problem of psychological determinism
TRANSCRIPT
-
7/29/2019 Problem of Psychological Determinism
1/8
The Problem of Psychological Determinism
The philosophical discussions over the question of whether free will exists or not have
significant implications on concepts such as moral responsibility and personal autonomy. Oneway to approach the problem of freedom and determinism is to see what it means for a person
to be morally responsible. There are two basic conditions that need to be satisfied. Firstly, the
person needs to be a free agenta being having control over his action. For if the actions he
performs are not up to him to decide he deserves no credit or discredit for doing what he
does. Second, he must be a moral agent an agent, that is, to whom moral claims apply. For if
the actions he performs can be neither right nor wrong, then there is nothing to credit or
discredit him with (Wolf 151). Essentially, the issue of existence of free will depends on the
first condition of whether a persons actions are under his control or not.
In this paper, I have tried to argue that a person is indeed a free agent. However, the
definition of what it means to be a free agent may not exactly conform to the strict criterion
laid down above for existence of freedom. This vital aspect will be elaborated in the course of
this paper. Moreover, arguing from the point of view of psychological determinism and
societal repression, I intend to show the possibility of determinism creeping into the actions
of a free agent.
The notion of free will in this case would seem rather paradoxical since the idea of a person
being someone whose actions are under his own control would oppose the notion that his
actions are determined by anything other than himself. In order to resolve this contradiction,
it is important to understand what is meant by psychological determinism. To say an action is
psychologically determined would mean that the actions of the free agent are determined by
his interests, his motives and his desires which are in turn determined by his heredity or
environment. This raises an interesting question as to whether the condition of freedom
depends on ones values or desires or whether it is the persons own free will on which the
values or desires of a person are dependent on. This is a difficult question to answer for it is
arguable that the freedom of a free agent is largely dependent on the conditions of his values
and desires. However, it can also be argued that the origin of ones values is dependent on the
freedom that one possesses. The kind of dependence in either cannot be seen as adhering to
an all infusing causality. For if one starts by assumption that the human agent is a being-for-
-
7/29/2019 Problem of Psychological Determinism
2/8
itself then it becomes increasingly difficult to think that their actions are entirely the result of
a causally determined chain of prior events which necessarily had to result in the actions that
they do. Therefore, I shall try to present the case that while the condition of freedom is
largely dependent on the interests one has, there is still an element of freedom in the agent
which becomes increasingly difficult to exercise considering the way he is psychologically
determined.
Parfit in his work Reasons and Persons points out that if one supposes that there is an
unreliable treatment for some disease and in most cases the treatment achieves nothing. But
in a few cases it completely cures the disease then for those particular it is only the effect that
matters (214). This example can be seen as illustrating the idea that causal chains cannot
always be seen as having one kind of effect when we speak of human beings. If we accept
psychological determinism then one can raise an objection as to whether the condition of
freedom is true. For if the interests of an agent are determined by his heredity and
environment then it is not up to the agent to have the interests he has. Furthermore, if the
actions of the agents are dependent on his interests then the agent cannot but perform the
actions he performs (Wolf 152). These objections embark the fundamental notion that if the
condition of freedom is to be satisfied then actions cannot be psychologically determined. For
then the agent would not have the ability to do otherwise. If psychological determinism is
seen in this way, obviously the will of the agent cannot be free. For the will to be free, the
actions of the agent cannot be determined by his interests or his interests cannot be
determined by anything which is external to the agent. However, if one tries to imagine an
agent whose actions are not determined by his interests then this agent would have the ability
to act against his interests. Such an agent would be able to act against everything he believes
in and everything he cares about. It would mean, for example, that if the agent's son were
inside a burning building, the agent could just stand there and watch the house go up in
flames. Or that the agent, though he thinks his neighbor is a fine and agreeable fellow could
just get up one day, ring the doorbell, and punch him in the nose. (Wolf 152-153). On the
other hand if one imagines an agent whose interests are not dependent on anything external
then there are no reasons for the agent to have the interests that he would have. It might be
possible for such an agent yet to care about others at the same time. In both the cases narrated
above, were the agent is psychologically undetermined, the main problem which arises is that
it cannot be possible for the agent to be moral one. For if we require that his actions not be
determined by his interests, then a fortiori they cannot be determined by his moral interests.
-
7/29/2019 Problem of Psychological Determinism
3/8
And if we require that his interests not be determined by anything else, then a fortiori they
cannot be determined by his moral reasons (Wolf 153).
In my opinion, the condition of freedom i.e. the actions of an agent are under his control is
taken too rigidly and strongly as to think that a person cannot be influenced in his decision
due to external factors. Free will does exist for a person who has the option to do otherwise.
If the condition of freedom is seen as the ability of the agent to act differently then strict
determinism cannot be accepted. This notion of freedom is a conditional statement which
emphasizes that an agent could have done otherwise had he tried. This does not rule out the
possibility of being psychologically determined since the determination of ones interests is
in my opinion, are not entirely dependent on environment and heredity but is in some part
also dependent on the way one interprets the external factors which influences ones interests.
Concerning the idea of acting differently, Wolf writes that incompatibilists, will point out
that such an analysis is insufficient. For an agent who would have done otherwise if he had
tried cannot be blamed for his action if he could not have tried. The compatibilist might try to
answer this objection with a new conditional analysis of 'he could have tried'. He might say,
for example, that 'he could have tried to do otherwise' be interpreted to mean he would have
tried to do otherwise, if he had chosen. But the incompatibilist now has a new objection to
make: namely, what if the agent could not have chosen? (154). The objection raised by the
incompatibilist is the claim of the universal determinists who regard all conscious desires and
preferences as having a causal history. In that regard, human actions are only free as long as
the agent is doing what he wishes even if he has no real choice (Meissner 96-97). However,
this rather reduced concept of freedom makes it very difficult to assign moral responsibility. I
shall argue that relatively free decision making is possible within a context of psychological
determinism. It will be shown that while the individual could choose to act otherwise in cases
where other options are available and thus cannot evade the moral responsibility. However,
exercising this freedom requires a certain realization of this choice being available to the
agent which is difficult in the way societies have been set up.
The idea of free-will that I wish to present, does not entirely deny determinism. As pointed
out before, the sort of determinism that is involved here is different from the causal
determinism of natural sciences. The Austrian psychologist, in his psychoanalytic theory
dealt with the problem of determinism and free-will. This determinism accounts for the
relatively mature capacity for deliberative decision-making and for self determining choice
-
7/29/2019 Problem of Psychological Determinism
4/8
possible realistic alternatives (Meissner 97). The determinism of psychoanalysis deals
ultimately with motives and reasons rather than with causes. It deals only with psychic
actions and deliberations and not with actions that may be coerced. Psychoanalysis showed
that there are many psychic actions involving choice among alternative possible objects or
action or courses of action in which the decision does not seem to be predetermined and
options remain possible but not necessary, and there therefore not necessarily determined
((Meissner 97). Ernest Wallwork writes concerning Freud that [he] holds on to the paradox
that freedom of choice is compatible with determinism not by narrowly restricting freedom to
a contrived definition but by seeing that the emergence of the capacity for relatively free
decision-making and action occurs within a context of psychological determinism (73). It
cannot be said that Freud was equivocally committed to hard determinism since there are
many statements found in The Ego and the Idwhich refute that position. For instance, Freud
writes that Analysis does not set out to make pathological reactions impossible, but to give
the patients egofreedom to decide one way or the other (50)
Freuds ideas on free will are ambiguous as he assumes that free will and determinism are
mutually exclusive. Free will is viewed more as a subjective experience in which the agent
experiences that his acts are free. I think the idea that free will and determinism are mutually
exclusive is relevant, but it cannot be simply concluded that the free will is merely a
subjective experience. "Freedom does not lie in the experience but in the actual capacity and
function of choosing and deciding among possible alternatives" (Meissner 98). The reduced
view of freedom as merely a subjective experience leaves it in a conceptual limbo which has
no real impact or efficacy (Meissner 98). Such view of freedom raises the question as to
whether free will is a psychological capability or simply an illusion. The will is not entirely
determined since there is the possibility of choosing other options within psychological
determinism. One can say that there are certain motives, desires and needs can be so
compelling that the action of the will is coerced and therefore the will is not free in that case.
However, this is always not the case since the very experience free choice can also be seen as
being illusionary. For instance, if I choose to continue to write, and if I do choose to write
then my motive is determined; but I can also choose to do something to something else and I
choose to do then my choice is determined in that case too. In either case the motives for both
the choices are different. However, the choice in both the cases is determined and yet at the
same time free. The evidence of my experience of non-coerced, non-necessitated choice is a
valid piece of evidence that cannot be dubbed as mere illusion (Meissner 99).
-
7/29/2019 Problem of Psychological Determinism
5/8
Determinism and freedom can thus be seen as being mutually exclusive in certain cases when
the action of the will is not coerced by any other factor. The aim of psychoanalysis is to
liberate man from his inner shackles and [help] him to enlarge the sphere of his autonomy
and gain greater self mastery (Dilman 181). In psychoanalysis it is up to the agent to
actually heel the divisions within oneself in order to arrive at a truer self by establishing
autonomy over ones motives and the actions which follow from them. While Freud does not
deny the reality of free will and responsibility (Dilman 189) it is important to question the
very need for psychoanalysis. Why is it that there are divisions within oneself and why would
a person feel the lack of self autonomy over the actions in which he has the choice to act
differently. I think that even if one accepts that there is free will then the mere idea of having
these thoughts shows that there might be some element of determinism entering a free world
scheme. The Scottish psychologist R.D Laing wrote in the Preface to his book TheDivided
Self that "Freud insisted that our civilization is a repressive one. There is a conflict between
the demands of conformity and the demands of our instinctive energies, explicitly sexual.
Freud could see no easy resolution of this antagonism, and he came to believe that in our time
the possibility of natural love between human beings had already been abolished" (11). This
conflict between the demands for conformity and our instinctive energies can be seen as
being at the root of the problem of determinism. What this conflict creates is a feeling of the
lack of autonomy. Laing in his study of people suffering from schizophrenia concluded that
the reason for the madness of these people was because they gave into psychological
determinism and could not make choices in cases where they did have the ability to act
differently. Laing points out that the task in psychotherapy was to make an appeal to the
freedom of the patient in deciding who they would like to be (61).
In how far we are free in making free choices when it comes to performing actions within the
context of psychological determinism is a problem that not only concerned the
psychoanalysts but others as well. With the rise of existentialism in the twentieth-century, an
emphasis is placed on the the quest for authenticity, the shedding of the repressive "ready
made"1 life that society shackles us with in favor of true spontaneity, living in accordance
with one's authentic self (Malinovich 158). Another intellectual group that was concerned
with this problem of psychological freedom was the Hegelian Marxists who emphasized
Marxs early writings on the alienation of the worker within a capitalistic society. They
argued that it is only within a genuinely socialist society could human beings be free to
-
7/29/2019 Problem of Psychological Determinism
6/8
realize their true nature (Malinovich 159). The realization in the twentieth-century that way
modern societies had set themselves up leads to people living their lives in a way which is not
entirely authentic goes to show how difficult it can be to make free choices within the context
of psychological determinism. Psychoanalysis presupposes that it within oneself to define the
way one wants to be. However, the extent of self division, evasion ad self-deception in
human life and of the failures of autonomy in individual lives (Dilman 188-189) make man
inevitably bound up in a way which makes it difficult to exercise freedom in a broader sense.
In Herbert Marcuses Eros and Civilization, he brought together the ideas of existentialism,
psychoanalysis and Hegelian-Marxism (Malinovich 159). In my opinion, he showed that
freedom in the capitalistic world had now become a very limited concept and this has made it
very difficult to exercise autonomy within psychological determinism. Marcuse was severely
critical of the way present societies impose psychological determinism by providing a very
narrow notion of what a persons motives and desires ought to be. I agree with Marcuse,
since many of our most basic motives (that govern are actions) are largely dependent on our
environment and society which are presented to us in a way which makes it very hard to
envisage alternatives or other possible ways of exploring ones potentialities. Malinovich
writes that
One of the few possibilities which comes to mind, in contemporary society, is some
attempt at regulating aspects of the mass media, in particular those which affect the
psychological development of young children. There has been much concern of late
about the effect that the constant portrayal of violence has on children's minds. More
generally, there is concern about the passivity created by the fact that American
children spend a large part of their leisure time watching television and are subjected
to a conditioning based almost entirely on commercial interests. These are dangers
which Marcuse was one of the first to point out-long before they became documented
by studies (177-178)
The problem that the conditioning of the psychological development of young children is
becoming regulated and is highly dependent on external factors is an issue which shows to
what extent the actions of these children are psychologically determined. I have tried to show
that strict determinism is impossible through the theory of psychoanalysis which assumes that
humans do have the ability to choose otherwise and do possess some freedom in cases where
it is available. It is possible to assume that human beings do have free will since determinism
is shown to have been something which is not necessary in all cases. The condition of
-
7/29/2019 Problem of Psychological Determinism
7/8
freedom can be satisfied if a human thinks that his actions are in line with his desires and
motives. However, our actions are very much determined by our motives and desires which
are largely dependent on psychological determinism which is external to human beings.
While free will is a possibility, a limited form of determinism has come into play which has
made it increasingly difficult to choose otherwise due to way societies have set themselves
up. In order to be able to explore a greater possibility of freedom, it is important that
psychological determinism is taken seriously. The conditioning of a persons motives and
desires should aim at providing a greater choice and showing different ways to interpreting
ones environment and exploring other possibilities so that a person may become more
autonomous, self-directing, self-governing, self-rulingabove all sovereignin his decision
making.
-
7/29/2019 Problem of Psychological Determinism
8/8
References
Dilman, Ilham. Free Will: An Historical and Philosophical Introduction. Routledge, 1999.
Freud, Sigmund. The Ego and the Id. The Hogarth Press Ltd. London, 1949
Laing, R.D. The Divided Self. 1990 Reprint. Penguin Books, 1960.
Malinovich, Myriam Miedzian. "On Herbert Marcuse and the Concept of Psychological
Freedom." Social Research Vol 49:1(1982): 158-180.
Meissner, William W.. The Ethical Dimension of Psychoanalysis. SUNY Press, 2003
Wallwork, Ernest. Psychoanalysis and Ethics. Yale University Press, 1991.
Parfit, Derek. "Reasons and Persons." Western Philosophy: An Anthology. Ed. John
Cottingham. 2006 Edition Blackwell Publishing, 1996
Wolf, Susan. "Asymmetrical Freedom." The Journal of Philosophy Vol. 77, No. 3(1980)):
151-166.