proactive presence civilian protection proactive presence · henry dunant centre for humanitarian...

PROACTIVE PRESENCEField strategies

for civilianprotection

Liam Mahony

PROACTIVE PRESENCE FIELD STRATEGIES FOR CIVILIAN PROTECTION

PROACTIVE PRESENCEField strategies for civilian protection

The plight of civilians trapped in war is one of thegreatest challenges of our times. All agree that providingrelief alone is insufficient. The international responsemust equally focus on measures to provide greater protection to civilians.

But what measures? Short of armed peacekeeping,one option is to deploy unarmed international staff -human rights monitors, ceasefire observers, protectionstaff with humanitarian agencies - who through theirpresence will deter abuses.

To be effective, however, those deployed must pursueproactive strategies to deter abuse, encourage localactors and support reform efforts.

This manual describes these strategies. It is the firstcomprehensive study of these issues, based on hundredsof interviews and an analysis of 9 separate missions,covering a range of institutional mandates.

Centre forHumanitarianDialogue

Centre forHumanitarianDialogue

PROACTIVEPRESENCE

Field strategies for civilian protection

Liam M

ahony

Centre for

Hum

anitarianD

ialogue

Ded

ication

This book is dedicated to all those w

ho are strugglingfor their lives,their dignity and the integrity of theirfam

ilies and comm

unities in situations of widespread

violence and abuse.It is they who take the greatest risks

and invariably find the most creative and durable

solutions for confronting violence and transforming

their societies.We w

ho have been privileged to work

beside them,and help in our sm

all way,can only m

arveland respect their courage and resilience in the face ofsuch challenges.

We

would like to thank our donors,in particular the

Rockefeller F

oundation,Foreign A

ffairs Canada and

the Royal N

orwegian M

inistry of Foreign A

ffairs,fortheir generous financial support.

The C

entre for Hum

anitarian Dialogue is an independent

and impartial organisation,based in G

eneva,Switzerland,

dedicated to the promotion of hum

anitarian principles,the

prevention of conflict and the alleviation of its effects

through dialogue.

114,rue de lausanne

ch-1202

geneva

switzerland

[email protected]

t:+ 41 22 908 11 30

f:+41 22 908 11 40

ww

w.hdcentre.org

© C

opyright

Henry D

unant Centre for H

umanitarian D

ialogue,2006

Reproduction of all or part of this publication m

ay be

authorised only with w

ritten consent and

acknowledgem

ent of the source.

Preface and acknow

ledgements

v

IIntroduction

1

PART I BEING THERE AND BEING STRATEGIC

2W

hen field presence protects13

3Inform

ation,analysis and strategy building37

PART II FIVE STRATEGIES OF EFFECTIVE PRESENCE

4S

ustained multi-level diplom

acy49

5C

onscious visibility63

6A

ctive encouragement and em

powerm

ent73

7C

onvening and bridging81

8P

ublic advocacy91

PART III CHALLENGES

9D

o no harm107

10T

he security challenge115

11Institutional challenges

12512

Conclusion

147

Bibliography

148A

nnexe:Methodology of research and interview

s154

Endnotes

156H

D C

entre158

About the author

159L

ist of acronyms and abbreviations

160

Contents

iii

CONTENTS

PREFACE AND ACKNOW

LEDGEMENTS

The plight of civilians trapped in w

ar and misery stands as one of the greatest

challenges of our times.

Increasingly,all those engaged in efforts to address

this situation recognise that providing material assistance alone is insufficient

and that,even as wars continue,m

easures to provide greater protectionto civilians

are required.B

ut what m

easures? Faced w

ith ongoing abuses of human rights and loom

ing oractual hum

anitarian crises,advocates and the media dem

and that something m

ustbe done.

Short of arm

ed peacekeep

ing or intervention,never an easy and not

necessarily a wise choice,one option is to deploy unarm

ed international staff,undera variety of institutional m

andates,in the belief that their presence will offer som

eprotection against abuse.S

everal such deployments have occurred in the past tw

odecades,though w

ith mixed results.U

ntil now,how

ever,there has been no system-

atic study of the techniques and strategies that these field missions can em

ploy tobetter the odds to m

ake a difference on the ground and to protect civilian life andproperty.

In launching the project that led to this publication,we w

anted to put flesh onthe bones of a theory of field-based p

rotection derived from the exp

erience ofhum

an-rights monitors,hum

anitarian protection staff and ceasefire monitors.T

hem

ost effective field workers engaged in civilian protection have an intuitive under-

standing of what should be done,and w

hat techniques work.O

ur aim w

as to recordand analyse this experience,

and then present the concepts underlying it so thatothers can benefit.T

he model w

e offer – of proactivepresence –features the skills

and tactics that international field personnel can use to deter attacks on civilians,toencourage and support local com

munities in their ow

n efforts to ensure security,and to influence governm

ents and authorities to institute and sustain reforms.It is

Prefacev

INTRODUCTION > BEING THERE > STRATEGIES > CHALLENGES

a model based on tapping into the synergies betw

een a strategic local presence,w

ell-informed international pressure and indigenous reform

movem

ents.O

ver 250 interviews w

ere undertaken during research for this book,and they

provide most of our inform

ation here.Those interview

ed include over 100 interna-tion

al field w

orkers with exp

erience in

dozen

s of conflicts,

represen

tatives ofgovernm

ents and armed groups in three field situations,

and mem

bers of civil-society organisations and com

munities in m

any countries.We are especially grateful

to those civil-society respondents in Colom

bia,S

ri Lanka and D

arfur,w

here we

conducted field studies,for taking risks to meet and share their view

s with us.

We

relied on the co-operation of several institutions,including the Office of the

UN

H

igh C

omm

issioner

for H

um

an

Rights

(OH

CH

R),

the In

ternation

alC

omm

ittee of the Red C

ross (ICR

C),T

he United N

ations High C

omm

issioner forR

efugees (UN

HC

R),

the United N

ations Children’s F

und (UN

ICE

F),

the Sri

Lan

ka Mon

itoring M

ission (S

LM

M),

the World

Food

Program

me (W

FP

) inS

udan,P

eace Brigades International,

the Nonviolent P

eaceforce and the United

Nations M

ission in Sudan (U

NM

IS).

Additionally,several people w

ith extensive field experience read and comm

entedon drafts of the report,

or otherwise advised on the project,

especially:N

icholasH

owen

,B

en M

ajekadou

nm

i,Ian

Martin

,M

ichael O’F

laherty,D

iane P

aul,

Christop

he Peschoux,

Roberto R

icci,B

eat Schw

eizer and Marc V

incent.Their

advice and support was extrem

ely useful.We are also grateful to A

lfonso de Colsa,

Lau

rie Gold

man

,G

eoffrey Gresh,Y

vonn

e Hu

tchinson

,M

CM

Iqbal,C

armen

Lozano,John M

ahony,Ram

Manikkalingam

,Larry M

inear,Cecile M

ouly,Yum

ikoN

akagawa,

Roger N

ash and

Michael S

mits for assistan

ce with the p

roject,including translation,research assistance or com

ments on draft reports.

The H

D C

entre aims to contribute to efforts to im

prove the global response toarm

ed conflict.A

key area of our concern is the protection of civilians,w

hetherthrough the direct m

eans of facilitating and encouraging civilian guarantees inceasefires and p

eace agreements,

or indirectly through suggesting strategies toauthorities and international agencies.T

his manual is the third in a series of publi-

cations offering strategic advice and practical guidance.The others in the series are:

1H

umanitarian N

egotiation.A

Handbook for S

ecuring Access,

Assistance and

Protection for C

ivilians in Arm

ed Conflict,

which p

rovides humanitarian field

personnel with an understanding of the basics of good negotiation skills,better

equipping them to defend and w

in acceptance of humanitarian and hum

an-rights principles in the field

Proactive Presencevi

2P

rotection.An A

LN

AP

Guide for H

umanitarian A

gencies,w

hich we co-authored

with O

xfam.T

his book describes the relation of protection to the traditionalassistan

ce activities of hum

anitarian

workers,

and

gives practical advice on

enhancing the former w

ithout jeopardising the latter.

The p

resent book reaches out to an even wider audience,

but with a m

orespecialist m

essage – looking explicitly at those mandated to ensure the protection of

civilians and human rights on the ground.W

e will publish later this year a book

exploring the ideologies held by those who prey on civilians,

and who appear to

disregard basic humanitarian principles.

It is our hope that this manual,

and all our work in this area,

will assist those

international agencies deployed in situations of conflict as they grapple with the

dilemm

as involved in protecting civilians.HD

Centre personnel w

orking on issuesof civilian protection include D

eborah Mancini-G

riffoli and Hugo S

lim,

both ofw

hom contributed to this book.

Ms.

Mancini in particular played a key role in

ensuring the manuscript reached publication.

It was m

y pleasure to co-ordinatetheir w

ork,and that of Liam

Mahony w

ho took the lead in researching and writing

the manual,and w

ith whom

I worked closely to conceive and design the project.

David

Petrasek

Policy D

irectorC

entre for Hum

anitarian Dialogue

Prefacevii


1INTRODUCTION

Ab

out th

is manual: aud

ience and ap

pro

ach

The objective of this manual

This m

anual is intended to help the international comm

unity to make better and

greater use of a powerful tool for protecting civilians:the conscious and proactive

use of unarmed international field m

issions deployed in conflict zones.B

ased ondetailed field research analysing the strengths and w

eaknesses of past field missions,

its objective is to encourage and guide international organisations that might deploy

personnel mandated to protect civilians.

Calling for greater use of such deploy-

men

ts,this m

anu

al offers detailed

strategic and

tactical recomm

end

ations to

achieve the greatest possible protection.U

narmed field m

issions can provide crucial p

rotection,w

hether voicing thecon

cerns of isolated

comm

un

ities in C

olombia,

or defu

sing in

ter-comm

un

altensions in eastern S

ri Lanka.T

hey have provided a cover of safety for besiegedactivists in deteriorating conditions in H

aiti and East T

imor,and built public confi-

dence in fragile periods of reconciliation in El S

alvador and Guatem

ala.Whether

it’s a bold press release or a well-tim

ed visit to a local comm

ander to chat overcoffee,

comm

itted field officers have been constantly imp

rovising creative andpractical steps to prevent abuses – thereby developing the tools of protection.

The w

ell-designed field mission can create an atm

osphere in which the costs of

abuse are more apparent to the perpetrators of violence against civilians.

It canp

rovide a safer sp

ace for civilians p

aralysed an

d stigm

atised by terror tactics,

support reform efforts inside a state apparatus,and create a bridge betw

een partiescut off from

dialogue by extended conflict.

Chapter 1

: Introduction1


Figure 1.1:

Target audience: m

issions that protect w

ith their presence

Target audience: diverse institutions with the com

mon objective of protection

This m

anual should be useful to widely diverse international deploym

ents,includingsecurity/ceasefire m

issions,hum

anitarian missions,

human-rights m

onitoringm

issions,electoral monitoring m

issions and complex U

N peacekeeping presences,

all of which carry out unarm

ed protection.We use broad and inclusive concepts and

terminology,w

ith the objective of rising above any institutionally specific jargon andpresenting a general analysis of protection strategies for all.E

ach organisation will

need to adapt these lessons to its own institutional environm

ent and mission.

Our

objective is to help not only the institutions that send field missions into conflict

zones,but also individual mem

bers of staff working in the field.

Most U

N agencies are accountable to system

-wide com

mitm

ents to integrateprotection into their operations. 1

Many hum

anitarian international non-govern-m

ent organisations (ING

Os) in recent years have also m

ade explicit protectioncom

mitm

ents.

Other in

stitution

s,su

ch as the ICR

C,

UN

HC

R,

OH

CH

R,

and

hum

an-rights

ING

Os

have lon

g-stand

ing

comm

itmen

ts to

protection

.U

nfortunately,the im

plementation of all of these com

mitm

ents in the field is notuniform

,and one still hears,far too often,that ‘protection is someone else’s job’.

This m

anual argues that a wide variety of institutions present in conflict zones

can and should implem

ent protection strategies in the field (Figure 1.1).S

ome have

questioned this broad approach,expressing concerns that the complexity and diffi-

culty of protection work should not be underestim

ated,that professional standardsm

ust be maintained,

and that encouraging organisations to do protection w

orkw

ithout sufficient comm

itment,

training or rigour could dilute the quality of theoverall international approach to protection,

perhaps even also undermining the

Proactive Presence2

Target aud

ience

Com

plexpeacekeeping

mission

Pro

tection

with

Presence

Hum

anR

ightsm

onitoring

Hum

anitarianA

gencyP

resence

Electoral

monitoring

Ceasefire

monitoring

credibility of those who do it w

ell.This concern is reasonable,

which is w

hy thism

anual aims to prom

ote not only a greater quantity of field presence,but also a

higher quality and effectiveness of protection work on the ground.

The few

institutions that may be currently developing a rigorous approach to

protection have insufficient capacity to meet the needs of civilians.

A great deal

more is needed.T

he challenge we face is to learn from

past experience,and to helpeach institution cap

able of contributing substantially to protection strategies to

develop the personnel,training,managem

ent and strategic resources both to offerm

ore protection and to do it well.N

o attempt to achieve this can be perfect,but fear

of imperfection is not sufficient reason not to try.

Hu

man

-rights m

onitorin

g mission

sH

uman-rights m

issions,whether stand-alone m

issions of the OH

CH

R or com

po-nents of a peacekeeping operation,have a clear m

andate for protection.There is an

obvious overlap between ‘protecting civilians‘ and ‘protecting hum

an rights‘.The

practical activities of these missions,how

ever,have sometim

es been too focused onthe collection

of data on

abuses an

d the p

rodu

ction of rep

orts,activities also

emp

hasised in these missions’

training processes.T

his manual calls for a m

orecom

prehensive toolbox,and demonstrates how

flexible human-rights m

issions haveused their presence m

ore creatively to achieve protection goals.

Com

plex p

eace operation

sIn integrated m

issions led by the Departm

ent of Peacekeeping O

perations (DP

KO

)or D

epartment of P

olitical Affairs (D

PA),the activities of hum

an-rights monitors,

political officers and humanitarian,civilian police and m

ilitary components can all

contribute to the protection strategies outlined here.These m

issions tend to bringsubstantial political w

eight,allowing field officers to project protective im

pact much

more effectively.

Although this study has not focused on arm

ed missions of the

‘blue helmet‘ type,these are nevertheless carrying out m

any of the same functions

as those described here in order to maxim

ise their protective impact,and they too

may find this m

anual useful.

Ceasefire m

onitorin

g mission

sC

easefire mission

s sometim

es have fairly limited

man

dates.

Nevertheless,

theinescapable connection betw

een attacks on civilians and the re-escalation of hostil-ities usually creates a built-in link betw

een a ceasefire agreement and the need to

protect civilians.The S

ri Lanka M

onitoring Mission is a case in point:

it has aclassic role of ceasefire m

onitoring,but this falls within an agreem

ent that also artic-ulates broad protection concerns for civilians,opening the door to an active protec-tion role for the m

ission.S

imilarly,

the Kosovo V

erification Mission w

as able tostretch its ‘ceasefire’

mandate to allow

for substantial intervention on behalf of

Chapter 1

: Introduction3


threatened civilians.Although they often focus on m

ilitary skills in their monitoring

and recruitment,these m

issions should also develop a more diverse set of protec-

tion tools to meet their objectives effectively.

Electoral m

onitorin

g mission

sA

n electoral monitoring m

ission might appear to have a straightforw

ard technicalfunction but,w

hen installed in a conflict zone,it takes on a protection role.Insecurityis often a prim

ary motivation dem

anding electoral monitoring,w

hich usually has anobjective of establishing an environm

ent favourable to an effective vote.Thus,

forexam

ple,the UN

Mission in E

ast Tim

or (UN

AM

ET

) in 1999 was officially an elec-

toral monitoring m

ission,but the overwhelm

ing threat to the planned consultation’ssuccess w

as the lack of civilian security,which Indonesian authorities could not or

would not p

rovide.Thus the m

ission became by default a p

rotection mission.

Sim

ilarly,other electoral missions have had to play active roles in protection.

Hu

man

itarian field

presen

ceT

he combined presence in a conflict zone of m

ultiple humanitarian agencies is

often far more extensive than that of purely protective m

issions.Hum

anitarians arealso often present w

here there are no explicit monitoring or protection m

issions atall.

Hum

anitarian protection has already been the subject of significant research,consultation,

publication and field experience. 2E

ach humanitarian organisation

needs to sustain its non-partisanship and its access to victims,

while still taking

advantage of its protective capacity.Most hum

anitarians in the field do not want to

be silent witnesses.T

hey want their presence to protect,

even if that is not theirprim

ary mandate.M

any of those interviewed for this study cited countless exam

-ples of direct and indirect protection achieved by these m

issions.A

humanitarian agency has particular latitude w

hen it is increasing the protec-tive im

pact of its own operations and lim

iting the protection damage of those oper-

ations.It can p

lay a demanding advocacy role,

insisting to other actors that itsprogram

mes be safe and secure and free of risks to civilians.

Beyond sp

ecific humanitarian p

rogramm

es,there are a variety of p

rotectionproblem

s linked to an assistance mandate,w

hich give an agency a reasonable justifi-cation for an active protection role.A

gencies will need to decide for them

selves howfar they can go,taking into account their ow

n capacities,and possible risks to theirassistance w

ork.This m

anual encourages them to consider going outside the im

me-

diate areas of programm

atic operations,in order to increase civilian protection.

Com

plementarity and collaboration

A field m

ission is seldom a stand-alone player.Ideally,in a conflict zone w

ith many

international actors present,there will be a unified approach to protection,in w

hich

Proactive Presence4

each agency includes protection within its m

andate,factors protection concerns

into each of its operations,and understands how

it can contribute to a broaderstrategy.Institutions w

ith different mandates need to develop their ow

n approachesto protection – som

e will be direct,w

ith a role of investigation and even denuncia-tion,w

hile others will be m

ore subtle,allowing them

to contribute in ways that do

not jeop

ardise their other hu

man

itarian m

and

ates.C

o-ordin

ation shou

ld help

different agencies to develop approaches that are complem

entary rather than eithercom

petitive or contradictory.E

ven when there are institutions present w

ith explicit mandates to engage in

protection

advocacy,their cap

acity to respon

d is often

insu

fficient.

Each U

Ncountry team

as a whole needs to co-operate to find solutions to joint problem

s,incollaboration w

ith NG

Os and the international com

munity overall.W

hen the scaleof hum

anitarian agencies’operations increases,their political weight carries w

ith itan obligation of active participation,

including collaboration in joint efforts andindependent protection advocacy.T

his includes sharing information,joint analysis

and assessment,sharing resources and responsibility for advocacy,supporting insti-

tutions mandated to p

lay more active p

rotection roles,facilitating each other’s

access to regions and populations,and defending each other against threats and

attacks.U

nfortunately,turf-battling,inter-agency criticism,and sem

i-public de-legitimi-

sation of other institutions’actions rem

ain comm

on.This lack of unity lim

its thepositive im

plementation of joint protection strategies.

But w

hat is seldom recog-

nised is that this contagious problem of inter-agency squabbling is a protection and

security problem in itself.

It makes every international field w

orker less secure,because the m

essage projected to anyone wanting to attack the international pres-

ence is that the weaker parts of the system

may not be supported by the stronger

ones.It is an open invitation to divide and conquer.International institutions needto develop internal m

echanisms to encourage a positive attitude to collaboration.

There should be som

e discipline and accountability for behaviour and statements

that de-legitimise and w

eaken other institutional allies,and also rewards and incen-

tives for productive,collaborative work.

The international legal framew

ork

International legal standards provide a solid grounding for the various protectionactivities that m

ight be undertaken by field missions.

International humanitarian

law (IH

L) and guidance deriving from

international human-rights law

set clear andreasonably precise rules on w

hat is permissible in term

s of the treatment of civil-

ians,and areas where individuals m

ust be free to exercise their rights.Rules exist to

define everything from the conditions of detention to the lim

its of free speech,notto m

ention all the detailed law concerning the conduct of hostilities.

Chapter 1

: Introduction5


In the past,there w

ere considerable doctrinal debates concerning the appro-priate circum

stances for the application of either IHL

or human-rights law

,and

some sense of contrasting realm

s of legal protection.Today it is refreshing to see

that,after much field experience,m

ost field missions find practical w

ays to use bothsets of legal standards in com

plementary w

ays,playing to the strengths of each.T

his book makes only passing reference to international legal standards,but our

starting point is,of course,

that international action to protect civilians should bebased in law

.International law

is a source of standards and objectives for thefram

ing of a mission’s rules of engagem

ent and entry agreements,

and it can beused as credible and legitim

ate grounds for pressure to change behaviour harmful

to civilians.If we do not deal here w

ith law in greater depth,it is because there are

nu

merou

s other resources in

this field to d

raw on

. 3F

urther,

research for thism

anual found little to suggest that gaps in the law form

obstacles to protection.

Meth

od

olo

gy, term

inolo

gy and

scop

e

Methodology: research and interview

s

The research for this m

anual,described in detail in the Annex,involved in-depth

interviews w

ith over 250 people,including field officers in all m

issions listed inT

able 1.1,as well as representatives of governm

ent,the military,arm

ed groups andcivil society in the conflicts studied.T

he field missions discussed here take m

anyform

s,bu

t they share the characteristic of being in

ternation

ally staffed an

ddeployed w

ith the objective of using their presence to improve,am

ong other things,the protection of civilians.

Terminology used in this m

anual

This m

anu

al will,

for convenien

ce,u

se the terms ‘m

ission’,

‘presen

ce’,‘field

mission’,

and ‘field presence’interchangeably to refer to all the different kinds of

institutional field presence regardless of whether they use the sam

e terms in their

own

self-iden

tification.W

e also refer to practition

ers on the grou

nd

as ‘fieldw

orkers,‘ ‘field personnel’or ‘field officers’,although we know

that in each institu-tion they have different titles.W

e have chosen this general approach in our termi-

nology in order to appeal to the widest range of institutional audiences.

Given the w

ide range of conflicts,w

e have also had to choose terms for the

various actors.We use ‘perpetrator’or ‘abuser’broadly to refer to any institution or

individual actively involved in harming civilians,or w

ith the potential or motivation

to do so– in other words those w

ho we need to protect against.W

e use ‘armed

group’to refer to those rebels,insurgents,etc.,who are entirely independent of state

Proactive Presence6

Chapter 1

: Introduction7


Table 1.1: International m

issions studied and visited during research for thism

anual

Country

Institution(s)/mission

Dates studied

Com

ments

El S

alvadorU

nited Nations (U

N)/

1991 pre-B

oth missions

ON

US

AL

(UN

Mission

ceasefireestablished under a

to El S

alvador)negotiated hum

an-rights accord betw

eenG

uatemala

UN

/ MIN

UG

UA

1994–97 pre-the corresponding

(UN

Mission to

ceasefiregovernm

ent and armed

Guatem

ala)group prior to a final peace agreem

ent or ceasefire.

Haiti

United N

ations (UN

) 1993–94

Established to m

onitorand O

rganization of hum

an-rights abusesA

merican S

tates (OA

S)/

under a military

MIC

IVIH

(International governm

ent after aC

ivilian Mission in H

aiti)coup d’état.

Rw

andaO

HC

HR

(Office of the

1994–97P

ost-genocide human

High C

omm

issioner for rights presence during

Hum

an Rights)/ H

RF

OR

continued arm

ed(H

uman R

ights Mission

conflict.for R

wanda)

Form

er O

SC

E (O

rganisation for O

ctober 1998 V

erification of a ceaseR

epublic ofS

ecurity and Cooperation

– March 1999

fire,prior to NA

TO

Yugoslavia/

in Europe)/ K

VM

(Kosovo

bombing cam

paign.P

rovince of V

erification Mission)

Kosovo

East T

imor

UN

/ UN

AM

ET

May–

Electoral m

onitoring (U

N A

ssistance Mission to

Septem

ber and facilitation of the

East T

imor)

1999popular consultationon autonom

y/independence.

Field visits

Colom

bia P

rimary focus on O

HC

HR

.1995–2005

Hum

an-rights(F

ebruary,S

econdary focus:ICR

Cm

onitoring and2005)

(International Com

mittee

reporting since theof the R

ed Cross),U

NH

CR

m

id-1990s with

(UN

High C

omm

issioner gradually expanding

for Refugees),P

BI (P

eace field presence.

Brigades International)

control,whereas ‘param

ilitary’refers to unofficial armed bodies under state influ-

ence or control.W

ehave chosen to study interventions of a p

rimarily non-m

ilitary nature –hence the frequent use of ‘unarm

ed missions’.T

his phrase implies no judgem

entregarding the efficacy or im

portance of armed peacekeeping m

issions,but rather

that we w

ish to fill a crucial gap in the existing literature.There has been consider-

able study of armed peacekeeping,

but very little has been done to explain theprotective im

pact of unarmed m

issions.We recognise also that there are m

any casesof m

ixed or combined initiatives – arm

ed and unarmed – and the conclusions here

may assist in guiding those efforts too.

The scope and structure of this manual

This m

anual outlines effective strategies and tactics for maxim

ising the protectionof civilians;it addresses significant obstacles to protection,and lays out the institu-tion

al and

organisation

al requirem

ents for im

plem

entin

g effective protective

missions.T

he general strategies here are relevant to protection efforts for all vulner-able groups in conflict areas.T

herefore,this approach does not provide specific

advice tailored to particular vulnerable groups such as children,internally displacedpersons (ID

Ps) or refugees.T

he tools here must be adapted to each context,but the

fundamental ideas rem

ain the same.

Proactive Presence8

Table 1.1: C

ont.

Country

Institution(s)/mission

Dates studied

Com

ments

Field visits

Darfur,

United N

ations 2003–05

Multi-institutional

Sudan

Hum

anitarian Agencies and

humanitarian and

(October,

Peacekeeping M

ission/political presence.

2005)U

NM

IS (U

N M

ission in S

udan)

Sri L

anka N

orway,S

weden,D

enmark,

2002–06C

easefire monitoring

(Decem

ber,Iceland,F

inland/ SL

MM

presence established2005)

(Sri L

anka Monitoring

under 2002 accordM

ission) betw

een the G

overnment of S

ri L

anka and the LTT

E

(Liberation T

igers of T

amil E

elam).

Nor does this book attem

pt to replace other important resources about m

any ofthe activities described.R

ather,it calls attention to complem

entary resources,andtries to p

ut each into context.S

everal resource boxes are included in the text,presenting selected key sources on relevant topics.

The rest of this m

anual is in three parts.In Part I,C

hapter 2 provides an analyt-ical fram

ework explaining the protective im

pact of field presence and presentingevidence for the sensitivity of governm

ents and armed groups to such presence.

Chap

ter 3 discusses the need to build protection strategies based on thorough

processes of information-gathering and analysis.

Part

II consists of five chapters on concrete protection strategies that interna-tion

al organisation

s,N

GO

s and

governm

ents can

app

ly.These are:

sustain

ed

multi-level diplom

acy (Chapter 4),conscious visibility (C

hapter 5),active encour-agem

ent and emp

owerm

ent (Chap

ter 6),bridging and convening m

echanisms

bringing parties together (Chapter 7) and public advocacy (C

hapter 8).In P

art III,on challenges to effective unarm

ed protection,C

hapter 9 looks indetail at the need to avoid negative im

pacts while carrying out positive protection

strategies,including avoiding the risk of reprisals against civilian contacts.Chapter

10 looks at the challenge of mission security.Institutional challenges and the steps

necessary to enable this kind of protection are outlined in Chapter 11.

Chap

ter 12 presen

ts some con

clud

ing thou

ghts,an

d the book en

ds w

ith adetailed bibliography and a note on the m

ethodology used in the research process.

A com

prehensive and positive approach

This m

anual has deliberately taken a positive approach.Draw

ing on a wide range

of experience including not only successes but also very serious errors,w

e haveconcluded that these tools of proactive presence need m

ore support and develop-m

ent.We are not singling out individuals,m

issions or institutions to evaluate andjudge past experience,but w

e are acutely interested in learning from all these expe-

riences – be they successes or failures – to distil learning and best practice.We have

opted to present the majority of these lessons and recom

mendations through posi-

tive experiences and examples.T

his does not mean w

e are unaware of the m

anyproblem

s.Interview

responses,unsurprisingly,

included well-founded criticism

s of indi-vid

ual

and

in

stitution

al failu

res,in

clud

ing

incom

peten

ce,lack

of train

ing,

dangerous errors,breaches of ethics,political manipulation,political cow

ardice andm

uch more.T

hese experiences have contributed significantly to the manual,even if

we

have not dissected them all publicly.O

verall,though,we conclude that these fail-

ings do not contradict the promise and potential of the protective tools of field pres-

ence.

In the few

cases where w

e do call atten

tion to a sp

ecific problem

aticexperience,it is only w

ith the intention of pointing the way forw

ard.

Chapter 1

: Introduction9


This positive approach is not naive.W

e make no claim

that unarmed field pres-

ence will alw

ays be enough,or will alw

ays be the right choice when civilian lives are

threatened.And the specific chapters below

on tools and strategies unequivocallyargue that presence alone is not enough:it m

atters what you do

with the presence.

This m

anual is intended to help each mission to m

ake these choices.

Proactive Presence1

0


PART ONEBEING THERE AND BEINGSTRATEGIC

12

2W

HEN FIELD PRESENCE PROTECTS

How

do we stop abuses against civilians? T

his manual focuses on proactive

protection:

actions and strategies that deter or dissuade against abuses,persuade abusers to behave differently,strengthen or expand civilian capacity

for self-protection,and foster institutional reform.In som

e cases proactive presencecan even influence the dynam

ics of conflict or other structures that promote abuse

of civilians,thus preventing or protecting against future victimisation. 4

This chapter explains w

hy such an approach is necessary.It lays out a fram

e-w

ork for understanding the multi-faceted im

pact of proactive presence,analyses

the mechanism

s which m

ake it effective and summ

arises some of the research

results that prove its effectiveness.

Need

for lo

cal presence

People have m

any mechanism

s for self-protection,and the state itself has a funda-m

ental legal resp

onsibility to p

rotect.When

these efforts do n

ot prod

uce an

outcom

e of true p

rotection,

the intern

ational com

mu

nity can

and

mu

st help.H

owever,international response strategies often have lim

ited impact because they

are mainly directed at top

-level decision makers.T

he international comm

unityapplies incentives or threats from

outside the conflict to persuade or deter govern-m

ents or armed-group leaderships to cease the abuse of civilians (F

igure 2.1).International pressure is im

portant,but often insufficient.System

ic abuses are aproduct of the collaboration of a variety of actors at m

any levels,all of which need

to be influenced.The w

ords spoken at the UN

Security C

ouncil need to be trans-lated into direct pressure and action on the ground by diplom

ats,embassies,donor

agencies and others.The pressure reaching a state or arm

ed group must go dow

nthe chain of com

mand.

13


Chapter 2

: When field presence protects

Unfortunately,

the transmission of top

-level international pressure is highly

uncertain.S

tates and armed groups have developed nim

ble counter-measures to

side-step pressure.This is illustrated in F

igure 2.2.D

ecision makers deflect and

undermine

pressure,using propaganda to destroy the legitimacy of accusing organ-

isations,isolating and stigmatising targeted civilian groups or shifting attention to

the actions of their enemies.T

hey also develop buffering mechanism

s to absorb andco-opt international pressure w

ithout overt denials,including the creation of stateagencies to deal w

ith international concerns.This ploy allow

s the state to claim that

it is taking all possible measures.N

on-state armed groups also create such buffers,

Proactive Presence1

4

Figure 2.1: W

ithout

presence: interna-

tional pressure

focuses only on

top-level decision

makers.

Figure 2.2:

Decision m

akers

evade international

pressure and

obscure

accountability

Perp

etrator

Internationalpressure

Targeted civilians

Decision

makers

Chain of

comm

and

Perp

etrator


Deflectors

and buffers

Targeted civilians

Decision

makers

Sm

okescreens

‘It’s not really me’

their political wings absorbing international pressure,

while their abusing m

ilitaryand intelligence w

ings remain offstage.

Abuser states and arm

ed groups also createsm

okescreens to evade responsibilityfor abuses,

even while adm

itting that they occur.A

comm

on and devastatinglyeffective sm

okescreen is the use of paramilitary or death-squad operations – often

either secretly un

der m

ilitary control,

or allowed

imp

un

ity to pu

rsue agen

das

convenient to the state.In other cases,

justifications such as ‘lack of discipline’or

‘loose cannons’distance the high-level decision makers from

the abuses.Banditry

and ‘accidents’also com

monly cam

ouflage political attacks.

Sm

okescreens giveboth the abusing party and its international allies a level of plausible deniabilityw

hen faced with accusations.

In the face of such counter-measures,

internationalresp

onse strategies n

eed to be com

plem

ented

by more targeted

and

effectiveprotective action.

As illustrated in F

igure 2.3,international field presence strengthens the interna-tional response to stop attacks on civilians in three crucial w

ays.

1 Targ

eting th

e entire chain o

f com

mand

:International presence projects the

visible concern of the international comm

unity to the entire chain of comm

andof abuser groups.F

ield officers interact with all ranks of the m

ilitary and civilianhierarchy,

national and local,ensuring their aw

areness of international conse-quences.

No other international effort can m

atch a field presence’s direct visi-bility to ground-level perpetrators.

2 R

evealing resp

onsib

ilities:M

onitoring and investigation on the ground canhelp

reveal relationships of resp

onsibility among arm

ed actors,for instance

Chapter 2


15

INTRODUCTION > BEING THERE > STRATEGIES > CHALLENGESFig

ure 2.3:

Proactive presence

strengthens

pressure at all

levels

Perp

etrator

Targeted civilians

Decision

makers

Chain of

comm

and

Pro

active presence

•Targets entire chain

•R

eveals responsibilities•

Strengthens international

comm

itment


‘‘ between a state and param

ilitaries.This increases accountability and,

to some

extent,combats counter-m

easures such as smokescreens.

3 S

trength

ening internatio

nal com

mitm

ent:W

hen an attack or harassment

happensdespite

international presence,the international comm

unity is likely toreact m

ore quickly than if there had been no international presence.Em

bassiesand hom

e governments w

ill engage more forcefully in p

rotection,esp

eciallyw

hen their own citizens are present in a m

ission and at risk,adding to pressureon top-level decision m

akers.

Three key functions of effective presence: deterrence, encouragement and

influence

A large field m

ission can protect proactively in three basic ways,through:

1deterrence – by constraining abusers from

carrying out attacks 2

encouragement – by encouraging civil society’s capacity to protect itself

3influence – by supporting progressive voices inside abusive or negligent institu-tions and p

romoting reform

s;these reform

ers can themselves contribute to

constraining abuse and encouraging civil society,and can p

ossibly prom

otelon

ger-term in

stitution

al reform to help

a governm

ent fu

lfil its protection

responsibility.

The follow

ing three sections look in more detail at each of these approaches.

Deterrence: co

nstraining ab

users

The decision to harm

civilians never occurs in a vacuum – choices are alw

ays beingm

ade.

Every d

ecision is affected

by a series of calculation

s and

percep

tions,

whether m

ade by a single individual or many actors in a com

plicated chain of

comm

and.A field m

ission can influence these decisions by creating circumstances

in which perpetrators recalculate the consequences and m

ake a different choice.A

nd every interaction between field officers and potential abusers – state or arm

edgroup – is an opportunity for influence.

‘If a comm

unity is completely abandoned,

the political cost of abusingsom

eone’s rights there is nil.If a local official denounces the abuse,

thecost is a little higher.B

ut if the international comm

unity makes it presence

directly known there,

the perceived cost is that much higher.

It doesn’telim

inate the risk,but it lowers the probability of the abuse.’

OH

CH

R field officer in C

olombia

Proactive Presence1

6

Chapter 2


17

INTRODUCTION > BEING THERE > STRATEGIES > CHALLENGESA

graphic model,based on the concept of political space,can help to explain how

a field mission constrains the behaviour of abusers. 5

In a comp

lex situation ofconflict,

soldiers,governm

ent officials or mem

bers of armed groups consider a

broad array of possible political or military actions.

Each action results in certain

consequences,or costs and benefits.T

he actors perceive some consequences as

acceptable,some as not acceptable,and thus define for them

selves the limits of a

distinct political space (Figure 2.4).‘A

cceptable’here refers to attacks that perpe-trators feel they can carry out w

ith impunity from

harsh consequences.P

erpetrators’notions of ‘acceptable’

consequences can be fluid over time,

andw

ill vary greatly among individuals and organisations.S

ome m

ay be aware of the

complex costs of attacking civilians,and go out of their w

ay to prevent them,w

hileothers m

ay be more attuned to other dynam

ics.Usually,perpetrators have interests

and motivations for being sensitive to international presence.E

ffective internationalpresence plays on all of these interests and m

otivations,reducing the am

ount ofabusive actions that rem

ain acceptable to the abuser (Figure 2.5).

Figure 2.4: The political

space for abusers’ actions

Figure 2.5:P

resence reduces

the political space for actions

acceptable to abusers

Actions w

ith acceptable

consequences (Impunity)

Actions w

ith unacceptable

consequences

Actions w

ith acceptable

consequences

Effect o

f pro

tective presence

Actions w

ith unacceptable

consequences

‘‘ The m

echanisms of leveraging international pressure on state actors are w

idelyunderstood.C

ivilian and military state actors are concerned w

ith their reputationam

ong other states,and the impact of this reputation on a vast array of political and

economic benefits they desire from

the rest of the world.L

eaders and politicians areanxious,em

otionally and politically,for their personal reputations.And often they

are concerned for their reputation within the civilian population;since the popula-

tion may respect and need the international presence,the state m

ay in turn have tobe responsive to this popular concern.

What is less com

monly assum

ed,but equally im

portant to recognise,

is thatarm

ed groups and p

aramilitary organisations are also sensitive to international

concerns.All parties are likely to be concerned if international pressure can cut off

their access to goods,m

oney,political support,

weapons or other key resources.

Most are sophisticated enough to recognise that their international reputation can

affect this access to resources.A

nd there is some evidence of grow

ing concernabout the risk of international prosecution for serious crim

es.Box 2.1 features key

factors contributing to the sensitivities of paramilitaries and arm

ed groups with

respect to international presence.

‘In

Catatu

mbo,

we

did

a

visit accom

pan

ied

by P

eace B

rigades

International.We w

ere stopped at a paramilitary roadblock.

PB

I made

phone calls and the paramilitaries m

ade phone calls and they let usthrough.T

he paramilitaries respect international presence…

they are try-ing to institutionalise them

selves legally.The collaboration w

ith the state isvery

clear… T

he paramilitaries are steadily occupying governm

ent posi-tions,and this m

akes the situation more delicate for them

.’

Colom

bian human-rights law

yer

Bo

x 2.1:Interests of armed groups and param

ilitaries that promote deterrence

Arm

ed grou

ps op

posin

g the state

�Independent arm

ed groups have international strategies and internationalreputations.T

he KL

A strategy in K

osovo,for instance,was entirely based on

internationalising the

conflict by

building alliances.

The

FM

LN

in

El

Salvador and the U

RN

G in G

uatemala readily discussed their hum

an-rightsbehaviour w

ith the international comm

unity,and alw

ays hoped to sustain agood international im

age .

Proactive Presence1

8

Bo

x 2.1:Cont.

�A

rmed groups seek to m

inimise the discrepancy betw

een the popular legiti-m

acy they claim and their ow

n behaviour towards the population.

�T

hese groups receive support from other states or from

diaspora comm

uni-ties,both of w

hom can be influenced by international pressure.T

he LTT

E,

for example,desires to keep liaison offices functioning in W

estern capitals forboth political and fundraising purposes.

�A

rmed groups run,

or benefit from,

multim

illion-dollar international busi-nesses,

whose operations can be interrupted or obstructed by state policies.

The F

AR

C in C

olombia w

as affected,for instance,

by US

drug policies,as

were W

est African guerrilla m

ovements by international diam

ond-trade regu-lations.

�T

heir reputation for abusing or respecting civilians can facilitate or hinder theaccess their enem

y (the state) has to military and econom

ic aid.The w

orse arebel group behaves,the easier it is for external governm

ents to justify sup-port to the state,econom

ically and militarily.

�Ideological alliances can prom

ote sensitivity.T

he EL

N in C

olombia,

forinstance,

has roots in the Catholic C

hurch and has explicitly responded tointernational

civilian protection

concerns and

Church

mediation

– for

instance,by voluntarily foregoing the use of anti-personnel mines.

�O

ngoing negotiations often bring benefits to armed groups,

and abusivebehaviour can threaten such processes.

Param

ilitary group

s influ

enced

by or allied

with

the state

�P

aramilitary groups also share concerns for their reputation,

popular legiti-m

acy,and economic interests.

�In addition,param

ilitary groups are influenced by state support,whether tacit

or direct,and are therefore sensitive to many of the sam

e pressures as states.F

or instance,groups such as the F

RA

PH

in Haiti,

the civilian patrols inG

uatemala,

the pro-autonomy m

ilitias in East T

imor,

the auto-defensasin

Colom

bia or the Janjaweed

in Darfur w

ere all reachable by international pres-sure channeled through the state,even in cases of purported ‘autonom

y’.�

Param

ilitary leaders often have future mainstream

political ambitions,adding

to concerns about legitimacy.

�P

aramilitary groups often benefit directly from

international military aid to

their state supporters,and they may not w

ish to endanger this flow of sup-

port by damaging the national reputation.

�In transitional situations,param

ilitaries fear that the state may turn on them

in a search for scapegoats to prosecute.

Chapter 2


19


‘‘ In addition to these leadership-level sensitivities,there are also reasons for middle-

and lower-rank perpetrators of any arm

ed party to pay attention to internationalpresence.

In a disciplined structure,there m

ay be orders or less direct messages

transmitting global concerns from

the top down and exerting control over behav-

iour in the presence of foreigners.Even w

ithout overt orders,middle- and low

-levelagents tend to fear any steps that m

ight not be approved by their superiors or might

in any way get them

into trouble.A

n international presence is often a new and

unknown factor for these local agents;it creates uncertainty,causing them

to inhibittheir behaviour.In addition,if for reasons of class,social standing,culture,profes-sion or rank they perceive the international observer to have com

parably higherstatus than them

selves,this creates a further inhibition.D

espite these many sensitivities,

however,

there will still be repressive actions

with consequences acceptable to the abuser.T

he Rw

andan government after the

genocide,for instance,was far m

ore worried about ongoing insurgency than about

international opinion,

and did not pay m

uch of a price for som

e of its abusesagainst civilians.T

he LTT

E in S

ri Lanka,

apparently for military reasons,

keptrecruiting children despite consistently high levels of international rebuke and localin

ternation

al presen

ce,an

d kep

t assassinatin

g Tam

il dissid

ents even

when

thevictim

s had exp

licitly built con

nection

s with the in

ternation

al comm

un

ity forprotection.

The im

pact of international presence,therefore,is incremental,not total.E

ven ifpresence fails to deter im

mediately,

however,

it may in tim

e reduce perpetrators’perceived political space.International presence m

oves the border between accept-

able and unacceptable action,and thus provides real protection.

The crucial role of perceptions

But no one know

s exactly where those borders are!T

his ever-present uncertainty canactually increase the im

pact of international presence.Each actor is guessing about

the possible rep

ercussions of their choices,taking calculated risks and m

akingm

istakes (Figure 2.6).

Perpetrators base their decisions on their ow

n perceptionsand estim

ates of what consequences they m

ight suffer.L

acking certainty aboutfuture outcom

es,they may base these estim

ates on a fairly realistic analysis,simple

Proactive Presence2

0

‘Serbian m

ilitary tanks were terrorising an A

lbanian Kosovar village w

ithregular tank bom

bardments.T

he Kosovo V

erification Mission placed a

bright orange vehicle and personnel visibly in the town square,24 hours a

day.The bom

bardments stopped.T

he tanks pulled away.’

Kosovo M

ission verifier

prejudice,a reactive attempt to avoid repeating past m

istakes – or any number of

other psychological factors.They learn by trial and error,and the errors are costly.

Increased

un

certainty an

d u

np

redictability are fu

nd

amen

tal characteristics ofconflict. 6

The arrival of an international m

ission in the conflict zone shrinks boththe real and perceived range of acceptable attacks against civilians (F

igure 2.7).A

n international field presence can guarantee costly consequences of som

eattacks.

At best,

the abuser w

ill accurately foresee this cost an

d refrain

fromattacking civilians.S

ri Lankan A

rmy officials,for instance,affirm

ed that their men

worry about being observed m

isbehaving in front of SL

MM

monitors,

and most

other observers concurred that the army had been very w

ell-behaved since them

onitors’arrival.Or,in contrast,the abuser m

ay miscalculate,m

ake a blunder and

Chapter 2


21


Figure 2.6:

Abusers’ political

space – real and

perceived

Figure 2.7:

Presence reduces

the overall space for

abuse

Actions w

ith unacceptable consequences

Overcautious

Unexpected

blunders

Real B

order

Actions w

ith acceptable consequences

Actions w


Overcautious

Real border w

ith presence

Actions w


Perceived border

Perceived border

Overall effect of protective p

resence

Unexpected

blunders

‘‘‘‘ pay a cost.In Alta V

erapaz,Guatem

ala,for example,the arm

y might have prevented

a 1994 massacre of recently returned refugees had it know

n that the subsequentoutcry w

ould force a defence minister’s resignation and speed calls for m

ilitaryreform

.O

ne U

NA

ME

T field

officer described

how the arrival of the in

ternation

alm

ission in East T

imor affected different m

embers of the Indonesian m

ilitary – eachreacting according to their ow

n calculations of the influence of the mission on their

political space:

‘They [the Indonesian m

ilitary] had always had the luxury of going unob-

served.N

o monitoring.

No reporting.

Now

everything was different –

everything would be know

n.It could get them

into trouble.S

ome w

eregenuinely w

orried.Others still knew

that they could get away w

ith it.’

UN

AM

ET

field officer

The m

oral authority a mission represents can also inhibit abusive action.M

oralityis one of the factors considered in any calculation of choices.H

uman beings gener-

ally wan

t to believe themselves to be hon

ourable.

Peop

le comm

itting acts of

violence will usually seek w

ays to do so without being observed and w

ithout beingblam

ed.If a presence can raise moral doubts,this can inhibit attacks

Som

etimes,the international presence protects by ‘helping’the abuser to avoid

mistakes – because the m

ission can overtly warn against a blunder.

Consider this

incident before the East T

imor consultation,

where the threat of political em

bar-rassm

ent prompted positive state action:

‘To m

e one incident epitomises it all.T

he consultation was scheduled for

Monday A

ugust 30.O

n Friday,

Mem

mo had been burnt dow

n.We had

800 nervous students.O

n Saturday the Indonesian C

hief of Intelligencecam

e to Maliana as a response to all the m

ayday signs.We m

et with the

highest level.I showed the generals the burnt villages and I gave them

anultim

atum:“‘W

e will not run the consultation in this region unless:(a) you

return and attend a reconciliation meeting;

(b) you do an information

campaign.W

e will not run it unless you agree.T

hen the whole w

orld spot-light w

ill be on Maliana”…

On S

unday the Bupati [local leader] convened

the meeting w

e had demanded.

And they w

ent around with loudspeak-

ers…It all cam

e down to street sense.W

e had some degree of leverage.

They knew

they had to react fast.They did not w

ant a “no consultation”to put a spotlight on this particular area.’

UN

AM

ET

political officer,East T

imor

Proactive Presence2

2

Bo

x 2.2:Factors com

plicating the impact of deterrence

�A

poor chain of comm

and cannot comm

unicate pressure efficiently toagents on the ground.

�K

ey players,for reasons of education or specific political analysis,may not

share the values or make the calculations the international com

munity

expects or hopes for.�

Schism

s and power struggles in an arm

ed or civilian institution can eclipseconcerns about external consequences of actions.D

ivisions in SL

M/A

,forinstance,com

plicated international humanitarian access to som

e parts ofD

arfur in 2005.Turf battles betw

een Colom

bian paramilitary groups have

had devastating civilian consequences.The 2004 split in the LT

TE

in Sri

Lanka led to an upsurge in LT

TE

attacks on civilians suspected of alliancew

ith the dissident Karuna faction.

�If an arm

ed group has economic self-sufficiency and believes it has funding

and weapons to sustain itself at w

ar for a long time,it can afford to w

orryless about today’s international rebuke:its cost–benefit calculation is longer-term

.�

Political or m

ilitary situational changes can also reduce sensitivity.For

example,w

hen war becam

e inevitable in Kosovo,Y

ugoslavian military sensi-

tivity to KV

M’s m

onitoring diminished.T

he Rw

andan army w

as less sensi-tive to H

RF

OR

monitoring w

henever it faced increasing insurgency.�

States and arm

ed parties can develop counter-strategies to neutralise theeffect of international pressure or underm

ine the legitimacy of a m

issionover tim

e.They m

ay be studying carefully external international pressure asw

ell as field behaviour,and calibrating their own responses to m

anipulatethe international com

munity.

�International actors send m

ixed messages,som

etimes saying one thing in

public and another behind closed doors,and perhaps continuing to deliverarm

s or development aid to abusers,or m

aintaining silence in the face ofserious ongoing abuses.T

hese ambivalent or contradictory m

essages callinto question the strength of the international reaction that a m

ission canthreaten to m

obilise.

Factors complicating deterrence

Several different factors can lim

it the deterring impact of a presence,and m

ust beconsidered carefully in a m

ission’s analysis (Box 2.2).T

hese factors diminish but

do not eliminate the protective im

pact of the field presence.Therefore,international

presence will not alw

ays be sufficient to reverse policies of abuse in the short run.

Chapter 2


23


Proactive Presence2

4

In Haiti in 1993,M

ICIV

IH could not persuade G

eneral Cedras to allow

the returnof P

resident Aristide,nor to stop his crackdow

n on civilian activists.HR

FO

R did

not p

ersuad

e the Rw

and

an arm

y to hold back from

retaliatory action again

staccused insurgents,w

ith great civilian cost.The international presence in C

olombia

or Darfur did not reverse tw

o of the worst displacem

ent crises worldw

ide.N

evertheless,the deterrence of proactive presence has a positive effect in most

cases.E

very mission needs strategies to take advantage of the concerns felt by

armed actors regarding international p

ressure.If those strategies also take into

account the potential complicating factors,they can effectively find w

ays to changethe behaviour of perpetrators and protect civilians.

Enco

uragem

ent: supp

orting

civilians pro

tecting

them

selves

Protection is also about em

pow

ering peop

le to organise to protect them

selves.C

ivilian integrity and human rights are m

ost readily respected,

protected and

fulfilled when people and com

munities are strong enough to assert and claim

theirrights.In essence,people are their ow

n best protectors.In most situations they seek

peaceful solutions to the challenge of self-preservation,but the pressures of violenceand repression close off their opportunities for developing those solutions.A

n inter-national field presence can encourage and strengthen local unarm

ed strategies.C

ivilians also make choices,

according to the political space available to them.

They too consider a broad array of possible political actions to w

hich they attributeacceptable or unacceptable consequences (F

igure 2.8).Their notion of acceptable

consequences can change depending on the individual or organisation,and over

time.F

or some civilians,torture,or the death of a fam

ily mem

ber might be the m

ostunbearable consequence.F

or others,just the threat of this would be unacceptable.

An organisation m

ight be willing to risk the death of a m

ember,but not the annihi-

lation of the whole group.S

ome com

munities w

ill choose displacement as a result

of certain threats,while other com

munities w

ill resist for longer.E

ffective international presence increases civilians’range of action in diverse

ways.S

ome com

munities w

ho stayed on their lands in war zones,for instance,have

asserted that without international presence,they w

ould have chosen to leave theirhom

es.For a public servant in C

olombia,w

orking honestly for the rule of law m

aybe risky to both life and reputation,but doing this side by side w

ith a UN

partner isless threatening.

Nevertheless,

even with such encouragem

ent there will still be

choices resulting in unacceptable consequences (Figure 2.9).

Civilians,like other decision m

akers,face uncertainty about which actions m

ightor m

ight not be acceptable (Figure 2.10).P

eople base their decisions on their own

percep

tions an

d estim

ates of what con

sequen

ces they might su

ffer.L

acking

certainty about future outcomes,they m

ay base these estimates on a sophisticated

analysis,an emotional reaction to a past traum

a or any number of other psycholog-

ical factors.A

s a result of this uncertainty,civilians m

ay do things they think are safe,but

then get hurt – they walk into unexpected danger.

For exam

ple,a young factory

worker in C

olombia m

ay consider it too dangerous to be an outspoken union

leader,deciding that it is safer to be just a quiet,rank-and-file mem

ber;but then sheis killed anyw

ay.O

n the other hand,civilians also choose not to do things that in

reality would have acceptable consequences:

they experience inhibition becausefear has been instilled so effectively.A

t a different factory,for instance,workers m

aybe too scared even to talk about unionising;yet perhaps there w

ould be no reper-

Chapter 2


25


Figure 2.8: Political space

for civilian action

Figure 2.9: International pres-

ence increases space for civilian

action

Actions w

ith acceptable

consequences

Actions w

ith unacceptable

consequences

Actions w

ith acceptable

consequences

Effect o

f pro

tective presence

Actions w

ith unacceptable

consequences

cussions at all.Inhibition is especially strong in situations of deliberate authoritarianterrorism

,w

here nearly all political or social action is rep

ressed;only p

assivityappears to have acceptable consequences.

The key im

pact of international presence is that it expands both the real andp

erceived range of acceptable action for civilians (F

igure 2.11).The p

resencelow

ers the costs of some p

reviously d

angerou

s actions by d

eterring abu

se.It

encourages civilians to be less fearful or inhibited,and thus to carry out actions thatw

ere not dangerous but were previously thought

to be dangerous.Nonetheless,the

presence cannot remove all risk of m

istakes.Som

e actions are now m

ade relativelysafe,though civilians m

ay still exercise caution and not take advantage of this recu-perated space.T

here may be new

unexpected dangers:civilians may believe som

eactions to be safer now

,while in fact they are not.T

hey could then walk confidently

into new dangers.A

mission needs to w

ork with civilians to ensure that the expec-

tations it creates are not unrealistic (see Chapter 9,

Do no harm

.) If this risk iscontrolled,the net result of the presence is an expansion of both the security andthe range of activity of civilians.

Field

presen

ce also coun

teracts the isolation an

d stigm

atisation that often

weakens civilians in the face of threats.T

he role of a mission as a first-hand w

itnessstrengthens the legitim

acy of local civilian comm

unities and organisations,addingto the overall international effort to protect them

,and thus adds an additional costto be considered by those w

ho threaten these comm

unities.F

or civilians,as for

perpetrators,the im

pact of international presence is incremental,

not total.B

ut ifthe ability to attack has been lim

ited,then presence is a real protection.If civilianscan carry out significant political activities that they w

ould otherwise have avoided,

then the presence has encouraged non-violent civil society.

Proactive Presence2

6

Figure 2.10:R

eal

and perceived

space for civilian

action

Actions w


Inhibition

Danger

Real B

order

Actions w


Perceived border

Influence: Sup

po

rting refo

rmers and

chang

ing so

cietalattitud

es

Policies of abuse are sustained by institutional structures and collective attitudes,

within w

hich norms and stereotyp

es developed to justify those abuses are left

unchallenged.A

n international mission’s p

resence calls these assump

tions intoquestion,confronting stigm

as and stereotypes,and publicly promoting a m

essageof respect for civilian rights and safety.T

hrough its relationship with the state and

armed groups,and through support of legitim

ate and comm

itted reformers,a field

presence pushes state institutions to fulfil their roles,rather than serve as buffers toco-opt pressure.

States and arm

ed groups are neither monolithic nor static,and a field m

ission isin a unique position to identify and support those forces in each institution that canprom

ote policies of respect for civilians.In a governm

ent,an arm

y or an armed

group,there are always m

ultiple forces at work:internal conflicts,pow

er strugglesand m

ultiple agendas.Institutional behaviour is thus a function of the interplay

among m

ultiple actors’calculations and choices.The com

plex nature of these insti-tutions presents problem

s as well as opportunities for a field m

ission’s protectiveim

pact.T

he moral authority of a m

ission can affect the calculations of people in variousparts of a governm

ent or societal structure,causing snowball effects.A

buse of civil-ians is an em

barrassment that m

any would like to ignore,but a visible m

ission pres-ence does not let them

.Meanw

hile,when m

ission staff build personal relationshipsand overtly encourage individual reform

ers or promote reform

structures,these

individuals and structures can alter the internal discourse in a repressive system.

Chapter 2


27


Figure 2.11:

Presence increases

overall space for

civilian action

Actions w


Real border w

ith presence

Actions w


Perceived borderD

anger

Overall effect of protective

Inhibitionp

resence

‘‘ Personal connections create channels for m

oral pressure with protective influence.

These sm

all changes accumulate,

and to a certain extent people begin adjustingtheir choices w

ithin this new m

oral reality.Thus,strengthening voices of reform

canslow

ly shift collective attitudes,making attacks on civilians less acceptable.

The com

plex political and social composition of large institutions presents a

field mission w

ith opportunities for constructively influencing decisions that affectcivilians.A

field mission can develop relationships w

ith decision makers of all ranks,

across the geographic territory and in a variety of professional functions.Its legiti-m

acy and its perceived links to multiple sources of international pow

er give it director subtle influence on m

any fronts.M

ost intergovernmental m

issions are formally placed in a strong position to

develop such influential relationships with state institutions,through m

emoranda of

understanding,technical support partnerships,or negotiation processes.While it is

crucial to sustain independence and avoid being co-opted,a mission can use these

relationships to augment its protection.Institutional allies not only prom

ote institu-tion

al change,

they also bring m

oral and

political p

ressure to bear on

theircolleagues.T

hese allies not only help efforts to protect civilians.They m

ay needprotection them

selves.And strengthening their voices and proposed reform

s canslow

ly shift collective attitudes,making civilian abuse less acceptable.

‘Even inside of questionable branches of the state,there are positive fac-

tors and people at work.Y

ou can gain their confidence and reinforce theircapacities.O

ver time you becom

e allies towards a com

mon objective.’

OH

CH

R field officer,C

olumbia

Mutually reinforcing im

pacts

The deterrence,

encouragement and influence functions of proactive protection

should be mutually reinforcing.T

he strength of civil society to protect itself is oneof the costs that p

erpetrators have to consider,

so when international p

resencestrengthens civilian capacity to respond,this can further inhibit attacks.L

ikewise,

since the fear of attack can be the major inhibitor of civilian organising and reform

activity,effective deterrence further increases civilian space and increases opportu-nities for progressive internal reform

s.And the greater the influence and relation-

ships a mission has w

ithin a state or armed group,

the more points of leverage it

should have available for deterrence.

Proactive Presence2

8

Do

es it wo

rk?

Every field m

ission studied in the research for this manual had evidence of positive

protection results – including deterrence of attacks,encouragement of civilians and

influ

ence over in

stitution

s.C

ivilians in

terviewed

were n

early un

anim

ous in

asserting that international presence encouraged their cap

acity to function in aconflict zone.

State officials explained how

field missions had influenced govern-

ment behaviour and even helped them

to promote reform

s or legislation.

Perpetrators are more sensitive than initially assum

ed

The deterrence im

pact of international presence on perpetrators is the hardest tom

easure.It is usually difficult to quantify,or even to prove that an abuse has beenprevented,as so m

any other variables contribute to the behaviour of those posingrisks to civilians in conflict.S

ubjective measurem

ents using individual impressions

can also be misleading.F

or example,tim

e and again during research,field officersseriously underestim

ated the effect of their mission on civilian security.T

hey oftendiscounted their influence by characterising arm

ed parties in specific conflicts asim

mune to pressure,possessing ‘total autonom

y’or exhibiting ‘pure delinquency’.Y

et the same resp

ondents would then often share exam

ples dem

onstrating thatthese sam

e ‘thugs’did indeed respond to international pressure. 7

Overall,the evidence suggests that there is usually a good deal m

ore sensitivityam

ong abusers than is initially assumed by those unfam

iliar with a given conflict or

the complex w

orkings of the parties involved.Box 2.3 provides a sum

mary of the

effectiveness of proactive protection in the nine cases studied in detail for this book.A

rmed actors routinely show

ed that they were factoring international presence into

their decisions,and there are numerous exam

ples of explicit reactions of moderated

behaviour due to the presence.T

he sensitivity of each state and armed group to international presence is of

varying intensity,but w

as evident even in situations in which w

arring parties didnot yet appear to have an incentive to m

ake peace,and w

here security situationsw

ere deterioratin

g.Their sen

sitivity can exp

and

or deteriorate over tim

e in a

conflict,indicating the need for strategies both to increase influence over time and

to defend a mission against counter-strategies intended to w

eaken its effect.The

question,therefore,is not ifabusers are sensitive to influence,persuasion or pres-

sure,but rather howsensitive they are,to w

hat kinds of influence,and what are the

appropriate channels of persuasion or leverage.

Chapter 2


29


Bo

x 2.3: Impact of proactive presence in nine conflicts

El S

alvador:

ON

US

AL

’s presence helped to sustain confidence in the peaceprocess,influencing extrem

e sectors of both sides to hold back from under-

mining it.O

NU

SA

L negotiated unprecedented access to the S

alvadoran legalsystem

,with staff m

embers actively intervening in num

erous cases to ensureprotection of due process as w

ell as to confront impunity.

Haiti:T

he initial arrival of MIC

IVIH

brought an ‘aura of international authority’w

hich calmed the violence for a period.

Later,

even as the security situationdeteriorated,

staff still intervened successfully on behalf of individuals.The

1994 expulsion of MIC

IVIH

II by the de facto government w

as seen as proofthat the regim

e saw the presence as inhibiting its range of action.

Gu

atemala:

MIN

UG

UA

also had an imm

ediate confidence-building effect forthe p

opulation and the p

arties.T

he regular app

earance of MIN

UG

UA

personnel on their doorsteps forced local comm

anders and militias to ‘interna-

tionalise’their local strategies of control and pay attention,despite decades ofim

punity.MIN

UG

UA

reporting and investigations also brought about notablechanges in state behaviour.

Local com

munities m

ade strategic use of theM

INU

GU

A’s encouraging presence to prevent harassm

ent by state authorities.

Rw

and

a:D

espite intense state counter-insurgency and the low post-genocide

credibility of the in

ternation

al comm

un

ity,H

RF

OR

man

aged in

certainperiods to develop a productive dialogue w

ith the government and the m

ili-tary,bringing num

erous concerns to their attention and jointly seeking solu-tion

s.R

wan

dan

prison

officials,d

espite their su

spicion

s of prison

ers asgenocidaires

or as

sup

porters

of the

Interhamw

ein

surgen

cy,regu

larlyresponded to suggestions and requests from

HR

FO

R about prison condi-

tions,or calling for due process for the accused.In some cases H

RF

OR

inves-tigation

s of abuses p

romp

ted p

rosecution

s of military officials.

HR

FO

Robservers cite exam

ples of governmental strategies to discredit the m

ission,asw

ell as the eventual decision of the Rw

andan government to expel H

RF

OR

,as further evidence of its sensitivity.

Kosovo:

Violence against A

lbanian Kosovars w

as much low

er during the periodof K

VM

presence than during the preceding period,even though w

ar was

imm

inent.The m

assive presence influenced Serbian m

ilitary and police deci-sions on num

erous occasions,including im

proving treatment of detainees

and stopping military harassm

ent.

Proactive Presence3

0

East T

imor:

UN

AM

ET

staff recount almost daily stories of successful protec-

tive intervention using the image and clout of the U

nited Nations to face

down and negotiate w

ith local militia leaders and soldiers.T

here is evidenceof m

ilitary orders telling the militias to m

oderate their behaviour towards the

intern

ational p

ersonn

el,an

d to carry ou

t most attacks aw

ay from their

watching eyes.Internal m

ilitary documents to the regional com

mand w

ouldw

arnof u

pcom

ing U

N visits w

ith orders like ‘D

isarm for the d

uration

’.D

uring the period of UN

AM

ET

presence before the ballot in East T

imor,

violence against civilians was m

uch lower than in the p

receding months,

although of course UN

AM

ET

itself was unable to prevent the w

idespreadkilling that follow

ed the ballot. 8

Colom

bia:

Although increasing m

onitoring has neither statistically lowered

overall abuses nor moved the country tow

ards peace,evidence suggests thatarm

ed actors are calculating costs and benefits and tailoring their behaviouraccording to the local presence of foreigners.International presence is w

idelyconsidered one of the only effective protections available to civilians.

Sri L

anka:T

he Sri L

ankan

conflict has been

heavily intern

ationalised

ford

ecades,

and

the respect for in

ternation

al presen

ce is shared by the

Governm

ent of Sri L

anka,the LT

TE

(Liberation T

igers of Tam

il Eelam

)guerrilla organisation,

and the civilian population in general.D

espite greatfrustration w

ith continued ceasefire violations (including many hundreds of

attacks and killings of civilians) and with the self-im

posed limitations of the

mission,respondents all over S

ri Lanka concur that the S

LM

M presence can

deter some violence and reduce m

isbehaviour – and could claim credit for

keeping the ceasefire alive.

Darfu

r:In the S

udan,international pressure led the state to open the D

arfurterritory to significant international presence in 2004.

But the state is very

ambivalent,

and most international organisations do not feel they are safe

from (state-sup

ported) m

ilitia and guerrilla attacks outside certain areas.N

evertheless there have been incidents and diplomatic interchanges show

ingthe S

udanese government’s resp

onsiveness to international pressure.T

heinternational agencies present have also been able to negotiate agreem

entsw

ith the SL

M/A

(Sudan L

iberation Movem

ent/Arm

y).Many in the civilian

population assert that the overall international presence has had a calming

effect on the conflict and the risk they face.

Chapter 2


31


‘‘ Creating sensitivity over tim

e

Even in situations w

here sensitivity is initially limited,

field missions can change

perceptions and alter political calculations over time – in som

e cases even incre-m

entally altering the balance of power.W

hen a mission protects voices of dissent or

reform,educates abusive parties and prom

otes an increase in international concern,it is creating new

opportunities for leverage that did not exist at first entry.Abusive

parties areactively trying to m

easure the changing results of international pressure.A

former G

uatemalan defence m

inister,for instance,

described his government’s

attempts to analyse changing dynam

ics in international pressure:

‘you have to figure out how to m

easure the difference between an unim

-portant chain letter,and a real clam

our that’s going to affect the interna-tional conscience.

And that’s very difficult to distinguish…

You have to

watch for w

hen it reaches the level of an inter-governmental problem

… If

they can penetrate the OA

S [O

rganization of Am

erican States] w

e’rescrew

ed,because we’re signers of all these covenants and treaties.’ 9

The longer a presence is deployed,the stronger its dissuading effect should be on

perpetrators.Initially,perpetrators might com

mit repressive acts despite the inter-

national presence – a failure of deterrence.But if the political response is sufficient,

these perpetrators will suffer unacceptable consequences,

and over the course oftim

e their perception of ‘acceptable’actions will change.T

he more severe the polit-

ical cost they pay,the more they w

ill be discouraged from future abuse.S

o even insituations w

here sensitivity is initially limited or gradually decreasing,field m

issionscan slow

this deterioration and have a positive influence over time.

�In C

olombia,the plight of internally displaced people and the need to prevent

displacement w

as forced onto the state’s agenda by international attention andby

the presence of field staff with displaced com

munities.

�In both D

arfur and Sri L

anka,the pressure of the international comm

unity ona local level raised concerns about sexual and gender-based violence to levelsthat neither the state nor arm

ed groups could ignore.�

Som

e advocates of child protection in Sri L

anka believe that their constantinteraction and dialogue w

ith the LTT

E is gradually sensitising the arm

edgroup to the problem

of child soldiers.�

The effects of the 2004 tsunam

i in Sri L

anka opened doors for increased con-tact and com

munication betw

een international agencies and the LTT

E,and

this openness was used to help address questions of protection.

Proactive Presence3

2

‘‘ To

take full advantage of the potential for increased influence over time,a m

issionneeds to counteract the strategies arm

ed actors will use to w

eaken it,and should

watch for em

erging opportunities to increase its impact.

The impact of proactive presence on deeper conflict dynam

ics

While m

any examp

les dem

onstrate how

intern

ational p

resence m

oderates or

diminishes abusive behaviour,it is m

ore difficult to determine w

hether internationalpresence can also system

atically reverse abusive strategies that result from deeper

conflict dynamics.

Som

e missions have contributed to ongoing positive transfor-

mations that w

ere the result of many supportive political factors.O

thers could onlydim

inish the damage to civilians in steadily w

orsening situations.O

ne of the nine missions studied in detail for this book,

UN

AM

ET

in East

Tim

or,can lay som

e claim to a decisive role in ending a conflict and reversing a

deep pattern of abuse.The political characteristics of the 1999 C

onsultation onautonom

y were unique,and the reversal w

as only consolidated with a subsequent

military presence – and after terrible violence.

But the consultation w

ould neverhave happened w

ithout UN

AM

ET

,and might have been cancelled any num

ber oftim

es if UN

AM

ET

had n

ot sustain

ed its com

mitm

ent,

desp

ite great risks.U

NA

ME

T thus succeeded in protecting a historical process that reversed decades

of deadly Indonesian occupation.B

ut the Indonesian military (T

NI) w

as staunchly independent (and by some

accounts xenophobic) and steadfastly opposed to Tim

orese independence.TN

Iw

as comm

itted to a policy of terror right to the end,with its m

ilitia leaders making

bellicose speeches calling for violence at rallies observed by UN

AM

ET

officers.N

either international pressure nor UN

AM

ET

’s presence convinced TN

I and itsm

ilitias to refrain from m

assacre and wholesale burning of E

ast Tim

or after theballot,ultim

ately forcing UN

AM

ET

to evacuate.But T

NI nonetheless show

ed justenough sensitivity – to its ow

n civilian government,to the international com

munity

and to UN

AM

ET

– to allow the consultation to be carried out,and w

as then forcedby

international pressure to back away from

its strategy of destroying the territory,and leave E

ast Tim

or independent after 25 years of occupation.

‘I saw a guy tortured in front of m

y eyes in Gonaives.T

hey arrested himbecause w

e went there and gave a talk on hum

an rights.He got arrested

for asking questions.He w

as taken to a local detention centre.We follow

ed.H

is hands and feet were tied behind his back.W

e saw him

,but when w

egot there they shut the door.’

MIC

IVIH

field officer

Chapter 2


33


Proactive Presence3

4

This leaves us w

ith a comp

lex problem

:international p

resence will probably

make a positive difference to civilian security in m

ost conflict settings,but it is nota panacea.T

here is no guarantee that a large unarmed m

ission can transform a

deteriorating conflict into a flowering peace process – far from

it.T

he model of political space described above in this chapter is also applicable to

the mission itself.E

ach mission m

akes its own calculations of desired outcom

es andaccep

table risks,con

siderin

g security issu

es,risks of exp

ulsion

and

limits of

resources and political support – each of which constrain the m

ission’s ability tooccupy m

aximal political space.Just like other actors,the m

ission and its staff will

be miscalculating and m

aking mistakes,over- or under-estim

ating risks,sometim

esw

alking into unexpected danger and often excessively inhibiting its own actions.

If proactive presence builds confidence and speeds progress in a promising tran-

sition,or slows abuse in a deteriorating one,civilians are better off in both cases.B

utw

hether this is enough to justify a large unarmed presence depends on w

hat thesponsoring institutions or governm

ents hope to achieve with that presence,

what

value they place on the incremental protection and w

hat costs and security risks theinternational com

munity is w

illing to bear to achieve increased protection.A

mission’s influence on conflict dynam

ics must be judged for both its im

me-

diate imp

act and over a longer timefram

e,and its strategies m

ust be designedaccordingly.A

ll wars eventually end,

and all periods of deterioration or stalemate

have within them

,som

ewhere,

the seeds of change – for better or for worse.A

ninternational presence can be judged on the m

erits of its imm

ediate function ofprotecting civilians one by one.It should also be m

easured and planned in terms of

its ability to identify,prom

ote and protect societal initiatives that might help to

break stalemates or reverse destructive processes by opening paths for change,and

in terms of its capacity to increase international pressure and efforts in the sam

edirection.

Key reso

urces on p

rotectio

n

Slim

, Hugo and A

ndrew B

onwick.Protection. An ALN

AP guide for humanitarian

agencies.London: ALN

AP

/OD

I, 2005.C

averzasio Giossi, S

ylvie. Strengthening Protection in War: A search for profes-

sional standards.Geneva: IC

RC

, 2001.Inter-A

gency Standing C

omm

ittee, Grow

ing the Sheltering Tree - Protecting

Rights Through H

umanitarian Action, U

NIC

EF, 2002.

ww

w.P

rotectiOnline.org is a w

ebpage of Peace B

rigades International’s

Mainstream

ing Protection P

rogramm

e, and contains numerous sources and

links to a wide variety of other protection resources for defenders of hum

anrights, local activists in civil society and international protection m

issions.

Sum

mary

Field presence is a necessary supplem

ent to other international response strategiesto protect civilians because it targets all levels of the chain of com

mand,

revealsresp

onsibilities and strengthens international comm

itment.

Field p

resence cancontribute to the protection of civilians in three im

portant ways.

1 D

eterrence:Every

interaction with a field m

ission should influence the politicalcalculations of the perpetrators in a w

ay that changes their perception of theirpolitical room

for manoeuvre,and transm

its the concerns and political pressuresof the international com

munity.

Arm

ed institutions,be they states or arm

edgroups,

have a wide range of m

otivations which create varying sensitivities to

this international influence.2

Enco

uragem

ent:F

ield presence empow

ers civilians to assert and claim their

rights and increases the actions available to them.

Both the real deterrence

offered by the mission,

and the less tangible feelings of safety and solidaritycontribute to an expansion of political space for civilian action.

3Influencing

societal attitud

es:Field presence represents m

oral authority thatcan legitim

ise institutional and societal reforming activity.It also is in a unique

position to identify the entry points for reform.

The im

pact of international field presence varies with changing political contexts,

and can be strengthened over time.T

his study demonstrates these effects in a w

iderange of conflict contexts,even w

here security situations were very delicate or dete-

riorating,or where an arm

ed actor was visibly resistant to influence.

The positive result of proactive protection w

ith international presence can neverbe dism

issed.Every situation,no m

atter how intractable or apparently hopeless,can

benefit from a rigorous analysis of the num

erous vulnerabilities to leverage andpossible entry points.International institutions have to answ

er hard questions aboutw

hat resources they are willing to invest and w

hat risks they are willing to take to

offer some level of protection to civilians.W

hen the answers yield a decision to go

in with a field m

ission,presence alone is not enough.Its success will depend on the

design and implem

entation of strategies taking into account the power dynam

icsand choices that underlie civilian abuse.

Chapter 2


35


36

3INFORM

ATIONANALYSIS AND STRATEGY BUILDING

The precondition for any effective protection strategy is a constant process ofinform

ation-gathering,analysis and strategy building – three interdependent

and

cyclical processes (F

igure 3.1).

The in

formation

-gathering p

rocessinform

s an analysis,w

hich in turn is used to create or amend a m

ission strategy.E

ach amended strategy inevitably raises new

questions,dem

anding additionalinvestigation and analysis.E

ven an astute strategy will need adjustm

ent to ongoingpolitical changes.

Chapter 3

: Information analysis and strategy building

37


Figure 3.1:

The cycle of

information-

analysis-strategy

No

thing

is static – cycle never stop

s

Inform

ation

gath

eringA

nalysis

Strateg

yFocus, prioritisenew

information

needs

Hard choices

Program

me

and advocacypriorities

‘‘ Hard strategic choices m

ust always be m

ade among countless possible targets of

influence or support.Inform

ation and analysis help a mission to use its lim

itedresources for m

aximum

protective effect.E

ach choice in turn refocuses the nextround of analysis,as sub-strategies are built for each target.

This m

ay seem obvious,

but insufficient political analysis and lack of strategicplanning for im

pact have been a frequent weakness in past field m

issions.To do it

well,the m

issions need leadership that devotes the necessary resources and time to

each part of the cycle,building the necessary networks for inform

ation-gathering,investing the necessary tim

e in analysis and ensuring that the mission is equipped

with the skills to im

plement effective strategies.

Gath

ering info

rmatio

n and external analysis

A good hum

an-rights report needs data on abuses,while a good protection analysis

also needs information on abusers.It needs to be perpetrator-focused,looking at the

institu

tions an

d p

eople resp

onsible for abu

ses,an

d d

issecting their chain

s ofcom

mand,m

otivations and objectives.It should articulate the interests driving theirdecisions,be they m

ilitary,political,economic,crim

inal,personal,familial or ethnic.

The inform

ation needed ranges from an understanding of a broad m

ilitary strategyof an arm

ed group or state military apparatus,

or the international political andeconom

ic strategies of a state,down to the local,social relationships of param

ilitarygangs in a tow

n.Sim

ilarly,to encourage civil society most effectively,the m

issionm

ust understand the strengths,weaknesses and strategies of civilian groups.

Good inform

ation is not just about facts and events.Current facts are good,but

the opinions,

percep

tions and subjective analyses of other parties m

ust also beincluded,w

ith each source being judged for its validity and wisdom

.The process

demands a com

plex network of sources – som

e public,som

e confidential.S

ome

missions,unfortunately,have been criticised for being too disconnected from

localrealities and local actors to develop an accurate analysis of the situation they hopedto change.

In contrast,for instance,

according to one head of office,U

NA

ME

Tquickly developed a trusted local netw

ork and used it fully.

‘By the tim

e we got tw

o-thirds of the way through the consultation prepa-

rations,we had an excellent inform

ation network.T

he civilian populationresponded so positively to our presence that w

e were getting m

ountains ofgood and reliable inform

ation.Often,I had better inform

ation,and quick-er,than m

y government-security counterparts.T

his was very valuable on

an operational level.’

UN

AM

ET

head of office

Proactive Presence3

8

Field m

issions should draw from

a wide variety of sources,including:

�existing protection assessm

ents,including those carried out by local organisa-tions or hum

anitarian agencies�

victims of abuses,civilians in threatened com

munities and organisations,w

it-nesses

�local organisations w

ho investigate and analyse abuse and conflict�

trusted government contacts

�form

al comm

unication with officials of states,m

ilitaries,and armed groups

�confidential sources inside,or close to,arm

ed institutions,including non-statearm

ed groups.�

trusted local analysts who can educate the m

ission about subtle social and eco-nom

ic factors affecting political decisions�

domestic and external international experts w

ith a long history of analysing theconflict or the relevant national institutions – virtually every conflict terrain inthe w

orld has been intensely studied and analysed,but these experts are sel-dom

asked to advise the corresponding field missions

�hum

anitarian and other international organisations with staff in the conflict zone

�em

bassy or foreign-ministry contacts w

ith networks and insights about key

decision-makers

�negotiators involved in dialogue w

ith the armed parties

�publicly available inform

ation such as newspapers,m

agazines,organisationaldocum

ents and relevant national websites – this includes,im

portantly,sourcesin the local languages,dem

anding that the mission invests staff tim

e in moni-

toring and translating relevant sources for analysis.

Information-gathering m

ust be carried out with caution.

�E

very source must be evaluated for accuracy,bias and judgem

ent,and notautom

atically dismissed or accepted.E

ven a biased source may have im

portantinform

ation,and a trusted source may provide a m

istaken analysis.�

Mission staff m

ust avoid appearing to be too inquisitive,which could give rise

to accusations of spying.�

Where necessary,great care m

ust be taken with confidentiality and protection

of sources.(For m

ore information,see C

hapter 9,Do no harm

.)�

Institutions across the political spectrum w

ill try to manipulate the m

issionthrough the inform

ation they pass on or withhold.

Informal protection analysis tends to reside only in the heads of individual field

officers,and institutions lose vital inform

ation if they do not create systems to

gather and collate these individual analyses,and pass them on for future planning.

Chapter 3


39


Bo

x 3.1: Collaborative data gathering

It might seem

obvious to suggest that multiple institutions should share infor-

mation and collaborate on data collection and analysis,

but this can be chal-lenging in practice.D

ifferent institutions,each with their ow

n mechanism

s andform

ats,would need to develop m

utually accessible systems of data collection.

Data collaboration requires agreed standards of consent and confidentiality that

protect p

eople from

the misu

se of delicate in

formation

,bu

t which d

o not

prevent international institutions from

using valuable information to p

rotectthem

.In addition,a collaborative data gathering should not be so onerous as todestroy efficiency or distract agencies from

usingthe data to take action.

In 2004–05 in Darfur,

OC

HA

launched an ambitious attem

pt to achieve

some level of inter-agency co-ordination of protection efforts,developing data-

collection formats,

organising protection working groups in each region,

andtrying to develop

a system-w

ide protection strategy.T

he initial data-format

process proved too complicated for m

ost people to use.More im

portantly,thedata collection w

as not closely linked to advocacy strategies,w

hich weakened

motivation

to particip

ate.The p

rocess was su

bsequen

tly reconsid

ered.T

hep

rotection working group

s also got mixed review

s,in p

art due to excessiveexp

ectations of their im

pact,

but also becau

se their deliberation

s were n

otsystem

atically linked to subsequent action.N

evertheless,the concept of inter-

institutional protection forums for collaboration and sharing at the local level

deserves continued developm

ent.This could increase the im

plem

entation ofprotection strategies by m

ultiple parties in the same conflict.

Analysis fo

r pro

active presence

Protection analysis is political.It is about pow

er and influence,and needs to iden-tify the chain of responsibility for attacks on civilians,

mapping out channels for

applying sanctions or offering incentives to change behaviour.It should avoid ideo-logical or con

spiratorial theories abou

t institu

tional behaviou

r,w

hich usu

allygenerate naive and incom

plete strategies.A subtle analysis of the functioning,m

oti-vations and internal organisational realities of abusive institutions can identifypoints of contact,

vulnerabilities to leverage or interests in incentives.S

ince eachinstitution is unique,

so must be the analysis:

the channel of influence for them

inistry of the interior will be different from

that for the army,and so on.

Those w

ho appear impervious to persuasion,the so-called ‘hard-liners’,should

Proactive Presence4

0

notbe dismissed as unreachable.S

ometim

es,for instance,even an abusive institutionw

ill have reasons to interact constructively with a field m

ission.Astute m

ilitary orpolitical leaders som

etimes recognise that their subordinates do not alw

ays transmit

vital information that m

ight result in criticism or discipline,so they m

ay perceive anindirect benefit from

the presence of external monitoring of their ow

n agents.S

ometim

es institutional behaviour is affected by complex historical,fam

ilial orethnic dynam

ics,by business com

petition,

corruption or any num

ber of otherfactors.A

n analysis has to evaluate the relative importance of the different factors

atp

lay in order to identify the most p

roductive strategy,and these factors are

seldom purely m

ilitary.To understand killings in C

asanare,Colom

bia,one needs toknow

the economic m

otivations sparked by the local struggles for control over

contraband gasoline from V

enezuela.To protect in D

arfur,analysis must consider

the varying motivations and histories of m

any different ethnic groups and tribes,asw

ell as the role of regional environ

men

tal and

econom

ic degrad

ation on

theconflict.W

ith such local comp

lexities,trusted and skilled national staff can be

crucial in developing an accurate analysis.C

onflicts change over time:

last year’s analysis may not be valid now

,but a

mission w

ill only know this if it has its finger on the pulse.F

or instance,the natureof the D

arfur conflict changed dramatically in a short tim

e,and if international

agencies did not perceive this change,their strategies became obsolete.L

ikewise in

Sri L

anka,strategies all had to be re-analysed after the 2004 tsunami.

The pow

er of a mission deployed over a large area lies partly in its capacity to

adjust its strategies to take into account the nuances of local realities.C

ultural,social,

political and military realities m

ay vary from one region to another.

Local

governments can be an ally in one province,and an obstacle in the neighbouring

one.The transfer of a new

comm

anding officer into the dominant nearby m

ilitarybase can drastically change realities for civilians.W

hen a mission’s analysis encom

-passes these subtle variations,local im

pact is enhanced,and the cumulative national

effect is greater as well.

A field m

ission must m

ake an equally thorough analysis of the internationalinfluences that can be brought to bear w

hen needed,to encourage compliance by

abusive parties.This requires an organic connection betw

een the mission,the polit-

ical leadership of its sponsoring institutions or states,and decision m

akers in theinternational com

munity interested in the conflict.M

issions with sponsoring insti-

tutions lacking these links to power lose opportunities for external pressure strate-

gies.Crucially,such external analysis includes understanding the varying pow

ers ofinfluence of the different diplom

atic delegations on the ground – and then usingthem

in the resulting protection strategy.This international analysis m

ust some-

times pay special attention to third-party countries that have a close interest in the

conflict,be they regional powers or key econom

ic partners.

Chapter 3


41


Bo

x 3.2:The challenge of analysing non-state armed groups

The legal and political structure of international institutions and the m

ethods ofpressure they com

monly use are designed prim

arily to influence governments.

They are less w

ell equipped to exploit,or even understand,

the sensitivities ofindependent arm

ed groups.When a m

ission underestimates the sophistication

and sensitivity of armed groups;or w

hen it dismisses the possibility of leverage

upon independent groups,it is unlikely to develop the analytical and strategic

resources it would need to affect them

.F

or example,the Interham

we

forces that systematically m

obilised a populationto m

urder hundreds of thousands of Tutsis in 1994 fled and dispersed across the

border to Zaire,

and continued to terrorise Rw

anda.A

fter the genocide,the

Interhamw

ew

ere considered morally ‘beyond the pale’,not to m

ention physicallyinaccessible.A

lthough some attem

pt was m

ade to learn from refugees returning

from Z

aire,HR

FO

R w

as in a fundamentally w

eak position to develop any clearstrategies about this arm

ed group’s continued influence on protection problems

in Rw

anda.It lacked inform

ation and points of contact,and probably w

ouldhave faced security risks had it sought them

.As a result,som

e mission staff relied

on the oversimplification that the Interham

we

had been transformed into discon-

nected bands of uncontrolled killers,despite their recent roots in such a highlyorganised genocide.

Som

e field officers feel that this lack of contact weakened

the mission

’s strategic capacity in

relation to both the Interham

we

and

thegovernm

ent.G

roups operating clandestinely do not make intelligence readily available,and

direct con

tact with these grou

ps is som

etimes p

rohibited or d

angerou

s.N

evertheless,there is alw

ays information som

ewhere,

and for any conflict ofsign

ificant d

uration

there will be p

eople w

ho have mad

e a poin

t of un

der-

standing how these groups function. 10

A m

ission must find these people.

If itcannot m

ake direct contact,it must use indirect sources – alw

ays taking care notto endanger the sources.

Missions in ceasefire or negotiation settings have easier access to non-state

armed groups,

and their experience invariably confirms that there are m

anydifferent political sensitivities and points of leverage.B

uilding on its unique legalstatus and access,

the ICR

C has developed careful analyses of arm

ed groups,and w

hile it must necessarily m

aintain due confidentiality in this role,it often

can find appropriate ways to advise other m

issions based on the lessons learnedfrom

this privileged access and analysis.

Proactive Presence4

2

‘‘ Build

ing a strateg

y for effective p

rotectio

n

Based on thorough inform

ation and analysis,a mission m

ust choose whom

to influ-ence and then design a plan to do it.S

trategy has to reconcile the analysis with the

realistic capacities and resources of the mission,and ask difficult questions.

�W

hat institutions are most pivotal in stopping the greatest num

ber of abusesor altering the m

ost damaging polices? W

hat are the mission’s relationships

with these institutions?

�W

ho are the people in these institutions most susceptible to influence? W

hohas decision-m

aking power?

�W

hat other forces or actors can influence these pivotal institutions? What

alliances can the mission build to m

aximise the com

bined influence?�

Which crises or situations can m

ost effectively be used to generate pressure onthe perpetrators’institutions?

�W

hat security risks need to be taken into account? How

do these differ forexpatriate and national m

ission staff? What are the optim

al protection roles forboth national and expatriate staff in this context?

Protection strategies need to be not only national,

but also regional and local –going right dow

n the chain of comm

and.Each target at each level requires a sub-

strategy.L

ocally,relationships are closer and m

ore personal.A m

ission’s contactsw

ith the local bishop or the chamber of com

merce,for instance,can have an influ-

ence on the mayor or the chief of police.In a regional city,w

here a mission m

ay bethe sole representative of international influence,it m

ay be a more pow

erful inter-national player than in the capital.L

ocal actors may desire the privileges and status

inherent in relationships with influential international actors.T

his gives local strate-gies greater flexibility.

Sim

ilarly,different strategies have to be developed for supporting civil society.

‘You have to identify w

hich promising forces,counterparts or factors w

ith-in the society could have a m

ultiplier effect if they were strengthened,and

use this as a criterion for choosing with w

hom to w

ork.You can lose a lot

of energy working to help a group that later turns out to have no m

ulti-plying im

pact.’

OH

CH

R field officer,C

olumbia

A key feature of a com

plex strategy is the sequencingof activities.

For any given

problem,

the mission needs to look first for the quickest and m

ost efficient inter-

Chapter 3


43


‘‘ vention or approach to achieve a solution.If this proves insufficient,

it may then

need to develop additional,m

ore complex steps (F

igure 3.2).F

or instance,if a

problem can be solved locally,it need not be addressed nationally or internationally.

If a given actor can be influenced through very quiet and subtle persuasion,this canbe tried first before escalating the strategy to include stronger persuasion,m

obilisa-tion of allies or even public pressure.

‘It is important to have a graduated response – to address a violation at the

level it was com

mitted.Y

ou can give the perpetrator or his imm

ediate supe-rior the possibility to resolve the case at his level,using the threat of rais-ing it above him

or of going public as an incentive to act.At the sam

e time

you are showing that you are not there to create problem

s but to find solu-tions w

ith him,

to work w

ith him.T

he threat of bringing the case to hissuperior or going public is itself a useful bullet,w

hich can spare the bulletitself.’

Field officer w

ith experience in multiple organisation

Proactive Presence4

4

Figure 3.2

An

example of

sequencing a

responseP

rob

lem o

r abuse

Local resp

onsib

le p

arty

Ab

usesto

ps

Ab

usesto

ps

Ab

usesto

ps

Ab

usesto

ps

Ab

usesto

ps

Make public

demands for action,

with international

allies

Involveinternational

allies – quietlyRaise issue

nationally, seekhigh-level decisionto control abuseInvolve other

actors: mobilise

allies, approachsuperiors, etc

Firmer approach:

incentives orw

arning of futurecosts

Persuadeindividual locally,

personally, confidentially

A m

ission should also calibrate its strategies appropriately to its levels of externalpolitical support,the strength of its m

andate and its level of resources.The stronger

the mandate and political support,the broader the range of tools available for use.

Strategic planning is a skill and an art,w

hich field officers should learn.It is aw

ell-developed discipline with m

any fine resources available that need not be dupli-cated here.International institutions that sponsor field protection m

issions shouldprom

ote development of this skill am

ong their field officers and managem

ent.The

head of mission m

usthave highly develop

ed strategic managem

ent capacity,

toen

hance everyon

e else’s efforts.This alon

e is probably n

ot enou

gh,how

ever,because strategic analysis takes tim

e as well as skill,and a head of m

ission may be

too much in dem

and for other vital organisational or diplomatic tasks to devote

enough time to strategic planning.A

t mission headquarters there should be addi-

tional designated people with these political and strategic talents w

ho can reallyfocus tim

e on national strategy development and im

plementation,and assist each

field office in local strategic planning,ensuring a level of coherence and quality

control across the mission.

Chapter 3


45


Figure 3.3: Sum

mary

of Chapter 3 –

information, analysis,

strategy

Inform

ation g

athering

Analysis

Strateg

y

•G

ather data on-

abuser’s chain of comm

and-

abuser’s interests (military, econom

ic, international, dom

estic)-

strengths and weakness of civilian

groups-

sources of international support or leverage

•D

raw on a w

ide variety of sources•

Be discrete and respect

confidentiality•

Account for biases

•U

nderstand who is responsible

•Identify channels to influence this individual

•U

pdate analysis constantly as contextchanges

•A

nalyse possibilities for internationalleverage

•C

reatively seek channels to understandand influence arm

ed groups

•C

hoose targets (local, national, regional)•

Choose allies or other forces that m

ayinfluence or exert pressure on them

•D

esign sub-strategies for each target•

Develop specific strategy for civil society

Sum

mary and

recom

mend

ations

Clear strategies based

on in

formed

analysis requ

ire a defin

ite organisation

alcom

mitm

ent.

�A

field mission m

ust comm

it resources and expertise to information gathering

and analysis.�

Mission leadership and field staff should be selected on the basis of analytical

capacity.�

Institutions deploying field missions should create structures and processes

that make such analysis a required step.A

mission should not be allow

ed toproceed w

ithout it.�

Analytical and strategic training should involve all of the field staff – so that the

personnel making daily political contacts fully understand the strategies their

actions must reinforce and prom

ote.�

Outsiders should be brought in to enrich this analysis and strategy building,

including people with prior expertise in the terrain – regional political experts

and specialised academics – as w

ell as strategic-planning professionals.�

A field m

ission should develop and maintain a contact netw

ork for local analy-sis.T

his requires strategies for dealing with bias,security and confidentiality.

�A

field mission should enrich its analysis by involving national staff w

ith politi-cal expertise in its planning.S

uch involvement can take into account their

potential biases,while still taking advantage of their analysis.

�T

here should be an explicit effort to gather intelligence about independentarm

ed groups,if such groups are a factor.Whenever possible this should

involve direct contact with those groups,w

hich in turn suggests the need forsecurity guidelines and a m

andate allowing such contact.

Proactive Presence4

6


PART TWO

FIVESTRATEGIES OF EFFECTIVEPRESENCE

47

Public

advocacyC

hapter 8

Sustained m

ulti-level diplom

acyC

hapter 4

Consciousvisibility

Chapter 5

Active

encouragement

Chapter 6

Pro

tectivep

resence

Convening and

bridgingC

hapter 7

4SUSTAINEDM

ULTI-LEVEL DIPLOM

ACY

48

Once the pre-condition of good inform

ation and analysis is met (as described

in Chapter 3),the first key protection strategy for a field presence involves

diplomatic intervention in daily situations and constant discourse w

ith keypolitical actors nationally and locally.T

he effect of these interactions is cumulative,

and has the pow

er to affect both local and national decision making,

reducingabuses and violent conflicts.

Consider an exam

ple:if a local comm

ander has orders to carry out a counter-insurgency cam

paign,he may know

that this will involve repression of civilians.B

uthe m

ay not be directly aware of the international com

munity’s concern about this.

If a report is written about his cam

paign,and sits in a file or is only discussed inm

eetings in Geneva or N

ew Y

ork,w

ill he even know about it? W

ill it affect hisstrategy? M

aybe,but very probably not.B

ut suppose an international mission field officer drops in to this com

mander’s

office.Over a congenial cup of coffee,the field officer shares new

s of the report.He

may even visit before the report is w

ritten,inviting the com

mander’s input.T

hecom

mander m

ay now consider that the field m

ission will also be having this conver-

sation with his superior officers,

and their superiors,local business leaders and

political figures in parliament,as w

ell as contacts in the local and national media.H

em

ay have to engage in local discussions about international humanitarian law

,sendsom

e of his men to these discussions,

and explain the dissonance betw

een thisdiplom

acy and their actual orders.He know

s now that after a given m

ilitary incur-sion resulting in civilian deaths,he w

ill be visited by a local or national multipartite

investigatory comm

ission involving the United N

ations,local government officials

and local civil-society groups.And he know

s that the results of that comm

ission aregoing to be a headache for his superior officer.P

erhaps now he is thinking about the

political costs of his actions.

Chapter 4

: Sustained multi-level diplom

acy4

9


‘‘ This is just one exam

ple of the fundamental potential of a field presence.W

iththe kind of inform

ation,analysis and strategy described in the previous chapter,acom

plex process of contact and comm

unication can be constructed.This should

include not only,for example,an offending com

mander and the m

ilitary structurethat is sup

posed to discip

line him,

and not only national governments that are

supp

osed to control their military,

but also local comm

unity leaders,business

leaders,local government authorities and others.E

ach contact encourages a changein behaviour.T

he more long-term

and constant the presence,and the m

ore rela-tionships that have been constructed w

ith these players,the more this is possible.

The opportunities to influence are everyw

here,every day,

and a field officershould take advantage of them

.When m

ission personnel are out in public,travellingto rem

ote rural areas,talking to the local mayor or priest or com

mander,everyone

is paying attention and calculating the consequences.And that changes things.

Where there is the political w

ill within a state or arm

ed group to listen,an impor-

tant comm

unication mechanism

can be the use of confidential dialogue and co-op

eration towards reform

.This can influence at not only higher p

olicy-making

levels but also further down the chain:at the low

or middle level a com

mander m

aybe afraid of being accountable to his hierarchy,and m

ay prefer to resolve an issuequietly at his ow

n level.A

ccording to one field officer with both O

HC

HR

andIC

RC

experience:

‘In my experience,

engaging even the worst abusers in this m

anner may

yield unexpected results:you give a fellow the choice betw

een solving theissue quietly,

among ourselves,

based on a gentleman’s agreem

ent – orputting him

on the line by raising the case with his superiors.N

ot only may

you solve the issue,but you may create a bond of confidence w

ith the fel-low

,an ally who does not perceive you as an enem

y,and who m

ay be use-ful to solve future cases.’

ICR

C protection officer

Sustained contact w

ith local players requires a clear discourse in each case,basedon careful analysis of how

to influence a particular abuser.This discourse m

ight beas m

inimal as a form

al courtesy visit or introduction,a mention of the field-m

issionobjectives,

or expressions of concern about a certain situation.It m

ight involvem

aking explicit requests for better co-operation.When appropriate,it m

ight involvedirect or veiled references to carrots and sticks or to international reputation.A

ndin som

e rare cases it might be effective to criticise candidly and dem

and action.E

very interaction is a political and diplomatic event requiring a strategy and a high

level of comm

unication skills.U

nfortunately,in the major m

issions studied for this book,this strategy of daily

Proactive Presence5

0

diplomacy is barely noted in training,

preparation and strategy building.M

issiondescriptions,

mandates and internal docum

ents do not emphasise it,

even thoughm

any experienced field officers understand it implicitly.A

cross the board,there isconfusion in practice:field officers interview

ed admitted that they got little diplo-

matic guidance,and they had no idea w

hether other field officers within their ow

nm

ission were approaching these interactions in the sam

e way.

Som

e pointed outthat the political officers at m

ission headquarters might not even approve of the

various discourse strategies used by individual officers out in the field.And several

interviewees felt that to achieve any effective level of local diplom

atic intervention,they had to ‘break the rules’.

Sim

ilarly,there is seldom a clear directive about how

much staff tim

e should bedevoted to diplom

acy. 11W

ithin the same m

ission,personnel from

one sub-officem

ay be mostly out interacting externally w

hile in another they are mostly at their

desks.And if agency or m

ission personnel think that this sort of local contact is‘som

eone else’s job’or mistakenly believe that the only im

portant advocacy is what

happens ‘at the top’,on a national level,they may not do it at all.O

verall,this localdiplom

acy seems to depend largely on individuals:if they have the skills and choose

to use them,it happens,and otherw

ise the opportunity is lost.Field m

anagers must

make the expectations of local diplom

acy and networking explicit to all m

issionstaff.

Hum

anitarian agencies,for exam

ple,w

ith their substantial field deployment,

have unique opportunities and constraints in carrying out this particular protectionrole.

On the one hand,

agencies with a program

me em

phasis on the provision ofassistance or services som

etimes face internal hurdles and m

ust overcome institu-

tional resistance and fears surrounding words like ‘advocacy’.

Research for this

book reveals a recurrent tendency to associate the idea of advocacy with a stereo-

typed image of vocal hum

an-rights denunciations and demarches,and to see this

concept also as somehow

contrary to some hum

anitarian institutions’mandates.In

fact,as many other hum

anitarian field officers will attest,diverse types of protection

comm

unication are already happening in a wide variety of w

ays in most hum

ani-tarian field operations.

Each institution needs to develop a unique discourse and set of m

essages linkingprotection needs to their prim

ary mandate,

whether that m

andate be assistance,election m

onitoring or ceasefire support.These m

essages can draw attention to the

causal links between civilian vulnerabilities to conflict and the specific program

-m

atic mandate of the institution.T

his allows the agency to engage in m

ore activeprotection advocacy,w

hile still championing its special responsibilities.

Hum

anitarian agencies in particular often carry a lot of economic and political

weight,due to the m

assive resource they inject into a conflict zone.This pow

er isn

aturally associated

with any p

rotection m

essage they convey,n

o matter how

subtle.Field personnel engaging in local protection com

munication can take advan-

Chapter 4


acy5

1


‘‘Proactive Presence5

2

tage of the unspoken political clout of their agency,which m

ay well be the sole ‘face’

of the international comm

unity in many places.

To

uphold mission integrity and sustain relationships w

ith national and military

leaders and the diplomatic corps,a field presence needs the highest level of diplo-

matic political skill in its leadership.T

he capacity of national authorities to relate toan international m

ission will vary enorm

ously.Mission leadership needs the versa-

tility to interact with all types of people,

always seeking opportunities to further

strategies for the protection of civilians.

Key reso

urces on neg

otiatio

n and co

mm

unication in th

e field

Mancini-G

riffoli,Deborah,and A

ndré Picot.H

umanitarian N

egotiation:A hand-

book for securing access,assistance and protection for civilians.Geneva:C

entre forH

umanitarian D

ialogue,2004.L

eBaron,

Michele.

Com

munication

Tools for Understanding D

ifferent Cultures.

Written for the C

onflict Research C

onsortium (available at w

ww

.beyondin-tractability.com

).M

cHugh,

Gerard and M

anuel Bessler.

Hum

anitarian Negotiation w

ith Arm

edG

roups.A m

anual for practitioners.New

York:U

nited Nations,2006.

Slim

,H

ugo.M

arketing Hum

anitarian Space.A

rgument and m

ethod in humani-

tarian persuasion.Geneva:C

entre for Hum

anitarian Dialogue,2003.

Dip

lom

acy with

go

vernment and

military

‘You need fluid channels of com

munication w

ith your state counterparts.Y

ou have to know w

ho to talk to.Maybe you can’t resolve everything,but

you should at least go to the right place,know w

ho will pay attention and

who is going to w

aste your time…

With a good relationship,you can call

directly – “What’s up w

ith this case?”.Without a relationship,you can’t.’

Head of sub-office,O

HC

HR

,Colom

bia

One key long-range objective of a m

ission is to strengthen a culture of peace andhum

an rights within the host governm

ent,and build capacity for civilian protec-

tion.This m

ay involve establishing close collaborative relationships in promising

situations.B

ut even in situations where the state m

ay be the chief obstacle toprotection,and perhaps the prim

ary perpetrator of abuse,a large mission w

ill stillbenefit from

close local and diplomatic relationships w

ith governmental and m

ili-

tary decision makers at national and local levels.T

hese relationships must be devel-

oped carefully to assure maxim

um access and influence,and yet not allow

the hoststate to m

anipulate or curtail the mission’s independence.

Close govern

men

tal relations allow

a mission

to pressu

re friend

ly officialsregarding particular cases,situations or political trends.B

y supporting allies insidethe govern

men

t,the m

ission can

prom

ote reforms in

a state structu

re that isabusing civilians.T

hus,the m

ission is positioned to bring maxim

al internationalp

ressure to bear.K

nowing w

ho is who,

it can direct this pressure to the right

targets,and help others in the international comm

unity do the same.A

llies insidethe governm

ent can also be important for m

ission security,especially if the mission

is challenged politically.A

mission

mu

st main

tain n

um

erous chan

nels of com

mu

nication

with the

government to take the fullest advantage of diverse opportunities for persuasion.It

must not lim

it links to only the foreign ministry or a governm

ent human-rights

body.It needs top-level direct contact w

ith the military,

police,the justice system

and any ministries that can directly influence the protection of civilians or resolve

conflicts that make civilians vulnerable.

A m

ission’s relationship with the governm

ent should always be respectful and as

transparent as possible,even if the mission is critical of governm

ent policies.The

mission should m

ake the effort to seek information from

the government before

taking positions or publishing statements.

Concerns should be expressed at the

local level before they are pressed at the national level.At the stage at w

hich publicstatem

ents are appropriate,they should not take the governm

ent by surprise andshould be consistent w

ith the private representations that have preceded them.

The relationship betw

een a protection mission and a state is often very strained.

The state m

ay tolerate the mission,

and yet obstruct or undermine its operations

with threats,harassm

ent or non-cooperation.Behind such actions exists the ever-

present,im

plicit threat of expulsion.R

ather than let such harassment paralyse or

silence it,however,a m

ission needs to meet every accusation,large and sm

all,with

a clear and

sometim

es strong resp

onse.

It may n

eed to reiterate p

ublicly its

neutrality and impartiality,call attention to the dam

age that accusations against itcan

cause,

and

even u

se intern

ational an

d d

iplom

atic sup

port if n

ecessary todem

and due respect.

Dip

lom

acy with

armed

gro

ups

A field m

ission should establish contacts and dialogue with all actors w

ho controlterritory and people,and w

ho have the capacity to harm the m

ission or the civiliansit aim

s to help.This contact should start by gaining acceptance and respect for the

Chapter 4


acy5

3


‘‘ mission as an im

partial actor,to protect it against attacks and secure its safe accessto civilians.T

his requires an unbiased approach – a credible political independencein w

ords and deeds.Where such open dialogue is blocked,everything possible m

uststill be done to transm

it messages to arm

ed groups – to clarify the mandate of the

mission,to augm

ent the security of its personnel and,where possible,to try to influ-

ence the behaviour of these groups towards civilians.

ICR

C respondents stress the im

portance of demonstrating a clear understanding of

the issues at stake for the group:

‘The quality of the IC

RC

presentation depends on knowledge and on

points of empathy.

For instance,

with the F

AR

C,

they have had a socialagenda.W

e can empathise w

ith that.You use these points of em

pathy as astarting point.’

Proactive Presence5

4

Bo

x 4.1:Relationships w

ith the military

Relationships w

ith the military can be particularly im

portant,and particularly

difficult.When m

issions have military and security p

ersonnel on staff,their

comm

on profession sometim

es allows them

to develop a rapport more easily

with local m

ilitary officials.Missions also have to take special care to avoid errors

that are perceived by the military as having dam

aging military consequences.

For instance,

missions have been accused of sharing confidential inform

ationw

ith rebel groups.Hum

anitarian agencies and local partners have to avoid inad-vertently becom

ing a logistical support to rebels.And if such groups are stealing

or controllin

g resources again

st the agency’s w

ill,the agen

cy may n

eed to

condemn this actively and vocally in order to assure the m

ilitary that it does nottacitly approve.

Also,

any advocacy efforts need to respect defensive military

sensitivities. 12

Ceasefire m

onitoring missions are particularly w

ell placed to develop goodrelationships w

ith their military counterparts.R

epresentatives of the Sri L

ankaM

onitoring Mission (S

LM

M) m

et as often as daily with m

ilitary officials.The

Kosovo V

erification Mission (K

VM

) held daily liaison meetings w

ith nearlyevery security body in the governm

ent of Serbia.T

he fact that the KV

M officers

tended to outrank their Serbian counterparts in these conversations w

as seen bysom

e as an important diplom

atic advantage.

‘‘ ON

US

AL

,MIN

UG

UA

,SL

MM

,KV

M,and U

NA

ME

T all had direct contact w

itharm

ed groups due to the international negotiations in progress,enabling ongoing

comm

un

ication of p

rotection m

essages and

chann

els for dealin

g with other

concerns as they arose.Conversely,in C

olombia,direct com

munication w

ith armed

groups is legally prohibited for all but the ICR

C,m

aking comm

unication by othersm

uch more difficult.

Nevertheless,

in rural areas,m

ost missions have sp

oradiccontact w

ith param

ilitaries and guerrillas,p

articularly at checkpoints on roads,

riversor trails.E

ven these contacts are opportunities to make a difference.

‘We have these sorts of discussions at checkpoints w

ith FA

RC

:“L

ook,this guy w

ith you is the cousin of a paramilitary,

so we’re taking

him.”

“You look,he’s not anyone’s cousin! H

e works for this organisation and he

is my responsibility.”

“We’re sure he’s his cousin.”

“And I’m

sure I’m looking out for him

.”A

nd you realise that if the international staff had not been there to make

this argument,the conversation w

ould have been different – “You,you’re

the cousin,out of the boat!”– and m

aybe we’d never see that guy again.’

Hum

anitarian officer,Colom

bia

In addition,m

ission staff and civil-society observers alike believe that Colom

bianarm

ed groups ‘have ears’in enough places to get messages.B

ut,outside the ICR

C,

there is no evidence of any systematic attem

pt to transmit a coherent m

essage ordiscourse to these group

s,other than through the form

al written hum

an-rightsreports of the O

HC

HR

mission.

(This is discussed further in C

hapter 8,P

ublicadvocacy.)

Com

munication w

ith armed groups can be a very delicate m

atter in the eyes ofthe dom

inant state and its military,and security concerns m

ust therefore be consid-ered in such contacts.H

owever,concern for security should not categorically rule

out such comm

unication.S

ecurity must be dealt w

ith strategically at the opera-tional level,considering also that lack

of contact with an arm

ed group may also pose

a security risk to the mission.

Co

ntrolling

bias

Even though our intention through this m

anual is to advise maxim

al contact with

armed actors and those w

ho influence them,a m

ission must still be cautious about

getting too close.A protective field m

ission is always subject to accusations of bias,

Chapter 4


acy5

5


which have seriou

s consequ

ences in

terms of secu

rity,the ability to stay in

acountry and the ability to build the relationships necessary for m

aking an impact.

The m

ission must strive to control the

perceptions and accusations of mission bias,

and also any real bias that might result from

a mission’s behaviour,

structure,com

position or objectives,if it does not adequately guard its comm

itment to im

par-tiality.

The K

osovo Verification M

ission (KV

M),for instance,despite the fine w

ork ofm

any conscientious monitors,w

as perceived by many as too close to the K

LA

.Itw

as even accused of sharing military intelligence and helping to prepare the w

ay forthe subsequent N

AT

O attack.K

VM

monitors w

ith human-rights experience ques-

tioned the way in w

hich the mission publicly exploited a m

assacre in Racak by

jum

pin

g to conclu

sions an

d ru

shing to p

ress with accu

sations again

st theY

ugoslavian government in a m

anner that a more neutral hum

an-rights mission

would never have allow

ed.T

he support for independence was so prevalent am

ong the East T

imorese as

well as w

ithin the international comm

unity that it would have been im

possible tofield a m

ission without a preponderance of personnel w

ho personally supportedindependence,so U

NA

ME

T w

as very vulnerable to accusations of bias.When the

victims of violence are m

ostly of one ethnic group in a conflict,such as in Darfur

or Sri L

anka,international hum

anitarian or protective missions w

ill usually havem

ore contact with this group.A

ssistance or protection to victims based purely on

need inevitably associates a mission m

ore with w

hichever side of a political divisionhas m

ore victims.

A lim

ited mandate,

analysis or work plan can also create a bias.

If an agencyfocuses its w

ork on child soldiers,for instance,and only one armed party is using

child soldiers,the agency’s categorically constrained approach may lead it to under-

state (or not even investigate) the other kinds of abuses being carried out by theother party.A

mission w

hich enters a long-term conflict but focuses solely on m

oni-toring current violations m

ay find itself legitimately accused of bias for ignoring

victims of past abuses,

since these past abuses (and their victims) m

ay have asm

uch to do with the current conflict as those still being carried out.

Standard

reporting strategies emphasise current perpetrators,but a m

ission can also developrestorative strategies that focus on victim

s,a longer-term

app

roach to societalhealing that does not favour current victim

s over past ones.

A m

ission can minim

ise the risks of perceived and real bias by:

�negotiating agreem

ents that allow it access to all population groups and arm

edparties,and dem

anding flexibility in its activities and methodologies

�being geographically accessible to all key groups

Proactive Presence5

6

�taking care that its m

ethodologies and language skills do not implicitly favour

or give greater access to one group over another�

ensuring balance in any aspects of mission staffing that m

ight project a signalof bias externally

�protecting its independence from

the political agendas of its sponsoring states– this can be difficult but a m

ission’s ability to carry out protection impartially

may require it to confront contrary decisions of its ow

n sponsoring institutionsor states

�not allow

ing any mission personnel to pursue intelligence or m

ilitary functionsfor their ow

n government

�sustaining transparent and respectful relationships w

ith different sectors ofsociety – if a m

ission is invited in by government,a good relationship w

ithcivil-society groups can help to overcom

e perceptions of bias�

avoiding too much contact w

ith any one group �

undertaking thorough analysis – this is essential,as ignorance and poor analy-sis are seldom

unbiased in their impact.

Even w

ith the greatest of care,accusations of bias will happen.W

hen they do,them

ission needs to assess their merit:

if they are based on real problems,

it may be

advisable for the mission to take corrective action,

altering something about its

structure,objectives or activities to achieve greater im

partiality.If the accusations

are false or malicious,the m

ission needs to defend itself and its objective comm

it-m

ent to impartial protection.T

hose whose abuses are being observed w

ill oftenseek to de-legitim

ise the observer.A m

ission needs to foresee these accusations andbe ready to react.

A m

ission will be stronger if it effectively rebuffs accusations of bias and sustains

a cross-sectoral reputation for fairness and objectivity.Holding this ground,it has

the space to convene different players,give voice to the voiceless and make im

por-tant pronouncem

ents that local players cannot.

Co

mm

unication tech

niques

Diplom

acy can involve a wide variety of techniques,including direct pressure,indi-

rect pressure (‘hinting’),humour,politeness,subordination or hum

ility,praise andstressin

g mu

tual objectives or d

evelopin

g solution

s together.O

ne field

officerd

escribes field com

mu

nication

with au

thorities and

perp

etrators as theatre:a

perform

ance of politely nuanced threats aim

ed at instilling concern in abusersabout the future consequences of their actions.A

nother mission leader describes

this process of deliberately vague ‘hinting’w

ith particularly reactionary military

leaders:

Chapter 4


acy5

7


‘‘‘‘‘‘

‘You can’t [convey pressure] very directly.Y

ou can allude to the concern ofthe international com

munity or the forthcom

ing report to the General

Assem

bly.A

nd certainly at the junior level,you can do a sort of nam

e-dropping,

refer to your last discussion with the com

mander-in-chief or

remind them

that you have channels that go to their superiors,but you

have to do that fairly subtly.P

utting things in writing is also im

portantbecause it can reach m

ore people than your imm

ediate interlocutor,and

you can copy it elsewhere and so on.’

UN

AM

ET

field officer

Indeed,in tense and constantly changing situations,field staff trying to decide howbest to com

municate and achieve their objective m

ust be adept at improvising.

‘Once “at the scene”

– how to deal? C

racking jokes,killing tim

e,being

polite;having a good com

mand of the local language w

as indispensable.A

sk for coffee.‘What a beautiful evening!’

Sm

all talk and small talk and

small talk until the tension ebbed aw

ay.You had to adopt a style of subor-

dination and subservience.L

ong-winded praise.

I would just try to w

earthem

down.S

tressing our ‘mutual objectives…

’.They w

ould get so boredw

ith me! B

ut I was never disrespectful.Just alw

ays looking to decrease ten-sion.T

rying to find intellectual angles…

UN

AM

ET

field officer

‘You w

ould go to visit the bourgmeistre.Y

ou would feel guilty w

hile doingit,

because there were all kinds of people w

aiting in line to see him w

honeeded a paper signed.Y

ou would barge in and he w

ould be happy to seeyou and you w

ould spend 20–30 minutes…

I think we interrupted his

drudgery of having to sign another visa form to allow

someone to visit the

next comm

une… I think it w

as also a bit prestigious to be seen to be talk-ing to folks from

the UN

.’

HR

FO

R field officer

Som

etimes the im

mediate target of influence is not so easily identified or talked to.

For exam

ple,where w

idespread civilian displacement is threatened,a m

ission visitto a region m

ight not target a particular individual,but rather be used as an oppor-tunity to contact m

any different parties,each having the potential to influence thesituation indirectly.

In some cases a governm

ent will use its ow

n comm

unicationexperts to influence a m

ission.The G

overnment of Indonesia sent a special task

force headed

by a former am

bassador an

d w

ith a corps of E

nglish-sp

eaking

Proactive Presence5

8

‘‘ personnel from the foreign m

inistry and military liaisons to deal w

ith UN

AM

ET

and the international comm

unity.

‘Now

that was a tw

o-edged sword,w

ith advantages and disadvantages.Itw

as partly there to handle us,but in some cases it did act to facilitate our

comm

unication,and probably more than that – because these w

ere peoplew

ith international exposure,and some didn’t like w

hat they saw going on,

and may have put pressure on their colleagues…

we had extrem

ely well

set-up channels at all kinds of levels.’

UN

AM

ET

head of mission

Bo

x 4.2:Mission language skills

The ability of international personnel to speak local languages can be a crucial

skill.P

ast mission practice has been erratic:

if the local language was E

nglish,S

panish or French a m

ission might benefit from

fairly high levels of proficiencyam

ong its exp

atriates,bu

t most others d

epen

ded

on local tran

slators. 13

Language allow

s for intervention and,without it,you can’t really hear the other

side,and you don’t get the nuances of a situation.

Local translators are not

always reliable,m

ission staff cannot ascertain their quality,and in any case theinteraction is unnatural and inhibited.A

s a general principle,the usefulness ofin

ternation

al field officers in

creases dram

atically in relation

to their locallanguage skills.

Chapter 4


acy5

9

INTRODUCTION > BEING THERE > STRATEGIES > CHALLENGESS

LMM

monitors

with S

ri Lankan Arm

y

officers

© SLMM photo archive

Diplom

atic comm

unications can be carried out by a single institution or jointly.W

hen multiple institutions show

up together at meetings,and projecting a sim

ilarprotection m

essage,the impact can be m

uch greater,while the political risk to each

individual institution is lessened.O

ne subtle way to transm

it a protection message in contacts w

ith authorities andarm

ed groups is simply to ask questions about civilian safety.S

uch curiosity linksthe sp

ecific program

mes of an

institu

tion w

ith a more gen

eral concern

about

civilian

security.

Sim

ilarly,a

hum

anitarian

m

ission

– w

hatever its

specific

programm

es – should always express visible concern for the safety of its ow

n staffand those of its local partners.H

owever,the m

ission should also link this concernto civilian

safety overall,by callin

g attention

to the program

matic resou

rcesprovided by the institution and how

harmful it w

ould be for all concerned if a lackof security for civilians hindered delivery.

Sum

mary

The com

munication strategies described in this chapter require analytical,political

and diplomatic skills.S

pecifically,mission staff m

ust be able to:

�identify a range of actors – including abusers,national and local governm

ents,local com

munity leaders or business leaders – to be targeted

�develop and adopt clear,organisation-w

ide messages for each of these actors

that staff mem

bers can adapt to their experiences and apply consistently�

open as many channels of com

munication as possible – this is especially

important for arm

ed groups because contact with them

is often much m

oresporadic

Proactive Presence6

0

SLM

M m

onitors with

LTTE cadres

© SLMM photo archive

�create a culture of respect,transparency,m

utual consultation and open han-dling of accusations

�m

aster different comm

unication techniques,such as direct pressure,indirectpressure,hum

our,politeness,humility,praise and stressing m

utual objectives.

This is a tall order,

and every field officer cannot be expected to be a masterful

diplomat – such a constraint w

ould paralyse the necessary recruitment for large

missions.

But it is exactly because these skills are com

plex and difficult that theinstitution needs to em

phasise them in training and in ongoing field practice.N

otevery field officer can im

provise the perfect line for every situation,but they can

learn a great deal from others if the m

ission comm

its to helping them.

Chapter 4


acy6

1


5CONSCIOUSVISIBILITY

62

‘‘‘‘

‘They [the S

ri Lanka M

onitoring Mission] need a larger force.T

hey aretoo far from

incidents.They can’t get there fast enough.T

hey need to bem

ore available.When they are close by,

there is kind of a guilty feeling:“W

e might get caught by the m

onitors.”T

his is not so strong if they aretoo far aw

ay.’S

ri Lankan A

rmy official

Part

of the protection message is sim

ply visual:the mission’s cars driving through

the country,an im

pressive helicopter now and then,

or prominent regional and

local offices.Without a w

ord,every sighting of the mission rem

inds observers thatinternational concern has to be considered in their political calculations.In essence,a m

ission should visibly project both political power and m

oral authority.

‘For the com

munities this [visibility] generates a reflected protection.W

hyreflected? B

ecause the simple fact that they see a U

N vehicle travelling the

roads,through the villages,through zones of high conflict – the simple fact

that one of these blue vests is going to go ask after the local troop com-

mander,ask w

ho is responsible for the zone – this alone in itself generatesa level of protection because w

hat it says is,“These com

munities are not

alone.These com

munities have friends in high places”.’

Colom

bian human rights law

yer

Chapter 5

: Conscious visibility

63


‘‘ The U

N m

issions studied in El S

alvador (ON

US

AL

),Guatem

ala (MIN

UG

UA

),H

aiti (MIC

IVIH

) and East T

imor (U

NA

ME

T) each created a visible ‘aura’

thataffected the national consciousness im

mediately.

Interviewed for this book,

anofficer of the K

osovo Verification

Mission

(KV

M) d

escribed its p

resence as

complete saturation.

‘We w

ere visible 24/7.Driving through every single village.N

o locale was

off-limits.W

hen something happened w

e could set in motion an im

medi-

ate response.’

KV

M officer

It costs money to project such visibility,requiring offices,vehicles and people – and

ideally rap

id d

eploym

ent of these to m

ake an im

pact.

Slow

dep

loymen

t hasham

pered many m

issions,forcing them to recuperate from

an initially weak im

ageas they slow

ly expanded.A

nd in the rare cases of excessive presence,a m

issionshould consider the need for som

e level of modesty:a preponderance of luxury air-

conditioned land-cruisers constantly driving around poverty-stricken comm

unitiescan quickly becom

e a source of resentment.

Mission visibility is intended to sustain constant concern in the m

inds of abuserparties,and also to build confidence am

ong civilians.This dual audience can cause

a dilemm

a at times – it m

ight seem strategic to em

phasise meetings and contact

with governm

ent and military officials,

at the expense of visits to civil-society

groups or rural villages.But if a m

ission locates its office in the richest part of town,

close to facilities and circles of power,it m

ay be much less approachable or acces-

sible to poor victims of abuse.O

ne activist representing victims from

poor comm

u-nities,for instance,com

plained,‘They just stay up there w

here it’s comfortable.’

A m

ission needs to overcome the tem

ptations or imposed restrictions that lim

itits visibility to certain safer areas,or only to those w

hich rate high on the interna-tional agenda.

Security concerns should of course be a key factor in p

lanninggeographic projection of m

ission visibility.The m

ission therefore needs good secu-rity analysis – based fundam

entally on detailed political analysis of the changingconflict dynam

ics in each region.(See also C

hapter 10 on security challenges.) InD

arfur,for instance,the vast majority of international attention and visibility w

assituated around larger tow

ns and IDP

camps,w

ith only minim

al presence if any inthe vulnerable com

munities in the rest of the territory.T

his caused some concern

that UN

Security rigidly defined som

e areas as ‘no go’and maintained those lim

i-tations even after political conditions changed,thus hindering agency ability to bepresent in isolated areas.

Proactive Presence6

4

‘‘‘I think they have to get closer to the organisations and com

munities,

sopeople understand m

ore clearly that they can count on their interven-tion…

In the indigenous lands there is no one,and no one hears about

what happens…

they [international missions] have to get past this idea that

they should only show up after som

ething extraordinary happens.’

Colom

bian indigenous leader

Visib

le reactions at d

ecisive mo

ments

If a particularly difficult situation arises,and there is a call from the civilian popu-

lation for help or presence,the willingness and speed w

ith which the international

mission

visibly respon

ds has im

portan

t consequ

ences n

ot only for p

rotectiveim

pact bu

t also for build

ing local tru

st and

credibility.

MIC

IVIH

,K

VM

and

UN

AM

ET

,for example,show

ed the Haitian,A

lbanian,and Tim

orese populationthat they w

ere ready and willing to respond to urgent calls,go to dangerous places

and intervene quickly to try to protect.On the other hand,if a m

ission’s response istoo slow

or too-often negative,refusing aid because it is ‘outside our mandate’,the

trust in the mission felt by threatened groups and com

munities w

ill be damaged.

This creates a dilem

ma for m

any missions – especially in settings of frequent

crisis and limited hum

an resources – because the desire to build up longer-termcom

mitm

ents or projects can legitimately constrain the resources available for crisis

response.High-profile events also create high expectations of results,and a m

issionm

ust take special care not to make prom

ises it cannot keep,nor to respond instinc-tively to a situation unless it has a com

mitm

ent and capacity for follow-up.

Such

crises are nevertheless mom

ents when a very focused and intense,short-term

use ofpresence can have a particularly notable protective im

pact,sending a powerful and

mem

orable signal of solidarity to the victims.

Unfortunately,m

ission decisions to reducevisibility m

ay also affect protection –negatively.T

he most notorious exam

ple is the UN

decision to reduceits presence

in Rw

anda at the beginning of the genocide,sending a clear message of im

punityand encouragem

ent to the genocidaires.This dynam

ic can arise in much sm

aller andsubtler w

ays;therefore,whenever a m

ission decides to reduce or move its presence

in a given area,it should carefully consider the possible negative messages of these

decisions.E

ach mission should consider a w

ide variety of mechanism

s for visibility,and

use each according to how it fits into its broader strategy,and according to current

security con

sideration

s.F

our p

ossible mechan

isms in

clud

e:the in

stallation of

regional or local offices,the use of special visits or comm

issions,direct accompani-

Chapter 5


65


‘‘ ment of threatened individuals or groups,and the use of a hum

anitarian-assistancefunction as protective visibility.E

ach of these is discussed in turn in the next foursections.(C

hapter 8,Public advocacy,looks at other strategies also related to visi-

bility,including use of the media.)

Dep

loying

regio

nal or lo

cal offices

The research findings w

ere unequivocal that a field mission has a greater influence

on protection if it can deploy its staff to the maxim

um in zones of conflict,m

akingitself accessible to the population and to all levels of authority,and w

ith the mobility

for staff visits to any locality quickly.ON

US

AL

,MIN

UG

UA

,MIC

IVIH

,HR

FO

R,

KV

M and U

NA

ME

T all deployed the m

ajority of their staff to regional officesthroughout the country.S

LM

M and O

HC

HR

/Colom

bia,with few

er resources,stillput an em

phasis on field offices.A m

ission sub-office is a microcosm

of the nationalpresence,and has m

ore direct and daily contact with regional or local authorities and

greater access to more com

munities,also being able to m

ake prompt local responses.

When a m

ission functions only in the capital,the middle echelons of pow

er haveless need to pay attention.B

ut when regional or local com

manders know

they will

get regular visits from the m

ission next door,and the local comm

unities know that

this office is only a few hours aw

ay if they need help,the opportunities increase

dramatically for all the com

munication interventions described in the p

reviouschap

ter.A

gencies intervening directly with the LT

TE

in cases of abduction orforced recruitm

ent,for instance,

stressed that the closer they were to the local

events,the greater their success rate in freeing people.T

he sub-office also helps a mission to ‘regionalise’

its political analysis,m

oreaccurately reflecting local conditions and developing sub-strategies tailored to thepeculiarities of local actors.H

RF

OR

staff,for instance,stressed how different the

conflict dynamics w

ere from one region of R

wanda to another.

‘The w

orst thing that could happen would be for the U

N to judge and

speak about Colom

bia based only in Bogotá.V

isits to the countryside havem

ore impact.F

or victims to denounce,it is a delicate risk,and to go all the

way to B

ogotá to do it is nearly impossible.’

Colom

bian civil-society lawyer

Even w

ith limited resources,m

issions have developed sub-office strategies.SL

MM

compensated for its lim

ited size by establishing part-time ‘P

oint of Contact’offices

in comm

unities where it w

as not permanently stationed,

making w

eekly visits tothese offices to receive com

plaints and reports.Where there are m

ultiple interna-

Proactive Presence6

6

‘‘ tional agencies with protection functions in a region,they can collaborate to locate

their sub-offices in complem

entary locations,to multiply coverage.In other cases,

organisations have set up ‘hub’offices in relatively secure towns in a region,w

hichgives them

easy access to more delicate areas nearby.W

hen the UN

or a major

intern

ational m

ission sets u

p a su

b-office,N

GO

s will often

follow,

and

theincreased presence serves to increase hum

anitarian space.In som

e cases,the sheer size of a country,or difficulties of travel and access,canm

ake the deployment of m

ultiple field offices a daunting challenge,with significant

consequ

ences for resou

rces and

security.

How

ever,if the m

ission’s an

alysisconcludes that the deploym

ent of more sub-offices in rural region w

ould add to itscapacity to protect civilians,

it will need to address these costs,

and make every

effort to seek out the necessary resources.T

he presen

ce of a sub-office is p

erceived locally as a visible in

stitution

alcom

mitm

ent,and this is broadly appreciated.

Civilian groups in B

ucaramanga,

Colom

bia,for instance,described the installation of an OH

CH

R office there as a

‘dramatic change’.T

his was not only because it m

ade their access to the mission

logistically easier,but it was also seen as recognising the value of their local identity

and the significance of the challenges they faced.This recognition has an encour-

aging effect in itself.

Sh

ort visits, sp

ecial com

missio

ns or d

elegatio

ns

Civil-society groups and others vehem

ently criticise missions that install them

selvesin a region but are then virtually invisible,m

issing opportunities because of bureau-cratic decisions to stay indoors.

In Colom

bia,for instance,

the most com

mon

request to every international mission w

as that they get out to rural areas more,and

visit more com

munities.

A visit by an international m

ission to an isolated region sends a message to

perpetrators.It thus opens spaces and encourages local action.These visits m

ightbe carried out indep

endently by the field mission,

or on a multi-p

artite basis.S

ometim

es the participation of an international field presence allows a m

ulti-partiteinvestigatory com

mission to go w

here national actors would not otherw

ise venture.T

his facilitates visits by government officials to isolated regions that,

because ofguerrilla presence,they had previously considered off-lim

its.Well-tim

ed visits may

even significantly alter civilian choices.

‘After a grave event,the fact that a com

mission goes and pays attention –

this is a very important factor for a com

munity,encouraging them

not tojust flee and displace them

selves.’

Civil society representative,C

olombia

Chapter 5


67


‘‘ Mission visits m

ay well provide the only access local people have to a m

ission or tothe international com

munity.M

any people cannot easily travel to the state or eventhe provincial capital to m

ake a report,as such trips are often impossible for logis-

tical,financial or security reasons.

In some cases in C

olombia,

mobility w

as socontrolled by arm

ed groups that villagers could not travel at all,and the only time

they saw outsiders w

as during such mission visits.

Proper follow

-up to such visits is essential.Unfortunately,in particularly intense

conflicts,sporadic visits may increase local vulnerabilities and fears.In C

olombia,

for instance,many respondents stressed the need for follow

-up,sustained presence,or at least frequent regular visits to com

munities.If a m

ission intends to intervenein a delicate situation it should be ready to keep in touch,to reduce risks of repeti-tion of the pre-visit problem

or of reprisals resulting from the visit.It also needs to

demonstrate that it w

ill dosom

ething.Local people are often w

illing to bear some

level of risk if they believe their interaction with the m

ission has a chance of helping.

‘Som

etimes w

e don’t even know ourselves w

hat happens after these mis-

sions… P

eople want to know

how m

uch lobbying resulted,w

hat impact

they had in terms of transform

ing the political situation,and in terms of

protection.’

International aid agency representative,Colom

bia

‘These visits raise high expectations and hopes.T

hat’s why follow

-up is soim

portant,especially follow

-up on the comm

itments m

ade as a result ofsuch visits…

they sometim

es lead to pronouncements by the m

ilitary orthe authorities,but no one holds them

to these comm

itments.’

IDP

Advocate,C

olombia.

In situations of widespread abuse,a m

ission will never have the resources to visit

every comm

unity in need.It must prioritise according to w

hich visits are likely tohave the greatest potential to protect the greatest num

ber of people,and accordingto w

hich will m

ost effectively promote the m

ission’s national protection strategy.

Direct acco

mp

animent

Protective accom

panim

ent is a highly targeted and labour-intensive method of

protecting particularly threatened individuals,organisations or activities.It involvesliterally w

alking or travelling with a threatened individual,

living in threatenedcom

munities,

or being based at the location of a threatened activity or organisa-tional office.T

he impact is the sam

e in principle as other protective presence,butm

uch m

ore focused

.A

ccomp

anim

ent exclu

sively iden

tifies and

profiles the

Proactive Presence6

8

‘‘ protected person or group,saying loudly,in effect,‘Don’t touch this

one!’Because

close or regular accompanim

ent of specific people or groups is so labour-intensive,it is u

sually reserved

for cases of very high risk,or p

eople w

hose survival is

perceived as critical to broader strategies – such as high-profile civil-society leaders,exem

plary comm

unity efforts or key witnesses in a delicate legal case.

Peace B

rigades International has rigorously developed this tool,offering daily

accompanim

ent to many threatened civil-society activists,or having its volunteers

living in vulnerable comm

unities that are developing new strategies to confront

conflict.N

umerous personnel of other m

issions cited examples as w

ell,including

accomp

animent of com

plainants or w

itnesses in sensitive rights cases,staying

overnight in IDP

camps or w

ith recently resettled refugees,or hosting and living insafe-houses for victim

s of sexual violence.H

umanitarian agencies som

etimes use

partner relationships to facilitate a subtle level of direct accompanim

ent in threat-ened com

munities w

here they have assistance projects.The IC

RC

accompanies

joint medical m

issions into conflict zones,providing protection to more vulnerable

national medical groups w

hile also collaborating in the medical task.

‘This raises our profile a great deal.B

ecause to go to a village or on a roadw

ith the United N

ations gives us a high level of protection.E

speciallybecause the U

N has such close relationships w

ith the state and carriessuch respect.’

Hum

an-rights lawyer,C

olombia

Accom

panying threatened groups can be both politically and physically risky,but it has dem

onstrably saved lives and sustained organisations and comm

unities.G

uatemalan refugees,for instance,refused to return from

Mexico until they got the

Guatem

alan government to agree to allow

them direct accom

paniment in every

resettled village – w

hich was p

rovided

by dozen

s of intern

ational N

GO

s and

hundreds of international volunteers.Num

erous groups in conflict areas attest thattheir survival w

ould have been in doubt without the direct presence of international

NG

Os or agencies.

Direct accom

paniment requires a careful analysis of the security risks of each

case,and the political motivations and sensitivities of the potential attacker.A

rmed

parties should be informed of the accom

paniment,and should know

that it can andw

ill generate an imm

ediate response if something happens to those being accom

-panied.A

ccompanim

ent is intimate and can involve an em

otionally charged rela-tionship.

It should be handled professionally,and dem

ands trust,confidentiality

and clear agreements.E

fforts should be made to m

inimise the inevitable intrusion

into the accompanied person’s life or the organisation’s internal business.

Perhaps the biggest lim

itation of the accompanim

ent methodology is the hum

an

Chapter 5


69


‘‘ resources it requires.It takes a lot of people to offer intensive accom

paniment to

even a small num

ber of organisations or comm

unities,and there w

ill always be

many m

ore in need than could ever be accompanied.W

hile it is an important part

of the tool kit of a protective presence,accompanim

ent has to be used sparsely andstrategically,even by a large m

ission.The direct accom

paniment function,in som

ecases,

may be an area w

here complem

entarity is key:certain agencies or N

GO

sm

ay offer accompanim

ent to specific partners rather than creating an unrealisticexpectation that a general protection m

ission can meet everyone’s accom

paniment

demands.P

ressure to meet too m

any accompanim

ent needs may distort a m

ission’sp

riorities.N

evertheless,the m

ethodology of d

irect accomp

anim

ent shou

ld be

developed,and available when the context dem

ands it. 14

Hum

anitarian assistance and visib

ility

Hum

anitarian activities can often serve as a powerful justification for regular access

to threatened populations that might otherw

ise be isolated.S

ometim

es humani-

tarian access is possible even when the level of fear in these com

munities is far too

high for any explicit human-rights investigation.

‘When you go into a particular zone to protect a com

munity and you have

nothing to say,because you can’t talk about the violence,

your presencegenerates intrigue and suspicion.W

hat are you doing there? Who called

you? In contrast,if they are re-building a school there,you can go in everyw

eek to see how the school is doing.T

his gives you the justification to trav-el through zones the U

N w

as not passing through before,through check-points and all.W

e get a sustained contact with the com

munity,

and heartheir concerns.’

UN

HC

R representative in C

olombia

Hum

anitarian needs assessments can also be key opportunities for international

visibility in isolated areas.Joint assessm

ents,looking at both protection and assis-

tance needs,project a dual message:‘W

e will help.A

nd we are w

atching.’The provi-

sion of assistance can be a crucial door-opener for international p

resence.The

assistance role is important to a variety of local actors,and can thus add a level of

security and political weight to the presence and its m

essage,as long as care is takenthat the resources being provided are not them

selves a target for attack.F

inally,hum

anitarian agencies working prim

arily with local partner organisa-

tions need to consider carefully how the visible p

resence of these partners can

effectively project the protective political power of the agency itself.T

his power not

only in

creases protection

for comm

un

ities where the p

artners w

ork,bu

t alsoprotects the partners them

selves.If local armed actors know

about these partner-

Proactive Presence7

0

ships,and that the partners w

ill be supported politically by major international

players such as the World F

ood Program

me or other U

N agencies,this know

ledgebecom

es a political factor in their calculations about how to treat the com

munities

and partners concerned.Im

plementing such a projection of pow

er through part-ners m

ay require some careful consideration of ‘labelling’– how

partners identifythem

selves an

d

their relation

ships

with

spon

soring

intern

ational

agencies.

Personnel from

partner agencies should also be offered training in how to m

anageand com

municate this relationship w

hen working in the field.

Sum

mary

A field m

ission that successfully projects itself visibly throughout a conflict territoryshould seldom

be asked,‘W

ho are you?’.P

eople should have seen the m

issionbefore,

heard about its visits elsewhere,

known people w

ho have been to its sub-offices,or been told by their boss to pay attention to its visits.O

f course,a mission

cannot be everywhere at all tim

es,so it must prioritise its visibility and m

ovements

according to their potential to protect the greatest number of people,and according

to their usefulness to achieve the overall objectives of the presence.

Key m

ethods for achieving effective visibility include:

�developing other ‘institutionalised’m

echanisms of presence,such as regular

points of contact and scheduled rounds�

responding rapidly to crisis situations with visible visits show

ing solidarity andconcern

�deploying sub-offices throughout the territory,w

here they can be seen and vis-ited,and from

which field officers can easily visit state and provincial institu-

tions as well as isolated rural com

munities

�carrying out regular visits to conflict-prone rural areas,and guaranteeing fol-low

-up to prevent reprisals�

when necessary and feasible,providing direct accom

paniment for persons,

organisations or comm

unities at high risk �

taking advantage of non-protection programm

es (such as humanitarian assess-

ment,educational program

mes or m

edical missions) to em

phasise the protec-tive role of international presence

�seeking w

ays to extend the ‘visibility message’of the international presence to

local personnel and local partner organisations,such that their own visibility

enhances civilian protection without causing security risks to them

selves.

Chapter 5


71


6ACTIVEENCOURAGEM

ENTAND EM

POWERM

ENT

72

‘Many groups w

ould disappear from fear w

ithout this monitoring.’

Colom

bian NG

O law

yer

Civilians are not m

erely the beneficiaries of international efforts for protection.T

hey are protagonists in their own protection.A

field mission’s efforts,therefore,

should both complem

ent and strengthen civil society’s capacity to develop its own

strategies for addressing abuses.This w

ill include using protective presence to helpp

eople overcom

e their inhibition

s and

fears about civic activism

,su

pp

orting

comm

unities and organisations in mobilising to prom

ote protection objectives,as

well as confronting the polarisation and stigm

a that isolate and paralyse targetedsocial groups.

A field m

ission is just one actor in a broad array of local organisations,local

comm

unity leadership,national civic movem

ents,political parties,religious organ-isations,labour unions,w

omen’s organisations,peasant organisations and others.In

a conflict situation their diverse activities are critical to any serious strategies forchange.S

ome of the m

ost impressive cases of standing up to terror,for instance,

come from

well-organised,

cohesive comm

unities.In contrast,

disorganised andunsupported com

munities are m

uch more vulnerable to m

anipulation through fearand violence.

A profound lack of protection often reveals som

ething seriously wrong w

ith therelationship betw

een a government and its people – that the people do not have the

organisation

al capacity or p

ower to con

trol their own

governm

ent.

This is a

problem often requiring reform

and capacity building for civil society,in additionto the governm

ent-focused capacity building that often dominates international

missions.

Long-term

change requires an organised and participatory civil societypossessing the expertise,resources and structures to restore a healthier relationship

Chapter 6

: Active encouragem

ent and empow

erment

73


‘‘

‘‘ with the state.

Otherw

ise,reform

s within

the governm

ent or attitu

de chan

gesam

ong abusers may not last.

The p

olitical-space m

odel described in Chap

ter 2 above shows how

civilianaction

s are constrain

ed by both rep

ression an

d fear.T

his is a self-reinforcin

gprocess,because any restrictions on public or organised activity lim

it the capacityof a com

munity or society to respond to or sanction abusers.

In short,violence

inhibits the comm

unity’s ability to protect itself,and a field mission should seek to

counteract this.Conversely,each courageous action by civilians that confronts these

inhibitions has a collectively reinforcing effect,pushing aw

ay the constraints thatothers perceive to be lim

iting their actions.

‘Here,nothing w

ill happen to you as long as you don’t say anything.’

Cam

pesino from U

rabá,Colom

bia

In some com

munities in conflict zones,fears are so great that people w

ill not speakof them

,and thus civil society cannot organise a response.

In such situations thepresence of the international com

munity m

ay be the only factor that enables peopleto talk about their problem

s and to seek solutions.In the LT

TE

-controlled northand east of S

ri Lanka,

most T

amils w

ho disagree with the LT

TE

are afraid toprotest.International presence m

ay help overcome such fears and foster increased

organisation of civil society with long-term

potential for change.

‘We should be thinking m

ore about joint missions,

where the stronger

organisations bring a presence that carries protection to local and nation-al groups,but at the sam

e time these national groups bring their experi-

ence and knowledge and capacity – w

hich in itself really protects the inter-nationals!’

International monitor,C

olombia

Reversing

stigm

a and iso

lation

Com

munities or sectors of society are especially in need of protection and encour-

agement by international presence if they have been stigm

atised and isolated by thestereotyp

es of abuser groups or the dynam

ics of the conflict.F

or instance,in

Colom

bia,civilians in a conflict zone are routinely suspected of ‘collaboration’with

the armed party that controls the territory.

Each tim

e territorial control shifts,in

either direction,these suspicions can have deadly consequences.E

thnic groups,m

ovements or sectors of society also face stigm

atisation with

mortal risks.

Hutus in post-genocide R

wanda w

ere suspected of participation in

‘‘Proactive Presence7

4

genocid

eand

sup

port for the in

surgen

cy.The G

uatem

alan A

rmy carried

out

systematic p

ublic d

isinform

ation cam

paign

s to convince local resid

ents that

refugees returning from M

exico were all guerrillas.

Disp

laced peop

le are oftenautom

atically suspected of being politically responsible for their misfortune,w

hileunion activists and m

embers of hum

an-rights NG

Os are routinely labelled ‘guer-

rillas‘ or ‘terrorists’.

Chapter 6

: Active encouragem

ent and empow

erment

75


Bo

x 6.1: Case exam

ples of encouragement and civil-society relationships

�M

INU

GU

A had conscious strategies for strengthening civil society,and

used its rural presence to encourage local groups.These groups in turn

developed strategies to use the mission’s presence,inviting it to events and

key meetings,or advocating for m

ission investigations.�

In 1993–94,repression forced most H

aitian activists into hiding,notwith-

standing the MIC

IVIH

presence.Although the H

aitian people appreciatedit,this presence could hardly be said to have encouraged civil-societyactivism

.Monitors there feared that the m

ission had raised local expecta-tions beyond its ability to fulfil them

.�

In Rw

anda,encouragement of civil-society organising by the m

issionappears to have been lim

ited to a few N

GO

s in the capital,as mission per-

sonnel perceived rural civil society as too weakly organised to create an

effective partnership.�

The ethnic A

lbanian population saw K

VM

in 1998–99 as an ally,but them

ission was not there long enough to strengthen civil-society capacity prior

to NA

TO

bombing.

�W

hile the international presence in Darfur overall had very w

eak connec-tions w

ith local civil society,humanitarian agencies had partnerships w

ithlocal assistance N

GO

s.UN

HC

R,for exam

ple,had a protective partnershipw

ith a threatened legal-aid NG

O.

�S

LM

M did not regard the strengthening of civil-society capacity to protect

itself as falling within its m

andate.Many local respondents voiced high lev-

els of disillusionment w

ith the mission’s perceived distance from

civil-socie-ty groups,and urged it to develop closer links.

�O

HC

HR

and UN

HC

R w

ere warm

ly described as firm allies by civil-society

groups in Colom

bia,and engaged in countless joint activities.In fact,encouragem

ent is a two-w

ay process,as human-rights groups pointed out

that the OH

CH

R presence itself is in part the result

of years of civil-societypressure on the state and the international com

munity.

‘‘ These stigm

atising stereotypes are resilient – once in people’s minds they don’t

go away easily.

An international m

ission can set a counter-examp

le by its own

behaviour,

makin

g contact w

ith isolated an

d stigm

atised grou

ps,

and

find

ing

opportunities to break down the stereotypes:

‘These

comm

unities w

ere com

pletely stigm

atised,and

the U

N

visitshelped confront this.T

hese visits were im

portant even though they were

short.In 1997,they verified the collaboration of paramilitaries and police.

In fact,the param

ilitaries directly threatened the comm

ission.B

ut thecom

mission helped open up people’s voices.’C

olombian church w

orker.

Pro

blem

s in missio

n relationsh

ips w

ith civilians

With a genuine belief in its ow

n good intentions,a mission can som

etimes take for

granted its relationship with civil society.

But num

erous factors can damage this

relationship,such as:

�civilian perceptions of pro-governm

ent mission bias,due to technical and

political relationships with m

inistries �

lack of transparency – the appearance of secrecy provokes distrust �

excessively rigid or bureaucratic responses to civilian requests �

cultural insensitivity �

inability to speak the local language �

alienating statements or behaviour by m

ission staff,showing apparent con-

tempt for local civil society

�violation by m

ission staff of local ethical standards and codes of conduct (forexam

ple by visiting brothels,excessive drinking,dating local people) �

poor analysis,raising doubts about the mission’s capacity to help

�neglectful treatm

ent of information and sources

�dealing prim

arily with national elites,w

hich can be problematic especially if

the political elites and the conflict are divided along ethnic lines�

depleting civil-society organisations by absorbing their activists into relativelyhigh-paid roles in m

ission support�

allowing m

anipulation of the mission by the state or an arm

ed group �

reluctance to address issues with the governm

ent on the grounds of sustaininga ‘good relationship’

�poor security behaviour,creating fear of associating w

ith the mission

�being too sm

all a mission to respond respectably to civilian needs.

Proactive Presence7

6

‘‘ Perhaps w

orst of all,international organisations sometim

es absorb and repeat stig-m

atising stereotypes against domestic groups or com

munities,either through care-

lessness or as a result of trusting biased sources of information.G

iven the perceived‘neutral’credibility of institutions concerned,careless repetition of stereotypes canbe particularly dam

aging.All too often,international personnel repeat governm

entsuspicions of local N

GO

s,or allege links to a guerrilla movem

ent.An international

mission should ensure that its form

al and informal m

essages do not unconsciouslyexacerbate the stigm

atisation and isolation of certain groups.If other internationalorganisations engage in such stereotyping,they should be confronted and urged tochange their approach.

‘When [they] refuse to talk w

ith us,saying,“I can’t have a relationship with

you because of our neutrality”… this sends a signal that they believe w

ehave links w

ith the guerrillas,and this signal puts us in danger.’

Local N

GO

lawyer

Enco

uragem

ent with

out raising

false expectatio

ns

Unless encouragem

ent is linked to a real improvem

ent in security,a m

ission canencourage excessive risk-taking.L

ocal activists interviewed for this book reported

that,under the stress they face,they often cannot pay careful enough attention tosecurity precautions,and that a useful role of an international presence w

ould be tohelp them

learn security skills,for exam

ple through workshops.

An international

presence cannot use ‘non-substitution’

or ‘local emp

owerm

ent’as an excuse to

renege on its responsibility to protect.For instance,according to som

e respondents,the U

N presence in A

fghanistan encouraged the national human-rights body to

implem

ent human-rights investigations,even in situations w

here there was no secu-

rity for them to do so.T

hey argue that a more robust international m

ission shouldhave been present to accom

pany and protect the Afghan investigators and take

some of the heat for their findings.W

hen citizens taking risks to protect others arethem

selves attacked or threaten

ed,

a protection

mission

mu

st do everythin

gpossible to com

e to their aid.T

he East T

imor experience is an exam

ple of very high-stakes encouragement.

UN

AM

ET

’s presence encouraged full popular participation in the very dangerousballot that led to independence,and enabled T

imorese political organisations to feel

that they in turn could encourage popular participation.A

s violence and threatsm

ounted,the UN

promised,‘W

e will not leave.’B

ut it was a prom

ise that it couldnot keep:as security conditions deteriorated drastically,the m

ission reached a point

Chapter 6

: Active encouragem

ent and empow

erment

77


where it felt that its protective im

pact was not significant enough to justify the risk

to its staff.The m

ission first pulled out of all the provinces,and then held on in Dili

until a military intervention w

as mandated,and until it could evacuate the national

staff and IDP

s hiding in its compound.H

ere,the UN

policy of encouragement –

firmly supported by the leadership of T

imorese civil society – arguably increased

civilian vulnerability to subsequent massacres.S

ome argue that U

NA

ME

T should

never have made such an unequivocal prom

ise,since it could not guarantee the

protection

imp

lied.

In con

trast,su

bsequen

t feedback from

Tim

orese activistssuggests that this encouragem

ent was a w

orthwhile risk,given that it helped to end

an occupation that had already cost tens of thousands of Tim

orese lives.E

ncouragement is thus very com

plex – who decides how

far to go? A m

issionshould,

of course,never actively encourage excessive risk-taking by civilians,

noroverstate its ow

n protective value.But civilians w

ill make their ow

n choices aboutw

hether to feel encouragedby a presence,and w

hich risks to take.An international

mission can’t stop local people from

choosing to take risks,and arguably shouldn’teven if it could.In the face of repression and conflict,risk-taking is essential to anyprocess of change.

Bo

x 6.2:A key national actor – the C

atholic Church in Latin A

merica

In all the Latin A

merican cases studied,

the Church has been very active in

protecting civilians.Although the state is the ‘legal duty-bearer‘ w

hen it comes to

civilian protection,the Church in L

atin Am

erica has often been the ‘moral duty-

bearer‘,advocatin

g for protection

and

hum

anitarian

sup

port.

Som

etimes

Church involvem

ent features the top institutional hierarchy,but even w

ithoutsuch leadership,local priests and dioceses actively protect civilians.

The C

hurch is often the only national institution maintaining contact w

ith allparties in a conflict,and w

ith comm

unities throughout a territory,making it an

unparalleled source of inform

ation,analysis and influence.

It can influenceau

thorities as well as en

courage p

opu

lar confid

ence,

and

consequ

ently its

activists have often needed international protection.

Missions should m

ake a special effort to understand such influential institutions,their divisions and pow

er structures,and their potential strategies for promoting

peace and protection.These institutions m

ay have far more influence on political

and conflict developments than any international presence.

Proactive Presence7

8

Sum

mary

The m

ission needs to ask at every turn:w

ho in civil society is affected by thisp

roblem? W

ho is already taking action (or should be) on this problem

? What

alliances and collaborations are going to move us forw

ard towards a solution? W

hatis the best role for this m

ission within this broader context?

A m

ission should encourage comp

lementary strategies by other actors,

bothin

ternation

al and

nation

al.The con

cept of p

roactive presen

ce is by no m

eans

reserved for the international comm

unity:reputable national institutions (religious,professional of civic) can also use their status to protect w

eaker and more isolated

groups.A

field mission,

therefore,can encourage influential m

embers of society

such as business owners,

entertainers,diplom

ats,clergy and others to engage in

protective presence and advocacy,or can encourage the presence of high-rankingofficials or local celebrities at events relating to people at risk.T

he mission should

generally use its clout both by giving direct protective coverage and also by encour-aging locally based protection efforts.

There is a variety of steps a m

ission can take to pursue these objectives:

�Include civil-society sources in inform

ation-gathering,and local advisers inanalysis,w

here appropriate.�

Develop an understanding of the strengths and w

eaknesses of local civil socie-ty,identify key organisations w

ith potential for a multiplier effect,and w

ork forrelationship building and support.

�N

ever settle for the simplistic analysis that there is no organised civil society to

relate to:keep looking.�

Provide protective presence as needed for vulnerable or stigm

atised comm

uni-ties and groups.

�D

evelop mechanism

s or platforms to involve civil society directly in the m

is-sion’s w

ork.�

Develop m

echanisms for regular dialogue w

ith key civil-society groups.�

Pay attention to how

mission behaviour can strengthen or dam

age civiliantrust.

�C

ontrol expectations through transparent dialogue with civilian groups,in

order to avoid excessive risk-taking.�

Consider organising joint m

issions with local and national groups.

�S

upport civil-society efforts,both financially and politically,that contribute tohum

an rights and protection.�

Offer skills-building support on security and protection,international law

,hum

an-rights monitoring or other key topics to interested civil-society groups.

Chapter 6

: Active encouragem

ent and empow

erment

79


7CONVENINGANDBRIDGING

80

‘‘‘‘

‘You need to open spaces that bring together com

munities or N

GO

s who

are threatened or stigmatised,w

here they can get closer to the state insti-tutions,before som

ething worse happens to them

– at a table where they

can describe their problems and w

hat has happened to them.B

ut at leasthave som

e direct personal contact – it helps to break down prejudices…

when they sit dow

n together and talk about very concrete things and abouthow

each party should be behaving – in my opinion this contributes to

their physical protection.’

OH

CH

R field officer,C

olombia

An international field p

resence can provide a bridge across divides created by

conflict.An international m

ission is often the only actor with the capacity and cred-

ibility to convene different parties,and is particularly well-placed to bring together

threatened civil-society groups with state representatives.In interview

s carried outduring the research for this m

anual,the power of this bridging role w

as acknowl-

edged by civil-society groups,field officers and government representatives alike.

‘The international role can im

prove citizen participation and relationshipw

ith their own authorities.T


unity can help to devel-op closer relationships betw

een the comm

unity,the N

GO

s and localauthorities – building bridges of confidence.’

Head of H

uman R

ights Departm

ent,Colom

bian National P

olice

Convening activities have a protection function even w

hen they do not yield anyprom

ising steps towards reconciliation or im

mediate problem

-solving,because theycreate n

ew p

aths of comm

un

ication an

d d

ialogue.

Ad

dition

ally,every tim

e avulnerable group or activist is associated w

ith the field mission in the presence of

Chapter 7

: Convening and bridging

81


‘‘ the state or armed

group,

their credibility an

d thu

s their quota of p

rotectionincreases,

as this relationship sym

bolises a political cost to anyone w

ho might

consider an attack against this person or group.

Sub

tle, low

-intensity brid

ging

Shuttle diplom

acy

Sim

ply having relationships with m

ultiple parties opens up opportunities to transmit

concerns and seek solutions,w

ithout even bringing the parties together.A

s oneC

olombian N

GO

activist explained,‘The fact that the O

HC

HR

sustains close rela-tionships w

ith NG

Os and com

munities – this also builds confidence w

ith state func-tionaries,assuring them

that we are not all their enem

ies.We are m

ore able to talk.’F

ield officers from the H

uman R

ights Mission for R

wanda (H

RF

OR

) set up desksinside prisons and established direct relationships w

ith prisoners.But these sam

e offi-cers w

ere regularly meeting and socialising w

ith prison officials,

building up a

rapport.This rapport opened up m

any opportunities for the effective transmission of

concerns to prison officials,and for seeking solutions together.Given the tragic prison

conditions,every incremental change or early release had life-saving potential.

In some polarised situations,this ‘shuttle diplom

acy’is recognised explicitly bythe parties involved.S

ri Lankan police and civilians alike pointed out that they had

no channel for talking to the LTT

E guerrillas,and they respected the role of the S

riL

anka Monitoring M

ission (SL

MM

) as a formal go-betw

een in local situationsw

here comm

unication was essential to defuse tensions.

‘With the arm

ed forces it has been difficult for us,as there is a lot of fric-tion betw

een civil-society groups and the armed forces.B

ut they [the UN

]have played the role of interm

ediaries.We speak w

ith the OH

CH

R office,

the office speaks to the army,and then talks to us again.T

his has worked

a little better than having direct meetings.’

Civil-society law

yer in Medellín,C

olombia

Getting m

ore voices heard

Civil-society groups often face a situation w

here they cannot get any audience with

the state or with an arm

ed group;or if they do achieve such audiences,

all theyreceive are accusations of subversive activities,and they m

ay be labelled as traitorsby

their own com

munities for trying to com

municate w

ith ‘the enemy’.

UN

HC

Rprotection officers in S

ri Lanka recounted num

erous examples of being the ‘voice‘

of civilians who either feared,or could not get,an audience w

ith either party.This

often opens up the first opportunity for a productive dialogue.

Proactive Presence8

2

‘‘ Likew

ise,for state authorities,an international mission’s w

illingness to maintain

contact with civil-society groups gives these groups a credibility that m

akes stateauthorities m

ore willing to listen.A

s one civil-society representative explained to afield w

orker,‘If you will bring this issue up at the m

eeting,then I will be able to talk

about it.’When it w

orks,groups,

previously ignored,finally feel their voices are

heard.Over tim

e this can evolve into a real dialogue,to some extent hum

anising apolarised situation.

Bringing a guest

Doors tend to open for an international m

ission,and som

etimes the m

ission canusher other people through those doors.It can recom

mend to civil-society groups

that they invite officials to collaborate on initiatives.O

r it can bring civil-societyvoices into greater contact w

ith state mechanism

s.For instance,support for R

ule ofL

aw p

rogramm

es can encourage the involvement of legal exp

erts from w

ithinnational civil society,

thus allowing a technical-sup

port relationship

to facilitatedialogue and connection.

Mo

re intensive and structured

convening

Multi-partite delegations

The technique of m

aking visits (as described in Chapter 5) can be particularly

powerful w

hen the visitor becomes a ‘m

ulti-partite delegation’involving represen-tation from

the state,civil society and the field mission going together to assess a

situation.S

uch experiences of w

orking together invite collaboration on formal

follow-up,

and can create permanent relationships.

Colom

bian activists pointedout,

for instance,that after a governm

ent official participates in such a trip,it is

much easier for civilian groups to initiate legal cases relevant to the events studied.

Som

etimes,these initiatives bring governm

ent officials for the first time to com

mu-

nities that have been completely isolated.

‘the important w

ork is out in the many hundreds of villages w

here the statehas been com

pletely absent.I just came back F

riday from a w

eek-long tripon one river.W

e met w

ith indigenous comm

unities,and w

hen we asked

them w

hen was the last tim

e they had had a visit from a state authority,

they replied that since they founded the comm

unity eight years ago theyhad never had a single visit from

a government functionary.T

his time,

only because we w

ent,a representative of the Defensoría cam

e with us.’

OH

CH

R field officer,C

olombia

Chapter 7


83


Convening m

eetings and discussions

An international presence can som

etimes defuse polarisation just enough to create

a neutral space w

here moderate leaders can be heard and find som

e comm

onground to quell tension.T

hese might be inform

al or confidential meetings,or larger

consultations where different voices share the floor.

In the east of Sri L

anka,for

instan

ce,both the S

LM

M an

d the N

GO

Nonviolen

t Peace F

orce proactively

convened

Tam

il and

Mu

slim com

mu

nity lead

ership w

hen com

mu

nal violen

cebroke out,

effectively preventing escalation.In D

arfur,respondents described a

unique and reconciliatory gathering of African and A

rab nomad sheikhs,convened

and accompanied by an international agency’s protection officers.S

uch consulta-tions m

ight address thematic questions,

or the needs of particular group

s.F

orinstance,w

omen’s groups and indigenous groups have requested that field m

issionsfacilitate a greater ‘voice’for their concerns.

Workshops

Skills w

orkshops,in addition to their capacity-building impact,are m

echanisms for

bridge-building and also protection.For exam

ple,a Colom

bian activist was calling

attention to constant police mistreatm

ent and torture of youths arrested on gang-related and drugs charges;he faced death threats from

sources he presumed to be

close to the police.The O

HC

HR

mission organised a w

orkshop with the police on

youth issues,asking this man to participate as co-trainer.T

his helped to sensitise thepolice on the issue,but also gave the civilian activist som

e UN

legitimacy,de-stig-

matising his role in the eyes of the police.It even led to ongoing relationships w

ithsom

e police contacts.He is convinced it contributed to saving his life,and strength-

ened his ability to advocate for vulnerable young people.

Longer-term joint initiatives

Various inter-sectoral w

orking groups,thematic com

missions and other structures

have been facilitated by international missions,

in which different parties accept

responsibility for working together and addressing the concerns of civilians.T

heC

olombian case study w

as particularly rich with exam

ples of these initiatives overthe years.T

hese joint-working experiences can be difficult,controversial and som

e-tim

es disillusioning,but they can also move state functionaries to show

some real

responsiveness to civilian concerns,w

hile allowing civil-society groups to identify

and work w

ith progressive allies inside the state apparatus.It usually takes time to

develop such initiatives.

Proactive Presence8

4

‘‘‘‘‘‘

‘Here at the regional level it has been possible [due to O

HC

HR

presence]to organise w

orking groups and discussion with the F

iscalia,with the head

of the Procuraduria,the interior m

inistry and the mayor’s office.T

his hasw

orked very well,enabling us to overcom

e many m

isunderstandings… In

this line of work there is som

etimes a tendency to believe that all w

ho work

for the state are the enemy,and for them

to think that everyone in socialorganisations is the enem

y as well.’

Civil-society law

yer,Colom

bia

The field officer involved in this initiative stressed that the im

pact is onlyseen over tim

e.‘We’ve m

et every two w

eeks – for over two years now

.It

requires constant nourishment and m

utual learning.Now

we are starting

to see results.I am certain there are som

e actions of the army…

that final-ly after being dealt w

ith by this comm

ittee have resulted in some investi-

gations.There are constant m

eetings about concrete problems and situa-

tions.’

OH

CH

R field officer,C

olombia

Joint mechanism

s for early warning and prevention

In some cases,

a field mission can help to create structures intended to identify

escalating situations that will adversely affect civilian com

munities and m

obilise apreventive and protective response by m

ultiple actors.These early-w

arning struc-tures bring together governm

ent,civil society and international players to diagnoselocal risks,produce tim

ely reports and recomm

end preventive action by the author-ities.T

he practical impact of such m

echanisms depends largely on the com

mitm

entof the state,

and

for this reason the attem

pts at early-w

arnin

g mechan

isms in

Colom

bia have been disillusioning to some.

‘We spent tw

o years working out a protocol w

ith UN

,the government,the

ICR

C and the C

hurch,on protection of com

munities at risk,

which

included both visits and follow-up,

within a rights-based fram

ework.

It’san excellent w

ork in academic term

s,but of no use in practice,because thegovernm

ent has impeded im

plementation.

I think the UN

needs to bem

ore proactive,and we’re going to keep trying.’

Activist for ID

P rights,C

olombia

Other m

echanisms have integrated the efforts of the hum

anitarian comm

unity,both international and national.

For instance,

the negotiation of ‘humanitarian

accords’holding armed parties to com

mitm

ents about protection as well as access

Chapter 7


85


to assistance has been an avenue for collaboration among C

hurch,hum

anitarian,and protection actors,

together with states and arm

ed groups.These accords can

establish ongoing monitoring m

echanisms that sustain these connections.

A m

ission must,of course,take care not to raise unrealistic hopes in ineffective

or co-opted

mechan

isms,

because d

isillusion

men

t can cou

nteract the p

ositivebenefit of co-operation.H

owever,w

hen these efforts are even partially successful,they p

lace protection and p

revention concerns squarely before the state bodiesresponsible for civilian security.T

hey also bring together civil-society,religious,

government and international actors w

ho share an obligation or concern regardingcivilian security.

Bo

x 7.1: Key governm

ent allies: the example of the C

olombian D

efensoria

International intergovernmental m

issions in Colom

bia have supplied substantialtechnical support to the D

efensoria,an ombudsm

an-like body established by thegovernm

ent,as well as to a special hum

an-rights branch of the Fiscalia

(justicem

inistry) ostensibly devoted to prosecuting human-rights cases.T

his support isdefended on the grounds that these institutions are prom

oting the rule of law,

changing state behaviour from w

ithin and supporting reformers.In the absence

of any progress towards a political solution in C

olombia,how

ever,such govern-m

ent mechanism

s have made little if any difference to the near-total im

punitythat exists in C

olombia for abuses against civilians.

Mem

bers of staff within

these institutions span the political spectrum from

honest reformers to param

il-itary allies.T

he few defensores w

ho dare to challenge the paramilitary m

ovement,

or the army’s close link to it,are routinely harassed,driven into exile,rem

ovedfrom

their positions or killed.D

espite some honest prosecutors,

the Fiscalia

isaccused of being p

olitically co-opted,

and it too has suffered threats againstprosecutors and judges.

In such settings,a close alliance with a governm

ent agency is a delicate matter,

since it affects the public legitimacy of an international m

ission.Mission staff of

OH

CH

R rep

eatedly stressed the imp

ortance of these links for their work in

Colom

bia.C

ivil-society respondents,although often positive about the m

orecom

mitted individuals in the D

efensoria,theF

iscalia,and even the police force,w

ere also more p

rone to scepticism

about the naivety of expecting p

rogressthrough such institutional support.

Strong concerns w

ere expressed that if aninternational m

ission does not speak out publicly about the ways in w

hich theseinstitutions are m

anipulated and p

olitically controlled to prevent them

fromhaving a real im

pact on impunity,its alliance and direct support for these bodies

may am

ount to promoting a charade.B

ut even the most critical voices affirm

edthat the honest reform

ers within these structures need international protection.

Proactive Presence8

6

These governm

ent bodies with an explicit obligation to protect rights are an

important bridge for an international m

ission.The m

ission can pull them into

investigations,

delegation

s and

comm

issions;

it can d

eman

d som

e level ofaccountability from

these bodies.This interaction can help to bring potential

allies within the state apparatus closer to the victim

s of abuse and to under-standing their situation,

and it can create channels of comm

unication between

victims and the state.A

t a minim

um,calls for accountability can help bring to

light the impotence or inaction of failed governm

ent mechanism

s.And at best,

active co-operation with honest reform

ers can create new structures and change

institutional attitudes.

International b

ridg

ing

Relationships betw

een local actors and other international mechanism

s and playersalso have a protection function,

and again the unique position of an intergovern-m

ental field mission can enable such relationships.A

mission can facilitate interac-

tion between influential international actors and local or national officials w

ho haveeither a direct protection duty or w

ho are possibly associated with abuses of civil-

ians.These contacts are not only a rem

inder of the clout of the mission and the

political costs of abuse,but they can also be a positive status symbol for the officials

seen to be m

eeting im

portan

t intern

ational figu

res.T

hese contacts can

helpprogressive functionaries inside abusive institutions to find additional internationalsupport for reform

and legitimate protection efforts.

For exam

ple,one creative

technique for supporting promising reform

ers is to arrange to have them invited

outside the country to international conferences,consultations and trainings,where

they will com

e into contact with other progressive allies,w

ho will further encourage

their reform efforts. 15

Civil-society grou

ps ap

preciate every p

ossible chance to m

eet with S

pecial

Rapporteurs or other international figures or delegations visiting the country,and

the field mission can and should facilitate this.A

field mission can also facilitate civil

contact with representatives of em

bassies – in capital cities,or when em

bassy stafftravel to regions.A

n even stronger relationship can develop if the mission can facil-

itate visits by embassy officers and other intergovernm

ental representatives to theregions of conflict,w

here they can come into direct contact w

ith comm

unities andlocally threatened groups.

As before,

every visible contact with these influential

international actors adds to the quota of political protection available to threatenedgroups.

Som

e international institutions understandably fear jeopardising their neutralityand w

ill choose not to promote local groups publicly at a global level.If so,they can

still choose quieter and safer ways to pursue the sam

e links.These relationships are

Chapter 7


87


in the field mission’s interest,because external netw

orks can carry out independentlobbying and advocacy in the international com

munity,building up protection for

the groups concerned.They can provide types of political support that are outside

the mandate and capacity of a field m

ission,but that can have direct and comple-

mentary protective im

pact.And w

hen these local groups have their own netw

orksof support,

they are less likely to need to call on the field mission w

hen they arefacing a crisis or threat.F

urthermore,any increase in the level of international soli-

darity for civil-society groups may also yield an increase in international political

support for the mission itself.

Sum

mary

Convening and bridging strategies bring together polarised actors and facilitate

dialogue between local or national actors and international players.T

hese strategiesrequ

ire constan

t observation of these d

iverse interaction

s and

soun

d p

oliticalanalysis in order to identify the right opportunities to im

prove relationships andgive

leverage to vulnerable civilian groups.

Mission staff should be trained in strategic use of the w

hole array of bridging tech-niques,including:

�shuttle diplom

acy – being in contact with polarised groups,or w

ith both vic-tim

s and perpetrators�

enhancing the voice of marginalised groups

�raising issues that can be dangerous for local groups to raise

�organising m

ulti-partite delegations or investigations involving both civil socie-ty and governm

ent�

using international credibility to convene meetings of m

ultiple parties�

organising workshops or other events involving m

ultiple parties�

creating longer-term m

ulti-partite mechanism

s,such as thematic w

orkinggroups or com

missions,or hum

anitarian accords�

creating or supporting early-warning m

echanisms that assem

ble representa-tives from

government,civil society and the international com

munity to diag-

nose local risks and identify preventive action �

facilitating contact between local or national actors w

ith influential internation-al groups,including visiting delegations,rapporteurs,and the diplom

atic corps�

using programm

es of direct technical assistance with the state to provide addi-

tional bridging opportunities with direct protection benefits.

Proactive Presence8

8

All of these strategies draw

on the unique credibility that an international presencecan possess,a credibility that inspires confidence on the part of civil society w

hilealso op

ening doors of comm

unication to armed p

arties and governments.T

hispotential,w

hen fully realised,can yield creative solutions for the protection of civil-ians.

Chapter 7


89


8PUBLICADVOCACY

90

Public reporting and advocacy are perhaps the m

ost traditional tools of protec-tion.P

ublic exposure is a political cost to an abuser,and public encourage-m

ent is an incentive for reform.G

lobally targeted advocacy by a field mission

can increase the level of international political attention and pressure being appliedby

others,generating additional future political costs.These strategies are broadly

acknowledged as pow

erful,though not all of the missions studied took full advan-

tage of them.Y

et even in the Sri L

anka Monitoring M

ission (SL

MM

),one of theleast public of the m

issions studied,field officers pointed out,‘The only threat w

ehave is to show

the statistics’.ICR

C respondents stressed the com

plementary value

of other organisations’public approaches.E

very public strategy,

whether it involves hum

an-rights reporting,

using them

edia or organising public events,has associated risks and draw

backs,w

hich areevaluated differently by different institutions.E

ach mission w

ill need to choose itsow

n approach,according to its view of how

best to contribute to protection in theshort,

medium

and long term.T

he concept of strategic sequencing discussed inC

hapter 3 is important in planning w

ork on public advocacy,as the solution to agiven p

roblem m

ay or may not require high-level intervention.

Each advocacy

campaign needs to be calibrated to take into account several factors:

�the current political context

�receptiveness of the target to public advocacy or pressure

�existing levels of political support for the advocacy m

essage,both domestically

and internationally�

the prior history of attempts to deal w

ith the issue through non-public strate-gies.

This strategic p

rocess should also consider the benefits of comp

lementarity in

public messages:

how different institutions’

messages can separately influence a

Chapter 8

: Public advocacy9

1


situation towards the desired outcom

e,and when a com

bined message of m

ultipleinstitutions m

ight be stronger and more effective.W

hen using public advocacy,it isim

portant to avoid the temptation to create a shock for its ow

n sake.Information

should not be released too early,after insufficient investigation,as this can affect thecredibility of all future advocacy.T

he objective of the advocacy is not the headlines,but a concrete im

provement in the situation,and the style of each m

essage shouldbe crafted w

ith this in mind.

Benefits and

risks of p

ublic ad

vocacy

The value of public advocacy and reporting

Careful public advocacy can enhance a m

ission’s protection of civilians in many

ways:

�sanctioning abusers through public exposure

�giving positive reinforcem

ent to reformist factions in governm

ent�

establishing a mission as a credible authority on civilian-protection needs

�setting the tone of national debate on civilian protection

�helping to create appropriate expectations of the m

ission within the local pop-

ulation�

reducing local suspicion and counteracting accusations of bias,through educa-tion

�prom

oting awareness of protection needs and hum

an rights�

encouraging involvement of civil society in the prom

otion of protection andhum

an rights�

raising the profile of isolated groups and individuals at risk�

strengthening international concern,increasing the quota of international polit-ical w

ill to take necessary action.

Risks of public advocacy

Public advocacy can,how

ever,sometim

es create friction and even result in retalia-tion.M

issions considering these strategies also have to weigh the risks,including:

�retaliation against the m

ission by accused armed actors,including threats,

harassment or attacks that could lim

it the possibilities of implem

enting otherprotective strategies

�retaliation by closing off access to regions or vulnerable populations

�expulsion of the w

hole mission,or individual personnel being declared persona

non grata

Proactive Presence9

2

‘‘ �retaliation against local contacts and sources

�alienation of key contacts

�closing off dialogue w

ith the government,w

hich should be the main guarantor

of protection.

Many of these strengths and risks are already discussed in other parts of this book.

A few

items deserve additional com

ment,

though,before the second half of this

chapter looks in detail at public techniques.

Strengthening international concern

‘We have seen 20 years of recom

mendations that are never com

plied with.

The only things that are ever com

plied with are those things associated

with the greatest am

ount of international pressure.’

Colom

bian civil-society activist

A lack of international p

olitical will or com

mitm

ent to take vigorous steps for

civilian protection is often cited as the major challenge facing a field presence.B

utpolitical w

ill is not static,and a m

ission’s international advocacy can change it.S

ometim

es,at the outset,there is barely enough international interest to deploy apresence.

Rather than adjusting its expectations and strategies to an inadequate

level of international support,each m

ission must consider all possible m

eans ofpersuading the international com

munity to step up its com

mitm

ent.T

he protective impact of a local presence,

for instance,is greater if the local

actors fear that their names m

ight be showing up in international reports,

poten-tially causing com

plaints from their superiors.

A m

ission strategy can make this

more probable through a variety of external m

echanisms,including globally distrib-

uted reports,international m

edia campaigns,

direct lobbying with other govern-

men

ts or linkage to in

ternation

al legal mechan

isms.

Often

,this ‘in

ternation

aladvocacy’

happens in country,as m

issions keep the local diplomatic com

munity

informed through briefings or even quiet collaborative planning.

If this risk of exposure of abusers exists,it can serve as an incentive or subtle

threat that can enhance all the comm

unication and diplomatic efforts described in

Chapter 4.In other w

ords,a public-advocacy strategy is useful even when it is not

being exercised.C

onversely,if violators know

that a mission w

ill never or rarelyexpose them

,the power to influence is dim

inished.The international com

munity is

interested in international field missions.E

xternal states will trust m

ission reports,and be m

ore willing to bring pressure to bear w

ith the support of credible informa-

tion.And these states m

ay also be the donors making decisions about the m

ission’sfunding.A

mission that fears or chooses not to engage actively w

ith the interna-

Chapter 8

: Public advocacy9

3


tional comm

unity is missing a significant op

portunity for both p

rotection andsupport.

Som

etimes,international actors that ought to be active allies of a field m

issionneed som

e prompting through advocacy to fulfil their obligations to protect people.

Unfortunately,

pessimism

about the elusive ‘international political will’,

or aboutinstitutional inertia,is so prevalent that som

etimes m

issions hesitate even to ask for

Proactive Presence9

4

Bo

x 8.1: Creating international political w

ill

In the missions studied,there w

ere diverse approaches to international advocacy.

�In H

aiti,MIC

IVIH

’s regular public reports helped to build internationalinterest in a large-scale intervention in late 1994,even though the w

illing-ness to intervene had been m

issing during the crises of 1993.�

In Central A

merica,M

INU

GU

A and O

NU

SA

L used both regular public

reporting and informal diplom

atic comm

unication to sustain an internation-al critique of im

plementation of the peace agreem

ents.�

UN

AM

ET

in East T

imor bolstered international w

ill sufficiently to assurecontinued pressure on Jakarta.Its risk-taking presence gave its m

essageslegitim

acy,making it difficult for the regim

e’s propaganda to work.

�C

ontroversially,KV

M exploited incidents in K

osovo to build internationalsupport for N

AT

O’s subsequent intervention.

�H

RF

OR

provided regular briefings to the donor comm

unity in Kigali,

Rw

anda,but with little im

pact on overall support for the RPA

government.

When the R

PA expelled the m

ission,there were no voices of protest from

any major international players.

�T

he Sri L

anka Monitoring M

ission maintains diplom

atic relationships inC

olombo,but is only m

inimally engaged in international advocacy for civil-

ian protection.�

OH

CH

R-C

olombia actively publicises reports and lobbies internationally,

and has good support within the local international com

munity.D

espitecontinued high levels of im

punity for abusers,and little international action,hum

anitarian and human-rights players m

aintain pressure on donors to linkaid to protection needs,and the O

HC

HR

mission plays a key role in pro-

viding analysis for this advocacy.�

When various U

N voices raised the alarm

of near-genocide in Darfur in

2004,the pressure opened up access to a substantial field presence.More

recently,many international field personnel have been w

ondering where the

advocacy pressure has gone,and do not feel that they have access to advo-cacy channels to build up m

ore external pressure.

what is necessary.Instead there is self-censoring for fear of a negative answ

er.One

UN

official described an example in w

hich mission leadership did not request the

number of hum

an-rights monitors that they believed to be necessary,assum

ing inadvance that this w

ould be refused.A

nother UN

official comm

ented ‘We have

learned what the S

ecurity Council w

ill buy.’The leadership of a m

ission,however,

should not settle for too little from its international allies.

Even if dem

ands forgreater international action m

ay risk the ire of the host government,m

ission leadersand institutional sponsors need to get into the fray and som

etimes dem

and theapparently im

possible.

Fear of expulsion or reprisal

The fear of expulsion or loss of access com

monly holds back organisations w

ith afield

presen

ce from gettin

g more actively involved

in p

ublic advocacy an

dprom

oting greater international action.Som

e protection officers in Darfur noted a

dynamic of ‘anticipatory obedience’,w

herein the Sudanese governm

ent had effec-tively silenced advocacy w

ith vague hints of sanctions affecting access,or simply by

making advocates feel ‘pushy’.S

ome m

issions,including MIC

IVIH

and HR

FO

R,

have suffered expulsions,and their public reporting arguably contributed to this.

Field officers w

ere nonetheless quite proud of the times w

hen their missions had

been outspoken about abuses,at the risk of expulsion,and thought it was the right

thing to do.T

he fear of reprisal is often overstated.In our interview

s in North and S

outhD

arfur, 16even N

GO

s that have been fairly vocal in their advocacy assert thatalthough this m

ay increase their risk of harassment,

they did not see this signifi-cantly affecting their ability to deliver services.A

lthough there were som

e incidentsand exam

ples of apparent closure of access,the connection between advocacy and

losing access is gen

erally very tenu

ous.T

he more com

mon

pressu

re faced by

humanitarian organisations is the harassm

ent of their staff.One observer referred

to this as a ‘calibrated harassment,a counter-strategy against the international pres-

ence’.But even the correlation betw

een advocacy and harassment is not statistically

clear.In D

arfur,for instance,

personnel from m

any agencies felt that they were

regularly harassed regardless of their level of vocal advocacy.A

mission,alw

ays measuring the political space available to it,m

ust take calcu-lated risks.

A host state w

ill most often not

want to suffer the p

olitical cost ofexp

elling a credible international presence,

despite having threatened to do so.

Conversely,

states are sometim

es so interested in the image benefits of having an

international presence that a mission m

ight even use the threat of voluntary exit aspolitical pressure.A

s some IC

RC

respondents suggested,one should be ready to

demand

‘meaningful presence or no presence’.T

his means that the parties m

ust

Chapter 8

: Public advocacy9

5


‘‘ show a real w

illingness to alter behaviour rather than merely m

anipulating a pres-ence or using it to create a positive im

age,and that a mission should be w

illing toleave if the conditions or constraints of access are unacceptable.

Clearly,either risking expulsion or exiting in protest carries a heavy cost in loss

of access.Many w

ould say,‘we can’t help at all if w

e are not there’,and this must be

consid

ered.

Bu

t a mission

also has to set limits an

d stan

dard

s about w

hatconstraints are acceptable.

If it reveals that it will put up w

ith anything just forperm

ission to stay,it has little power left w

ith which to influence.

Local civilian groups in C

olombia,

interviewed during a period w

hen sourcesclose to the governm

ent were hinting at expelling the U

N,w

ere nearly unanimous

in their call for greater outspokenness by all international missions present.T

heyfelt it w

as worth taking som

e risk of expulsion,arguing that little would change in

Colom

bia if the international comm

unity remained indifferent to the conflict.

Sim

ilarly,fear of reprisal against local contacts also forestalls public action,

butcom

mitted local activists often see the risk as w

orth taking.A

s one Sri L

ankanM

uslim com

munity leader replied,w

hen asked whether m

ore public SL

MM

actionon com

plaints would put local com

plainants at greater risk,‘As a com

munity w

e arew

illing to face that risk.If nothing is public,

people get more and m

ore disillu-sioned.’

A state w

ill more often resort to a lesser reprisal,such as harassm

ent,or quietlyexp

elling in

divid

ual m

ission m

embers rather than

an en

tire mission

.F

ieldpersonnel say that the inhibiting fear of being dubbed persona non grata,by gettingtoo close to controversial protection issues,

can result in a quiet lack of initiative.U

nfortunately,institutional practices can reinforce this insidious dynam

ic,by not

protesting such individualised expulsion,and by allowing field officers’careers to

suffer as a result.

‘A state m

ay resort to blackmailing the m

ission or bluffing it by requestingthe departure of one of the m

ost active mem

bers of its team,for w

hateverreason,w

hile underlining the virtues of the mission,its great w

ork other-w

ise,etc,

so as to create divisions within the m

ission,and,

if the mission

caves in,which it often does,send a clear m

essage to all other team m

em-

bers.A m

ission must refuse to be dictated to on its staffing policy by the

host government – full stop.N

o professional and credible staff should besacrificed for a so-called “greater good”

of the mission – this is never a

“greater good”,but the beginning of the end for it.It is a test of strengththat m

ust be fought with clarity,courage and determ

ination,and that must

be won:the m

ission will gain respect through it,or lose respect if it caves

in.

Proactive Presence9

6

‘‘‘A

ll staff need to be protected against these attempts – and know

that aslong as they are doing their professional duties,they w

ill be protected bytheir ow

n hierarchy.They absolutely need that support to keep m

orale upand,w

ith it,the strength and courage to continue the struggle.’

Field protection officer

Closing the space for dialogue

Another thorny dilem

ma of public advocacy is that it can alienate key contacts and

cut off dialogue with accused abusers.C

hapters 4 and 7 argued that comm

unica-tion w

ith the abuser institution is critical to protection,and that missions can even

build enough trust to convene divergent groups and solve problems.T

hese strate-gies require open channels of com

munication.

ICR

C respondents,

for instance,often point out that the quality of dialogue necessary to achieve their objectives isdifficult to sustain in parallel w

ith active public criticism.

Other agencies recount

times w

hen abuser groups ‘punished’a m

ission for its public criticism by sim

plyshutting the door for a w

hile.In theory,public advocacy could have a net negativeeffect,if the protection benefits it produces are outw

eighed by the costs of losingother protection opportunities.

This is a pow

erful dilemm

a,because no one has yet proven empirically that one

strategy produces better protective results than another.B

ut some m

issions havem

anaged to continue both public critique and close relationships with criticised

parties.There are reasons,

after all,w

hy abusive actors tolerate or even want the

mission

there,an

d resu

lting d

imin

ished d

ialogue m

ay often be tem

porary.

Transparency and respect are im

portant here.HR

FO

R,for instance,w

as harshlycriticised by the R

wandan governm

ent for some of its public reporting,and subse-

quen

tly came to an

agreemen

t that its reports w

ould

not go p

ublic u

ntil the

government saw

them first – a m

ove seen as showing respect w

hile also protectingthe m

ission.E

stablishing ongoing and regular processes for contact between the

mission and authorities or arm

ed groups can help,so that concerns that arise may

be discussed rather than left to fester;and relationships may be m

ended.In som

e cases,the explicit political goals of a mission m

ay affect its objectivityand lim

it its willingness to use public advocacy techniques.A

ceasefire monitoring

mission or com

plex peace presence,for instance,may have a clear political m

issionto sustain a particular set of agreem

ents between the parties.T

his objective requiresan ongoing rapport that m

ay appear to collide with the friction that can result from

public advocacy that is critical of the parties.

Chapter 8

: Public advocacy9

7


The risk of silence

For these and other reasons,som

e institutions choose to avoid or minim

ise publicadvocacy.

Hum

an-rights NG

Os,

both international and local,are generally very

critical of this choice.They argue that the proxim

ity of a field presence to abusescarries w

ith it a moral responsibility to speak out,especially since an abusive party,

byhosting a m

ission’s presence,may be seen as co-operative,and this could actu-

ally strengthen its hand to carry out abuses.If there are enough international actorspresent,the public advocacy of one organisation can support the quiet advocacy ofanother.B

ut a problem arises if too m

any leave the public role to ‘someone else’.

When a situation is too dangerous for local people to speak out,and every interna-

tional agency stops talking too,all that remains is silence.

Techniq

ues of p

ublic ad

vocacy

Institutional and general audiences

Public advocacy can take m

any forms and call for a variety of responses.It m

ay beaim

ed d

irectly at the offend

ing p

arty,d

eman

din

g changes in

behaviour.T

hem

essage may be intended for m

ore general consumption,w

ith an objective of pres-suring the target through a variety of sources,including both dom

estic audiencesand the international com

munity.It m

ight be aimed m

ore specifically at prompting

action by the U

N S

ecurity C

oun

cil (UN

SC

),U

N rap

porteu

rs or the Hu

man

Rights C

omm

ission.Public reports,therefore,m

ight include recomm

endations ofU

NS

C or rapporteur visits to troubled areas,

or for action by a treaty body.The

advocacy message m

ight be specifically geared towards the diplom

atic comm

unity,w

ith an eye to using the leverage of bilateral relationships to influence the actions ofthe abuser party.

Public reporting on abuses

Public reports can prom

ote all of the positive objectives listed above in this chapter,and for this reason they frequently form

part of a protection strategy.Monitoring

and reporting are highly developed tools,ably described in other resources.There

are,for example,standards and best practices developed for interview

ing,informa-

tion gathering and report w

riting aimed at ensuring the legal credibility of the

public assertions of a mission.

Any m

ission engaging in public reporting needsskilled personnel w

ho understand these tasks and standards and can adapt them to

specific contexts and conflicts.

Proactive Presence9

8

Chapter 8

: Public advocacy9

9


Key reso

urces on h

uman-rig

hts m

onito

ring

There is a w

ide literature available on human-rights m

onitoring.S

ubstantialreferences to training resources can be found in these w

ebsites and publications.

Consolidating the P

rofession:The hum

an rights field officer(w

ww

.humanrightspro-

fessionals.org).This is a research,

training and capacity-building project insupport of enhanced delivery of services by hum

an-rights field operations,convened and facilitated by the U

niversity of Nottingham

Hum

an Rights

Law

Centre (H

RL

C).T

his web-page has m

any of its own research resources,

as well as u

p-to-d

ate links to d

ozens of other key resou

rces on top

icsincluding m

onitoring,human-rights education,training and reporting.

Hu

man

Rights E

du

cation A

ssociation (w

ww

.hrea.org).N

um

erous lin

ks totraining resources on m

onitoring,fact-finding and human-rights education.

Monitoring S

tate-sponsored Violence in A

frica.A practical guide.

Civil L

ibertiesO

rganisations,Lagos;K

enya Hum

an Rights C

omm

ission,Nairobi;N

etwork

of Independent M

onitors,D

urban,2000.

(http://w

ww

.protectionline.org/

article.php?id_article=128).

O’F

laherty,Michael (ed).‘T

heH

uman R

ights Field O

peration:Law

and prac-tice.’A

shgate (forthcoming).

OH

CH

R.

Manual on H

uman R

ights Reporting.

Gen

eva:O

ffice of the High

Com

missioner for H

uman R

ights.Available online at:http://w

ww

1.umn.edu/

humanrts/m

onitoring/.O

’Neill,W

illiam G

.A H

umanitarian P

ractitioner’s Guide to International H

uman

Rights L

aw.

Occasion

al Pap

er 34,P

roviden

ce,R

I:W

atson In

stitute for

International Studies,1999.F

or copies contact the Hum

anitarianism and W

arP

roject via e-mail at:H

&W

@tufts.edu.

The rep

orting p

rocess has three key stages,each of w

hich can be p

lann

edaccording to its protective effect:

information collection,

report preparation anddissem

ination.

Information collection:

Classic hum

an rights ‘monitoring’,as used by the O

HC

HR

for instance,encom

passes much m

ore than reporting.The process of gathering

information itself protects,independent of any resulting report.

It creates a justifi-cation and fram

ework for the kinds of com

munication and visibility strategies

described in Chapters 4 and 5.Just the know

ledge that a mission is carrying out a

particular investigation can generate changes in perpetrator behaviour.

While pursuing accurate data,field officers m

ust of course take great care aboutthe confidentiality of inform

ation,protecting the identity of victims w

ho could betargeted for reprisals.

Interviews m

ust be sensitive to the emotional state of the

victims,

who m

ay suffer secondary trauma in recounting their experiences.

For

other victims,the opportunity to tell their story in a setting w

here they believe it will

contribute to change is cathartic and empow

ering.

Report preparation: A

public report – even a formal hum

an-rights analysis – is astrategic m

essage.So w

hile it should be technically and legally accurate,it must also

be written in a readable and persuasive form

at and style.A pow

erful report shouldaugm

ent national and international pressure and concern,and force abusers into

damage-control m

ode.At best,the report w

ill make explicit recom

mendations on

how abusers can m

ake amends.S

uch recomm

endations should in turn facilitate theongoing daily diplom

acy of field officers at the local level.

�R

egular,periodic reports allow a m

ission to follow progress and changes,

update situations and report (both critically and positively) on fulfilment of

previous recomm

endations.Experiences of O

NU

SA

L and M

INU

GU

A,for

instance,showed how

the publication of periodic reports could become an

important political event in the country,generating expectations,advance

debates and considerable reactions.�

Them

atic reports can set the tone of national debate,forcing abusive parties todeal w

ith a topic they would rather ignore.(E

xamples include reports on sexu-

Proactive Presence1

00

Hum

anitarian

assessment in

Darfur

Michael Heller Chu

al and gender-based violence in Darfur,and reports on child soldiers in S

riL

anka.)�

Special investigations are a particular kind of them

atic report.In most cases,

there is no possibility that a field mission w

ill respond to or investigate allabuses.Instead,it chooses one or a few

emblem

atic cases for in-depth investi-gation.T

hese investigations can affect the national and international debate,and the recom

mendations they yield should affect abuser behaviour tow

ards aw

hole range of past or potential future victims.

Dissem

ination:In some m

issions,there may be too m

uch emphasis on the value of

published reports as the main reason for a field presence.In an endeavour w

herem

ost outcomes are frustratingly intangible,

written docum

ents are reassuringlym

easurable p

rodu

cts;how

ever,this solid

ity is decep

tive.A

file cabinet fu

ll ofreports w

ill not change anything.They are useful only insofar as they are acted

upon.International m

issions need a dissemination and publicity strategy to fulfil

the potential of their painstaking monitoring and w

riting.This includes dissem

ina-tion to the general public,

as well as to em

bassies and other influential circles,so

that others with high-level access to abusers m

ay echo the messages and priorities

of the mission,backed up by the credibility of the report.

With a sufficient presence deployed,

and a good system of periodic reporting

and dissemination,

a competent m

ission can earn a unique position as a credibleauthority on civilian protection needs and rights abuses in a country.T

he OH

CH

Rm

ission in Colom

bia,for instance,has over time becom

e a powerful influence on

the national debate on human rights and civilian protection.

National N

GO

s useO

HC

HR

reports – in fact depend on them – and the m

ission’s ongoing series ofrecom

mendations guide both national and international pressure for change.

Bo

x 8.2:Evidence for the future

Field m

ission investigations may yield im

portant data for future trials.K

VM

data,

for instan

ce,con

tributed

to the ind

ictmen

t of Slobod

an M

ilosevic.H

RF

OR

provided initial investigatory data for the subsequent genocide tribunal.A

lthough it is difficult to prove that the prospect of future trials has a deterringim

pact,it is certainly som

ething that is increasingly on the public agenda.N

oon

e in S

ud

an has been

tried yet by the In

ternation

al Crim

inal C

ourt,

forinstance,but everyone know

s there is a list,and some know

they are on it.And,

as one African U

nion monitor noted,‘N

obody wants to spend their old age in

prison.’

Chapter 8

: Public advocacy1

01 INTRODUCTION > BEING THERE > STRATEGIES > CHALLENGES

Working w

ith the media

The use of print,radio,television and w

eb-based media can be a pow

erful multi-

plier of a mission’s m

essage,both nationally and internationally.

Although som

esm

all presences choose to stay under the radar,it is generally not in a m

ission’sinterest to be unknow

n or misunderstood,as this tends only to generate suspicion.

A good m

edia strategy can help a mission to control its ow

n public image,and to

respond actively to detractors.

At the m

ost obvious level,media releases and broadcast public events can publicise

a mission’s public reports or its positions on critical events.W

ith mission support,

local media can prom

ote awareness and encourage the involvem

ent of civil societyin the protection and prom

otion of human rights.F

or instance,field missions can

support and participate in regular programm

ing on the air,and have an interactivep

resence on

the web in

the local langu

age.A

regular m

edia p

resence en

ablesdifferent kinds of public m

essages for deterring abuses,and creates opportunities tosupport and give a higher public profile to groups in need of protection or reform

sin need of support. 17

Each m

ission needs to decide how best to w

ork with the m

edia.H

ere are a fewgeneral recom

mendations.

�T

here are countless good resources available to help organisations learn todevelop and control their contact w

ith the media (see resource box).U

sethem

;don’t reinvent the wheel.

�A

mission should have press officers w

ith the professional skill to handle pub-lic com

munications.T

his recruitment should not be an afterthought.T

heseskilled officers should coach other m

ission mem

bers in dealing with the m

edia.�

Handling local m

edia demands fluent local language skills.

�M

edia strategy must adapt to the local context.F

or instance,in a country with

low literacy,use of the radio can be critical.

�A

mission should establish an active relationship w

ith the media,but not to the

point of being ‘managed’by them

.

There are bound to be errors and setbacks in dealing w

ith the media,and a m

issionneeds disciplined guidelines about w

ho talks to journalists,and what they say.B

utthese should not be so excessively restrictive as to prevent necessary and productivep

ublic com

mu

nication

.It can

be usefu

l to build

a netw

ork of reliable med

iacontacts by identifying reporters regularly covering your country in the foreignp

ress an

d

establishing

person

al relation

ships

with

the m

ost resp

onsible.

International media outlets and journalists need stories,

credible experts and reli-

Proactive Presence1

02

Chapter 8

: Public advocacy1


able sources they can contact in times of developing crises.If you w

ant them to use

your message,

make sure they consider you a credible source and know

how to

reach you quickly.

Key reso

urces on w

orking

with

the m

edia

Institute of Peace and W

ar Reporting (http://w

ww

.iwpr.net/).

Institute for Media P

eace and Security (http://w

ww

.mediapeace.org/).

Making the M

ost of the Media:Tools for hum

an rights groups worldw

ide,The C

enterfor S

ustainable Hum

an Rights A

ction,2000.Jem

pson,

Mike.

Working w

ith the Media,W

HC

A A

ction Guide.

MediaW

iseT

rust and World H

ealth Com

munication A

ssociates Ltd,2005.

VIP visits

Visits from

VIP

s (very important persons) are key opportunities for influence,w

ithm

ajor media attention.W

hether the visitor is a politician,pop personality,religiousleader,special rapporteur or a w

hole comm

ission,this is a mom

ent when people are

listening,and field missions should exploit these opportunities to prom

ote protec-tion.W

hen state officials meet w

ith external VIP

s brought in by the mission,they

are sometim

es getting access to a contact they would not otherw

ise make.

When V

IPs m

ention concerns about protection,or mention specific threatened

comm

unities or organisations,this gives greater legitimacy and protection to those

mentioned.W

hen VIP

s visit threatened organisations or comm

unities,the visit

becomes a local event that groups can leverage for longer-term

benefit.A field pres-

ence should encourage and facilitate such visits,and make every effort to coach and

guide visitors so that their message and im

pact is consistent with the m

ission’sstrategy.

Public events

A m

ission can enhance both its image and its protection m

essage through the spon-sorship of public events such as celebrations,conferences,m

emorials,presentations

of awards and the like.S

uch happenings are a good opportunity to stress the posi-tive prom

otional messages of the m

ission in the public eye,and they give visibilityand legitim

acy to both the mission and the groups and local individuals w

ho partic-ipate.

Sum

mary

The potential influence of public advocacy on protection is w

idely recognised.It isnot the answ

er to all problems how

ever,and it comes w

ith certain risks or dilemm

asthat each organisation needs to evaluate.T

hese include alienation of key contactsand retaliation against the presence or its local contacts

But public advocacy can address these problem

s and avoid the danger of silenceby

actively seeking the support of the international comm

unity,taking calculated

risks and making conscious efforts to keep

open the sp

ace for dialogue duringpublic criticism

.Institutions need to sequence their advocacy m

essages strategi-cally.T

hey can also benefit sometim

es from collaborative advocacy w

ith otherprotection institutions.

Mission personnel should be fam

iliar with a variety of public advocacy tech-

niques.P

ublic reporting on abuses involves the collection of information,

reportpreparation and dissem

ination,and take the form of periodic or them

atic reports,or special investigations.W

orking with the m

edia includes developing strategiesadap

ted to the local context,m

edia networking and p

reparing staff for m

ediacontact,plus arranging public events and V

IP visits.

Proactive Presence1

04


PART THREECHALLENGES

9DO NO HARM

10

6

Every

institution operating in conflict zones needs to recognise the high level ofuncertainty inherent in its actions.

Good intentions do not necessarily yield

good outcomes,

and examples of errors and unintended consequences are

well docum

ented.Field m

issions need to be constantly alert to this risk,and need toexercise both discip

line and good judgement to avoid hurting the p

eople they

intend to help.

Six categ

ories o

f risk for internatio

nal missio

ns

Individual behaviour and codes of conduct

The behaviour of m

ission staff has direct consequences for the protection of civil-ians:

individual security lapses can put both the field officer and others at risk;failure to m

aintain requisite confidentiality can put witnesses and sources under

direct threat of reprisal;inappropriate or insulting cultural behaviour can be seriousenough to create risks for the field officer or their local associates.O

ther behavioursm

ay not directly create protection risks,but they can undermine a m

ission’s credi-bility w

ith local actors.Paternalistic or disrespectful behaviour tow

ards local peoplem

ust be avoided.Most institutions have codes of conduct to help regulate behav-

iour,but they often lack rigorous screening processes to prevent predictable prob-lem

s,or don’t enact enforcement procedures in cases of non-com

pliance.

Insufficient political information and analysis

The process of analysis outlined in C

hapter 3 not only helps to create good protec-tion strategies,

but also helps to avoid bad ones.It should be self-evident that a

Chapter 9

: Do no harm

10


mission is m

ore likely to put itself and its local contacts in danger if it does not havegood political analysis and good local sources.

But counter-exam

ples abound ofm

issions being highly disconnected from local sources of analysis.W

ithout a multi-

faceted network,

the mission w

ill not only lack crucial information for avoiding

mistakes,

but it will also be m

uch more vulnerable to m

anipulation by a single

‘apparently good source’,w

ith no point of comparison.

Ill-informed m

issions arem

uch more easily sw

ayed by rumours and uncorroborated inform

ation.International institutions m

ay be injecting substantial resources into the localeconom

y,as happens in large humanitarian operations.Insufficient socio-political

analysis can prevent a mission from

seeing how resources are being diverted,

orpossibly contributing to the control of illegitim

ate leaders.

Lack of learning

Many m

istakes are understandable and reasonable – anyone walking into an unpre-

dictable conflict situation is likely to make them

.These errors becom

e less justifi-able,how

ever,when they are m

ade repeatedly – even within the sam

e organisationor during the sam

e conflict.The lack of clear and organised learning from

pastm

istakes is a key reason why so m

any mistakes are rep

eated – sometim

es with

serious negative consequences for the protection of civilians.(See also the section

on learning from the past,in C

hapter 11.)F

or example,m

onitoring missions have confronted the risk of reprisals against

witnesses for decades,

and learned many lessons about w

itness protection,som

e-tim

es as a result of tragic errors that might have been avoided.W

hile there has beensom

e consolidation of guidelines on witness p

rotection within O

HC

HR

,other

missions involved in any kind of inform

ation gathering on protection often repeatthe sam

e mistakes.

Unintended consequences

When a m

ission has other program

ming in addition to p

rotection,it needs to

ensure that none of the consequences of those programm

es adversely affect itsp

rotection goals.In m

any humanitarian organisations,

for instance,the role of

‘protection officer’is being developed to apply a protection lens to other program-

ming in order to m

inimise its possible detrim

ental effects.F

or instance,hum

ani-tarian assistance can be a source of inter-com

munal conflict over the distribution of

resources.The hiring of local partners can have consequences affecting the protec-

tion image of a m

ission,depending on the public im

age or bias of those partnerorganisations.

Som

etimes,

programm

ing or donor pressures cause an assistance effort to befocused on a particular subset of the population.In D

arfur,for instance,both the

Proactive Presence1

08

Chapter 9

: Do no harm

10


humanitarian com

munity and

the initial OH

CH

R field p

resence concentratednearly all of their initial attention on ID

P cam

ps.The consequent m

arginalisation ofthe rural people w

ho had not fled their homes provoked a strong perception of

favouritism and bias,further fuelling existing inter-ethnic resentm

ent.A

short-term solution to a serious problem

can have negative long-term costs or

side effects.In a case of conflict-caused destitution in D

arfur,for instance,

largeproviders of relief resources such as W

FP,IC

RC

and UN

HC

R quickly becam

e them

ost powerful econom

ic players in the region.This m

ade them an attractive target

for infiltration by armed groups and governm

ent alike.In addition,such a massive

economic infusion in a crisis m

ust be accompanied by a long-term

analysis of itsim

plications for the economic and political future of the entire region – som

ethingthat seldom

occurs.S

imilarly,

an electoral monitoring m

ission may find that the local technical

capacity for administering an election resides prim

arily within certain elite groups

or particular ethnic groups.The m

ission needs these skills,yet this program

ming

objective could collide with a need to project an unbiased approach.

Key reso

urce on avo

iding

negative im

pacts

Mary B

.Anderson’s

Do N

o Harm

:How

aid can support peace – or war

calls atten-tion to the diverse negative im

pacts of the operations of the international reliefcom

munity.T

he Do N

o Harm

manuals and parallel w

orkshops developed prac-tical program

ming recom

mendations,in particular to avoid the risk of interna-

tional aid and presence unintentionally fuelling violent conflict,and to ensure

that aid supports local capacities for peacemaking and conflict reduction.T

heselessons are still of vital im

portance to both the humanitarian com

munity and all

other institutions operating in conflict zones.T

he book is available from L

ynne Rienner publishers (http://w

ww

.rienner.com

/viewbook.cfm

?BO

OK

ID=

88&search=

do%

20no%

20harm).

For

more

information on the D

o No H

arm project and w

orkshops see the web-page of the

Collaborative for D

evelopment A

ction (ww

w.cdainc.com

).

Underm

ining local efforts

One of the m

ost important benefits of netw

orking and thorough analysis is to allowa m

ission to respond to imm

ediate attacks against civilians and needs,w

hile alsostren

gthenin

g the

long-term

cap

acity of

a com

mu

nity

to p

rotect itself.

Un

fortun

ately,in

ternation

al actors often d

istrust w

ell-organised

comm

un

ities,fearing them

to be politically biased or in some cases corrupt.S

till,they are the only

‘‘ civil structures available for the people.Bypassing these entities for short-term

effi-ciency m

ay be costly.For instance,prom

oting an international tribunal in a transi-tional situation m

ay result in greater due-process guarantees,

but supp

orting anationally based judicial process m

ight do more for the long-term

establishment of

the rule of law.

An international m

onitoring mission,

for instance,m

ay have the best of inten-tions w

hen it takes over from national actors the collection of hum

an-rights data –such w

ork might indeed be extrem

ely dangerous for local people.Nevertheless,the

risk exists that such substitution will w

eaken civil society’s capacity to develop itsow

n monitoring m

echanisms to keep its governm

ent accountable.Large m

issions –such as in K

osovo – may find that they have drafted the entire educated local elite

into UN

service positions,completely disabling the society’s capacity to achieve a

post-intervention equilibrium

.E

very mission needs to develop

the capacity to

analyse the long-term possibilities of local structures before jum

ping in to substitutefor them

,and could sometim

es develop hybrid solutions.

Risk of reprisal

‘We have to be very careful in speaking w

ith people in the comm

unities.N

ot because we think they are linked w

ith armed groups,but because w

eknow

that those groups are watching to see w

ith whom

the comm

unityspeaks.W

e have seen examples of retaliation afterw

ards.And in a sm

all vil-lage there are no secrets.E

veryone knows w

ho talked to whom

.’

Hum

anitarian field officer in Colom

bia

If an armed party regards an international presence as an obstacle to its objectives,

one of the least costly ways to underm

ine the presence is through reprisals againstits m

ore vulnerable local contacts.When H

RF

OR

staff distributed a questionnairein a prison,and then m

ade the mistake of leaving copies in the prison,those w

hocom

pleted the questionnaire received harsher treatment.In S

ri Lanka,civilians w

horep

ort any problem

s with the LT

TE

are routinely harassed and threatened,so

much so that the m

ajority of complainants w

ill not allow their nam

es to be used ortheir cases to be follow

ed up.A M

uslim m

ember of an S

LM

M local m

onitoringcom

mittee w

as reportedly forced to pull out after death threats from the LT

TE

.T

amils fear to speak of problem

s in groups,for fear of the LT

TE

finding out.Ahistory of harassm

ent and reprisal by Sri L

anka state security forces also adds to thedynam

ic of fear that prevents the mission from

following up on m

ost cases.

Proactive Presence1

10

‘‘ ‘‘

Chapter 9

: Do no harm

11


‘Once the international presence is gone,

there tends to be a reaction,because the param

ilitaries see the contact with internationals as a challenge

to their control.S

o the international accompanim

ent needs to be a littlem

ore permanent.’

Local activist,C

olombia

Despite concerns about reprisals,m

ost activists believe that international visits arenecessary and helpful,and that the net protective result for com

munities visited by

an international mission is positive.M

issions must find w

ays to minim

ise the risk ofreprisal w

ithout curtailing protective action.This often involves avoiding nam

inglocal sources in public reports.S

ometim

es,on public visits,a mission w

ill focus itsitinerary on talking to authorities,

allowing local civilians to seek m

ore discreetm

eans of contacting the mission,such as through m

ore private meetings aw

ay fromthe eyes of the com

munity.

Peop

le often feel that a comm

itment of follow

-up and future visits is som

ep

rotection against retaliation.N

GO

s point out that ongoing hum

anitarian anddevelopm

ent contacts with com

munities are one type of perm

anent accompani-

ment that helps,since arm

ed parties will know

at least that whatever they do w

ill benoted in the next visit.M

ore importantly,a field m

ission needs to listen to the localorganisations and w

itnesses,and honour their concerns about security and discre-tion.

‘The m

ost dangerous thing is arrogance.You have to enter into relation-

ships and dialogue with som

e sense of humility and respect and caution.’

Mission field officer

Key reso

urce on p

rotecting

witnesses and

sources

A particularly sensitive need is to protect w

itnesses and key sources that provideinform

ation to a field mission about abuses and perpetrators.T

he OH

CH

R is

developing a detailed manual on this:

United N

ations Office of the H

igh Com

missioner for H

uman R

ights,Handbook

for Hum

an Rights

and Hum

anitarian Practitioners on the P

rotection of Persons

cooperating with them

in sensitive environments,draft,forthcom

ing.

In the polarised and volatile setting of a conflict zone,however,no level of effective

presence can eliminate entirely the risk of retaliation.T

he international presence byn

ature or d

esign en

courages p

eople to organ

ise and

take risks,an

d therefore

inevitably increases some vulnerabilities even as it adds protection,as show

n in them

odel described in Chapter 2.T

here will alw

ays be mistakes,m

iscalculations andunintended consequences.T

he field mission and local organisations should be

trying to analyse these dynamics together to m

inimise the risk and discourage

excessive risk-taking,even as they recognise the need to act where necessary.

Sum

mary

Field m

issions can take deliberate steps to minim

ise the risk of negative impacts

from their presence.

�C

odes of conduct should be created,taught in staff training and used to moni-

tor behaviour and enforce compliance.

�T

horough analysis should consider possible negative impacts:this m

ay involvean extra effort to predict and avert unplanned consequences of the m

ission’sactions.

�L

essons from experience should be learned and taught:learning from

pastm

istakes is the only way to avoid repeating them

.�

Multiple and som

etimes contradictory institutional agendas in com

plex pro-gram

ming should all be considered.T

here may be a risk of negative protection

consequences from other program

ming not directly related to protection.

�S

trategies and operational plans should be chosen to sustain comm

unities;itcan be very dam

aging to substitute for local expertise or undermine local

structures.�

Extrem

e care is needed to avoid putting local staff and contacts at risk.The

mission should defend these contacts and sources from

any threats.

Proactive Presence1

12

Chapter 9

: Do no harm

11


10THE SECURITY CHALLENGE

11

4

Pro

mo

ting security and

smart risk-taking

A

field

mission

in

a

conflict

zone

is in

evitably a

dan

gerous

un

dertakin

g.International m

issions have suffered threats and attacks too numerous to list.

InR

wanda in 1997,for instance,five H

RF

OR

personnel were killed,and other staff

mem

bers received death threats for taking on sensitive cases.U

NA

ME

T had at

least 14 local Tim

orese staff mu

rdered

,an

d local m

ilitia leaders kid

nap

ped

MIN

UG

UA

observers.National personnel of international N

GO

s have been killedin D

arfur.In other settings,international staff mem

bers have endured a variety ofserious abuses,

including ransom kidnap

ping.Y

et even these casualties pale in

comp

arison to the losses of in

ternation

al person

nel in

conflicts su

ch as Iraq.C

learly,a field m

ission must prepare com

petent staff candidates with seasoned

security strategies for the risks they may face.

There are m

any resources available on staff security in conflict zones,which this

manual w

ill not try to replicate (see Key resources).E

very mission needs to m

akesure that it studies such guidelines,and prepares its ow

n mission-specific security

analysis based on particular political and local conditions.Staff m

embers m

ust havethe opportunity to study these,and there should be a process of ensuring disciplinein their im

plementation.

Secu

rity prep

arations can

not elim

inate risk,

however.

A p

rotection m

issionunw

illing to take risks would achieve nothing,

and the mission’s risks are usually

few in

comp

arison to the d

angers facin

g local civilians.

When

intern

ational

personnel go where the local people are in the greatest danger,their ow

n risk factorsnaturally increase,but so does their protective im

pact.T

herefore,security strategies should prom

otesm

art risk-taking.A m

ission will

make the greatest difference w

hen it gets out of the safe neighbourhoods of them

ain cities,and makes itself present w

here the trouble is,interacting with victim

s asw

ell as perp

etrators.S

ecurity strategies m

ust m

ake this interaction

as safe asp

ossible,but should not p

revent it,w

here the risk can be mitigated.T

hus,for

Chapter 1

0: The security challenge

11


instance,in KV

M and U

NA

ME

T,the default assum

ption was that the risks w

erem

anageable.Whenever possible,

these missions responded to calls for help,

trav-elled to sensitive or dangerous locations to be seen and heard,

to talk down the

threatening abusers and show solidarity w

ith frightened civilians. 18M

ilitary andpolice expertise helped to enable the m

issions to manage risk.

Key facto

rs in a missio

n security analysis

Am

ong the key factors contributing to a mission’s security analysis are:

politicalanalysis,

transparency w

ith armed actors,

mission neutrality,

a network of local

allies and support from international allies,and early response to w

arnings or initialattacks.W

e will look at each of these in turn.

Political analysis

The m

any important technical and practical security guidelines available are not

fixed recipes,but rather ingredients of a security strategy that must be devised for

a particular political context.Security choices are inextricably linked to a m

ission’sp

olitical analysis.In H

aiti,M

ICIV

IH p

ersonnel in 1993/4 were surrounded by

violence,but their analysis concluded that the mission itself w

as not a target.This

analysis enabled mission staff to participate in delicate cases and trips that had

protective impact.

When its personnel w

ere murdered in R

wanda,

allegedly by a disgruntled orrenegade

Interhamw

erebel,

HR

FO

R lacked sufficient inform

ation to analyse theim

plications of the attack.Its cautious reaction,therefore,was quickly to reduce its

Proactive Presence1

16

Key reso

urces on field

security

Cutts,M

ark and Alan D

ingle.Safety F

irst:Protecting N

GO

employees w

ho work in

areas of conflict.Save the C

hildren,1998.E

guren,E

nrique.Protection M

anual for Hum

an Rights D

efenders.Dublin:P

eaceB

rigades International and Frontline,2006.(A

vailable at http://ww

w.protec-

tionline.org).L

loyd Roberts,

David.

Staying A

live:Safety and security guidelines for hum

ani-tarian volunteers in conflict areas.

Geneva:IC

RC

,2006.G

eneric S

ecurity G

uide for

Hum

anitarian O

rganisations.E

CH

O,

2004(http://europa.eu.int/com

m/echo/evaluation/security_review

_en.htm).

Security in the F

ield.New

York:O

ffice of the United N

ations Security C

o-ordi-nator,1998 (A

vailable at http://ww

w.unep.org/restrict/security/security.doc).

rural presence,leaving a vacuum during a tim

e of vulnerable refugee returns.More

information or a different analysis m

ight have yielded a different reaction.In C

olombia there w

ere two separate instances of political attacks on expatriates

– one by the FA

RC

rebel group in which three N

orth Am

erican activists were

killed,and another by A

UC

paramilitaries in w

hich a Spanish N

GO

worker w

askilled.If the analysis of these events had suggested a trend or a strategy by eitherarm

ed group to attack expatriate presence,it would have had a serious inhibiting

effect on all protective missions in C

olombia.B

ut,in both cases,analysts concurredthat these attacks w

ere political mistakes,and that the F

AR

C and the A

UC

paid aserious political cost in each case,and w

ould be unlikely to repeat the error.Thus,

the attacks did n

ot significantly change the security analysis for other foreignpersonnel in these regions.

Because it is so dependent on political context,

security strategy is not easilytransferable.D

epending on the possible motivations of the arm

ed parties to harm a

mission,

what m

ight seem rash in one conflict could be perfectly safe in another.

But if a m

ission lacks a rigorous analysis,everything m

ight app

ear risky (andindeed could be),and the uncertainties can lead to excessively conservative deci-sions about risk-taking,w

ith the effect of limiting protective opportunities.S

ecurityassessm

ents need to be kept up to date.In some settings,‘no-go’areas rem

ain off-lim

its even after the actual security situation has improved.T

his means that the

population in danger in those areas is not benefiting from international presence,

even though presence is possible.

Transparency with arm

ed actors

Transparent relationships w

ith armed parties are crucial for good security strate-

gies.A m

ission should not provoke unnecessary fears by being unpredictable in aconflict zone.

Som

e missions m

ake it a standard practice to give local police andm

ilitary authorities advance notice of all their movem

ents.A m

ission should be justas transparent w

ith armed groups.C

omm

unication is a sign of respect;it helps toovercom

e polarised stereotypes that may exist about the m

ission,and it may avert

the risk of the armed group m

aking other misjudgem

ents about the mission.

Itshould not be assum

ed that an armed group has a realistic understanding of a

mission and its role if this is not com

municated to them

.W

here direct comm

unication is prevented by circumstances beyond the control

of the mission,

this needs to be recognised as a potentially serious security risk.W

here possible,

indirect means of com

munication should be develop

ed,w

hileadvocacy efforts should seek to overcom

e any political blocks to direct comm

uni-cation.

For instance,

in Colom

bia,U

N and N

GO

missions are legally prohibited

from con

tact with illegal arm

ed grou

ps.

When

they are operatin

g in terrain

controlled by these parties – which they m

ust do frequently – they cannot give anydirect advance notice of their m

ovements or intentions.T

he OH

CH

R reports on

Chapter 1


11


state,paramilitary and guerrilla abuses,but does so w

ithout talking to either of thelatter tw

o.A

n international presence sometim

es uses the media or inform

al contacts with

civil-society groups to broadcast indirectly their motives,objectives and even their

movem

ents.S

ometim

es direct contact with rep

resentatives of armed group

s ispossible outside the country even though it is prohibited in the national territory.L

acking the ability to give advance notice or describe intentions directly,m

issionfield staff tend to put a heavy trust in these arm

ed groups’capacity for surveillanceand intelligence gathering,often assum

ing that they already know w

hat they are notbeing told.H

owever,this is not a safe assum

ption.

Neutrality

In a polarised situation,any perceived alliance with one m

ilitary institution makes

you a potential target of their enem

y,as attacks on U

N staff in Iraq tragically

proved.In D

arfur or Colom

bia,for instance,

humanitarians bringing assistance

into guerrilla-controlled territory have to be careful that they are not labelled asguerrillas them

selves.

Local and international allies

An inform

al network of trusted local inform

ants can be crucial to mission safety.

These allies provide analysis of dangers facing the m

ission,and at times can pass on

discreet warnings to m

ission personnel about expected events.E

xternal politicalsupport can provide a key safety net for m

ission staff,especially if those consideringan attack take political costs into account.

UN

AM

ET

,for exam

ple,w

as able togenerate a steadily increasing flow

of international messages of pressure in response

to escalating security incidents,leaving no doubt about the level of international

support it enjoyed.

Early response

Attacks and threats to a m

ission are sometim

es part of a campaign to underm

ine itsw

ork or provoke its departure.Attacks m

ay start small,and gradually escalate.T

heyshould be addressed early.

Unfortunately,

a mission m

ay tend to discount theim

portance of the first threats,reserving a response until greater harm is done.B

uta vigorous early response can succeed in stopping the escalation.F

or example,in

2004,the Uribe governm

ent in Colom

bia launched an aggressive campaign of de-

legitimisation against P

eace Brigades International (P

BI),the largest N

GO

protec-tive presence in the country.

PB

I had to respond with one of the highest-profile

campaigns of international political support in its history to secure its ongoing pres-

ence and stop a further escalation of threats.

Proactive Presence1

18

‘‘ ‘‘

‘There is a need for an organised response to a threat or an attack against

a protection operation… A

protection operation must create that capacity

to show its teeth and,if necessary,to use them

and bite back quickly:itsprotection depends on its capacity to hurt…

In Cam

bodia,after the firstattack against us (arm

ed men kidnapped the 5-year-old daughter of our

administrator,shot a bullet in her thigh and dropped her in a dark street

in the centre of the capital),w

e created an imm

ediate response network

which involved the local press corps,

Am

nesty International,H

uman

Rights W

atch,the local/regional correspondents of the N

ew Y

ork Tim

es,W

ashington Post,A

sian Wall S

treet Journal and several other large news-

papers,key U

N contacts in N

Y,

and senior officials in different foreignm

inistries.There w

ere not many,but a short briefing note or a few

phonecalls w

ere sufficient to mobilise a m

assive response which scared the gov-

ernment and m

ade it understand the simple m

essage:‘O

HC

HR

:hands

off.’We did the sam

e with the hum

an-rights NG

O com

munity w

hen itcam

e under attack,with the sim

ple message:‘T

ouching them is touching

us’.There w

ere no further attacks against us or our Cam

bodian human-

rights colleagues in the years I was there.’

OH

CH

R field officer

Deterio

rating security co

nditio

ns

What d

oes a mission

do w

hen a situ

ation d

eteriorates and

risks increase?

Evacuation is alw

ays an option,but a mission needs to have other m

easures of ‘self-defence’

in place that will strengthen its security and allow

it to continue to offerprotection.T

here was strong feedback from

most respondents in research for this

manual about the need for perseverance.A

bove all,this requires a politically astutem

ission lead

ership that w

ill wisely an

alyse changin

g risks and

ratchet up

thepreventive political response,

demonstrating w

hat the potential international costw

ill be if the mission or those under its protection are touched.

‘Deteriorating situations are w

here we m

ost need presence.’

OS

CE

field officer

In essence,the role of a mission rem

ains the same w

hen conditions deteriorate.

�It is still there to m

onitor and protect,and,if things are getting worse,m

ore peo-ple in the international com

munity are probably listening.T

he mission can thus

help negotiators and policy makers to m

ake informed and effective decisions.

Chapter 1


11


�T

he field presence continues to be a real-time local voice of international con-

cern,informing the parties on the ground,right dow

n the chain of comm

and,of increasing concerns and steps that m

ay be taken.�

Everyone understands that an attack on an expatriate provokes a greater

response than an attack on a local person.The international presence raises the

stakes both for the armed parties,w

ho must take greater care,and for interna-

tional actors who w

ill be under greater pressure to act if something happens to

the mission.

All this requires,

however,

that the international comm

unity actually supportsthe m

ission,

and

increases this su

pp

ort when

it is un

der fire.

As d

escribed in

Chapter 8 on public advocacy,

the mission should be proactively eliciting such

support and attention from the international com

munity.

Unfortunately,

field officers have often felt that they could not count on suchsystem

ic supp

ort and that their missions’

continued existence was p

recarious.S

everal field officers in Colom

bia,for instance,suggested that a single,major secu-

rity setback,such as the killing of a UN

worker,could lead to a pull-out of the w

holeU

N presence.T

hey had no confidence that a co-ordinated or robust internationalresponse w

ould back them up.If they w

ere right,this suggests a dangerously weak

level of international comm

itment.If their fears w

ere exaggerated,it is still a seriousp

roblem:

an expectation of w

eak supp

ort that could be self-fulfilling,since the

mission m

ay not demand the backing it deserves.

Projecting w

eakness can eveninvite attacks on a m

ission,if its detractors believe they can easily intimidate it into

leaving.Furtherm

ore,mission personnel are burdened by the fear that ‘m

y mistake

will end the m

ission’,and this inhibits daily choices about risk-taking and protec-tion.S

ometim

es we see an escalation of harassm

ent against international staff ororganisations on the ground,starting w

ith the weaker partners.L

arger internationalm

issions n

eed to resp

ond

actively and

firmly to any harassm

ent of their ow

np

ersonn

el,or those of p

artner organ

isations.T

hey should

also have assertive,system

-wide responses to harassm

ent of other agency or NG

O staff m

embers.T

he‘m

essage’in responding to harassm

ent of international workers should link staff

safety with general civilian safety,rather than im

plying that it is more im

portant toprotect international personnel than other civilians.

Natio

nal perso

nnel and security strateg

ies

National personnel are integral to a m

ission and its security.They m

ust be selectedw

ith care,and their special protection needs must be considered carefully.T

hey canalso be a key source of inform

ation,analysis and w

isdom,

directly protecting theless-in

formed

expatriates.

Som

e intern

ational in

stitution

s are now

emp

loying

Proactive Presence1

20

‘‘ increasingly higher proportions of local staff.In the protection field,though,thereare strengths to the expatriate role,w

hich provides a particular kind of protectionto its national colleagues.

Alw

ays a delicate procedure,staff selection should never be rushed.

It shouldshun ethnic or political bias,

considering the security implications for a m

ission’scredibility,and guard against infiltration.F

inally,and equally important in selection

of national staff as expatriate field officers,there are basic ‘good security’charac-teristics of caution,discretion,and a sense of hum

ility.

Special security vulnerabilities

National m

ission personnel and the m

ission strategists overall need to prep

aretogether for the d

ifferent secu

rity realities faced by n

ational staff m

embers.

Consider this blatant exam

ple of higher-risk exposure described by a UN

officerw

ith experience in East T

imor:

‘In military docum

ents planning for the referendum,

the first prioritym

entioned is security for the international observers.Way dow

n the list isthe goal of protecting the T

imorese;12 or 13 T

imorese U

N w

orkers were

killed.In one case when a few

national staff were killed,the U

N w

ent inw

ith a helicopter to get the ballot boxes.The Indonesian m

ilitary man they

talked to clearly knew in advance about the planned attack.T

hey askedhim

,“Why didn’t you stop it?”

He replied,“I told them

clearly:don’t harmthe internationals.”

He seem

ed to think that ought to be enough for us.The

orders were clear.’

UN

AM

ET

field officer

To

minim

ise these vulnerabilities,m

ost presences choose to keep

national andexpatriate roles distinct,

reserving the more delicate protection and intervention

roles (such as ICR

C delegate or U

N hum

an-rights observer) for expatriates,andusing national personnel in tasks of prom

otion,assistance or m

ission support.As

one field worker put it,referring to national personnel,‘T

he closer to combat,the

less we expose them

.’Y

et,even in the m

ost vulnerable locations,the expatriates

nearly always travel w

ith a local driver,who needs to be trained for m

inimal diplo-

matic responses w

hen coming into contact w

ith authorities or armed parties.

System

atic and adequate concern for national staff security has been a weakness

of international missions,

though there has been some progress.

For instance,

inO

ctober 1993,M

ICIV

IH evacu

ated from

Haiti w

ith no secu

rity provision

orfollow

-up for Haitian national personnel or local collaborators,a failure that to this

day still evinces traumatised em

otional responses from som

e mission personnel.

Chapter 1


12


Whereas in 1999,

surrounded by angry militia in a w

alled comp

ound in Dili,

UN

AM

ET

staff held firm,

resisting and re-negotiating evacuation decisions untilthe security and the evacuation of T

imorese staff and ID

Ps in the com

pound couldbe assured.N

evertheless,in some m

issions visited in 2005 there were still no special

procedures in place for national staff security in the event of evacuation.T

here are no easy solutions – and sometim

es the options for p

rotection ofnational personnel after a m

ission leaves are quite limited.N

evertheless,this is allthe m

ore reason to think them through carefully in advance.

Op

tions such asleaving vehicles and com

munication equipm

ent behind,identifying safe houses,ororganising system

atic check-ins and follow-up,

for instance,all require planning

and advance comm

itment.

Sim

ilar security planning should be happening for am

ission’s key local contacts,witnesses and sources.

Local staff security advice

One dynam

ic often overlooked is the extent to which national personnel and local

collaborators directly protect the mission and the expatriates.A

s one UN

HC

R field

worker insisted:

‘The national staff you travel w

ith are critical.They have better

sense.They learn m

ore.They have to be carefully chosen.’L

ocal personnel,beingm

ore familiar w

ith the local culture and politics,pick up cues the outsider misses.

Stories proliferate of discreet w

arnings alerting expatriates to danger.Internationalorganisations that secure the services of expert local analysts have a potential gold-m

ine of security advice,w

hich,if used,

will prevent m

istakes and improve their

overall mission strategies.

Sum

mary

Security strategies need to prom

ote smart risk-taking,

enabling active protectionstrategies for the m

ost vulnerable civilians.This dem

ands:

�contextual political analysis of local security realities,rather than transferringrigid rules from

other settings�

transparency and respectful relationships with arm

ed actors�

a good network of local allies

�strong support from

international allies�

comm

itment to early response to w

arnings or initial attacks,before they esca-late.

Proactive Presence1

22

When the security situation is deteriorating,

the mission w

ill need to take extram

easures of political self-defence,also encouraging increased international politicalsupport,

recognising that its protective value for vulnerable civilians will be espe-

cially important at such tim

es.S

pecial preparation is required to ensure nationalstaff security,

taking into account the increased vulnerability of national mission

personnel and associates.

Chapter 1


12


11INSTITUTIONALCHALLENGES

12

4

Every

field mission studied in research for this m

anual has suffered from som

ecom

bination of serious and avoidable weaknesses.T

hese include:insufficientresources,training or preparation;poor analysis;and inadequate international

or institutional support.Given w

hat the missions achieved despite such w

eaknesses,one cannot help but w

onder how successful they w

ould be if these challenges were

overcome.

If an institution is going to create effective field missions to achieve protection

for civilians,it m

ay need to make som

e hard choices.S

ometim

es,institutional

changes and some new

structures and processes may be required.T

his chapter will

examine the challenges of m

eeting the following crucial institutional objectives:

�take a com

mitted approach

�get the right entry agreem

ent – and stretch it�

make the m

ission big enough�

use the right mix of skills

�provide adequate and appropriate training

�care for m

orale and mental health

�learn from

the past and build for the future.

Take a com

mitted

app

roach

‘It is better to be unarmed in this situation.’

Military officer serving in S

LM

M

While excessive optim

ism is not helpful,it is essential to have a realistic view

of thestrengths of any given approach in order to use it to the fullest.U

nfortunately,there

Chapter 1

1: Institutional challenges

12


‘‘

‘‘ are some prevailing attitudes that lim

it many institutions’and individual field offi-

cers’capacity and confidence to carry out effective protection strategies.First,there

is a tendency not to claim credit for the protection that unarm

ed missions have

successfully brought about,because this seems to contradict the general high regard

for the protective p

ower of the gu

n.

‘Well,

we cou

ldn

’t really protect anyon

e,because w

e were unarm

ed’,was a frequent com

ment from

interviewees.B

ut thosem

aking this comm

ent would then invariably share num

erous examples in w

hichtheir interventions changed outcom

es,and protected people.T

his attitude sends a signal of impotence.

If a mission or its staff project the

belief that an unarmed presence only indicates the international system

’s reluctanceto deploy an arm

ed presence,it w

eakens respect for the mission,

and thereby itspow

er.Preventive im

pact is linked so inextricably to perceptions that this inevitablyhas self-fulfilling consequences.If a m

ission does not believe in its own effective-

ness,why should anyone else?

This is not to discount the potential value of an arm

ed component to a m

ission.In D

arfur,for example,there w

as strong positive feedback from civilians about the

protective role of the African U

nion’s armed patrols,

and UN

MIS

human-rights

monitors have an escort arrangem

ent with A

frican Union troops for som

e situa-tions.B

ut in many other situations,field officers and local respondents alike pointed

out that an unarmed presence w

as sometim

es more dissuasive against violence than

an armed one.A

nd they caution against the assumption that an arm

ed presencenecessarily has positive consequences.

Field officers doing unarm

ed monitoring

often prefer notto have m

ilitary escort,since this lim

its their activities.In som

ecases,

mission staff felt that had

their military observers or civilian police been

carrying weapons,there w

ould have been a high likelihood of shoot-outs between

mission staff and local arm

ed players,potentially resulting in deaths or provoking apolitical crisis for the m

ission.

‘It is much better to have civilian m

issions separate from the blue helm

ets.It com

plicates things – the people confuse one with the other.

Here in

Colom

bia [with no U

N m

ilitary],it is clear.But in other places,a hum

an-rights officer accom

panied by the military can appear to be an offence

against someone’s sense of sovereignty.It is better to go alone.I don’t think

they offer us increased protection… In R

wanda it w

as much better for us

[HR

FO

R] after the m

ilitary mission left;before that,w

e were alw

ays beingconfused w

ith them.’

Field officer w

ith experience in Rw

anda,Angola and C

olombia

Unarm

ed and armed presences are tw

o distinct tools,to be used independentlyor in com

bination,according to the political possibilities available for intervention.B

oth tools have strengths and weaknesses.T


unity needs to

Proactive Presence1

26

develop its approaches based on a more nuanced appreciation of different inter-

vention strategies and their relevance to varying contexts,avoiding the oversimpli-

fied assumption that the m

ilitary option is the only ‘real’protection.S

econd,beyond the comparison to arm

ed strategies,there is a more generalised

sense of failure and futility within m

ost inter-governmental organisations,

which

serves to underestimate further the im

pact of the field missions.

Because conflict

situations do not necessarily improve,or local actors do not alw

ays pay sufficientattention to the international com

munity and som

etimes even flaunt their disdain,

mission representatives can m

ake the mistake of assum

ing they have little or noim

pact.T

hird,in situations w

here there are multip

le international institutions in thefield,

each with a potential for protection,

there is a widespread tendency to de-

legitimise and criticise the efforts of other institutions.T

his destroys the potentialthat these allies should have for collaborative and com

plem

entary strategies.It

creates a natural vulnerability to ‘divide-and-conquer’strategies by actors who w

ishto u

nd

ermin

e intern

ational p

rotection efforts.

Protection

institu

tions n

eed the

internal discipline to control these turf battles and demand an attitude of respect

and collaboration from their ow

n staff towards other institutions.

A sense of futility and im

potence in the face of widespread violence can be an

occupational hazard.It can be heightened by widespread problem

s of institutionalm

orale,in which people question deeply and criticise the political w

ill of their own

institution,its organisation and m

anagement.T

hese concerns prompt fear,

pain,cynicism

and other emotions that all contribute to the underestim

ation of impact.

Attitudes that discount the value of unarm

ed presence can influence policy deci-sion

s,resu

lting in

redu

ced w

illingn

ess to dep

loy such m

issions.

Mod

esty and

humility can be great qualities for both individuals and institutions,

especially ininternational and cross-cultural settings.

But,

just as blind optimism

is naïve,the

underestimation of im

pact can lead to bad strategic choices,resulting in m

issedopportunities for protection.

Getting the right entry agreem

ent – and then stretching it

A m

ission’s negotiated mem

orandum of understanding,

agreement w

ith the hostgovernm

ent or other formal agreem

ent calling for its presence,can either enhanceor w

eaken its options for protection.A w

ide range of options must be kept open,

not only in the formal agreem

ents negotiated with the host state or arm

ed groups,but also in the internal institutional dialogue about ‘w

ho we are and w

hat we do’.

This dem

ands an approach that seeks maxim

um room

to manoeuvre w

ithin anyform

al agreements.

Ideally,a field presence will negotiate form

al,principle-based agreements giving

it the broadest range of possible strategies and methodologies to best m

eet theprotection needs of the population.Ideally,these should include,for instance:

Chapter 1


12


‘‘ �full and unim

peded access to the entire territory�

unconstrained comm

unication with any party in the governm

ent,military or

armed groups and am

ong civilians,including access to detainees�

comm

itments by arm

ed parties to comm

unicate and meet w

ith the mission,

and to respond to enquiries�

comm

itments by the arm

ed parties to support the mission politically and

refrain from actions or statem

ents that would underm

ine it or put it at risk�

a clear legal framew

ork,with the authority of international law

and treatyagreem

ents�

unlimited right to gather inform

ation�

no limits or censorship of public statem

ents or reports�

comm

itments by the parties for the security of the m

ission,but no limits put

on the mission also m

eeting its own security needs

�com

mitm

ents by the parties that persons who have contact w

ith the mission

will not be detained,questioned,placed under surveillance or otherw

ise bullied�

the right to choose and prioritise technical-support tasks in the context of them

ission’s own protection strategy

�technical agreem

ents facilitating logistical support and provision of the mis-

sion,so that blockages cannot be used to paralyse it (including the use of spec-ified radio frequencies and im

portation of necessary equipment w

ithout taxa-tion or other fees).

The negotiation environm

ent is never perfect,

of course.B

ut when these entry

conditions are not met,the m

ission planners need to be acutely aware of the poten-

tial costs to the mission.A

mission w

ith limited access to territory or civilian groups,

or without the ability to investigate atrocities,

risks serious illegitimacy.

Mission

negotiators need to understand how to use international legal standards to insist

upon certain minim

um operating conditions for a m

ission’s presence.

‘When you have poor agreem

ents to back up the presence,then the needfor a very m

ulti-skilled civilian presence increases dramatically.

In thiscase,the fact that the G

OI [G

overnment of Indonesia] w

as responsible forsecurity w

as a fatal flaw,putting all the protection burden on us,w

ith lit-tle to back it up.’

UN

AM

ET

field officer

A field presence also has an im

plicit mandate based on w

hat it believes it can dow

ithout excessive negative repercussions – a limit determ

ined by the nature of thearm

ed parties and the level of international political back-up the mission can count

on.Thus for instance,K

VM

had the most vague of w

ritten mandates to ‘verify’a

ceasefire that was not even agreed to by both w

arring parties.B

ut with backing

Proactive Presence1

28

‘‘‘‘ from the O

SC

E and N

AT

O it took a very liberal view

of that mandate.

As one

observer put it,‘We had to “spin”

protection and prevention as “verification”.’And

spin they did,putting into practice a very activist protection identity.

UN

AM

ET

had n

o explicit hu

man

-rights man

date,

and

civilian secu

rity was

formally in the hands of Indonesian authorities,but the m

ission had sufficient inter-national support,and com

mitm

ent on the part of its own staff,to take a sim

ilarlyactivist protection approach.

‘There w

as no clear consensus on the mandate…

We w

ere perhaps luckyour staff w

ere sufficiently foolish to behave as they did – outgoing andinterventionist.W

e did whatever it took,and had coverage for it.’

UN

AM

ET

field officer

‘You hear of an attack? Y

ou jump in the jeep and go stop it.

Once the

CivP

ol guy tried to stop us:“We don’t do this.W

e are not the local police.”W

eignored him

.We w

ere the police,in fact,as the police were not doing

their job of protecting people.Maybe this level of intervention w

as crazy.B

ut we saw

it as part of our mandate.’

UN

AM

ET

field officer

The point here is not that protection staff should devise independent strategies that

contradict institutional mandates,but rather to em

phasise that if a field mission has

sufficient willingness,

moral authority,

and political support from its institutional

headquarters,in p

ractice it can have greater control over the interpretation of

formal agreem

ents,and thus much greater flexibility to engage in proactive protec-

tion.Nevertheless,

the nature of the state and armed groups w

ill limit a m

ission’sability to stretch the envelope.

�O

NU

SA

L and M

INU

GU

A,for instance,both had m

andates determined by

peace negotiations,but were differently affected by the different dynam

ics ofpow

er among the parties.O

NU

SA

L personnel felt that they had the freedom

to pursue a much m

ore activist and interventionist role,because theS

alvadoran state was w

eaker than its Guatem

alan counterpart,in relation toboth the respective guerrilla m

ovements and the international com

munity.

�In H

aiti the weakness of local governm

ental structures allowed for relatively

flexible and effective local interventions in individual cases.�

Rw

anda was literally re-creating a governm

ental system after the genocide,and

this situation of flux gave the mission staff m

any opportunities to offer ‘helpfulsuggestions’that could affect the treatm

ent of prisoners.

Chapter 1


12


�U

NH

CR

personnel in Sri L

anka,operating under a mandate for helping

refugees and internally displaced people,read this as a mandate to respond to

abductions of almost any civilians,on the grounds that the dynam

ic of abduc-tion and forced recruitm

ent was an im

portant obstacle to the return ofrefugees and ID

Ps to their places of origin.

With non-state arm

ed groups,the concept of an entry agreement,m

emorandum

ofunderstanding (M

OU

) or mandate is often m

uch more am

biguous.If a mission is

unable to negotiate an agreement that allow

s it to relate to armed groups that m

aybe com

mitting violations in the country,it faces a political and security dilem

ma.If

it ignores abuses by armed groups,it w

ill be accused of partisanship.But,as w

ith astate,any public criticism

of an armed party’s behaviour should be accom

panied bysom

e attempt to engage in dialogue.O

therwise,arm

ed groups may m

isunderstandthe m

ission and stereotype it as an enemy.

In transitional negotiation situations such as El S

alvador,Guatem

ala,Darfur and

Sri L

anka,

this dialogu

e was p

ermissible.

Bu

t in n

on-tran

sitional situ

ations of

conflict,contact w

ith armed groups is harder to secure,

and sometim

es explicitlyp

rohibited.In C

olombia,

for instance,the O

HC

HR

documents and rep

orts ongu

errilla abuses,

but is p

rohibited from

any direct com

mu

nication

,an

d som

eobservers felt that this w

as a serious security risk for them.Ideally,a m

ission shouldtry to achieve a sim

ilar level of clarity with an arm

ed group as with a governm

ent:a clear and transparent M

OU

giving the mission a flexible authority to do its w

ork.

Making

the m

ission b

ig eno

ugh

Arguably,even a very sm

all field presence can carry out many protection tasks,and

have an incremental im

pact on the particular cases it focuses on.How

ever,a largem

ission can also aim to m

ake a bigger change in the overall conflict.

�A

large presence affects the national consciousness and becomes a player not to

be ignored.Its local actions will thus have greater w

eight and more authority.

�N

umerous individual and increm

ental protection efforts – at each mom

ent,ineach locality or on each them

atic area – accumulate,and reinforce each other.

Ideally,this combined effect creates a m

omentum

that changes attitudes andbehaviours.

�A

large presence is more difficult for national actors to m

anipulate.A sm

allm

ission,for instance,may serve a positive public-relations function for a host

state but without significantly curtailing its policies that hurt civilians.

Proactive Presence1

30

How

large a presence is necessary? Setting the optim

al mission size is a com

plicatedchallenge.It w

ill be affected by:

�the size of the country

�the population

�the num

ber of ongoing abuses�

the scale and nature of combat

�security risks

�transportation and other logistical factors

�the variety of tasks the m

ission engages in�

levels of collaboration and complem

entarity with other institutions.

For instance,

in Darfur the vast area of the territory and the difficulty of travel

require more people to ensure adequate coverage.

HR

FO

R had people in m

ostp

refectures,but,

due to the heavy work schedule,

observers seldom m

ade theirpresence know

n in rural areas outside the major tow

ns where they w

ere stationed,unless responding to crises.F

igure 11.1 gives some rough com

parisons of the scaleof d

ifferent m

issions relative to the p

opu

lation served

and

land

area covered.

Interviews w

ith field staff and managem

ent suggest that some m

issions were judged

to be ‘big enough’in terms of personnel and deploym

ent of sub-offices – includingO

NU

SA

L,

MIN

UG

UA

,M

ICIV

IH,

HR

FO

R an

d U

NA

ME

T.T

he KV

M w

asvastly larger than the rest,and arguably too large.

Chapter 1


13


Figure 11.1:

The comparative scale of international field m

issions

50403020100

ColombiaOHCHR

Colombia*

Darfur

Sri Lanka(North & East)

Rwanda

El Salvador

Haiti

Guatemala

Kosovo

East Timor

International personnel per millioninhabitants (black) and per

thousand square kilometres (brown)

636.36128.59

100053.33

*includes OH

CH

R, IC

RC

, UN

HC

R and P

BI

Territory

In Colom

bia,the O

HC

HR

had only 28 international staff mem

bers and 52national p

ersonnel during the period of this study,

and only three sub-officesoutside B

ogotá.The four largest international organisations w

ith some protection

mandate in C

olombia,O

HC

HR

,UN

HC

R,IC

RC

,and PB

I,had a combined total

staff of about 160 internationals.Considering that C

olombia has a population and

area greater than the total of El S

alvador,Guatem

ala,Haiti,R

wanda,K

osovo andE

ast Tim

or combined,that the conflict affects the entire territory,and that levels of

abuse are high,these numbers are very low

compared to those for other m

issionsstudied.T

he international protective presence is still largely absent in much of the

country,a concern noted by most of the civil-society respondents interview

ed.M

ost of the Sri L

ankans interviewed – including som

e mem

bers of the armed

forces – consid

er the SL

MM

presen

ce too small an

d in

need

of expan

sion.

Interestin

gly,thou

gh,w

ith the huge in

ternation

al hum

anitarian

presen

ce thatarrived in the conflict zone after the 2004 tsunam

i,some respondents com

mented,

‘We don’t really need m

ore foreign presence here.’H

owever,

since much of that

humanitarian relief presence w

as notcarrying out proactive protection functions,

the SL

MM

and other protection actors remain overw

helmed.

In the missions in w

hich size was not reported as a serious problem

,there were

atleast 15 exp

atriate international observers per m

illion peop

le in the affectedcon

flict zone.

In C

olombia there are few

er than five p

er million

,even

when

combining the four separate institutions.

Sim

ilarly,the larger m

issions had aboutfour observers or m

ore per thousand square kilometres,w

hile the density of pres-ence in C

olombia lags far behind.

The p

recedin

g chapters’

analysis,

though,

prop

oses a more com

prehen

siverange of activities than m

ost missions have engaged in,and this w

ould necessarilyrequ

ire more hu

man

resources.

So even

a mission

size previou

sly consid

ered‘adequate’m

ight better be considered as a minim

um,if these recom

mendations are

to be implem

ented fully.

Using

the rig

ht m

ix of skills

Managem

ent

There is general agreem

ent that a mission needs strong leadership,w

ith good polit-ical strategic judgem

ent,diplomatic skills and the courage to stand up for the iden-

tity and integrity of a mission and its principles.B

ut beyond this,mission leaders

must sim

ply be good managers,able to m

aximise the potential of a large organisa-

tion and provide leadership and guidance to a large staff.Mission leaders m

ust alsobe able to advocate to ensure that a m

ission is getting the resource support andpolitical coverage it needs in order to function.

Som

e missions have suffered from

poor managem

ent or rapid turnover of lead-ership.H

RF

OR

,for instance,had five mission leaders in less than four years.It is a

Proactive Presence1

32

particular challenge for a fast deployment – a m

ission conceived to respond to acrisis – to find the right leadership.T

he sponsoring institutions need a roster ofqualified m

ission leaders and managers,ready to be called upon in crisis.A

lso,inorder to consider and plan m

issions,and ensure consistent quality,the institutionneeds a high-level m

anager dedicated and available for their creation.O

therwise,

this task is sidelined and not given the attention it requires,and handed to someone

without m

ission-planning experience.Such a designated m

anager might if neces-

sary perform the role of chief of m

ission in a new presence,until another qualified

appointment can be m

ade.T

he same m

anagerial and leadership skills are also needed at the helm of each

sub-office.In contrast to a headquarters position,

field managers often have to

create their own functional structure from

scratch,adapt institutional strategies tolocal conditions and personalities,and m

anage local and national staff.

Com

position of a field presence

There is a strong argum

ent for a mission of m

ixed professions,to maxim

ise protec-tive im

pact by taking advantage of each profession’s strengths,especially within the

UN

system.C

ivilian police forces,for instance,have experience in handling violentincidents,crisis response and security m

anagement.P

olitical officers should come

with an ability to handle the strategic analysis needed to guide a m

ission’s activitiesand develop its diplom

atic approaches to different actors.Hum

an-rights monitors

can recognise and analyse complex dynam

ics of abuse within a legal fram

ework,

helping a mission to create response strategies and credible public reports that build

mom

entum for change.

Com

plex UN

missions have generally recruited from

all of these professions,and have used personnel w

ith diverse experience in a variety of roles.In contrast,non-U

N ceasefire m

issions such as KV

M and S

LM

M w

ere heavily military in

composition;O

HC

HR

missions focused solely on hum

an-rights monitors.

Som

e mixed

mission

s have mad

e very effective use of the com

bination

ofcivilian political staff or hum

an-rights monitors and international C

ivilian Police

(CivP

ol).The civilian police,

at best,com

e already trained for rapid reaction anddirect intervention in tense situations,w

ith an ability to relate to their counterpartsam

ong local authorities.In UN

AM

ET

,there was a C

ivPol presence in every local

team,

and officers were directly involved in rapid intervention in cases of threats

and attacks on Tim

orese villages and activists.C

urrently,Australia has developed

an ‘International Deploym

ent Group’

of 500 Civilian P

olice prepared for rapiddeploym

ent to conflicts in the region,w

hich recently played an important role in

the post-conflict transition in the Solom

on Islands.E

ach profession has its strengths,and its limitation.S

uch a mix w

ill work best if

the mission also institutes internal lesson-learning processes to share skills am

ongpeople com

ing from different backgrounds.

If the roles are too isolated and this

Chapter 1


13


learning and sharing does not occur,the result could be the ‘worst of all w

orlds’inw

hich each profession makes the m

istakes it is not trained to avoid.In planning m

ission composition,som

e attention should be paid to other kindsof balance as w

ell,in order to control perceptions of bias and extend the range ofrelationships a m

ission can build.This includes a m

ix of gender,age and nationality.N

ationality balance can affect a mission in a variety of w

ays:some people m

ay trustor distrust som

e field officers because of their nationality;field officers m

ay bep

erceived to ‘rep

resent’

the political p

ower an

d clou

t of their home cou

ntry,

contributing to the political calculations of local actors;local people may distrust a

mission w

hose racial composition is too different from

their own;

or,in contrast,

they may distrust citizens of nearby states based on past conflicts.T

hese consider-ations need to be taken into account.

Gender diversity and aw

areness

The differential im

pact of armed violence on w

omen and girls is w

ell documented;

the fact that the overwhelm

ing number of com

batants and security-force personnelw

ho threaten civilians are men (or teenage boys) in itself w

ill present particularrisks.F

urther,continued systemic discrim

ination on the basis of gender is likely tobe present in m

any countries where a field m

ission deploys,and this too will have a

dramatic im

pact on patterns of violence and the ability of affected comm

unities torespond.

International staff deployed to protect civilians must be adequately prepared to

ensure that gender-specific violence and persecution are anticipated and addressed.T

his suggests not only gender-sensitive aspects of training,in identifying risks andquantifying violence,but also a com

mitm

ent to gender diversity in staff composi-

tion.Missions w

ith insufficient female field staff m

ay find it difficult to respond tothe particular risks faced by w

omen and girls in the host country.

Selection and field-officer profile

Experienced field w

orkers almost unanim

ously agree that staff selection for inter-national m

issions has been a serious problem.W

hen the selection of personnel isdecentralised,

contributing countries send peop

le to a mission but there is no

centralised control over who ends up on a m

ission,or how they are selected.O

SC

Em

issions su

ffer from su

ch a decen

tralised p

olicy.O

ne H

RF

OR

field officer

recounted ‘[one country] sent us 20 observers for three months.W

e fought,‘NO

!S

end us 5 for three years!’But that w

as not on their agenda.’Another problem

issim

ply a lack of serious screening – personnel are chosen on the basis of a written

app

lication and sent off to the field without even an interview

,m

uch less anyserious training to rem

ove those who are not ready or capable.

A third problem

is the lack of critical investigation into applicants’past experi-ence.(‘W

e hire people with 10 m

issions behind them,regardless of how

they actu-

Proactive Presence1

34

ally performed in those m

issions…’) If there are screening criteria,they are seldom

integrally linked to the actual needs and context of a particular operation – exceptfor language skills,

and even this criterion is not always m

et.A

nd finally,once

people are selected,m

ost institutions deploying missions have no clear processes

for evaluating field staff,and,if necessary,for removing a person w

hose perform-

ance may be dam

aging a mission.

There are positive exceptions:all field m

issions interviewed in C

olombia felt that

selection there was w

ell handled.OH

CH

R staff pointed out that selection processes

now include adequate input from

the field.The IC

RC

has a rigorous selectionprocedure,

followed by a m

onth-long induction in Geneva before personnel are

sent to the field

.A

n altern

ative mod

el is that of the Au

stralian In

ternation

alD

eployment G

roup,which selects civilian police based on nom

inations and recom-

mendations from

their superior officers in their departments.

Despite som

e weak selection procedures,

there was a high level of consensus

among all interview

respondents about what the criteria should

be for selecting fieldofficers.

Nearly all agree that professional qualifications can be useful,

and avail-ability for an adequate m

inimum

stay is vital,but that m

ore intangible personalcharacteristics,

skills and experience are also important for successful fieldw

ork.T

hese include:

�com

mitm

ent to civilian protection�

flexibility,being adaptable to the local social and cultural context�

tolerance,respect and cultural sensitivity �

a high degree of comm

on sense �

a sense of humility;and no sense of superiority,w

hich causes problems of

comm

unication as well as errors in analysis

�com

fort with the field-based lifestyle,and experience to dem

onstrate this�

strong analytical skills�

strong and diverse comm

unication and diplomatic skills – especially good lis-

tening skills,an ability to talk effectively with all kinds of people,and being

able to transmit concerns to m

ilitary personnel firmly but w

ithout offending�

being able to work as part of a team

– not rigid and not prone to creating con-flict

�skills in conflict resolution

�language ability relevant to the context

�a proper grasp of the hum

an-rights approach�

ability to cope with stress.

These traits,gleaned from

over a hundred interviews w

ith field staff,cannot all bepicked out from

a written application,

or even from a short interview

.E

ffectiveselection requires a subjective decision by evaluators w

ith good judgement and field

experience.

Chapter 1


13


Som

e ING

Os face this challenge by linking selection to an intensive training

process.After a detailed application w

hich includes analytical writing,reflection on

past experience by applicants,and long interview

s,applicants are im

mersed in a

week or m

ore of training.This training also serves as a final screening,w

here expe-rienced trainers can tell if candidates lack im

portant qualities for field work,and can

recomm

end that the decision to send them to the field be revoked.

Mission practitioners or leaders from

the field should participate in the selectionof their ow

n personnel,but unfortunately the geographic distance can lim

it thed

epth

of con

tact requ

ired

for a

good

jud

gemen

t.T

he aforem

ention

edtraining/screening process also provides a solution to this challenge,if the institu-tion arranges for key people to com

e from the field to participate as both trainers

and selection evaluators.T

he mistakes of poorly screened field staff are costly,dam

aging a mission’s repu-

tation and credibility,and som

etimes presenting a serious security risk.

Rigorous

control over the selection of personnel is a sign of institutional maturity and respon-

sibility.H

and in hand with rigorous selection goes the need for legitim

ate staffappraisals in the field.T

his would allow

a mission to im

prove the quality of its work,

identify needs for additional training and correct errors of selection,as w

ell asinform

ing the mission’s understanding of the necessary criteria for future selection.

Ad

equate and

app

rop

riate training fo

r missio

np

ersonnel

In addition to poor selection,lack of training is a major cause of poor-quality field-

work.

On average,

the comm

itment to training in the m

issions studied has beenextrem

ely low.In m

any cases,no training was offered at all – or at least the field offi-

cers interviewed had no know

ledge of it,and had received none themselves.S

ome

missions have offered brief orientation sessions on the ground,often long after field

officers have started their service.M

ost existing training is criticised for its dry,lecture format or legal character,

and its irrelevance to practical field problems.T

raining is often focused only ontransm

itting organisational mandates and rules,or political inform

ation about thesituation;seldom

is it focused on improving practical skills.In the w

orst of cases,the apparent ‘crisis urgency’of a situation has been used to excuse the om

ission oftraining altogether,w

ith the consequent risk that the most delicate m

issions are theleast prepared.

There have,

however,

been some prom

ising exceptions.M

any MIC

IVIH

fieldstaff w

ent through an intensive three-week orientation in H

aiti,complete w

ith prac-tical exercises and role-plays on culture,

politics and how and w

hen to intervenew

ith authorities,and some study of the local language.U

NIC

EF

and UN

HC

R have

both develop

ed gen

eral staff trainin

g program

mes,

which in

clud

e protection

comp

onen

ts in w

orkshops an

d sem

inars as w

ell as on-lin

e distan

ce-learnin

g

Proactive Presence1

36

courses.The IC

RC

and NG

Os including P

BI and the N

onviolent Peace F

orce alldem

and substantial off-site training sessions before deployment.

Appropriate preparation for a delicate field operation should include a num

berof different com

ponents:

�off-site training before deploym

ent,both general and mission-specific

�on-site training and orientation after arrival in the m

ission�

an ongoing mentor relationship w

ith a more experienced field officer

�periodic training during service,including on specific practical topics

�regular appraisal processes and de-briefing at the conclusion of service.

Off-site training before a m

ission

Before final acceptance for service in the field,

candidates should go through anintensive participatory training process.T

his should serve to familiarise them

with

the dem

and

s of fieldw

ork,w

hile also giving an

experien

ced train

ing team

theopportunities for final selection and screening of candidates before allow

ing themto serve in

the field.

Role-p

lays in p

articular,

are a pow

erful train

ing tool for

assessing certain skills of comm

unication,practical analysis and teamw

ork.T

his initial training should be skill-focused and general,w

ith an objective ofpreparing field officers for service in a variety of contexts.It should also prom

ote aclear understanding of the institution sp

onsoring the field presence,

and buildm

orale and loyalty to it and its mandate.A

nd it should have a formal assessm

entprocess,in w

hich a team of trainers can m

ake suggestions to individuals for addi-tional preparation.

An institution that participates in m

ultiple field missions should take advantage

of this general training to involve candidates who are likely to serve in a variety of

contexts.

These join

t experien

ces may cem

ent organ

isational coheren

ce and

morale,such that field w

orkers can think ‘outside the box’of a single mission,show

empathy and concern for other m

issions,be prepared for multiple m

ission servicein their career,and fully grasp the m

andate and principles of the sponsoring insti-tution as distinct from

operational objectives in a given context.Inter-governmental

missions have been plagued by confusion am

ong field workers about institutional

mandates,and by m

orale problems stem

ming from

this confusion.Likew

ise,expec-tations from

service in one mission have been a source of conflict and confusion

when a field w

orker moves on to another.

Mission-specific training can be a separate process aim

ed at preparing alreadytrained field officers for a specific m

ission.Or,if new

officers are being recruitedurgently for a specific m

ission,it could be a second stage of the initial training

process.This training helps field w

orkers to apply general skills and strategies to thespecific m

ission,and it can identify gaps in knowledge and preparation for a partic-

ular mission.

Horror stories abound of field w

orkers arriving in the field with no

Chapter 1


13


knowledge of the real conditions,the culture or the politics of the situation they w

illface.T

he mission-specific training should prepare all field personnel for a sm

ootharrival and an efficient transition to initial fieldw

ork.E

ach mission w

ill face distinct needs and demands in term

s of security,discre-tion,

comm

unication styles,m

ission mandate and cultural understanding,

forexam

ple,and it would be a m

istake to assume that either generic training or experi-

ence in another mission can adequately prepare people for arrival at a new

one.Field

officers,and even civil-society respondents,stressed in interviews the im

portance offield officers w

ith prior exp

erience receiving some clear training in a country’s

context before arrival,since they otherw

ise might have too strong a tendency to

apply lessons and strategies from other contexts w

ithout appropriate adaptation.F

inally,advance mission training should consciously develop a sense of esprit de corps

for field personnel who w

ill later be depending on each other on the ground.S

ome suggest that m

ission-specific training is best done only in country.This

has serious risks:field personnel would still be arriving ill inform

ed.In some cases

they will not be ready to deal w

ith mission conditions,

something they should be

persuaded to consider before departure to the field.The field reality is often tum

ul-tuous and unpredictable,

and institutional comm

itment to rigorous training upon

arrival is easily lost in the pressures of imm

ediate demands.F

inally,the capacity toabsorb a training process im

mediately upon arrival is constrained by the num

erousstresses and uncertainties characteristic of arrival in a new

culture and context.

On-site training after arrival

Ideally,arriving field workers w

ill have a chance to settle in briefly,overcome som

eof the initial shock of arrival,

meet their colleagues,

learn something about w

orkexpectations and im

merse them

selves in the mission’s operational language.

For

this arrival process,some kind of support or m

entoring is essential.Then,w

ithin ashort tim

e,there should be a serious on-site training/orientation to complem

ent thetraining received before arrival.

This training can continue as one-to-one m

entoring,but there are significant

advantages to arranging arrival schedules so that there are group orientations fornew

arrivals.G

roup training is efficient for the mission,

since experienced fieldpersonnel w

ill not face the same questions repeatedly.B

ut it is also much better for

the arriving field workers,

who w

ill share the experience and many of the sam

equestions w

ith others in their situation.This training is a chance for the m

ission toinstil a clear and coherent sense of identity and m

andate in each field officer,avoiding confusion and contradiction.

Mentoring, ongoing training, appraisal and debriefing

Training processes,no m

atter how thorough,are never enough.N

ew people in the

field do not always know

where to turn w

ith questions and doubts,and for help in

Proactive Presence1

38

devising strategies for complex or threatening situations.IC

RC

delegates in partic-ular stressed the value of having a learning relationship w

ith a more experienced

delegate.N

ot everyone is lucky enough to find this by themselves.

Mentoring

should be institutionalised,from

the highest levels of mission leadership dow

n tothe individual field officer.A

mission’s training staff should establish com

munica-

tion links with experienced officers w

ho serve as mentors,to learn from

their expe-rience,and constantly im

prove the training processes.D

epending on their length of service,there should be a process for continued

training of personnel in the field,bringing together recent and m

ore experiencedstaff m

embers.

Experienced field officers should be periodically invited back to

participate in off-site pre-mission trainings,giving them

a chance to reflect outsidethe field context w

hile also serving as a resource for new candidates.

Larger m

issions should consider having an ongoing mobile training unit:expe-

rienced trainers who travel to the various m

ission sub-offices to carry out seminars

in a flexible manner that can respond to developing needs in the field.T

his mecha-

nism w

ould also allow for inter-institutional sem

inars and training in particularlocal settings w

here a variety of organisations are confronting similar problem

s.P

eriodic appraisal and debriefing of field officers at the end of their service is aresp

onsibility of any institution,and yet it doesn’t often hap

pen.

Ideally thereshould be som

e link between these processes and a m

ission’s training unit.These

evaluations can show w

hether field officers are getting adequate preparation,and

can inform ongoing training.

Training methodologies

The prim

ary methodologies of training for com

plex political work have to be expe-

riential and practical.It m

ust involve some serious problem

-solving practice,in

which staff are not listening to lectures,but participating in learning m

ethodologiesto help them

come up w

ith answers and strategies them

selves,because this is what

they will need to do in the field.T

his can involve role-plays,

simulations,

well-

prepared exercises for team strategy-building,and serious debates am

ong partici-pants about com

plex and thorny quandaries they may face.T

he training processshould elicit doubts and fears,

and seek constructive means of addressing them

.K

nowledge of technical issues,or the passing on of inform

ation,though important,

should be covered in separate seminars.U

se of training time for the dissem

inationof inform

ation should be minim

ised.W

hether on-site or external,a training process should bring in outside resourcepeople.If it is m

ission-specific training,it should involve local analysts and profes-sionals,or representatives of beneficiary groups,and it should involve substantivedialogue.S

ome participation in training by m

ission leadership is important,espe-

cially as training can play such an important role in building a m

ission’s sense ofunity and m

orale.Also,sharing com

parative experiences from other m

issions canbe very useful.

Chapter 1


13


Training should address specific skills that have been generally under-em

pha-sised.A

s noted above,for instance,training in gender-related aspects of protectionis often a crucial gap to cover.T

raining should also include practice in all the analyt-ical,strategic and com

munication skills that have been detailed in earlier sections of

this book,especially those skills that are not automatically part of the professional

education that field workers receive before joining a m

ission.

Training policy

All of these suggestions depend on one prim

ary policy decision:a serious institu-tional resource com

mitm

ent to training.This includes:

�a budget covering personnel,travel and logistics

�dedicated and qualified training staff both outside and inside the m

ission �

a time com

mitm

ent in the work plans of all field staff to spend the necessary

time being trained and assisting in training

�m

inimum

training thresholds,below w

hich a field worker w

ill not be deployed.

The m

ost frequent justification for not making these com

mitm

ents is lack ofresou

rces and

time.T

his is flawed

logic,sin

ce a prop

ortional com

mitm

ent to

training is necessary at any resource level.Institutions that fail to invest sufficientlyin training do not usually fix this problem

as their budgets grow – other dem

andscontinue to take resource p

riority.International institutions w

ill not imp

lement

better trainin

g when

they have more m

oney,

but w

hen they d

ecide it m

attersenough to prioritise in their existing budgets.

Institutions sending protection workers into conflict zones should also consider

multi-institutional collaborations on protection training.

It would be a useful step

for some inter-institutional conferences and consultations to begin a dialogue and

share resources and wisdom

in this field.Training institutions should be developing

rigorous teaching modules for protection practitioners,and training a larger cadre

of trainers for field missions.

Care fo

r the m

orale and

mental h

ealth o

f missio

n staff

Another striking gap in nearly all of the m

issions studied was the lack of institu-

tional attention to the emotional needs of field w

orkers.The statistics on post-trau-

matic stress am

ong people in this occupation would probably be shocking if anyone

had paid enough attention to m

easure it.A

n institution has a legal and moral

responsibility to care for those people on the ground taking the risks and absorbingthe stress.A

nd on a practical level,high levels of emotional burnout and stress are

also major im

pediments to the quality and efficiency of a m

ission’s performance.

Proactive Presence1

40

‘‘

‘I was burnt out after three m

onths in Kosovo...I did not think it w

ould beso difficult to live through such a situation.’

KV

M field officer

Num

erous factors make m

ission personnel in conflict zones especially vulner-able to m

ental- health problems.T

hese include:

�direct security risks – fear for oneself,and the consequent stress of constantsecurity caution

�indirect security risks – constant fear for the w

ell-being of co-workers and local

contacts�

direct trauma – living through violent experiences

�secondary traum

a – living and working constantly close to victim

s of trauma

�stressful living conditions – unfam

iliar terrain or climate,heat,risks of serious

health problems,inadequate housing or facilities for com

fort or personal space�

loneliness – distance from loved ones

�stress of collective w

ork – the demands of w

orking as a team,w

ith mem

bers allunder stress,w

hich generally manifests in internal group dynam

ics�

cultural stress – unfamiliarity at first,or fatigue over the longer term

fromfunctioning w

ithin an unfamiliar culture

�institutional stress – frustration w

ith the inefficiency or lack of resources of them

ission itself and its inability to respond adequately to the pressing human

demands of victim

s.

In over one hundred interviews w

ith field staff,not a single person felt that therew

as adequate institutional treatment of m

ental-health needs.O

ne reaction to thisw

as the stoic approach – ‘You just have to be tough,and cope w

ith it yourself.’In

fact,it appears that few field m

ission personnel were even w

arned before deploy-m

ent that there was danger and stress involved in the w

ork.Applicants to m

ost ofthese institutions are not asked to reflect seriously on their com

mitm

ent and readi-ness for such risks,

or their ability to maintain a calm

and objective demeanour

under threatening circumstances.

‘You know

I saw lots of dead.V

ery bad dead.Did anybody take care of our

brain? Do you think it is norm

al? It is not normal to see dead people.

Nobody w

ill talk about it.Is anybody prepared for that?’

HR

FO

R field officer

Chapter 1


14


‘‘

Proactive Presence1

42

But there is a grow

ing recognition that a mission has a responsibility to m

inimise

these health risks by encouraging skills for self-care,mutual support am

ong teamm

embers,

training for coping with stress,

and by providing adequate services forpeople w

ho have been traumatised or burnt out.A

few organisations offer w

ork-shops on m

anaging occupational stress to staff,or m

ake post-incident or post-m

ission psychological support available.In only one case,

PB

I in Colom

bia,w

asthere a staff-person in the field w

ith the job of providing mental-health support to

staff and volunteers.T

here are imp

ortant in

itiatives un

derw

ay to develop

constru

ctive policies,

trainin

g,therap

ies and

sup

portive p

ractices for field w

orkers.P

rotection field

missions m

ust make a com

mitm

ent to learn,and take advantage of w

hat is beingdeveloped by other organisations.T

he point here is not to re-state best practice inm

ental-health support for field workers,

which is better described elsew

here (seeK

ey resources),but rather that protective field missions need first and forem

ost tom

ake a policy and resource comm

itment to use the tools that exist.

Key reso

urces on self-care and

mental h

ealth fo

r field m

ission w

orkers

Ongoing resource developm

ent in this field can be found at these web-links:

Peop

le in

A

id

(ww

w.p

eoplein

aid.org);

Action

w

ithout

Bord

ers(w

ww

.psychosocial.org) and Hum

anitarian Practice N

etwork (w

ww

.odihpn.org).

Lovell-H

awker,

D.

Effective D

ebriefing Handbook.

London:

People in A

id,2002

(http://ww

w.peopleinaid.org).

Oxfam

UK

.Managing to C

ope(12pp,2002).

Post T

rauma S

tress(4 pp,2002).

Preparation and S

upport of Staff W

orking in Conflict A

reas:G

uidance form

anagers.(9 pp,

undated).Available from

Oxfam

,e-m

ail staffhealthservice@

oxfam.org.uk.

Salam

a,P

eter.T

he Psychological H

ealth of Relief W

orkers:Som

e practical sugges-tions.(http://w

ww

.reliefweb.int/library/docum

ents/psycho.htm) 1999.

Hum

anitarian A

ction and

Arm

ed C

onflict.C

oping w

ith stress.

Gen

eva:International C

omm

ittee of the Red C

ross,2001.

Learning fro

m th

e past and

build

ing fo

r the future

Missions and their sponsoring institutions should system

atically collect and analyseexperiences and learn from

them.M

ost have failed to do so.There is little in place

to ensure that one mission learns from

the mistakes of past m

issions,even when the

missions are sponsored by the sam

e institution.The transm

ission of institutionalm

emory and lessons is largely left to individuals.Y

et newcom

ers arriving in the fieldare often not even given sufficient overlap w

ith their predecessors to learn fromrecent experiences.

There is a grow

ing pool of experienced field personnel and leadership from past

missions.T

hey are each bringing their own lessons from

one mission to the next.

They also bring their m

emories of w

ho serves well in different contexts,and these

personal links can p

ositively affect selection processes,

yielding more qualified

mission staff.B

ut this is very ad hoc.Even w

hen a mission has people w

ith priorexperience,this is no substitute for system

atic lesson learning.Individual mem

oriesten

d to over-em

phasise m

istakes and

errors,an

d this ten

ds to bias strategies

towards avoiding scandal rather than m

aximising positive im

pact.S

ome efforts outside sponsoring institutions have tried to im

prove this situation.T

he Aspen Institute convened a series of studies and consultations on m

any of theunarm

ed missions of the 1990s.

In 2002,the R

ockefeller Foundation convened a

consultation in London of experts in unarm

ed monitoring,

which included plan-

ners of u

pcom

ing m

issions.

Exp

erienced

practition

ers have also pu

blishednum

erous articles in journals to preserve important lessons from

field experience.F

ield missions rarely utilise internal procedures to record and learn from

theirexperiences.T

hey cite the pressing need to prepare for the next crisis,which seem

salw

ays more urgent than sitting people dow

n to analyse what has just happened,so

that they may do better next tim

e.Rapid staff turnover exacerbates this gap.L

essonlearning doesn’t happen unless it is structured into the w

ork plan and managem

entof a m

ission,for instance through regular staff retreats or meetings to share notes

on mistakes and successes.T

his would not require anything so daunting as institu-

tional reform – only a m

ission-level comm

itment to value lesson learning enough to

invest resources and time,and to do it.M

anagers should implem

ent structures toensure sufficient overlap and the passing on of essential lessons during staff transi-tions,as w

ell as bringing staff mem

bers together in organised processes to discussexperiences and preferred practical responses to shared challenges.

Sum

mary and

recom

mend

ations

Believe in unarm

ed protection

�R

espect and understand the relative advantages and disadvantages of armed

and unarmed intervention strategies.

�R

espect the efforts of other institutions.

Chapter 1


14


Get the right entry agreem

ent – and stretch it

Aim

to secure:

�unlim

ited access to territory,all key players,and information

�com

mitm

ents by armed parties to support the unarm

ed presence,ensure itssecurity,

comm

unicate regularly and co-operate on logistical aspects�

a clear legal framew

ork�

freedom to choose technical-support tasks

�freedom

of expression�

sufficient political support to allow the flexibility for other activities as neces-

sary to improve protection.

Make the m

ission big enough

�L

arger missions have increased political pow

er,protection impact and inde-

pendence of the manipulations of national actors.

�T

oo small a m

ission can convey political benefits to abusers while insufficiently

holding them to account for their actions.

�O

ptimal m

ission size depends on a range of factors including the size of theterritory,its population,the num

ber of ongoing abuses,the scale and nature ofcom

bat,the precise role of the mission and the level of com

plementarity and

collaboration with other presence on the ground.

Use the right m

ix of skills

�Include a range of professional capacities including hum

an-rights monitoring,

humanitarian assistance,civilian policing and m

ilitary-observer skills,anddiplom

atic/political experience.�

Select personnel carefully and rigorously,using intensive face-to-face processes

that allow for evaluation of the m

any crucial subjective qualities required forfield service.

�E

nsure that mission m

anagement has the strategic,leadership and political-

diplomatic capacity to lead a protection m

ission effectively.

Provide adequate and appropriate training for m

ission staff

�C

omm

it serious institutional resources to training.�

Expand training to cover the full spectrum

of the field officer’s mission experi-

ence.

Proactive Presence1

44

�U

se experiential and practical training,with interactive m

ethodologies.�

Initiate internal and inter-institutional ‘lessons-learned’projects,linked to train-ing.

Care for m

orale and mental health

�C

omm

it resources to staff care.�

Encourage m

utual support among team

mem

bers.�

Offer training and other adequate services to deal w

ith stress and trauma.

Learn from the past and build for the future

�P

rovide opportunities to share and analyse strategies and techniques.�

Consciously cultivate a cadre of experience that can m

entor new field officers.

Chapter 1


14


12CONCLUSION

14

6

Effective field presence can significantly contribute to and enhance the protec-tion of civilians.T

he specific lessons and recomm

endations of this manual,are

relevant to a wide range of deploym

ents of international missions and agencies

on the ground in conflict zones.The international com

munity needs to take greater

advantage of the p

rotective pow

er of field p

resence,

and

dep

loy more su

chm

issions.P

assive presence for its own sake is not needed;

rather,the requirem

ent is forw

ell-informed and carefully analysed strategies and tactics that use the presence of

each field officer to influence all the actors around them.T

he five strategies ofsustained diplom

acy,visibility,encouragement and em

powerm

ent,convening andbridging,and public advocacy are basic building blocks for any protection m

ission.O

ther strategies and activities will also em

erge in particular situations.T

hese ideas will contribute to protection only w

hen they are applied in real situ-ations on the ground.

For this reason,

we hope that each organisation or m

issionw

ill take our recomm

endations as a basis from w

hich to develop appropriate andeffective strategies for their specific situations,

and take greater initiative for thep

rotection of civilians.Ideally,

they will build these suggestions into their ow

ntraining and planning.T

his may m

ean using this manual as it is,but it could also

mean integrating the lessons into other internal m

anuals and training materials.

This process of integration w

ill allow each organisation to tailor the approach to

their individual institutional identity and reality.P

rotection is a difficult challenge,and this m

anual by no means presum

es tohave all the answ

ers.The tools of proactive presence m

ust be used together with a

wide range of other efforts to assist and protect victim

s of violence and war all over

the world.It is our deepest hope that this m

anual will assist institutions and indi-

viduals,and that it w

ill encourage greater deployment of protection m

issions andm

ore active use of proactive protection tools by field officers worldw

ide.

Chapter 1

2: C

onclusion1

47

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assacre and thepolitics of intervention.N

ew Y

ork:Basic B

ooks,2002.P

aul,Diane.B

eyond Monitoring and R

eporting:Strategies for field-level protection of

civilians under threat.New

York:B

laustein Institute,1997.P

oliczer,Pablo.‘M

onitoring and Leverage over N

on-State A

rmed G

roups.’U

npublished manuscript prepared for the R

ockefeller Foundation,2001.

Pustyntsev,B

oris.Making A

llies:Engaging governm

ent officials to advance human

rights.Minneapolis,M

N:N

ew T

actics in Hum

an Rights P

roject,Center for

Victim

s of Torture,2003 (http://w

ww

.newtactics.org/m

ain.php/A

dministrationandtheP

ublic).P

orter,Toby.‘M

echanisms for m

onitoring ceasefire and peace agreements’

Unpublished m

onograph.Geneva:C

entre for Hum


Ricci,R

oberto.‘One Y

ear of Hum

an Rights M

onitoring with the U

N H

ighC

omm

issioner for Hum

an Rights in R

wanda’,P

apers in the Theory and

Practice of H

uman R

ights,Num

ber 21.Colchester,U

K:H

uman R

ightsC

entre,University of E

ssex,1996.R

obinson,Geoffrey.E

ast Tim

or 1999:Crim

es against humanity.G

eneva:UN

O-

HC

HR

,2005.R

obinson,Geoffrey.‘T

he fruitless search for a smoking gun:tracing the origins of

violence in East T

imor’in R

oots of Violence in Indonesia:C

ontemporary violence

in historical perspective.Leiden:K

ITLV

Press,2002.

Robinson,G

eoffrey.‘“If you leave us here,we w

ill die”’inT

he New

Killing F

ields:M

assacre and the politics of intervention.New

York:B

asic Books,2002.

Robinson,G

eoffrey.‘With U

NA

ME

T in E

ast Tim

or’in Bitter F

lowers,S

weet

Flow

ers:East T

imor,Indonesia and the w

orld comm

unity,pp 55–72.New

York:

Row

man and L

ittlefield,2001.R

obinson,Geoffrey.‘P

eople’s war:m

ilitias in East T

imor and Indonesia’,S

outhE

ast Asia R

esearch9(3):271–318,2001.

Sam

set,Ingrid.‘Whose m

ission? Lim

its and potentials of the SL

MM

’,Lines

online magazine (http://w

ww

.lines-magazine.org),A

ugust 2004.S

avage,David.D

ancing with the devil:A

personal account of policing the East T

imor

vote for independence.Victoria,A

ustralia:Monash U

niversity Press,2002.

Shaw

cross,William

.‘Lessons of C

ambodia’in T

he New

Killing F

ields:Massacre

and the politics of intervention.New

York:B

asic Books,2002.

Slim

,Hugo and A

ndrew B

onwick.P

rotection:An A

LN

AP

guide for humanitarian

agencies.London:O

DI,2005.

Suares,F

ilomena.‘B

earing witness’in T

he New

Killing F

ields:Massacre and the

politics of intervention.New

York:B

asic Books,2002.

Suntinger,W

alter.‘Monitoring H

uman R

ights in Kosovo:T

he Work of the

Kosovo V

erification Mission,O

ct–Nov 98 – M

ar 99’,Presentation at the sem

i-nar ‘H

uman R

ights in Bosnia and H

erzegovina’,University of V

ienna,23 June1999.

Trow

bridge,Erin.‘B

ack road reckoning’in The N

ew K

illing Fields:M

assacre andthe politics of intervention.N

ew Y

ork:Basic B

ooks,2002.

Proactive Presence1

52

UN

MIS

/OC

HA

.‘Protection of C

ivilians:A strategy for D

arfur.’UN

MIS

,2005.U

nited Nations.‘R

eport of the Panel on U

nited Nations P

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(Brahim

i Report).A

/55/305-A/2000/809.N

ew Y

ork:UN

,2000.U

nited Nations.T

he United N

ations and East T

imor:S

elf determination through pop-

ular consultation.New

York:U

ND

PI,2000.

United N

ations.The U

nited Nations and E

l Salvador,1990–1995.N

ew Y

ork:UN

DP

I,1995.U

nited Nations O

ffice of the High C

omm

issioner for Hum

an Rights,H

andbookfor hum

an rights and humanitarian practitioners on the protection of persons coop-

erating with them

in sensitive environments,draft,forthcom

ing.W

elchman,L

ynn.‘Consensual Intervention:A

case study on the TIP

H.’

Background paper prepared for a conference on international hum

an rightsenforcem

ent.Jerusalem:C

entre for International Hum

an Rights E

nforcement,

1994.W

hitfield,Teresa.‘S

taying the Course in E

l Salvador’in H

onoring Hum

an Rights

From

Peace to Justice.W


Young,H

elen.‘Darfur:L

ivelihoods Under S

iege,Interim S

umm

ary Report.’

Medford,M

A:F

einstein International Fam

ine Center,2005.

Bibliography

15

3

ANNEXE: METHODOLOGY OF

RESEARCH AND INTERVIEWS

The conclusions in this m

anual are based on data gathered from a variety of

sources including documental and archival m

aterials,in-depth telephone interviews

and three field trips.R

elevant data from the author’s prior research and practical

experience in Guatem

ala,H

aiti and El S

alvador was also integrated.

Most inter-

views w

ere tape-recorded,except in som

e cases during field trips where it w

asjudged that recording w

ould be a security concern or hindrance for respondents.M

ost interviews w

ere individual,although a number of interview

s held during thefield trips w

ere in group settings with civil-society organisations and local com

mu-

nities.A

ll interviews w

ere transcribed,and the data in these transcriptions were coded

and entered into a database.The coding process included 200 keyw

ords,allowing

for transversal comparison of m

ultiple themes across several thousand data entries

covering the different conflicts and mission institutions.

These data w

ere thenanalysed according to each them

e,eliciting lessons learned as w

ell as judgements

widely shared am

ong respondents about best practice in such missions.

Altogether,

over 270 respondents participated in individual and group inter-view

s:70 in Colom

bia,over 60 in Sudan and over 80 in S

ri Lanka,as w

ell as 60additional interview

s with field officers,

observers and experts familiar w

ith pastm

issions.Field visits w

ere made to 14 cities and tow

ns:Bogotá,M

edellín,Cali and

Bucaram

anga in Colom

bia;Khartoum

,El F

asher,Nyala and E

d Daein in S

udan;C

olombo,

Kilinochchi,

Jaffna,T

rincomalee,

Katancuddy and B

atticaloa in Sri

Lanka.In addition,several rural com

munities near these settlem

ents were visited.

Interviews in the F

ield:

Field research included interview

s with m

embers of the follow

ing fours groups

1)G

overnment

officials:including

over 20

representatives of

state institutions,

including several police superintendents and military com

manders w

orking inzones of conflict,several form

er military and civilian authorities,co-ordinators

of humanitarian affairs,

human-rights com

mission officers,

public defenders,representatives of om

budsmen’s offices and governors.

2)A

rmed group representatives:

In Sri L

anka and Sudan,

due to ongoing peaceprocesses at the tim

e of the research,it was possible also to m

eet with represen-

tatives of the guerrilla organisations,the LTT

E and the S

LA

.In Colom

bia,how-

ever,it was not advisable to secure interview

s directly with representatives of the

Proactive Presence1

54

guerrilla or paramilitary groups.

3)C

ivil society:The field trips w

ere also the primary vehicle for hearing the opin-

ions of civil society and comm

unities about the role of international presence intheir ow

n protection.D

ozens of interviews w

ere carried out with individuals,

NG

O leaders and com

munity groups in both urban and rural settings.T

heseincluded visits to seven ID

P cam

ps or displaced comm

unities in Darfur includ-

ing both ethnic African and A

rab respondents,discussions with N

GO

consortiathroughout S

ri Lanka representing diverse ethnic com

munities,

and meetings

with dozens of N

GO

and comm

unity representatives individually in all threecountries.W

here information w

as available about presumed political or arm

ed-group alignm

ents of NG

O or civil-society groups,

interviews w

ere securedacross the political spectrum

.In total these interviews included the distinct opin-

ions or reflections of over 100 civil-society respondents.4)

Representatives of international agencies and IN

GO

S engaged in protection w

ork:including

embassy

personnel,donor

consortiums,

30 field

personnel from

humanitarian agencies,20 field officers from

ING

Os,and A

frican Union peace-

keepers and civilian police.

Every field visit of course included num

erous interviews w

ith the managem

ent andfield officers of the focal m

ission.This included the head and deputy head of m

is-sion in O

HC

HR

-Colom

bia as well as heads of all O

HC

HR

-Colom

bia sub-officesand several additional hum

an-rights field officers.In S

ri Lanka,

interviews w

ereheld w

ith the SL

MM

Head of M

ission and Chief of S

taff,other headquarters per-sonnel,

the heads of three field offices and half a dozen additional monitors in

Colom

bo,Jaffna,Kilinochchi,and T

rincomalee.In S

udan,with a research focus on

humanitarian presence,interview

s were carried out in K

hartoum w

ith the Deputy

Resident C

o-ordinator,high-level managers from

the WF

P and U

NH

CR

presence,the U

NM

IS D

irector of Protection,and over a dozen representatives of additional

humanitarian agencies,including U

NIC

EF,O

CH

A,and U

NM

IS H

uman R

ights,in E

l Fasher,N

yala,Ed D

aein and Khartoum

.In addition to the focal m

ission of each field study,research also examined the

role of other key protection agencies with a presence in all three conflicts,in par-

ticular the ICR

C,

UN

HC

R and U

NIC

EF.

Interviews w

ere carried out with 18

ICR

C delegates in the three conflicts,

and 13 field officers for UN

ICE

F and

UN

HC

R.

Protection

-focused

IN

GO

s like

Peace

Brigad

es In

ternation

al in

Colom

bia and the Nonviolent P

eaceforce in Sri L

anka were also included.

Additional interview

s beyond the field trips were held w

ith 24 former field offi-

cers from past m

issions,including two heads of m

issions.Respondents also includ-

ed nine other headquarter-based ICR

C staff,

five OC

HA

protection staff,seven

representatives of international NG

Os,academ

ic experts,and additional represen-tatives of D

PK

O and D

PA,as w

ell as experts on the Australian international civil-

ian police.

Annexe

15

5

END NOTES

1 F

or example,U

N S

ecurity Council R

esolutions 1265 and 1296,and variousresolutions of the Inter-A

gency Standing C

omm

ittee.2

Slim

and Bonw

ick,Protection.A

n AL

NA

P guide for hum

anitarian agencies;M

ancini-Griffoli and P

icot.Hum

anitarian Negotiation:A

handbook for securingaccess,assistance and protection for civilians

(see Bibliography for full details).

3 S

ome relevant references regarding the use of law

are provided in Chapter 8

under the discussion of monitoring and reporting (and listed as 'K

eyresources on hum

an-rights monitoring').

4A

broader conception of protection is widely used by the IA

SC

and ICR

C,

delineating three spheres of protection action as follows.(i) R

esponsive actionaim

s to stop,prevent or alleviate the worst effects of the abuses.Im

pact is pre-ventive and im

mediate,but also aim

s to deter future abuses.(ii) Rem

edialaction assists and supports people after violations w

hile they live with subse-

quent effects.Impact is short-to-m

edium term

.(iii) Environm

ent-buildingaction m

oves society as a whole tow

ard protection norms that w

ill prevent orlim

it future abuses.Impact is long-term

and structural.The m

ore limited

approach of this manual,how

ever,is to focus on the proactive and preventivelevels of protection that lim

it perpetrators' capacity to damage.

5 T

his analysis is drawn in part from

Mahony and E

guren,Unarm

edB

odyguards(see B

ibliography for full details).6

A potential criticism

of Figures 2.4 and 2.5 is their apparent assum

ption thatactors are entirely rational.H

owever,F

igures 2.6 and 2.7 also take intoaccount irrational decision m

aking.Whether actors cannot calculate w

hat will

be in their best interests,or are applying different psychological yardsticks totheir decision m

aking,the result is the same:their actions w

ill not be entirelypredictable,and they w

ill make m

istakes.7

Of all the conflicts and arm

ed parties studied,only in the case of theInterham

we in R

wanda w

ere no data found on sensitivity to internationalpresence.B

ut this may w

ell be a gap in the data,as none of those interviewed

about the 1994-98 HR

FO

R period had any direct contact w

ith theInterham

we.

8 F

or additional data and analysis see the report of the East T

imor T

ruthC

omm

ission,CA

VR

,available at:http://ww

w.ictj.org/dow

nloads/CA

VR

/12-A

nnexe1-East-T

imor-1999-G

eoffreyRobinson.pdf.

9 A

uthor interview w

ith Hector G

ramajo,cited from

Mahony and E

guren,

Proactive Presence1

56

Unarm

ed Bodyguards

(see Bibliography for full details).

10F

or instance,interviews carried out w

ith Form

erly Abducted C

hildren of theL

ord's Resistance A

rmy (L

RA

) in Uganda revealed im

portant dynamics and

tactics of the LR

A that could help to understand the protection vulnerabilities

of civilians as well as the leadership structures of the organisation.

11In a notable counter-exam

ple,SL

MM

personnel have firm m

anagement

directives to 'get out of the office'.While they are faulted by som

e for lack ofcontact w

ith civil society,they are constantly in touch with both arm

ed parties12

While expressing concern about m

ilitary harassment of a large ID

P cam

p inD

arfur,advocates needed to understand that the combination of guerrilla

infiltration in the camp w

ith the camp's proxim

ity to the region's major airport

was extrem

ely sensitive in military term

s.13

MIC

IVIH

was apparently the only m

ission to provide rudimentary tutoring -

three weeks of classes in H

aitian Kreyol.A

nd UN

AM

ET

was able to recruit

some political officers w

ho spoke Bahasa Indonesian.

14S

ee for example M

ahony and Eguren,U

narmed B

odyguards,or Mahony,S

ideby S

ide(see B


See P

ustyntsev,Making A

llies:Engaging governm

ent officials to advance human

rights(see B


An im

portant caveat for all our results is that our field visit covered onlyN

orth and South D

arfur,as West D

arfur was then declared off-lim

its for non-essential travel.O

ur interview respondents included m

any with experience in

West D

arfur.17

Enhancing the profile of any threatened group or com

munity m

ust of coursebe done in collaboration w

ith that group,taking into account any possiblerisks of reprisal that could be generated by an expanded profile.

18F

or a spirited day-by-day account of the experience of one Australian C

ivilianP

olice Officer in U

NA

ME

T,describing m

any such showdow

ns with

Indonesia militia,m

ilitary and police,see Savage,D

ancing with the D

evil:Apersonal account of policing the E

ast Tim

or vote for independence(see

Bibliography for full details).

Chapter 1

: Why field presence protects

15

7

Proactive Presence1

58

THE CENTRE FOR HUMANITARIAN

DIALOGUE (HD CENTRE)

Working to im

prove the global response to armed conflict

The H

D C

entre is an independent,Geneva-based foundation w

hose purpose is top

revent hu

man

sufferin

g in w

ar.O

ur hu

man

itarian ap

proach starts from

theprem

ise that preventing and resolving armed conflict is the surest m

eans of doingso,and to this end w

e promote and facilitate dialogue betw

een belligerents.W

eare neutral and im

partial,supporting only those solutions that offer the best

prospect for a just and lasting peace,in line with international law

.T

hrough ou

r work,

we aim

to contribu

te to efforts to imp

rove the globalresponse to arm

ed conflict.We believe that dialogue based on hum

anitarian princi-ples can assist in achieving political settlem

ents,and that the informal initiatives of

a private foundation can usefully complem

ent formal diplom

acy.W

epursue our objectives w

ith a comm

itment to new

approaches,to learning,

and to collaboration,working w

ith others across borders,beliefs and professions.

About the author

15

9

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Liam M

aho

nyis

a pioneer in the theory and practice of international protection.H

is experience includes protection work w

ith Peace B

rigades International (PB

I) inG

uatemala in the 1980s,developing training fram

eworks for P

BI,and co-founding

PB

I’s field p

resence in

Haiti.

He is the co-au

thor of:U

narmed B

odyguards:International accom

paniment for the protection of hum

an rights,the first book

analysin

g and

explain

ing the tactic of p

rotective accomp

anim

ent.

Other w

orkincludes editing the K

osovo Report

of the Independent International Com

mission

on Kosovo (O

xford University P

ress,2000).Liam

has been Lecturer in P

ublic andInternational A

ffairs at the Woodrow

Wilson S

chool,Princeton U

niversity,and was

the series editor of 40 monographs on innovations in the hum

an-rights movem

ent– the Tactical N

otebookseries of the N

ew T

actics in Hum

an Rights P

roject.H

isrecent consulting projects include com

missions for the R

ockefeller Foundation,the

World

Cou

ncil of C

hurches,

Am

nesty In

ternation

al,the O

ffice of the High

Com

missioner for H

uman R

ights and the World F

ood Program

me.

Proactive Presence1

60

ACRONYMS AND

ABBREVIATIONS

CO

DH

ES

C

onsultoria para los Perechos H

umanos y el D

esplazamiento

(Council

on Hum

an Rights and D

isplacement),C

olombia

DPA

D

epartment of P

olitical Affairs (U

N)

DP

KO

Departm

ent of Peacekeeping O

perations (UN

)F

AR

C

Fuerzas A

rmadas R

evolucionarias de Colom

bia (Arm

edR

evolutionary Forces of C

olombia)

HR

FO

R

Hum

an Rights M

ission for Rw

anda (UN

)IC

RC

International Com

mittee of the R

ed Cross

IHL

international hum

anitarian lawIN

GO

international NG

OK

VM

K

osovo Verification M

ission (UN

)K

LA

K

osovo Liberation A

rmy

LTT

E

Liberation T

igers of Tam

il Eelam

M

ICIV

IH

International Civilian M

ission in Haiti (U

N/O

AS

)M

INU

GU

A

UN

Mission to G

uatemala

MO

Um

emorandum

of understandingN

GO

non-governm

ent organisationO

AS

Organization of A

merican S

tatesO

CH

A

Office for the C

oordination of Hum

anitarian Affairs (U

N)

OH

CH

R

Office of the H

igh Com

missioner for H

uman R

ights (UN

)O

NU

SA

L

UN

Mission to E

l Salvador

OS

CE

Organisation for S

ecurity and Cooperation in E

uropeS

LM

/A

Sudan L

iberation Movem

ent/Arm

yS

LM

M

Sri L

anka Monitoring M

ission (UN

)P

BI

Peace B

rigades InternationalT

NI

the Indonesian military

UN

U

nited Nations

UN

AM

ET

UN

Assistance M

ission to East T

imor

UN

DP

U

N D

evelopment P

rogramm

eU

NH

CR

UN

High C

omm

issioner for Refugees

UN

ICE

FU

N C

hildren’s Fund

UN

MIS

UN

Mission to S

udanU

NS

C

UN

Security C

ouncil W

FP

W

orld Food P

rogramm

e (UN

)

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