Prison Reform & Privatization: the Case of Illinois

Tristan DiFrancesco

POLS482: Seminar in Public Policy

Philip J. Wood

Monday, April 7th, 2014

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The past four decades have seen an unprecedented global development of neoliberal policy-

making manifested, in part, in the privatization of public services. Despite ‘raggedness’ and uneven

development across space and time, privatization is an expanding trend across many jurisdictions of the

United States prison system.1 In the aggregate, since 1997, the total number of incarcerated persons has

increased less than 16 percent while spending on corrections has increased 72 percent, and new private

prisons increasing relatively to those public.2 However, it appears there is no sufficient factor that can

explain the decision to privatize across state jurisdictions,3 although it has been suggested there may be

determinations outside the scope of conventional empiricist lenses.4 The lack of an adequate

generalizable theory of prison privatization justifies the delving into a particular jurisdiction, in this case

Illinois, to consider the “material in detail, to analyse its different forms of development, [and] to trace

out their inner connection.”5 Perhaps there is utility in seeking both the necessary and sufficient

conditions for the event of privatization to take place, and an understanding the complex process that

lies beneath.

The presence of private interests and actors in Illinois correctional facilities today is limited, and

yet structural factors such as overcrowding, neo-liberal restructuring, and the rise of the political Right

are accelerating forces in Illinois. The great paradox of this case is the inability of for-profit prison

corporations to penetrate this state system despite the presence of those factors. How does Illinois

1 Nossal & Wood. 2004. The Raggedness of Prison Privatization. Queen’s University, Kingston. p.1.

2 Justice Policy Institute. 2011. Gaming the System. Eds. Ashton & Petteruti. Washington, D.C. p.3.

3 Nossal & Wood. Raggedness. 1.

4 Wood, Phil. J. Marx, Method and the Private Prison. Queen’s University, Kingston. p.2.

5 Marx. Capital 1. P.102 in the context of Wood. Marx, Method. 18.

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resist prison privatization when “it is beginning to look more and more like California did a few years

ago[?]”6

On the surface, a single piece of legislation - a 1990 Moratorium passed by the Illinois General

Assembly (GA) - appears to be the legal lynchpin that outlawed the contracting of private companies in

prison operations, and the simple answer is that the ‘New Right’ has receded in every general election

since the 1990s – with the exception of 2010 – which reconciles with the claim that their success may be

a necessary condition for privatization.7 But if we adjust our focus onto the forces behind legislation, it is

clear that many neoliberal structural forces that correspond with privatization in other US jurisdictions

are also salient in Illinois, as are some context-specific elements. Behind the Moratorium, neoliberal

forces are applying constant and opposing pressure to anti-privatization legislation and groups.

Privatization is sweeping Illinois, particularly non-administrative prison services such as healthcare,

providers of which are using the same strategies as the for-profit corporations that still threaten to

circumvent the legal bulwarks.8 Even so, the obstacles to privatization are by no means weak or

irrelevant. A variety of entrenched but potentially ebbing factors appear to preserve Illinois prisons as

public institutions: a mobilized opposition movement, a strong guard union with an interest in

preserving the status quo, and an exceptionally long and unsuccessful experience with private prisons.

A HISTORY OF ILLINOIS PRISONS, 1833-1990.

It is appropriate to begin in the troubled past, for the first prison in Illinois was, in fact, a private

institution. Alton prison was opened in 1833 following the outlawing of public whipping as a method of

disciplinary punishment. The institution was leased to administrators that employed prisoners as

6 Dunn, Jamie. 2013. State of the State. Illinois Issues. May 2013. Web.

7 Nossal & Wood. Raggedness.

8 Justice Policy Institute. Gaming. 4.

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labourers, maintained the property, and operated the facility.9 These operators would sell the products

of prison labour on the open market; the State only collected rent on the property.

By all accounts, life in the prison was bleak, and a number of public servants spoke out on the

conditions and ineffectiveness of Alton. House Representative Dorothea L. Dix addressed the GA in Feb.

1847 to complain about the poor living conditions of prisoners at Alton: there was no chapel, a

dysfunctional hospital, no institutional rehabilitation effort, no supplies for convicts upon release, no

baths or showers, dirt floors, and no dining tables or chairs.10 In 1854, Governor Thomas Ford said that

“in the course of 15 years of experience under the new system, I am compelled to say that crime has

increased out all proportion to the increase in inhabitants.”11 That “new system” appeared to be a

massively expanding for-profit prison complex. From the original 24 cells in Alton, the facility expanded

to 256 cells by 1857, with two inmates per cell. The Alton prisoners were soon moved to the new

“Joliet” prison which, by 1860, at maximum capacity and double-bunking, held 2000 inmates.12 The

Federal government took over the then-vacant Alton facility for use as military reservation and

penitentiary for prisoners of the Civil War.

Originally, the leasing of Joliet was opened for bidding to landlords, as had Alton, and in 1863

the first lease expired and was transferred to one James M. Pitman.13 The state senate investigated the

prison and Pitman following the quick turnover of the lease to Samuel Buckmaster, then-member of the

GA, a transaction deemed illegal. The committee found that Pitman had used bribery to obtain the lease

in 1863, having paid between $5-10k to members of the GA in return for their support, and his

9 Illinois Department of Corrections. 2013. A Short History of Illinois Corrections.

10 IDOC. A Short History.

11 Ibid.

12 Greene, William Robert. 1977. Early Development of the Illinois State Penitentiary System. Web.

13 Senate Journal, 1857. 25 G.A., 3 Sess. 27. Found in: Greene. Early Development. 193.

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accomplices in the effort were found to be Buckmaster and Dr. I.A. Buck, who was himself a penitentiary

commissioner.14 Further testimony before the committee revealed that many state officials, including

then-governor Richard Yates, had known of these conflicts of interest and ignored them. The committee

concluded that “it was not only the right but the duty of the legislature to declare the lease invalid and

resume control of the prison”.15

In 1867 the practice of private administration was fully abolished as “immoral” and the state

took over management, purchasing enormous capital that had been employed therein. The state then

allowed private businesses to employ prisoners in their respective industries, collecting wages on the

prisoners’ behalf and putting it towards maintaining the prison.16 In 1904 that contract system was

finally replaced with prison industries - more internal systems – a move largely at the behest of

organized labour movements that brought prison labour fully within the public sphere and “marked the

end of a long controversy over state responsibility for lawbreakers... A new emphasis on prisoner

welfare and rehabilitation soon made the Illinois penal system a model for the nation”17

This transitional period saw the state eject private actors from the expanding prison industry

and centralizing policy under the Department of Public Welfare; consequently, a number of innovative

reforms took place. The Illinois State Reform School at Pontiac opened in June 1871 as a facility to

rehabilitate first-time offending men under the age of 26.18 The idea was proposed by the Illinois

Teachers Association and would develop into one of the most robust and successful juvenile

14 Greene. Early Development. 194.

15 Ibid.

16 Lohnman, Joseph D. & Long, Harvey L. 1957. A Chronology of Corrections: Illinois. Crime & Delinquency. October

vol. 3 no. 4 p.424-426

17 Greene. Early Development. 195

18 IDOC. Short History.

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rehabilitation programs in the US.19 The program began as a segregation of younger and older offenders

to provide alternative care to each group; on the one hand, emphasizing education was a priority for

juveniles for whom “labour was to be light and serve an educational factor.”20 Probation was

implemented for adults, and women’s facilities were later opened within Joliet.

These changes seemed to reflect genuine attempts to reduce recidivism rates and target young

offenders through novel means; however, they were countervailed by emerging structural issues such as

poor finances and overcrowding. The issue of overcrowding became especially problematic by the

1890s, when the prison population quadrupled: double and triple bunking became commonplace.21

However, by the turn of the century, increased public interest and transparency coincided with further

reforms from 1900-1915, that initially appeared successful. In 1903, inmates between 13 and 15 were

further isolated in what became known as the “George Junior Republic”, which was a sort of self-

governing framework in which the inmates “made rules, elected leaders, and even decided punishments

for their peers.”22 Outside juvenile prisons, reforms were less experimental, focusing instead on

strengthening now-traditional rehabilitative methods such as industrial arts, recreation and library

access, de-emphasizing discipline in favour of reward systems.23 Media coverage and a spree of state

policies brought forth a massive allocation of funds for new prisons in the next three decades.24 State-

19 Greene. Early Development.

20 Pisciotta, Alexander W. 1991. A House Divided: Penal Reform at the Illinois State Reformatory 1891-1915. Crime & Delinquency 37: p.165

21 Pisciotta. House Divided. 173

22 Pisciotta. House Divided. 177.

23 Green. Early Development. 193.

24 'Illinois State Reports. 1872. 27th General Assembly. p. 875. Available in Greene. Early Development. 195.

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sponsored researched showed that recidivism was less than 20% among youth offenders, and

anecdotally low among adults between 1901 and 1906.25

The first half of the twentieth century saw a consolidation of institutions within the state

purview, judicial discretion in sentencing and parole, and what could be called a stable prison regime

under the public administration.26 The Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC) was established to

manage what had become a very large set of public institutions by the 1960s. Governor Richard B.

Ogilvie created the ‘Task Force on Corrections’ in July 22, 1969.27 The group performed research and

policy recommendations in collaboration with the John Howard Association (JHA) and federal

committees, which it ultimately presented to the governor, who in turn established the IDOC that

winter. At the inception of the Department, the Governor spoke out in favour of prison welfare as a

social responsibility under the purview of government:

“We must break the present cycle of arrest, incarceration and release, which in a

majority of cases is repeated over and over again. We are faced with the most difficult

of all tasks—the understanding and changing of human behavior—and we must

approach our job with a full awareness of the failure of past policies… In Illinois we keep

our adult felons incarcerated for periods longer than 45 other states, yet our rate of

recidivism, or return to prison, is one of the highest. We speak of rehabilitation, but we

provide only one vocational officer to every 50 custodial officers at Joliet. We have

given our state a half-way house program and work release programs, but we have not

given a full professional department to administer these programs… The threat to our

25 Follows 1900 pp.141-58

26 Lohnman, Joseph & Long. Chronology of Corrections.

27 IDOC. Short History.

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people and our institutions is not of the future—it is a clear and present danger. It must

be met with all the skills, the tools, the financial backing and the dedication we can

summon to the task. With your help, this administration will take the first vital steps

which this present danger demands.”28

Indeed, the effectiveness of the public system was not comparatively high at that time. As the

pressure to privatize grew through the 1970s and 80s, the Private Correctional Facility Moratorium Act

was drafted and passed into law in 1990, banning the sale or purchase to a private entity of property or

contracts for the purpose of running a prison.29 Some services and subcontracting remained legal until

amendments made in 2002 and 2011 that respectively extended the ban to local jails and most services.

Significantly, this band was not extended to inmate healthcare, which would blossom into a billion-dollar

industry today.

MODERN ILLINOIS PRISONS

In the past twenty years, there has been a spree of privatization in many areas of the Illinois

economy: the Chicago Skyway, the city’s parking meter system and several downtown parking garages

have been privatized; Rod Blagojevich attempted to privatize the State Lottery, as well as state

tollways.30 Yet prisons remain curiously immune to the spread of ‘market solutions’ amidst protracted

economic crisis at the state level. Pressure to privatize remains intense, and even though for-profit

prison firms such as the Corrections Corporation of America (CCA) and GEO Group have so far failed to

28 Illinois Department of Corrections. 1970. First Annual Report. Cited in IDOC. Short History.

29 Illinois General Assembly. 1990. Private Correctional Facility Moratorium Act.

30 Hellman, Nathan. 2010. Privatization spree can’t touch Illinois prisons. Medill Reports. Chicago.

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penetrate the jurisdiction, their peers have employed similar strategies to considerable self-enrichment,

just as systemic issue in the DOC bear down upon the status quo.31

Perhaps more telling are the main factors that resist privatization: a strong guard union and

mobilized, outspoken public interest groups. By examining the engagement of these opposing forces

over the process of privatization, this section is intended to illustrate the present conditions that,

through subsequent inter-jurisdictional comparison, may hold some explanatory power. First, the

systemic issues facing Illinois prisons will be discussed and then the salient groups and countervailing

interests will be examined.

SYSTEMIC PROBLEMS

Conditions in most of the forty-eight prisons under the IDOC are far from idyllic today: hunger

strikes have taken place in four of the state facilities, and in 2012 a lawsuit emerged on behalf of

inmates at Vienna Correctional Facility regarding “inhumane” conditions.32 In Vandalia, from which

pending lawsuits have also emerged, prisoners are estimated to have 33 square feet each in their

prisons and cells (state law requires 50), and they are given three hours or less of exercise time each

week.33

Capacity is well beyond its limits, for as of August 2012, IDOC housed almost 50 percent more

inmates than it was designed to hold.34 Many minimum and medium security facilities housed more

than 100 percent beyond their design capacity”35 Additionally, over the past decade, Illinois’ elderly

31 Justice Policy Institute. Gaming. 3.

32 Rushton, Bruce. 2012. State sued over prison conditions. Illinois Times. Thursday, June 28, 2012.

33 Ibid.

34 Hellman. Privatization spree.

35 John Howard Association. 2010. Unasked Question, Unintended Consequences: Fifteen Findings and

Recommendations on Illinois’ Prison Healthcare System. Chicago, IL.

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prison population grew by more than 300 percent, and proportionally, as overall incarcerations have

only increased by 40 percent.36 This aging population has no doubt put additional strain on the private

inmate healthcare system, which amidst allegations of malpractice and denial-of-service has been

litigated against no less than 250 times since the 1980s.37

It has been suggested that if Illinois fails to provide adequate health care for prisoners, it could

face sanctions similar to California, where, following a U.S. Supreme Court ruling in 2011, the state was

ordered to cut its prison population by 30,000 inmates. The ruling found that the overcrowded

conditions in California’s prison system violated prisoners’ constitutional rights because the system

“equaled cruel and unusual punishment” and “focused on the degradation of the prison system’s health

care and mental health care.”38 Time will tell.

GROUPS & INTERESTS

PUBLIC INTEREST GROUPS

Perhaps the most prominent prison-affiliated interest group is the John Howard Association, the

very same group that Governor Ogilvie collaborated with in the design of the IDOC. The JHA is a non-

profit organization inspired by the eponymous English immigrant and prison reform activist. The group

has independently monitored conditions in Illinois prisons since 1901, and they now operate in 33 other

states. According to a February 2005 interview with various board members and volunteers, advocacy

organizations like JHA have dwindled.39 Even so, the JHA continues to publish both empirical studies of

36 Rushton. Privatization spree.

37 Dunn. State of the State.

38 Ibid.

39 Cross, Cenabeth. 2005. The John Howard Association. We the People Media. Web.

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prison conditions and make normative arguments regarding relevant public policy, particularly detailing

of the shortcomings of both public and privately administered services.40

The Illinois Coalition of Immigrants and Refugee Rights (ICIRR) is a coalition of over 130 activist

groups that represents individuals and families of migrant workers, immigrants and refugees who face

legal issues or imprisonment.41 When CCA began lobbying the village of Crete in order to gain permission

to construct a new private facility to house immigration offenders on behalf of US Immigrations and

Customs Enforcement, ICIRR cooperated with Crete residents in an outspoken campaign to defeat the

council vote on the matter, can effort that was ultimately successful.42 However, CCA has moved on to a

new proposal to build in the now-defunct Joliet prison lot in Cook County; a move that has met

equivalent public outcry, with help from ICIRR.

THE GUARD UNION

The American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees (AFSCME) represents

Illinois prison guards through Council 31, among some 70 000 other Illinois public servants.43 The Union

is one of the largest in the United States, with more than 1.5 million members. Despite the poor

condition that many prisons and prisoners appear to be, prison guards are actually benefitting from low

staff-to-inmate ratios. The incentive lies in that due to overcrowding there is high demand for guard

labour, while comprehensive unionization has restricted supply, ensuring ample hours and

compensation for those who are willing to work overtime. In 2012, some workers with annual wages of

40 JHA. Unasked Questions.

41 Illinois Coalition for Immigrant and Refugee Rights. About ICIRR. Web.

42 Equal Voice News. 2013. Illinois’ Cook Country Condemns Private Prison Effort. Web.

43 AFSCME. 2014. Organizational History. Web.

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$50-60 000 dollars reported making nearly $100 000 due to overtime.44 While overcrowding and poor

quality of care have likely made Illinois prisons less safe for guards – and certainly for inmates - there is

unsurprisingly little appetite for privatization, at least materially: essentially all of the $61M in Illinois

GA campaign contributions since 1990 have gone to Democrats.45 A spokesman for Illinois chapter of the

AFSCME, was quoted saying that “it is not about union influence, but what is best for prisons… Private

prisons are banned in Illinois and other states because the privatization of public safety is bad policy, a

private prison operator does not have safety as its first priority.”46

CORPORATIONS

Part of the rationale informing public opposition to privatization are a number of empirical

studies that show private prisons to be comparatively detrimental to both guard and inmate welfare.47

Furthermore, there is clearly an incentive for private prison corporations to not only expand demand by

influencing legislation that increases incarceration rates, but also to reduce costs by providing services

to inmates at the cheapest possible rate,48 because like environmental costs, neoliberal economics

makes little provisions for the social costs of mass incarceration as anything more than “externalities”.

Corporations exert influence on legislation in three ways: lobbying, direct campaign

contribution, and building relationships, networks and associations.49 It has been noted that private

44 Yeagle, Patrick. 2012. “Senate votes to widen ban on private prisons” Illinois Times. Aril 5, 2012

45 Centre for Responsive Politics. AFSCME Affiliates. Web.

46 Hellman. Privatization spree.

47 Adler School Institute on Public Safety and Social Justice; Illinois Coalition for Immigrant and Refugee Rights.

2011. White Paper on Broken Logic: The Over-Reliance on Incarceration in the United States. Chicago, IL; JHA.

Unasked Questions; Donahue, John D. 1988. Prisons for Profit: Public Justice, Private Interest. Economic Policy

Institute; JPI. Gaming.

48 JPI. Gaming. 3.

49 Ibid.

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prison companies support incumbents who win elections, regardless of party, although CCA and GEO

Group, the two largest for-profit prison corporations, overwhelmingly support Republicans.50 Beyond

the material, there are also ‘softer’ methods of influence:

“With former employees in positions within state and federal administrations, private

prison companies have been able to gain access to the executive branch. In order to

build relationships with the legislative branch, these firms have become active members

of associations that include policymakers and are involved in formulating new policies.

In this way, private prison companies have been able to insert their own agenda into the

process of drafting new legislation that strengthens their bottom line.”51

Corrections Corporation of America

CCA, the largest private prison operator in the United States, is present in Illinois only the

solicitation for new business. A federal immigration detention center contract was proposed to be built

in the town of Crete by US Immigration and Customs Enforcement, but failed after village council shot

down the proposal with help from ICIRR.52 Having brought in $1.67 Billion revenue in 2010 - an increase

of 88 percent in less than a decade - CCA is rapidly expanded outside the state, but they are still clawing

into Illinois. In 2012 alone, CCA’s known efforts to lobby federal and state legislation included firms such

as: Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld, receiving $220,000; Mehlman Vogel Castagnetti Inc., receiving

$280,000; McBee Strategic consulting receiving $320,000; and CCA in-house expenditures of $970,000 in

lobbying for 2012.53 In Illinois, as of 2013 CCA employs seven lobbyists, four of them exclusively, to

50 Bender, Edwin. 2000. Private Prisons, Politics & Profits. Web.

51 JPI. Gaming. 28.

52 NWI Times. 2012. Crete Village Board Rejects Detention Facility. Web.

53 Carson, Laura. 2013. Meet the Private Prison Lobby. Counterpunch. March 14, 2012. Web.

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“lobby general assembly members on issues of economic development”, and Akin Gump Strauss Hauer

& Field has been actively working in-state since 2002.54 Due to disclosure laws, only the associations and

general intentions of lobbyists are made public; however, the explicit policy of the CCA to influence

legislation - that which favours increased incarceration rates and removing barriers to privatization - was

published in CCA’s 2010 Annual Report:

“The demand for our facilities and services could be adversely affected by the relaxation of

enforcement efforts, leniency in conviction or parole standards and sentencing practices or

through the decriminalization of certain activities that are currently proscribed by our criminal

laws. For instance, any changes with respect to drugs and controlled substances or illegal

immigration could affect the number of persons arrested, convicted, and sentenced, thereby

potentially reducing demand for correctional facilities to house them. Legislation has been

proposed in numerous jurisdictions that could lower minimum sentences for some non-violent

crimes and make more inmates eligible for early release based on good behavior. Also,

sentencing alternatives under consideration could put some offenders on probation with

electronic monitoring who would otherwise be incarcerated. Similarly, reductions in crime rates

or resources dedicated to prevent and enforce crime could lead to reductions in arrests,

convictions and sentences requiring incarceration at correctional facilities.”55

GEO Group

The GEO Group operates a variety of other private care facilities such as rehabilitation and elder

care in addition to full-scale prison administration. GEO operates 118 correctional facilities, 80 600 beds

in the US, Australia, South Africa, and the United Kingdom. American prisons contribute 60 percent of

54 Illinois Secretary of State. Lobbyists Search. Web.

55 CCA Annual Report 2010. Available in JPI. Gaming. 5.

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the corporation’s revenue, and is revenue was estimated to be approximately $842 million in 2010. GEO

Group has two facilities in Illinois, which provide private treatment in “criminal thinking errors, cognitive

and behavioral changes… emotional and academic programming such as individual counseling, group

counseling, character education, goal planning and interpersonal skills training.”56 The high volume of

litigation regarding the existing supported in-part by groups like JHA, was noted in 2011 as a disincentive

by GEO executives in public transcripts of strategy conference calls on investment in Illinois.57

Wexford Health Sources and a Case of the ‘Revolving Door’

The most significant private element of Illinois prisons is the provision of inmate healthcare,

which in 2010 was contracted exclusively to Wexford Health Sources in a $1.36 billion 10-year contract,

having performed the majority of services since the 1990s. That figure represents a state expenditure

equivalent of nearly $3000 per inmate, per annum based on the latest DOC population statistics.58 Even

so, the state has faced an estimated 250 lawsuits related to prison quality-of-healthcare in the past 20

years.59 The previous period of work by Wexford was controversially unaudited by the state, and there is

no public record of how any money was spent before 2010. However, following the introduction of bill

HR57 - which passed the general assembly unanimously last May, but has yet to go through the senate -

an audit of all IDOC healthcare facilities must take place in the next three years. The contract has been

finalized.

Wexford itself has contracted four firms through which it channels campaign contributions and

has done so in the last six election cycles, in addition to ongoing legislative lobbying through public

56 GEO Group. 2014. Woodbridge Interventions. Web.

57 GEO group, The. 2012. Q2 2012 GEO group inc. earnings conference call - final. Fair Disclosure Wire. 2012, Aug

08. Web.

58 IDOC. Annual Report. 18

59 Dunn. State of the State. Web.

16

affairs firm Stricklin & Associates, among others.60 The founder of Stricklin, David Stricklin, was formerly

the chief of staff of Rod Blagojovich while he served as a Democratic Member of the House of

Representatives. 61 In 2003, Blagovich was elected Governor of Illinois; Stricklin departed and became a

lobbyist, found Stricklin & Associates in 2005, and immediately started lobbying on behalf of Wexford.

Blagojovich, who had employed Stricklin for three years, was then only halfway through his first term as

head of a Democrat-dominated GA; his second term would be cut short when he was impeached on

charges of corruption in January 2009, and he soon begin a 12-year prison term. He was succeeded by

Pat Quinn, his running mate in both elections, who was then duly elected to a full term in 2010 and saw

the successful passage of Wexford’s contract in 2011.62

CONCLUSIONS

The valence of certain factors in a comparative sense is only realized alongside equal

concentration on other cases. For now, in light of the significant activism and political mobilization of

non-profits and the guard union in Illinois, perhaps future comparative analysis of should place more

focus on the factors that resist privatization. While a new private facility in Illinois could simply hire non-

unionized workers, existing institutions are foisted with the AFSCME, which through the same avenues

of influence manipulated by corporations has integrated itself deeply within Illinois bureaucracy.

Perhaps union ‘strength’ is equal and opposite to corporations; they appear to have similar access to the

legislature. Then again, perhaps a comparative empirical perspective is an inadequate framework for

understanding historical trends as general as neoliberalism, globalization, etc. At least in Illinois, the

supposedly necessary ‘rise of the New Right’ has not occurred; however, if privatization is considered a

60 Secretary of State. Lobbysist Search.

61 Centre for Responsive Politics. Opensecrets.org. Web.

62 Tareen, Sophia. 2012. Feds Buy Thomson Prison for $165 Million. CBS Local.

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process, and not an event, then the structural elements – overcrowding, neoliberal restructuring and

organized political power of corporations and their allies – are all present and active.

In Illinois, the behaviour of Wexford Health Services reconciles within the “triangle of private

prison political influence,” and although the value of their 10-year contract in totally is approximately

equal to CCA’s revenue in 2010 alone, 63 Wexford contracts to over 100 other state-owned prison

facilities across the US. As a private firm its financial status is not publicly available, 64 but the implication

is powerful: even non-administrative privatization is profitable, aggressive, corrupt and deeply

problematic.

Finally, the history of privatization in Illinois remains significant because it illuminates a process

of penal reform in motion since 1833. There are obvious connections with the initial spurt of

privatization and today; the recurring issues of overcrowding and fiscal crisis driving prison policy, and a

defensive legislature and engaged non-profits. But to draw general or causal historical patterns may be

premature without a stronger foundation. This paper should merely serve to enrich a material

understanding of particular conditions and relations in Illinois: only one segment of an empirical base

from which abstraction and transhistorical meaning can emerge.

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