proceedings - inside special ops
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By Captain John J. Burnham, U.S. Navy
NSWs traditional operations now include even moreand
fasterirregular warfare. This is not going to change anytime soon.
22 Juy 2009 www.usni.g
On Easter Sunday, SEALs rescuedMaersk Alabama
Captain Richard Phillips off the coast of Somalia
and quickly dispatched three pirates. This brought
Naval Special Warfare (NSW) into the spotlight
for a few news cycles. Footage of Basic Underwater De-
molition/SEAL (BUD/S) training ran on cable news, statis-
tics on operational deployments and recruiting got air time.The coverage highlighted one of NSWs core missions:
maritime special operations. But this incident of strategic
application was only one in a long stretch of NSW opera-
tions since 11 September 2001.
Like the other units inside the U.S. Special Operations
Command (USSOCOM), SEALs and the NSW commu-
nity have continuously adapted during Operations Endur-
ing Freedom and Iraqi Freedom. As the current fight ap-proaches the eight-year marklonger than NSWs direct
Cpyig 2009, Proceedings, U.S. Naa Insiue, Annapis, Mayand (410) 268-6110 www.usni.g
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to SEAL teams. The Naval Special Warfare Command
(NAVSPECWARCOM), a one-star headquarters, was
established as the stateside command. In 1987 the U.S.
Special Operations Command was created, carving NSW
away from the Fleet and into a dedicated SOF chain of
commandwhich continued to report through the Navy
administratively. As a minority in a command dominated
by the Army and Air Force, NSW played limited but criti-
cal roles.One of the biggest issues was that NSW continued
to deploy in much the same way it had for 30 years: in
platoon-size elements, attached directly to ships or The-
ater Special Operations Commanders. By the late 1990s,
it was apparent that the community needed to update its
organization. The force was expanding, operational re-
quirements overseas were shifting, and training needed
to be streamlined.
NSW 21 Sets the Stage
NSW 21, as NAVSPECWARCOMs overarching plan
for these changes was known, was the most comprehen-sive community reorganization since UDTs had shifted
to SEAL Teams. The goal was to increase relevance and
effectiveness to reflect the maturity of theater SOF op-
erations while maintaining operational support and focus
to the Fleet commanders. As one of many structural and
operational changes, SEAL teams would now deploy
with operations, intelligence, and logistics enablers into
theaters as NSW squadrons, not piecemeal to individual
commanders.
The transition was not always smooth, but in the end the
new NSW 21 organization provided the Fleet and theater
commanders with more responsive capability. It set the
stage for NSW to effectively deploy after 9/11 to meet
the new mission requirements.
Into the Present
In recent testimony before the House Armed Services
Committee, USSOCOM commander Admiral Eric Olson
noted that special operations forces (SOF) are employing
many of their core capabilitiesunconventional warfare,
counterterrorism, civil affairs, information operations, and
partnering with host nation forces.5
The benefits of using NSW in many cases revolvearound their small footprint, the precision of their opera-
tions, and their ability to blend and adapt to environment
and mission requirements. This year (and since just after
9/11) about 85 percent of overseas SOF units are deployed
to the Central Command theater of operations, and that
percentage is about the same for NSW.6Tactically, the
mission scope covers all operations: urban, desert, and
riverine combat in Iraq; long-range small-unit operations
in Afghanistan; maritime special operations in the Philip-
pines; and a number of continuing training relationships
with the maritime special operations forces of numerous
countries in all theaters. Staffs and specialty augmentshave been involved as wellintelligence, communica-
www.usni.g PROCEEDINGS 23
involvement in either World War II or Vietnamwe must
assess our performance as well as how the nature of this
enemy is changing the organization, capabilities, and stra-
tegic employment scheme of naval special warfare.
While balancing the very different demands of maritime
special operations and the missions in Iraq and Afghani-
stan, we need to explore how to maintain meaningful ties
to the Navy as well as to USSOCOM. And we need to
study the question of where to put resources for the nextfight.
Movement: NSW Legacy
As a small force in a big service, NSW has always
used combat necessity and evolving conflicts, along with
their important after-effects, to shape the community and
its capabilities. This has involved defining the capability
required, devising the training and outlining resource re-
quirements, convincing sometimes reluctant theater com-
manders of the mission feasibility and value of the force,
and finding the right operators for the job.
World War II saw the beginning of the long struggle bythe navys frogmen to define their mission and understand
who they are.1From the early days there was a broad
scope of missions: Scouts and Raiders in China behind
enemy lines as advisers, Naval Combat Demolition Units
blowing obstacles in support of the Normandy landings,
underwater demolition teams in the Pacific supporting am-
phibious landings after the disaster at Tarawa.
The early focus was on direct action, not so much
counterinsurgency or nation-building.2That shifted when
President John F. Kennedy encouraged all the services to
expand special operations. In a 1962 speech at West Point,
Kennedy described his vision: This is another type of
war, new in intensity, ancient in originswars by guer-
rillas, subversion, insurgents, assassins; wars by ambush
instead of by conventional combat. . . . It requires a whole
new kind of strategy, a wholly different kind of force,
and therefore a new and wholly different kind of military
training.3
The Navys Unconventional Activities Committee rec-
ommended the formation of a unit on each coast to be
the focal point for Navy involvement in guerrilla and
counter-guerrilla operations: Sea Air Land (SEAL) teams.4
This marked the first step away from direct Fleet support.Drawn from the existing UDTs, SEALs hit the radar in
Vietnam, where their advisers were from 1962 to 1973,
and their platoons operated from 1965 to 1971.
Underwater-demolition and SEAL teams reconnected
with Fleet commanders after Vietnam through direct sup-
port deployments with battle groups and expanded part-
ner training with other countries maritime special op-
erations forces. In 1983, all remaining UDTs converted
AP Photo (AAroN FAvIlA)
CRITICAL ONGOING EFFORTSIn 2002, U.S. special forces and SEALstrained with local counterparts in the southern Philippines jungle. The
militant extremist group they aimed to take out, Abu Sayyaf, has beenlinked with al Qaeda and continues to operate.
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tions, logistics, administrative supportand the entire
community has been expeditionary.
Broadly speaking, NSW has changed since 9/11 in three
primary ways: the fusion of operations and intelligence
(ops/intel), interagency teamwork, and a refocusing on
irregular warfare.
The Ops/Intel CycleMuch has been written about the SOF find-fix-finish-
exploit-analyze cycle that describes how operations and
intelligence come together before target execution at the
tactical and operational levels, with the rapid exploita-
tion and follow-on analysis that leads back into the ops
cycle. This is a vastly improved dynamic from pre-9/11
processes.7
SEALs in Vietnam were known for their ability to gather
timely, quality tactical intelligence and act on it quickly.
In todays ops/intel machine, that same thread connects
strategic intelligence straight to the tactical level, opera-tions that are then augmented by manned and unmanned
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance platforms.
These provide a real-time picture of the enemy network
and individual targets.
The exploitation cycle has likewise expanded. Intelli-
gence gained from operations is fed directly to the larger
intel community, complementing the national collection
and starting the cycle again. Operating at the speed of
war now extends up, down, and across the spectrum.8
Joint and Interagency Teamwork
Joint special ops increased during the 1990s, but the in-
teragency effort had nowhere near the same level of effort
or emphasis. That has now changed. The Combined Joint
Special Operations Task Force structure has come a long
way since Operation Desert Storm. Today, SEALs work
not only with conventional U.S., Coalition, and partner na-
tion forces; they also interact directly with representatives
from every agency in our government. Operations En-
during Freedom and Iraqi Freedom have served as livinglaboratories for NSW in joint/interagency operations.
LEGACY OF COVERTNESS SEALs in Vietnam (here in 1969, watching the detonation of a satchel charge they set to destroy a Vietcong bunker)were known for timely information-gathering and quick action. Today, those same skills are applied to real-time pictures of enemy networks andindividual targets.
AP
Pho
to
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Whether it is working with Provincial Reconstruction
Team representatives from the Departments of State,
Commerce, Agriculture, Justice, or the U.S. Agency
for International Development;or having almost all the
three letter agencies live and work with them in their
spaces, NSW members are now experiencing levels of
interaction leagues beyond pre-9/11 days. Tactical les-
sons learned can be shared or improved upon, and chal-
lenges or obstructions at higher staff levels can be moreeasily surmounted when people deal face to face and
communicate with others who have had similar deployed
experiences.
The system is not perfect. Some information stovepipes
remain, and the occasional organizational turf battle still
occurs. But overall it is a vast improvement, and its a
two-way street. As NSW gains from its contact and work
with other agencies and departments, those representatives
are exposed to NSWits people, the tactics, the opera-
tions, and the results.
Another factor that will have
positive long-term effects is thehuge number of Navy augmentees
in the ground fight. When an O-5
submariner or aviator has spent
a year commanding a Provincial
Reconstruction Team and has
worked daily with the SEAL and SF units in his province,
its a powerful lesson in understanding NSW. Similarly,
Navy intel specialists in an interagency task force work
side by side with CIA, NSA, DIA, NGA and other per-
sonnel from all the intelligence disciplines, directly sup-
porting operations and interacting with the operators. And
Seabees,communicators, and supply personnel live at the
forward operating base with the assault forces, building
the camp and interacting with locals for contracted ser-
vices. They are immersed in the overall battle rhythm.
The legion of Sailors and officers who have lived and
worked with NSW in Operations Enduring Freedom and
Iraqi Freedom will be like the bulge in the economic fore-
cast charts: Years from now, when they are O-6s and E-9s,
they will have a fundamentally different outlook based on
their time working in those environments. This is good for
NSW and for the Fleet as a whole.
Irregular WarfareNSW has a long operational history in the areas that
now make up what is termed irregular warfare. In todays
counterinsurgency environment, unilateral combat opera-
tions must fit into a larger framework of security, develop-
ment, and governance. The success of this effort will have
the long-term effects of denying sanctuary to the enemy
and stabilizing the region.
NSW forces have continued to improve the combination
of advising and operations as they work with Iraqi and
Afghan army and police, Philippine maritime comman-
dos, and other nations forces during training exchanges.Bringing irregular warfare to a full capability has been a
SOCOM priority, and NSWs inherent access to countries
with maritime special operations forces has been a key
part of this effort. The concept of conducting operations
by, with, and through partner nation forces is a rule, but
so is maintaining the ability to conduct unilateral opera-
tions when required.
NSW has benefited from the Navys increased focus
on irregular warfare. This past spring the Office of Naval
Intelligence created four subordinate commands, one ofwhich is the John F. Kennedy Irregular Warfare Center.
Thus, a five-year ONI project was given formal structure.9
Initiatives like this will increase the connection with what
NSW is already doing around the world.
Funding for NSW has also improved, as have ways in
which money can be used. In the 1990s, training and work-
ing with foreign SOF was done under the Joint/Combined
Exchange Training program. This system maintained rela-
tionships but could not be operationalized. In 2003, Con-
gress appropriated $25 million for
geographic combatant command-
ers to bolster partner nation forcesand gain access, through employ-
ing indigenous units, to hostile
areas where U.S. forces cannot
openly operate. Known as 1208
funding for the relevant section
in the legislation, it has been renewed and expanded since
its inception, and proven to be a valuable force multiplier
for NSW.10
As in any dynamic environment, we must exploit oppor-
tunities, address issues, and improve processes. Enduring
situations like post-9/11 operations have long-term effects,
of course, and discussing them goes beyond tactical les-
sons learned.
Combat Leadership
An NSW operator who enlisted or was commissioned
in 2000 and finished BUD/S or Special Warfare Combat-
ant Crewman training in 2001 has known only combat
deployment cycles for the first half of his career. Reserve
NSW groups are staffed with combat veterans who re-
turn to support the forward-deployed task forces on their
augmentation cycles. This unprecedented level of diverse
experience is having a significant impact on the commu-nity. The full scope of benefits will be clear as junior
operators and technicians assume leadership positions,
mentored by combat veterans and with current relevant
experience themselves.
This kind of a game-changing factor could be a boon
to NSW. The potential downside is that a community with
too much of the same type of perspective in its ranks may
get stuck in the rut of fighting the last war, or, as Admiral
Olson expressed it, concern over short-term gains in com-
bat experience at the cost of reduced capability in specific
skill areas not utilized in OEF and OIF.11
For this reason it is crucial that we gain perspective onthe thematic and organizational changes. We must lift the
We need to think aboutwhat the world will be
like in ten years.
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principles out of tactical white noise and guide the com-
munity on the best path forward. For example, instruction
in language and cultural knowledge must be prioritized
and considered a long-term training investment. There are
only so many frogmen and too many countries in which
operations are possible. We need vision to determine
where the next focus areas should be.
Finding the New OperatorsAt the other end of the leadership chain, recruiting
continues to be strong. There was a concern that the op-
erational tempo and demands would push people away.
However, the new operators understand the deployment
cycles and requirements of the careerand they accept
them. What would have been categorized as a crushing op
tempo in the 1990s is now considered normal.12
Motivated operators and high morale are critical fac-
tors for a long fight. But high as the warriors enthusiasm
may be, that of their families may not last. We must con-
tinue with our attention and concern for the well-being
of spouses, children, and other family members, whilecontinuing to ensure operators get the proper amount of
time between deployments to stay on top of the wave.
Maintaining the Fleet Connection
In a number of categoriespersonnel augmentation
for deployments, increased budgeting, and high recruit-
ing prioritiesthe Navys support to NSW has improved
dramatically in the past ten years. And despite the opera-
tional demands of the current fight, we remain connected
to the Fleet in training and other professional exchanges,
along with officer and senior enlisted placement on key
naval and joint staffs.
This close relationship results in service support for cur-
rent and emerging joint NSW requirements, support that
pays real dividends. What still remains, though, is for the
rapport to be strengthened between non-Fleet expedition-
ary ops elements of the Navy. This means NSW, the Naval
Expeditionary Combat Command (formed January 2006),
and the Marine Special Operations Command (directed by
the Secretary of Defense in fall 2005). Given the relatively
recent creation of each, its about the right time to engage
at deeper levels and shore up linkages.
NSW Expanding Leadership Roles
The past ten years have seen a significant increase in
SEAL leadership in the Navy and joint arenas. In 1999
NAVSPECWARCOM was a one-star headquarters, and the
highest leadership outside NSW lifelines was at the O-6
and E-9 levels in the Theater Special Operations Com-
mands.
Ten years later, NAVSPECWARCOM is a two-star com-
mand with a Force Master Chief. SEAL flag officers work
at SOCOM HQ, at the National Counterterrorism Center,
and on the National Security Council staff. SEALs have
been commanders of Special Operations Command
Centraland Special Operations CommandEurope, a SEAL two-
star is the Fourth Fleet commander, a SEAL three-star
commands the Joint Special Operations Command, and a
SEAL four-star commands USSOCOM.
Todays senior flag officers and senior enlisted entered
NSW in the mid-1970s, when the Navy was considering
shifting the two SEAL teams to the reserves; their career
arcs have seen a considerable shift in the communitys
relationship with the Navy.
Looking Ahead
We need to look beyond todays fight and think about
what the world will be like ten years from now. NSW will
be in the war zones for some time to come, but when the
ACCELERATED OP TEMPOUSSOCOM commander Admiral Eric T. Olson (right) recently testified before the House Armed Services Committee that hisforces were using core unconventional-warfare capabilities while partnering with host nation forcesat an operational pace he termed the new nor-mal. Appearing with him are Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Michle A. Flournoy (center) and Commander, U.S. Central Command General DavidH. Petraeus (left).
DoD
(BrADleyA.lAIl)
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joint task forces wind down and the bureaucratic amberresin again hardens around the various organizations, it
will be essential for our tactical relationships to have
matured. Its easy when everyone is deployed together,
but when the temporary overseas structures dissipate, as
military and civilian counterparts climb their respective
organizational ladders, a permanent, institutionalized solu-
tion must already be in place.
As he goes through his small-unit drills, every young
frogman learns that the goal of a SEAL element when
faced with an enemy force is to create a momentary im-
pression of overwhelming fire superiority. You need to
make the unknown enemy think your element is a lot
larger while you figure out exactly
what to do next.
Organizationally, NSW has been
doing that for most of its existence.
Since 9/11, its contributions have been
increasingly recognized, resourced,
and supported. But with greater gifts
come greater responsibilities.
The upcoming decade will requirethe community to ruthlessly scru-
tinize and assess its core missions.
For example, significant acquisition
decisions about maritime platforms
are coming in the next few years.
SEALs and other NSW team mem-
bers, even as they continue to perform
numerous critical operations in sup-
port of the global fight, must always
remember that only one force inside
SOCOMNSWis charged with
and capable of the unique maritimespecial operations missions. And, as
Maersk Alabama Captain Phillips
knows, keeping that edge sharp is a
no-fail requirement.
1. Orr Kelly, Brave Men, Dark Waters (Novato, Calif.:
Presidio Press, 1992), 101. Two of the best references
on the origins and history of NSW are this and The
Naked Warriors, the 1956 classic by legendary frog-
man Francis Fane (available as a Naval Institute Press
reprint).
2. Susan Marquis, Unconventional Warfare: Rebuild-
ing U.S. Special Operations Forces(Washington, D.C.:
Brookings Institute Press, 1997), 65.
3. Speech given at West Point, Public Papers of the
Presidents of the United States, John F. Kennedy
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office,
1962), 453.
4. Kelly, Brave Men, Dark Waters, 76.
5. Testimony of Admiral Eric Olson, USSOCOM Com-
mander, FY2010 National Defense Authorization Budget
Request for USSOCOM, 4 June 2009. U.S. House Com-
mittee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Terror-
ism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities. Available
through Federal News Service, www.fnsg.com.
6. Testimony of Admiral Eric Olson, 4 June 2009.
7. Michael T. Flynn, Rich Juergens, Thomas Cantrell,
Employing ISR: SOF Best Practices, Joint Forces Quarterly, 3rd quarter 2008.8. Ibid.
9. Robert K. Ackerman, Naval Intelligence Ramps Up Activities, Signal, February
2009.
10. P.L. 108-375, Section 1208, 28 October 2004. Available at ww.dod.mil/dodgc/
olc/docs/PL108-375.pdf.
11. U.S. Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Advance Policy Questions for Vice
Admiral Eric T. Olson, USN, Nominee for Commander, U.S. Special Operations Com-
mand, 12 June 2007. Available at www.armed-services.senate.gov/statemnt/2007/
June/Olson%2006-12-07.pdf.
12. Testimony of Admiral Eric Olson, 4 June 2009.
Captain Burnham, a SEAL with combat experience in Bosnia, Afghani-stan, and Iraq, is Deputy Commander, Naval Special Warfare Develop-ment Group in Dam Neck, Virginia.
ADVISING AND FIGHTINGU.S. special forces work in Iraq and Afghanistan to help secure thepopulation and disrupt enemy networks. Here, a female Army soldier in the Iraqi Special Opera-tions Forces Brigade prepares for a joint operation in an Najaf province.
U.S.MArINe
CorPS
(ChAgoZ
APAtA)