even worse, redundant employees may be terminated because of Inadequate long-term planning. Present practices resul t in the underuse o f human potential and so create lies o f quiet, unseen career desperation.

A t the very least, more thoughtful attention to the differences between product iv i ty improvement in the public and pr ivate sectors i s necessary. It would help to better understand the limited nature o f the product iv i ty vision as well as i t s unique ethical characteristics. If this should occur, product iv i ty wi l l increase as a resul t o f more constructive and effective relatlons between those within public agencies and those on the outside who direct these organizations. It would be a giant step toward reducing the misleading rhetoric, destructive practices, and policy neglect that most publ ic employees endure today.

Balk/Productivity lmprovewnt i n Covernwnt Agencies: An Ethical Perspective 483

FOOTNOTES 'According to J. Campbell in The Masks of God: Occidental Mythology

(New York: Penguin Books, 1980). a prime function of myths i s "... to support the social order, t o integrate the individual organically w i th his group" (p. 520).

2l am indebted t o Alaln Beiliassein o f the Rockefeller College o f Public Affairs and Policy (State University o f New York a t Albany) who brought th is dist inct ion to my attention.

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