PreviouslybyA.S.DulatandAdityaSinha

Kashmir:TheVajpayeeYears(2015)

PreviouslybyAdityaSinha

TheCEOWhoLostHisHead(2017)DeathofDreams:ATerrorist’sTale(2000)

FarooqAbdullah:Kashmir’sProdigalSon(1996)

ForthcomingfromAsadDurrani

PakistanAdrift:NavigatingTroubledWaters(2018)

THESPYCHRONICLES

RAW,ISIandtheIllusionofPeace

A.S.Dulat,AsadDurraniandAdityaSinha

Tomylateparents,ShamsherandRaj,whospentmanyjoyoushoursplayingbridgewithtwosuccessiveHighCommissionersofPakistaninIndia:SyedFida

Hussain,myfather’sformerICScolleague,andAbdulSattar.

—A.S.Dulat

Toallthefacelessagentswhotakegreatrisksintheserviceoftheircountry.

—AsadDurrani

Tomyparents,NeelamandChandreshwarNarainSinha,who,inEnglandduring1965-71,werebestfriendswithGulshanandNazirHussain,immigrantsfrom

Lahore.

—AdityaSinha

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ContentsPreface

Introduction

I:SETTINGTHESTAGE

‘Evenifweweretowritefiction,noonewouldbelieveus’

TheAccidentalSpymaster

BrotherhoodtotheRescue

II:THESECONDOLDESTPROFESSION

Pakistan’sDeepState

ISIVsRAW

TheCIAandOtherAgencies

TheIntelligenceDialogues

III:KASHMIR

StatusQuo

TheCoreK-word

AmanullahGilgiti’sDreamsofIndependence

Kashmir:TheModiYears

TheUnlovedDrFarooqAbdullah

TakeWhatYouCanGet

IV:KABUKI

IndiaandPakistan:‘Almost’Friends

LonelyPervezMusharraf

Modi’sSurpriseMoves

TheDovalDoctrine

TheHardliners

BB,MianSahebandAbbasi

GoodVibrations,India-Pakistan

V:THEFLASHPOINTS

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HafizSaeedand26/11

KulbhushanJadhav

TalksandTerror

SurgicalStrike

ThePoliticsofWar

VI:NEWGREATGAME

TheDealforOsamabinLaden

SelfishSelf-interestsinAfghanistan

DonaldTrump,Nudger-in-chief

Pakistan’sPal,Putin

VII:LOOKINGAHEAD

ForgeStructureorBreakIce?

CouncilofSpies

AkhandBharatConfederationDoctrine

DeewangiKhatam

Notes

Index

AbouttheBook

AbouttheAuthors

Copyright

Ifonlysomehowyoucouldhavebeenmine,whatwouldnothavebeenpossibleintheworld?

—AghaShahidAli,‘TheCountrywithoutaPostOffice’

Preface

Inthededication,A.S.DulatandIhaveeachmentionedIndia-Pakistanfriendshipsthatweredeepand,sillyasitmaysound,beautiful.Itisagrowingfearthatintheage of shouting heads on TV and hyper-nationalistic NRIs, we are reminiscingaboutabygoneera.Allhopeisnotlost—myelderdaughterwasbestfriendswithaKarachi-iteduringherundergraduateyearsatNewYorkUniversity.Onthewhole,however,sheseemspartofashrinkingminority,andawindowofopportunityforgoodwillbetweenthepeopleofthetwonationsmaybeclosing.Itistokeepthatwindowopen,andshowthatthroughthewindowonemayseeendlesspossibilities,thatthisbookwaswritten.

The hostilities that are ceasefire violations across the Line of Control eruptoccasionally, but the norm is of long periods of peace. Similarly, armed conflictbetweenIndiaandPakistanhasbrokenouton fouroccasions in their71yearsofindependence.Eventheproxywarofterrorismischaracterisedbyintenseburstsofviolencethatoccasionallypunctureeverydaypeace.

Thecoldwarbetweennations,conductedbytheirspyagencies, iscontinuous,however.Thereisnolet-up.Therearenouniforms,orcounter-measuresthatforceterroriststooptforsofttargets.Spiesandtheirnetworkslive24x7liesatgreatriskto themselves. They are a last line of defence. If a Kargil happens, then it isultimatelyattributedtointelligencefailure.Terrorismisseenasaslippagethroughaninvisiblenetputupbytheagencies.Wariseitherpursuedoravertedmainlyduetointelligenceefforts.

Thearmy’sInter-ServicesIntelligence(ISI)directoratehasbeenPakistan’smainintelligenceagencysinceimmediatelyafterindependence.Thecabinetsecretariat’sResearchandAnalysisWing(RAW),founded50yearsagoasofSeptember2018,wascreatedoutofIndia’sIntelligenceBureau(IB)duetoperceivedfailuresofthe1962 and 1965 wars with China and Pakistan, respectively. Due to Pakistan’sunique history, the ISI has gained a larger-than-life aura, often seen in India asPakistan’sDeep State. TheRAWhas a similarly sinister image, if not among itsowncitizensthenatleastamongthoseacrossthewesternborder.

This book brings together two men who each had a stint at heading theirrespectiveagencies.Assuch,theyhavebeenprivytotheirnation’sgreatestsecrets—whethertheyrelatetosecretagentsplacedinsensitiveforeignlocations,nuclearweaponry, strategic intelligence, or secret liaison with foreign agencies andgovernments.Theyarethekeepersoftheirnation’sdarkmatter.

Indians and Pakistanis keep trying to talk to one another. Politicians and

diplomatsspeaktotheircounterparts;peaceniksexchangenotes; sportsmensharelocker-roomchat;andbusinessmendroolovereachother’smarkets.This isopen.Spychiefs rarely talk toeachother—youcanbecertain that the spiesneverdo—thoughtherehavebeenoccasionswhentheirgovernmentshavedirectedthemtodo so. In the last two decades, some former spychiefs have come together toexchangeviewsinTrack-IIdialogues.Buttheyhaveneverspokenopenly.

Asthetwospymasterssay,theyareawareofthestakes.Whattheysaytoeachother,aroundatable,theirguardsdown,countsforsomething.Theirconversationgoes to the heart of the India-Pakistan relationship; a deep dive into the DeepState,ifyouwill.

ThisbookwasDulat’ssuggestionaftertheencouragingsuccessofthe2015bookweco-wrote,Kashmir:TheVajpayeeYears. Since he andDurrani had earlier co-authoredtwopapers,hisideawastofollowthatformat.ChikiSarkar,thepublisheratJuggernautBooks,suggestedtomethattoreachawideraudienceaswellastomake it an interesting read, it ought to be in a dialogue format. She pulledHitchcock/Truffautoutofherlivingroomlibraryasanexample.Itwasawinningsuggestion,inmyopinion.

AfterDulatgotDurranionboard,theyenlistedthehelpofPeterJones,oftheUniversityofOttawa’sCentreforInternationalPolicyStudies.HehelmstheTrack-II‘IntelDialogue’betweenIndiaandPakistan,andhegraciouslyagreedtohostmeat themeetings in Istanbul (May24-26,2016)andBangkok(February1-3,2017and October 28-30, 2017), so that we could spend a couple of days after theofficialengagementtoproducematerialforthisbook.Therewasameetingthatwedidonourown inKathmandu,Nepal (March25-29,2017), thoughSudheendraKulkarnioftheObserverResearchFoundation,anardentsupporteroftheprojectthroughout,offeredtofacilitate.

These meetings produced a total of over 1.7 lakh words. The manuscriptpreparedforpublicationwashalfthatsize.Thetranscriptshadalotofspontaneityand the two former chiefs got into the spirit of each discussion; I have tried toretainthattoneinthemanuscript,despitethesecondthoughtsofeachparticipantatdifferentpoints.IhavealsoattemptedtoprovidetheflowingliterarystylethatDrFarooqAbdullahtoldmeheadmiredmostaboutKashmir:TheVajpayeeYears.

UnlikeKashmir:TheVajpayeeYears,whichwasessentiallyDulat’snarrativeandthus demanded to be read chronologically, this conversation between Dulat,Durraniandmyselfcanalsobereaddifferently:thatis,onemayreadchaptersorsectionsoutoforderor inisolation,anddriftbackandforththroughthebookasonefancies.Thechoiceisthereader’s.

In acknowledgement, mention must go to Krishan Chopra, who seized the

projectwithbothhandsanddidnot letgo;Siddhesh Inamdar,whoput inmuchefforttoproducethisbook;myfriendsMayankTewari,whoatdifficultmomentsreminded me that Philip Roth would have treated this project as ‘material’, V.Sudarshan,whoremindedmethatthisprojectwasanenviablejournalisticexercise,andP.Krishnakumar,whogavemeagigatMid-Daywhichwasinvaluableinmoreways than one; and of course my spouse, Bonita Baruah, whom I regard as mybetter51percent.

AdityaSinha

NewDelhi,India

March2018

Introduction

Pointingtothehorizonwheretheseaandskyarejoined,hesays,‘Itisonlyanillusionbecausetheycan’treallymeet,butisn’titbeautiful,thisunionwhichisn’treallythere.’

—SaadatHasanManto

Kaashkehumdosthote.

GeneralAsadDurraniandIhavegelledeversincewemetataTrack-IIdialoguenamedafterThailand’sChaoPhrayaRiver.Itwasheldintheaftermathof26/11,inthewakeofWesternapprehensionofwhatmaycometopass.Whoknows,ifamadmanwasincontrolwecouldallstillbeblowntokingdomcome,inrevengefor1971oreven1947.

GeneralSahebhasbeenafriend.Hisstraightforwardnessisstriking.Thereisnobullshit;forhimaspadeisalwaysaspade,whichisattimesdisappointingforme.Hehasneverhesitatedtospeakuporrenderhelp.

WhenPrimeMinisterNarendraModiwaspreparingtotaketheoathofofficein2014, two notables from Srinagar called and suggested that Pakistan’s primeminister,MianNawazSharif,beinvited.Theysaidhewaskeentocome.Sinceitwas early days, people in high places were prepared to listen, so I passed themessage along.Therewas excitement in government, but the bigwigswanted anassurancethatMianSahebwouldcomeifinvited.

Toconfirm,IfirstcalledaseniordiplomatinPakistan.Hisadvicewastonotriskit, because Nawaz Sharif might not be allowed to come to India. Somewhatdisappointed I called the General. His response was unequivocal; there was noreasonforNawazSharifnottocome.GeneralsinPakistanaregenerallyright,andmoresoAsadDurrani.

OurwivesmetatoneoftheTrack-IImeetingsonKashmir,heldinDecember2015ataDeadSearesortinJordan.MywifeParanandtheBegumarepolesapart.ParanenjoysanoccasionalsmokewiththeGeneralwhereastheBegumapprovesofneithersmokingnordrinking.Yettheygotalonglikeahouseonfire.Incidentally,at the same meeting, the Pakistanis enquired whether there was any hope offorward movement between India and Pakistan. I stuck my neck out and saidsomething should happen soon. Lo and behold, we were in Abu Dhabi onChristmasDayonourwayhomewhenwe learnt thatModiji haddropped in atLahore.Sincethen,however,theprocesshasgonenowhere.

If it’sanyconsolation,Pakistanis inabiggermessthanweare.ThemanIndiaput its faith in,Nawaz Sharif, is likely to be kept out of power (alongwith hisfamily)bythemilitarywhenthenextelectionsareheld,likelyinAugust2018;the

military’spreferredchoiceisthecurrentPM,ShahidKhaqanAbbasi,whomMianSahebhadhandpickedtoreplacehim.

InanyIndia-Pakistanconversation,Kashmirwillinevitablycomeup.InJanuary2018,duringmyannualpilgrimagetoGoa,ImetaKashmiriinatailoringshop.HetoldmethatKashmirwantedindependence.

‘Whateverfor?’Ienquired.

‘Howwouldyouexpectme to react if youwalked intomy shop and slappedme?’hesaid.

That’s what the security forces do in Kashmir. Anyone can be stopped andbeaten,heclaimed.Theslightestprotestorstone-peltingleadstoteargasandpelletguns.Kashmirremainsontheboil:theLineofControl(LoC)andborderaremorevolatilethanusualandquestionsarebeingraisedaboutthegovernment’smuscularpolicy.

AreformedmilitantwhohadflirtedwiththeLashkar-e-ToibavisitedmemorerecentlyandspokeofthethreatofincreasingradicalismintheValley.HesaidtheyouthinSouthKashmirpreparedformartyrdomandhadnoconcernforPakistanastheybelievedtheywerefightingforAllah.AsformerPakistanForeignSecretaryRiaz Mohammad Khan acknowledged, the 2008 Mumbai terrorist attack didirreparabledamagetotheKashmiricauseandtarnishedIslamabad’simageaswell.Pakistanhadbeenoutofitsincethen,untilwebroughtthembackintothepicturein2016.

Themilitant,whonowresemblesaprofessormorethanaterrorist,warnedthatthe Jamaat-e-Islami, once with pockets only in Sopore, Shopian, Kulgam andPulwama,wasnowomnipresent in radicalising theyouth. Ithadmade inroads inthe state government and infiltrated the J&K Police as well. The central jail inSrinagarwas thehubof radical indoctrination,he said frompersonal experience.Militancy was a thriving industry, where everyone was someone with a vestedinterestinthestatusquo—exceptthatthestatusquoisneverstatic.TheKashmiriswhocravepeaceliveinfearofthenextexplosion,notknowingwhereorwhenitwillhappen.WhatachangethisisfromthetimewhenSrinagarwasacityofgreatstyle,fromthe1960stotheearly’80s.

ThesituationinKashmir,likeourrelationshipwithPakistan,isgoingnowhere.It waits for another Vajpayee. Could General Pervez Musharraf and Dr FarooqAbdullah,sharingmanysimilarities,givenanopportunity,havefoundasolutionontheLoC?KashmiriscravepeacebuttherecanbenopeaceorforwardmovementinKashmirsolongaswekeeprelatingittoelectionselsewhereinthecountry,justaswedoinourrelationshipwithPakistan.WeneedtotalktoPakistanasmuchasweneedtoengagewithKashmir.AsChiefMinisterMehboobaMuftisaidinthestate

assemblyinFebruary2018,withtheriskofbeingcalledanti-national,thereisnoalternative to engagement with Pakistan. Or, as the old Kashmiri communistMohammedYousufTarigamisaid,seekinga‘securitysolution’toafundamentallypoliticalproblemwillnotsucceed.

Findingawayoutofanymessrequiresawillingnesstolisten.ItconnectsustoKashmirandtoourselvesaswell.Butwearesocaughtupinthenoisearoundusthat very fewhave the time to listen. Sentiments at times aremore illuminatingthanfacts.EmpathyisthekeytounderstandingKashmir.

I have learntmuch fromTrack-II, including the similarities betweenKashmir,AfghanistanandBalochistan.NotedPakistaniauthorAhmedRashidoncesaidthatif Kashmir were resolved, Afghanistan would be a cakewalk. At one of ourmeetings,RustomShahMohmand,aPakistanibureaucrat,diplomat,andagemofa humanbeing, remarked that Pakistan needed to put its ownhouse in order inBalochistanbeforefindingfaultwithIndiainKashmir.

Surprisingasitmaysound,IwasashappyleavingthePrimeMinister’sOfficein2004as Iwas joining it in2001,eventhoughthesewereby farmybestyears ingovernment.Yes,therewasatingeofsadnessatleavingtheRAWjustwhenIwasbeginningtoenjoyit;17monthsisnotenoughforachief.Buttherearesomanyworlds,somuchtodo.Retirementisthebeginningnottheendoflife.Whocouldhave imagined I could even become an author in the bargain?As someone said,there is no pleasure in having nothing to do; the fun is in having lots to do anddoingnothing.

Having lived more than my life of secrecy, spookiness still clings to me. AKashmirifriend,notknowingwehadshiftedresidencetoDefenceColonyinDelhi,dropped in and enquired if this was my ‘new safe house’. Pakistani friends stilldon’tbelievethatmyonlye-mailIDismywife’s.Andmywifetellsallherfriendsthat you can never get thewhole truth out of this spook.A ‘cover story’ is stillusefulattimes.

WhentheideaofajointprojectwasfirstmootedbyPeterJonesatoneofourTrack-IImeetingsinIstanbul,theGenerallaughedandsaidnobodywouldbelieveusevenifwewrotefiction.Wehavetriedtostayasclosetothetruthaswebelieveit to be even if some of it is regarded as fiction. The reality is that there arenormallymorethantwosidestomoststories.Truthisakaleidoscope.

Iknowtherewillbepeopleinthefraternitywhowillsayhowdidtheseswinesgetsochummy:whowasworkingforwhom?Afterallwehaveeachbeenapartoflicensedskulduggeryoneitherside.

Noteveryonewillagreewithwhatwehavesaid,possiblynobody.Buttheeffortherehasbeen tomake some senseof the India-Pakistan conundrum in thehope

thatsanitywillsomedayprevail.

Ihaveoftenbeenlabelledanoptimist.Ifso,it’sonlyawayoflifeandIhavenoregrets,orasGeneralSahebsays,hedoesn’tgiveadamn.AllIcansayit’sbeenagreatlife.AsMarkTwainputsit,goodfriends,goodbooksandasleepyconscience:thisistheideallife.Andthis,Ibelieve,ishowtheGeneralandIhavegoneaboutit,eventhoughheismuchmoreofarealist.

Finally,thisprojectcouldneverhavetakenoffwithoutourfriend,philosopherandguide,AdityaSinha.

A.S.Dulat

NewDelhi,India

March2018

IwasbornanIndian—therewasnoPakistanthen.Rawalpindi,mybirthplaceandnow the headquarters of the Pakistan Army in which I served for over threedecades, iswhere I liveafter retirement.WhenBritish Indiawasdivided, IwasaschoolgoingkidinSheikhupura,acitythatfellonthePakistaniside.Iwassparedthe horrors of theGreatDivide, except for a brief glimpsewhenwe visited ourrelatives inDelhiduring summervacation in1947.The riots forcedus to returnpost-haste, but strangely I have nomemories of the journey backhome. Itmusthavebeenoneoftheluckytrainsthatgotaway.

OnechangeIrecallfromsoonafterPartitionwastheabsenceofamatka.Theshop halfway to schoolwherewe often stopped to sipwater had a new owner.Unlike hisHindu predecessor, he had no use for the pitcher that contained theelixiroflife.Thenextepisodetoremindmethattheworstwasnotyetoverwaswhen we moved fromMatka to Mucca. I can’t remember what caused tensionbetweentherecentlydissectedtwinssometimein1950,butIdorememberthatourprimeministerrespondedbyraisinga fist—whichbecameknownas ‘Liaqat’sMucca’. Throughout those years, though the Kashmir issue was simmeringsomewhereinthebackground,thestudyofhistoryinourschoolswasmostlyaboutthegloryoftheMuslimruleinIndia.Littlesurprisethatitledtosomefascinationwiththeseatofpower,bothpoliticalandspiritual:broadlytheregionboundedbyDelhi,AgraandAjmer.Anylinkwithoureasternneighbourthuscontinuedtobefollowedwithgreatinterest.

I grewupwatching Indianmovies; even knew all the great names from showbusinessbased in ‘Bombay’,anamethatstill soundsmorefamiliar thanMumbai.Indeed,ittooksometimebeforesomeoneexplainedtomewhyMuslimactorslikeDilip Kumar andMeena Kumari had to take non-Muslim names. Episodes thatdealt with the Mughal period were generally watched with nostalgia. But my

memories of those earlier years were more influenced by the sporting scene.Cricket duelswere keenly listened to, as radio commentarywas the onlyway tofollowthem.Butunlikepresenttimes,thesewerenotamatteroflifeanddeath.

In a test match in Montgomery—now Sahiwal—where we had a world-classstadium, an Indianbatsman, SanjayManjrekar,was the crowd’s favourite. In thesame city, when it hosted the National Games, the Indian Punjab was alsorepresented.AftertheeventsomeSikhsdroppedintoseemyfather,whoatthattimewasinchargeofCentralJail.Theycametogetafewdurrees(cottonwovencarpets)—the place was famous for this product—and pleaded for immediatedelivery so that these could be taken as personal baggage—let’s say ‘duty free’.Overtimethelegaciesofthepasthadtobeshedbecausetherealpolitikoverrode.

Imayhave joined thearmy in1959becauseAyubKhanhadputschedonlyayear earlier, or because the girls in Government College Lahore, where I wasstudying,clearlyfanciedthosewhoshowedoffinuniform.ButafterIdid,itturnedoutthatIhadtoappearmoreoftenincombatthaninmyformeralmamater.

Whiletrainingforwar,weweretaughtthatthoughwehadtofightbetterthanourlargeradversary,butmustalsokeepinmindthatourenemytoowasdoinghisdutyforhiscountry.Andwhenwesawthatbothinthe1965and1971wars,theIndian and the Pakistani armies deliberately spared non-combatants—fightinggentlemanlywars,inotherwords—mutualrespectamongstthetwomilitarieswasreinforced—but so did the belief that our countries were not likely to becomefriends anytime soon. Post-’71, even within the uniformed clans—despiteprofessionalcorrectness—theassessmentoftheantagonistbecamehard-nosed,andtheattitudeharder.

In due course, I went for training and visits abroad, and met our easternneighboursonneutralground.Thathelpedmemakethebestofabadrelationship.OnceonacourseinthenorthGermantownofHamburg,IbumpedintoasouthIndianprofessor.Thenextdayhewalkedintoourapartmentwithhiswifetoinviteus to his home.When returning the courtesy, I asked him if he had any dietaryrestrictions. He said that as a Brahmin he was forbidden to eat even eggs. HisGermanspouse,however,assuredusthatshecouldmakehimdevourwhateverweserved.

When I returned to Germany as an attaché a few years later, my Indiancounterparts walked up to me at the first opportunity to introduce themselves.Thoughirritatedbyourhost’sspecialfavourssincePakistanwasthefrontlineallyin Afghanistan, they did not let our domestic battles affect our personalrelationship.ItwasduringthatperiodthatthefirstIndianofficerwastocomefortheGermanGeneral StaffCourse, and from amongst the alumni Iwas the firstpersontobecontactedforadvice.OperationBlueStartookplacesoonafterIleft.

OtherwiseIwouldhavetickledoneofthemthatthedaysofoneSinghortheotherrepresentingtheIndianArmyinGermanywereover,andIamsurehewouldhavetakenitsportingly.

Ever since, therehasneverbeen ‘anyquietonoureastern front’.TheSiachenviolation; Indira Gandhi’s assassination; Brasstacks—if it was an exercise or anoperationdependeduponitsdesign;theSikhinsurgencyandtheKashmiruprising;thenuclear tests; theKargil ingress;and indeedall thepost-9/11turmoilensuredthat our relationship was alive and (literally) kicking. Indeed, the period wasdotted,evenifsparsely,bypeaceeffortsliketheCompositeDialogue,Vajpayee’sbus yatra, ‘they met at Agra’, and the Kashmir bus service. The toxic, or theintoxicating,mixhelpedpeoplelikeme,whohadbeeninandoutofhotseats,joinpost-retirementtheever-expandingclubfatuouslycalled‘thestrategiccommunity’.

Nosurprise,therefore,thatsomeofusareburstingwithwisdomthatcanhardlywait to be shared.One of themore usefulmeans to do sowould indeed be anexchangeamongstkeyplayersontheoppositesides—providedofcoursewewereprepared to concedeour faults andprovide adifferentnarrative, evenalternativefacts.Howfarmy‘comradeinarms’—ashedescribesourequation—AmarjitSinghDulat,andIhavesucceededinthismissionisobviouslyforthereadertojudge.

AsadDurrani

Rawalpindi,Pakistan

March2018

I

SETTINGTHESTAGEIntheopeningchapters,DulatandDurraniexplainhowthisbookcameaboutandwhytheythought it relevant.Theyspeakabouttheirbackgroundsasprofessionalintelligenceofficers,andnarrateanepisodethatnotonlysolidifiedtheirfriendshipbut also firmedup their belief that a healthy India andPakistan relationshiphasmorebenefitsthandownsides.

Settingthescene

May25,2016:Our first setofmeetingswas in Istanbul,atanupmarkethotel inthe historicOld Town. The first time the three of usmetwas for lunch at therooftop restaurant, the mild sun pleasantly shining through the windows, thewaterfrontvisibleinthedistance.GeneralDurranilookedatmeintensely,asiftosizemeup.PeterJoneswasevenmorewary,perhapstheeffectofafullplateofTurkishkebab.

1

‘Evenifweweretowritefiction,noonewouldbelieveus’

Aditya Sinha: The trust between you and Mr Dulat would seem unusual to alayperson.Howdiditcomeabout?

AsadDurrani:Inmyexperience,oncepeoplebelievetheyaregoingtogettogetherand exchange their views as professionals, more often than not they have noproblem. Also, when we speak and one says—this is how we read a particularsituationat the time;and then theother says—well,wewere reading it like this.Thisisofgreatmutualbenefit.

Forexample,whenIreadDulat’sbook,1Ifoundsomanythingsbeneficial,butalsoclarified.Forinstance,howtheothersidereactedtoaparticulardevelopment.

Sinha:Anexampleofaneye-opener?

Durrani: The Kashmir uprising. I was involved in aspects for a couple of years.Whenithappened,IwasheadingMilitaryIntelligence.Wewerelookingformoreinformation. It was not my subject, more for the foreign office or the ISIdirectorate.And it happened during Benazir Bhutto’s first government, probablyearly1990;sheaskedallthreefortheirassessments.

Someweresaying,it’shappenedbefore,it’sanothertypeofdevelopmenttakingplace,moreyouth,andnotlikelytolast.SuchpeoplehadknownaboutcommotioninKashmir.

It,ofcourse,wentonlongerthanexpected.Thedeficiencyonoursidewasthatthosewhogotinvolvedweresurprised;theyweren’texperts,maybeignorant,andtheirassessmentwasnotuptothemark.

Dulat’s book showed that on the other side they had a man dealing withKashmir for a long time, ten years, I think, before he became RAW chief, indifferentcapacities.Hewasasked todo somethingabout it,manage it aswell aspossible,andthat focuscontinued.Thatcontinuityofpersonalities,ofknowledgeandexperience,andprobablyalsoofpolicy.

Onourside,thePakistaniside,mostofthetimewedealtwiththedevelopmentfrom event to event, as a person saw it fit, not clear till late what actuallyhappened,howfaritwouldgo.Andevenifonefiguredoutthebestwayforward,the government changed, the personalities changed, and even the policy, so

continuitydoesnothappen. Just readingDulat’sbookhighlighted this forme. Itwas not a complete surprise, one knew about him and the tenures on the otherside.

I remember in MI someone told me that on the Jammu side there was alieutenant colonel posted there for 15-16 years, I forget his assignment. I wastemptedtorecruithim.Heprobablyknewmoreaboutusthanourownpeopledidbecausetheychangedsooften.Thatmaybepeculiartothesystem.

Sinha:Whatdoyouhopeforfromthisbook?

Durrani:Frankly,theideawasAmarjit’s.Hesaid,let’sdoabook.We’vedonejointprojects, the first on intelligence cooperation, after the Pugwash Conference2 inBerlinin2011,andthatwasagoodexperience.ThesecondwasapaperpublishedbytheUniversityofOttawaonKashmirin2013,anditwasencouraging.

Dulat’sbookwasalso interesting for itsLondon launch. IndiansandPakistaniswerethere,includingsomePakistaniacademicsandotherswithwhomIoncespentan evening. One of them messaged me: ‘We were at the book launch and therelaxed way in which the former RAW chief spoke, with a bit of humour,reminded us of ourmeetingwith you. Andwe thought someonewith a similarbackgroundmightdoasimilarproject.’

Ifourbeingtogethergetstractionandcreatesinterest,onecangiveperspectiveonsomematters.Ifonewouldsayone’spieceasfranklyandhonestlyaspossible,withoutbeingdefensiveoroffensive,thenthiswasaprojectworthpursuing.

Amarjit Singh Dulat: We had done two papers. Some people provoked andproddedus:‘Youguysseemtobecomfortablewitheachother,whydon’tyoudosome writing?’ Let’s attempt something a little more serious, and we wrote onintelligence cooperation. As General Saheb says, when professionals meet theyexchangeviews.Iagree,therehastobeacomfortlevel.

Wehavedifferent types of personalities.Ourbackgrounds are different, apartfrombeingfromthe(intelligence)agencies.Buttherearecommonalitiesalso.Hedoesn’t bother to watch television, nor do I. I realised he can be laid-back. IthoughtIwastheonlyonewhowaslaid-back.Itgivesyoucomfort.

Theinterestingthingwashe’smysenior.WhenwemetIwasactuallylookinginthisTrack-IIbusinesstomeetsomeonefromtheISI.ItwasahugeopportunityandIdidn’twanttojustspendmytimewithdiplomats,drinkingwhiskey.Iwantedtotalkourkindofbusiness.

IfirstwenttoPakistanfortheBalusaGroup3meetinginJanuary2010,thankstoSalmanHaidar.4WhenIgottoLahorethefirstthingIaskedthegeneralstherewas—isn’tthereanyonefromISIwholivesinLahore.Iactuallysaidthis.

‘No,you’llhavetogoto“Pindi”,’cametheresponse,‘oratleasttoIslamabad.Ifyouhadtoldus,wemighthavearrangedit.’

AndthenIcameacrossGeneralSaheb.

Durrani:ItwasinaChaoPhrayaDialogue5inBangkok.Weco-chairedasessiononterrorism.

Dulat:Iwantedtosaythingsbutitwasmyfirsttime.Iwantedtobemoretruthfulthanwenormallyare,butfoundmyselfwaffling.Andwhenhespoke,hespokesodirectly,aboutproxies,andhowtheywerelegitimateforeveryintelligenceagency.

During the coffee break, I said: ‘General Saheb, what are you saying aboutproxies?’

‘Why?’hesaid.‘Don’tyouuseproxies?WhatdidyoudoinBangladesh?WhatwastheMuktiVahini?’6

Themanwasdirect.‘No,Sir,Iunderstand,’Isaid.‘I’vefigureditout.’

Therewerethreeofusatthefirstfewmeetings,includingVickySood,7andwewerelaughingabout‘happyhours’.GeneralSahebsaidthesesessionswouldgoon,but that the three of us should talk separately. The three of us sat down withglassesofwhiskeyandstartedtalking.Moreopenlyandhonestly.

Iwas surprised by the things he said.He said amazing thingswhich I franklycouldn’tthinkof,becausespooksdon’ttalkeasily.AndforaformerISIchieftobetalkingcandidly.EvenVickywaspleasantlysurprised.

After the secondmeeting Vicky went off to greener pastures in Europe.Wewereleftbyourselves,acertainrelationshipbuilt.

In Islamabad in 2011, when we got a bottle of Black Label (whiskey) fromGeneral Saheb’s car and had a drink inmy room, he spoke tome about how itwouldbe ifwehad anunderstanding. For instance, ifMumbai8 happened again,therewouldbeanunderstandingthatIndiahadtoretaliate.Andthat itcouldbemanaged.ThatIndiacoulddowhat(PrimeMinisterNarendra)Modidid,asurgicalstrike.

Itwas interesting.Herewasa former ISIchiefwithaconsiderable reputation,suggestinghowtochoreographsurgicalstrikes.Howcanapersongetmorecandid?

The ISI is supposed to have themost difficult rogues. I have gotten to knowGeneralSaheboveraperiodoftimeandhehassurprisedmemoreandmore.

Thesesessionswenton.Oneinterestingmorningthetwoofussattogether,ataconference in Istanbul,andMaliniParthasarathyof theHinduwas soexcitedshetook out her phone and took a photograph, saying, ‘I’ve got the two spookstogether.’Itsoundedsofunny.

It was in that session that Peter Jones9 made a suggestion that we writesomething.

Durrani:Ajointpaper.

Dulat:Wewroteajointpaperonintelligencecooperation.GeneralSahebinitiallyremarked that even ifwewrote fiction nobodywould believe it, but okay,we’llgiveitatry.ItwaspublishedsimultaneouslyintheHinduandinDawn.

ThenPetersuggestedwedoaKashmirpaper.ThatisnowontheUniversityofOttawawebsite.

Sinha:Whatwasthereactiontoyourjointpaper?

Durrani:(Americanacademic)StephenP.Cohensentamessagethathewasveryimpressedbyourpaperon intelligencecooperation.He’saspecialistonIndo-Pakaffairs.Igotemailsfromelsewhere.

Sinha:Whatdothegovernmentssayaboutsuchmeetingsorpapers?

Durrani:Notaword.

Dulat:Sameonourside.AndbecauseGeneralSahebisinternationallyrenowned,StephenCohenmayhavecalledhim,butnobodycalledme!

Durrani: I’m sure there are people on your side, like a couple on ours who areupset and say: ‘These chaps?What do they know?Havingmessed up royally intheir own time, they want to have a joint anti-terror mechanism and a jointintelligence?Theywantanotherparadigm?’Theythinkwearelookingnotonlyforrecognitionbutfurtheremployment.

Even in the US think-tanks like Brookings Institute, which are ‘Inside theBeltway’,theykeepchurningoutpapers,earmarkingthemtoSenatecommittees.Unlesswhat they say supports existing government policy, theywill not get dueattention.Theymakerecommendationsbutthegovernmentisfollowingapolicyinthebeliefthatit’sdoingtherightthing.Rarelyisareportseenandisthebasisforhelp.

Dulat:Absolutelyright,Sir.That’swhatgivestheIDSAornowtheVivekanandaFoundation importance, because they toe a certain line. These are almostgovernmentthink-tanks.

Sinha:Theyupholdthestatusquo.

GeneralSaheb,after interactingwitha fewchiefs fromtheotherside,doyouseeMrDulatasrepresentativeofIndianspooksorisheamaverick?

Durrani:Ofcoursehe’sdifferent.Wearealldifferentinourownways,butheisdifferentinanumberofways.

Firstofall,hishands-onexperience.MorethantenyearslookingatKashmir,attheIB,thenastheRAWchief,thenatthePMO(PrimeMinister’sOffice).Thathewas a former IBmancoming toheadRAWand thathewas acceptedmeanshisapproach was different. I know institutions resist outsiders gatecrashing theirdomain. They would like to show that this intruder fails. Otherwise, inductingoutsiders might become the norm. I know from personal experience, and alsowithinthemilitary.

Certainly his book also shows that he’s not stuck on a particular idea. HeunderstandstheKashmirissue’sgenesis,notthinkingofwhattodonow,aresponsehere,atit-for-tatthere,butseeingthebiggerpicture,thepeoplethere.

YoumaymanageKashmirormuddlethroughitbutfinallyonewillhavetofinda lasting solution.This iswhenhe sayswe’llhave todo somethingdifferent.Myassessment,though,isthatwearenotlikelytodoanythingthatmuchdifferent,notbecausewearestuckinagroovebutbecausewehavesettledconclusionsasStatepolicythatwetryandmakelastaslongaspossible.

Myownexperienceinintelligencewaslimited,justthreeandahalfyears,sohemay have more narrative to add, I have less. But we have come to certainconclusionsthatmaslayehhaiandperhapsthatcanhelpshiftthefocusfromtheusualrutandprovideawayforward.Somemaybescepticalaboutthethingswecomeupwith,butevenifafewthoughtsstartmakingsensetothem,thenitcouldpercolatetodecision-makers.

Dulat:Yes,I’velearntanamazingamountthroughKashmirinthelast30years.TounderstandKashmiryouhavetoempathisewithKashmir,youhavetohaveaheartto try and seewhat is happening.And if you start understandingKashmir you’llfindthatyouunderstandalotmorehappeningintheworld.

KashmirtookmetoPakistan.AndintryingtofigureoutPakistan,thattookmeto Afghanistan. And looking at Afghanistan, I find so many similarities withKashmir.

(Pakistani writer) Ahmed Rashid once said that if we can sort out Kashmir,Afghanistanwouldbeacakewalk.KashmirleadsyoutoCentralAsiaaswell.WhenIlookattheworldIfindthereisalottolearnfromwhatishappeninginKashmir.

GeneralSaheboncementionedthePalestinianproblem.Inmanywaysit’sstuckinthesamewayasweareinKashmir.

TheinterestingthingisthatnewsaboutourassociationhastravelledinKashmir.AfewKashmirissaytomethatonewayoutofthiswholethingistogetacoupleofIndianswhounderstandKashmirtogetherwithafewformerISIchiefs,andthefirstnamealwaysmentionedisGeneralSaheb.Theysayifyougiveusachancetositwithyouguys,wecanfindawayout.

It’s interestingthattheseparatistKashmiri looksat it likethat.HeknowsthatthiscannothappenwithoutPakistan.Noweventhemainstreamiscomingtothesameconclusion.MuftiSaheb10usedtosaythis.Mehbooba11doesn’tsayanything,rarelydoesshementionPakistan.Strangely,DrFarooq12hasbeenrepeatedlysayingthatunlessIndiaandPakistansitdown,we’llnothaveasolutioninKashmir.

Sinha:SinceGeneralSahebmentionedthebook,youreceivedcriticismforitandforsayingthatmoneyplayedapartinKashmir,thoughthatmaynotbeasecrettoaprofessional.

Dulat:YouweredeterminedtosendmetoTihar(jail)!Whenitcameout,liketheGeneralsaid,nobodysaidawordtome.Officially,directly.ButIcouldsensethattheestablishmentwasnothappy.And therewerepeoplewhowere critical.Notdirectly.Likeyouheard. I’mnot surprised,others also toldme thatpeoplewerenothappy.Isaidyeah,sobeit,I’vewrittenabookandthat’sit.

What is the big deal about money? This became a big thing for everyone.(Seniorjournalist)HarinderBawejatookmetolunchjusttogetmetotalkaboutmoney.Moneyisagivenallovertheworld.

Durrani:(Chuckles.)

Dulat: I said it inacertaincontext, thatafter I leftgovernmentandthePMOin2004,someblamedmeforeverythingthatwentwronginKashmir.It’sthisguy’sfault,hebribedKashmiris.A senior, seniorofficer said Ibribedmyway throughKashmir.

My reaction was:Why don’t you try dealing with Kashmir? Or tell me of abetterwayofdoingit?

2

TheAccidentalSpymaster

Aditya Sinha: General Saheb, how did you reach the ISI? Before you met MrDulat, had either of you met counterparts from the opposite agency? Did youpicturethemtohavehornsandtails,forexample?

AsadDurrani:Myentry to intelligencewas accidental. Iwasnot trained for thiswork.Iwasanormallineofficerwithareasonablygoodcareer.

The first time Iwas nominally administered by an organisation called ISIwaswhenIwasafullcolonelandwaspostedasdefenceattachéatourembassyinWestGermany,1980-84.Otherwise,thepostisanopenone.

Do you know who cleared me for the posting ultimately? I was a seniorinstructorat theCommandandStaffCollege, forusaprizedposition.WhenmynamecameupfortheGermanyposting, ithadtobeclearedbyvariousagencies.Oneofthemwenttomyin-laws’houseinModelTown,Lahore,toaskaboutme.Noonewasathome,sotheywentandaskedtheneighbours’chowkidar,‘Yehkaiseloghain?’Thatchapsaid,‘Yehacchheloghain.’IgotthegreensignalandIalwayssay that my neighbours’ chowkidar provided the certificate that the intelligenceagencysought.

Sinha: So had your in-laws been home, you might not have become defenceattaché?

Durrani:Quitepossible.Youneverknowwiththesein-laws!

AsdefenceattachétheISIwasadministratively lookingafterme,but Ihadnocovertmissionsassignedtome.IwasnotspyinginGermany.Thehostsknewme,Iwould go and get information from them. Iwas lucky to go there, just after theSovietinvasion1ofAfghanistan;becauseofPakistan’sstancewehadextraordinarilygoodrelationswith theWest.Getting information fromtheGermanswasnobigdeal,andaftertheNATOattachés,Iobtainedthemaximum.Attimes,Ievengotexclusivebriefings.

IreturnedtoPakistanandresumedmycareerasalineofficer.Zia’s2planefellfromtheskies,andthenewarmychief,GeneralMirzaAslamBeg,withwhomIhadserved,putmeinchargeofMilitaryIntelligence(MI).Thatwasaboltfromtheblue.

ThemovetoISIwasalsoaccidental.AfterBenazirBhutto’s3dismissalinAugust

1990theywerelookingforapersontokeeptheseatwarmtilltheyfoundsomeoneelse.JustbecauseIwasinMIfortwoyears,asamanagerofthatbranchandfromthemilitary,doingmilitaryassessmentsonthemilitaryfront,theygrabbedholdofme. Since I was current on Afghanistan, current on Kashmir, current on theimpendingIraq/Kuwaitcrisis,Igotthejob.

Ispentnearly18monthsattheISI.Surprisingly,whenIlandedinMIIsawanIndianconfidentialreportdescribingmeasahawk.NoonefromtheothersidehadevertalkedtomeexceptforyourattachésinGermany.Abroadyouaren’thawkishor dovish, you are colleagues working in a third country, sometimes exchangingviewsandtalkingon‘soft’matters.

Sinha:WhatwasyourimageofintelligenceworkbeforeyouwenttoGermany?

Durrani:Anynormalperson,inPakistanorinIndiaorelsewhere,iswaryofanyoneinthespookbusiness.Thatchapprobablyhastheboss’sears.Godknowswhatelsetheseintelligencechapsareupto,theymovecovertly,quietlyandsurreptitiously.Sobecareful.

WhenIwasinthebusinessIsaidgoodheavens.Wewereassessingthreatstothecountry, external and external-sponsored threats, trying to warn the relevantquartersthatthesethreatsaredeveloping,thesearethedangerousones.Itwasn’twhatIusedtothink,cloak-and-daggerwork,butitwasanhonourablejob.

That’swhy Ihad theCorpsof Intelligencecreated in thePakistanArmy.Theidea had been floating for some time but I said let’s go ahead with it. Certainaspects of intelligence should be handled by specialists. Previously there werereservations, and this apprehension was not misplaced, that professionals in thisbusiness would acquire the form or character of a mafia, and become abrotherhood.Andthen,leaveasidethecountry,everyoneelseintheenvironmentisthreatened.ButIwentaheadwithit.

Onethingthathappensiscollateraldamage.I’mlookingforthepeopleonthepayrollofanenemycountry,whomaybeonthepayrollofpeoplewhoseinterestsarenotthesameasmine,andintheprocessstumbleonactivitythathasnothingtodowiththeinterestsofthecountry.Imightthinkit’sagoodideatosorthimout.Some would even blackmail: look I caught you with a girl, nothing to do withnational security, but since one has come to know about this extra-maritalrelationshiponecannailthatchap.

These thingshappen.This isnotourmain taskand if ithappens, ithas toberesolved.Butitmakespeopleseeintelligenceassomethingtobeshunned.Acovertoperator can know things we don’t want him to know, and he may be at aparticularlevelbutcangotohighlevelsbecauseofthenatureofthejob.Ifpeoplethinktheywillgetexploitedandmisused,theygetscared.

Sinha:YoualsoservedunderNawazSharif?

Durrani: ItneverworkedoutwithMianSahebwhenhefirstheadedgovernmentandIwasDGISI.Peoplecantalkaboutchemistryorabouthiswayoflookingatthings.Itjustdidnotworkout.

Sinha:Youdidn’tthinkhighlyofhisintellectualcapability.

Durrani:That’s one. I also thought hewas paranoid about certain things.Aboutwhat themilitarymightdo,what the ISIwoulddo, shouldhenothavehisownpersontoheadISI?

WhenmybossAslamBegleft,andsincetheDGISIservesatthepleasureoftheprimeminister regardlessof thearmy—thearmynever says, ‘issiko lagao’—Igotready togo.Since I servedas a two-stargeneral itwas supposed tobea stopgaparrangement.

UltimatelyIbecamethree-star,continuingbecauseMianSahebsaidthatAslamBeghasgoneandAsifNawaz(Janjua)hascomeinhisplaceasarmychief.Thisisparanoia:thinkingthatifAsifNawazgetshisownDGISIthenthere’llbeanarmy-ISI nexus that he’d be facedwith. Sharif had had his doubts aboutme, but hisexpectationssuddenlychangedandhenowthoughthehadhisman.

Itwasanexampleoftheflawedperceptionthatcivilianpoliticianshadofhowaffiliationsandloyaltiesintheserviceswork.Wearenotanyone’sman.Youcanbefondofsomeonebutwhenitcomestoworkyouareloyaltotheinstitution.Thatstillremainsapluspointforus,andonmanydifferentlevels.

For instance,withAslamBeg I did not agree on the firstGulfWar, in 1991.With Nawaz Sharif I did not agree on Afghanistan; he believed that we wereworking for not only a broader consensus but we were also asking the UnitedNations—Benon Savan used to be special emissary (formally, the Secretary-General’sPersonalRepresentative)—towork for theLoya Jirga, becausePakistanindividually or Pakistan-Iran or Saudi Arabia may not be able to. We weren’tmakingheadwayonAfghanistan, so the reconciliation should be led by theUN,supported by the OIC (Organisation of Islamic Cooperation). We had workedhard.Theforeignofficemayhaveledthatparticularstrategyandwesupportedit.

It’swell knownhowAslamBeg saw the firstGulf crisis. JehangirKaramat asDGMilitaryOperations (DGMO) did not agreewith him. I asDG ISI did notagreewithhim.Buthedidnotholditagainstus.Infact,oncehisownassessmentwent wrong, he actually almost publicly admitted he was wrong. That’s thegreatnessoftheman.

InSharif’sparticularcase,hehadthefearthatthischapcan’tbetrusted.Sosixmonthslater,hefoundanopportunityandappointedhisman.Ileft.

Itwasgoodforme,Iwentbacktothemainstream.Iheadedsomethingthatnoonewithmybackgroundhadeverbeeninchargeof,themilitary’straining.It’samostly infantry army and I was an artillery man, a gunner. I had served in aninfantryformationbutthat’sanotherstory.Iwasthefirstnon-infantryofficerwhoheaded the army’s training branch, which also holds inspections. I was happyduringthatperiod,andthenwentontoNationalDefenceCollege.Ifanyofusgetsanall-armsappointment,itwasafeatherinthecap.

Sinha:Thisisn’tthefirsttimeyou’vetalkedaboutyourISIdays,isit?

Durrani:There isonethingthatIndiansshare,whethertheyarefriendlytowardsPakistanorhostile: nothing gives themgreaterpleasure than if a former ISImancanbeputonthemat.

Twicethiswasthecase:in2004atthePugwashConferenceinDelhi,andattheTehelkameeting in London. I found them a good bunch, Tarun Tejpal and hissister,theirfatherbeingaformerfauji.Butonstage,onbothoccasions,whentheyaskedmetosaysomething,itwasusuallythatImusthavebeensendinginfiltratorsintoIndia.

Howdoyouavoidthatembarrassment,orhowdoyoudefendit?Imadelightofit saying, you peoplemisunderstood.Wewere not sending infiltrators, we weresending people because your visa regime is so rigid, we were sending them forpeople-to-peoplecontacts.Goandmeetthem!Goandtalktothem!

Dulat: The General said something very apt that while in service nobody isanybody’sman.IhaveoftenbeenreferredtoasDrFarooqAbdullah’sman,whichincidentallyIregardasacompliment,butin2002whentheNClosttheAssemblyelections I was made out to be the main villain. I was then Brajesh Mishra’s‘henchman’andoftenonthewrongsideofNorthBlock.

3

BrotherhoodtotheRescue

AsadDurrani:WhenyoumentionedalackofhostilitytowardsPakistanIthoughtof an episode that should findplace in this book.ThatwaswhenMrDulat andsomecolleaguesrescuedmysonOsmanwhowasstrandedinIndia,inMay2015.

AmarjitSinghDulat:IgotacallfromGeneralSahebwhileoutfordinner,around11p.m.Hesoundedabitdesperate.

Durrani: Osman was in Kochi, on behalf of the company he works for. It’s acompany that he had a hand in co-founding, in Germany, and had recentlyestablished an Indian office.As head of one of the company’s software divisionsOsmanwent there for aweek for fresh recruitment and to develop an esprit decorpsinthenewteam.That’saculturetherethatdoesnotexistinmanyplaces;it’swhy a company is successful not just for the product but also for its collegialatmosphere.ThewaythattheJapanesedoit.

Thecruxis:mysonwashereonaPakistanipassport.Thoughhe’sbeenlivinginGermany for 20 years or so, and in this company for 15 years, he had kept hisPakistaninationality.He’dsay,I’mapatrioticPakistani.

AndpeopleinKochiwerefascinatedbyhim.‘YouarefromPakistan,howniceto seeyou,’ theywould say.Theywereveryglad to seeaPakistanibecause theyhad never seen one before. And these were not Urdu speakers; there he spokeEnglish.Someonetoldhim,nexttimebringyourwifeandfamily.We’dliketoseeaPakistaniwoman.

Onthisvisithefinisheduphiswork infour-fivedays.Hethoughtoftakingaflight fromMumbai.Theofficepeople inKochi senthimtoMumbainotdue tobloody-mindednessbutoutofignorance.TheydidnotknowthatifapersoncamewithaPakistanipassporthehadtofollowacertainprocedure:hehadtoleaveviathe city his visa allowed. They were only used to handling German passportholders,dotheirregistrationandflyaway.Theydidn’tknowaPakistanipassportholder had to go to the police station, he had to go to Foreigners RegionalRegistrationOffice,andthatonthewayoutofthecountryhewouldagainhavetogotobothofficesforclearance.

AttheMumbaiairport,however,theimmigrationofficialssaidyourvisaisonlyforKochi,whatareyoudoinginMumbai?Andhewassentawayfromtheairport.

He then rang me up for help and advice, and besides talking to our high

commissionerinDelhi,AbdulBasit,IcalledupASD.

Dulat:PossiblybecauseithappenedinMumbaiitwaseasierforustohelpoutthanit would have been in Delhi. General Saheb was unusually worried and keptinquiringwhetheritwassafeforOsmantostayinMumbaiorwhetherheshouldreturntoKochi.Isaidthatmeansacceptingthatwecan’tdoanythingbutwewilldosomething,it’ssuchaminorthing.Let’ssleepoverit,thoughIdon’tthinktheGeneralwouldhavesleptpeacefully.

IalsospoketoaformercolleagueinRAW,whoI’msurehelpedwithouttakinganycreditforit.Moresubstantively,in2003atip-offfromtheRAWtotheISIhadsavedGeneralMusharraf’slife.

Durrani:Osmanwas stuck in some office for three to four hourswhere no onewantedtodealwithhim.Itwasanormalsubcontinentalbureaucraticoffice,wherewheneverhesaidIhavebeenreferredtothisgentlemantheywouldsay,sahebtohseatparnahinhain.Twicethishappenedthatanamewasgiventohimandtheysaidtheofficerisnotinhisseat.IwasonthephonewithOsmanandIsaid,theyobviouslydon’twanttodoanything.

Wewereinapanicbecausewedidnotknowwhatwouldhappen.

But even thosepeopledidnot say tohim,youdon’thave a visa forBombay,whatareyoudoing,pakdo,andarkaro.Thatcouldhavehappened,butitdidn’t.

All thiswhilemywife and Ihad another concern—what if someone reportedthatOsman, the son of a former ISI chief,was roaming aroundMumbai,whichhadn’tforgotten26/11,withoutavisaforthatcity?

Even his taxi driver had a good idea what was happening because he stayedoutsideforfourhourswithhisluggageinthecab.AporteradvisedhimtogobacktoKochi,weknowaboutthisthingaboutleavingthewayyoucame.

Dulat: TheGeneral calledme six to seven times the next day, often asking thesamething:shouldIsendhimbacktoKochi?Itoldhim:‘Ourboysareonthejoband,Inshallah,hewillflyoutofMumbaiintheevening.YoubelieveinAllahandIhavefullfaithinWaheguru,allwillbewell.’

Asthedaypassed,thethingwasstuckinthepolice’sSpecialBranchinMumbai,anditwasaSaturdaysothingswereclosed.IgotaholdofJeevanVirkar,anoldfriendfromthe IB. IknewtheMumbaipolicecommissionerbut thatwasanoldlinkandIhadn’tbeenintouchwithhim,whereasJeevanandIhadkeptmeeting.Wewere inthesamesocialcircle, sohewasa friendthroughout. IcalledJeevanandsaid,bhaiyehkarnahai.

Incidentally,JeevanhadmetGeneralSahebbecausehehadattendedacoupleoftheseTrack-IImeetings.Hepromisedtosortitout.

Durrani:A fewthingshappenedduring this toand fro thatcouldonlybe sortedoutbythiscyber-savvygeneration.Forexample,whenOsmanhadearliertriedtoboardtheflightandwasoffloaded,thechapattheimmigrationofficeaskedhim:‘HowdoweknowthatyouwereeverinKochi?Youmayneverhavegonethere!’

Osman quickly went on the internet on his cell phone and downloaded thedocument of theKochi police registration. Later,with Jeevan’s intervention, thelady in charge of the office arrived to finally force the reluctant staff to provideOsmanwiththenecessarypapers.

ThemanatthedeskaskedOsmanwhatflighttoMunichhewouldbetaking.Hehadn’t booked a flight yet, so he quicklywent to theLufthansawebsite andreservedaseatonlineforthenextflight.Thenheshowedthemthereservationandtheyweresatisfied.

Itwasacombinationofhiscyberexpertise,goodluckandhelpfromDulatandCo.thatgothimoffthehook.

For 24 hours he had been on the phone, and a thing that was declaredimpossiblewaspulledoffforhim.

Sinha:AformerRAWchief’sIBbackgroundhelpedaformerISIchief.

Durrani:AfterthisepisodehiscompanyinsistedhetakeaGermanpassport.Theysay,we’ve been asking you to change your nationality, then all these restrictionsthat are imposed onPakistanis in India, youwon’t have to dealwith them.Youweresavedbytheskinofyourteethbyyourfather’sfriend,otherwiseyouwouldhavebeenintrouble.Imagine,beinginMumbai,after2008,beingaPakistaniandwithafatherwhowastheISIchief.Theymighthavesaid,whatacatchwe’vegot!

Now,withhiswifeandtwodaughtersOsmanhashelpedretardthedeclineintheGermanpopulation.

Dulat:WhenOsmanfinallyleftMumbai,theGeneralcalledandsaid:‘YourfaithinWaheguruhelpedOsman.’

‘OurGuruNanak said therewas noHindu, noMussalman,’ I told him. ‘Wewereatbestbornintoafaith.TheSupremeBeinghadrescuedOsman.’

IrangupJeevanandthankedhimprofusely.ThenIrealisedI’dbetterthankmyex-colleague fromRAW,so I ranghimup. ‘Notatall,Sir,’he said.But thebestpartofhisresponse,whichmademeextremelyhappy,washisreferencetoGeneralSaheb.

‘It’sourduty,’hesaid,‘afterall,he’sacolleague.’

Durrani:Iimmenselyvaluethatremark,andhopetogettheopportunitytothankthegentlemanpersonally.

II

THESECONDOLDESTPROFESSIONInthesefourchapters,DulatandDurranidiscussthebusinessofspying.Wetackle,head-on, theperceptionsof the ISIandcompare it to theRAW.Theyassess theactivitiesofotherintelligenceagencies,particularlyoftheUS,England,RussiaandGermany.Theythenspeakabouttheadvantagesofadialogueofspychiefs,andtheneed to formalise a spy-spy communication channel between India andPakistan,withtheiruniquecallforan‘openpost’ineachother’snationalcapitals.

Settingthescene

Istanbul,May25,2016:Wecongregate inDulat’s roomfor ‘happyhours’ in theevening,adayofgoodworkbehindus.Sincethetaperecorderisoff,afewotherretiredspychiefslandintheroom,their(lubricated)tonguesloosenandthejokesbegintofly.Itmaynowberevealedthatspiesallowthemselvesacertaindegreeofbawdinessinafraternalatmosphere.

4

Pakistan’sDeepState

AdityaSinha:PeoplesaytheISIisPakistan’s‘DeepState’.

AsadDurrani:Many intelligenceagencieshavebeencalled theDeepState.CIA,KGB.It’satermdenotinganestablishmentwhichrunstheaffairsofstatebehindthescenes.Theverynomenclatureindicatesthatitisinvisibleyetinfluential.Inmyvocabulary,it’sapsy-warterm.It’salsohypocrisy.TheUnitedStateshasa‘DeepState’anditcomprisesbigmoney,themilitary-industrialcomplex,andtheJewishlobby.

The ‘Deep State’ inAmerica can even scuttle presidential policy, as it did toPresidentBarackObama’s efforts toend thewars inAfghanistanand theMiddleEast.TheCIA, StateDepartment, Pentagon, and themilitary-industrial complexmakethepoliticalleadershiphelpless.ThisisnotsomethingPakistansays,variousAmericans including some former CIA heads say yes, there’s no coordinationbetweenvariousorganisations,sowedowhateverwedeemfit.

Deep State, incidentally, is also making life miserable for President DonaldTrump, preventing him from improving relations with Russia or fulfilling hiselectionpromisestodisengagefromforeignmilitaryventures.

Sinha:Didn’tPakistan’sDeepStatekeepOsamabinLadenhidden?

Durrani:I’vebeenonTVwithmyownassessment,whetherunkochhupakerakhahua hain, orwhether at some stagewe knew,wehad the upper hand.At somestagetheISIprobablylearntaboutitandhewashandedovertotheUSaccordingtoamutuallyagreedprocess.PerhapswearetheoneswhotoldtheAmericansiskolejao,wearegoingtofeignignorance.1Ifwedeniedanyrole,itmayhavebeentoavoidpoliticalfallout.CooperatingwiththeUStoeliminateapersonregardedbymanyinPakistanasa‘hero’couldhaveembarrassedthegovernment.

A.S.Dulat:Ourassessmentisthesame.ThathewashandedoverbyPakistan.

Durrani:Itwasprettyuncomfortableforus.

Dulat:InIndiawehadneverheardtheterm‘military-industrialcomplex’tillafewyearsago,thatitwasbecomingpowerful.

As for the ISI, it’sagreatorganisation,otherwise itwouldn’tgetnamedeveryday in India. Whatever goes wrong in India is attributed to the ISI. It’s veryeffective,whetheryoucallittheDeepStateortheStatewithintheState.Itisby

farthemostexcitingoftheintelligenceagencies.

Sinha: But ISI publicity has come down after Narendra Modi became primeminister.Noweverythingisblamedonliberalsandintellectuals,notonISI.

Dulat: IwasonceaskedbyaTVchannel inKarachiwhat I thoughtof the ISI. Isaid,ISI’sgreat,IwouldhavelovedtohavebeentheDGISI!

Sinha:Haveprimeministers inPakistanbeenfearful,ambivalentor fascinatedbytheISI?

Durrani:Quitedistrustful.Idon’tthinkanyonewantstotasktheISIwithagoodrun-downonanysubject,thoughit’stheirright.

On critical matters the ISI will often impose itself simply because it needs adecision.Weneededtotakeacertainstep,butwedon’twanttowarnthemilitary,thecivilianleadership,thebureaucracy.

SomethinktheISIispowerfulenoughtoordereveryonetofallinline.Evenifthatweretrue,theISIwouldnotgetciviliancooperationunlesstheywerewilling.

Dulat:You’reright,butthepointisit’sasmallstate,it’sadictatorship.WhentheISIfocusesononething,theyhavethemanpowerandcapabilitytodoitinmanykindsofways.They’llgetitonewayoranother.

Durrani:TheISI’scloutgrewprobablybecauseofthe(1980s)Afghanjehad.Theorganisationwasdeveloped,andgivenplentyofresourcesandsupportbecausetheSoviets had invaded Afghanistan. Otherwise it would never have had thewherewithal that a country facing somany threats, external and internal, wouldget. It still remained shortandhad to focusonquality. It couldnotaffordmuchmanpowerandhadtomakedowithless.

Itdevelopedareputationforefficiency.ItalsodevelopedareputationbecausemanypeopledidnotlikewhattheISIdid,duetoclashinginterests.Oneexamplewas after the Soviets left, theUnited States becameuneasy: now that the job isdone,howdowecuttheISIdowntosizebeforeitbecomestoobigforitsboots.

Therewasaparticularreason,concededbyGeneralBrentScowcroft,whowasUSPresidentGeorgeH.W.Bush’sNSA(nationalsecurityadviser).Twoyearsafterthe1991GulfWarhesaid inLondonthat the ISIassessmentof the Iraqi forces’potentialwhenitoccupiedKuwaitwasbetterthantheCIA’s.ItwasmyassessmentthattheCIAhighlyexaggeratedthethreat.Wehardlyhadanyassetsonthegroundandrequiredahard-nosed,cold-blooded,methodicalassessment.

TheCIAdeliberately overblew the threat either to oblige its politicalmasterswhowereraringforwar,ortoplaysafewithdubioussatelliteimages.Idon’tknowwherethesatelliteswerelookingwhenIndiawaspreparingforitsnucleartestsin

Pokhranin1998.

Dulat:GeneralSahebdismissedelectronicsurveillanceandIagree,Idon’tbelieveanythingelectronicunlessit’sendorsedbyhumanintelligence.

Durrani: If I was in the CIA’s position I would also worry about the type ofassessmenttheISIwascapableofmaking.Ihavesaidthis inapiecepublishedintheAtlanticafewyearsago:thenexttimeyouwanttosexuptheWMDthreatinIraq,ashappenedin2003,andiftheISIsays,nonsense,youshouldbeworried.

These things created the ISI profile. Larger than life? Probably a littleexaggerated. But it had to be efficient given Pakistan’s environment: India is bigenough, Afghanistan is hot enough, Iran is experienced enough and sometimesindependentenough,andtheUSalsostillmeddles intheregion’saffairs.TheISIhadtojugglemanyballs.

Youpeopleprobablydid thingsmorediscreetly.Youcouldafford to:youhadtime,weattimeswereinahurry.Wefeltthreatenedtotheextentthatweoptedfor immediate results. One can lose the basic principle of doing things coolly,deliberately,forthelonghaul.

Dulat:TheISIchiefwasthelastword,hecouldsayanythingandgetawaywithit.Right or wrong. He had to be right if he was saying so. Our guys were morecircumspectinanassessment,whichwassupposedtobemoreserious.

Durrani: ISI’s ability tomake political assessment has been quite limited. YahyaKhan2wentaheadandheldthe1970electionbecausetheintelligenceagenciestoldhim itwouldbeahungoutcomeandhis regimewould thuscontinue.However,Mujibur Rahman3 swept in East Pakistan, Bhutto4 swept in West Pakistan, andYahyaKhanlandednowhere.

WhenIheadedISI,peoplereportedassessmentsandlikelyturnoutforthe1990election. I said the People’s Partywould suffer, but onlymarginally. The resultsshowedthePPPwasdecimated.Somuchforthatassessment.

Whenitcomestograssrootsintelligence,however,thepolicearemoreeffective.Nooneisbetterthanthepolice’sSpecialBranch.

Forexample,theLalMasjid5episodeinwhichmanychildrenandwomenwerevictims of a massacre. I believe it was a disaster. It was badly handled by theauthorities:wrongforceused,wrongmeans.Onoccasionslikethatwhenyouhavehundredsofchildrenandwomenwithpossiblytensofmilitants inaplacethat isopentomovementandenoughinformationavailable,andifyouhavetotakethemilitantsout,it’sbesttousetheSpecialForces.Theyoperatestealthily,andwouldhave nabbed themilitants while saving the innocent. But they sent the Rangersinstead,whoburntdowntheplace.

Thatincidentgaverisetosuicidebombers.

A couple of weeks later I was in Rawalpindi. These garrison towns havephotography studios and tailor shops where military people go, have a uniformtailoredandgetaphotographtaken.Iwenttothewell-knownBhattistudios,asonmanyoccasions,andanSHOwalksin.Herecognisedmeandsaid:‘GeneralSaheb,ekSHOdakaamsi,tussisaarifauj lekaruthhepahunchgaye?’(ItwasanSHO’sjob,whydidyoutaketheentirearmythere?)

A single SHO could have gone in, seen howmanymilitants were there, andthenprobablybribedafeworprobablygotaholdofthefamilymembersofafewof them and used them to release hostages. And before we know it, the 10-12militants would have been taken care of. But the government did not trust theeffectivenessofthepolice.

Then the Peshawar school incident,6 whichwas a nasty one. The intelligenceagencies had been warned that a big place would be hit, but which one of thehundreds? The Special Branch would have noticed unusual activity at the APS(Army Public School), whichwas on thewatchlist, and increased security. Thattypeofnear-timeinformationismoreuseful.AndthenwouldcometheISIs,theRAWsandtheIBstobuildthebigpictureofterroristattacks.

Themighty ISI will say, whowill implement it?Who’s better known to thelocalswithwhomweultimatelydeal?That’swhatthelocalpolicearefor.Allwecandoisensurethepoliceremaineffective.

Dulat: I’m happy thiswhole argument is coming from theGeneral and notme.BecauseI’manoldIBguy,buthe’saGeneral.AndchiefoftheISI.

Sinha:ThemostinfamousISIchiefinIndianeyeshasbeenthelateGeneralHamidGul.7HewastoIndiawhatAjitDovalistoPakistan.

Durrani:HamidGulwasmypredecessor, thoughnotmy immediateone. IhaveknownHamideversincewewerebothlieutenantcolonels.Hewasaprofessionalintelligenceman.Verybrainy.Readalot.Andhisfortewasthathewouldtryandhypothesisethings,puttheminaparticularcontext.Idon’tknowwhathehimselffabricated,buthehadaparticularpurpose.Hispresentationwasalwaysimpressive.Knowledgeofhistory,etc.Ifhebecamefamouslateritisbecausehetalkedaboutthesetheoriesorhypotheses.

Hamidlikedtosexthingsupforthenecessaryimpact.Weweredifferenttypesof people but remained friends till he died. We agreed on certain things anddisagreed on others but were friends. I admired him, and his knowledge,commitmentanddedication.

Dulat:Yes.Weusedtosayhewasthevillain,thegodfather,theultimate.Andyet

afterhepassedaway,quiteafewtributeswerepaid,somenotverynice.

Themost interesting thingwas thatA.K.Verma8wrote a piece in theHindusaying therewas a timewhenHamidGul offered peace to us. Itwas a positivetribute. Reality and perception don’t always match. And on our side, if you’relookingforhawks,A.K.Vermaisahawk.Yethe’swillingtocreditHamidGul.

Durrani:WhenHamidwasDGISIhewasmonitoringthe1988election.IwasatMI.HesaidthePeople’sPartywouldwinandcameclosetotheactualnumberofseats. But hewentwrong in Punjab and Sindh; the resultswere the opposite ofwhathepredicted, by the samemargin. In Sindh, hepredicted less for thePPP,theyswept.InPunjab,hepredictedmoreseats,theygotthatmanyless.

Sinha:Aroundthattime,theBibleforreporterslikemewasTheBearTrap.9

Durrani:TherearemanybookslikeTheBearTrapthatareinaparticularmould,with an agenda. That’s all that I want to say. It wants to highlight a particularpersonality or period or contribution. That becomes the problem.When it waspublished,Ithinkduringmyperiod,someonecameandsaidlookatwhat’swritten.Whatshouldwedo?Shouldwegetaholdoftheman,courtmartialhim,issuearebuttal? I said, there must be 20 people who have read it but once we dosomething,200peoplewillreadit.

I’mnothappywiththingsthatareprojectedoutofcontextorsendamessagethatmightnotbehelpfuleithertothecountryortotheorganisation.

Idon’trecallaccuratelyastowhatwefoundatthattimethatshouldbevettedorscrutinised.Butonesaid,letitbe.Whateveryousayaboutthebookwillneverbe as effective as the book itself. Also, it was well-written, a foreign chap wasinvolved. One had heard good things about the author Mohammad Yousaf’scontributions. He headed the ISI’s Afghan cell under General Akhtar AbdurRahman,10atacrucialstageoftheAfghanjihad.

Sinha:SincetheISIispartofthemilitary,canpeopleenterathigherlevelswithoutamilitarybackground?

Dulat:Letmetakethelibertytosaythatwemaybealittlemore‘onthejob’.

Durrani:Wehadahandicapinthisregard.There isexperienceandcontinuity intheIB,SpecialBranches,police.

ISImadeitsnamefordifferentreasons—Afghanistan,militaryrule—butithasacertainpersonnelproblem.MIcametomewhenIwasamainstreamofficer,andIwasmovedtoISIbecauseIwascurrentonbothofourfronts.

This was not unusual. Many heads of ISI and MI came with no intelligenceexperienceforavarietyoffactors.Bythetimeyoustartunderstandinghowyou’re

supposedtodofieldjobsorspecialisedjobs,yougetpromoted.Itisagap,thoughthemilitaryseesitasmovementwithintheforce.

TherewasanairforceofficerwholeftISIandwenttotheIB.FewdothatsincetheIBismostlypoliceorciviliansfromthegovernmentcadre;someretiredmilitaryofficershaveheadedtheIBbutthat’sanexception.Wedidn’tmissthechap,buthedidareasonablejobinIB.Theinterestingparthappenedwhenhefellafoulofthepoliticalleadership.Theymadehimstayathome,butgavehimhispay,andhekept silent, pursuing leisure like reading, writing, etc. This would not havehappenedinthemilitary.

Onemorething.Back in2010,AmanullahGilgiti11was leadinghispeople fortheOctober2712marchfromMuzaffarabadtoChakothiontheLineofControl.Iwentalong.There’san importantbarrierwithabattaliontopreventpeoplefromgoingtooclosetotheLoC,andIthoughtIwouldtellthemwhoIwas,onceuponatime.Therewasa juniorcommissionedofficerwhostoppedmeandsaid: ‘Saheb,aapkabhithhetohthhe,abhitohnahinhainna.’

Dulat:Thathappens all the time.Theymaynotopenly say it, butnobody takesnoticeofyouonceyou’reoutofthesystem.

Durrani:ThefirstthingIwasinvolvedinwhenIenteredtheintelligencebusinesswastheMaldivesinvasion.13Alsoatthattime,NepalwasactivebecauseitboughtsixMPA(MasterPieceArms)gunsfromChina.ThereafterRajivGandhi14enforcedaweaponsembargo.15Isaid,ifthisisthesituationbetweenNepalandIndia,wheredowe fit in?Wemay have hadwishes for a long time, but thiswaswhen onestartedlookingatit.Howdowemakeuseofthis?

Benazir’sgovernmentwasneither interestednorknewwhat todo.Withsomecolleagues I said,whatwouldGeneralZiahavedone?Weagreed thatZiawouldhavebeenproactive.Peoplewouldhavebeenseendoingsomething—statements,visiting,callingtheambassador,theworks.

SoIwentandlookeduptheNepaleseambassador.Kathmanduusuallypostedretiredmilitarychiefsasambassadors.Inthosedaysacoupleofmilitarymenhadfollowedoneanother.TheSriLankansalsodid that. Iwentandaskedhim,howcouldwehelp?

Sinha:TheyhadamilitarymanbecauseofZia?

Durrani:Probably.Forme,itwasadevelopmentinIndianbackwaters,howcanwemakeuseofit?

Dulat:Howcanweexploitit?

Durrani: The Kathmandu dinner we three had, I asked our host despite yourpresence, whether India makes the Nepalese unhappy. He said, yes, of course.

Because here is a big country, India, with hegemonic ambitions. They likeprevailingonus,tellinguswhattypeofsystemweshouldhave,whetherornotitisgoodforus.ThatwecouldbeapartofIndia,abigprovince,benignly,positively.That’sonewayofannexation.WhatisittheydidtoSikkim?

Butwhyonly talk ofNepal and India?Afghanistan andPakistan:we’remuchsmaller than India, and Afghanistan much bigger, more potent and moreproblematicthanNepal.YetAfghangeneralscomeandsay,youthinkweareyourfifthorsixthprovince,kyabaatkarraheho?Someofourpeoplesay,youareouryoungerbrother.Theyimmediatelyrespond:‘Youngerbrother?Wewerethere200yearsbeforeyoucamealong.WehadneverevenheardofyouinAfghanistan.’

Thisequationofanoverbearingcountryanditsneighbourexistsonoursidetoo.

Dulat: The Nepalese were always willing to concede that they are the youngerbrothers.

Sinha:WhathappenedwiththatNepaleseambassadorwhowasamilitaryman?

Durrani:Hesaid, ‘We’reonlytryingtogetclosertoChina,thatwasthehelpwegotfromthem.Indiaisnottheonlyone.’Neverputyoureggsinonebasket.

Butnothinghappened.PakistanwasnotinapositiontohavedonemucheitherinMaldivesorinNepal.

Sinha:Thatambassadorbecameyourfriend.

Durrani:Iwentandmethimonceortwice.WhenIwasthehead,theISIheaddidnotattendreceptions,foreignNationalDays,nothing.IonlyattendedtwoNationalDay functions. One was whenMani Dixit16 invited me when Foreign SecretaryMuchkundDubeywasvisitingIslamabad.

Igot toknowManiwell. Imethimwhile IwasatMIandsitting inthearmychief’sroom.ManihadtakenoverasIndianhighcommissionerandwasmakinghisfirst call on Aslam Beg, who handled things well though he sometimes got badpress.AfterhalfhourorsoAslamBegsayswe’regoingtoholdabigexercise(Zarb-e-Momin).AfterOperationBrasstackswedidnotwanttosendthewrongsignalorcreatepanic.Hesaid:‘We’regoingtoholditwellawayfromtheborder.’

Mani Dixit, the trained, blue-blooded diplomat that he was, merely said:‘General,Iwillconveyyourmessagetopeoplebackhome.’

AfterImovedtoISI,DubeywasvisitingandIwasinvitedtoareception.TheDG ISI is unlikely to go to an Indian reception even under the best ofcircumstances,but Iwent andManiDixitwas appreciative.WechattedwithhisdaughterAbha,whowasresearchingonSindh,andthenIhadafewminutesone-on-onewithDubey.

TheotherfunctionwaswhenNepalsentaninvitationforitsNationalDay.Theambassador, that General, was a clever man. There was no one else at thereception,Iwastheonlyonethere.JusttheambassadorofNepalandtheISIhead.The man was so clever that when he found out I was coming, he probablydisinvited everyone or postponed it. He just wanted a one-on-one with me.Otherwisenoreceptions.

Dulat:IservedinNepalthree-and-a-halfyears,underthreeambassadors,myonlyexperience in diplomatic service. I made a lot of friends and the key to thosefriendshipswascricket,becauseIplayedalot.

Itstartedmodestly.Nepalnowhasanationalcricketteamwhichin2017visitedBangladesh.Inthosedaystherewerefive-sixcricketclubs.TheIndianembassywasone.Theyhadtwotournamentshere.Onewasaleague,andonewasaknockout.Irepresented the Indian embassy and came into contactwith a lot ofNepalese. Imademanyfriends.

In those three-and-a-half years the Indian embassy became a serious cricketteam. At the end of it we won the league, we won the knockout, and in ourarrogancewetookonacombinedNepalteamandbeatthemaswell.

Sinha:That’swhytheycalledyouBigBrother.

Durrani:Beatingthemwasnotagoodidea.WeusedtohaveapolotournamentinBruneiandtheAmericanteamthatcameadvisedusnottobeattheSultan’steam.Thatwastheprescriptiontogetinvitedagainandagain.

Dulat:Maybeitwasnotagoodideabeatingthem.Asaresult,aNepalesecricketteamevolved.BeforeIleftKathmanduIwasinvitedtoplayforNepal;theyweregoingtoBangkoktoplayinThailand,theremustbesomeclubthere.IsaidIwouldlovetocome,butI’mnotNepalese.I’llhavetostayoutofthis.

Onebecamewellknownherebecauseofcricket.There’sabigparadegroundknown as Tundikhel, where the parades are held, andwhere cricket used to beplayedinthosedays.

There was a game going on, we were playing one of the major clubs inKathmandu, theGentlemen’s Cricket Club. I was watching from the boundary.Thebatterhadgottenout,andayoungsterwalkeduptomeandasked(inNepali),who’splaying. IsaidIndianEmbassyvsGCC.Hedidn’trecognisemeandasked,Daulatkikatiho,meaning,howmuchdidDaulatscore.Iwastickled.

ButthenetresultwasmyfinalambassadorwroteareportonmetoDelhisayingIdidnothingbutplaycricket.

Durrani: I got a similar compliment from a famous corps commander. He wasaskedifIcouldbetakenfromthecorpsforappointmentelsewhere.Hesaid,yes,as

long as he’s available to join the corps team in the coming golf tournament. Forhim,hisbrigadecommanderwasofnouse.

Sinha:AnyanecdotefromyourMIdays?

Durrani:There’s one aboutA.Q.Khan.17 TheDGMI attends certain receptionsand Ioncewent toaparticularNationalDay reception.Manycarscome,peopleget out, they go in.Once they come out, theman at the gate announces them.GeneralDurraniSahebkigadileaaye.

Onthatoccasionthevaletsaid,GeneralSahebaapektarafkhadehojaye,Ihavetotalktoyou.Isaidkyahua.Hesays,whatbusinessdoesA.Q.Khanhavetocometo all these receptions? Meaning this man should preferably be away from thelimelight.Hesays,SahebIdomyduty,IhaveneversaidA.Q.KhanSahebkigadileaaye. Ialwayssay,driverFazaluKhan,gadi leaaye, sothatnooneknowsthatA.Q.Khanwashere. I’mtryingtokeepthismanasanonymousaspossible.Thischapcomesandtakespartineverything.

Iappreciatedthisgesture,butA.Q.Khanlovedtobeseenandrecognised.Hemayhavebeenapplaudedatacoupleofplaces,buttherewereenoughpeoplewhodid not appreciate it. Self-projection was one of his weaknesses, but hiscontributiontoournuclearprogrammewassubstantialifnotdecisive.

I went to the President Ghulam Ishaq Khan, who was the custodian of ournuclearprogramme.Hegot that role fromZia-ulHaq.Z.A.Bhuttoas theprimeministerwas the fatherof theprogramme,Zia tookchargeof it and fromhim itpassedtoGhulamIshaqKhan.Hewasthebestmantoensurethatourprogrammeremainedoncourse,becauseheknewhow todealwith things. If theAmericanscame,hewouldnottalktothem.Ifsomeoneelseasked,hewouldexplainourneedforit.

Isaid,Sir,A.Q.Khan’sappearanceonfrequentoccasions,hispublicstatements,theyarenotright.Thewiseoldmanthathewas,hesaid,yes,Iknow.Everymanhastobeacceptedasapackage.He’suseful,he’sindispensablefortheprogramme,andthisissomethingwehavetolivewith.

Had I gone anywhere else they would have said, please go and talk to thepresident.Somewouldsay,layoff.Toothers,hewouldsaynoneoftheirbusiness.Hewouldmakesurenoonetouchestheprogramme,noonefiddleswithit,nooneeventriestoderailit.

Sinha:Soyourfriendsweren’tscaredoftheDeepState?

Durrani:Onthelighterside:astheheadoftheISI,anoldfriendinvitedmeforasmalldinner.Drinkswereserved.Someguestsgotscaredandsaid,GoodLord,wecamehereforaniceeveningandthechiefspymasterissittinghere.He’sgoingto

tellpeopleweweredrinking.Andsomeofthemwereuniformedofficers.

Myfriendassuredthem,Iknowthisfellow,andhehascertainconstraintsrightnow,buthe’snotlikelytogoaroundandsaythatso-and-sodrinks.Theyprobablythenfeltconfidentthatokay,wecangetawaywithit.

People may be scared that those caught drinking are dealt with severely.Regardless of all the prohibition from law, from religion, I do not remember ifpeoplewhowerefondofthetipplewereeverharmed.GeneralZiawassurroundedby peoplewhowere fond of drinking. It’s unbelievable. And these peoplewerescaredbecauseIwasthere.

5

ISIVsRAW

AdityaSinha:Whichisbetter,ISIorRAW?

A.S.Dulat:TomakeacomparisonwiththeRAWmaynotbefairbecausetheISIismuch older,whereas theRAW is nearly 50 years old, bifurcated from the IB inSeptember1968. Its creationwas a falloutpossibly of the ’62 and ’65wars, andMrs Gandhi1 felt the intelligence from abroad at her level was not receivingsufficientattention.

AsadDurrani:OnceanAmericanjournalistwithpoorposturecameuptomeataconference,casuallyposingaquestion:‘HowdoyourateRAW?’

Itwasobviouslynot socasual aquestion, andwasprobably intended tocatchmeoff-guardandprovokemeintoanalysisorsaynothing.Hewas likelytogototheRAWchiefandsay,look,thisiswhattheotherfellowsaid,andgetaresponsefromhim.

Instead,almostreflexivelyIsaid:‘Atleastasgoodasweare.’

The ISI’s Afghanistan involvement happened before I took over, but I foundabsolutelyeveryoneapplaudingit:friends,oldfriends,newfriends,pseudo-friends.ManycameandsangpraisesthatISIhasbecomecapable,itcontrolseverybody,ithasaname.

When I had that one-on-one with a member of (Foreign Secretary) Dubey’sdelegation,heasked: ‘What is the ISI’smain focus?’Atthat timeourmain focuswasofcourseAfghanistan,but I thought I shouldputSouthBlocktowork.So Isaid:‘India,ofcourse.’

Dulat:IwouldagreewithGeneralSahebthatifyoutookRAWandIBagainsttheISIoragainstPakistan’sagencies,theyareasgoodprofessionally.There’salotdonebyour agencies thatpeopledon’t get toknowabout, or shouldnot get toknowabout. In the intelligenceworld India produced big names like B.N.Mullik2 andR.N.Kao3andM.K.Narayanan4andnowAjitDoval.5

Durrani: About ten years ago a ratings website called Smashing Lists came outwith,amongotherlists,theworld’stenbestspyagencies.Outoftheblue.ISIwasnumberone,followedbyMossad,CIA,andalltheothers.

Ofcourse,athomepeople felthappyabout it. Iwasaskedand I said, Idon’tknowbutthecriteriaforthisratingseemedprettygood.Onewasthenumberof

threatsPakistanfaced,bothinsideandoutside,anotherwastheresourcesavailabletoit.UnlikethedayswhenwegotmoneyfromSaudiArabiaandAmerica,there’sashoestringbudgetandsoatightcontrolofmoney.

Thepoint isnotwho’sone,two,threeorfour.Youdoa jobwell,keepa lowprofile, no one takes credit, no one blamed, no claims. Like you guys did yourMuktiVahiniquietly.

For me, the best way to judge ISI was that during the Soviet occupation ofAfghanistan, it got all the help from most of the big players in the West butallowednointerferenceinitsrole,organisingtheresistance.ButthentheColdWarwasoverandwehadtochangeourobjectivesintheregion,andtheISIwaskeytothat.

Another accomplishment is that none of our operators ever defected or was‘caughtoncamera’.

Sinha:WhathasbeenthegreatestISIfailureagainstIndia?Iwillaskhim(Dulat)asimilarquestion.

Durrani:Ithinkmycolleagueshouldstart.

Dulat: Our biggest failure against Pakistan is that we’ve not been able to turnaroundanISIofficerorhaveanISIofficerworkingforus.Ornottomyknowledge,atalevelwhereitcounts.

IfyougobacktotheColdWar,whatwasthemaintaskofaCIAofficer?Itwastosomehowfindadefector.IfaCIAguyfoundadefectorthenfortherestofhiscareer he didn’t need to do anything, because he had donewhatwas supremelyrequired.

On our side I don’t thinkwe’ve even imagined it properly and I don’t thinkwe’vesucceeded.

Sinha:EvenifwehadamoleinsideISI,nobodywouldknow.

Dulat:Molesareeasiertohavethandefectors.

GeneralSahebwastalkingaboutdoubleagents.Doubleagentsarethenextbestthingtodefectors.IfaguyisworkingforPakistanandIgetholdofhim,thenIhaveachanceofgettingtowhereI’msupposedtobe.So,notbeingabletofindanISIdefectorisourbiggestfailure.

Durrani: At the operational level, the 1965 war, we could claim we got goodinformationabouttheotherside,howtheyareassembledforwar.Butitwasalosteffort.

Inthe1971wartheISIwasunabletoanticipatetheattackinEastPakistan.

In my time we predicted that India’s military build-up, after the Kashmiruprising,wasnotintendedforwar.Icanpatmyownbackforthat.

But the biggest failure was when the Kashmir uprising happenedwe did notknowhowfaritwouldgo.Thesethingsusuallyruntheircourseinsixmonthsorayear.Whenitbecamelasting,wewonderedhowtokeepahandleonit.Wedidn’twantittogooutofcontrol,whichwouldleadtoawarthatneithersidewanted.Couldwemicro-manageit?Thatwasourchallenge.ISI’sleverageontheKashmirinsurgencyturnedoutlessthansuccessful.

Inparticular,IregretittilltodaywhywedidnottakeAmanullahGilgitimoreseriously.Hisgroupledtheuprising.Hestartedit,initiatedit,spokeaboutit.ImethimwhenIwasattheISI.Hedidnotseemimportantatthattime.Inanycase,histhirdoptionofindependencewasunnecessarilymuddyingthewater.Andwhatdidindependencemeananyway?

Gilgiti,though,wasprobablythemostseriousone,focusedandconnected.Likethe rallies atChakoti.Everyyear, onour side,October27 is celebrated asBlackDay. Gilgiti was the only person who brought his crowd in, disciplined, sober,serene,conductingtheproceedingsandthemarchwithoutcommotion.Theotherswerenon-serious,theycamefromhereandthere,madetheirspeechesandleft.

ButgoingbacktotheevolutionoftheKashmiruprisingofthe1990s,Ithinktheformationof theHurriyat6 toprovideapoliticaldirection to the resistancewasagoodidea.Givinguphandleonthemovement—lettingthefactionsdowhattheybloodywellwantedto—wasnot.

Dulat:Letmemakeclearonething.InpublicperceptionnotgettingDawood7orHafizSaeed8orMasoodAzhar9areglaringfailures.ButifinsteadofputtingoutasupariforDawood,you‘turned’theISIstationchiefinDelhi,thatinintelwouldbeamuchbiggerthing.

About the Pakistani angle in Kashmir, they often crow about putting outsomebodyhere, or bumping off somebody there, or forcing someone to form anorganisation,orsendingoutdiktats.It’sokay,workstoanextent.

Kashmir is very painstaking and requires patience.That iswhere Pakistan haslostout.

Becauseafterawhilethefeelingwas,asGeneralSahebsaid,jaanedo,letthemgo.ThisisonthebasisofconversationswithPakistanisoverthelasttenyears,sincetheMumbai attack. The general responsewas that they can talk about Kashmirlater,fornowtheycanputitonthebackburner.

But it’snow ‘gameon’again in the last threeyearsbecauseof theuncertaintywe’vecreated.ThestatusquomesswecreategetsPakistaninterestedagain.

IusedtotellPakistanifriendsinTrack-II,let’sdiscussyourcoreissue,Kashmir.EvenGeneralSahebwouldsay,thereisn’tsufficientinterestinKashmir.Forgetitforthetimebeing.

It’s been like that. It’s a typical military reaction, a typical military way ofdealingwithaproblem.Thatpossibly,Sir,isoneoftheshortcomingsintheISI.

Durrani:That’sinoursystem.

Dulat:Youbulldozeyourway.TheKashmiriknowshowtoplaydifferentsides.

Sinha:SotheintelligencegameiswonbytheKashmirieventhoughheissuffering.

Dulat:AfellowI’veknownforyearswilltellmeonethingandsixmonthslaterwilltellmesomethingelse;hisperception,hisstory,everythingwillchange.

Inbetween,he’llbowlGeneralSahebagoogly.

ButKashmirrequirestime.Ifyouwanttounderstanditorgetyourselfinvolvedthenitrequirestime,patience,empathy.

Durrani: I agree. I also agree with the point that under the circumstances,KashmirisorAfghans learntolivewithit,whichmeansyouhavetokeeptwoorthreedifferentsidesingoodhumour.Andstillsurvive,fightingtheIndianarmyortheUSarmy.

Dulat:AboutAfghanistan,wealwaysknewitwasgoingtohaverepercussionsforus. If theCIA let loose the ISI inAfghanistan, thenyou let loose theHizb,10 theLashkarandtheJaishinKashmir.Youmaysayitisdirectlylinked,butthere’saninevitabilityaboutit.IftheAmericansfelttheISIwasgettingoutofcontrol,andtheyfeltitasearlyasthen,thenourapprehensionswerejustified,thatthisisgoingtohavebig-timeimplicationsinKashmir.

Durrani:It’seasytotalkaboutpossibilitiesandscenarios;ifyoudothat,thentheywill do this. The capability, performance possibilities, conducive situation:manyfactorscomeintothepicture.Itdoesn’thappenthatyourpeopleareinAfghanistanandourpeoplewillgotoKashmir.It’snotacyber-gameinwhichyoucantargetJaish-e-MohammedthissideandaRAW-backedgrouponthatside.Doesithaveingress?Wouldlocalscooperatewiththem?

Atthesametime,ifweintenddeployingagroupIdon’tthinkoneiswaitingforthe Indians orAmericans to take a step and then, as quid pro quo, do it.We’dprobablybedoingitalready.Ifnotblatantly,atleastinsomeformorother.It’snotnecessarilytit-for-tat.

Dulat:Itwasnottit-for-tat,Sir.Wealreadyhadthetit!Nowweweregettingthetat.

Durrani:Sometimesyoumightbelieveitisso.Sometimesyoumightdoitbecause

ifyou’renotgoingtodoitinKashmiryou’regoingtosomewhereelse.

Dulat:SoweagreethatiswhentheISIgotalarger-than-lifeimageandthatwasitsheyday?

Durrani:TheKashmirthing?

Dulat:TheAfghanthingandthenKashmir.

Durrani:TheAfghanthing.Kashmir?

Dulat:KashmirfollowedtheAfghanthing.

Durrani:Whenonewas lookingatKashmir, it ispossible thatonewasunable toget thewholepicture right.But initially, if thepotential is suspect,wewait andwatch.

Dulat:That’sright,that’sright.

Durrani:Thenwesaythatbecauseoftheproblemsthatyouhaveelsewhere,thisisnot right time forus to startplaying theSikhcard, theKashmir card, theULFAcard.

Eventually,theideawasthatifthisisanuprising,itshouldnotleadtoaconflictthatneithersidewants.Itcanblowup,involvebothcountriesinawarthatneithersideisbargainingfor.

Theideawastokeepitonaleash.Whetherwecouldcontrolthesethingsisadifferentmatter altogether.Onehad a good idea about our limited capability tohandlesomanybigthings,andpunchingaboveone’sweightisnotagoodidea.

But if the dynamics of that thing was beyond us, that’s anothermatter. TheintentionoftheStatewas,however,nottocontinueonthistrack,andultimatelyflyagreenflagonLalQila(RedFort).

Indeed,somemighthavesaidthat—nowthattheSovietUnionwasnomore—ZiaorHamidGulhadambitionsbeyondAfghanistan!Butessentiallywewereonlythinkingabouttradeandcultural links.Atthattimeevenprojects like‘electricityfrom Central Asia’ looked like a bit over the top. Now with CASSA 100 andCPEC,itseemsthatsomefuturisticthinkingwasalwaysinorder.

ItsoundedfantasticatthetimebuttheonlysubstantialthingIheardwas,let’sgetelectricityfromCentralAsia.Isaid,whatnonsenseareyoutalking,howwillwegetthelinesovertheWakhancorridor?Butnow,25yearslater,theChina-PakistanEconomicCorridor(CPEC)isaboutthat.

Dulat:Returning to thequestionofprofessionalism, I had asked thoseKashmiriswho had seen us andwho had been to the other side, which agency has betterpeople or is more professional? The general response was that our guys are

generally better. Pakistan has some fine officers but they may not have an AjitDoval.

Durrani:ThankGod.

Dulat: I would say the RAW or the IB could certainly dowith aGeneral AsadDurrani.

Sinha:TheRAWhashaditsshareofpoorleaders.

Dulat: Iwouldalwayscontest that since itwouldbe trueof agenciesworldwide.Therewouldbeoutstandingchiefsandsomequiteordinary.GeneralSahebhassaidhis opinion of the CIA was that it is a great organisation but it is a third-rateintelligence agency.11 If the CIA is third-rate then its chiefs must have beenordinary.

Sopedestrianchiefsareeverywhere,intheIB,intheISI.

Sinha:HastheISIconsistentlyseenstrongleadership?

Durrani:GenerallyweregardtheIndiansystemasmoreeffective.It’sinstitutional.It’s not at anyone’swhims, likewhenTariqAzizwas pulled out of the revenueserviceandmadeourNationalSecurityAdvisor.OrtheloyalistwhowasasecurityofficerbutmadetheIBchief.

The DG ISI may be recommended by the army chief but the appointingauthoritywastheprimeminister.Notnecessarilybecausehe’ssomebody’sfriend.He’llhave ideas, flair,knowabitof internationalrelations,management,andtheright temperament. Take his timewith things. Somewhowere brusque tried toturntheorganisationonitshead,butmercifullytheorganisationisresilientandcanwithstandtemporaryshocks.

Dulat:Oneproblemisthatunlikesomeotheragencies,weareburdenedwithnotjustintelligencecollection,butintelligenceanalysis.IthinktheISIislikeusinthisregard.Inbothagenciesthereistoomuchemphasisonanalysisandnotenoughoncollection.Ouragenciesneedtobemorehands-on.

Otherwise they are burdenedwith toomuch.What is an agency supposed toproduce? Ifyouwant it toknoweverything thathappens, thenyoumissout theessentials.What isour focus?Arewe lookingatPakistan?Afghanistan?Kashmir,Tamil Nadu, Punjab? Internal security, external security? Counter-intelligence?Counter-terrorism?It’sendless.

Anotherhandicapwehaveisourtenure.

Durrani:Mossadchiefhassixyears.

Dulat:TheMI6chiefcouldservelonger,andafterithegetsknighted.Iwaschiefforonly17-18months,likeGeneralSaheb.Justasyou’resettlinginandbeginning

to understand thewhole thing and enjoy it, your time’s up. In India now chiefshavetwoyears,buteventhatisnotenough.Itshouldbethreeyears,exceptthatthe longer the term, themore peoplewillmiss out on being chief.Youhave toweighthis.

GeneralSahebsaidtheISIworkedonashoestringbudget.InthatcasewehadnobudgetatallbecausewewereneverfundedbytheCIA!

There’s also the question of keeping a lowprofile. Therewas a time in IndiawhenyouneversawaphotographofanIBchief.MrKaowasneverphotographed.Now chiefs becoming public and being in the open is a recent phenomenon. Isupposeit’sthesamearoundtheworld.

Sinha:Isittougherforspychiefswithastrongprimeminister?

Dulat:Itistougher,butit’salsobetter.Thetaskingwouldbemuchtougher.Theagenciesliketocreatetheirowntasking.Wefeelweknowitbetterthananybodyelse.Whenthetaskingstartscomingfromthetop,howithastohappenandwhichwayweareheading,thenitbecomesthatmuchmoredifficult.

It’sdifficultifyouarecatering,asGeneralSahebhinted,toacertainregime,oracertainset-up.WithaprimeministeraspowerfulandstrongasModi,thejobofthe intelligence agenciesmustbe thatmuch tougher. Itmightbe getting simplerbutitwouldnotbeeasy.

Therehavebeen, incidentally,primeministers in Indiawhohadno interest inintelligence.Idon’tthinkMorarjiDesai(1977-79)consideredintelligenceanasset.P.V.NarasimhaRao (1991-96)was too intelligent and thought itwas fraud andchuglibaazi. Even I.K. Gujral (1997-98) was sceptical about intelligence. PrimeministerslikeRajivGandhi(1984-89)founditfascinating,maybebecausehewasyoung.Hewasabsolutelyfascinated,andreliedsomuchontheagencies.ThestoryisthattheDIBwouldhavecoffeeandchocolatewithhimat10:30everynight.

TheprimeministerthatIservedwith,A.B.Vajpayee(1998-2004),helikedtolisten,helikedtobebriefed.Hedidn’treact,buthemadeyoufeelimportantandthatwhatyou’retellinghimhewantstoknow.Hedidn’trubbishit.Forapersonwhospokelittleandwassoreallyhimself,hegaveyouapatienthearing.

Sinha:DotheIBandtheRAWworktogetherwell?

Dulat: I’m not saying that we don’t work together, we do. The nature ofintelligencework is such that inevitably there is a certain degree of jealousy andone-upmanship.Buthowfardoyoutakethat?InAmerica,therehavealwaysbeenproblemsbetweentheCIAandFBI.Nottosaythatitdoesn’thappenelsewhere.It’sattributedtohowbigtheCIAbecame.Onthegroundthat’sresentedbytheotherpeoplewho’redoingthesamekindofthing.

Durrani: If in India youareworking together, youareone step aheadofus.Wehardlyseeanycooperationbetweenouragencies.

Dulat:Pakistanisonestepbehindus?I’mglad,thereshouldbesomethinginwhichtheyarebehind.

Durrani:InPakistan,cooperationbetweengovernmentdepartments,civil-military,andgenerallyisfarfromdesirable.Itmaybebecauseofourhistory.

Dulat:IgrewupintheIB,spent30yearsthereand,strangely,hadn’tthefoggiestideawhathappensintheRAW.IntheIBwehadcontemptfortheRAW.Whenasked if I would like to head that organisation, I jumped at it. I was otherwiseretiringasnumbertwointheIB;earlierthehomesecretaryofferedmeoneofthepara-militaryforcestoheadandIsaidno,Ispentmywholelifeinintelligence,whywouldIwanttomoveout.

When Iwent to theRAW theydidn’t like it.Understandably, they thought Iwasanoutsider.IttookawhiletosettledownandforthemtoacceptthatIknewthe business. Interestingly, everybody worried that there would be a hugeinfiltrationoftheRAWbyIBguys.MyoldfriendsthoughtIwasstillanIBguyintheRAW.Sowhenevertherewasalittleargumentordiscussionbetweenthetwoorganisations,IBchiefswouldsay,arreyaaryou’reoneofus.I’dsay,ofcourse,butnowI’mheadingtheRAWanditsinterestswouldbeuppermostinmymind.

CabinetSecretaryPrabhatKumaronedayasked,Dulat,maindekhtahoonidharudharIBwaleko,RAWwalekobhidekhtahoon,tumnetodonodekhehai,tumbataowhichisbetter.Isaid,botharebetter.Isaid,theIB’smoresolid,itcomprisesbasicallypolicemen.Hereyouhaveamixofvariouskinds,sosometimesthere’snogellingtogether.

Sinha:EspritdeCorps?

Dulat:Yeah,sometimes.Butmantoman,therearegoodpeopleintheRAW,soweshouldnotrunitdown.WorkingtogetherwassomucheasierinmytimeintheRAWbecauseIwouldcallShyamal12upandsay,let’ssitdownandsortitout.

Unfortunately it didn’t last long. After us, it was back to square one, thesquabbling,etc.Therehavebeenperiodswhereit’sbeengood,butnotalways.

Sinha:Doesbureaucraticslothexistinintelligenceagencies?

Dulat: Yes, in two ways. One is the sloth that develops within an organisation.Intelligence agencies in a sense are bureaucratic, but you have to keep clear ofbureaucratese.Whatwedointheagencyisnotauthorisedorgiveninanybook.Noruleswouldpermitmanythingsthataredone.Soifyoubringbureaucracyintoanintelligenceorganisation,slothwillfollow.

The other difficulty is that as an agency you still have to deal with thebureaucracy, which varies from government to government. Like in Modi’sgovernment, I don’t think that problem exists, because there is only Modi andDovaltodealwith.There’snootherbureaucracy.Eventheotherministersdon’tcount.

Similarly inVajpayee’s government itwasbasicallyhimandhisNSA,BrajeshMishra.Theothersdidn’tcountformuch.

The defence or foreign ministers didn’t interfere in our functioning.When IjoinedtheRAWandwenttomeetthecabinetsecretary,hesaid,I’mheretohelpyouadministratively.Professionallyoroperationallywhatyoudo, Idon’twant toknow.Telltheboss.Heseemedalmostscaredofus.

Thatkindofresponsefromthebureaucracyisperfect.Butit’snotwhatalwayshappens.Ahomesecretaryandacabinetsecretarycouldmakethingsdifficultforyou. Itdependsonthe in-betweenman. It’shappenedfromtimetotimethatanNSA has cut off interaction between the prime minister and an agency.Unfortunately,thestatusofthechiefdependsonthatrelationship,andeverybodywatchesyou,whoyouhaveaccessto,whoyoureportto.

That’swhyinBritaintheyhavethiswonderfultraditionwherethechiefcanaskfortimewiththeprimeministeranytime.

Sinha:Militaries alsohavebureaucracies.Whenyouwere ISI chief, did you facebureaucraticsloth,orwaseveryonetooafraidoftheDeepState?

Durrani:Thereisabureaucracy,nodoubtaboutthat,oneinthemilitaryandonein the defence ministry. They have power that the army cannot underestimate.Evenwhen themilitary is ruling the roost, theministry can ride roughshodoverindividuals.

Military bureaucrats are the ones at various headquarters as staff officers, etc.Theattitudeofthesepeopleisbetterthanthatofthenormalbureaucracy.Notthattheywon’tcreateproblemsorwritedissentingnotes,etc.It’sjustthattheculturehas no such thing as a staff officer sitting on a file. The civil bureaucracy isdifferent: it canblocka file, thedemandswon’tbecheap.Thatbureaucracywillnotletthingshappen.

ThecomparisonbetweentheIndianandPakistanibureaucraciesisthatourshasits strength anda fewweaknesses.The strength is thatwhetherornot anyone ishappy, they recognise that they have to do their work. Theweakness is it’s themilitary holding Pakistan together. The bureaucracy’s ability to keep its politicalmastersincheckislimited.

In India it is good: strong, efficient, connected,maintained, functional. It has

heldtogether.Ithasnotletpoliticiansrunamok.ItsproblemisthesamethattheAmericanestablishmenthas.Thisestablishmentdoesnotallowanyonetostepoutof line.Iftheprimeminister isapowerfulonelikeModiorVajpayee,yes,but itkeepsacheckonhowmuchtheycando.Thebureaucracycanobstructorfacilitatematters.

InthecaseofAmerica,theestablishment’sattitudewas,we’llseeObamasahebhowlongyoucangothroughwiththat.

Dulat:Whatyou’resayingisinteresting,Sir,becauseIndiandemocracyisratedasone of the better ones theworld over. I’vewatched the bureaucracy from1990whenIreturnedfromKashmirto2004,whenIleftgovernment.WhatIobservedwasthatthefaultlaynotwiththepoliticianbutwiththebureaucracy.Ofallthegreat guys that I saw during my 14 years in Delhi, except for a couple ofexceptions,theotherswerejustbureaucrats,theydidn’tstandforanything.

ButinthecaseofDrManmohanSingh,hecouldnotgotoPakistan,andwhilehis party did not support him, itwas sadly his bureaucracywhich did not help.Wheneversomethingwentwrong,thefingerswereimmediatelypointedathim.

Durrani:Thebureaucracyisnotpopularanywhere,whetherintheUS,Germanyorhere.

Yourremarkisinterestingthatpoliticiansarenottobefaulted.Inourcase,westillarenotfondofthedemocraticwaysofdoingthings.Tillthathappens,notonlypoliticiansbutsometimesthemilitaryleadershiptoosharestheblameforspoilingthebureaucraticcultureinPakistan,makingthemineffective,forcingthemtogiveintotheirdemands.Itistheoldculturethatdidnotwanttobechanged.

Dulat: Another significant point that General Saheb has made is the traditionalneutralityofthebureaucracy.Wheredoesitexistnow?InIndiaitendedwithMrsGandhi.MaybeinBritainitstillexists,butthatmustbethesolitarycountry,ifitexists.

Durrani:AyubKhan13startedtinkeringwithit,butmoreorlessitremainedsteady.

Dulat:Whenyousaytinkering,howmanyyearsaftertheBritsleftdiditsurvive?

Durrani: (Z.A.) Bhutto is when the rot started, Zia-ul-Haq expedited matters.Cultureofcorruptionmadeitworse.Themilitarybureaucracytoodidnotremainunaffected.

Sinha: You oncementioned the Soviet system’s problemwas that it allowed nodissent.Butistheredissentinamilitarysystem?

Durrani:Ourculturehasdeveloped inamannerthat ifyoudon’t likesomethingonewouldsay,tumkozyadapatahai?Thatistheculturewherethebossdoesnot

likepeoplewithdifferentviews.

OnceIwaspartofanexercisewiththeGermanarmy.Intheeveningwewereatthebarwiththelocalcommand,asergeant,someofficers.Everyonepaidforhisown drinks.And they allwere free to disagreewith each other.We are not yetthere.

Sinha:DoestheRAWmaninIslamabadhaveatoughertimethantheISImaninDelhi?

Durrani:Idonotknow.Inmytime—eventhoughKashmirwasontheboil—Idonot recall if there were any ‘unusual’ complaints from either side. But I dounderstandwhentheyprotestthattheirgovernmentwasnotbeingastoughastheadversary’s.

Dulat:Actually,Sir,ithasn’thappenedoflatethankfully,butsomeyearsagosomeofourofficerswereroughedupinPakistan.Theyhadbadexperiences.

Sinha: In the late ’80s there was an Uttarakhand IPS officer whose face wasbruised.Hisphotowassplashedinthepapers.

Dulat:That’sright,UPorUttarakhandcadre.Hewasroughedup.

Durrani:IwastheDG,MI,soIdon’tremember.

Dulat:Idon’trememberhisnamebecauseIdon’tknowifitwashisrealnameorhiscovername.

Durrani: Since this is a book about broader subjects, let’s say the diplomats,attachés, and cover officers from both sides face a problem. Not giving them atoughtimewouldbeexceptional.

Sinha:Whataboutthetwoagenciesandtheiruseofthemedia?

Durrani:One thing incommonbetween the twoare themediawars.TheyevenfinanceTVchannelsinthebeliefthatthesewillworkforthem.Theyhavenoideahowtogoaboutit.

ThefirstsuchchannelwasanIndianone,itwaspaid.

Dulat:Whopaidit?ISI?

Durrani:ISIcametothefieldmuchlater.

Dulat:He’s sayingan IndianTVchannelwas sponsoredbyan Indian intelligenceagency.

Durrani:ByRAW.IfIremembercorrectly,25milliondollars.Inthosedaysitwasnotasmallfigure.

Sinha:Eventodayit’snotasmallfigure.

Dulat:Butwhatwasthisfor?Neverheardofit.

Durrani:To start a channel towork forRAW.This iswhat intelligence agencieseverywhere believe, that the media must be financed to wage psychologicalwarfare.

Muchas I consider theCIAa third-rate service, on this front theymanage topersuade the media. It brings journalists around on core issues such as Pakistanbashing,orbenefitsofacivilnucleardeal.

Once a media organisation establishes credibility, the agencies start on coreobjectives: micro-managing, choreographing, managing from behind the scenes,steeringthetypeofcoverage,etc.

Mycountryonthisfronthasnotbeenimpressive.TheAmericansandBritishdothisthebest.Manufacturingfacts,creatinganenvironmentforwhenyougotowar,thesepeopledoitwiththehelpofthemedia.

Sinha:Whydidn’ttheISIjustsponsoranIndianchannel?

Durrani:IbelievethataprimeministerandtheNSCwokeuptotheideaandsaidcreatingassetsinIndiaandmanagingperceptionsmightnotbeabadidea.Whethertheycameupwiththerightassetornot,Idonotknow.

How subtle they are, letme give an example.An articlewas once publishedundereitheraHinduorSikhnameintheNation,Lahore.IsawthatthiscouldnothavebeenwrittenbyanyoneotherthananISIofficer.ThemanwhowasgiventopublishitdidnotevenchangetheterminologytoIndianiseit.

I’mthankfulyoupeopledidn’tsay,hahaha,isthisallthatcanbedonebyyouidiots,comeandlearnalessonfromus.

6

TheCIAandOtherAgencies

AsadDurrani: I never rated CIA assessments highly. Never. They don’t believetheyhavetocarryoutgoodassessments.Becauseinanycasetheyaregoingtosettheplaceonfire.Bombit.

Essentiallytheyrelysomuchontechnology.It’sonlyafacilitator,ultimatelytheassessment ismadebyhumanbeings.Like the Indiannuclear tests, Idon’tknowwhetheritwasbydesign.Butinanycasetheirintelligencefailed.

Likewhen no less thanRobertGates1 came running to India and Pakistan inMay 1990. In thewake of theKashmir uprising earlier that year, India partiallymobiliseditstroopstoitsborderwithPakistan.TheISIassessmentwasthatIndiadidnotintendtowagewar,asmanyessentialitemswereleftinthecantonments;theirgovernmentwantedtodemonstrateseriousnesstoitspublic.Sowekeptmostofourformationsintheirpeacelocations.Wejudgedcorrectly.

TheUS,however,sawIndiantroopmovementaswellassomecranesmovinginandoutofourbasesandconcludedthesemightbemissiles.Gates,however,wasscrambledtopreventapossiblenuclearwar.

The point is, I don’t hold them high when it comes to human intelligence(humint) or analysis. I’ve alreadymentionedhow they got itwrong forboth theGulfwars.TheywerejustprovidinganexcusefortheUSmilitaryaction.

Aditya Sinha: You’ve mentioned that in the British set-up, the MI6 doesn’t doanalysis.

A.S.Dulat: It doesn’t.But Iwas talking of the importance of humint.Youneedpeople to work for you. If you’re banking only on listening in on HizbulMujahideen, without context or without getting in the organisation, quite oftenyou’llgetdisinformation.Thereisalimittohowmuchyoucangettechnically.Ifitgetsknown.theadversaryiswarnedandcanuseitagainstyou.

TheKGB,CIA,Mossad: they’re great names but I agreewithGeneral Sahebthat CIA assessments have not always proven correct. There’s a lot of wishfulthinking. You jump to a conclusion and prepare reports. That’s not the wayintelligenceiscollected.

Forexample:IwasabouttoleaveNepalinFebruary1980.Theelectionhadjust

happenedinIndia,andMrsGandhireturnedwithamajority.BeforetheelectionIspoke to some CIA people in Kathmandu and they were convinced that BabuJagjivanRamwouldbethenextprimeminister.Onehadabetwithme.Isaid,no,MrsGandhiiscomingback,Ihaven’tbeeninIndiaforfouryearsbutIcantellyouthis.

Theyoftenbackthewronghorse.

KGB is tougher, but they have their crudeness. They’re not the mostsophisticated.KGBpeoplehavegottenintotroubleinvariouscountries.

PeoplesayMossadisthemostprofessional,butIdon’tknow.Itissotightandthey’reonlyconcernedwiththeirownagendas.It’sdifficulttosay.ButtherehavebeensomegreatMossadchiefs.

Sinha:IfMossadwassogreat,wouldn’tIsrael’sproblemshavebeensortedout?

Dulat:Problemsdon’tgetsortedoutifyouhaveafixedmindsetthatthisiswhatitis,thisiswhat’sright,thisiswhatweknow,andthisiswhat’swrong.Thenwhatwillyoudoanyway?It’salreadydone,there’snothingforyoutofindoutorgain.Youknowitall.

You’vegottoopenyourmindalso.TherehavebeenMossadchiefslikeEfraimHalevy,mycontemporary,whowasdifferent.

Durrani: Therewere some credible heads ofMossad.One of themwas there inBerlin at the Pugwash Conference, and a predecessor of his. I found that afterretirement both of them said openly, so brazenly, thatwhat theGovernment ofIsraelhadinmindaboutattackingIranwasinsane.

Dulat:Yes,that’sright.

Durrani:KGBwouldnotpassthosetestsIhaveforintelagencies.Primarilyit’sinasystemwheredissentisnotappreciated.Asubordinateisunlikelytosay,Comrade,yourassessmentisincorrectaboutthis,thisishowithappens.

Dulat: Sir, you will find with every agency, the nature of this business is such.KGB’sproblemwasthatitwaselitist.That’showPutin2todayrulestheworld,he’sthesamestock.TheseoldColdWarwarriorsarenotreconciledtothechangesthatcameaboutinRussia.That’swhyPutinistryingtodragitbacktothetimewhentheSovietUnionwasdominant.

Durrani: I believe the German BND works methodically, seriously. Germansanywayareseriouspeople.Buttheirproductissometimesnotuptothemark.

BND is a victimof their owndesire tobeperfect.Everythinghas tobedoneflawlessly,tieduptothelastdetail.

Sinha:Soitlosessightofthebigpicture?

Durrani:Thatiswhatonehaslearntovertime.You’renotgoingtowaitforeverforeverythingtotricklein,andthensaywe’vegoteverythingnow,let’scomeupwithaplan.Someonehastosay,thisishowitseemstobedeveloping,solet’sdothis.That’s the job of a person who is supposed to carry out strategic assessment,strategicanalysis,strategicrequirements.

That was lacking in the BND. After German reunification, someone said theeconomy turned out worse than what we expected.Where were you, BND? Adepartmentthatwassupposedtoassessthishadachap,andIbelievehisresponsewas: we had intelligence coming that we were filtering, analysing, and siftingthrough computer, but itwas somuch thatwe had just reached the 1950s and’60s,notthe’90s,whenthecollapsetookplace.

Youdon’texpectthisfromanyintelligenceagency,perhapssaturatedwithdata,30yearsbehindonyouranalysis.

Likethis,otheragencieshavebeenflatwrong.Latertheycookuparationale.Ifultimatelytheagencycannotprovideyoustrategicortacticalwarningintime,thenwhatgoodisthishugeapparatus?

Dulat:Everyintelligenceagencylikestobelieveitknowsmorethaneverybodyelse.InprofessionaltermsIthinktheBritsareprettygood.Theytalktheleast,dotheirjobquietly.

Sinha:AndtheyhaveJamesBond.

Durrani:About JamesBond Idonotknow.But theBritishwayofworking, likeafterthe7/73attack,iscalm.Itdoesn’thelpotherwise.

Sinha: Even after the recent Westminster4 attack they approached it calmly,methodically.

Durrani:TheBritishreputedlyareahundredyearsahead.Thatishowyoubecomethe sole superpower of your era for a couple of centuries. The Americans weremore powerful than Britain everwaswhen they became the sole superpower in1990-91.Moreindustry,militarypower,allies,andmorethreats.Nochallenge.Itwasall-powerful.

Tenyearslater,thedeclinestarts.Nowadayswhotakesthemseriously?Indeedtheycanbombalot;butthatisaboutalltheycan.

Dulat:TheBritshavetheadvantageofnothavingtoprepareanalysesallthetime,everyday.They’reworking on something for a long time, taking their time, andyoupassononlywhat isnecessary to theexecutivehead.AndthechiefsofMI6andMI5haveaccesstotheirprimeministerwhenevertheywant.

Durrani:Theyhaveaculture,theyallworkfortheCrown.

Sinha:TheAmericansputoutalotofliteratureabouttheiragenciesbutwedon’t.

Dulat:MullikSahebwrotehismemoirs.

Sinha:How long agowas that? India andpresumably Pakistanhave a paucity ofliterature.

Dulat:Idon’tknowwhy.WehadanIBchieftenyearsago,NehchalSandhu,whowaskeenthatahistoryoftheIntelligenceBureaubewritten.Butsomebodymusthavesaidno,it’stooearly.Theusual.

Sinha:Tooearly!It’stheworld’soldestintelligenceorganisation.

Dulat:Archivescan’tbeopened.It’scrazy,becauseiftheAmericansorRussiansorBritish can talk about their agencies, it’s only to their credit. And credibility. InIndiapeopledon’tevenknowwhattheIBis.There’sconfusionbetweentheIBandCBI. They know, as General Saheb said, the local thanedaar, but not what theSpecialBranchis.

Sinha:TheISImadeasplashwithTheBearTrap.

Durrani: Considering that we have not had an impressive tradition of writinghistoricalaccounts,TheBearTrap—thoughofquestionableaccuracy—wasstilltheright effort. India has a couple of books, but the CIA-sponsored works makeatrociousreading.

Sinha:Thatincludesmemoirs,orthejournalisticaccounts?

Durrani: Generally it’s bad. Someone spends six months somewhere, then goesbackandwritesathickbook.AftertheSovietswithdrewfromAfghanistan,PeterTomsenwasappointedtheUSpresident’sspecialenvoy,sohewasthereduringmyISIperiod.Ineverthoughtofwastingtimeonhim.TheUSambassadoronceaskedme,whydon’t youmeethim? I said Ihadneverheardofhim,whatdidhedo?Still,Imadetheefforttomeethim.Hewasunremarkable.

The next one hears of him, he’s produced this thick a book (The Wars ofAfghanistan, 2011),which comprisedhis six-monthorone-year stay, spent goingthroughnewspapers.Hecameintocontactwithnoone.Therewasevenachapteronme.EventhatImighthavefoundflatteringexceptthathisbooksaidhewastheonerunningAfghanistan,Iwashisdeputy.

Sinha:Howsuperficial.Still,theirorganisationvetstheirwritings.

Dulat:TheCIAhasasectionthatdealswithpublicity.Theydevoteconsiderabletimetothis.

Durrani:Butevenforoldtime’ssakeIamnotmotivatedtoevenopenthebook,consideringthetrashthesepeoplewrite.

IntheirsystemitisthepresidentwhopickstheCIAchief,andthat’showtheyendupwithalightweightcalledWoolsey.5Healsowroteathickbook.6Andthatother chap, he has anuninterrupted record of telling lies. I forget his name.Hisrecordoftellingliesisunblemished.

Dulat:Panetta?7

Durrani: Panetta was a vicious man, but this particular man was the one whoobligedontheissueofIraqiWMDs.8

I should admit thatwe feel that if it is coming from aCIAman, itmust becorrect. Their pen is backed by a mighty sword. Neither of us has that sort ofsword.

7

TheIntelligenceDialogues

AdityaSinha:HowdoestheISIseetheseinteractionsyou’vebeenhavingwithMrDulat?DoesitseeRAWassinister?

AsadDurrani:Noonehasevertalkedtomeonthissubject,butgoingbymypastexperience—inthatwhateverIsaidorwrote,neveroncewasIcautioned—allmyinstitutions, civil ormilitary,must have had enough confidence inmy ability toholdmyown.No surprise there—wehavenever suffered fromparanoiaon suchmatters.

After being liberated from service constraints, I havewritten joint paperswith aformerRAWchiefandgivenmyassessmentonthekillingofOsamabinLaden,notquiteinlinewithofficialversions.Noonehaseveraccusedmeofindiscretion.

Sinha:Whataboutyou,MrDulat?Hasanyoneasked,yehaapkyakarrahehain?Orjokinglysay,DulatSahebtohISIkaaadmihain.

A.S.Dulat:It’sfanciful,Idon’tthinkso.LikeGeneralSahebsaid,whateverwe’redoing,we’redoingopenly. Inanycase, theRAWwouldnot tellmewhat to saynow.Idon’tknowwhatisgoingonintheRAWorIBtoday.AndIhavedisagreedwithpeople,ontelevision.Eventhebookhintsatit.

Durrani:Atthis levelnoonewillbeblamed.Noonewill imaginethataboutMrDulat.

Dulat:Hisadvantageishehadtheexperienceofmeetinganofficerfromourside.Hehadachief-to-chiefmeeting. Ineverhad.Formethiswasabsolutelyunique,meetinghimandthenmeetingothercounterpartsfromtheISI.

Durrani:ThischargeofbeinganISIagent,whoeveritwasthrownatIfoundwasnotworkingforus.TheISIhadnobusinesstoemploythatperson,hewaseithersouselessorunreliable.

Sinha:Thatdescribesus.

Dulat:I’mnotinanycaseofanyuse!

Durrani: One would not even try to recruit him because he’ll probably not berecruited.

Butwhathappens is somepeoplegoaroundsaying,doyouknowwhoIworkfor?Justtoestablishtheirclout.I’vebeentold,butthatchapmustbeworkingfor

you.Notthatonewouldsayonewayortheother.But,goodlord,thisishowthesethingshappen!

This particular charge will be laid against someone because of a weakness orunreliability inthatperson.Otherwise,noteveryonewhohaspassedbythatgatewillbedubbedanISIorRAWagent.

Sinha:WhichRAWchiefdidyoumeetwhenyouwereISIchief?

Durrani:IttookplaceinSingapore,sometimein1991.Bajpai1headedRAW.Wemet over twodays, exchangeddevelopments. I’m sure theKashmir uprisingwasthefocusofourmeeting,becauseithadalreadytakenshapewhenIjoinedISIinAugust1990.Aftertheso-calledGatesMission,thingsweregetting‘hotter’,so,onan initiative by our foreign office, all credit to them,wemet around sixmonthslater.

Onceyoumeetsomeoneforthefirsttime,youspendmostofyourtimejudgingtheotherside,assessinghowmuchtheywanttorevealortalkabout.It’salwaysthesecond,thirdorthefourthmeetingwhereyoumightfigurethatout,butthefirstisalwaysaprobe.

Nothingearth-shatteringtookplace.Wemet. Iwasclearaboutonething: thepersonontheothersideofthetablewasanexperiencedintelligencehand.He’sthechief of theRAW.Hemusthave spenthis life inhis career.On this sidewas apersonstilllearningtheropes,andIdon’tthinkonecaninayear,orthecombinedtimeIspentinMIandISI.Imusthavebeenextracareful.

Dulat:Thisisinteresting,GeneralSahebsayingthatourchiefsareexperiencedandgood professionals, whereas our view has always been that the ISI is somethingspecial.Theseguyshavesomuchauthorityandcandowhattheylike.Likeitusedtobesaid,it’sastatewithinthestate.

Durrani:SoBajpaiand Imetonce,but itwasnot followedup. Ifbothcountrieshadbettersensetheywouldhavefolloweditupcorrectly.Buttheycan’tbecauseoftheirparanoia.OtherwiseHamidGul’smeetingwithA.K.Verma,mymeeting,andothers,2thesecouldbeinstitutionalised.Withouthavingtobeannouncedeverytime.

Buttheydon’tmeet,soeachtimetwochiefsmeet, itstartsafresh.There’snocontinuity ofprocess. It doesn’t happen that after (Musharraf’s) fourpoints, youpickupfromthere.

Dulat:Becauseit’snotinstitutionalised.Ifyouthinkintelligencechiefsaretoobigthen take down a level or to themiddle level. But let there bemeetings, if it isinstitutionalisedthensomethingwillflowoutofit.

Durrani: Inanycase,anyonewhoknowsthe functioningof theStateknowsthat

justbecausetheRAWchiefandtheISIchiefwanttodosomethingdoesnotmeanitwillhappen.Thewholeestablishmentgetsinvolved.

Dulat: Iagreewithyouentirely,Sir. I’monly interruptingyoutosay,pleasegivethe ISI chief and the RAW chief a chance. A fair chance in which they shouldbelieve.It’seasyforustobelievebecausewearenowoutofthis.Butifyouhavean ISI chief and a RAW chief who believe, then things can happen, even smallthings.

Durrani:That chancewon’t be given for the simple reason thatwhen ImetmycounterpartIdidnotknowhimandIdon’tthinkheknewmewell.Ourconclusionwas,wewillkeepatit.Buthewasnotallowed.Inmycasesomeonemerelyhadtosay,haanbhaikarteraho.Therewasadeafeningsilenceinstead.

Dulat:Nowitseemsthere’snomeeting,nothing.

Durrani:Areyousuretherearenomeetingsnow?

Sinha:ArethecurrentRAWandISIchiefsmeeting?

Dulat:Whoknows?Weshouldnotknow.

Durrani: This is the right answer. If they are really meeting seriously, then weshouldnotknow.

Dulat:Icertainlydon’tknow.Ialsodon’tknowwhentheylastmet.GeneralSahebhasmet,EhsanSahebhasmet.

Sinha:Youdidn’tmeetGeneralMahmud?3

Dulat:No,I’venotmet.

Durrani:WhenImetBajpaionlyfive-sixofourpeopleknew.Andformanyyears,I denied it—even after B. Raman hadwritten about it in his book. Then a timecamewhenIdecidedtosayyes,ImettheRAWchief.

Dulat: It’s something I alwayswanted to do. I’vemore thanmade up. Pakistanifriendshavehelped,andI’mtheonlyRAWchiefwho’sbeentoPakistan,notoncebut fourtimes. I’vebeenonPakistanTV.OurfriendEjazHaiderputmeonTVand later had teawithme.He said: thank you, forme this is the greatest thingbecausenobodyinPakistanhashadtheRAWchiefonTV.

Durrani: Someonewho knew I neverwatch TV rangme upwhen Iwas sittingdoingsomethingelse,notnecessarilymoreproductive.‘Quickly,quickly,switchonthatchannel,’hesaid,andMrDulatwasthere.Ijustcaughthimsay,yes,ofcourseIhaveafriendinPakistan,andhetookmyname.

Sinha: In your book you said the best intelligence organisation because of itsinfluenceistheISI.

Dulat:Imaintainthat.GeneralSahebwaskindtopaytributetotheRAWbutthefactiswhatwethinkoftheothersideisnotalwaysaccurate,nomatterhowmanybooksarewrittenaboutit.WhenheandItalk,we’retalkingfacts,ifwe’rehonest.Otherwiseitisjustanassessment,andtherestishearsay.

Sinha:HowhavetheTrack-IImeetingsofformerintelligencechiefsbeengoing?Isthereacrimony?

Dulat: In our Track-II my experience is that when there have been meetingswithoutdiplomats,weseemtomakemoreheadway.

WhentheUniversityofOttawastartedamilitary-to-militarydialogue(betweenIndia and Pakistan) it wentwell. GeneralDurrani suggested they have a similardialogueofretired intelligenceofficers,and it’sgoingall right.At least there’snobickering.It’spleasantthoughwemaynotagreeoneverything.

I’ve attendedmany such sessions since 2008, and of all the sessions, the onesbetweentheintelligenceofficersarethemostpleasant.ForeignserviceofficerstakethemselvessoseriouslythattheyseemtobestillattheAgrasummit4orIslamabad,etc.TheyforgetthisisTrack-IIandthattheyarenolongerambassadorsorforeignsecretaries.

The other day someone made a long presentation. I said why do we needpresentations?We’realltalkinghereasfriends.Nothingwrongwithapresentationbutitseemsyou’vecomepreparedforsomething.

Therearetimeswhenthemoodisbetter,andtimeswhenit’snotthatgreat.I’lltell you this time5 it was not so bad. From the General’s or the Pakistani side,though,Igotthefeelingtheythinkit’sworsethanbefore.Thingsareslipping.

Durrani: Iagree.Whenwestarted thisdialoguemanysessionswere sanguine:nofireworks.Ievenworriedweweren’ttalkingaboutthingsprovocativeenough.Butthat’sthewayintelligencepeoplework.Hard-boiled,cold-bloodedassessment,noblamegames;oneunderstandswhatit’sabout.

Lately, not only in this dialogue but also in a different Track-II session, it isdifferentbecauseof the situation,especially inKashmir.Thatnecessitatedoneofourcolleaguestogiveabackground,substantiallyandinaparticularsequence,tofocusthediscussion.Thatwasthereasonforthepresentation.

IfthistimetherewereheateddiscussionsitwasbecauseKashmirisbad,gettingworse.ItmayleadtoconsequencesthathavenothingtodowithKashmirperse,but will affect the India-Pakistan relationship, regardless of what we want. So,certainaggressiveanddefensiveopinionscometothefore.

Dulat:I’dliketotakethisupwiththeGeneral.Sir,you’drecallwhenwemetinSeptember2016,therewasmoretotalkaboutorbitchabout.Kashmirwaspretty

hotatthatpointoftime:inJuly,August,September,October.Thosefourmonthswerebad.InSeptember,wewerestillinthethickofthingsinKashmir.Yoursidelegitimatelyhadmoretorakeupandaskwhatweweredoing.

ThingshavecooleddowninKashmir.Inanycase,thingscooldowninwinter.ThereasonthisheatgetsgeneratedisthatinPakistanthere’sthisperceptionthat’sgetting stronger all the time, that as long asModi is primeminister nothingwillhappen.

Durrani:My difference here is that in September 2016 itwasn’t because of thePakistaniside.Rightnow,thingsarequiet.ButUriandtheso-calledsurgicalstrikehappened,whichhavevitiatedtheatmospheremorethanever.

TheconcerninPakistanisthatthisislikelytoeruptagain.Evenifwekeepoutofit,therewouldbeaspilloverintheformofmoreUrisandmoresurgicalstrikes.Maybethat’swhypeoplewerenotascoolasourIndiancolleaguesexpected.

Dulat: Itwascoolenough,Sir.Noonegetsexcited.But this timeyouhadover-imaginedKashmir.Kashmirhasalwaysbeenthere, itnevergoesaway.Therearetimeswhenthingsareabsolutelynormalorcoolbutthoseareexceptional.

That’swhyI’vealwaysmaintained,notonlywithourPakistanifriendsbutevenourIndianfriends,whydon’tweacknowledgethatKashmiristhecoreissue?Let’stalkKashmir.Whatisitthatwe’reafraidof,orashamedof,inKashmir?

Amongstthisgroup,thereactionis‘okay’.

Durrani:Whataboutyourcolleaguesbackhome,forexample?

Dulat: If you bring diplomats into it then, ‘OhMyGod, don’t mention the K-word!’

Theseguysunderstandit.OneadvantageisbothCD(Sahay)6andKM(Singh)7

haveworkedinKashmir.TheymaynotagreewithmebutinmeetingstheyagreethatweneedtotalkKashmir.

Sinha:MrDulat,youwereinaneventinLondonrecently8withanotherformerISIchief,GeneralEhsan-ul-Haq.Howdidthatgo?

Dulat: It was great fun. Aamir Gauri, who runs a think-tank called South AsiaForumfortheFuture,calledupaboutsixmonthsagoandaskedif IwouldgotoLondonandtalk.Isaid,I’malwayspreparedtogotoLondon,buttalktowhom?Originally,Sir,hesaid,areyouallrightwithGeneralAsadDurrani?Isaidperfect,there’snoonebetter.Nexttimehecalledtoconfirm,hesaidGeneralEhsanwillbethere.Isaidokay.

ThefunctionwasonOctober6attheLondonSchoolofEconomics(LSE).Thehall that could accommodate about 300 was packed: students, staff, academics,

journalistsanddiplomats.

Hecalledusfordinnerthenightbefore,andIsaid,good,EhsanSahebandIcangetonthesamepagesothatwearetalkingtoeachotherratherthanateachother.Thesubjecthetoldmewas intelligencecooperation.Thefunctionwasheadlinedsomethinglike‘Doesintelligencedoanygood?’or‘Isintelligenceanygood?’

ButGeneralEhsandecidedtotalkabouttheIndia-Pakistanrelationship.Hesaidit’sa70-year-oldrelationship,weneedtotalkthat.HehadKashmironhismind,basically. I said, Sir, the subject is intelligence. He said, no, no, so much hashappened, India-Pakistan-Kashmir. I said,okay.He said, if youdon’tmind Iwillspeakfirst.Isaid,IwouldlikeyoutospeakfirstsothatIcanreact.

HestartedwithKashmir,humanrightsandwhathappenedinKashmir,andtheIndia-Pakistanrelationship.Ireactedtothat,andagreedwithalotofwhathesaidanddisagreedwithsomeofit,butitwaslivelybanterandingoodhumour.

I got him back to intelligence. Actually I wanted to credit him and Sahay,withoutnamingSahay, so I said: ‘You andyour frienddid a good jobwhenyouwere talking to eachother, that’swhat comesout of intelligence cooperation. In2003wehadaceasefire,bothofyoudidwhatyourmasterswanted.’Iaddedthestory that we provided intelligence which may have saved Musharraf’s life.‘Congratulations,’Isaid,‘greatworkdone.’

Peoplewere tickled that these two spooks had such easy conversation. Therewas a question-answer session, andwe tried to answer everything. At one pointEhsanSahebwasinafix.AcoupleofBalochboyswerethereandaskedawkwardquestions.Hetriedtoskirtthequestion,Idon’tblamehim.Finallythemoderatorsaid:‘General,areyougoingtoanswerthatquestionornot?’Hetoldher:‘I’mnotapolitician, these are things forpoliticians to answer.’Hedealtwith it fine, buttheydidembarrasshim.

Thatapart,itwentoffbeautifully,andafterwardswewenttoapubnextdoorwherethemediawasatus.ItwasmostlythePakistanmedia,andonegroupweretalkinginPunjabi.IansweredtheirquestionsinPunjabi.Theyweretickled.

Sinha:Didthattalkcomeupfordiscussioninthecurrentdialogue?

Durrani: On my prompting, this round was kicked off with an account of theLondon meet. I thought it was an important high-profile event that had takenplace.Second, itwould startourprocessonapleasantnote.Laterononeknowswhat is coming.Maybe third, my vested interest. Dulat Saheb always says Bossfirst,thistimeyou’renotgoingtogetawaywithit.HeswitchedbossesandstartedcallingEhsantheboss,butatleasthehadtotalkfirst.

Ehsandoesagoodjobandisbettersuitedtorepresentourpointofview.He’s

morerecentonmanythings,sinceheheadedtheISItenyearsafterme.ThenhewasChairman,JointChiefsofStaff,dealingwithsuchissuesinabroadercontext.

Dulat:Ehsanisaniceguy,butthetwoofushaveachemistrythatallowsustobemorecandid.

Durrani:It’strue,it’strue.I’mhappythatmyinterlocutorishonest.Itrytobeashonestaspossible,andwhenIcannotIwillprobablysayso.

My problem is with those under peer pressure. Always looking over theirshouldersattheircompatriots,thinking,gharjaakarkyabolenge.

Dulat:It’snotjustpeerpressure,Sir.

Durrani:Everyone limits themselves. In thisgroupIhavebeen fair, Idon’t thinkthere ispressure, Idon’t restrictmyself. In apublic forum likeLSE, it’spossiblethatImighthedgemybetsoncertainthings.Eventhere,onewouldprobablybemorefrankthanmanycolleagues.

Dulat:That’sthewholefunofit.Thisbusinessofhush-hushand,whatyousaid,guyswithhornsstabbingeachotherinthebackhasitslimitations.Ifoneweretobemoreopenandtocooperate,thenthesky’sthelimit.

Sinha:WhatistheequationbetweenGeneralEhsanandMrSahaynow?

Durrani:Theymetbackthenbecauseitwasrequiredbytheirbosses, itprobablyworkedoutwell.Neitherhascarriedapositiveornegativeburdenfromthattime.Each speaks independently. But there can still be backslapping, they are notinhibited.Whichisallright.

Sinha:Theyshareacomfortlevel?

Durrani:Theywouldprobablysaythesamethingselsewhere,it’snotbecausetheyareEhsanorCD.Inourcase,ImaysaysomethingfranklyifMrDulatisthere;ifsomeothersarethereIwouldnotcare.I’mliberatedtothatextent.

Dulat:Thetrickisyourcomfortlevelwiththeotherperson.Itrymybesttotreatitlightly,crackjokes.Whysoseriousaboutthesethings?Ittakesweightofftheotherguy,thatI’mnotheretobelittlehimorPakistan.We’reheretohavefun,that’sthereasonwegottogethertotalk.

Durrani:Thisattitudehelpsusgetsomewhere.

Dulat:Wemighthaveadigateachotherbutwelaughandit’sallingoodhumour.

III

KASHMIRThesesixchaptersgototheveryheartoftheproblembetweenIndiaandPakistan:theissueofJammuandKashmir.Thebilateralrelationshipisfrozeninastatusquo,and Dulat and Durrani each have their own interpretation of what ‘status quo’means to each country, and what makes it attractive to their respectiveestablishments. They discuss the sustained attempt to tackle peace in the‘composite dialogue’; the tellingway inwhich the ISI treated one of the earliestadvocates of Kashmiri independence; the unmet Kashmiri expectations duringNarendraModi’s prime ministership; and the enigma of Farooq Abdullah. BothmenagreethattheonlywayforwardforKashmiris is to ‘takewhatyoucanget’,insteadoflookingforatotalresolutionallatonce.

Settingthescene

After an eight-month gap, the project is resumed in Bangkok in February 2017.Frommyroomonthe12thfloorwehaveamagnificentviewoftheChaoPhrayariveraswellasthesouthernskylineofthecity.StrongcoffeegetstheGeneralandMrDulattorecountamusinganecdotesduringtheirforeignpostings.

8

StatusQuo

AsadDurrani:ForaslongasIcanrememberIndiahasbeenconsideredastatusquopower.WhichforPakistanmeantnomovementonKashmir,frankly.Weweren’tatthattimethinkinganythingmorethanKashmir.YoumayhaveaddedsomethingaboutPOKbeingyours,itwasmerelyasabargainingchip;butIfeltthatwheneverthe need arose we would say, let’s settle down and sort it out. No one took itseriously.PakistanwastheonethatwantedtochangethestatusquobecauseitwasnothappywiththestateofaffairsinKashmir.

Iarrivedattheconclusionthatcompositedialoguethatconcludedin1998wasanexcellent framework to resolveormanage India-Pakistan conflicts. Its formulawas good, its algorithm excellent, essentially saying that by discussing lessintractable issueswe could create an environment of confidence.Thenwe couldstartondifficultissueslikesecurityandKashmir.Atalaterstagewecouldbringin‘terrorism’.

This composite dialogue worked out, after many initial hiccups, when yourforeign minister came to Islamabad in 2006 to sign a ‘milestone agreement’. Itmade plenty of sense, and there was plenty of excitement. I was among thoseinvitedtobeattheMarriottHotelfortheannouncement.IflewinfromEurope.Theexpectationwasthatthetwosideswouldagreetokick-startthepeaceprocessbyfacilitatingtheKashmirileadersfrombothsidesoftheLoCtointeract.

Someofuswerehangingaroundoutsidethehall,quippingthattheyweregoingtostartabus,butwhatiftheoddbusgotblownup?Suddenlypeopleemergedandsaid,yesabuswillrun.Isaid, looksabitriskybutagreatsymboltokickofftheprocess.

Itwassupposedtobeonlysymbolic.Substantialthingsweretohappenonothertracks,theeasierones.Andwhennothinghappened,evenonthesimplest issues,thatiswhenIconcludedthatIndiawasseriousaboutmaintainingthestatusquo.

My argument is this. India believes that if the status quo was disrupted, thedynamics of changemight be difficult to control. If the situation went below acertain threshold, it would not only harm Pakistan but also India. Similarly, anupwardtrendwasnotinIndia’sinterests.Pakistanismightbecomemoreconfident,morecocky;Kashmirismorevocal,moreviolent,andtheymightfeelthatinanewsituationtheycouldachievesomething.Soevenifitwasnotcomfortablewiththeexisting situation, India must have concluded that it was better to contain any

upwardtrend.

India is comfortable, Pakistan has problems. India is doingwell, going places,beingwooedbytheworld,70to80billion-dollartradewithChina.Whyupsettheapplecart?

It seemed like sound reasoning. Also, a number a people outside thesubcontinent but with an eye on India got the same impression. ‘This is themessageweget,’suchpeoplesaid.

India is thus not just status quo but a strictly status quo power. It will doeverything topreserve that andnot evenmove in adirection fromwhich itmaybenefit, because to do so means giving up on old friends with whom you’recomfortable.The-devil-you-knowargument.

IcanthenunderstandwhyDelhididnotrespondtoMusharraf’s1initiatives.Ifyoudon’tlikesomethingyourespondbysaying,thankyou,we’llstudyit,you’llgetourresponseinduecourse.ThestudiedsilenceindicatedtomethatDelhihadnodesire to respond. Indiplomatic termsDelhi toldus toget lost, goclimbapole,we’llhandleitourway.

A.S. Dulat: We’ve always had this argument about the stalemate. What is thestatusquoifthereisnothingbetweenIndiaandPakistan?Evencomingandgoingisa problem. If relations were better, we would be having these conversations inDelhiandLahore,everyweekend.

I’ve always been of the belief that the status quo is nothing, andwe need tomoveforward.Actually,ifthestatusquohelpsanyone,ithelpsPakistan.

Letmegiveaconcreteexampleofthisstatusquobusiness.Let’stakeKashmirtoday.Ithasbeenstuckwiththestatusquosince2012.Buttodaythestatusquofavours Pakistan because this BJP-PDP2 coalition has let down the Kashmiri inmanyways.Mehboobaknowsitbutshe’sstuck,andbothsheandPakistanknowdiscontentisgrowinginKashmir.

For the first time since the movement started, militancy is pretty muchindigenous in the Valley. The boys have grievances or feel discriminated or feelhopeless. It’s just 20-30 boys but that’s bad enough. The whole population iswilling towalkbehind them.Thesearedisturbing things forus, sohowdoes thestatusquohelp?

Butyes,atthispointoftime,ithelpsPakistan.Butinthebigpicturethestatusquocanneverhelp.

Durrani:A year or two agoMrDulat began saying the status quo suits Pakistanmore, because there is a problem inKashmir. I didn’t comprehendhis reasoningnordid I go into itsdepthuntil the turmoil afterBurhanWani’s killing.3 Then I

started toying with the idea that because of what is happening in the Valley,Pakistanshouldsimplysitbackand‘watchthefun’.PerhapsIndiawouldbeforcedtochangeitsoriginalpolicy,itsoldthreats,itsoldapproaches.Andthenwemighthaveanewstatusquo.

Onecouldsaythatatthispointoftime,thestatusquoisnotunfavourabletoPakistan.PakistancouldbecomfortablewiththeunrestexceptthatKashmirisdied.Also, if it inevitably goes on and even if youwant nopart in it, therewouldbefalloutonthissideoftheLineofControl.Still,wecannotonly livewith it,butalso get on with other things. I sometimes say our relationship has achievedstrategicstability.

Dulat:Nowwhywouldastablestalematebepositive?

Ifwecouldwriteapaperonintelligencetogetherandifateverymeetingwe’veadvocatedtogetherthattheintelligencechiefsmustmeet,itisnotstatusquo.I’vegonebeyondthattoproposethatthestationchiefsinbothcapitalsshouldbeopenposts.

Weused tohave this routineofpreventing theAllPartyHurriyatConferencefromgoingtoteaatthePakistanHighCommissioninDelhi.Then,whenPresidentFarooq Leghari visited in 1995,Narasimha Rao said stop this nonsense. Anyonewhowantstogoshouldbeallowed.Anyonewhowantstotravelabroad, lethimgo.VajpayeetookitfurtherbyactuallyfacilitatingHurriyattraveltoPakistan.

So there was forward movement. Then it stopped, and we are now movingbackwards. That’s why we are where we are today. The mood in Delhi is thatthere’s no need to talk to theHurriyat. There’s no need even to talk to FarooqAbdullah, though there isnobodymoreknowledgeableaboutKashmirandDelhiandtheworldthanFarooqAbdullah.Sohegoesoff toSouthAfricaorDubaiorwhereverandholidayswithhisfamily.

It’sano-winforbothsides.

Durrani:Thestatusquodoesnotmeanthatthereisnomeeting,nomovement,nogoingandcoming.Infact,youcanhaveallthatsolongasyouensurenochangeinthepolitical arrangement.Nochange in the stakes that canprovide incentive forfurther change. Nothing like, this bus started running so something else musthappen;forthenthebusisstoppedinitstracks.

To the extent that when Musharraf spoke of a four-point formula that hethoughtwas reasonable and partly aligned to the other side’s view, one found areluctance(inIndia)toformaliseit.BecausetodaywemaysayLoCisirrelevantfortrade,tomorrowtheymaywantaEuropeanUnion-typearrangement.That’swhenIsaidstrategicstalemateisIndia’sobjective.

IbelieveditsobecauseimprovingrelationswithPakistan,evenifnotlimitedtoKashmir,meantpeacebutalsomeantcompromisesoncertainpolicies,becauseit’sgive-and-take.Thereforethesaying:thepriceforpeaceisattimeshigherthanthepriceofconflict.

Conflict is manageable, there will be occasional firing across the border, andpeoplemay die. But the price of peacemay entail accepting the old division ofKashmir or arrangementwithPakistan, changing the former IndusWaterTreaty,etc.Thatmighttriggerotherdynamics.

Dulat: Iagreethateventhethingswhichlooksimplestdon’tgetdone.Thefour-pointformulathatIkeepharpingonissomethingthatcamefromPakistanandwasacceptedbytheKashmiris.Wedidnothavetoomuchobjection,soitseemedmostdoable.Andyet,whentheback-channelgotontoit,theyjustkeptontalking.AllweneededtodowassitdownwiththefourorsixpointsthatMusharrafhadlaidonthetable,andeliminatewhateverwedidn’tlike.Butwedidn’t.Nonetheless,DrManmohan Singh did saywhile demitting office that the deal was almost done.Donebutnotdone.HowtypicalofIndo-Pakrelations.

Thewindowof2006-07closedbeforeMusharrafwent,andafterhedisappearedwe said, if only he had been around so much could have happened. The samefellowwebitchedaboutas thevillainofKargil.Musharrafhad to say let’s forgetKargilandmoveon,Imadeamistake.

MusharrafrepeatedlysaidwhateverisacceptabletoKashmirandKashmiriswillbe acceptable to Pakistan. His four-point formula was in keeping with thisstatement.

AdityaSinha:Twentyyearsfromnow,willwehavethesamestatusquo?

Durrani:Idonotknowwhichtermtousebutusually,whenitlooksnegativeitisstatus quo, andpost-nuclear tests itwas strategic stability.Weoften discussed itinternally,ourministryofdefenceevenpublishedmyviewsinajournal.

The crux of it was that strategic stability exists, at all levels. It’s not static,stabilityisalsodynamic.Onceit’supsetby,let’ssay,therequisitionofafantastictechnologybyIndia’sdefence,likeballisticmissiledefence,BMDs,Pakistanwouldtry to restore it by something like tactical nuclear weapons. It just reconveys astatusquo-likesituation.

Twenty years from now, chances are we’ll have a different type of stability.There would be developments in 20 years that we do not know, so much canhappenevennextyear.Butthe‘newnormal’willnotbethestatusquoof1980sor’90s.

On theotherhand, if I lookback,20years agowehad these sameproblems:

Kashmir, India-Pakistan friction, Afghanistan. The narrative is more or less thesame,thepressurescontinue.

Sinha:Twentyyearsfromnowthingsmaylookabitdifferentbutwillessentiallystaythesame.

Durrani:Statusquomeansastabilityofaparticularkind.Themorewechangethemoreweremainthesame.

Dulat:Twentyyearsfromnow,OmarAbdullah4mightstillbethechiefministerinJ&K.That’sthewayIlookatit.Seriously.

Sinha:Youdon’tgetmuchmorestatusquothantheAbdullahfamily.

Durrani: Twenty years fromnow,OmarAbdullah is, let’s say, amember of theKashmirMuslimConference.

Dulat:Hecanbeamemberofanything,Sir.OmarAbdullah isOmarAbdullah.Heisnownotyet50,so20yearsfromnowhe’llstillbeinhis60s.Perfectage.

Durrani:Whocansaywithcertaintythatitwillnothappen?

Dulat:Nobody.But if you askme, this is themost likely.Also, hewill be chiefministerafterMehbooba.

Durrani: That is reasonable. Look at a bigger rivalry, United States and Russia.Twenty years back, the Soviet Union collapsed, the US was the sole survivingsuperpower, ruling the roost. Todaywe again have the two biggest powers thatcount: theUSanda toss-upbetweenRussiaaloneorRussia-China.Europe isnolongerthesortofUSallyitusedtobe.Thereisasituationinwhichvariouspolesarebalancingout.Itdoesnotlookstablebutitissustainable.

Butwhygetstuckon‘statusquo’?Ionlylightlymentionedit,andinthecontextof Kashmir. Now I see it as a status quo of compulsion, which leaves thealternatives,policies,strategiesabitriskyandthat’swhyyousticktoit.

Sinha:WillSAARCexist20yearsfromnow?

Durrani: Ididn’tknowSAARCexistedor that itmeantanythingatall. Itmeansless than ‘no firstuse’of Indiannuclearpolicy,which ismerely to scorebrowniepoints.SAARC,ifanything,hasprovidedaplatformwhereyoucangettogetheronthesidetoexchangesomewords.

Dulat: Not even a ‘walk in the woods’.5 There’s an interesting correspondencebetween Kennedy and Khrushchev in which the Russian talked about a bridgeacrossariver.Hesaid,tellpeoplethereisabridgeacrosstheriver.Andifpeoplestart believing there is a bridge, then even if there’s no bridge it’ll serve thepurpose.Quitefascinating.

Durrani:InthetimebeforePakistandemonstratedithadanuclearbomb,ifpeoplesuspectedorbelievedwehadnuclear capability then it servedourpurpose. So Iagree,butinthiscasethereisadeepermeaning.

Dulat:Theymeanttheymusthelpcreateabridgeacrosstheriver.Peopleshouldbelievethereisabridge.InIndia-Pakistanrelationsthatisnecessary.Peopleshouldbelievethatthereisabridge,ifyoudon’tliketheword‘hope’,Sir.

WhenMusharraf came toDelhi in April 2005 to watch cricket, around thattimewehadafewfriendsandfamilyoutonthelawnandacousinofminearrivedwith a Pakistani friend. He was a businessman in Lahore or Karachi. I said,welcome,haveadrink.Whenhewasleavinghesaid,IcouldhavebeeninLahoreorKarachi.There’snodifferencebetweenthereandhere.

The Punjab-to-Punjab relationship is like that. So the people-to-peoplerelationshipisimportant,andthebelief—Iwon’tsayhope—isimportant.

Ironically, Imustadmit thatback inmyIByears Iusedtothinkofpeople-to-peoplecontactasalotofbullshit.I’dsay,PakistanisscrewingusinKashmir,howispeople-to-peoplecontactgoingtohelp?Butsincethenonehasseenalot.Onehasexperiencedalot.

Durrani:Thereisthecontextofassessment.Onceanassessmentismade,aleadergivespeoplehopethingswillimprove.Thatishisjob.

Dulat:Anotherthing:IndiaisahugecountryunlikePakistan,whichisPunjabplusa littlebithere and there.And in India,whenyoumoveoutofDelhi thenwhobothers about Pakistan? Those who do talk, the intellectual in Calcutta or thesouth,they’reforbetterrelationswithPakistan. It is thiswretchedDelhiwith itsnorth IndianorPunjabiculturewherewe’realways ready fora scrapandbelievenothingcanhappen.ButgotoKolkataortoHyderabadorChennaiorBangalore,youfindtheyaredifferent.

Durrani: Understandable. They are detached, and somemay not be awarewhatexactly the problem in Kashmir is. However, we are referring to that largerenvironmentinwhichbothcountriesfindcertainpitfallsorimpedimentstomovingforward.Whenever things do not seem to bemoving verymuch is ‘status quo’,thoughletmeavoidthisphrase.

Dulat: Kashmir keeps coming up in bits and pieces, but you were mentioningBurhanWani.

Durrani: Once this phase of the uprising took place, I asked people who areinvolved in the Kashmir issue, not officially but otherwise, some of them oldKashmirhands:Will thingsbedifferent?Yes, it looksdifferent,peopleareangry.Insteadoftalkingoffighting,theyaretalkingofembracingshahadat. ‘Martyrdom

cults’,someonesaidunkindly.

Ifit’sgoingtobeunusualthentheIndianswilladoptunusualwaysofhandlingit.RegardlessofwhatIndiadoes,itwillcontinuetomanageonmostoccasions,itcan contain whatever happens, it can suppress Kashmiris, appease them,accommodatethem.Ithashappened,itwillcontinue.Ifitcontinues20yearsfromnowOmarAbdullahmightbethechiefminister,buttheproblemkeepsfestering.ButKashmiruprisingisonly28yearsorso,therearethingsthathavegoneonfor50,60,70years.

Wealsohaveanexample, thoughnot as severe, inBalochistan. In the last70years, fiveuprisings. Fewpeople are involved,mainly5,000-10,000 angry youth,butit’savastareasotheyaredispersed.It’snotunited.Wemanagetocontainiteachtimeandhave limited it to fiveor sixdistrictsoutof34.FormostBalochisPakistanremainstheleastbadoption.

Despite their weaknesses and despite our ability to contain the unrest, theproblemwillcontinue.Itisnotonlyaproblemof5,000people.Otherswhomaynot have taken that path and may still believe in Pakistan have grievances thataren’t less.Thereareinherentstructuraldeficits inthepoliticsandeconomics,allcomplex, so theywill continue. It indicates that a problem is resolved bymanyshort-termandlong-termastutemeasures.

Similarly,thingswillkeephappeninginKashmir.

Sinha:Soduringthenext20yearstherewillbemoreBurhanWanis?

Durrani:Assuming there isnothingmore thancontainment, crackdown,politicalmanagement,hangingontothepolicythatKashmirhamarahai.

Kashmirhasblownup somany times,notbecauseweweredoing something.This time ithasblownup forone reason,next time for another reason.BecauseKashmir is complex and needs something other than simple management by aKashmirexpert.

Dulat:There’snoexpert,Sir.ThequestionofKashmir20or50yearsdown thelineisgoingnowhere,leavingKashmirwhereitis.Butifwedon’tchangeourwayofthinkingonKashmirthentherecanbemoreBurhanWanis.Becausefranklyourproblemisthatwehaven’tbeenhonestwithKashmir.

Sinha:KashmirisfeardemographicchangeintheValley,whichiswhathardlinerswant.Ifinthenext20yearsthatbeginstohappen,willitnotchangethegroundsituation,andthusthestatusquo?

Durrani:Changingstatusquothrougha‘dhamaka’event,likeabusyatraoranUri,isoneway. I am suggesting somethingmorenuancedandgestures that aremoresubstantial.

For example: Both of us talking, it’s not a ‘shosha’ to distract people butsomething for discussion. Maybe after a year or so the same thing would bediscussedmoreseriously.Thatwouldbeachangeofthestatusquoforthebetter.

OnKashmironehasoftentalkedaboutsendingoutafeeler.Weknowthetypeofnoiseitwillcreateonbothsides,soitmustnotbedoneofficially.Unofficiallyithasalreadybeendone.AwayfromthespotlightpeopletalkaboutthedangersordisastersofanindependentKashmir.ATVchanneldiscussedwhatwouldhappenandits implications.WouldPakistansuffermoreorIndia?Suchdiscussionsbreakthemould.

IndiagotdividedintoIndiaandPakistan.PakistangotdividedintoPakistanandBangladesh.Ifbeforeanyofthishappenedsomeonehadsaid,breakupIndia,thatchapwouldhavelosthishead.Butatsomestageithappened.

SotheideaistostartadiscussionlikethatofQuebec.Youwantindependence,goaheadandvoteforit.Wewanttochangethestatusquoandimproveit;butatthesametimewedon’twanttoquestionourarticlesoffaith.Thatstatusquowillnotbebrokenbutwillworsen,asithaswithinsixmonths.Anotherstatusquowascreated, another quasi-stable relationship reached. The next time somethinghappens,itwillworsen.

We’relookingforadevelopmentthatwillraisethebar.

Dulat:Sir,wecanplaythesewargames,butwhoknowswhatwillhappen.TherearepeopleinDelhiwhobelievePakistanwillinevitablybreakup,whichisalotofrubbish.

Durrani: So let’s consider the implication of Pakistan breaking up.Discuss karo,bhai.Goodforusorbadforus.

Dulat:Ohno,muchworseforus.

Durrani:Letthemdiscussit,andafterthatifitisnotgoodforus,ifit’snotgoingtobebetterforusthen…

Dulat: That’s precisely why a smart politician like Vajpayee went to Minar-e-Pakistan,againstalladvice.

Durrani: HamidGul used to talk about India being too big for us and that weshoulddoeverythingtobreakitup.Wejustlaughed,butinthatnoonewassayingitwillnothappen,andsomeonesaidifithappensitwillbegood.Informallypeoplespeakofbreakingthemonster.

Dulat:TherearealsopeoplewhobelieveinAkhandBharat.

Durrani: I don’tmind discussingAkhandBharat.Wehave come this far butwehavenosolution.

Dulat:AsAdityawouldsay,theseareallacademicdiscussions.

Durrani:Wecanconsidermovingtoaconfederation,andthentoaunitedIndia.Howcanwereversethecycle?Atleastdiscussit.Europeanshavebeendoingsofora long time. It took half a century to achieve the ‘united Europe’ imagined byChurchill.

Sinha:Europebecameaunion,andnowit’scomingapartagain.

Durrani: Yes. There’s no such thing that is final. No borders can be redrawn?Bordersgetredrawnallthetime.

Dulat:DrManmohanSingh spokeofbreakfast inAmritsar, lunch inLahore anddinnerinKabul.Washedreaming?

Durrani:Onecantalkaboutthiswhenthisdiscussiontakesplace.

Dulat:That’swhyasagesturefromIndia,theeasiestthingforourprimeministeris to ring up the Pakistani prime minister and say come lunch with me atHyderabadHouse.Itonlytakes35minutesfromLahoretoDelhi.

Durrani:Yes,wecanalsogo.Andwhilethey’rehavingtheirlunchweknowafewpeoplewhowouldratherhavea…

Dulat:Whynot,Sir,whynot.

9

TheCoreK-word

AdityaSinha:Intheend,itcomesdowntoKashmir.

A.S.Dulat:Rhetoricapart,thereareacoupleofrealitiesinKashmir.TheKashmiriaccepts it’s not going anywhere, India won’t let go; and that beyond a point,Pakistan cannot help. Pakistan is a friend and a good fallback. It’s been triedthroughinvasionorraidersorwarbutPakistanhasnotbeenabletoclaimKashmirandwillnotbeableto.

Butsomethingneedstohappen,somethingpositiveontheground.Otherwise,K-word or no K-word, we come back: Kashmir is an issue, in dispute, it is aproblem.Wedon’t accept it as a dispute or problem, but the fact is there is anissue.The story’s not over.Common sense says that for everybody’s sakewe tryandmoveforward,howevergradually.

WhatdoIhaveinKashmir?I’mnotaKashmiri,I’mnotrelatedtoanyone.ButIkeep talking to the Kashmiri so that he believes that not everybody in Delhi isunwilling to listen. It is important to keep that sentiment alive. In my years ingovernment onlyHome SecretaryK. Padmanabhaiahwould entertainKashmiris.Otherwise there isnoone.So IdisagreewithmyownIndian friends.WeshouldfacethisK-wordorK-factorupfront.

Sinha:DoesthatincludePakistan’srole?

Dulat:We saw theKashmirdevelopment in1989-90 as inspired,monitored andsupportedbyPakistan. Interestingly,asGeneralSahebsaid,andasKashmirisalsotoldus,itbecamebiggerthanPakistanimaginedorbargainedfororpreparedfor.Certainthingswentoutofcontrol.Itjustcarriedon.That’swhyintheend—andalsobecauseofeventslike9/11—whenitfizzledoutthenonceagainPakistanwasblamedfornotunderstandingKashmirisensibility.

Durrani:OnKashmir Idefertomyfriendbecausehisknowledgeandexperiencearemore.

Dulat:That’sverykind,Sir.

Durrani:Heknowstheground,thepeople;heservedthere,hasbeeninandout.Ican’tevencrosstheborder.ButIdidservein[so-called]‘Azad’Kashmirformanyyears.

Sinha: If IndiaadmittedKashmir is thecore issue,would itbeabreakthrough in

bilateralrelations?

Dulat:Idon’tknow.DependsonhowPakistanwouldreact.

Durrani:OnacoupleofoccasionsIhaveheardIndianssaytheyconsiderKashmirthecoreissue.ThefirstwasSalmanHaider,aco-authorof‘compositedialogue’.Idon’trememberexactlybuthesaidsomethinglike,yesitmaybethecoreissue.

Inacompositedialogue,thecoreissueneednotbediscussedatthebeginning,but only as the peace process goes along. The initial focus is on improving theenvironment.Only then is it time to talkabout thedifficult issue:Kashmir.Andlater, terrorism. Some in India will concede that Kashmir is a major problemwithout calling it ‘core issue’; at the same time, however, they say that Pakistanbelievesthecoreissuemustbediscussedatthebeginning.

The composite dialoguewas forme learning aboutmaking peace. Earlier onehad only learned and taught how to make war. I tried to see if the lessons ofmilitarystrategywereapplicable.Enoughpeopleagreed,includingSalmanHaider.

‘You and Shamsad (our foreign secretary) absolutely got to the core of ouroperations strategy,’ I told him. Operations strategy has two prongs: one is thebattle, the other is the manoeuvre. You fight somewhere, create the rightenvironmentforthemanoeuvreorbreak-out.Itshouldbeinsuchamannerthatitcreates a favourable environment for the battle. It’s a cycle of battle andmanoeuvre.‘Youseemtohavedoneit,’Isaid.

This composite dialoguewas themanoeuvre, and itwas essentially creating afavourable environment for the battle, which was the resolution of Kashmir. AcivilianversionofthebattleforKashmir.

Isawthattheconceptmightfit.Iadmiredthatthesepeoplethoughtofmovingoneighttalkingtracks.Inmilitarystrategyyousometimeslaunchanoffensiveandseewhichfrontmakesprogress.Theonethatcreatesanenvironmentforyourmainbattle,andnotwhereyoumightnothavemadeprogressduetoenemyresistance.

Yes,Salmansaid,wheneverweworkedontheevolutionofcompositedialogue,people spoke of Liddell-Hart’s strategy of ‘expanding torrents’.1 You start littlestreams,othersjoinin,andthewholethingexpands.

Onintractableissues,unlessyou’vegonethroughthecrustyoudon’tgettothecore.I’vesaidthisathome,thattogettothecoreissueyoumustnegotiatethroughtheperipherals.

Sinha:Doyoubelieveit,MrDulat?

Dulat: It’sa laboriouswayofgoingaboutthings.Kashmirneedstobedealtwithmoredirectly.

There are bureaucrats who have never been to Srinagar but pontificate onKashmir.

Wesaythat2001-08wasgoodforKashmirandthatbecausePakistanhadtolivewiththeburdenof26/11forfive-sixyears, itdidn’traiseKashmir.26/11furtherembarrassedPakistanatTrack-IImeetings.SomePakistanis said, ‘Ifevennowwedidnotlearn,wearedoomed.’IusedtoneedlesomePakistanidiplomatorotheratlarger, broader gatherings, that’swhat’s happened to your core issue, yaar? Let’stalk Kashmir. Pakistan was comfortable with it not being on the agenda. Nowwe’vegoneandmesseditup.

Durrani:EvenafterthesetbacksofKargil,thenucleartests,afterMusharraf’sAgravisit, Iassumedthatwewouldreturn to thecompositedialogue.Sensiblepeoplehadworkedmeticulouslytomakeitrobust.

Then I foundKashmir-relateddevelopment in themeantime,which surprisedmeasIthoughtKashmirwilltakeabackseattilltheenvironmentimproved.BothIndian and Pakistani decision-makers, however, wanted a symbolic gesture onKashmir and they came upwith the bus thatwould run between both parts ofKashmir. I hoped this symbolic bus would take care of hotter things, Kashmiriswould be involved, and then Islamabad and Delhi would get on withmundaneaffairs,culturalexchanges,andthepoliticalsettlementofotherdisagreements.Butevenontheeasiestthings,visaorculture,etc.:noprogress.Theonlydevelopmentwasonthethorniestmatter,Kashmir,andthatwasabus.

I said there must be a reason why India won’t move even on the smallestproblems. It led to another earth-shattering conclusion: India does not want thestatusquotoberockedbecauseitisfavourable.

With even Musharraf’s initiative that was popular in India and Kashmir, noresponsecoming,I’mconvincedthatIndiawouldnotriskanychangeinthestablerelationshipbetweenthetwocountries,asitmightcreateadynamicthatgoesoutof control. India’s objective seemed to be: ‘Zameen junbad na jumbad GulMohammed’(theearthmayshakebutGulMohammedwillnot).

Mythinkingwasshaken.

ItwasalsoshakenaftertheWaniepisode.ThingsweresodifficultfortheIndiansidethatIusedtoreadpaniconthefacesofvariousIndianinterlocutorsatthesemeetings.Theylookedworried.MrDulatsaidsomethingwillhappen.

Ithappenedanddidn’tseemtobetoobadforus.Ithasbeentacticallyhandledforcontainment.Foranactualbreakthroughyouneedsomethingelse: somethingthat’sdifficult,takestime,requirescompromises.Itusuallydoesn’thappen.Soforusthebestthingistositbackandwatch.

Sinha: Pre-Partition India—where were Kashmiris going to work, migrating to?Whereweretheircultural,business,politicallinks?WithmodernIndiaorPakistan?

Durrani:Goodquestion. Statistics canprobably give an answer.ManyKashmiriscameoveraperiodoftime:IqbalandNawazSharifandSalmanTaseerorhisfatherand others. Themain arterywas Srinagar-Muzaffarabad. Even today that road istrafficable.

Dulat: Idon’t think thequestion is significant.Yes,GeneralSaheb is right,mostKashmiriswholefttheValleyinthosedaysnaturallygravitatedtowardsSialkotorIslamabad.Butthat is trueof thePunjabialso.Very fewPunjabiswenttoDelhi.ThemostcosmopolitancityintheregionthateveryonewenttowasLahore.Ifyouplayed tennis in the Lahore gymkhana, or if you went to Government College,Lahore,itwastheultimate.

ManyyearslaterwhenIhadtogotocollegemymotherasked,‘Don’tyouthinkheshouldjoinStStephen’sCollege?’Myfatherresponded,‘WhatisStStephen’sCollege?’ He was a product of Government College, Lahore, so he felt DelhiUniversitycouldnevermatchPunjabUniversity.

SoIdon’tthinkthatisrelevant.

If you look historically, Kashmir’s linkage ismorewith Iran andCentralAsiathantheArabianside.InSrinagarthereisnowanewclassofRichieRichs,likewehaveinDelhiandothercities.Guyswho’vemadegoodmoney,theuppermiddleclass, like to travel to Dubai and do their shopping. Even sanitaryware is fromDubai.

Of course, Kashmiriswould like to be part of India’s growth story, even if itimpliesgoingtoBangaloreorBombayorGoa,etc.ButwhattheyultimatelyaspireforisgrowthintheValleyitself.IfthereisanITrevolutioninthesouththenwhynothere?

Kashmirisstilloneofourmoreaffluentstates.Youdon’tseemanybeggarsinSrinagar.MostKashmirisownahouse.Theyeatgoodgosht,feweatbeef;onlytheruralfolkcan’taffordmuttonsoeatbeef.

Whathurtshimisbeingtreateddifferentlyfromtherestofthecountry.

Durrani: The Pakistan government’s per capita investment in Kashmir is themaximuminthecountry.Nootherregionreceivedthatkindofmoney.Itcanbeseenonground.Theinfrastructuretheretillaboutthe1990swasbetterthantherest of the country. People have to bewon over, so let’smake roads. KashmirisdesireeducationmorethananyoneelseinPakistan.Childrenwalkingtoschoolisacommonsight.At7a.m.IwasshiveringandsawKashmirikidswalkinginshort-sleeves,bagsonback.

PerhapsKashmirisontheothersidefelttheywerenotbeinglookedafteraswellasonthePakistaniside.

Dulat: I don’t think so.YoumentionedPOK. Ideliberatelyhaven’t talked aboutthatKashmir.Idon’tknowitwell,soit’sbettertokeepshut.ButIknowthereareproblems that side also. It’s not correct that the grass is greener on that side,becauseKashmirishavetoldmeonvariousoccasions,jaanedijiyeinko.Allowhimtogoacrossandseeforhimself,hewouldreturnimmediatelydisillusioned.

WehaveKashmiriboys leftback inPakistan.Someof themmarried, tookupbusinesses, settled. They’re all right. But quite a few would like to return.Salahuddinisnotyoung,buthemayliketoreturnandsucceedGeelaniSaheb.Hehasfromtimetotimeindicatedpoliticalambitions.

Durrani: Best would be getting Kashmiris involved, be it in Track-II or formalmeetings.Askafewfromthatside,afewfromthisside.Evenifinitiallyinhibitedthey are capable of telling you off.Delhi, you are the devil; and Islamabad, youhave not been our best friend.Wemight then hear their sentiments.Otherwiseyou’requotingKashmirisinIndiawhohavenootherwaybuttobepartofIndia,saying,inkojaakardekhnetohdedoosritaraf.

Sinha: General Saheb spoke of a bandwidth of stable stalemate: that above thisbandwidth, better India-Pakistan relations might worsen things in Kashmir forIndia.

Dulat:Onthecontrary,thebettertherelationship,thehappiertheKashmiriis.HisfearisthatwheneverthereisIndia-Pakistantension,hewillbeatthereceivingend.

TheonlyKashmirileaderwhodidn’treacttothisearlierwasFarooqAbdullah.Now,hehassaidrepeatedlythatthereisnootherwaybuttohavegoodrelationswithPakistan.Heunderstands.Thequestionis,whatisthewayout?YoucansayKashmir is keyor coreorPakistan’sunfinished agenda,but thepoint is tomoveforwardfromthestatusquo.

Durrani: India has made symbolic compromises in the past like the bus. Theestablishment’s paranoia is that an upturnwillmakeKashmiris confident. Itwillencouragethemtoblowthelidonthepotoftheirsentiment,thesimmeringthatwashandledtechnicallywillboilover.

How goodwouldKashmiris feel in a Pakistan-India patch-up? Some of themrightlybelievethatonceourrelationsimprove,onthePakistanisideKashmirgoesonthebackburner.We’redoingtrade,whybringupthiscontentiousissue?TheK-wordbecomesanirritationforthepoliticalleadership:phirKashmir?Badimushkilsekiya.

Dulat:WehearthisfromKashmirisaswell.IndiaremembersKashmironlywhen

there’saproblem.Mirwaizhassaidthis,otherstoo.

I’vebelieved that if theKashmiri ishappier, the fallbackpositionyouprovidewoulddiminishandhopefullyoveraperiodof timedisappear. If theKashmiri ishappythenwhydoesheneedPakistan?Heneedsitwhenhe’sintrouble.

Durrani:An improvement inKashmirwill alsomean greater Pakistani influence.Geography, history, religion, and sixty years of oppression and second-classtreatment;eventodaysecurityforcesarethere.

Thingsarenowtakencareofthankstoyourgoodmanagement,butIdon’tseehappinessontheKashmiriface.Thosewhohaveapassport,whotravelout,whoare enlightened,who are allowed at all theseChao Phrayas and elsewhere: theylookallrightbutthemomenttheygetachancetheysay,westillhavecheckposts.

Pakistaniscomfortablewiththat,perhaps.If itcontinues,thebacklashwillbeagainstIndia.Letthemfaceitforsometime.We,inanycase,won’tbeabletodomuch.ThePakistanfactorisnotnecessarilyalwaysgoodforKashmirisorMuslims.

Dulat:Theboss’sobservationthatanimprovementinKashmirwillimplyincreasedPakistaniinfluenceissomethingIneverlookedat.Wouldthatactuallyplay?

ButfromtheKashmiripointofview,theIndianpointofviewandthepointofview of peace, some forwardmovement should keep happening. General Sahebtalkedaboutthebus that started.Start trains, startcomingandgoing, sendappletrucksbackandforth,makelifeeasier.LettherebepeaceontheLoC,wherelifeistoughbecauseofconstantshelling.Alotof localsare inwheelchairs,maimedforlife. If nothing else, people on the border could be reassured of peace. You canunderstand if people in Srinagar feel insecure whenever tension grows, howinsecurepeopleontheborderfeel.

Kashmirifriendsaskedmemanytimes:abjungtohnahinhonewalahai?

Durrani: My assessment on India-Pakistan, Kashmir, on the ground reality, thepossibilities,etc.,doesnottalkabouthopesorwishes.Ijustcontinuelookingatthefactsonground.Very seldomImove froma realisticorpragmaticapproach.OntwooccasionsImadeanexception.

OnewasAmritsar.2ItisnotthatPakistanhasnotbeencriticisedbefore,butitwasembarrassedagainstallnorms.Pakistancaninternallysayitisbotheredbythisthing.ButonceithappensonIndiansoil,thisSouthAsianhospitality,diplomaticnormswere violatedbyModi,AshrafGhani (whom I call a non-Afghan), sayingthingsthatembarrasstheirownpeoplebackhome.

Second,with all that ishappening inKashmir,post-Wani,when theKashmirileadership, the Mehboobas, etc. sit back and feel helpless, and do not evensymbolicallyanswerthepainoftheirownpeople,thenthebattleislost.Finito.

Dulat:That’swhy,Sir, IndiaandPakistantogethercoulddoa lot inKashmir.AswecoulddoinAfghanistanaswell.IsaythisaboutKashmirbecauseweknowtheKashmirisbetterthanyouwillknowthem.They’reapartofourcountry,wedealwiththemeveryday.Theylistentoyou,they’reafraidofyou,butweknowthembetter.

Durrani:On a hard-boiled, cold-blooded, hard-nosed assessment alone I can tellyounow:Idon’tseethathappening.

Dulat:No,no,Ican’tdisagreewithyouoneverything.

Durrani:Onthis,ifyouthinkitwillchange,doletmeknow.

Dulat:Idon’tknowifitwillchange.Butifweweretochange,wecouldchangesomuch.

Durrani:Wecould.

Dulat:BothinKashmirandinAfghanistan.

Durrani: So the moral of the story is India and Pakistan should hand over thismanagementtous.Shouldthisgodowninthebook?

Dulat: There is aKashmiri, better notmention his namebecause last time I gotgriefformentioningnames,heknows,likemostKashmirisknow,theyknowmorethanbothofusknow,Sir.TheyknowthatwemeetattheseTrack-IImeetings,alsobecauseofthebookandthephotographs,thewhiskeyandall.Theyenjoyallthis.

ThisKashmirisaystome,aapjabDurraniSahebsemiltehotohhummebhilechaliye.Humteenofaislakarasaktehain.

Sinha:WhenwillGeneralSahebbeabletovisitKashmir?

Dulat:WheneverIcanvisitMurreehecanvisitSrinagar!

Durrani:ForhimtogotoMurreeisnobigdeal.

Dulat: It’s in a lighter vein because I once askedhim if could go toMurree anddrinkbeer.Hesaid,no,I’llgiveyouMurreevodkainIslamabad.

10

AmanullahGilgiti’sDreamsofIndependence

AdityaSinha:HaveyouevermetSalahuddin1orAmanullah?

AsadDurrani: Amanullah, yes.When the uprising began,wewere justmarkingtimeto seewhathappens.Amanullahwasanearly resistance fighter.His ideaofthe third option, independence, was not bad. But it put off many Pakistanis,especially the establishment. Its support was, well, to describe it as weak is notdoingjusticebecausesomedidn’tlikehimatall.Iadmiredsomeofthethingshedidandsaid;forinstance,hisreligiouscommitmenttohisOctober27visitstotheLoC.Andhowwell-organiseditalwayswas.

Amanullahhadreasontobeupsetwithus.SooverwhelmingwasourdesirethatKashmiraccedetoPakistan,towardsSardarQayyum,2theslogan‘KashmirbanegaPakistan’,totheJamaat-e-Islami,3thatthesegotourpoliticalsupport.Wetriedtotell him, haan bhai, Amanullah, you are right, and that fellow is also right. ButAmanullahwasshort-changedandheknewit,andhewasright.Ilaterrealisedourmistake,butbythenitwastoolateformepersonallytodoanything.

Sinha:HewasnottheISI’sfavourite?

Durrani: He certainly was not the ISI’s favourite. Not the ISI’s favourite, notPakistan’sfavourite.

We had no business tomake value judgments. Pragmatically we should haveaskedwhich countrywould losemore ifKashmir became independent.My ownassessmentwasIndiawouldlosemorebecauseIndiahadmore.Ifafterhavingbeenin India for60-70years they stillwant independence, that sentimentmustcountforsomething.

IfindependenttheywouldkeepgoodrelationswithIndia,I’msureofthat.TheywouldreachouttoChinaforvariousreasons.ButKashmir’sheartwouldbewithitswesternneighbour.

That’swhyifsomeonetalksofindependencethenwehavenobusinessgettingintheway.SoAmanullahwasnothandledwellbyus.

A.S.Dulat:IndependenceisnotanacceptableoptioninPakistan.

Durrani:Indiagivesitaspecialstatusof370.4Weliketobelievetheyareanother

type of state, with a president and prime minister. Okay, they have the samecurrency and same administrative structure, etc. But if they decide onindependence, enough would say: why not? We always claimed the Kashmiris’heartiswithus,soanindependentKashmirshouldgravitatetowardsus.Ihavenoproblemwithindependence.

Dulat:Buttheestablishmenthas.

Durrani: The establishment is, at best, careful. Some stupidly say that anindependentKashmirwouldbedisastrous.

Dulat:Thereyouare.

Sinha:Whatisthelogicofdisaster?

Durrani:Paranoia.

Dulat:ParanoiaandwhethertheKashmiriisreliable.Canhebetrusted?

Durrani:SomedotalkoftheKashmiri’sunreliabilitybutit’stypicallyaPakistaniorsub-continental or universal trait not to believe that anyone other than yourselfcould be reliable. In Pakistan, Punjabis cast aspersion on Pushtuns, Balochis andlatelyonMohajirs;PunjabissaywearethelargestcommunitybutwewerealsothemostreliablefortheBritishandMughalempires.Sincethey—andthePushtuns—actedasmercenaries,whyshouldtheybeconsidered‘morereliable’?

NoneofthemthinkanindependentKashmirwouldbeforthebetter.Theyaremoreworried aboutwhatwouldhappen toManglaDam. Itswaterwould comethroughanothercountry,theyargue.

The worst argument from a sensible person: If Kashmir would becomeindependent it would get more foreign support and troops; America, Germany,Japan, all would be there. They’ll give money because Kashmir is strategicallyimportant.They’dliketoestablishbases,astheyhaveinAfghanistan.PakistanandIndia will both have less influence, and powerful Westerners will take overKashmir.

That is why I suggest to our various Track-IIs to discuss the independenceoption. Wargame the different scenarios. If a large section, even a majority, ofKashmiriswouldtakeindependenceifgivenachoice,thenletthemhaveit.

Dulat: Ioncediscussed independencewithYasinMalik,5becausehesaid: ‘Aapkesaathkyabaatkarenge,humtohazadichahtehain.’

‘IfyoucouldgetindependencethenIwouldwavetheKashmiriflagwithyou,’Itold him. The hard reality is that Kashmirwill not get independence. Indiawillnevercountenanceit.

Pakistanisalsonervousandit isclearinAmanullah’scase.Hewaspartofthe

first resistance, or revolutionaries, of the JKLF.Hewas involved in theRavindraMhatre6murdercaseinEngland.TheBritsdidn’thaveenoughevidencesohewasdeported.HethenwenttoBrusselsandfinallyevenBelgiumthrewhimout.Thenhecame toPakistanhopinghewouldbeacknowledgedas theultimateKashmirileader, as big as Sheikh Saheb. Interestingly, all these revolutionaries, includingAmanullahKhan,hadabackgroundintheNationalConference.

AmanullahoriginallybelongedtoGilgit.HelivedawhileinKupwaraandthenshiftedabroad.But in theValleyhewasgeneral-secretaryof thePlebisciteFront,workingcloselywithMirzaAfzalBeg7whileSheikhSahebwasunderarrest.TheJKLFboyshadasimilarbackground.

When he came to Pakistan post-1982, during General Zia’s time, he wasreducedtoanideologuebecausetherewerenotakersforindependence.Hesatathome, organised marches and in due course, as the Kashmiris say, he becameUncleji. It’s a sadend tohis story.Hisdaughter is verybright,married toSajjadLone.

Durrani: The third option is saleable in Pakistan. Nawaz Sharif, withoutforethought,spokeofitduringavisittoIraninhisfirsttenure.GhulamIshaqKhansaid theUNSecurityCouncil resolutiongaveusa locus standi in thematterandshouldnotbegivenup,butwecouldexploreotheroptions.It issaleable,excepttherewillbehueandcry.

Sinha:ButAmanullahcouldnotsellit.

Dulat:Amanullahcouldnotsellit,evenYasinMalikcouldnotsellit.

Durrani:Theycan’tsellit.

Dulat:That’showtheHizbulMujahideencameabout.

Sinha:Yousaidhewasthefirstwaveofresistance,andhecouldnotsellit.

Durrani:NoKashmirileaderwillbeabletosellit.Properlyorchestrated,onecanwinovermanyPakistanis.Theproblem is thatPakistanis arenot smart.And theIndianDeepStatewillnotletthathappen.

Dulat:Thepointyoudonotmention,Sir,istherearen’tmanypeoplelikeyouwiththeconfidencetosell thisproposal.YoumentionedManglaDam;butmorethanthatit’stheKashmiri,howwillyoudealwithhim?

Durrani:Yes,yes,I’vealreadygrantedthatsomewillnotlookatitotherthaninanarrow perspective. They will say: You also? You want Pakistan to suffer? YouwanttoloseKashmir?

That criticism scaresmost. That’swhy, if properly explained, those favouringindependencecangoupfromfivepercenttoten.Atsunamicandevelop,I’msure.

Butwhowillorchestrateit?

Sinha:AmanullahKhan’sson-in-lawisverymuchapartoftheJ&Kgovernment.

Dulat:HeishalfBJP.

Durrani:True.Ithinklackofsmartness,lackofwisdom.

Dulat:Lackofbelief.

Durrani:Lackofconfidence.

Dulat:Lackofconfidence.That iswhywhenthemovementstarted itgotoutofevenPakistani control. Immediately youdrew the Jamaat inbecause youneededmorereliablefootsoldiers.

TherewasadebateinKashmirinlate1989onwhethertheJamaatshouldjoininornot.Geelani8 Saheb is on recordhaving referred to theseboys as terrorists.ThenhewassummonedtoameetinginKathmandu,andthingschanged.

Durrani:Movementsareusuallyhijackedbybetterorganisedparties.

Dulat:Quiteright.

Durrani: Like the Iranian revolution was triggered by the Tudeh Party, acommunist group, but thenhijacked by the clergy led by (Ayatollah)Khomeini.TheEgyptianArabSpringwasstartedbythepeoplebutafterapausetakenoverbythe army. Afghanistan’s problem began with infighting among the communistfactions—the Khalqis, the Parchamis, etc.—but when the Soviets invaded, thegroundwas captured by themujahideen and their Islamic supporters whowerenowhereclosetothecommunists.NowwehavethosewhocollaboratedwiththeSovietsinstalledinKabulwithAmericanhelp.

InKashmir,Amanullahandothersledtheresistance,buttheJamaatwasbetterorganised and hadmore influence on our side. It’s a universal phenomenon thatonce a movement starts, the initiators are jettisoned in due course. They areideologues,mayhavethegoodofthepeopleatheart,butrarelytheabilitytosteeritthrough.

11

Kashmir:TheModiYears

Aditya Sinha: General Saheb has repeatedly referred to the fallout of BurhanWani’s death in 2016. The summer of 2017, however, was different; it wasrelativelypeaceful.Wasthisyourexpectation?

A.S.Dulat:BurhanWani’skillingwasonly a catalyst.After all,whowasBurhanWani?Agood-lookingladwhosephotoswereonFacebook.SomeevensayhewasaCIDsource,butonlyGodknowsthetruth.

ItgoesbacktotheDecember2014electionswhoseresultsatisfiednobody.TheBJP dreamt of Mission 44,1 and my friend ‘Pompy’ Gill was managing the BJPcampaign in Srinagar.He said five-six seats definitely but hoped for eight. Theydidn’tgetasingleseat.

ItfrustratedtheBJP,andalsothePDPbecauseittoodreamtof45seats.Theygot28.MuftiSahebcouldhavedonewiththree-fourseatsmoretobeastrongerchiefminister.HewasvulnerableandhadnooptionbuttogoalongwiththeBJP.

Heinvitedmetohisoath-takingonMarch1.Itwasstillcold.BJPbigwigswereonstage,hugging.Themomenttheprimeministerleft,hisentourageleft:Advani,MuraliManoharJoshi,AmitShah,theRSSguyRamMadhav,thewholelot.MuftiSaheb made the mistake of calling the press and thanking the separatists andPakistan.

ImmediatelyinDelhipeoplesaid,arreyaaryehkiskobanadiyachiefminister?Yeh tohPakistanihai.The journalist JyotiMalhotra calledme: ‘Please givemeabalancedview.’ I felt sorry forMuftiSaheb.AsJ&Kchiefministerhehad to saysomething.Whatgood iscallinghimaPakistani?He’sbeen Indianallhis life,hewasintheCongressformanyyears.

AfterthatMuftigotnothing.

MuftiunderestimatedModi,overestimatedhimself,andfoundhimselfinafix.But having long been a politician with thick skin, he managed things. Mostdisappointing, though, was that nothing came as relief for the September 2014floods, inwhichpeopledied,propertywasdestroyed.TheKashmiri thought thePDP-BJPalliancewouldbringsomething,butnothinghappened.

This drift continued.Mufti Saheb died a brokenman. That’swhyMehboobatookthreemonths to takeoathofoffice.AndMuftiSaheb’s funeral inBijbehara

sawjust3,000-3,500people.

AsadDurrani: Thank you for saying this.We are counting on themistakes youpeoplemake.

Dulat: Worse was to follow. Once Mehbooba became chief minister she cameunder greaterpressure.TheRSS-types spokeof special camps for sainiks and forthe Pandits, etc., and every now and then dropped hints that Article 370 wasunnecessary.

TheKashmirifeltthathewasbeingtakenforgranted,andthatinhisownlandhemightbereducedtoaminority.Thenwheredoeshego?Thatistherealfear.Ithas never been as conspicuous as now. Therefore, even Geelani Saheb, whoremainedaloyalbuddyofMuftiSaheb,isintwominds:isMehboobaokayornot?Butthereisnootheroption.

Iwas in Srinagar in June 2016 and everybody said thingswere looking good,tourism was at its peak, flights coming, no rooms available. Yet I could sensesomethingwasgoing togive.Therewasawhisper,dekhtehain,Eidkebaadkyahota hain.Wemet somewhere, Sir, inLondon, and I said something is going tohappeninKashmir.Anditdid.

It’sdifficulttopredictKashmirbecause itcanchangeovernight,as itdidwithBurhanWani’s killing.But it is apparent that theKashmiri is sick and tired, andwantspeace.Therefore,thisstone-pelting,theseprotests,couldgoonindefinitely.

Tothesecurityforces’credit,theydidagoodjobin2017neutralisingbignamesinmilitancyorterrorism.Militantshavebeenpickeduporknockedoff,orthey’vecome overground. Still, strange things keep happening, like this chopping off ofwomen’shair.Theysayit’saghost.

On the ground the situationmay look normal to somebody fromDelhi, butthingsarenotallrightinKashmir.

That’swhytheappointmentofthespecialrepresentativeiswelcome.Whateverthereasonforit.Atleastwewillstarttalkingtopeoplewehavestoppedtalkingto.

In Kashmir we have a chief minister who was silent for a long time. Thisappointmentgaveherheart,andshewelcomedit:‘Thisiswhatyouwanted,thingswillimprovenow,’shetoldherpeople.

Dr Farooq Abdullah also said it’s good except that we also need to talk toPakistan. Omar had some reservations. GhulamNabi said, why have you takenthree years to do this? Chidambaram, who’s a regular commentator now onKashmirafterhavingbeenhomeminister,saidthisisanacknowledgementthatthegovernment’smuscularpolicyhasnotworked.Buthealsowelcomedit.

Sinha:WhatisthereactioninPakistantotheeventsof2016?

Durrani:Therewas consensus inPakistan that in thepost-Wani developments itshouldneither interferenorbe seen tobe involved.Some schadenfreude (feelingpleasedwiththeadversary’splight)wasunderstandable,butafterUriandtheso-called surgical strike,we realized that sitting back anddoing nothingwas not anoption.Wewouldinevitablygetinvolved.I’msuretheconcernnowiswhattodoiftheeventsof2016followacoursethatDelhiisbentuponsteering.

Dulat: There were indications in the six-eight months post-Burhan Wani, asGeneral Saheb puts it, of separatists and the mainstream in Kashmir comingtogether.Remarksorstatementsfrombothsidesindicatedthis,anditwasthebestthingthatcouldhappen,forKashmirisneedtothinktogether.

But post-UP elections2 therewas nomore commonality. This suited both theGovernmentofIndia,whichdidn’twanttotalktoseparatists,andtheGovernmentofPakistan,whichwouldliketheseparatiststoremainontheirside.

Sinha:TheirlimitedaimiskeepingtheHurriyatontheirside?

Dulat: Yeah. TheHurriyat is the Pakistani team. India has its team, Pakistan itsteam,andtheKashmirisareinbetween.

Sinha:GeneralSaheb,doyouagreewiththisassessment?

Durrani: The best that can happen and seems possible is to make Kashmir thebridge.The twoofuswould love toworknot for independenceor reunification,buttoprovideasenseofcomforttothepeople.

Whenwegetpermissionwedon’tevenhavetotalkaboutit.NeithersidehastosaythisisaboutterrorismorasolutiontoKashmir.Buthowtoconvertthisprocessintoreality?

Dulat: Icouldn’tagreemore.Kashmirshouldbethebridge, it’s therightstartingpoint. Ihavealwaysmaintainedthat ifwehavetotalk, let’s talkKashmir. Ifyoumove forward on Kashmir, then you are automatically moving forward onterrorism. When we complain about terrorism, we are talking about Kashmirwithoutsayingso,thatiswhereterrorismis.

Thatisthewaytogoaboutit,butIdon’tseeithappening.

Thecrucialthingisdon’trubtheKashmirinoseinthegroundanyfurther,don’tgivehimasenseofdefeat.ThatiswhentheKashmiristartstopeltstones.

Take Siachen, for instance. I’m tired of talking about it because of thedeflection.Itwon’thappenunlessthere’ssomeforwardmovementonKashmir.

Sinha:WhatifModiweretoannouncethathewouldscrapArticle370?

Durrani: I’mnot impressedbysuddenmovesthataren’twell thoughtthroughorsustainable. Indeed, the media has a rollicking time thereafter. Later, when thebubblebursts,onemayhavetocomeupwithanothergimmick.

Dulat:Yes,370istalkedaboutfromtimetotime,maybenotinseriousquarters.Ifit happened one could anticipate celebrations in India, but it would negativelyimpactKashmir. It isnowameaningless thing, somesay it’s just theatrebecausewhat’sleftof370?Nothing.It’sbeenguttedtotheextentthatnothingisleft.Andwhywouldyouwanttoremovethislastsymbol?

Sinha:Demonetisation did nothing for blackmoney, but itmade people believeModiistough.

Dulat:Ihope370isn’tscrappedbecauseitwillgivetheKashmirireasontosay,seethiskeepshappeningtous.It’sbeingdebatedinSrinagar:ifithappenswhatdowedo?

Sinha: General Saheb, how do you see the appointment of former IB chiefDineshwarSharmaasaspecialrepresentativetotalktoKashmiris?

Durrani:IfyouwantendorsementfromPakistan,appointapersonlikeMrDulat.ThismancanhandlethegenuinegrievancesofKashmiris. If it’sanestablishmentmanitwon’tmakemuchdifferenceexcepttemporarilycalmtempers.HewillnotestablishthesortofchangethatcouldexcitePakistan.

Butthey’veappointedsomeone.Let’ssee.

Whoam I to saygoodorbad?Noexcitementonmypart.Our foreignofficesaidtherightthing,whichiswhattheforeignofficesdo.WhystickyourneckoutandendorsesomethingthatmayturnoutbadlyfortheKashmirisandforus?

Sinha:Whatdoyouthinkwasthemotivationtodothisatthistime?

Durrani:Ithinkitwasyetanothergimmick,becauseTillerson3wascomingtotheregion.InPakistan,onsuchoccasions,wewouldusuallygetholdofafewpeopletosustain the illusion of cooperation. In the good old days the Indians had amarvellous plan. A few weeks before an American visited they would create ahostileenvironmentsothatonarrivalhewasonthedefensive.India’snotasmallcountrythathastopresentitselfinagoodmanner.

Now there is a nexus between India, the United States and Israel, with theKabul regime playing the poodle. The bloc they target is Pakistan-China, withscuttlingCPEC(China-PakistanEconomicCorridor)astheirimmediateaim.

IndiawantedtotellTillersonnottoworryaboutKashmir.Youdon’tevenhaveto raise it, we’ve appointed a competentman—like yourAfPak envoys—to takecareofit.Tillersoninanycasewouldhaveagreed;evenifhehadmentionedithe

probablywouldhavesaid, look,Kashmircontinuestopresentaproblem.Hewasnotgoingtomakemuchnoise,buteventhatwaspre-empted.

Dulat: Let’s say it’s because of Tillerson. As you know I’m an optimist. I knowDineshwar,we’vebeencolleagues andalso colleagues inKashmir.He’s a simple,straight,uncomplicated fellowwho feels forKashmir.He’s a good listener,not aguywholikestoblab.

Sinha:ButMrDovalwouldhaveappointedhim,thoughRajnathSinghannouncedit.SohewoulddoasMrDovalwants,isn’tit?

Dulat:Quiteright.Sowewelcomeitallthesame.ItoldGeneralSaheb,let’sgiveitachanceforsixmonths.

Durrani:Indeed,itishischancetotake.

Sinha:GeneralSahebsaidsomethingabouttheKashmirissuegoingonforthenext200years.

Durrani: No, no, no. That was not the point. I meant that even if it goes onindefinitely,itdoesnotmeanweshoulddonothinginKashmir.

Dulat:Quiteright.

Durrani: Building roads, infrastructure, democratic representation there. That iswhatImeant.

Dulat: I’m all for it. I’ll get blacklisted in Delhi but I say that Kashmir beforeanythingelseinPakistan.Wedon’thavemuchexplainingtodo.Yes,nowandthenthingsarenotastheyshouldbe,asin2016-17.

But when we talk to our Pakistani friends I would like to ask them somequestions:Why are you doing this?Why don’t you understand Kashmir a littlebetter?

Sinha:Thisbookcomesoutinthesummerof2018.WhatscenariodoyouseeinKashmirthen?

Dulat: Difficult to say. There’s the Pakistan factor. If we start talking to theKashmiris, we also need to talk to Pakistan. Ultimately, when we reach somecivilitywith theKashmiris, then they shouldbeallowed to talk toPakistan.Thishashappenedinthepast.

What happens in the summer depends on what happens in the winter first.Usually, once the J&K government shifts to Jammu,4 there’s comparative peace.Butthesixmonthsof2017-18winterarecrucial.

WhenthegovernmentshiftstoJammutheactionalsoshiftsthere.Tothearmycamps, theparamilitary, the J&Kpolice. Jammu is bad enough, but latelywe’ve

hadincidentsinPunjab,whichbordersJammu.WehadanincidentinGurdaspurand one in Pathankot which gave me the heebie-jeebies. Suppose there’s anincident down theGrandTrunkRoad, in Jalandhar orAmbala, almost touchingDelhi.

Solet’swatchthewinter,howitgoes.

GeneralSahebsaidthatinbadtimes,ifyou’retalkingithelps.Somearguethatevenwhenwearetalkingorstarttalking,somethinggoeswrong.Itmaygowrong,butinthelongtermitwillbenefitus.Giveitalittlewhile,giveittraction.

Durrani:Youdon’tneedrocketsciencetoknowwhatshouldbedone.Sometimesitwouldhelptostickone’sneckoutandsaythisislikelytohappen.Thesyndromeisknown:unreststartsinsomeformandtheState’sfirstreactioniscrackdown.Itpanicsthatifitwaits,theunrestmayspread.Thefirstinstrumentusedisamilitaryone. Then, regardless of what people say, the situation is contained and you’rewilling to talk and address their grievances. But once it’s over, the reaction isusuallythatthere’snoneedtoforanythingmore.Let’sgetonwithsomethingelse.

TheStatecanuseforce,sometimesbrutallyandregardlessofitsconsequences.Theunrestcanmakeatacticalwithdrawalorbebattered.Butinevitablythereisaresurgence.He’sright,itcouldbesixmonthsorsixyearslater.

WhetheritisKashmirorBalochistan,itwillresurge.Iftheresistanceispotent,itbouncesbackmoreviolently.LikeKashmir,post-BurhanWani.Theepisodemayhavebeentriggeredbysomethinglesssignificantthan10or20yearsago,buttheeruptionsarewilder,moreserious.

TheAfghanmujahideenwereharmless,focusedonresistingforeignoccupation.SomewentontobecometheTaliban;alittlemoreradicalandyouhavealQaeda.IfalQaedaisputdown,youhaveDa’esh.Thatisthepattern.

Call me cynical or nihilist but I feel it is realism to say there will be nomeaningfultalksonKashmirbetweenIndiaandPakistanfortheforeseeablefuture.

Dulat:IfthisinterlocutorworksthenultimatelytheKashmiriswillwantapoliticalinteraction.DineshwarSharmacan’tdecidethat.

WeforgetKashmirisnotamilitaryproblem.GeneralSahebisabsolutelyright,whenthere’supheaval,thefirstreactionis,let’sputthisdownandthenwe’llsee.That’sokaybutlet’snotforgetthisisapoliticalmatter.InKashmirit’sanemotiveissue.

Don’tdisturbtheKashmiripsychebysayingunnecessarythings, likethearmychiefdidafterthisappointment,thatitwon’taffectmilitaryoperations.Everyoneknows it won’t stop. But why must you state this? When you do, it meansDineshwarSharmaisofnoconsequence.

Similarly,whenweagreetotalktoKashmiris,thisisasetline,we’lltalkwithintheConstitution.Youhavetobedaft to thinkthat theUnionHomeMinisterorthePrimeMinister…

Sinha:OrthePresidentofIndia.

Dulat:…can talk outside the Constitution. Prof. Butt5 said this tome, yeh aapbaateinkyonkarteho?It’srubbingsaltintotheKashmiriwoundinsteadofsaying,come,whatdoyouwanttotalkabout,wehaveanopenmind.

That’swhatAdvani,whoinNDA-Iwasconsideredahawk,said.YouasktheseHurriyat guyswhohad two roundsof talkswithhimand they say,Advanijiwasreasonable.ThefirstHurriyatdemandasalwayswasforthereleaseofsomeoftheirjailedcolleagues.Advanijisaid,allright,giveusalist.Andthen:Whatelsedoyouwant?Prof.Buttsaid,Sir,we’llcomebackwitharoadmap.InMay2004theyweretoproducearoadmap,buttheBJPlosttheelection.ButeveniftheBJPhadwonthatroadmapwouldnothavebeenputonthetablebecauseit’sonlyinthemind.Very little beyond the status quo can be said except accommodation andhonourablepeace.

WhatI’msayingisthattheobviousneednotbesaidifitoffendssomeone.TheKashmiriunderstandsverywellhislimitationsandwhatisfeasible.

12

TheUnlovedDrFarooqAbdullah

A.S.Dulat:WhenwetalkofKashmir,I’mconfidentthatGeneralSahebandmyselfcouldco-optFarooqAbdullahandthethreeofuscouldsitdowntogether.AlotonKashmircouldbedone. If, for somereason,Farooqalone isnotacceptable, thenco-opt twopersons:Farooqanda separatist likeProf.Ghani.Twoofusand twoKashmiris.Wecouldtriggersomeexcitement.Allitrequiresisreasonableness.

It’sbeenonmymind.FarooqhasnotbeentoPakistaninalongtime.Heneedstogothereforhisownfact-findingmission.

AsadDurrani:Whatacoincidence.Soonafterthe1990uprising,inameetingwithGilgiti and others, there was a suggestion to invite Farooq Abdullah. TheestablishmentpeoplewereopposedtothisideaandI’mnotsurehowitwouldhaveplayedout.

Imethimonlyonce,duringtheTehelkaconferenceinLondon.Hetriedhisbesttoavoidme,butaftermytalkhewasn’tunhappy.Ibelievehemadepositivenoisespost-BurhanWani.Dosayhellotohimforme.

Dulat: Everyone tells me that Farooq is my friend, and I am flattered, but thereason I suggest Farooq is that he is one Kashmiri who understands not onlyKashmirbutNewDelhiwell.He is thebestbridgebetweenDelhi andSrinagar.Nowhe’sreachedastagewhereheneedstounderstandPakistan,andifhedid,andhealreadyknowsDelhi, then itwouldhelp.His involvementwouldhelpagreatdealinmovingforward.

His views arewell known but he has been saying repeatedly that you cannothaveasolution,whichhe’sneverearliersaid,withoutPakistan.Newwisdomhasdawned.

Durrani: If ithappensafterthisbookisout,wewillhavereasontofeelgratified.Thepointis,hereisanidea.It’snotbeenattempted.Itneedsnofunding.ItmightbebetterinabookthaneitherofusgoingandsuggestingittoourNSAs.

Dulat: You can take it for granted that Delhi will never appoint Farooq asinterlocutoronKashmir.TheonlywayitcanhappenisifhegoestoPakistan,andPakistanisconvincedthatFarooqistherightinterlocutor.TheproposalthencomesfromPakistan:fromtheprimeminister,orthearmychief,ortheISIchief,ortheNSA,etc.That’showitcouldhappen.

Durrani:True.Tarikayahihotahai.Thewayofmakingsomethinghappenisthatitmustlookliketheotherperson’sidea.

Dulat: I’m reminded of 2002, after Farooq lost the (assembly) election. Hesuddenly decided to go to Pakistan, and the NCP minister Praful Patel wouldaccompanyhim.HecalledthepresstohisplaceinDelhiandannouncedit.Iwastaken by surprise, and I asked, have you spoken to the PM?He said the two ofthemwould now go andmeet theprimeminister.AllVajpayee saidwas, ‘Havesomefood.’

So,suchan invitationhastocomefromPakistan,because itwon’tcomefromDelhi.

WhenFarooqfoughtandwontheby-electioninSrinagar(inApril2017)therewas widespread feeling that the Government of India didn’t want Farooq inParliament. It’s ironic because the Government of Pakistan also doesn’t wantFarooq in Parliament. This is the message from the separatists, which impliesPakistan.Itechoestheirpoliticalthinking:‘WhyFarooq?He’sunreliable.Whathashedone?Whatisthisfamily,thisdynasty?They’repro-India.SheikhSahebusedtodothesame.’

Ironically, the main lesson that Farooq learnt was when his father, SheikhAbdullah,madepeacewithMrsGandhi in1975.Hisgreat father,after spending23yearsinjail,founditnecessarytomakepeacewithDelhi,thenhemustalwaysstayontherightsideofDelhi.AtthebeginninghespentayearandahalftryingtodefyDelhiandreceivedarudeshockin1984withhisdismissal.

Other politiciansmight think Farooq is a joker, theymight think anything ofFarooq, but Farooq cannot be ignored, his very presence cannot be ignored.Lookingaheadtothe2019election,hewouldhavearoleinOppositionunity.

IalsobelieveFarooqwouldmakeanoutstandingforeignminister.

AdityaSinha:Notinthisgovernment.

Dulat:No,notinanygovernment,evenhisown.Peopledon’ttakehimseriously,thatistheunfortunatepart.

Durrani:We canmake him deputy primeminister.We can say though hemayhavecomefromyourside,he’sours.SowemakehimdeputyPM.Farooqwillhavea problem accepting the offer, and the Pakistanis would have delivered amasterstroke.

Butwhoisgoingtobellthecat?

Sinha:Noonewantstorocktheboat.

Dulat: Mufti was to be given a Padma Shri posthumously, but Mehbooba, etc.

turned it down. Padma Shris have been awarded to Kuka Parrey’scounterinsurgents. But FarooqAbdullah, for all the services he’s rendered India,hasn’tgotrecognition.

Durrani:Farooqhasgotnothing?

Dulat:Nothing.

Durrani:Serveshimright.

13

TakeWhatYouCanGet

AsadDurrani:OnKashmir,there’stheoldrecipe.Oneisrealistictoknowwhatisatstakeforbothcountries.Thisissueofconflictisaconflictingissue:we’realwayssayingresolvetheissue,findafinalsolution,forusit’sacoreissue,etc.

Butitcanbeturnedaround.ItisbestresolvedbymakingKashmirthefocusofthe two countries’ cooperation. ‘From Conflict to Cooperation’ might be areasonableslogan.

A.S.Dulat:Absolutely,absolutely.

Durrani:Sothisisourrecipe:don’tlookatindependence,don’tlookat370,anddon’tlookattheLoC.

AdityaSinha:WhatwouldbethefirststeptowardsthiscooperationinKashmir?

Durrani:Wedon’thavetoreinventit.Peoplebeforeus,wiserpeople,havefoundawaybystartingatthepeople’slevel.Simplemovement,alittletrade,letthembeinvolvedinthesematterswhileDelhiandIslamabadtakeabackseat.

Oncethepeoplefeelcomfortabletheymightthemselvessay:‘Wedon’twanttobethemainissuebetweenyoutwocountries,whichmightleadtowar,etc.We’reallrightasweare.Nochangeinstatus,nothingbig.Thetwocountries,you’dbebetterofffollowingourexample.’

But the approach has to be indirect. Instead of saying we want a divided orjointly administered Kashmir, or any other formula that has been talked of, I’dsuggestanindirectandincrementalapproach,startingwithlittlesteps,likebusandtrade,etc.

Dulat:Confidence-buildingmeasures.

Durrani:Continuewithout sayingwhat youwant at the end.When it comes toconflictresolution,ithastobeanevolutionaryprocess.

And everyone must always remember the conventional wisdom: you don’talwaysgetwhatyouwant.

Sinha:Sothen,takingwhatyoucangetmakesthemostsense.

Durrani:In2000,EhudBarakofferedapackagetoYasserArafat.1Barak,aformerdefenceminister and a highly decorated soldier,may not have been the greatestIsraeli primeminister inhistory, butwhathe offeredon the surface of it looked

good. If you looked deeply you might have found weaknesses. But it had thatwisdom,thatspirit.

God knows I’m not an expert on the Prophet’s accepting the Treaty ofHudaybiyyah.2Ijustreadaboutit.Maybeitwasintendedtoteachusalltheneedtocompromiseandthecriticalityoftiming.

WhenthePalestiniansobjectedtovariousprovisionsinthepackage,itwasthatthey could only compromise if Israel agreed to all concessions. Itwas amistake.Thesummitfailed.

Takewhateveryoucan.Youneverhavetosayitisover.Khatam,chhutti.Youtakeit,improveyourposition,andafteradecentintervaloffive,eightortenyearsyoucomebackandask,butwhataboutthereturnoftherefugees?

InKashmir’scase,thismaybehowyoudiscussthesolution.

Dulat: The story is that before SheikhAbdullahwent aheadwith theAfzal Begaccordin1975,hesentDrFarooqAbdullahtoPakistan.DrFarooqwentandmetZ.A.Bhutto,whoissupposedtohavetoldhim:‘Atthispointwecandonothingtohelpyou.So,takewhatyoucanget.Ifyou’reofferedpeaceandpowerinKashmir,takeit.’

There was also a story in Kashmir that Yasin Malik was advised by theAmericans to do business with Delhi. When Yasin said that Delhi wasunreasonable,theysaid:‘Youshouldtakewhatyoucanget.’Theysaiditwasnotthefinalarrangement,butifsomethingisonoffer,grabit.

Callitthesemifinalorquarterfinal;andwhoknowswhatmayhappen?

‘Take what you can get, that’s good enough,’ this is the essence of what DrFarooq Abdullah repeatedly advocates. In Kashmir, you can’t change anything.What is theirs is theirs,what is ours is ours.There’s nopoint inpretending.WehavetosettleontheLineofControl.Thiscanbedoneinvariousways,andmaybenotascrudelyasFarooqputsit.ButthatwasalsotheessenceofMusharraf’sfour-partformula:LoC-plus.TheLoCcosmeticallydressedupsothatbothsideswon,neitherlost.That’swhereforwardmovementlies.

PakistanissittingprettyasthesituationinKashmirsuitsthem.Delhiseemstothinkthatwe’reallright,there’snoprobleminKashmir.

Durrani:Bhutto’sadvicewassogood.Idon’tknowhowthesethingskeepgettingmissed;dowewantallornothing?Isitjusttakeitorleaveit?Whenwewantallornothing,we are likely to get nothing. But also,whoever asked you to take it orleaveitwasalsolikelytestingyournerve.So,asBhuttosaid: ‘Takewhatyoucanget.’

IV

KABUKIThesesevenchaptersgointothemeatoftheIndia-Pakistanrelationshipitself,andthepersonalitieswhohavecometodefineit.TheseincludenotjustGeneralPervezMusharraf and the politicians of his country, but also Prime Minister NarendraModiandAjitDoval,forwhomthePakistanishavestrongfeelings;andthesectionof Indian government that Pakistanis regard as itsmost hawkish. Lestwe forget,therearealsopositivesinourcountries’historywithoneanother.

Settingthescene

Kathmandu,March26,2017:Wespendthedayinanoisylobbyofourhotel,offtoasidebutstillnotescapingthegeneralhub-buboftheebbandflowofguestsastheycomeanddepart.WegooutforlunchtoThamel,butthethicksmogoftheNepalese capital, comprising pollution and the dust that hasn’t settled from thedevastatingearthquaketwoyearsearlier,makesitdifficulttoseewhereweallareactuallyheaded.

14

IndiaandPakistan:‘Almost’Friends

A.S.Dulat:One day in 1980 or ’81, Iwas summoned by a senior IB colleague,VinodKaul.HesatdownstairsfrommeinourRKPuramofficeinDelhi.Kaulwasfrommy cadre (Rajasthan) andmuch senior tome; I was recently promoted todeputydirector.Hewasatopanalystincertainsubjects,includingPakistan.Hesatmedownandsaid:‘YouknowthesePakistaniswell,canyouhelpus?’

Iwastakenaback.‘Sir,you’vegotitwrong,’Isaid.‘IknownoPakistani.Infact,IstayfarawayfromPakistanis.’

‘Your car number was noted at the Pakistan counsellor’s, where there was acocktail,’hesaid.‘Youwerethere.’

No,Itoldhim,Ihadn’tattendedanysuchfunction.Hetoldmetothinkitover.Then: ‘Yourparents are also good friendswithPakistanis?’Yes, I said.Thatpartwastrue.

I thoughtperhapsmycarhadbeen stolen frommyKidwaiNagar residence. Iwenthomeandaskedmywifeifshehadloanedittoanyone,becauseitwasnotedataPakistanifunction.Shehadn’t.What’stheaddress,sheasked.

‘Oh my God,’ I said. In Vasant Vihar, near where the Pakistani gentlemanstayed,therewasanursinghomewheremybrother-in-lawwasadmittedafteranaccident.Soourcarmusthavebeenparkednearbyandthenumbernoted.

ThentherewasthesecondpartofKaul’squeries,aboutmyparents.Theylivedin SagarApartments, on TilakMarg inDelhi, right next to PakistanHouse.Myparents loved toplaybridge—asdid two successiveenvoys.So theyused toplaybridgetogether,mostlyatmyparents’place,sometimesattheGymkhanaClub.

The firstof theenvoyswasSyedFidaHassan, appointedambassador in1976.Hewasmyfather’soldfriendasbothwerePunjabcadreandbothhadbeenpostedin Sialkot together. The moment he arrived in Delhi he began looking for oldfriendsandfoundmyfatherlivingnextdoor.

The gentleman following him was Abdul Sattar, who was passionate aboutbridgeandwouldlandupatSagarApartments.Soforaboutsixyearsmyparentscontinuously interactedwith Pakistani envoys. For them, theywere all the samePunjab.

Aditya Sinha: Bridge was their bridge. Any other prominent players at their

gathering?

Dulat:AprominentIndiandiplomat,SamarSen(popularlyknownasTinooSen),anold ICSwhogot shot in the shoulderwhilehewasourhighcommissioner inDhaka.Hewasbindaas,auniquebureaucratwhodidn’townanythingafteryearsofservice.SattarSaheboncecalledhim‘fakir’.He livedasapayingguest,didn’townacar,wentaround ina taxi.Someyears laterheheard Iwas involvedwithKashmir, so he calledme to the club and asked: ‘Are you one of those bloodyhawks?Allrightthen,wecantalklikegentlemen.’

AsadDurrani:ThisremindsmeofaLalu1story.HevisitedPakistan(in2003)andcreatedan impactbecauseofhisawamiwaysandhis talking the languageof thepeople.Passingthroughamarkethewouldpickupapotatoandsay,‘Lalukehaathmeinalu.’Peoplewentwild.

What impressedmewas whenwe had a television discussion involving threePakistanis and Lalu. One of us was aggressive, saying, ‘I do not knowwhat theIndianpolicyonKashmir is.’ThewiseLaludidnotutteraword.Heknewifhespokeaboutpolicytheatmospherewouldsour.Butthemaninsisted.Finally,very,veryslowly,Lalusaid:‘IndianpolicyisKashmirisanintegralpart.’Themanonoursidelostallsteam.

Lalu’s reluctance to answer indicated a hard-boiled politician who wanted toconvey a message of peace and cooperation.Why would he want to talk aboutofficialpolicyifitwouldcomplicatethings?

Dulat:But,Sir,whatisthebasicproblembetweenIndiaandPakistan?Yourhighcommissionerwas inChandigarh and said the troublewith India andPakistan ismisunderstanding.Whatisthemisunderstandingwhenthereisnounderstanding!

Thereisdistrust,moredistrustandmostdistrust.

Durrani: Itmaybe true,difficult to say. Is itPartition? Is it thehistoryof1,000years?Isitthatwestartedoffsobadlyandcontinuedtogetcomplicated?Isitthatthe establishments’ approach is not amenable to breakthroughs or dramaticreversals? Is it thatwe’vegone indifferentdirectionsandnowfindthatchangingdirectionwillproducedynamicsthataredifficulttomanage?

I used to find this too philosophical. But over a period of time, you evolvehypothesesorprinciples.Don’thavebigdesigns, keepachievable targets, and lettimepassandwe’llseewhathappens.

Butgoingstepbystep,tactically,managingthings,you’reactuallyjustdrifting.You will not control the elements required to achieve a particular sublimeobjective.

There are many things that will come in the way of peace with India. A

particularbiggerstepwasagreeingtothecompositedialogueframework.

You took a step and suffered a setback. You managed it, and after four-fiveyears, Vajpayee says, give peace another chance. Moving in fits and starts,momentum isneverbuilt.Wenever get to a stagewherewecan say from thesefourpointswecan take thispointand itwillmakeadifference, itwillmake theprocessdurable,ifnotentrenchit.

Sinha:Whatdoyouseeastheproblem?

Dulat:Goingbackathousandor10,000yearsisgoingtoofarinhistory.Partitionhasplayedapart, it leftwounds.There arepeople inPunjab’sborder areaswhohave not forgotten Partition. Whenever there is talk of better relations withPakistantherearepeoplewhosay,betterrelationswithwhom?

Theother thing is that ithas todowithwherepower lies.Like Imentioned,outsideDelhithereislittlehostilitytowardsPakistan.Delhiishostile,eventothepeoplewholivethere.Beingthecentreofpowerisnoteasytodealwith.

The basic problem has been distrust. It has grown over the years becausePartitionhappenedandPakistanwasnothappywithKashmirgoing to India, theinvasionofKashmir,and itsbifurcation.WehadOperationGibraltar, thewarof’65,thenthe’71war.It’sremainedlikethat.There’salwaysbeensomeamountofhostility.Ithinkitisonlypost’75,whenSheikhAbdullahmadepeacewithNewDelhiorwithMrsGandhi, that thingscalmeddown.MrsGandhiwas toughandcouldhavetakenapositiononpeace,butafterthe’71warPakistanwasofnogreatconsequencetoher.

MorarjiDesai,ChandraShekharandGujralSahebwerewell-meaningbutnoneofthemlastedlongenough,likeManiDixit,andsoontheIndiansidetherehasn’tbeenanyonebigenoughtotakeacallonmovingforwardandshakinghandstillwecametoVajpayee.Hethoughtdifferently,hadstature,authority,andhealwaysfeltthat this madness has to end, this permanent confrontation with Pakistan ismeaningless.ManmohanSingh tried to replicatePanditNehru,whomadeeffortsbutcouldn’tclinchthedeal.

Sinha:WhichIndianleaderislarger-than-lifeinthePakistanimind?

Durrani: Therewere a few.The first onewasDesai. I believe some forces fromoutsidetheregion—Americanscanalwaysbecountedupontobebehindsuchacts—wantedhimtocreatesomedifficultiesforZABbecausehewouldn’tgiveupthenuclearpath.Notonlythatherefused,butalsomadeitveryclearthatgettingtheoutsidepowersinregionaldisputeswascourtingdisaster.ThentherewasChandraShekhar,whointhefewmonthsthathewasprimeministeralsotookalongviewof our bilateral relations. Listening to him on a variety of subjects was sheerpleasure.

Gujral was intellectually well endowed and probably the brain behind thecompositedialogue initiative. If sub-regionalisationwasthefulcrumoftheGujralDoctrine,Ithinkitcanformthebedrockofarenewedinitiative.ButlikeChandraShekhar,hetooledaminoritygovernmentanddidnothavethetimeandpowertoturnthingsaround.

Vajpayeewastheonlyonewhocouldanddidtoanextent.ManmohanSinghhad his heart in the right place but did not have the resolve to stand up to hisdetractors.Allofthem,however,ultimatelyfailedtooverridetheentrenchedIndiaestablishment.

Dulat: No, Sir, no-no-no-no-no-no. Here I disagree totally. Vajpayee was neveroverwhelmedbytheestablishment;hewastheestablishment.Nobodyquestionedhim,eveninmeetings.

The only time that Advani2 sulked was during IC-814.3 He was reportedlyagainstreleasingtheterroristsandhijackers.Hediditsmartly,byabsentinghimselffromthemeetingwhenthisdecisionwastaken.YetheneversaidawordagainstVajpayee.

Durrani:ButVajpayeeultimatelydidn’tworkout.That’swhatI’msaying.

Dulat: That nothing happens no matter who’s the Prime Minister of India is acynical view to take. This whole project is about looking at things positively.GeneralSahebisonrecordwithregardtopeoplelikeMorarjiDesaiandChandraShekharandGujralSahebbecausehe’sagreatadmireroftheGujralDoctrine.

VajpayeeandDrManmohanSinghbothdidtheirbest.Vajpayeewasnotthatyoung,hewascautiousandhemovedslowly,buthekeptmoving.HetookthebustoLahore,4anddespiteKargil5invitedMusharraftoAgra.6Unfortunately,itendedin a fiasco, andVajpayee came back fromAgra extremely disappointed.Despitethat he went to Pakistan again for the 2004 SAARC summit. His NSA BrajeshMishratoldmeclearlytokeepworkingonKashmirwhileheworkedonPakistan,sothatthetwostreamswouldmergesomewhere.InVajpayee’smindhewasatitallthetime,andheprobablythoughthehadtime.Hedidn’texpecttostepdownin2004.

Durrani: Vajpayee’s initiative continued to benefit India because one and allblamedusforKargil,whichwasanywayafoolishoperation;itcameafterthebustoLahore.WhowasgoingtocreditMusharraf?

Dulat:You’reright,Sir.Onethingafteranother,andyetafterKargilwestillcalledMusharraftoAgra.

Durrani:Yes,afterKargil.ItcreatedanenvironmentagainstMusharraf.OnceAgrawasover,peoplecalleditanhonest-to-goodidea.Musharrafregainedground,and

not only in Pakistan. Some respected Indians blamed Advani for scuttling thesummit.

ButaboutVajpayee,embarrassedashewasbyKargil…

Sinha:AndtheParliamentattack.

Durrani:Yes,Parliament.But inKathmandu,whenMusharrafwalkeduptohimandextendedhishand,youcouldseeVajpayee’shesitation.Peoplecalleditagreatgesture but the PrimeMinister of India visibly didn’t like it. He looked as if amilitarymanrulingasmallercountrywalkeduptohimandhewasnowexpectedtoactgraciously!

Still,hehadthegoodoftheregionatheart.Hewasnodoubtasked,whydoyoucontinue tomake thesegestures towardsPakistan?Hesaid,weneverknowwhatUSAwasup to in this region. For amanof fewwords, this single sentencewasenough.Somedidn’tgetit,oneitherside,thatcosyinguptotheUShasneverbeenagoodidea.

Dulat: When Manmohan Singh became prime minister, everything had beenpresentedonaplatter, itwas justaquestionof taking it forward.Thegoodmantriedhisbest;hedidn’tjustwantit,hecravedit.HewantedtogotoPakistan,itwasanemotional thing.Asaneconomistandaworld leader inhisownright,hewantedtoleavebehindalegacy.AsheandthePakistanisidehaveeachsaid,adealwasalmostdone.

Unfortunately, the Congress was not supportive, his bureaucracy—he had aprincipalsecretary,anNSAandothers—didnotseemsupportive.Hecutalonelyfigure.Idon’tthinkSoniaGandhieveropposedtheidea,butjustkeptaloof.

IagreewithGeneralSahebthatoftendealsarealmostdonebutnotdone.That’sthesadpart.Butwhywasn’t it?Itshouldhavebeencompletedby2007,wehadthatwindowofopportunitywhenMusharrafwasstillincontrol.

Durrani: But ‘almost’ does not make it happen. In Pakistan, Naseerullah Babar,Godblesshissoul,asinteriorministerinBenazir’ssecondgovernment‘almost’didanoperationagainstmilitants inKarachibut then thegovernment fell (in1996).Similarly, we ‘almost’ achieved a breakthrough when Sheikh Abdullah was inPakistan (in 1964), butNehru died. And of course, hadMusharraf not got intodomestictroublein2007,adealonKashmirhad‘almost’beenclinched.

These ‘almosts’ have happened many times. A mathematician once said, ifsomething ‘almost’ didn’t happen then there was a 100 per cent chance that itwouldnot.

Dulat:DrManmohanSinghallthetimehadPakistanandKashmironhismind.It’sunfortunatethathehadhislimitations.IagreewithGeneralSahebthattheIndian

establishment,ashecalls it,ortheIndianbureaucracyisverypowerful,thereareno twowaysabout it.Buthaving said that,ourbureaucratsare risk-averse.Theyare so smart they also look for what the politicians want. Nowadays thebureaucracyistotallysoldonModiji.

Yetpoliticsandleadershipareakeytothiswholething.WithVajpayee’sbustoLahore,therewasaeuphoriainDelhithatnowallourproblemswithPakistanareover,settled,khalaas.

Durrani:Institutionsshouldbestrongerthantheindividuals,andIndiais‘generally’well served by its institutions holding together, evolving consensus on nationalpolicies, anddigging theirheals toprotect them.Downside,however, is that thisleads to the ‘permanent establishment’, the bureaucracy, assuming the role of‘godfathers’ of thepolicy.They get so attached towhatever theyhave sired thatevenachangeforthegood,ortokeepupwiththe ‘zeitgeist’(thespiritof time)becomes nearly impossible. That may explain why despite public and politicalyearningsonboth sides,even the flimsyvisa regimecouldnotbe liberated.Evendeclared concessions like senior citizens would be exempted, or such-and-suchcategorycouldgetavisaonarrival,hadnochancetobeimplemented.Thechapatimmigrationwouldsimplysay,bhaimujhetohletterabhitakaayaanahinhai.

AfterMusharraf’s takeover,Mani Dixit was asked in what direction relationswerenowheaded.HerepliedthathistoryshowedthatwhenthemilitaryhadthereinsofpowerinPakistan,Indo-Pakrelationslookedup.

There’sareasonforthat.Themilitaryhasenoughonitsplateinternally.Onceyouhavetheleversofpower,youwouldliketokeeptheeasternfrontasquietaspossible, as well as send out a good message. So there’s a pragmatic reason.Institutionally, themilitary in Pakistan is not anti-India. It shows that when thegeneralstalktooneanother,theydon’thavetoacttough,theysaywecanmanagerelations,I’mnotinhibitedbyanypoliticalforce.

India’sadvantage isthecapacityorcapabilityofthestate.YouhaveModiandDovalvsJanjua7andNawazSharif.

Sinha:Adoublesmatch.

Durrani:Nomatch!TakeNarasimhaRaoandNawazSharif.Itwasmytime,Isaid,problemforus.NarasimhaRaohadspent50yearsinthecorridorsofpower,hadagood understanding; and on our side was a first-time prime minister whoseexperiencewas limited to thanaandkacheheri.Hebelievedhecould turn India-Pakistanrelationsaround.

Hewasboundtofail.NarasimhaRaoknewhowtohandlehim.HesatquietlyonNawazSharif’soverture for sixmonths.That’show it’splayed.That’show itwas played years later onMusharraf’s initiatives.When Narasimha Rao did not

respondforsixmonths,MianSahebsaid,hmph,jawabhinahinaata,nowwhatdowedo?

When your gang has this advantage, why does it blame Pakistan for thedeterioration in relations? Our gang does not know how to make use ofdevelopmentsinKashmir,orforthatmatter,anydevelopment.Whateverhappensthesedaysisbydefault,itsavesPakistanperhaps,andnotbythemistakesofyourteam, which is obsessed with giving no relief to Pakistan or changing therelationship.

Sinha:Youseemtobecynicalaboutyourownpoliticalleadership.

Durrani: The India-Pakistan relationship was best played by Zia-ul-Haq, in myassessment.

Dulat:Withwhichofourprimeministers?

Durrani:RajivGandhi.

Zia went on regardless of the difficulties on the western front, because heunderstoodthattheeasternfronthadtobekeptquiet.Onewishedthatourprimeministers had taken this into account. Musharraf had the right idea but wasimpatient.

After Uri8 happened, a correspondent fromOutlook called and asked what Ithoughtwouldhappen. I said: ‘NawazSharifwouldbe the lastman standing forrapprochement.Mercifully,Modiwillnotgivehimachance.’

The more interesting point is one that Dulat Saheb keeps making aboutleadership:ifonehasnotdoneitinthebeginningoftheirtenure,theywon’tgetachance to do it at all. I don’t like politicians at all, they may come up withsomethingat the lastmoment thathasnochance, just to save face. Itwillbeaninitiativetheywantedtotakebutcouldnot,andbeforegoingjustwanttohavealegacythattheywereamongthegreatestleaders.

InthefiveyearsofZardari’spresidency,hedidnothavethecouragetosignthepipelineprojectwith Iran.No international lawpreventedhim fromdoing so.Afewdaysbefore leavingoffice,he finallydid,probably forposterity.Noonewasfooled.

IfManmohanSinghat thefagendofhis tenuresaidhehadalmostclinchedadealwithPakistan,thenhebelongedtothiscategory.Onapersonallevel,IfoundManmohanSingh clean, efficient.While Imoved fromMI to ISI in 1990, IwaslookingatIndia,seeingitseconomywascollapsing,stockmarketwasdown.AbigcountrylikeIndiawasunravelling.Wewerefeelingbetterafteralongtime.

Sinha:Theywerecelebrating.

Durrani: The election happened soon after I took over.NarasimhaRao appointsManmohanSingh as the financeminister and India turns around.This coincidedwith a reverse in our system because a new democratic order took over whichwasn’t up tomaintaining themomentum of the previous three decades ofGDPgrowth of 6 per cent or more. The politicians were euphoric at finally gettingpowerandexercisedtheirpolicies.

IgaveBenazirthebenefitofthedoubtthatherteamwasnewanddidn’tknowhowtogoaboutthings,sotheirpoliciessuffered.ThenMianSahebcameinandhispolicieswere no less disastrous.His teamwas a littlemore experienced, so theycould stabilise the economy abit.Buthis politicalmanagement,whichmatteredmorethanafeweconomicreforms,didn’tworkoutwell.

Sinha:Arepoliticians lesskeenaboutthenational interestandmoreabout imagemanagement?

Durrani: In the long run the national interest can be served by things that webelieveshouldbedoneorthatDulatSahebsaysshouldbedone.Butintheshortterm,orfortheirpoliticaltenureorfortheirimagemanagement,thesepeopledidwellforthemselves.Forthemselves.

On the macro front I agree with people like Vajpayee, Brajesh Mishra andAmarjitSinghDulat.Theywereontherighttrack,couldsustainit.Butwhatifitwas not sustained when the government changes? The Pakistan army can beblamedformanythings,butitdiddoafewthingshonestlyandwithvision.

Likerestoringciviliangovernmentin1988,thatitwouldbeBenazirandNawazSharif,etc.Anewrepublic issetup,nowit’suptoyoupeople,youwillrunthepolicies.PleasekeeptheOppositiononboard.Ihavewitnessedthispersonally.Ifaftermakingyour5percentdifferenceorimprovement,iftheOppositioncomestogovernmentandreversesitordoesnotsustainit,thenwe’llhaveaproblem.

NociviliangovernmentwaspreparedtoacceptthattheywouldhaveacommonminimumagendawiththeOppositiontosustainsuchissues.

Dulat:I’mnottalkingaboutpoliticiansnecessarilyagreeingordisagreeingortherebeing a summit. Generally when we talk about diplomatic relations, the firstbarometer is: are the foreign secretaries meeting or not meeting? Fine, whyshouldn’ttheforeignsecretariesmeet,it’stheirjobtomeet.

Durrani: That’s my point, in countries like India or America where theestablishment isstrong, leaders likeObamaorTrump,orVajpayeeorModi,maycomeandmakeadifferenceinnuance,inatmospherics,andcanevenbringaboutacosmeticchange.Butthepoliciesremainthesame.

Anotherdevelopmentthatisevenmoreseriousisthatovertime,whenadvice

onhow to go about thingswas not followed, the committedpeace-lovers or thepeaceniksorthepeacelobbyturnintohawks.Theyhadlongbelievedinworkingforpeaceandwhentheyseethewholethingscuttled,theywouldsaytohellwithit.

Dulat:That’swhyitrequiresalotofpatience.

Durrani:Yeah,that’sright,patience,overaperiodoftime.

Dulat:Limitlesspatience.

Durrani:Whoarethosepeoplewhohavelimitlesspatience?

Dulat:Ultimately,youhavetoinvestintrust.

Durrani: And stop talking of the mindset. The international community, worldmedia,ourownmedia,ourownneo-liberals,theyallsay:let’saddressthemindset.They’vebeenletdownsomanytimes,eithermakingpeaceornegotiatingterritory,ormorerights,thattheybecomedisillusioned.

Theworstadviceistoaddressthemindset,madrassabandhkaro.Theyhaven’tevenbeentoamadrassa.I’venotgonethroughamadrassa,andIoncebelievedinouralliancewiththeUS.I’veanalysedthepeaceprocesswithIndia.Ineverhadtogotoamadrassatoconcludethatgimmicksforpeacewon’twork.

15

LonelyPervezMusharraf

A.S.Dulat:GeneralSahebsaidhewouldexplainhowKargilhappened, justafterVajpayeehadbeentoLahore.Sowhydidithappen,Sir?

Asad Durrani: It was Musharraf’s obsession for a long time. Pakistan had anadvantage in the Kargil sector before the ’65 war, dominating a particular vitalsupply line.Thesewere lost in ’71whensomedominatingheightswerecapturedbyIndia.

Dulat:You’resuggestingthatithadtodowithSiachen.

Durrani:ThatroadtoLehwascriticalforIndia.Inboththe’65and’71wars,Indiapre-empted.Sincetheterritoryissecluded,IndiaeasilytooktheKargilheights.

Afterthe’65warthearrangementwastoreturnthecapturedterritorybyeachside,whetheritwasChamborKargilorRajasthan.etc.I’maveteranofboththewars,andduringthe’71warIwasinthedesert,butsoonafterthewarIwasintheKashmirsectorandgottoknowthedealthatwasmade.ThedealwasthatPakistanwouldkeeptheChambsalient,andthenewLineofActualControlwasdrawnsothatmostoftheKargilheightswereontheIndianside.

Musharrafwasobsessedabouttakingthemback.

As a two-star DGMO he suggested doing so during Benazir Bhutto’s secondtenure.‘PrimeMinister,wecandothat,’sohesaid.Shereplied,‘Maybeyoucan,butpoliticallyitwon’tbesustainable.’

Whenhe became the army chief, he said that after carrying out nuclear testsPakistanwas inabetterpositionfortheoperation.Hostilitieswouldnotescalate,post-nuclearisation, he felt. But, he said, I can assure you that we will take theKargilheightsback.WhatcantheIndiansdo?

Inmanyways thisnuclearisation theorywasa flawedassessment,buthebuilthispremiseon‘nuclearimmunity’:thataftergoingnuclear,wecouldgetawaywithplentyofthings.Theparthegotwrong,ofcourse,wasthatifyoudothesethingsitmay not escalate to nuclear war but you would be accused of being reckless,unwise.Thatyouareriskinganuclearconfrontationinthebeliefthat95percentofthetimeitwillnothappen.Butwhatabouttheother5percent?

Dulat:WhataretheseKargilheightsyou’retalkingof,Sir?DidhenothaveSiachenonhismind?

Durrani:I’llcometoSiachen.Thisreactionmusthavesurprisedhim.Headmitshedidnotforeseethisreaction.

Dulat:Whichreaction?

Durrani:Howtherestoftheworldreactedtohisirresponsibility.

HeprobablymisjudgedIndia’sstrongreactiontoo.Vajpayeewasgoingforearlyelections,soleavingitatthatwouldhavecosthimdearly.

Itmisfiredandtheheightshadtobevacated.Onlyafewpeoplewereprivytotheplan.NawazSharifknewabit,notthewholething,buthehadgiventhego-ahead,sohehadtotakepoliticalresponsibility.Igivehimthebenefitofthedoubt,thathedidnotknowtheplan’sextent;hemayhavethoughtthatjustasmallareawouldbetaken.

The Siachen connectionwas an afterthought.When askedwhy he did it, hisresponsewasthatotherwisetheIndianswouldhavedoneanotherSiachen.In’84theytooktheSiachenGlacierwhilewewerelookingtheotherway.AccordingtoMusharraf,Indianswereplanninganotheringress,andsohepre-emptedthem.

The Siachenmovewas confirmed by one of your generals, Chibber,1 who in2000cametoIslamabadandsaid,‘YouPakistaniswantedtogoandoccupySiachenbutIgottherefirst.’

Dulat:That’swhathesaidatthetimethatithappenedalso.

Durrani:Ididn’tbelieveMusharraf’srationale.Iwronglyconnectedthenewpost-nuclearsituationwithhisearlierefforts.

Dulat:Earlieryou saidNawazSharif is adimwitwhoshouldneverhavegone toWashington.Hehadnooption,hewassummonedtoWashington.

Durrani: An old friend keptme abreast of the developments. I was retired andliving in Rawalpindi, where the defence ministry is. Defence secretary GeneralIftikhar2AliKhan servedwithmewhen IwasNDCcommandant.Nowhe’s nomore.WheneverIrangup,Iftiwasoneofthefewpeoplewhoalwaysfoundtimeandsaid,comeover,let’shaveachat.

Yousaywehadnooption,butIunderstoodthatPakistanhaditsoptions.Onewas,havingsaidthesewereirregulars,andsincetheydonotholdground,quietlyvacatetheheights.AndsinceweweretalkingtoChina,whosaid:‘Arewenotyourfriends?You’vemadeyourpoint,nowwithdraw.’

And then, sinceVajpayeehadcalledNawazSharif and said: ‘Kyakar rahehobhai? I’ve an interim government and an election to fight.Why don’t you takethemback?’

Hecouldhaveclaimedtohaveresponded:‘Achhaaapkehtehotohlejatahoon,

varnapatanahinhumneaapkokyakarlenatha.’

TheworstoptionwastogoonJuly4andsay,‘Merijaanchhudao.’Iftheideawas to ‘oblige’ Clinton when the latter asked him to withdraw from the Kargilheights—and thus expect theAmerican President to save his government just incaseSharifranafoulwiththemilitary—MianSahebwasdeludinghimself.

DuringNawazSharif’svisittoWashington,DC,ImetMusharraf.Isaid,‘Theekhai,jaanekikyazarooratthi?’Buthewassilentbecausethepressurehadprobablyalreadygottohim.

Aditya Sinha: During the Kargil war, the government released a tape of aconversationbetweenGeneralMusharrafandGeneralAziz,interceptedbyRAW.MrDulatinhisbooksayshewasnotinfavourbuthischiefwas.Whatwasyourreactionasaprofessionalorasaformersoldier?

Durrani:YourhighcommissionerinIslamabad,G.Parthasarathy,sentmecopiesofthetapeandthetranscript.OnceIreadandheardthem,Iwasnotamused.

Dulat:IfyouweretheRAWchiefandthetapecametoyou,howwouldyouhavedealtwithit?

Sinha:Wereyounot surprised that the Indianswere recordingyour armychief’sconversations?

Durrani:Ourarmychiefactedunwisely:talkingonanopenline.TheIndiansweredoingtheirjob.

Dulat:Whenitlandedonmychief’sdesk,hegotexcitedandtookitstraightawaytotheprimeministerandtheydecideditshouldbemadepublic,totelltheworld,especially theAmericans, thatwehave tapes. I said, Sir,whydid youmake thispublic?Thechannelwhichwewerelisteningintowouldnowbecloseddown.

Durrani:Thatpointiscorrect,asfaras intelligenceisconcerned.Wewouldhavesaidnowthatwe’veheardit,howmuchcapitalcanwegetbymakingitpublic?Orshallwekeepquietandsee if somethingmorewouldfollow?Ididn’tevenknowwhatchannels,Ithoughtitwassomeopenbloodychannel.

Dulat: It was an open channel. But the point is that there was a line betweenMusharrafandAziz thatwasusedandwe listened into. Itmighthavebeenusedagain.

Durrani:True,ifitwasaspeciallinethenmakingitpublicwasablunder.Butweknow each other’s capability to intercept, especially if the line is less thanabsolutelysecure.Iwouldagree,unlessyouhavemilkedthecowdry,don’texposeit.

Dulat:Whatthebossissayingisthatwelistenintoalotofstuffbutwedon’ttell

you.

Durrani:Yes,itmustnotbemadepublic,butthatiswhyyoudon’tusetelephone,email,messaging,Skype,whichnowadaystheysayissecure,orWhatsapp,whichalsotheysayissecure,forconfidentialinformation.

Sinha:Didn’tMusharrafsaythatMianSahebwillnotholdup?

Dulat:HewascallingfromBeijingandheaskedAzizhowthingswerebackhome.Azizsaid,haan,haanbilkultheekhain.TheexcitingpartwasthatMusharrafthensays,Ihopethesepoliticianshaven’tpanicked.Thatwasthecrux.

Durrani:G.Parthasarathy,asIhavealreadymentioned,sentmeatranscriptandacopyofthattape.Hesimplysaid,foryour information.Butonthehealth,or ill-health,oftheoveralloperation,ithadnoeffect.

Sinha:Youdon’tsoundimpressedwithMusharraf.

Durrani: I have nothing personal against Musharraf. During service he wasrespectful.Hewascommissionedfouryearsafterme,inmyformation;Iwasthenacaptain.AftertakingoverheofferedmeagoodassignmentasambassadortoSaudiArabia.

When I found his policies to be disastrous I started publicly criticising them.We’ve had our militants, extremists, hardliners and fundamentalists, but thecurrentphaseofmilitancyinPakistanstartedbecauseMusharrafsentthearmytoSouthWaziristanin2004.However,tohiscredit,nooneeverthreatenedmeforcriticisinghim.

Sinha:MrDulat’sbookstatesthatMusharrafcouldhaveclinchedapeacedealwithIndia.

Durrani:He’sprobably lookedat it closely,beingon that side,moreobjectively.Musharrafwantedtoimproverelationsbuthismethodologywasdefective.YoudonotstartbombardingIndia,orDelhi,withproposals.Oneweekyoumakeone,thenext you make another. This tsunami of proposals from Islamabad—if I was inDelhi I would say, no need to react.We’ll seewhat happens.We’ll wait till hemakesanotherthat’smorefavourabletoIndia.

Or,comingfromhimisthereadesign?Willtheygainmoreandtrapus?Soyougiveittime.

Themethodology should alsobedifferent. It shouldnot bedone through themedia,becauseevenifitlookedgoodtoIndia,itmightbereluctanttoletPakistantakethecreditforthe‘ground-breaking’initiative.

Dulat:WhyIndiadidnotreact,Iagree,Sir.Wewastedthatwindowof2006-07.KhurshidMahmudKasurihaswrittenabook,SatiLambahhasalsosaidwealmost

didit.Whatisthepointofthat?Ialsoalmostdidmanythings.

I don’t know Musharraf, though I would have loved an interaction. Myadmiration of him comes from what I saw in the context of Kashmir.Withouthesitationordoubt, inthelast25yearstherehasn’tbeenaPakistani leadermorepositive or reasonable on Kashmir than Musharraf. His repeatedly saying thatwhatever is acceptable toKashmiris is acceptable toPakistan—thatwas good forIndia.Weshouldhavetakenthatandbuiltonit,butagainwedraggedourfeet.

MusharrafwashemmedinbyAmericanpressurebecauseof9/11.Butwhateveritwas,hetoldtheseparatiststofallinlineorbecomeredundant,andthatiftheyhadpoliticalambitionstofightelections,thentogetonwithit.TodayPakistanistrying desperately to get the Hurriyat together;Musharraf made no such effort.WhenhefoundthatGeelaniwasanobstacle,heevensaid,atsomemeeting,‘Getoutoftheway,oldman.’

Hewasdefinitelyforward-looking.IfyouaskaKashmiritoday,GeelaniSahebapart,hewillsayifanythingisdoablethenitisthefour-pointformula.

As for Musharraf the general, the army chief, the president—I don’t knowanything other than what the Americans said, that he’s a good guy, English-speaking,whiskey-drinking.Wecandobusinesswithhim.

Durrani:Musharraf’sinDubai,wheneveryougo…

Dulat:Sir,I’llneedanintroduction.

Durrani:He’llbehappytomeetyou.Ehsancanfacilitateit.Inmycase,he’snothappywithmethelasttenyears.Iwenttotowncriticisinghisflagshipproject,the‘devolution’ policy that was supposed to take governance to people’s doorsteps.TheconceptwasfinebutthewayheandTanveerNaqviwentaboutitwasarecipefor disaster. It wasmy first big interaction with themedia, and he did not likecriticism coming from a former military man. I was supposed to be part of hisconstituency.Sohewon’tbehappywithmyreference.

Sinha:Whydidn’tNawazSharifsackMusharrafimmediatelyafterKargil?

Durrani:SackingMusharrafwassomethinghewantedtodo.Heinduecoursedidso.

Dulat:Thatwasmuchlater.

Durrani: I’m sure some saner advisors were holding him back. Musharraf’spredecessor, JehangirKaramat,had resigned—orwasmade to resign—just a yearbefore.AnavalchiefhadbeensackedsoonafterSharifbecametheprimeminister.Ridingroughshodoveraninstitutionlikethemilitarywasneveragoodidea.Withour history, a more deliberate course must have been recommended. But, of

course,MianSahebcouldonlywaitlongenough.

In SeptemberNawaz Sharif concluded that he would be uncomfortable withMusharraf continuing in the powerful post. One way of making Musharrafirrelevantwithoutsackinghimwastopromotehimtobethechairmanofthejointchiefsofstaff.ThisisapostthatcommandsonePAandoneorderly.AnemissarywassentwiththeofferbutMusharrafturneditdown.NawazSharifthenofferedtokeephimasthearmychiefandalsopromotehimaschairman.Musharrafsays,thatIcando.

ItbecamecleartoMusharrafthathewouldbesackedatthefirstopportunity,sohedevelopedacontingencyplan.

InAugust,MusharrafandIhadaone-on-one.MusharrafinvitedmetohisofficeandsaidthegovernmentwasbentuponpubliclyblamingthearmyfortheKargilfiasco. Fine, I said, sowhat?He saidhe justwantedmyopiniononwhatwouldhappen.

I said, if I knowNawaz Sharif, hewould continue to be uncomfortablewithyou,ashewaswithBaig,withAsifNawaz,andevenwithJehangirKaramat,whowasalaid-backarmychief,professionallysoundandwhodidnotthrowhisweightaround. Even after the 1998 Indian nuclear tests Karamat said merely, primeminister, this is thearmy’sview,youhavetoconsiderthepoliticalandeconomicfallout.Butwithhimalsoitdidnotworkout;threemonthsbeforehewastoretire,heresignedratherthantakeasecondmoreoftheacrimony.

SoItoldMusharrafitwon’tworkoutwithyou.He’lllookforanopportunitytoget rid of you. But this is not the right environment for a political coup; ‘evenbananarepublicsnowadayshaveafacadeofdemocracy,’Iremembersaying.Sogoaheadandthinkofthenextstep.That’swhereI left. ItwasclearthatMusharrafcouldnotlaunchacoupunlesstherewasagraveprovocation.

That rationalewas soonthereafterprovidedbyNawazSharif,whenhesackedhimonOctober12.Itwasnotjustthedecisionbutthewaythatitwascarriedout.Arre, the army chief is in the air and you announce he’s sacked and order hisaircrafttoflytoAmritsarorelsewhere.ItwasadistastefulwayofdoingthingsbutrathertypicalofMianSaheb.Itturnedouttobeprettycostly.

Dulat:WhatsurprisesmeisthattheGeneralsclosesttohimduringthecoup,whohelped him and were considered loyal to Musharraf, dumped him once he leftpower.

Durrani:Infact,itwasMusharrafwhodumpedthe‘co-conspirators’.Azizgotofflightly, given the4th star,butoutside the army;Mahmoodwas sacked;Osmani,Commander 5 Corps, whomight have facilitatedMusharraf’s plane’s landing inKarachi,easedoutinduecourse.

Dulat:MahmoodwassackedbecauseoftheAmericans.

Durrani:Yes,theAmericans.

Dulat:Azizbenefitedineveryway,buthehadnogoodwordforMusharraf.Why?

Durrani:Thisisthewayoftheworld.Zia-ul-HaqalsojettisonedpeoplelikeFazleHaq, who said ‘ikatthe aaye the, ikatthe jayenge’, and Chishti, who hehypocritically used to call his ‘Murshad’ (guru). Zia was too clever for that. Tocontinuewithkingmakersistoensurethattheywilltakeyoudowninduecourse.Newpeoplecomein,servetheirpurpose,andgetthrownout.

Dulat:Thatisthesadthingaboutwhomyouareserving,thatthereisnoloyalty.

Durrani:Fewpeopleareloyal.

Dulat:Evenlesshavearegardforloyalty.

Durrani: The really loyal person may not be loyal to a personality but to amovement,acoup.Ortheydoitforthecountry.

Dulat: Sir, whenwe talk of loyaltywe talk of personal loyalty, but these thingsdon’t last.TheonlyGeneralwhostill speakswellofMusharraf isGeneralEhsan.AndSikander3isokaywithhim.

Durrani:Ehsanwasclose toMusharraf.Hewasunhappywitha fewpoliciesbuthe’s not one of those who, when out, start bad-mouthing the once benefactor.ThereisanotherwhobenefitedalmostasmuchasEhsan.Hehadretiredandwasbroughtinasfederalminister.Onceheservedhispurpose…

Dulat:Outisout.

Durrani:Outisout.ButhedoesnotspareMusharraf.Therearetwo-threeofthemwho do not spareMusharraf. I understand both views. One, you benefited anddon’tspeak;theother, ifyoubelievesomethingwentwrongthennothingshouldstopyoufromgivinganinsiderview.

Dulat: Yet despiteKargil,Vajpayee still calledMusharraf toAgra. Sir, youmustknowquitealotabouttheAgrasummit.

Durrani:NotenoughexceptwhatI’veheardfromyou.

Dulat:ThismaybemereconjecturebecauseIwasnotinvolved,butIthinkitwasamarvellousoperation.

Durrani:Really?Achha.

Dulat: It was. Vajpayee’s NDA cabinet was one of exceptional talent withexceptionalpeople.NotallofthembuteventheyoungerlotlikeArunJaitleyandPramod Mahajan. It had bigwigs, though: Vajpayee, Advani, Jaswant Singh,YashwantSinhaand,mostunderratedofall,GeorgeFernandes.

Georgewas a greatplayer and a gooddefenceminister.He fitted inperfectlywithBrajeshMishra,and likeBrajeshMishraandVajpayee,hewouldnotutteraword in a meeting. But if you went to him, he would talk frankly one-to-one.WheneverVajpayeewasintroubleheusedGeorge.

ThewayAgraplayedoutwasremarkable.Myknowledgeisbasedontwothings.One,whatBrajeshMishracamebackandtoldme,whichshowedhis frustration.MuchmorewaswhatQaziAshrafsaid.Hetoldmethingsingreaterdetail,bothashighcommissionerandthenwhenImethimin2014.

BrajeshMishraranaparallelforeignofficeoutofthePMO,andheplannedthis.Ifyourecall,theideatoinviteMusharrafcamefromAdvani.BrajeshMishrahadadirectlinewithQaziandheencouragedQazitobefriendAdvani—throughGeorgeFernandes.HeprobablytoldtocallGeorgetosetitup.Heranthisoperation.

QaziandAdvanibecamebuddies.AdvaniproposedtheAgrasummit.ThenheaskedQazi,areyouhappynow,whichQaziwas.

I later asked Qazi, what went wrong with your friend in Agra? He said theAdvaniofAgrawasdifferent fromtheAdvaniofDelhi.ThechemistryhadgonewronginthemeetingwithMusharraf.

The lacuna in this plan was that the Pakistanis, particularly Qazi, were notadequatelybriefedtotakecareofAdvaniinAgra.Thatiswhereone’segocomesin,thathecanmanageitall.AlltheeggswereintheVajpayeebasket,soAdvanifeltoffended,andthesummitfailed.

Sinha:EvenwithinthegovernmenttherehastobealotofpolitickingbeforeitcanmakepeacewithPakistan.

Dulat:Thiswasnotanordinarymove.Itwasexceptional,expectedbynoone.ThisisafterKargil,afterthecoup,afterMusharrafappointedhimselfPresident—assoonas it was announced, an invitation was sent. So some kind of politicking wasrequiredforittohappen.

Sinha: So it has to be like this. For there’ll always be aKargil or aBombay justbehindus.

Dulat:AfterBombaynothinghappened.

Sinha: General Saheb, have you seen this kind of manoeuvre to get somethinggoingwithIndia?

Durrani:Two-threepointsthataremoresignificantthanthesummititself.Oneisthatifyouwentandbriefedtheforeignministerorthedeputyprimeminister,yourbosswouldgetupset.

Dulat:Idon’tknowifhewouldgetupset,buthehadnorelationshipwithAdvani

or Jaswant Singh. The IC-814 hijack provided an opportunity to shift JaswantSingh to finance and Yashwant Sinha was brought in his place. The momentYashwantjoined,BrajeshMishratoldmetogobriefhimonKashmir.

Durrani:ThiscanhappeninoursystembutmostofthetimeifIwentandbriefedsomeone, no one would be too bothered. The DG ISI, DG MI, must havesomething. We trust him. If he meets Najibullah’s intelligence chief withoutanyone knowing, okay, he takes this decision, let’s see what happens. That isprobably where we may take credit for our system being more trusting. Yourbureaucracyismoreefficientandisknowntobetough.

Sinha:Allyou’resaying,Sir,isthatinPakistanthemilitaryissupreme.

Dulat:You’ve got thiswrong.This PMOwas relaxed, itwaswonderful toworkthere. Brajesh Mishra never told me, don’t meet Advani. On the contrary, DrManmohanSinghcalledupjustbeforethe2002(assembly)electionsandsaid,canyoucomeacrossandgivemeyourassessmentonKashmir.Isaid,certainlySir,I’lljust informmy boss. Brajesh said, yes, yes,Manmohan Singh has spoken tome,please go ahead and brief him. Iwent and had a long chatwithDrManmohanSingh,attheendofwhichIsaid,Sir,Ihavegoodnewsforyou.You’regoingtodoextremelywellinJammu.Hewaskicked,andsaid,canIgotellMadam?

It’snotas if IwaschokedupinthePMO.Ihadfreedom, itwasprobablymyweakness that if the boss didn’t think it important to meet these people, whyshouldI.

Durrani:I’lltake(Sinha’s)remarkingoodspirit,thatatleastthemilitarysystemisnotsuspiciousorparanoid.

TheAdvanithingsurprisedme.Thedeputyprimeminister,afamousmanandanexperiencedpersonwholetsuchanimportantthingbescuttledorsubvertedornot supported, simplybecausehewasn’tgettingenoughattention? India-Pakistanrelationscanbeendangeredbecauseofthat—iswhatI’veunderstood.

Musharraf spoke tome before and I had hoped hewould tellme somethingaboutthepreparations,diplomaticandother,buthedidn’ttellmeanything.Igottheimpressionhewasgoingadhoc,thatwashispersonality.HeprobablythoughthecangotalktotheIndiansandaftersometimethey’llbeeatingoutofhishands.Thatsortofconceithe’shadforalongtime.

Hewent,and likeMrDulat says, itwas subvertedbyAdvaniandothers.ThebreakfastmeetingwhereAshraf JehangirQazi invited editorswas telecast beforethe summit, thatwasnotverywise. Inan importantvisityoudon’t conveyyourmessagesthroughthemedia.Ifatallsomethingistobesaiditisthatwe’lldoourbest.

After the summit, when people saw that nothing happened, Vajpayee, anexperienced,highlyrespectedman,didnotseeoffMusharraf.Hedidnotcomeouttothecar.Inourculturethisisunusual.Zia-ul-Haqwouldthinkofgettingridofsomeone,butwouldwalkhim to the car andopen thedoor.Thatwashis style.Theprimeministernotaccompanyingthevisitingpresidenttothecarlookedbad.

Vajpayee shook hands and went off, and Musharraf’s few steps to the carseemedtohavelastedaneternity.Ohgod,Icouldseefromhisbodylanguagethatthemanwashopingthatnoonewouldseehimortakehisphotograph.

16

Modi’sSurpriseMoves

A.S.Dulat:Assurprisingasitmaysound,ModididmoreinhisfirsttwoyearsforIndia-Pakistanrelationsthanhispredecessor.It’sadifferent,instinctivediplomacyinwhich the foreign office has little role. It fully flows out of the PMO, and sohappenseasily.Modihasnoproblemovercomingthefrictionsandreservationsthatdiplomatshave.Eventheforeignministerisoftennotintheloop.

AdityaSinha:It’sagoodwaytoshort-circuitinternalfriction.

Dulat:Not thatSushmawouldbeanobstructionbecause she’soneof thebetterministersinthisgovernment.

Modi’s record shows he had the imagination to invite Mian Saheb for hisswearing-in.That itwasmessedupby the foreign secretary1 is unfortunate.Andafterthat,asthingsseemedtoreachadeadend,whetherinKathmandu2orNewYork,3hefinallylandedup,extempore,inLahore.4

WeweretogetheronDecember21,Sir,hopingthatsomethingwouldhappen.

AsadDurrani:Yes.

Dulat:Loandbeholdonthe25thhewasinLahore.

TheotherpositivethingisthattheNSAsareinclosecontact.I’mtoldtheytalkto eachother.Unfortunately, despite everybody’s intentions, the relationshiphasreachedadeadendfast.Igetthefeelingthatwe’reonlymarkingtime.

Unfortunately, thepolitics is toomixedup,unlikewithManmohanSinghandVajpayee,whokept it in thebackground.Yes,politicscomes intothepicture, inwhatyougetoutofit.Everyprimeministerispolitical,butwedon’thavetomakeitsocrude.

Sinha:WhatisModi’sPakistanpolicy?

Dulat:FranklyIdon’tknow.ThereisnoPakistanpolicy.

Durrani:DovalishisPakistanpolicy.

Dulat:Yeah,butyouknow,DovalandModiarethesamething.Afterallhe’shisNSAandhewouldn’tdoanythingdifferent.

It’s more opportunism. He went to Lahore, but those were better days.Everyone said the chemistry betweenMian Saheb andModi was good, perhaps

becauseMianSahebwentoutofhisway;hispoliticalinstinctsmaybetellhimthatbetter relations with India would help him politically and as a businessman. Ifrelations improve, so does trade, business prospects and many other things. HewouldbemoreconfidentinPunjabandPakistan.

Atonepointoftime,Modiwasgoingalongwiththat.TillPathankothappened.Thenhe could sortof livewithPathankot.But afterUri,Modi’s feelingwas,wetriedyouguysandyoufailedus,everynowandthenthere’saPathankotoranUri,sohowcanwedobusiness?

Mufti Saheb’s absence from the political scene has also affected the largerpoliticalscenario.HisdaughterMehboobahasbeenadisaster.

Sinha:GeneralSaheb,yousaidModididnotcutagoodfigureacrossourregion.Pleaseelaborate.

Durrani:ThereactioninPakistantoModi’selectionwasthatitservedIndiaright.Let Modi take care of India, destroy its image, and possibly destroy its innerbalance.

I’ve not been impressed by his antics.What did hemean crash-landing aftergiving Pakistan an earful inAfghanistan?He comes toRaiwind to attendNawazSharif’s granddaughter’s wedding, and his drama and tamasha merely createdspectacularconfusion.Peoplewereshell-shockedandjuststoodthere.

IprefersomeonelikeVajpayeewhodidnotdeliverbuthisapproachwasright.Apersonwhomanagestherelationshipwellwillnotkeepyouontenterhooks.NotthatthereisanyintentiontoequateVajpayeewithModi.Worldofdifference.Wewould be happy if someone likeVajpayeewas primeminister in Pakistan. Poet,philosopher,hecouldhavebeenagoodprimeministerforus.

Dulat: Does Pakistan prefer DrManmohan Singh or NarendraModi? There’s acontradictionbecausesomewhereGeneralSahebhassaidthatahardlinerinIndiamaybeinPakistan’sinterest.That’swhyIbelievePakistanishappyifKashmirisinamess.

AlotofpeoplethinkModiisthegreatestthingtohappentoIndia.I’veearliersaid thatVajpayeewas an exceptionalprimeminister, andhe led an exceptionalgovernment.ButModidoesn’thavemuchofacabinet.There’sModi,andthenextguyisamileaway.TheonlyoneModiholdscloseisDoval.

Even his home minister, a decent person who is keen to do something inKashmir,isquitehelpless.

Durrani:Rajnath?

Dulat:Rajnath.

Vajpayee, who was head and shoulders above Modi, still had to deal withAdvani.Modiisonhisowntrip.Hedoesn’tevenbotherabouttheRSSattimes.

Sinha:Buttheirworldviewisone.SowhatexactlyhasModiaccomplished?

Dulat:Peoplesayheneedsmoretime,15years.

Thisbringsmetoanotherpoint.GeneralSaheb’sorPakistan’sproblemmaynotbe what happened in 20165 as with the government in Delhi. As a hard-nosedintelligenceofficerhesaidthatwhetherhelikedModiornot,thiswasstillagoodopportunityforIndiaandPakistantomoveforward.HefeltthatitisaBJPHindugovernmentwithwhichPakistancandobusiness.

LiketheargumentinIndiathatweneedamilitarygovernmentbackinpowerinPakistan.Advaniusedtosaythatifthereistobeforwardmovementtherehastobe a BJP government. NowModi’s is the perfect BJP government. It won’t getbetterthanthis.MoreHindu,ormorenumbers.Youmightdisagree,butin2019Modiwon’tgetasmanyseatsinParliament.TheBJPwilltakeaverylongtimetogetasmanyseatsagain.

Durrani:TheISI’spreferenceisbecausehardlinerscantakeharddecisions.

Thisremindsmeofanepisode,theendof1997,beforethe’98electionthattheBJP won. I published an article in the News, Islamabad, ‘Who’s afraid of theIndianawolf’,onhowweneednotworryabouttheBJPcomingtopowerbecauseitmight turnout tobe good forus. If nothing else, the illusionof India being asecular-ledcountrywouldgo.

AfterafewweekstherewasanexplosioninCoimbatore,whereAdvaniwastoaddress ameeting. It probably added to the BJP’s support base, not very big insouth India.After thisexplosion,apaper inSwitzerlandpickedupmypieceandlinkedittotheCoimbatoreblast,sayingthatsinceDurranisaysaBJPwinwouldbegoodforthem,theISImaybebehindtheblast.

Theygotelected,andIsaidIhopetheycarryoutanucleartestbecausethatwillgiveusagoldenopportunitytodothesame.

TheVajpayeegovernmentgaveustheimpressionthataMuslim-baiterinpowerin India would not necessarily be a bad thing. This party may be able to takedecisionstheCongresswasunableto.

Sinha:When theUS invaded Iraq, people said it can’t getworse.Now they callGeorgeW.Bushamoderate.IfYogiAdityanathbecomesprimeminister,youwillsayModibadashareefaadmitha.

Dulat:Westillsayit,Modiisaverydecentman.Thepointisifheshookupthesystem,he’dcreateanopportunity.

DuringDrManmohanSingh’searlydays,whenIhadjustleftthePMO,ItoldaHurriyat leader,whydon’t you carryonwithwhatweweredoing?He laughed:‘Youwantustodobusinesswithhim?OurproblemiswithHinduIndia.’

That’swhyDrManmohanSinghgotthewrongendofthestick.Vajpayeeleftitallforhimonaplatter,buttheBJPwouldnotleavehimbe.HewasmoreafraidoftheBJPthan10Janpath,asmanypresume.TheBJPwasalwaysalloverhim.

Durrani:InObama’seightyearshenevertooktheriskinAfghanistan,onPakistan,in Libya, in theMiddle East. So his legacy is failure, other thanCuba and Iran.Similarly,ifModilaterfindsfailureisstaringinhisfaceexternallyandthenwantsto extend a hand, no one will take it seriously. They will wonder: lame duck?Outgoing?

Dulat: I beg to differ. Modi is no Obama, who was a fine American president,intellectually andotherwise. It’s not easy for a blackman in theUnitedStates. Idon’tthinktheseguyshereevenhadthatkindofimagination.

Durrani:Obamawasintellectuallywell-endowed,Iagree.SowasCarter.Alltheseintellectualbig-wigs,theirintellectlednowhere.Reaganwasnointellectual,muchlikethisDonaldDuckorwhateverhisnameis.Trumpisabigduck,butmayturnouttobesmartultimately.ReaganturnedouttobethemostsuccessfulAmericanpresidentof the20th century.Heknewnothingbuthe selected12goodpeopleandthingsturnedoutallright.ForAmerica,theydid.

Modi is a showman.He likes theatrics.He likes to keep people guessing.Heknows that after reading the riot act to Pakistan in Dhaka6 and Kabul,7 if hecrashlandsinLahore,peoplewillbewonderstruckandsay,hereisthemanofthemoment.Hereisamanwecandobusinesswith.Buthehasnointentionofdoinggood for the region; his only thought is of creating an impact back home. He’ssmart.

WithMianSaheb it isnot thechemistry thatworksbecauseMianSahebdoesnotworkchemically.Heworksatbestinstinctivelyorprobablydrivenbybusinessandfinancialconsideration.Heunderstandshowtosurvivepoliticallyathome;butoninternationalrelationshehastheacumenofacamel.

Sinha:Aduck,acamel,andModiis?

Durrani:A fox.Modi is smart.Absolutely.So isDoval.Howdowe thinkaboutDoval and Janjua? Doval was a good intelligence operator, a good thinker; acunningmind, but that’s not the point. Janjua? Run of themill soldier. I don’tthink he’s learnt more about relations with India after commanding corps anddivisionsandtheSouthernCommand.Ihavemethimjustacoupleoftimesandmyconclusionis,no;hecouldnotgetthebetterofDoval.

Onbothfronts,primeministerandNSA,youhavehadahugeadvantage.

Sinha:MrDulatissayingModicandoit,you’resayingModiwon’t.Whynot?

Durrani: Iamfeduptalkingthesamethingthe last20-30years.WhenI lookatModi and his team, and what one knows of people like Doval, the politicalenvironment in India, I feel they can’t. Yes, there are people likeVajpayeewhoknew how to manage it by cooling the situation with Kashmiriyat-Jamhooriyat-Insaaniyat.Butthesepeoplearenotcutoutforit.They’renotlikelytodoit.

Sinha:SoModican’tdilutehistoughguyimage?

Dulat:Thatisoneproblem,thathehasacertainimageandwouldnotliketodiluteit. Itwas tohis advantage inmoving forward. IwouldagreewithGeneralSahebthatastimegoesbyitlooksmoreunlikelythatanythingwillhappen.

Theotherthingisthatforallpoliticiansworldwide,unlesstheydothingsinthefirst six months or year, then it’s unlikely they’ll do anything the rest of theirtenure.Also,Modi’s guys are obsessedwith elections andmove fromelection toelection.

Sinha:SoyouagreewithGeneralSaheb?

Dulat:It’snotlikelytohappen,no.

YouhadaskedhowitlookedwhenwewerehalfwaythroughModi’stenure.Itdidn’tlookgood.Evenhisadmirerswonderedwhathadhappened.

I used to feel uncomfortable thatwhenever Iwent to a social get-together inDelhi,Ifoundthat18ofthe20peoplewouldbepro-Modi.Itwasdifficulttoeveninquireabouthim.TwoyearslaterIfounditchangeddramatically.

Harish Khare wrote that the last election was won on Hindutva.Along withHindutva,theuppermiddleclassthoughtitwasdoingwellandthatwithModiitwoulddobetter.Thathasn’thappened.

Sinha:Modihasayearleft.HowdoesPakistanseehisprospects?

Durrani:First,he’slikelytogetasecondterm.Second,whetherornotheremains,myoldthesisisthatitsmanagementcanbedifferentbuttherelationshipremainsthe same. Sometimes a bit calmer as in Vajpayee’s or even Manmohan Singh’stime.Third,theenvironmentinIndiaissuchthateventhepublicwouldsaytherewasnopointinmakinganothergesture.

Sinha:GeneralSahebsaysthatevenifModidoesnotreturnin2019,thingswon’tchange.DoyouthinkModiwillbeback?

Dulat:Modiprobablywillbuthe’llfindthegoingmuchtougher.TheCongressand

other Opposition will give him a run for his money. But then who knows theIndianvoter,he’sfooledeverybodymostofthetime.Modicouldbesurprised.

Sinha:Couldtherethenbea‘reset’ofIndia-Pakistanrelations?

Dulat: Idon’ttotallyagreewithGeneralSaheb.Hesaidit’salwaysthesame,theactors don’t matter much. But there’s clearly a world of difference betweenVajpayee and Modi. Vajpayee was a towering personality, a philosopher, andunfortunatelyhebecameprimeministertoolate,whenhewasacautiousoldman.Still,hewasa shrewdpoliticianandcouldchoreographthingshisway.Whenhesaidthingstheymadeanimpression.

17

TheDovalDoctrine

A.S.Dulat:AjitDovalkeepscomingup inour inteldialogue.For thePakistanis,he’sthedevilincarnate.

AsadDurrani:Idon’twanttoputitlikethat.MaybesomeinthePakistanipressdogive that impression. In the business he’s just another person doing his duty,probablydoing itwell.Butwhathashedone todeserveamention inourbook?Evenifonementionedhimnegatively.

ImetDovalacoupleoftimes,evenbeforeImetMrDulat.ThefirsttimewasinMuscat, Oman, at an India-Pakistan Track-II in 2005, organised by theInternational Instituteof StrategicStudies.Recently liberated from servicehe sattherequietly.

Theyseatedthreeofuswith intelligencebackgroundstogether,andbychanceourmicrophonesweren’twired.Dovalhadjuststeppedout.Imadeacrackthatweweren’twiredtothesamesystemasourmonitoringwasbeingdoneelsewhere,andMrDovalhasgonetoactivateourchannels.Therewasagoodamountoflaughter.

HewasalsoattheTehelkameetImentioned.Quiet,observing,difficulttoread.Ultimatelyhealsospoke,andthatiswhereonecouldassessthathisexperienceinPakistanaffectedhiminadifferentway.He’snoManiShankarAiyar.1

Dulat:Hewaspartofourinteldialogueandattendedthefirstfewsessions.

I’ve known Ajit for a long time. He’s been a colleague and good friend too.WhenhejoinedthisgroupItoldPeter,Inowseehopeinthisprocessbecausewehave here a gentleman who is going to go places. Everyone looked around andrealised I was talking about Ajit. He has gone places but he hasn’t helped theprocess,andthenhejustoptedout.

Asfarashiscapabilitiesgo,he’soneofouroutstandingoperationalguys.He’safieldman.

The trouble, though, with people who are so much into themselves, is thatthey’re lonesomeand they stayaloof. InALegacyofSpies2 there’s a relevant linethatsays,thetroublewithspooksisthattheyfinditdifficulttoinvestintrust.

Thesehigh-profileguyswhokeeptothemselveshaveaproblemoftrust.Ajitisaguywhowon’ttrustanybody.Inourbusinessitis,inanycase,noteasytotrust.He’s not the only one, incidentally.Other big names in Indian intelligence have

beensimilarlylonely.

AdityaSinha:YouneverhearintheIndianpressaboutthePakistaniNSA,GeneralJanjua,inthewayDovalismentionedinthePakistanimedia.

Durrani:Sometimeswhenthepressfindsatarget,itbenefitstheperson.Hehasn’tchangedpolicy.He’sjustalittlemorehardlinebutit’sstillwhatIbelievehasbeenIndianpolicyforalongtime.Heshoutsmore,likeTrumpdoes,alotofhotair.Heprovidesthatmasala.

We’retalkingmoreofthesubstanceoftherelationship,notofpeoplewhofrothat themouth.Onemet him later in this intel dialogue once or twice.He spokewithaswagger,soIthoughthehasgainedconfidence.Ididn’tknowhewasgoingto join Modi as his NSA, and that he was cross-examining me like an NSA-designate.

Theupshotishe’sjustdoingwhathisbosswantsdone.Maybemoremuscularly,morevocally.

Sinha:You’vetalkedaboutMrDulat’shands-onexperience.TheNSAisanothergentlemanwithalotofhands-onexperience…

Dulat:MorethanI.

Sinha:…thoughhisapproachisdifferent.Soisitexperienceorisitoutlook?

Durrani:That’sagoodpoint.Peoplehaveexperiencebuthowdoesitaffectthem?

When it comes to Palestine,we in Pakistan, theArabworld and theMuslimworld have similar reactions. Yet we do not all believe that you must take theswordandbooktonon-believers.

Soyourhands-onexperienceinPakistancanbedifferent.InAjitDoval’scaseitprobablyaffectedhiminawaywherehefelt,‘OhGod,thiscountrymustbedealtwithanironfist.’AndMrDulatafterworkinginKashmirmayhaveconcludedthattherewereotherapproaches.

Sinha: General Saheb, how did it go when a group of former Pakistan highcommissionersmetDoval3inDelhiin2016?

Durrani: Six high commissioners had an invitation from the Aspen Centre, SatiLambah4 was themoving force. They considered their most substantial meetingwaswhen they calledon theNSA.AjitDoval treated them indifferently, saying:‘Wearewatchingyou.Ifsomethinggooddoesnotcomeoutofourinvestigation,andifwefinda linkbetweenPathankotandMumbaiandastatestructure,therewillbeconsequences.’

Whenthemeetingfinishedhedidnotshakehandswithagroupthatishighlyregardedinbothcountries.Justwalkedaway.Themessagewasconveyed.

Dulat:Sir,youobviouslygot it fromsomebodyat thatmeeting.What Iheard inDelhiwasthecontrary; thehighcommissionerswerepleasantlysurprisedthathewasniceandsoftdespitehisreputationofbeingtoughasnails.

Durrani:He softly put across themessage that India didn’twant good relations,thankyouforcoming.

Dulat:Yes, ifsomething likethatwassaid, it’suncalledfor.LetmesaythereareunderstandablereservationsperhapsaboutAjitDovalinPakistan.

Durrani:Hereitwasnotaboutreservations,it’stheaccountoftheparticipants.

Sinha:Yousaidhisnamecameupintheinteldialogue.Whathappened?

Dulat: He comes up in everymeeting because of the thingswritten about him.ThatDoval’sshadowloomsovertheplace.Idon’tknowhowfarthat’strue.I’vehadverylittleinteractionwithAjitsincehe’sbecomeNSA.

Durrani:Inthisparticularmeeting,5wetalkedaboutthepresentenvironmentandwhetheritispossibletoreachouttothedispensationinDelhi.Mypointwas,no,let’snoteventry.

Dulat:Ihadoncestuckmyneckoutafewmeetingsago.Isaidthisdialoguethingisn’tgoinganywhere,Ihaveanidea,whydon’tyouinviteAjitDovaltoLahoreorIslamabad?My gut feeling tellsmehewould love to go.Maybe that could be abeginning.

Durrani:Iraisedthefirstobjection.

Dulat:Ehsanagreedandsaidyes, thatshouldnotbedifficult.Onourside,K.M.Singhsaidwhynotalsoameetingwiththearmychief?AndEhsan’sresponsewas,yes,possibly.

Havingsuggestedthis,Iwassceptical.Ajitinpresentcircumstancesisnoteasilygoingtogetaninvite.Hehasn’tgotone.

The twoNSAs have a relationship. I’m told they talk on the phone but theyhaven’tmetforalongtime.Sothatrelationshipisnotgoinganywhere.Wouldyouagree,Sir?

Durrani:My two objections are, first, this invitationwould not go downwell inPakistan. More importantly, suppose he rebuffs us and says, why should I. It’spossible that he then goes around saying despite all I have said and done aboutPakistan,theseguysstillcomecrawlingontheirknees.He’scapableofthat.

Sinha:That’sabitmuch.

Dulat: Actually, the question of his accepting the invitation was raised. It wascheckedandtheresponsewas,yes,Ajitwouldbequitehappy.AsIthought.Yet

theinvitenevercame.

Sinha:SotheNSAisthekeypersontobreakingtheIndia-Pakistanstalemate?

Dulat: That depends on the NSA system, which in India is only three primeministersold.Thewayit’sevolving,theNSAisakeyfigure.ThisparticularoneisModi’s henchman. He’s the number two, much like Brajesh Mishra was toVajpayee.Butthatwasamoresophisticatedrelationship,nobodytalkedaboutit.

Durrani: Let’s sayModi and Ajit Doval are work in progress.We do not knowwhereitwillgo.Tillnowthesignalsaremixed,butifonebelievestheyaremoreintotheatricsthenit’snotlikelytogoanywhere.

Dulat:There’snodoubtthatsignalsaremixed. I’msure itwouldconfuseyou; itconfusesusinDelhi.Iseeitlikethis,thatthereisakeenness,almostananxiety,tosucceed.ToprovethatModi’svisittoRaiwindwasnotfornothing.

Sinha:WhatisthedynamicbetweenthetwoNSAs?

Dulat:GeneralSahebwillknowbetter,butfromwhateveronehearsthechemistryisgood.

Sinha:That’spuzzling.

Dulat:Notif it’saquestionofone’ssenseofimportance.Theygetalongfine,noproblem,eachisjustaphonecallaway.Theycalleachother,seeeachother.It’sagood relationship. But they’re not taking advantage of it, and both sides are toblame. If there is something good going, forget the primeministers for the timebeing,whyhaven’ttheycapitalisedonit?

Pakistanhas notpaid sufficient attention toAjitDoval.When everything elseclosesthereisagreatwindowofopportunityandthatisAjitDoval.Hewouldgrabanopportunityifitshowshimcominginbetter,biggerlight.

Durrani:Well,Idon’tfeelcomfortablethinkingDovalistheperson.Ifitwasuptome, I would not even talk about him.However, hematters nowadays, asModimatters. I agree he is smart and would not miss an opportunity for anotherspectacle.WinModi or himself browniepoints.But I’mnot counting onhim toturn around the relationship and make it stable. Next time he’s in Lahore orIslamabad,itwillbeforalltherightreasonsforIndia,butallthewrongreasonsforthelong-termrelationship,andwithoutwishingusanybenefit.

Dulat: I thinkthat’soneoftheproblemsintherelationshiprightnow,andI’malittlehandicappedbecause,asIsaid,he’sbeenacolleague,afriend,soIdon’twanttoputtoomuchintoit,butIthink,inthePakistanmind,whereitmatters,Dovalremainsaproblemunfortunately.

Sinha:Soundslikedeepdistrust.

Dulat:That’swhatI’msaying.It’sunfortunate.Yousaidyouwouldn’tevenbothertothinkabouthim,somebodycouldsaythesameaboutHenryKissinger.Also,he’snotnecessarilyahardliner.

Durrani:Who?

Dulat:AjitDoval.HetoesModi’sline.HealsotoedManiDixit’s line.Heatonepointtoed[M.K.]Narayanan’sline…I’lltellyousomething.HeisconvincedthatModiisthegreatestthingthathashappenedtoIndia.ThatIcanvouchfor.

Durrani:SoinfuturewehavetoworkonDovalandnotModi?

Dulat:Dovalwould enjoy this.That’swhy I keep saying get him toLahore.HelovesPakistan!

18

TheHardliners

Aditya Sinha: You said Indian foreign office was radically anti-Pakistan. Pleaseelaborate.

AsadDurrani:ThatwasbasedonhavingdealtwithIndiandiplomatsinIslamabadandotherplaces.AtthePugwashConferenceinDelhiinFebruary2004theIndianforeignsecretaryhostedadinnerandImetafewpeople.Talksweretakingplaceand the environmentwas all right, but I listened to theway some of the juniordiplomats spoke.One of theminions threatened us that all would change ifwedidn’timproveourbehaviour.

TavleenSinghwroteapiece saying the foreignoffice seemedprogrammed forPaki-bashing.Thatconfirmedmyfeeling.Overtimeoneunderstandsthestanceoforganisationsand institutions. Ibelievethat institutionsdevelopacultureof theirown,andSouthBlock1ishawkishonPakistan.

A.S.Dulat: Diplomats tend to have fixed mindsets. It might be the baggage ofPartition,ortheforeignofficefiles,butIwouldn’tsayit’sacrosstheboard.Therearesomeonbothsides,particularlythosepostedineachother’scapitals,whohavebeenoutstanding.Mostofourdiplomatshavebeenunderstandingandreasonable.OurhighcommissionersinIslamabad,youwouldagree,havetriedtoreachoutandmakefriendsanddotheirbest.

What happens in Delhi is slightly different. Satyabrata Pal, who served inIslamabad, is pro-Pakistan because he’s not anti-Pakistan.He has an openmind.Thereareothersaswell.You’vementionedManiDixit,ShivShankarMenonandSatiLambah.Thelastfewhighcommissioners,T.C.A.Raghavanand,beforehim,SharatSabharwal,havealldoneanoutstandingjob.

ButIagreetherearepeoplewithfixedmindsets,andI’msuretherewouldalsobesomeonthePakistaniside.

EachsuccessivePakistanhighcommissionerinDelhiseemstobebetterthanthelast.ForanIndianhighcommissioner,IslamabadisnotascomfortableasDelhi isforaPakistanhighcommissioner.He isabletogetaround,has lotsof friends. InPakistan there ismorehostility.Also, if you call thePakistanhigh commissionernames,immediatelythereisatoughertit-for-tat.

It’s sad because it is awaste of time.We need to bemore positive, tomoveforward.Thereisnopointnit-pickingthatthisiswrong,thatiswrong.

Letmealsosaythegeneralsaremostcomfortablewithoneanother.

Durrani: A foreign office has to keep a stance in keeping with the country’sdeclaredpolicy.Soit’scareful.Ittriesnotonlytomaintainthecountry’sstancebutreinforceitaswell.

Let’stakeanotherforeignoffice.IntheUS,withwhomourrelationsgoupanddown,theCIAandthePentagon,butespeciallytheCIA,actasgoodcops,sayingwe have to hang in there, this is our policy, Congress is tough. The StateDepartment, on the other hand, keeps a straight face, stiff upper lip, speaks theminimum—all to give the message that you’d better be careful. It may be thenatureoftherelationship,butitisalsotheirjob.Nottobecaughtoff-guardlateronhavingsaidsomethingoff-policy.

Dulat:Absolutely correct.Diplomats tend tobecautious.Theyhaveaknack forspendinghoursproducingnothing.

Sinha:Perhapstheforeignofficeisalwaysonrecord,whilefaujisandspooksareofftherecord.

Dulat:That’spossiblytrue,butnottheonlyreason.It’samentalityintheforeignoffice. You’re not going to concede an inch. There are umpteen stories ofobstructionbydiplomats.EvenAgra.Nooneknowswhatreallyhappenedthere.MusharrafsaiditwasVivekKatjuwhostalledit.

Sinha:He’shawkish.

Durrani:He’sboundtobe.Weneverhadanydoubtabouthim,especiallyintheIPArounds.Hespeakssoftly,he’spleasanttotalkto,butthingshesaysreflectbothhismindsetandhismessage.

Comingbacktothequalityofdiplomats,Iagreethatyourhighcommissionerswhocomearetopoftheline,theyreturnandbecomeforeignsecretary.

Sinha: Mr Dulat said Pakistanis are tougher on Indian high commissioners thanIndiansonPakistanhighcommissioners.Doyouagree?

Durrani:It’sabsolutelypossible.

Dulat:Itisafact.

Durrani:Youcan’ttake itoutonanyoneelse.Youseesomeoneonourturf,youpressurehim.

Dulat: The ISI has more manpower in Islamabad to chase the Indian highcommissioneraroundthantheIBhasinDelhi.

Durrani: That is a reflection of their quality. After retirement many speak andwrite openly, and are known on Track-II, except Riaz Khokhar, who’s at times

considered difficult. There was once an informal exchange planned between DrMubashir Hassan, now in his 90s, who only leaves Lahore for Delhi, neverIslamabad;andMaharajKrishnaRasgotra,an icon in Indiandiplomacy.MubashirHassanhadrecommendedtwonamesforhisnextvisit,RiazKhokhar’sandmine.Rasgotrasaidthere’llbeaproblemwithbothnames,andwedidn’tgo.

Exceptforhim,everyoneelseiswellregarded,likeAzizKhan,thedarlingoftheDelhicrowd,orNiazNaik,knownasthefatherofTrack-II.Afterretirement,theypleadedforaforward,positivemove.

Everyhighcommissionerisbetterthanthelastbecausehisjobistomanagetherelationship,nottothreaten.

Sinha: Riaz Khokhar, who is consideredmost hawkish, was in Delhi a ‘Page 3’personality.

Dulat:Hehad a remarkable combination of high commissioner and deputy highcommissioner,agentlemanbythenameofKakakhel.

Durrani:ShafqatKakakhel.

Dulat:HewasagreatplayerinDelhi,seeneverywhere.

Durrani: Certainly considered a good diplomat.Hewas a colleaguewhen I wasdefenceattachéinGermany.Well-essayed,positiveorpro-goodrelationship,butasadeputyhighcommissionerifhehadtodohisdutyhemusthavedoneit.

Dulat:Hedidmorethanhisduty!

Durrani:Areyousuggestinghewentaroundandmetthe‘softer’targets?

Sinha: You said that no matter how proactive a diplomat, they were unable toovercometheestablishment.

Durrani:ManiDixithadthegoodoftheregionatheartbutdidn’tlivelongenoughtodothethingshehadundertaken.WhenwemetatPugwashin2004hesaid,I’mnow with the Congress, and though it’s unlikely to win it will do better thanbefore.TheCongresswonandhebecameNSA.Hesaid,nowthingswilllookup,and our response was in any case likely to be good because of Musharraf. Hispassingawaywasasetbacktotherelationship.

ShivShankarMenonhadhisheart in itduringhis time in Islamabadandwasquitepopularthere.Whenhewasgoingbacktobeforeignsecretaryhesaid,nowleaveittome,letmeseewhatIcando.

Sinha:ThisUNgeneralassembly(2017)IndiaandPakistanhadalotofexchanges,holdingupphotos,etc.It’soddweattackeachotherontheworldstageeveryyear.

Dulat:Noteveryyear,butthisyearwe’rebackinaction.

Sinha:Whatpurposedoesitserve?

Dulat: It’sa levelofwhining,abiggerstage,worldwidepublicity.Wethumpthetableandsay,this iswhattheseguysareupto,andtheythumpevenharderandsay,lookatwhattheseguysareupto.Thishappenswhenyoudon’twanttolookeachotherintheeyeandsitdownandtalk.This isanoutcomeofnottalking.Ithappens also inGeneva, which doesn’t getmuch publicity.Whenwe’re talkingthenthesethingsdon’thappen;it’sjustfrustrationandtheatre.

IsaidtomyPakistanifriends,whenyoutalkofthesufferingofKashmirisorofhuman rights excesses, even Iwould tolerate it in support of theKashmiris. Butwhenyoutalkofa5,000-yearwarorofUNresolutions,thenwho’slistening?EvenKashmiris say, thePakistanis areno longer seriousaboutus,because these thingshavelongbeenforgotten.Whydoyouraisethisagain?WhenImetGeneralEhsaninLondonIsaid,whydoyouwanttousethisworddispute?BecauseifwegobacktotheShimlasummit,BhuttoandMrsGandhidecidedthatwhateverissuesthereare,mostofallKashmir,wouldbesettledbilaterally.ThisisanotherreasonfornotgoingtotheUN.

Sinha:Butthekeyisthatwhenyou’renottalking,thesethingshappen.

Dulat:Sir,letmeaskyou.WhyisitmucheasierwhenyouandItalk,orwhenourgroupmeets,thanwhendiplomatsmeet?I’maskingofPakistanreally,notthatourdiplomats are any better. Why are diplomats more hawkish than military orintelligencemen?Itpuzzlesme.

Durrani:Thediplomatminceshisorherwordsallcareerlong,hidingwords,soft-pedallingthings,becausethat’sthejob.Hewantedtokill theothermanbutwastaught not to; and hewas taught that if he had to send someone to hell, as thesayinggoes,saysoinamannerthatthemanmaylookforwardtohistrip.

Peoplelikeusduringourcareerbelievedinthemuscularapproach,kineticuse,nuclear bomb, etc. Once free, one can say we know the price.We know whatwe’vedone.Continuingispointless.

Dulat:That’sthething.Weknowtheprice.

Durrani:When diplomats cannot solve the problem,we go to the frontline, wesufferthepriceofthewar.Fordiplomatswordshavebeentheirtool.That’swhytheverbalexchanges.

Wehaveexchangednotonlywords,butalsootherassets.Havingdonethat,wedonothaveanydesiretocontinuedoingsomethingforthesakeofit.That’swhywebelieveintakingacalmerview.

Dulat:Whenever thePakistanidiplomats react, are theyanswerable to the ISIorGHQ?Dotheygetbriefedbythem?

Durrani:Noneof that,butwhat I initially saidprobably fits.Yourdiplomats areusuallymoreaggressive.

Dulat:Ours?

Durrani:SouthBlockiscalledtheGHQofIndia,butactuallyit ismorehardlinethanthat.

Dulat:IntheseTrack-IIs,whydoyougetthemostaggressiveones?

Durrani:Fromourside?

Dulat:Frombothsides.

Durrani: Yes, but from our side you might be thinking of Aziz Khan, RiazMohammed Khan. They’re not the aggressive guys. You have no idea of howaggressiveothersare.

Dulat:RiazKhokharIdon’tknowwellenough.ButI’veknownAzizSahebforalongtime.He’salwaysstruckmeasafineperson,agentleman,andreasonable.Butoflate,forinstanceinourmeeting2hewasaggressive.Nowwhatdoesitcomeoutof?Therehastobesomeexplanation.

Durrani:Whenthingscontinuetoremainfrozendespiteourdesires, someofthebestamongusbecomehawkish.

Dulat: I’ve never seen Aziz Saheb talk so long in a meeting, with so muchelaboration.He’susually amanof fewwords.This timeeach interventionofhiswaslong.Iwassittingnexttohim,thinking,isthisthesameAzizKhan?

Sinha:Mustbetheshrinkingofthepeacelobby,asGeneralSahebsaid.

Durrani:Hehasbelievedinthis.

Dulat: All our diplomats whowere high commissioners in Islamabad have beengoodwithpeople.

Durrani: Not all of them. Look at G. Parthasarathy. He was here when Kargilhappened.Buthegoesback…

Dulat:IthinkParthaisstillreasonable,hejustlikestohavehislastword.

Durrani: But is there any former high commissioner who is more hardline thanPartha?

Dulat: They haven’t been on Track-II, so I wouldn’t know. Somebody likeSabharwal,everyonesaysisagentleman.

Durrani:Sabharwalisnotthatbad.

Dulat:SatyabrataPal.

Durrani:I’msurehe’sagoodman.

Dulat: Excellentman.We’ve been onTV together and I haven’t found anybodymorereasonableonPakistan.T.C.A.Raghavan,againareasonableperson.

Durrani:That’swhyIsaidtheonlypersonIfoundwhoaftergoingbackdidn’tgooverboard. There are a couple I know who after retirement, well, they cancommandadivision.

19

BB,MianSahebandAbbasi

AdityaSinha:DoyoufeeldemocracyhasnotworkedwellinPakistan?

AsadDurrani:That goeswithout saying.Democracy is not only about elections,thoughit’sastepintherightdirection.Iwillquoteanarmychiefwhowasknowntowanttokeepholdingthereins.WhenAslamBaig,duringBenazir’sfirsttenure,heard rumblings from all sides that, look this is not working, the civiliangovernmentisnotgettingitsacttogether,hemadeastatement.Itwasanunusualstatementforanyarmychief,meantnotjustasamessagedowntheranksbutalsofor public consumption.He said: ‘Qaum ne apni direction chun li hain. It’s thedemocraticway.Anyone trying tocome in thewaywouldnotcomeout lookinggood.’

Ifitdidnotwork,itispossiblybecausePakistandidnothaveIndia’sstrengthininstitutionalconsensusandwayofworking.YourinstitutionalconclusionmaynotbegoodforPakistanortheregion,butit’saconsensus.Inourcase,so-and-so’stheboss,hewantstoleadthewayinhisownway,andtheinstitutionsometimesgivesanopinion,andsometimesjustfallsinline.

A.S. Dulat: Does religion play a role? How important is it? Does it affect orimpact?

Durrani:I’msureitdoes,butnotinthewaythatsomepeoplebelieve.TakeZia-ul-Haq,whomIknew.Oneofthemostreligiousonoursidewhousuallydidn’twadeinto domestic politics to his own advantage. But in international relations,especiallywith India, I don’t think religionplayed a part. People just use this torationaliseaparticularpolicy.

Dulat:Thisistheadvantageofadictator.He’sanswerabletonobody.Hemaybereligiousbutifhe’spracticalorpragmaticthenhedoestherightthingsandnobodyquestionshim.Whereaswefavourthedemocraticwaybecausewe’vehadnootherway.Ifeelthatproblems,orwhatyoucalldomesticcompulsion,ismakingthingsdifficultforPrimeMinisterModi.Idon’tknowwhathethinks,butthefactishehas started-and-stopped, started-and-stopped twice. It means there is somethingtroublinghim,forheisaproblem-solver.

Sinha:Isn’theridingatigerhecan’tgetoff?

Dulat:Isn’tthattheimpressionyouget?Don’tyouthinkso?

Durrani:That’strue.Ifyourideatigeryouhavethatproblem.Butofthemilitarydictators Ayub Khan, Zia-ul-Haq andMusharraf, themost religious-mindedwasZia.Whenitcametotherelationshipbetweenourtwocountries,eachofthemhadtheirownway.

Dulat:Musharrafwasthebest,themostreasonablewithus.

Durrani:Yes, Imean,okay. In thedealingsof these threedictators, andalso thecivilianheadsofgovernment,religiondidnotplayarole.

Dulat:Notevenatthebackofanybody’smind?

Durrani: No, no. If Zia-ul-Haq decided to improve relations, there was noopposition. If Musharraf decided so, despite his highly secular or suspectcredentials,nooneinthecountryopposedhim.

Sinha:Personallyspeaking,whichisyourfavouritepoliticianinPakistan?

Dulat:Idon’tknowPakistanthatwellbutIwouldsaymyfavouritepoliticiantherewasBB.

Durrani:Isee.

Dulat: She had charisma. She was good-looking, forward-looking, and I felt sadwhen shewaskilledbecause shehada future. It’soneof those ‘ifs’, youcan saynothingwouldhavehappened,possibly.But therewasnodoubt she could carrypeoplewithherlikenobodyelseinPakistan.

IwasinKarachiin2011.Therewasadinner,anditwasoutside,hot,andIsatwith someone fromtheBhutto family.Hewasa littleolder thanmeandhewasletting loose, abusing the political system and politicians in Pakistan. He said,Pakistan has had only one politician, ZulfikarAli Bhutto.Hewas a politician, aleader,astatesman.Therestareallruffians.

These are two interesting parallels. Many believe that Rajiv Gandhi in 1991wouldhavemadeabetterprimeministerinhissecondterm.Likewise,ifBenazirhadcomeback thingsmayhavebeendifferent inPakistan.Whether shehad thestaturetocontributetoIndia-Pakistanrelations,Idon’tknow.

Durrani:YoumustknowthatPakistanconsidersZ.A.BhuttothearchitectoftheBangladeshdisaster.TheultimateresponsibilityrestswithYahyaKhan,themanincharge. But Bhutto did subvert many attempts by Yahya and Mujib toaccommodate the interests of both thewings—and indeed he could become theprimeministeronlyifthemorepopulouseasternwingwasjettisoned.

Leaveasidehisacumen,intelligence,hisgraspandhisknowledge,evenhisclosecolleagues consideredhima fascist.He toleratednodissent.Close associates likeMubashirHassan,MerajMuhammadKhan,MustafaKharandJ.A.Rahimfellout

offavourbecauseinhiseyesnoonecouldbebigenough.Also,hewoulddrinkandplay billiards throughout the night after a meeting, but in the morning couldimmediatelydictateaperfecttelegram.

I’veknownBBpersonally,servingherinbothtenures.Shetwicedidmeagoodturn.Whenshebecameprimeministertherewasamythornarrativearoundherandhersufferingatayoungage.Herfatherwashanged,shewasexiled:fairytalesdon’tgetbetter.Shereturnedandwiththehelpofthedowntroddenwonbackherfather’sthrone.ThedictatorwastakencareofbythehandofAllah.Excitement.

But she never did anything for the poor. Not one thing that could havepolitically helpedher even5per cent.The first timeprobably only thehusbandwascorrupt,thesecondtimesheherselfwasinvolvedincorruption,asrevealedbycloseassociates.

Thesecondtimeshebelievednothingcouldstopher; shehaddivineblessingsandalltheimportantplayersonherside.Punjabcouldberuledbyallies.ShewasinfatuatedwiththeUS,thoughitnevercametoherhelpdespiteherpleastwice-thrice.

Shehad learnther lessonandwasnevergoing to fight themilitaryagain.Shethought shewouldhave survivedher first termhad shekeptgood relationswiththearmythough,andIwaswitness,thearmyhadnothingtodowithit.Well,notnothing, itwashappywhenshewasousted.But itdidn’tcreate the situation forherdismissalbyGhulamIshaqKhan,thePresident.

Imaynothavebeeninfatuatedwithpoliticiansgenerally,buttheirshareoflootpales compared to what BB, Zardari and the Sharifs skimmed off the nationalexchequer.

WhenRajivvisited,1 I attended the statebanquet thoughasDGMI, Iusuallywasn’tinvitedtomany.Thedecorumwaspoorastheusualsobrietywasreplacedby a bazaariya variety programme. BB did not believe protocol applied to her.Similarly,when theGerman president visited I attended the banquet thrown byPresidentLeghari as Iwas then theambassador toGermany.Shewalked inwithhertwochildren,asifitwereafamilyaffair.MaybetheAmericansdothingslikethis.

Rajiv wasn’t kind to her. At the joint press conference he was asked aboutKashmir,andherepliedthatthey’dheldelectionsthereandwhatwerewetalkingabout?BBhadnoideahowtorespondtothat.WhathesaidsuitedIndianpolicy,butherinexperiencedisqualifiedherfromareasonableresponse.Hisvisitdidherno good. People muttered: Was she aware enough? Did she want to give aresponse?Wasitjustacosyrelationshipanddiditmattertoher?Thesequestionswereasked.

Dulat:BBwasmy favouritebut as far as India is concerned,Vajpayee andMianSahebhadaspecialrelationship.VajpayeehadalotofregardforhimandhiswholeIndia-PakistanplanhingedonNawazSharif.Hewasdisappointedandupsetwhenthe coup happened. Then again in the last days of UPA-2, when the Pakistanelectionwasheld in2013,ourhighcommissionerSharatSabharwalwasgivenanextension.

Durrani:Sabharwalwasgivenanextension?

Dulat:Yes.SabharwalwasonextensionbecausehehadagoodrelationshipwithNawaz Sharif and the UPA hoped that Nawaz Sharif would become primeminister.NawazSharifhasbeenafavouriteonourside.

Durrani:Iknowandcanunderstandwhyheis.Theman,fromthedayhecametopower,isonlyacall,awhistleaway.Heneverlearnthislesson.

Dulat:BB?

Durrani:No,BBon India-Pakistanwasneitherwishy-washynor extreme.But inMian Saheb’s case, all efforts were made to persuade him to attend Modi’scoronation.Later,onethoughthisnumbertwowouldhavebeenbetter.But,theekhai.Hewastreatedbadlyandreadtheriotact.

Modi’scrashlandinginRaiwindafterbad-mouthingPakistanbothinDhakaandinKabul.Anyoneelsewouldhavethought,whatthehellisthiscircus.MianSahebstillresponded.

YoupeoplekeepsayingitwasagreatgesturebyModi.No.MianSahebactuallyshowedmore commitment. Because of his naiveté, everyone took it for grantedthathewouldcontinuetodoso.

Dulat:FromIndiawesawNawazSharifasabetterbetinmovingforward.Idon’tagree with the Pakistani way of seeing it. But yes, when he came for Modi’sswearing-in,heshouldhavebeentreatedbetter.

Durrani: The only point on which I was happy withMian Saheb was when heordered the nuclear tests. I absolutely publicly supported it. He took the rightdecision, abraveone, thoughheprobablyunderstandsnothing about the roleofnuclearweaponsornuclearcapability.Hetookthedecisionagainst thewishesofhisownconstituency,thebusinesscommunity,andwithstoodthepressureofthefive-tencallsfromClinton.ThatIappreciatedpubliclyandwroteabout.

Sinha:WhataboutthecurrentpoliticalinstabilityinPakistan?

Durrani: No, this has come up in a few places. Those looking deeply into thesituation believe that afterMian SahebNawaz Sharif’s departure, things calmeddown.2TheremaybehypeabouttheShariffamily’sstrugglewiththecourtcases,

butthebusinesscommunityhasreneweditsactivityandseemsconfident.

Thenewman,ShahidKhaqanAbbasi,Ipersonallyhaveneverbeencomfortablewithhim,butheissettlingdowninthejobandhandlingitwell.Allmycolleaguessayhe’saninstitutionalmanwhoworksfrommorningtillevening.Heconsultstheinstitutions. The national security committee that he heads has met often. Hishandling of the difficult relationshipwith theUS is considered good.He gave agoodspeechattheUN.InaninterviewattheAsiaSocietyhesaidtherightthings.

Tillerson visited butwas not afforded an opportunity to say one thing to thepoliticians and another to the army. They met him together, giving the samemessage:thatinsteadofbeingdefensiveorapologetic,whatwedoisforourownreasons.

Sinha:Ishetotallythearmy’smanandnotapolitician?

Durrani:He’snotbeenthearmy’sman.MusharrafwasfrustratedbecauseShahidAbbasi is the son of a former military man, Commodore Khaqan Abbasi.Musharraf’ssidetriedtowoohimawayfromNawazSharifbutAbbasiwasloyaltohispartyleaderandwenttojailratherthanplaysecondfiddletothearmy.

Onapersonalnote,therewasatimewhenbecauseofwhateverIwas,hewouldberespectful.WhenIleftandMianSahebwasfallingoutwiththemilitary,Abbasiwouldavoidme.Despitethat,Ifeelhe’striedtodoagoodjob.

Dulat: Interesting. Talking to Pakistani friends I’ve been trying to get a sense ofwhatwill happen inPakistan.GeneralEhsan and I spoke inLondon.He said, itcouldwellbeImran.3Isaid,really?Afewweekslater,everybodyaroundthetablesaidImrannowhasnochance.

WhateverIheardfrommyPakistanifriendsisthatAbbasiisthefavouritetobeprimeministeragainin2018.BecausethePML(N)controlsPunjab,whichisthree-fourthsofPakistan,sowhoevercontrolsPunjabwinsit.ThePMLcontrolsPunjab,thePPPalwaysgetsalookin,andImrandoesn’tgettoomanyseatsotherthaninLahoreandothercities.

AbbasiisMianSaheb’schoice.IaskedhowcomehechosehimoverShehbaz?TheanswerwasthatAbbasiwasnotexpectedtostabhimintheback.

Sinha:NawazSharifwasafraidhisbrother4wouldstabhimintheback?

Dulat: Even if he stabs him, the daggerwon’t go deep. You said themilitary, Iwould like towater thatdown, likeGeneralSahebuses theterm‘institutional’, Iwould say the establishment is happy. Since the PML is in control and theperceptionisthathe’sdoingagoodjob,hepossiblywouldbethefavouritetobeprimeministerin2018.ThedarkhorseisstillImran.

Durrani:He’scleverenoughtokeepsayinghewillfollowNawazSharif’spolicies.

Sinha:WhatwouldbehisapproachtoIndia?

Durrani:He’snotfallingoverlikeMianSahebeachtimeDelhicalled.Rightatthebeginninghewasasked,whatroledoes Indiahave inAfghanistan?Hesaid,zero.It’sadifferentmatterthatIbelievethereisanIndianrole;hismessagewasthatit’snolongerMianSaheb’sbusiness.

Dulat:WhatGeneralSahebissaying iscomingfrominsidePakistan.You’veseenpoliticsandpoliticiansallovertheworld.Atthispointoftimehe’sjustfillinginforMianSaheb. Ifhewas tobeprimeminister in2018,hewouldbehisownman.ThenhowhewouldreacttoIndiaortotheUS,we’dhavetowaitandsee.He’ssmartenough,welleducated,anengineer.He’snotanybody’sfool.

Sinha:Whenaretheelections?

Dulat:EhsanSahebwassayingmorelikelyAugust.

Durrani: Yes, because the new census and constituencies have to be taken intoaccount.

Dulat:There’sno rush.A lotof thingshave tobe settled inPakistan.TheShariffamily,theotherbrother.

20

GoodVibrations,India-Pakistan

AdityaSinha:Canwelistthepositivesofthebilateralrelationship?Andthingsthatmighthaveendured?

AsadDurrani:Letmerattleoffthingsthatarenotonlypositivebutcanleadustocertainconclusions.FirstistheIndusWaterTreaty.Therecanalwaysbeobjections,reservations and shortfalls, etc.This treaty is something that nobody in Pakistan,despiteourcomplaints,wantstogiveup.Indiacannotgiveitupbecauseit’snotaunilateralcommitment.Ithasstoodthetestoftime.

A.S.Dulat:Absolutely.

Durrani:Second,asamilitarymanwhowasapersonalparticipant, if there isanexampleof gentlemanlywar, the twowars against India, in ’65and ’71,were it.Bothsidesdeliberatelyavoidedciviliantargets.

Dulat:Bothwars?

Durrani:Bothwars.Thirdislesscommonlyknown.Soonafterthenucleartestsbyboth countries,1 the first thing donewas to establish a hotline to ensure that noactionbyeithersidewasmisunderstoodbytheother.Amissiletestshouldnotbemistakenforanuclearstrike.Nosurprises.

Thisistheonlylinethatremains‘hot’.Iknowotherhotlinesbetweenthetwocountries,evenbetweenthetwoarmies,thatgocoldwhenonesidewishestoavoidapromptresponseforacoupleofhours.

Sinha:Canyougiveaninstance?

Durrani:After a ceasefire violationyoumaybenefit bykeepingquiet.YourMOdoesthis.Onoursideifthereisreasonnottotakethecall,itwillgounanswered.Thenuclearhotlinewillremain‘hot’,however,becauseofthestakesinvolved.

Dulat:Alotofpositivescomeoutofmeetingsandengaging,talking,dialogue.TheengagementbetweenthetwoNSAswaspositivewhileitlasted,thePakistanisidesays there is nothing now.They talk on the telephone and nothing beyond that,whichisunfortunatewhenyou’vegotagoodthingandyouliketohaveasmoketogether and sit down and possibly have a drink.Why would you not want tocontinuethat?You’vegotnothingtolose,andeverythingtogain.

ThatwasincredibleaboutVajpayee.WhenhewenttoLahore,Pakistanandtheestablishment were surprised he wanted to visit theMinar-e-Pakistan.When he

visitedhemadeanemphaticendorsement,thatPakistanisanindependentcountrywithwhomwewouldliketohaveastableandprosperousrelationship.

At themuch-quotedGovernor’s banquetVajpayeedelighted thePakistanis asonlyhecould.‘MypartymendidnotwantmetocometoLahore,’hesaid.‘WhentheyhearofwhatI’vewritteninthevisitor’sbook,they’llsay,Lahorejanazaroorithha toh theek hain, lekin wahan jane ki kya zaroorat thi, mohar lagane ki kyazaroorat thi.’ Then he said, ‘Pakistan ko meri mohar ki zaroorat nahin hain,Pakistankiapnimoharhain’.

AfterwhathesaidinKashmiraboutinsaniyat,anyKashmiriwilltellyouthere’sbeen no one like Vajpayee. The question is, did he mean what he said? It’s aquestionoftheimpact,anditwaspositive.LikewhenhewentonApril17,2003andatapublicmeetingsaid,‘IproposetotalktoPakistan.’Thecrowdwentwild.

GeneralSaheb referred to the civilitybetween India andPakistanevenduringwar.Our friendShowkat theDIGhadan interesting story.Hewasaprisonerofwar in ’71, before he left the army and joined the police. There was a secondlieutenant who looked after the prisoners well. He askedme, can you find thisgentleman,helivesinJalandhar,andIwanttomeetandexpressmygratitude.

When we Indians and Pakistanis sit down in the evening, whatever theprovocation across the table, and have a drink, it shocks these Canadians andAmericanswhowatch.Theseswines,theymustbethinking,somuchmud-slinginghappensandyettheygetalongsowell.

Durrani: Talking of prisoners, my unit captured an Indian lieutenant, 2ndlieutenantSharmaandhisrunner,inthe’65warintheChambsector.AccordingtoSOPthefrontlineunittakesdownthenumber,name,rank,andthenpassestheprisonersofwartohigherheadquarters.Whenwecapturedhim,hetoldus, ‘Forthelast24hourswehavenoteatenanything.’Thoughwewerenotservingteaatthattime,thechapwasstraightawaygivenacupoftea.

Thesoldierswerealways,kidharseaayehobhai,achhahaanhaan,myparentscome from that side.Oneof ourswhodidn’t like the other side saidOhLala eOye,whichisaderogatoryremarkforHindubanias.Itwastheonlysuchremark.InvariablywejokedwiththeIndiansthatalltheirsoldierswerefromGujaratandLalamusa,2hopefullythereweresomefromIndiatoo.

Andthen,atahigherlevel,regardlessofhowthewarwasgoing,Manekshaw’s3

favouriteunitinthetwoarmieswas6FF(hisparentbattalion,4/12FrontierForceregiment) in the Pakistan army. During the two wars he would ask how’s 6FFdoing?

Andat thehighest level is (Morarji)Desai.TheAmericanswereprodding theprimeminister to go after the Pakistanis aswewere hell-bent on going nuclear.

Desaisays,I’mnotgoingagainstmyneighbouronyouraccount.

Thesethingshavehappenedforpersonal,historicalorneighbourlyreasons.Theyarethepositives.

Sinha:Morarjibhaisaidthispublicly,isit?

Dulat:Idon’tremember,itwasalongtimeago.

Durrani:Thisisthemessagewegotatthetime.Desaiwasknowntobelievethatneighboursshouldnotplaygamesonbehalfofanyoneelse.

WemayhaveproblemsamongstourselvesbutifwedoanythingagainstIndia,that costs India, on prompting from outside, then we are being stupid. Thosepeoplearefaraway,they’llgoaway,weareleftholdingthebag.

Forinstance,aftertheSovietsinvadedAfghanistan,AmericaandPakistanwereallies.TheAmericanswouldconstantlytellus,don’tbesopallywithIran,they’vegotourhostages.Zia-ul-Haq’sresponsewas,always,justasweestablishedcontactwith China although you didn’t like our original reaching out to China, it ispossibleonedayyouwouldliketospeaktoIranandwewillbetheconduit.Butevenifthatdoesnothappenwewon’tcreateaproblemintheneighbourhood.

What many may not know is that despite American displeasure and a fewirritations between Teheran and Islamabad, we continue to represent IranianinterestsinWashington.

Dulat: Everybody acknowledges that General Zia was the master of publicrelations.Cricketdiplomacy,landinguphere,etc.

Ashappens in every country,whenadignitary comes, somebody is appointedfrom thehost country to look after his security. In India the IntelligenceBureaudoesthis.GeneralZiawasabigmanas faras Indiawent.Adeputydirectorwasappointedinsteadoftheusualassistantdirector—acolleagueofours,O.P.Sharma,wholaterwasNagalandgovernor.Afterhisdutyhesaid,‘Bhaiyehgazabkaaadmihain.Sonice,sokind,socourteous,everything,allthegraces.’Loandbehold,fivedayslater,therewasapersonalletterfromGeneralZia,andO.P.Sharmacouldn’tgetoverit.Heshowedus,yehdekhiye,GeneralSahebkipersonalchitthiaayihain.Ididthisdutyoften,andthemostIgotfromMargaretThatcherwasaphotograph.The Prince of Wales’ security officer extended to me an invitation to visitBuckinghamPalace.YasserArafatwasmoreinterestingbecausehewouldhugyouandinsistonaphotographtogether.Butnoonewrotemeapersonalletter.

Sinha:Didn’tGeneralZiabestowamedalorhonouronMorarjiDesai?4

Durrani:GeneralZiawascareful,andifthisepisodehappened,GeneralZiawouldhave recognised it. That is whywe consider him to have handled certain affairs

well.

Yousee,there’snoendtosuchepisodes.

V

THEFLASHPOINTSThese five chapters discuss the lowest points of recent history, such as theNovember2008attackonMumbai;thecaptureofallegedspyKulbhushanJadhav;andthesurgicalstrikesbytheIndianmilitaryacrosstheLineofControlaftermajorterroristattacksinJ&KandPunjab.ThetwospychiefsalsodiscussthemeaninglessIndo-Pak rhetoric like ‘talks and terror can’t happen together’, and the pros andconsofwar.

Settingthescene

Kathmandu,March27,2016:Onenight, after adayof intense conversation,wevisitanoldfriendoftheDulatsfordinner.GuestsaresurprisedtomeetaformerPakistanispychief inperson.GeneralDurranibemoansthefact thatthePakistanirupeeisnolongeracceptedinKathmandu.

21

HafizSaeedand26/11

Asad Durrani: I don’t think anything was in common between Kargil and theMumbai attack, even assuming each happened during civilian rule. The peopleweredifferent.

A.S.Dulat:Sir,thenwhydidMumbaihappen?

Durrani:Mumbai remains the only incident inwhich I decided that Iwould beavailabletoanyIndianandPakistanichanneltosaythatwhoeverhasdonethis,beitstate-sponsored,ISI-sponsored,military-sponsored,shouldbecaughtholdofandpunished.It’snotonlyaboutthose168peopledead,fourdaysofcarnage,etc.Atthe time Pakistan could ill afford its eastern front caught in a war. There wereenoughproblemsinthewestandwithinthecountry.Idon’tknowwhodidit,buttherewerequestionsthatDavidHeadleynamedanISImajor.Itcreateddifficultiesforus.

Dulat:ButthestoryisthatHeadleycollaboratedwithHafizSaeed.1

Durrani: Because all these stories have floated around, people can go ahead andinvestigate.Foreightyearsbothofushaveadvocatedjointinvestigation,jointtrial,intelligencesharing,getonwiththeanti-terrorismmechanism,etc.,forthesimplereasonthatwecan’tdoanythinguntilandunlessthis isresolved.Tillthen,HafizSaeed, ISI, Jaish-e-Mohammed: it’s possible theyhadnothing to dowith it, thatthere’sathirdorfourthorfifthpartyinvolved.

Sinha:Inthelastbook,MrDulat,youmentionedthatwhentherelationshipisnotmovingforwardandthePakistanarmyfeelsthatIndianeedsakick,thensomethinglikeMumbaihappens.

Dulat:Absolutely right.My theoryorbeliefwas also thatMusharrafwouldhaveknownabout26/11.

Durrani:Buthewasoutofpower.ByAugust-September2008,hewasgone.

Dulat:Yes,butSir,theplanningwouldhavestartedearlier.Musharrafcouldhavebeenaparty.IstandbywhatIsaid,thatwheneverthereisfrustrationinPakistanthensomethinghappens.

Sinha: Recently,2 Hafiz Saeed was placed under house arrest. Indian TV newschannelssayit’stheTrumpeffect.

Dulat:Idon’tknowifHafizSaeedisimportantforTrump.Thatmighthavebeena

coincidence.According toGeneralEhsan, therewasan investigation inwhichhewaswanted,anditwasdecidedtolockhimup.

Durrani:Hewastakentothecourtsthoughtheyhadnothing(new)againsthim.Itisstillpossiblethathewasdetainedtoletthestormblowover.Insixmonthshecouldbeout.

Sinha:SoHafizSaeed’shousearrestisalsochoreographed?

Durrani: What’s new, as far as Hafiz Saeed is concerned, is more evidenceavailable?Onewouldexpectthatthere’sanarrangementwithHafizSaeed.

Isn’tthatwhathappensmostofthetime?ModijiinGujarat—theinquiryreportdoesnotabsolvehim.Butthecourtletshimgo,sonoonewantstotalkaboutit.AbiggerexampleisTonyBlair.TheChilcotreport4blameshim,yethestillhasnotbeenhauledup,withlegalopinionsplitoncharginghim.The9/11reporthas28pagesmissingbecauseofsensitiveinformation,orbecauseofAmericaninefficiency,or because of possible complicity; some persons had been released as they hadbusinessconnectionsorlinkstotheBushfamily.IthelpstheUSavoidunpleasantaction.

Sinha:SonopositiveimplicationsforIndia-PakrelationsfromHafizSaeed’shousearrest?

Durrani:There are very fewpositives on the India-Pakistan front right now.Butthiscanprovidebreathingspacetoacountrythatisconstantlyunderpressure.

Dulat: I don’t think this has been done because of India. But, asGeneral Sahebsays,itcouldbeusedbyGeneralJanjuatoringupAjitDovalandsay,look,we’vetakenactionand lockedthis fellowupforat least sixmonths, sothatnuisance isoutoftheway.

Durrani: In Afghanistan we may be a lesser culprit than the Taliban or AshrafGhaniortheUS.WhyisHaqqaninetworkanetwork?Ialsodon’tknow.Youcankeep creating a situation in which the culprit seems to be Pakistan but not thepeoplewhohavedonesomuchwronganddamagetoPakistan:theUS.

PickupanyreportbytheAmericansduringthelast15years,includingthoseoftheauditorgeneral, that lookataccountability,money spent, civilianskilled,andcombatants.Thereportsdobringthesefactsoutbutintheend,sincepunishmentcouldcausepoliticalembarrassment,theconclusionis:Pakistan’scomplicity.

Dulat:HowdoesHafizSaeedactuallyhelpPakistan?

Durrani:Thatprobablycomeslater.WhatcanPakistandoaboutHafizSaeed?

Dulat:That’sanothermatter.

Durrani:Howisitanothermatter?

Dulat:Iagreeit’sforthecourtstodecide.Butmyquestionis:whatisHafizSaeed’svalue?

Durrani: If you prosecute Hafiz Saeed the first reaction will be: it’s on India’sbehalf,you’rehoundinghim,he’sinnocent,etc.Thepoliticalcostisbig,now.

Dulat:Apartfromhisinvolvement,hehasnuisancevaluebecausehekeepsabusingIndia.ButwhatishisvaluetoPakistan?

Durrani:Thecostofprosecutinghimistoogreat.

22

KulbhushanJadhav

Aditya Sinha: What’s the story with Kulbhushan Jadhav,1 the alleged spy thatPakistansentencedtodeath?Howdocountriesdealwithespionagecases?

A.S.Dulat:GeneralSahebwilltellusbecauseithappenedinPakistan,Sir.

AsadDurrani:Well,youhavemoreexperience.

Dulat:Icanonlysaythatspookingwillneverend.

Durrani:Never.

Dulat: It’s thesecondoldestprofession.It’sconventionallybelievedthatspookingincreaseswhen the relationship between two countries improves. ThemaximumspookingbetweentheAmericansandIsraelistakesplacewhentheirrelationshipisatitsbest.ButaboutJadhavIdon’tknow,Sir,youtellme.

Durrani:No,yes.Essentiallyithasgoneonforever,butIdon’tagreethatspookingishalfashonourableastheoldestprofession.It’sveryhonourable.Spiestakegreatrisksinserviceoftheircountry.That’swhypeoplegetcaughtallthetime.

Normally,youdon’tplayitup.Firstsendamessage:weknowyouhavetwoofours,wenowhaveoneofyours.Wewouldlikeanexchange.Youcanhaveyourfellowbackbutwewantbothofours,etc.Thisisthewayitisdone.Overfive,tenyearsyoumakeexchangeslikethis.

Also,youdon’tannounceyouare looking formoreevidence.You’vegothim,askabouthiscontacts,network.That’sthenorm.

This particular case seems complicated. Normally one would be mindful ofIranian sensitivity. And for a long time people have been saying, which is nosurprisetome,howeveryonewhomatters ispresent inBalochistan.Not justtheIndians,theIranians,eventheIsraelis,theAmericans,theRussians,theAfghans…

Dulat:Chinese?

Durrani: …the Chinese, all are present. It’s an important area for differentpurposes.SomearetheretoblowupthepipelineIranandPakistanwanttobuild,ortosabotagetheeconomiccorridor;othersbecausetheydon’twanttomissoutonwhatthefirstlotareplanning.Theplaceiscrucialforthe‘NewGreatGame’.

WhenPakistanmadethisrevelation(aboutJadhav)theideamusthavebeentocountertheIndianthreatafterPathankot.Thoughthatfamousthreat2camelater,

attheendofApril,andJadhavwasarrestedinMarch.

Dulat:Whatwasthethreat?

Durrani:ThatIndiaislookingforlinksbetweenPathankotandourestablishment.Sowecameupwithacounter-argumentthatweknowyou’vebeendoingthis(inBalochistan).

Second, Pakistan has its hands full in Balochistan, taking countermeasureseffectively. The Baloch resistance hasmostly been downgraded. ShahbazTaseer3

was rescued after Qadri’s hanging.4 Pakistan probably is confident about givinghearttoourownpeopleandputtingthefearofGodintheIndianheart.Thisismyspeculation.

The reality could be different: we too know how to play these games. Youcaughtholdofsomany,wenowhaveanimportantcatch.It’sone-upmanship.

Theremayevenbeamore substantial, sinister reason; thatour side suspectedthegamewasgoingtoheatup.

Acountry likePakistanat times feelsunder siege fromalldirections: relationswithIndia,theAfghanistansituation,orthenumberofAmericansspreadingpoisonaboutyou.Whenallthisishappening,someadvocatetakingactionthatconveystoyourpublicthatwearen’talwaysonthereceivingend,andalsoit’snotalwaysthatwecan’trevealanything.Hereisone.

Dulat:Iagreeentirelywiththeboss.I’msurprisedthathedoesn’tknow,becauseIdon’t know, frankly. We’ve heard nothing but denials from Delhi, which isunderstandable;iftheguy’saspookitwillbedenied,andifhe’snotit’llbedenied.

Withwhatlittleknowledgeonehas,ifthiswereaRAWoperationandhewasaRAWspy,thenit’saprettysloppyoperation.

Durrani:Hmm.

Dulat: You don’t find a senior naval officer wandering around in Balochistan orChaman,orwhereverhewaspickedup.Whatthehellwashedoing?

Spies get caught, sure, but it may not have happened that way. One of ourearliertheorieswasthathewaskidnappedandbroughtthere.

Durrani:Hmm.

Dulat:Still,whatthehellwashedoing?There’snoexplanation,surprisingly.KaranThapar had asked this question on his TV programme and I denied it outright,sayingiftheforeignofficesayshe’sbeenkidnapped,we’vegottoseewherehewaspickedupfrom.

Loandbehold, thenextday this fellowwasconfessingonTV.Karanrangup

and said, your man is singing like a canary! I was taken aback. If it was anintelligenceoperation,itdoesn’tdoanyoneanycredit.

Sinha: If you had been the chief when this happened, would you have sackedsomeone?

Dulat:I’mnotsayingthat.I’mnotsayingIwoulddoitbetter,butasanintelligenceoperationit’sprettysloppy.Iftheguywasaspy.

Sinha:HewasfromBombayandhadtworelativesintheMumbaipolice.

Dulat:Yeah,hehad,andhewasrunningabusiness.

Sinha: Someone said he had a boat andwas running drugs, as the sea route hasbecomebig.

Dulat:Ihaven’theardthat.Butthathewasintosomebusiness.

I agree, it could have been kept quiet. In fact, it could have been used forgoodwill.TheNSAdialogueswekeephearingabout,allGeneralJanjuahadtodowascallAjitDovalupandsay,we’vegotyourguybutdon’tworry.He’llbetakencareof.Induecourseyoutelluswhattodowithhim.

It comes back to the basic thing, can the Indian and Pakistani intelligenceagenciescooperate?Andifnot,thenwhynot?

Sinha:SoJadhav’scaseisallaroundbungling?

Dulat:Youcan’tblametheNSAs, itwasonTVbefore it reachedthem.Then itwasallovertheplace.

Sinha:SoaftersayingISIandRAWarenumberone,wehavethisbungling.

Dulat:That’showgoodtheISI is, itputhimstraightonTV!LikewedidduringtheKargilwar,whenwemadepublic that interceptbetweenGeneralMusharrafandGeneralAziz.

This game is different from politics, and should be kept apart for it to beeffective.

Sinha:Aftertheinitialfuss,itwentquiet.

Durrani:I’mhappyifnothingishappening,suchshor-sharabahasnoplace.There’sa way to go about it. We should not have broached it with the poor Iranianpresidentwhilehewasanhonouredguest.Anditwasembarrassingthatthisfauxpaswascommittedbythearmychief.

Sinha:WemightaswelldiscussBalochistan.GeneralSaheb?

Durrani: From the very beginning, Pakistan’s handling of Balochistan has beenfaulty.No one understood that itwas complex better than the founder himself.

Jinnah may not have understood much about many subjects, but he saidBalochistanwasgoingtobehisprovince.It’sdifferent,sodivided,thinlypopulated.TherearedivisionsbetweenPushtunsandBalochis.WithintheBalochistherearetribes,andontopsittheBrahui.

Balochistanhasoneofthebiggestreservoirsofnaturalresources.Mercifullynotmuchhasbeentappedbecausewe’requitecapableofmessingup.Ipraythatwhenwe tap it,peoplewill correctlyexploit it andnotburn it like theSuigas,ornotmake it a political tool. The Afghans and Balochis would be interested. It’sstrategicallyanimportantplace.

ThePersianGulf, or the IndianOcean, that’s the extension; theArabianSea,the Indian Ocean, the Persian Gulf. Everyone is interested in this area, in thecorridor,andinthenaturalgas.

It’s no surprise that a few thousand people in Balochistan, which is a goodnumberconsideringtheydon’thavemanymillions,areupset.Alltheyneededwasencouragement from outside to take up arms and organise a resistance.Withoutthatencouragementsomemightstillhavedoneso.

Theirdisadvantageisthatsincetheyarefewandaren’tsupportedbythepeople—the people are not that seawhere fish survive—over a period of time they’vebeensuppressedorovercome.Thelastwasprobablythefifth5time.

Our forceasideorwhatwedidwith theKhanofKalataside,weputout theinsurgencywiththesnapoffingersinacoupleofyears.Thistimeit’stakenlongerbecausenoonethinksofarealsolution.IfIweretodrawaparallelwithKashmir,puttingdownthemovementisonethingbutwhatabouttheirheartsandminds?Here,thereisn’tenoughresources,will,orcompulsion.

Musharrafprobablywantedtodosomethingseriousandevenhecouldnotgobeyond some patchwork job recruitment. For the Balochis, projects that aresupposedtoprovidejobsdonotcount.You’llprobablybelookingatlabourfromKarachi,which is closer. Balochistan does not have the expertise, it comes fromelsewhere.

TheBaloch characteristicallywantmore respect and acknowledgement.Don’tsuspect their loyaltybecauseevenAtaullahMengal,onceadissident, a fewyearsago clearly said,we’venotbeenhandledwell butPakistan remains our least badchoice.

We’ve bought some, appeased some, and bribed others: Balochistan assemblywillalwayshave60peoplefrom30differentgroups.Soyouendupmakingnearlyall of them ministers. One man becomes Leader of Opposition and anotherSpeaker.Fiftyadministrators,smallplace.

Complexity aside, our ability to manage with the force of arms and a bit ofpaymentattherightplacesisconsiderable.InthiscasethecompulsionwastodoitquicklytogetCPECrunning.QuicklybecausewithAfghanistanontheboil,somewillexploititmorethanwecanmanage.

Thirdisprobablywhat ledtothisepisode,theoutsidefactor isabiggerthreatthantheBalochi.Icanagreethatyouimmediatelytakecareofthedissidenceandforeignintervention.Addressingpeople’sgrievancestakeslongandiscomplex,andrequiresmore thanMusharraf’s song anddance, even thoughhe tried as best hecould.Hesaidheknewwhattodo,whereasthefactisthatnoonedoes.

Dulat: I’m glad you compared it with Kashmir. I don’t know Balochistan butobviouslyit’sanissueandthereisdiscontentbecauseatseveralTrack-IImeetingsthere have been Baloch boys speaking openly about what’s happening there.They’veeventalkedaboutdisappearances,etc.ThereisanissuethatPakistanhastodealwith.

The question that comes up—General Saheb hasn’t raised it today, he’s in agoodmood—isourinvolvementorinterference.

TheseBalochleadersarewellknown.WhetheritistheRAWorourdiplomatsinPakistan,theywouldknowthem,andthat’snotabigdeal.I’malwayssurprisedwhenanybodysayswearefanningdiscontent,orpayingforit,ortrainingterrorists.Oneallegationwas that Jadhavwas trainingBalochterrorists. I’veneverheardofthis,frankly.IheadedtheRAW,anditdidn’thappeninourtime.TheGeneralhasacknowledgedthattheISIpaidmoneyinBalochistanapartfromKashmir.Thisisexactly what I had said in my book that money is a tool used by all agencieseverywhere.

Sinha: InPakistan it is alleged that Indian consulates inAfghanistan areused forthis.

Durrani: If Indian consulates areused,we’ll behappy.There are four consulatesand an embassy butwe need not inflate their number. In Pakistan somepeople,who are ill-informed and sometimes silly, will talk of nine consulates, 18; themaximumnumberI’veheardis23.IftheIndiansweretoconductespionagefromfourconsulatesthenweshouldbehappybecausethenwecankeeptrack.Anyway,espionageisusuallynotdonefromthere.

Acoupleof Indianconstructioncompaniescouldemployacoupleof Jadhavs.That is difficult to track. Essentially, we exaggerate Indian influence like weexaggeratedthenumberofconsulates.

WhatworriedmemostabouttheJadhavcasewastheIranianfactor.IthasledtospeculationinPakistan,thatwhenMullahAkhtarMansoor6wasreturningfromsomemeetingsinIran,Iranianintelligenceputachipinhisvehiclethathelpedthe

Americanstotrackhimdown.EvenifthiswastrueIwouldnottalkaboutit.It’screatingproblemsbetweenIranandPakistan.

ButregardingBalochistan:espionagehappens,peopleareinvolved.Second,I’vealways felt we are overplaying India’s involvement. The Americans are moreinvolved.Thereareotherswhohavemorereasontogetinvolved.

Thenthere’sDoval’sthreatsontape.Hewasaskedaboutitbytheformerhighcommissioners.7

Dulat:Whatdidhesay?

Durrani: They reminded him that he said, of course Pakistan is not going to betackleddifferently,whatwe cando is causemischief.He says, yes, but thatwaswhenIwasa freeman,beforeI tookoverasNSA.TheprivateviewofsomeonewhoisnowtheNSA.

But this debate is unimportant. The important thing is that, of course thesethingshappen.

Dulat:Ofcoursetheyhappen.ButtheallegationalwayswasthatitwashappeningoutoftheIndianconsulates.Asyousaid,thesearenotusedforespionage.

Durrani:Youcandoespionageindifferentwayswithoutitbeingtrackedortraced.Aconsulatemanwillhavethestatustopullstringsandlunchwithagents.Hecanbeclever so that thosepeople arenot caught,orhe cando it stupidly.Thebestthingisthatleadsshouldnotcometoyou.

AttimesIlight-heartedlysayifIndiaisn’tdoinganythinginBalochistanthenIwillloseprofessionalrespectforRAW.Thesituationistailor-madeforsomething.

Sinha:YousaidlikeKashmir?

Dulat:Yes,Kashmir.IfirstheardthisfromaPakistanidiplomat,anAfghanexpertandagemofaman,RustomShahMohmand,whenatoneoftheTrack-IImeetingshesurprisedeveryonebysayingPakistanshouldfirstsetitsownhouseinorderinBalochistan before blaming India for Kashmir. General Saheb has said the samethinginhismoresubtlemanner.WhentheBalochboysgooutandtalkabouttheirtreatment and disappearance, it’s serious, and it’s like if a Kashmiri goes to aconferenceabroadandsays,there’vebeen7,000disappearancesorwhatever.Thenumbermaybeexaggeratedbutyoucannotsayitisnottrue.

GeneralSahebisreasonable insayingthattheAmericansandothersaredoingmore. Inthecontextof theIndia-Pakistanrelationship, thefirst thing is toblameIndia. It’s said, you guys aremeddling inBalochistan. I’mhearing it for the pastfive-sixyears.

Durrani:JundallahisaSunnigroupthatwastargetingShiasinBalochistan.Itwas

supportedbytheUStocarryoutsabotageandsubversionintheIranianprovinceofSiestan.Icreditsomeonewhoisworsethanthedevilbecausehe’smessedupthiscountry,Zardari.Under hiswatch,whether itwas his Shia affiliation or anotherreason,PakistanandIranmountedajointoperation.AbdolmalekRigiwashandedoverandexecuted8andeversince,thingshavequietened.

Dulat:WhatistheAmericanmotivation?

Durrani:One,Iran.Two,ifBalochistanremainsunsettledtheycanrationalisetheirmilitarypresenceintheregionabitbetter.

If there is turmoil the US can more effectively play or spoil the NewGreatGame. It’s all about the resources inCentralAsiaandAfghanistan.Afghanistan’sunderground resources are supposedly worth a trillion dollars. Balochistan mustalsofigureinthatrespect.

America, China and Russia are all involved in the region. Another reason toremaininterestedistoseeifyoucancutyourrivalsdown.Iranwasconsideredanadversary and America’s objection to the Iran-Pakistan pipeline still continues.There are bigger opposing voices to the pipeline; some talk money, others talkabouttheShiafactor,butthiswasallforstakinganinterestandsometimesoutofmischief.

Americans are not known to operate surreptitiously and covertly. They bribeandarmpeople,whetheritwasAfghanistanevenaftertheSovietswerekickedout,orBalochistan,orlatelytheMiddleEast.Itisbynomeansabenignpower.

Sinha:AnIndia-PakistanagreementdidnothappeninSharmel-Sheikh9becauseofBalochistan.Doesitnotmaketheroadtopeaceabitlonger?

Dulat:PoorManmohanSingh.AmountainwasmadeoutofamolehillwiththatSharmel-Sheikhstatement.Allhesaidwas,okay,ifyousaythereissuch-and-suchthing, we’ll look into it.His point was that we don’t do these things, but sinceyou’resayingit,we’lllookintoit.That’sfair,insteadofsayingno-no-no-no-no.

Aprimeminister isnotsupposedtoknowaboutevery littledetail,every littleoperation, or every little happening anywhere in the world. I don’t thinkManmohanSinghsaidanythingwrong.

Durrani:Theother,moresubvertingfactorinplayisthemediaandthesepoliticalwise-acres. They create an environment that won’t allow you to do somethinghonestlyorinnocently.

Dulat:True.

Durrani:Bothofusagreethata jointanti-terrorismmechanismisagoodidea. Itcanstillbedone.Balochistan,yes,thisisallhesaid.So?What’stheharminsaying

you’lllookintoit?

Dulat:Unfortunately, itwasDrManmohanSinghwho said it andnotVajpayee.Some say Vajpayee would never say something like that. Probably Vajpayee’sadvantagewas thathewouldneverbe asked something like that.Noonewouldwanttoembarrasshim.

InDrManmohanSingh’scase,becauseofhisweakpositionthesematterscameupfromtimetotime.Despitehisgoodintentions,itmadehimlookweaker.Themedia played it up: ‘Aaah! We’ve conceded this, we’ve said that! We’veacknowledgedthis!’

What can a prime minister say? What can a president say? What can anypoliticiantryingtobuildbridgesandhaveaconversationpossiblysay?

23

TalksandTerror

A.S.Dulat:EverynowandthenwhenwearenotonthebesttermswithPakistan,wesay,‘terrorandtalksdon’tgotogether’.There’salogicinthat,butitcan’tbethatweshouldnevertalktoPakistan.Pakistanhasaproblemwithterror.They’vealsousedterroragainstus,sothenwhytalkatall?

Onceyoustartadialogueandontheslightestpretextsayterrorandtalkscan’tgotogether,theneitheryounevermeanttotalkoryou’relackingbrains.Whydidyoustartadialogue?WhydidyouvisitLahore?Whydidyoustartabackchannel?WhywasDrManmohanSinghwastingsomuchtime?

WhenNewDelhisaysterrorandtalkscan’tgotogether,itimpactsthepublic.WhenVajpayeetookthebustoLahorethemoodinDelhiwasupbeat.Today,talktoanyoneinDelhiaboutPakistanandhethinksyou’rehalf-crackedifyousuggestdialogue.Hesays,whatcanwegive?Anditcomesbacktothesamething:CanwecompromiseonKashmir?

Who’s compromising?Why do you use theword ‘compromise’ whenwe aretalkingofcooperation?We’renotgivinganythingawayandPakistanwon’tgiveusanything. It’s a question of what we have and how far we can cooperate. AsNarasimhaRaosaid,thesky’sthelimit,onceyoustartcooperating.

AsadDurrani:This statement, terror and talks don’t go together, remindsmeofother statements that on the face of it seem all right. ‘Terror and talks don’t gotogether.’ ‘Wehave no optionbut to talk.’ ‘Wars do not resolve anything.’ ‘Youdon’ttalktoterrorists.’Thesestatementsaremadesooftenthattheyhavebecomearticlesoffaithforquiteafewofus.

Dulat:Vajpayeenevermadesuchstatements.

Durrani:Thesestatementsarenotsensible.

Youdon’ttalktoterrorists?Youactuallytalkallthetimetoterrorists.Fortheagencyofanysensiblecountry, thesearethemost importantpeopletotalkto. Ifyoudonothaveachannelto,let’ssay,theTaliban,thenyou’remakingamistake.

There’snooptionbuttotalk?Sometimesonegetsintotroublewhenotherssay,you’vesurvivedforsolongwithouttalking,sowhysaythere’snooption?

Warsdonotresolveanything?Somanyquestionshavebeenresolvedbywars.Certain issues are not resolved because the principal need forwar is to create a

favourablesituation.

Sotalkingandterrorismdonotgotogether?Infact,theygosomuchtogether.

Dulat:Particularlyinourbusiness,GeneralSahebisright.Ifyou’renottalkingtothebadguys,thenwhoareyoutalkingtoandwastingyourtime?Youdon’tneedto talk to sadhu-mahatmas. If you’re dealing with bad guys effectively, you’regettingsomewhere.

Durrani:It’slikeearlychildhoodwhereifyoudon’tknowanythingyou’retoldtokeepquiet.Butifyoudon’tknowanythingyouneedtolearn;andyoucanonlydothatbyaskingquestions,whichmeanstalkingtoeveryone.

Dulat:That’swhyI said in theotherbookthatdoubleagentsare thebest. Iwasoftentold,don’ttalktoso-and-so,heworksfortheISI.Isaid:That’stheguyI’mlookingfor!IfIcan’tgettotheISIthenletmegettosomebodywhodoes.Doubleagentsareagreathelp.

Sinha: But what about from the other side: why not stop terrorism and starttalking?

Dulat: This is something theKashmiri has saidmany times. If Pakistanwants tostopterrorism,itcandosoatanytime.

Durrani:Stopwhat?

Dulat:MilitancyinKashmir.ThetapcanbeturnedoffwheneverPakistanwants.Inthatthereissufficienttruth.ThecontrolshavealwaysbeenwithPakistanoritsmilitary,etc.Kashmiriboyscannotcomeandgowithimpunityifyoudon’twantthemto.

Durrani: Regardingmilitancy, I’m sure the State can influence events, though Iusually would advise against it. If it does not engage with theHaqqanis’ or theKashmiris’resistance,othersfromwithinthecountrywould,andthebordersallowthese groups to be beyond one’s control. It’s an illusion that the State iseverywhere;wearenotaterriblyefficientState.Ourapparatusdoesnotreacheventhoseagainstus,leaveasideothers.

Butwedon’twanttoloseleverage;thisiswhathappenedinKashmirin’94orso. The charge of state-sponsored terrorism caused confusion. Someone had thebrilliantideatopullout,whichmeantnohandleorleverage.Thatwouldcreateanunwantedsituation.

Leverage bymeans like funding Salahuddin’s son is a way in whichwe keepcontrolandcanpreventcatastrophes.

Dulat: For us terrorism beginswith Punjab in the early 1980s. Then it shifts toKashmir.Therewasonceanapprehensionthatifthesetwoconnecteditwouldbe

amuchbiggerproblem.

WecameacrosscasesofinteractionbetweenSikhandKashmirimilitantsinthelate ’80s. I spoke to someSikhboys fromtheSikhStudentsFederationwhohadbeeninjailwithKashmiris.Somebecameinformers.Iaskedwhythingsdidn’tgofurtherwith theKashmiris. Their answer: theKashmiris didn’t have ‘guts’. Thatwaspositivefromourpointofview.

WhenKashmir’s turmoil started Iwasposted inSrinagar.Kashmiriboysweregoingandcoming,andweaskedlocalswhatwashappening.Theysaidcrossingtheborderwasnormal,nobigdeal.Itstartedwithahandfulofguys,fiveJKLFboys.Onethingledtoanother.

Unfortunately,inDecember1989,MuftiSaheb’sdaughter’skidnappingbecamea watershed in Kashmir. It gave the boys confidence, that they could get theGovernmentofIndiatogiveintotheirdemands.Kashmirisstartedbelievingtheymightgetazadi.Theyturnedtheirwatchesbackhalfanhour.

General Saheb conceded that even Pakistan was surprised at how quickly ithappened, and at its scale. Pakistan got more involved, leading to the HizbulMujahideen’srise.

Militancyhasn’t ended inKashmir.TerrorismhasbecomeapartofKashmir’slandscape.Themomentthingsgetbetter,somethinggoeswrong.Inalotofcases,wearetoblame.

After the JKLFor theHizbulMujahideen, terrorismbegan travelling southofthePirPanjaltoJammu.Thatcausedconcern.

Then came other tanzeems: Jaish-e-Mohammed, Lashkar-e-Toiba and othernames that changedoccasionally.Therewerealsobad incidents, like the siegeofHazratbal,theattackonthestateassembly,theattackonthetourismcentre,etc.

Over time the character of terrorism has changed.At first itwas open, theseboys were known, they had parades in downtown Srinagar. That’s why RobinRaphael1 insistedKashmiriswerefreedomfighters,notterrorists.Let’snotforget,theAmericansgotexcitedaftertheAlFarankidnappingsinwhichfiveforeignersdisappeared.Onewasbeheaded,oneescapedfromcustody,threedisappeared.

Terrorism now ran so deep underground that you couldn’t tell who was aterrorist.Since2015we’vebeenwitnessing40-50localboys,notlargeinnumber,comingoverground.Theseboystakeprideinit.Thereturnofthefreedomfighter.

LikeBurhanWani,theseguysareonFacebook.WhathappensinKashmirisadailyoccurrence,butwhatexcitesusmoreisanattackonanarmycantonmentorbase, or the threat that itwill travel to Punjab, as it has in the incidents atUri,PathankotandGurdaspur.

WeblamePakistanand thenask forhelp,but as there isnounderstandingorcooperation or even communication, we live with it. Our side has variousperceptionsondealingwithit.

Pakistan or Kashmir, there is no better way than engagement. We havehardliners and theoristswho say if youwant to negotiate, youmust talk from aposition of strength. Which means we will never talk, because where is thatpositionof strength?When things are all rightyoudon’twant to talk, andwhenthey’rebadyoudon’twanttotalk.

Sinha: Thosewho attackedMumbai were by no stretch of imagination freedomfighters.

Dulat:No,thefreedomfighterslastedtilltheearly1990s.Thisisaboutcreatingathreatandkeepingupalevelofviolence.You’reright,Mumbai2008isattributedtoPakistanandtheLashkar.

Sinha:Thereisalsothecategoryofboysaffectedbythe2002Gujaratriots.IndianMujahideen was born after that. They reportedly get some sustenance ormotivationfromacross.

Dulat:WhatMuslimswent through inGujaratwasboundtohave repercussions.Whether the IndianMujahideenwasbornoutof theGujarat riots,oroutof theBabriMasjiddemolitionandwhatfollowedinMumbaiisamatterofspeculation.Yes, some boys did go across to Pakistan. Every now and then we hear of thetrainingorinspirationtheyreceiveinKarachi’sBinorimosque.Anatmospherewascreated.

ThelatestisthisISIS2business.It’saffectedthewholeworld,Europemorethanelsewhere.WeinIndiaraketheISISupeverynowandthen.ButinacountryasbigasIndiaif60-70boyshavebeentoIraqorSyria,it’sadropintheocean.It’snobigdeal.

Despite all the violence andnoise,Kashmiris havenot been attracted to ISIS.Black flagsmight come out alongwith green flags, out of frustration, anger andalienation;butitdoesnotshowcommitmenttoISIS.

TheIndianMuslimisacoolMuslim:he’srational,moderateandnotinterestedin getting involved in nonsense. They would rather stay out of this mess. Yetradicalismisgrowing,perhapsasaresultofourmuscularpolicy.Jamaatcertainlyisgrowing.

Durrani:TheUSA’sgreatsuccessisitsabilitytocontrolthenarrative.Ourregionhas produced more terrorists because we call them terrorists. Iraq-Syria is nowover. Sikhs, Kashmiris, TTP,3 the Afghan Taliban, the Baloch dissidents, thesectarian militants: there are ethnic dissidents and political dissidents, but all of

themarelumpedtogetheras‘terrorists’.

The only definition of terrorist is now themilitant. The otherworse damage,though,istheterrorismthattheStatecommits.TheStatetargetsnon-combatantsmore than non-state actors do. If I don’t like you, I call you a terrorist and dowhateverIlikewithyou.Ican,becauseyouareaterrorist.

As Sikh militants are distinguished from Kashmiris, we found a similardistinctiononourwesternfront.TheAfghanTalibantoldustokeepthe‘PunjabiTaliban’ away from them. The ‘Punjabi Taliban’ have no idea how to wage anasymmetricwar. Its fighters rise in themorning, offer prayers, and then requesttheirnexttarget.TheAfghanTalibanarefinefighters.They’velasted35years,notby attackingpeople every daybut by staggering their operations anddiversifyingtheirmodusoperandi.

Kashmiris also lasted after an initial setback inwhich theyweremore action-oriented.Atsomestage,theyconcludedthatmilitancyalonewouldnotattaintheirgoal. Even if their support basewas large, struggle for independence is always along-drawnaffair.

Regarding the Sikh militancy, Indians were naturally grateful for the helpprovided by Benazir Bhutto’s first government. (I was quite surprised that theIndianstooksolongtomakeuseofit.)ButtherewasthelinkbetweentheSikhsand Kashmiris: by helping India, how adversely are you affecting the Kashmirisfightingfortheirfreedom,theirrights,andtheirgrievancesagainsttheIndianstate?

The other parallel with the western front is that Musharraf rounded upsympathiserstotheAfghanresistance,ortheTaliban,sendinghundredsofthemtoGuantanamoBaywithoutanydueprocessoflaw.He4admittedthisinhisbook—thathehandedoverhundredsofsuchpeople.ThenMusharrafsentthearmyintothetribalareas.TheresultistheTehrik-i-TalibanPakistan,of40differentgroups:some because we sided with the US against their fellow tribesmen, some for avarietyofotherreasons.ThelabelthatPakistangetsisof‘terrorism’butitisinfactduetoourinadequatepolicies,ourFaustiandealingswiththeUS,andindeedourrelationshipwithIndia.

Toprovethepointaboutforeignsupport,theequipmentthattheTTPusesisn’tavailable in the market: sophisticated weapons, electronic equipment,communications,etc.Sohowisthatasanexampleofterrorism?

OnAl Faran, I looked at it frommany angles though I didn’t have concreteinformation.Ihadneverheardofthisgroup,itcamefromsomeother…

Sinha:Harkat-ulMujahideen.

Durrani:Yes,absolutely.NooneknewAlFaran,andlaternooneevertalkedabout

it.ItwasprobablyafalseflagoperationbyIndianintelligence.

It resulted in anger directed towards Pakistan, and the Kashmiris. No longerwere they freedom fighters. They were terrorists because they kidnapped anAmerican,anEnglishman,aGermanandaNorwegian.

Wefindoneofthemescapes.Fantastic.Butheispickedupbyhelicopter—inanarea covered by forests and snow. The rest were never recovered. Years later, ahusband-and-wifeteamfoundoutandproducedabook.5Theymoreorlesscameup with what we thought. Though they found something, it remains a minoraccount in the big picture. But it led to calling the Kashmiris terrorists, notinsurgents.

It’s a problem becausewhen everyone is a terrorist, you treat themwith thesamehammer.Onesizefitsall.

So talking from a position of strength turned out to be a fallacy. But it is anarticleoffaith,especiallywiththemilitaries.Butwhathappensifinoureffortstoweaken the ‘terrorists’, they become stronger, like the Afghan Taliban? Whathappens if they become weaker? The insurgents would wait till they regainedstrengthinfivetotenyears.

Buttheworstpartofthisclichéiswhentheothersideisdownandyouareinaposition of strength you are more likely to refuse negotiations. Like with theAfghanTalibanin2002,Rumsfeldsaidtheydon’texistanymore,they’rehistorynow.Goclimbapole.Theresultisthat15yearslater,peoplepleadfortalksandtheyaskwhy:‘Whyshouldwetalk?WeareinapositiontotakeAfghanistan,theAmericansarenotgoingtobehereforever.’Theyareprobablywrong.Theycan’tconquerAfghanistan, andwhile theAmericansmay not be there forever, for allpracticalpurposesthey’llbearoundfortheforeseeablefuture.

That’s ‘terror’: it’s away to fight awar, and it’s apolitical instrument for theState.

Dulat: ImetAdrianLevyacoupleoftimesforadiscussion.ThefirsthalfofTheMeadow is correct. The doubts are about the second half, based mainly on theaccountofaseniorJ&Kpoliceofficerwhoisnotthemostreliableofsources.

Durrani:Who?Hisnameisgiven?

Sinha:Yes,hebecomesthebook’shero.

Dulat:Anyway,justthatlittlepoint.

IforgottheNaxalprobleminIndia.Thankfully,that’soneareawherewecan’tblamePakistan.

Sinha:MrDulat, a former PM,RajivGandhi,was assassinated by terroristswho

hadnothingtodowithPakistan,theLTTE.

Dulat:Ofcourse.Also,hewasalmostkilledonavisittoSriLanka,duringaguardofhonourwhenaSriLankansoldierreversedhisrifleandhithim.Hewashitbutfortunatelyhewassaved.

Sinha:ForIndia,ISIisthebogey.

Dulat:That’swhytheISIhastobethebestorganisation,becauseeverythingthathappensinIndiaisdonebytheISI.

Sinha:Inthe1990sIrememberIBguystalkingaboutanISIplantoencircleIndia.TheK2Kashmir-Khalistanplan.

Dulat: There was K2, there was encirclement, there was a thousand cuts.Colleagues have talked about it. They have also talked about the break-up ofPakistan, which I’ve always argued won’t happen for many reasons. It’s not abananarepublic,plusnooneintheworldisinterested.

Sinha:Let’saskGeneralSahebabout theseplotsagainst India,K2,encirclement.Aapbataye,ontherecord.

Durrani: As for the so-called Operation Topac, it never existed, even K.Subrahmanyam admitted asmuchwhenwemet in Islamabad in 1998. (He hadcome for a round of the Neemrana Dialogue. I met him over dinner at G.Parthasarathy’s,whowasdulyimpressedwithmysupportforthenucleartests.)

MahmudDurrani6oncetoldmetomeetBharatBhushan,a journalist.WhenIwent for thePugwashConference inDelhi,BharatBhushankidnappedme for acoupleofhoursandtookmetoaclubwhereIhadthebestgin-and-tonicandfishtikkas.

HetoldmehehadmetHamidGul,whowasfondofhimandhadgivenhimamessage.AfterKargil,Hamidsaid,Indiawastoobigforourcomfortsowehadnochoicebuttobreakitupintobits.

But ifbreakingupPakistan isdifficult, thenbreakingupIndia isbeyondus. IfIndiansthemselvesdecidetobreakIndiaupthennoonecanstopthem.ISIcan’treachNaxalitesorthepeopleinthesouth.Itcanbeblamed;afewofficerscanfeelflattered.

I sometimes ask, you blame us for everything but not when Murli ManoharJoshi7insistedonhistriptoKashmirtohoisttheflag.

Dulat:Thatwas1992.

Durrani:SomeonesaidtheISImadetheflagpolesothatthemomentheraisedtheflag,itfell.

Sinha:ModiwasonthattriptoLalChowk.HeorganisedtheEktaYatra.

Durrani:Oh!Isee.IwasheadingtheISIatthetime.

Sinha:Sonotonlydidyounotbreak the flagpole, youcouldnot identify India’sfuturePM.

Dulat:Bigfailure.

Durrani:Probablythatwasnotourfinesthour,butnooneblamedus.Probablywebroke the flagpole and spared Joshi because he had no chance of becoming theprimeminister.

Dulat:TheflagpolehasahistoryofproblemsinKashmir.OnIndependenceDay,2017,somethingsimilarhappenedwithMehboobawhenshewastakingthesalute.Sheorderedaninquiry.

Sinha:WastheISI’shandfound?

Dulat:Whoknows,Ihaven’tseentheinquiryreport.ItmightwellhavebeentheISI.

24

SurgicalStrike

AdityaSinha:Canyouexplainthesurgicalstrike,whetheritachieveditsaims,anditseffectonIndia-Pakistanrelations?

AsadDurrani:Thestartingpoint,asIsawitinAugust-September2016,wouldbetheindigenousuprisinginKashmir.Itcouldn’tbeblamedonPakistan,but itwasdifficult to control bymeasures chosen byModi and his team. Theremay havebeen other options that Modi’s team found unpalatable. So Pakistan had to beinvolved.Whichitinevitablywas,whenthespillovercameintheformoftheUriattack.

WhetherUriwasgenuineorafalseflagoperationisnotthepoint.ItprovidedIndiaanopportunitytogiveanappropriateresponse. If itwasaclassical ‘surgicalstrike’ or not, as long as it conveyed the right message—especially at home—itservedthepurpose.

Yourmedia played the right tune: finally a befitting response. They’ve savedface; they’vesalvagedadifficult situation.Kashmir induecoursewillcooldown.PakistanwiselyletIndiagetawaywiththeface-saving,declaredthesituationtakencareof.

A new status quo came into being—indeed till the next time.Will see whathappensnext!

Inmilitary terms,a surgical strikewouldnormallybe something likedroppingspecialservices200kmbehindenemylinestocarryoutaspectacularattackagainsta sensitive target: a nuclear installation; a GHQ; or Osama bin Laden. ShellingacrosstheLoCandaraidacoupleofhundredmetresinsideenemyterritorytokilla few goatswouldnot exactlymeet the criteria.But then thebiggerpurpose—apoliticalone—couldbefulfilled.That’swhyforsomeit’sagenuinesurgicalstrike,forothersapoliticalsurgicalstrike,andforyetothersafakesurgicalstrike.Inallcasesitservesastrategicpurpose.

Sinha:Soit’sadressed-uphotpursuitbeingpassedoffasapoliticalsurgicalstrike?

Durrani:Yes,it’smodifiedhotpursuit.Onecanlegitimatelyundertakehotpursuittohit aplace fromwherehostilityoriginates.Youdon’tknowwhere it is in thiscase, Lahore or somewhere else, but that’s not the point; a message has to bedeliveredtotheIndianpublic.

IwasinHeratinOctober2016,wheresomeonewashappytoseePakistaninabad light. No friend of ours. He surprised me by saying, before we discussAfghanistanmay I askwhatyou thinkof this so-called surgical strike? I thought,when suspicionshavegone that far,wherenoone is convinced that it’s genuine,thennottoobadforus.

A.S.Dulat: About this September 9 surgical strike, not being a military man, Idon’tunderstandwhat‘surgicalstrike’means.I’mfamiliarwiththeborderbecauseI’vebeenpostedinKashmirandvisitedmanytimes.

InthebackgroundofMumbai,GeneralSahebandIweretalkingoneday1andhesaid,therecouldbeatimeandsituationwhenyouwouldbecompelledtodosomething. Ifwe have a proper relationship or understanding thenwe could tellyouwhattodo.

Thatwouldbemyideaofasurgicalstrike:okay,nowit’snecessaryforyoutodosomething,socometosomewherenearMuzaffarabadandwhatever.You’llsay,it’sdone; and we’ll say, yeah, yeah, great, or we could protest but it would bemeaningless.

IwasnotinDelhiwhenthisstrikehappened,andoneoftheseTVguyscalled.OnTVtheDGMOsaid,we’veconductedasurgicalstrike,it’sover,andwedon’tintend anything more. In the meantime, the Pakistani reaction began, of totalindifference,asifnothinghadhappened.

I thought tomyself, and I said on TV that this is the perfect surgical strike.Becauseweapparentlyneeded todo something, andwe’vedone it.TheDGMOsaysso,andPakistansaysfine.That’sthereaction.

That’snothowitendedbecause,asGeneralSahebsays,politicalmileagehadtobedrawn.Sothemediawentonandon.WelearntfromtheCongressandformerNSAShivShankarMenonthatthishadhappenedmanytimesbefore.

The point is these sort of things happen on the border. Five years ago, twoIndian soldierswerebeheaded2 on the border, and Imet the primeminister,DrManmohanSingh,whowasperturbedbywhathappened.Isaid,Sir,thesethingshappenon theborder.Hesaid,but it’sbeing shownonTV.Hisconcernwas,asprimeminister,aboutwhatwouldhappen.

Durrani: It’s an interesting connection, Mr Dulat, with a likelihood that weconsideredbackwhenwewroteajointpaper.ItwasthatincaseofanepisodeliketheParliamentattackof2001,orMumbai2008, itcouldn’tbeforeverthatIndiawouldnotrespond.India’sreactionwouldbe:isPakistangoingtogetawaywithit?Whydowehaveabigarmy?TheIndianArmywouldthinkabouthowtorespondandcometothisconclusion:attackPakistan.

That’sriskyforanumberofreasons,sotheywouldhavetothinkofsomethingelse. That’s where the Cold Start doctrine becomes relevant again. It’s goodthinking because you choose your response. On our side there are self-servingargumentsthatitcan’thappenunderthe‘nuclearoverhang’.3But itcan.Nuclearoverhangwon’tpreventtwo-threedays’exchangeoffire.Kargilhappenedafterthenucleartests.

But Cold Start would lead us to respond with a technique of our own; forinstance,atacticalnuclearback-up,whichconceptuallyandtechnicallymakelittlesenseexceptforonthebattlefield,becauseitisunpredictable.IntheIndia-Pakistancontext,eventacticalnuclearweaponsmayhavestrategicconsequences.AmritsarandLahorearenottacticaltargets,they’reseparatedbyonly50km.There’splentyofIndiaandPakistanleft.

No. The two countries, if they are sensible, will ask their back channel: MrDulat, you knowAsadDurrani on the other side, let’s discuss how to handle it.Both would say, yes, because of India’s compulsion there are three-four placeswhereyoucanbomb,justmakesurethere’snottoomuchdamage.

The termIuse is ‘choreographedresponse’.Or,choreographedsurgical strike.Weunderstand,India,youhavetodosomething.

Ourpoliticalcompulsionisthatwemustalsorespond.Soforyourtenbombswe’llthrowone,don’tmind.Withoutdoingmuchdamageontheground,wecanget out of that sticky situation. You give a befitting reply to Pakistan, and werespond by saying, we don’t take things lying down. (PS: In the meantime, theWesttoohascaughtupwiththisrecipe.EmptybasesarebeinghitinSyriatolettheUSanditsalliesclaim‘punishmentinflicted’.)

Now that’swhat happened. I’m grateful thatmy friend today has thought ofthatconnection.Didithappenthatway?IdonotknowandI’mnotsupposedto.AndifIknew,Iwouldn’ttalk.

That’s theadvantageofachoreographedresponse. I agree that it’sModi,BJP,andotherswhohangtoughwhoareinthebestpositiontomakepeace.WithMianSaheb, theywere in a goodposition forpeace, theyhada goodpartner, and theright environment. But it didn’t happen.Modi and his team won’t do it. Theirtoughposturewillcontinue.

Sinha:IncaseofanotherPathankot,howwoulditbemanaged,orwhatwouldtheconsequencesbe?

Dulat:ThingslikePathankotorGurdaspurorUriorAkhnoorhavehappenedmanytimes. There’ll be lots of noise and if you ask for a prediction, we’ll carry outanothersurgicalstrike.

Themediacausesalotofproblemsbecauseeverythinggetsexaggerated.

Durrani:Mediaistheenemyofpeace.Ifthere’speace,mediapeoplewilllosetheirjobs,channelswillclosedown.Manywhogoyap-yap-yapandshouttheirheadsoffwillnotgetasecondlook.

Dulat: Ifyou’vebeentoKashmir,particularlytotheborder,manythingshappenthatdon’tgetmentionedanddon’tneedtobeknown.Manyinnocentciviliansarekilled or maimed or are in wheelchairs. People on both sides of the border aresufferingbecauseofourcallousness.Thesethingswillcontinuetohappen.

Like General Saheb said about the Americans in Afghanistan, saying out ofboredom,okay,boys,let’sgooutandshootsome.Onourborderalso,thefiringisoftenunprovoked.Bothclaimtheothersidehasdoneitsomanytimes.

Durrani:We’veseenamobilisationaftertheParliamentattack,andafterthemoreseriousMumbaiattackwesawthattheIndiansprobablydecidedasimilarreactionwas counterproductive. The next major event took place with the Modigovernmentinplace,whichhaspainteditselfintoacorner.

Idon’tknowwhytherewasn’tanyviolentkineticactionafterPathankot.Maybethe lessonsof2002,maybethenewgovernment,maybeNawazSharif,ormaybethere was an understanding. But after Uri, a surgical strike was announced andapplauded,whichiswhyIsaypaintedinacorner.Thenextepisodewouldbringpressure, thatwasn’t the surgical strike supposed toprevent anymore incidents?Nowwhat?

Either you’ll pull your punches or you declare you’re under compulsion forsomethingmore.Thisspiralofaction-reactioncanbecontainedinmanywaysbutsometimesthedynamictakesitoutofyourhands.Sohe’sright,wecannotpredict.

ButIhavenodoubtthatthedynamicoftherelationshipandaction-reactioncanbe contained depending on who’s in charge. Situations build, tempers build.Vajpayeecouldcontainit.

Dulat:GeneralSaheb’srightthatthisgovernmentwouldfinditmoredifficultthanVajpayeeorDrManmohanSinghtorestrainitself,becauseit’samorehawkishormusculargovernment.Andamoreno-nonsensesort.

I’mnotworriedaboutaGurdaspuroraPathankotoranAkhnoor,butifanotherMumbai were to happen, God forbid, then what would happen? Or anotherParliamentattack.TheGovernmentofIndiawouldfindrestraintdifficult.I’msuretheywouldhaveallthisinmind.

Whenever it has happened, theAmericans and others immediately arrive andoffer support. There are other ways of settling this and during Vajpayee’s timetherewascoercivediplomacy.Butwhenyou’vepaintedyourselfinacertainimage,

peoplearoundyouexpectinstantretaliation.

Let’sfocusonrestrictingittotheskirmishesorthelittleattacksthathappenonarmycampsoronapolicevan,etc.Thatcarrieson.

Durrani:I’mnotbeingalarmist,butlookatthemanyactors,non-stateactorsandstate actors who are interested in creating turmoil, who are not interested instability.

Dulat: That’s true. Talking at think tanks, etc., whenwe say we’ve been at thereceivingendofterrorism,we’vebornethebruntofit, it’safact.Butlookatthepoor Kashmiri. You asked why the summer of 2017 was quieter than the yearbefore.Sometimes those state andnon-state actors, asGeneralSaheb referred tothem,alsorealisethatthepoorKashmirineedssomerespite.

25

ThePoliticsofWar

AdityaSinha:ThelasttimethestatusquowasthreatenedwasOperationParakramin2002,andMrDulatwasingovernment.

A.S. Dulat: Good example, because what did Parakram achieve in the end? Inhindsight,itwasprobablyVajpayee’sonlyoptionbecauseyoucan’tfightawar,thegeneralsarenotreadytofight.Whatareyougoingtofight,whatwillitachieve?Somovetroopstotheborder.Andwecalleditcoercivediplomacy.

Sinha:HowdidPakistanseethatmobilisation?

AsadDurrani:Comingsoonafter9/11,andGodknowswhatwasactuallybehindtheattackontheIndianParliament,itwreakedsomuchtrouble.

If anyone believed that post 9/11 we were overjoyed at being yet again ‘thefrontlineally’ofthesolesurvivingsuperpower—nolongerthesolethereafter,andstruggling to survive as a superpower—one shouldgetone’sheadexamined.ThewarnextdoorinAfghanistan,andwewerethespringboard,wasspillingovertheDurandLine.Also,Indiamadethatfamousoffer,Pakistanispartoftheproblem,we’d be a better ally in Afghanistan, etc. Now after that, who would think ofaccentuatingproblemsontheeasternfront?Ifalapsehappened,ithasneverbeenresolvedinpeople’sminds.

Regarding the mobilisation, one understood that the Americans had alreadyprovidedacontextforpunitiveaction.After9/11theyattackedAfghanistan,andafter the Parliament attack India found the pretext to follow that line. InvadingPakistanwasprobablynotonVajpayee’smind,buttheminimumpoliticalnecessitywastobeseentobedoingsomethingserious.

HowdoesIndiarespond?Thathasbeenaproblemfrom2001,andwearestilllooking for a satisfactoryway of handling Bombay, Parliament, Pathankot,Uri. IwasinSaudiArabiaatthetimebutIagreedwiththeassessmentbackhomethattherewouldbenowar.

War can become an unintended consequence when things acquire their owndynamic.Liketroopmovementcanacquireadynamicofitsown.Logically,troopmovementwasthecompulsionbutwarwouldbebychoice;andthatchoicewasnot likely to be exercised. Nuclear overhang and US presence would providePakistanacushion.Callitconventional-unconventionalstrategicparadox.

After themobilisation takes place and you fall back; then you find it has notproduced much, if anything. At the Pugwash-sponsored India-Pakistan rounds,ManiDixit, AirCommodore Jasjit Singh of the IDSA and others supportedmyconclusion—presented as a paper, ‘The Law of Diminishing Threats’ that theCommodorelaterpublished—thattheneteffectseemedtobethatbothcountries’threat cards—Pakistan’s nuclear and India’s conventional—have been played outperhapsforthelasttime.

For Pakistan, there was a positive development. Our military had beenemployed for long periods on non-military duties, and because of yourmobilisation,foreighttotenmonthstheentirearmywasnowinbattlelocation.Itcouldnowcatchuponthemuchneededrefreshertrainingforcombat.

Sinha:DidthemobilisationnotcausesomeanxietyinPakistan?

Durrani:Ifthereiseyeball-to-eyeballcontactbetweentwoopposingforces,nobodywaslikelytositbackandenjoythefun.Chancesofsomethinggoingwrongmusthavebeentroubling.Italkedtosomeintheassessmentbusiness.Ehsan(ulHaq),whowasheadingtheISIatthetime,said:no,warwasnotlikely.Thedeploymentwasacompulsionandhadtobedone.Ithadbenefits,ithadcosts.

Notmanypeoplewhomatteredbelieved thatwarwould takeplace.But youcancountonthemediatokeepthealarmbellsringing.

Dulat: Yes, I think we agree that war is not an option. It makes no sense.Wefoughtafewinthepastandtheyhaven’tachievedanythingoneitherside,otherthantheirlosingEastPakistan,whichwasnotbecauseofthe’71warbutbecauseofotherstupiditiesthathappenedearlier.

Yes,VajpayeewenttoLahoreandsaid,humjungnahonedenge.MianSahebmust have been on board with that. After that Musharraf said war was not arealisticoption.ManmohanSinghwouldbethelastmantothinkaboutwar.

Buttherecanalwaysbeamadmanwhogetsitintohisheadthatasurgicalstrikeissomethingroutine.Sothatevenifthereisnowar,somebodycansaywe’regoingtoteachPakistanalesson.Wheredoesthatbeginorend?It’sdifficulttoanticipatewhatmightorcouldhappen.

TheAmericans always get excited. In 2001 theyworriedwhatmight happenafter theParliamentattackbecauseVajpayee said: I triedmybest forpeacewithPakistan, and despite Kargil I invited somebodywho staged a coup and becamePresident,andnowthis.Hewasinadifficultsituation.

Operation Parakram achieved nothing. It was a waste of money and causedhardship to soldiers who had to serve in inhospitable locations that summer. InJaisalmer it gets to 47 degrees. And you’re sitting on the border doing what? I

supposeitwasVajpayee’sonlyoption.

WhichbringsmetothewishfulthinkingonoursidethatPakistanisnotaviablecountry. It’ll break up. It was around the time Musharraf took over, someresponsiblepeoplesaidwe’refondofPakistanbut it’sgoingtobreakup. I said, Idon’tseePakistanbreakinguporanysignofthat.Theworldwon’tallowPakistantobreakup.Americawouldnevercountenanceit.

Durrani:Thispointaboutthechancesofwar,whatitultimatelyboilsdowntoistheuncertainty,theescalationandunintendedconsequences.

Dulat:Unintendedconsequences.

Durrani:Onemightsay:two-threedaysisunderstandable,youhadyourfun,stopfiring,gohome.Delhi,Rawalpindi,Islamabad,Washington,Beijingwouldallsay,pausebefore somemadmangetshishandon theMADbutton.Because then allbetsareoff.

But then all our assessments and strategies must assume that we are rationalactors. Pakistanis are not suicidal. Any nuclear launch from our side would beamplyresponded. Indeed, theuncertainty thataparticular threshold—tangibleorintangible—maybecrossedservesastherealdeterrence.

Sinha:Somephilosophershavesaidthatwarisamorenaturalstateofman.

Durrani:Itatleastiseasiertostartwar—anybloodyfoolcandoit—thanmakingandkeepingpeacethatneededeveryonewhocouldthrowaspannerintheworksto come and remain on-board. Thenwe have thosewho benefit fromwar—andindeedwe’veheardof themilitary-industrialcomplex in theUSandwarmongerselsewhere.Theykeepnudgingusallthatsomeofouropponentsonlyunderstoodthelanguageofthegun.Ithinknationalismandnationalinterest—anupshotoftheconcept of nation state—have also contributed to more armed conflicts. Maybethat’sthereasonIqbalcallednationalismasthenewGod.

Dulat:Yes,nationalismcanbecomeaproblem.

Durrani:Iagree.Youcan’thaveyourcountry’sinterestatheartifyoudon’thaveyourregion’sinterestatheart.Likesaying:‘No,Icouldn’tcarelesswhathappensintherestofPakistan,butinFaislabadthisshouldbedone.’TosayPakistanfirst,ortosaywemustsealtheAfghanborderinournationalinterest,that’salittlestupid.

Butrightnowenoughnumbersofourcompatriotsbelieveinit,thattheyhavenothingtodowithneighbours,neighbourscanfighttheirownwars,andthatweshouldonlyworryaboutPakistan.Whenneighboursfightwars,though,itisaboutPakistan!

Dulat: At the Karachi ‘Aman ki Asha’ meet in 2011 that I attended, the most

interesting thingwas that both the French andGerman ambassadors to Pakistanspoke.FirsttheFrenchmantalkedabouttheeffectsofwarandhowEuropecametogether.TheGermanwasbrilliant.Withoutmincingwords,hesaidthataftertheSecondWorldWar,Germanyhadconsciouslydecidedthatwarwasnolongeranoption. It suffered somuch during the wars that it would not go to war again,period.

In 2009, a lot of ambassadors suddenly became Afghanistan experts. OneNATOgroupcamefromGermanytoDelhi,andatafunctionatClaridgesHotelspoke of nothing but peace and dialogue, etc. So I said, I thought you guysrepresentedNATO,what’shappenedtoNATO?

Theworldhasbeenchanging.TenyearsbackHenryKissingervisitedDelhiandsaid, ifIrandoesn’tfall intolineitwillbeblownoffthefaceoftheEarth.Iranisstillthere,asiseverybodyelse.

Durrani:NATOambassadorswillcomeandusuallytalkaboutpeace.NATOisawarorganisation.

Dulat:That’sit.

Durrani:It’sawaralliance,andiftherearenowarstheywouldbeworried.Afterthe Warsaw Pact dissolved, NATO was expected to follow suit, but it keptinventingnewmissionstorationaliseitsperpetuation.InitiallyitwastokeeppeaceamongtheEuropeans,butafteritsfailureduringtheBosniancrisis,aswellaswiththe ‘Partnership for Peace’ by some of the states of the former Soviet Union,NATOisnowbreathingeasybecauseitfoundemploymentintheunendingwarsinAfghanistanandelsewhere.

Dulat:Infact,KissingeralsosaidinDelhithatifNATOfailsinAfghanistan,thenthat’stheendofNATO.

Durrani:RecyclingNATOdoesn’t sound good.However,war does serve certaininterests,let’snotcloseoureyestothat.EveninPakistan,acertainsmallnumbermight disingenuously suggest the need for simmering conflicts—to keep the USengagedwith the region.Their rationalevaries—from financialdividends tokeepIndian‘hegemonistic’designsincheck.

TaketheTalibaninAfghanistan.Mostofthem,ofcourse,wantthewartoend,but somemaybelieve inmaking the best of a bad situation: getting 500milliondollarseveryyearfromNATO.

Without war, though, there are aims that cannot be achieved.Without war,Bangladeshwouldnothavebeencreated.WithouttheKuwaitwarAmericawouldnothavegainedafootholdintheregion.WithoutattackingAfghanistan,therightpoliticalresponseto9/11domesticallywasnotpossible.

Tocompletelyruleoutwariswrong.Butwherewarbecomestheinstrumentofpolicy, andnot just an extension of policy by othermeans asClausewitz said, itbecomestheactualpolicy.Fromwhichtherestmustfollow.

What doesAmerica sell,more than anything else?Weapons. Just a couple ofweeksagotherewasaseminarattendedbyaUSundersecretaryof state.Hewashereforthestrategicdialogue,thoughtherelationbetweenPakistanandAmericaisnotstrategic.Andhesays,Indiansarebuyingplentyofweaponsandthatmakesus happy. It’s a true statement, but he also indicated what determines yourrelations.

Dulat:WhyisPakistannotbuyingmore?

Durrani:Weseemtohaverunoutofmoney.

Dulat:They’llgiveyoumoney.

Durrani: Even if we want F-16s, they say no subsidies till you go after theHaqqanis.Whichwouldbeanothersuicidalact.

Dulat:Ofcourse,Bangladeshwouldnothavebeencreatedwithoutwar,butalothashappenedsince’71.

Durrani:Yes.

Dulat:Wartodayisamuchmoreseriousthing.

Sinha: What about the statement by (then) defence minister Manohar Parrikaraboutdoingawaywiththe‘nofirstuse’policy?

Durrani:Thankyouforsayingthat.Itwouldbenicetohearothervoicesbecauseprofessionals, incidentally, do not agree on it. Amongst us there is almostirreconcilabledebateastowhatitactuallymeans.

Dulat:Itmeansnothing.

Durrani: I agree, and am impressed that a civilian understands this better thanmanyinthemilitary.Declareddoctrinesarenotalwaystheactualones—incaseofnuclear, they’re seldom if ever. The reason is simple: ambivalence is the firstprincipleofnuclearwarfare.Take,forexample,theNFU(nofirstuse)andNNFU(nonofirstuse).IndiamustdeclareNFUtoconveyconfidenceinitsconventionalsuperiority.IfPakistaneversaidthat:notonlythatitwouldhavenocredibility—weacquiredittodeterourmorepowerfulneighbour—butwouldalsoconveythewrongmessagetoourpeople.

Remember,thenuclearassetsareprimarilypoliticalandpsychologicalweapons.

Dulat:(Parrikar’sstatement)wasonlyapoliticalstatement.

Durrani: When Zardari said Pakistan should also have a ‘no first use’ policy,

someone said, Zardari Saheb, you may know about commissions on nuclear orotherdeals,whatdoyouknowaboutnucleardoctrines?

Theirpoliticalmessagecancreateconfusion,commotion,anxiety.Parrikaragainthreatenedwhenyougotanewarmychief,thirdorthefourthGorkhain lineorsomething, that you’re talking again of Cold Start. This discussion can go onforever.Butessentially,theprofessionalsays,underthecircumstancesastatementwasrequired.IthelpsthecurrentIndia-Pakistantension.Butitwillpass.Becauseitdoesn’tmeanasmuchaspeoplebelieve.

Sinha:Sothestatusquoremains,andnobodyreallymeansanythingmuch.

Durrani:Ultimately, it’severycountry’sdomesticpolitics thatmatters.Americanreactionto9/11wasinvadingAfghanistan,whichcanonlybejustifiedbythefactthat FortressAmericawas pierced.Americanswanted blood, nothing less than aspectacularattackwouldhaveappeasedthem.PakistanofferedtotakeoutOsamabinLaden,giventime,sothattheUSwouldn’thavetocomeandattack.ButthatwouldnothavesatisfiedtheAmericans.

Sinha:GeneralSaheb,youwereinthe’65and’71wars.WhatwereyourthoughtsaboutIndiaduringthesewars?

Durrani: There is a misunderstanding about soldiers, that since they’re fightingeachothertheymustbetheworstrivals.

OnceanAmericandelegationcameoverforbriefingonourtrainingdoctrines.Aftermystintat theISI, IhadmovedtoheadtheTrainingBranch intheGHQ.Oneofthevisitorsaskedif‘hatingIndia’waspartofourtrainingsyllabi.Isaid,onthe contrary, our soldiers are drilled that when the time comes you fight, butremember the other man is doing the same duty for his country. That is ourtrainingdoctrine.Iwasangry,soIadded,unliketheAmericanarmywhereyouaretoldtokillthe‘enemiesoftheUnitedStatesofAmerica’,allothersaremotivatedtodefendtheircountry.

ThisisthespiritIfoundontheyoursideaswell.

Ourarmiesaretrainedthatyouhavetofight;ifyoumiss,theotherchapmaynot. But remember, once the hostilities cease, flag meetings take place, youexchangejokes,tea,coffee.

Dulat:I’mfromnorthernIndiaandwehavealotoffamilyandfriendsinthearmy.Asyoungstersthere’sexcitementaboutwarbutwhatyouquicklyfigureoutisthatnobodywantswar,it’sadirtybusiness.Itcanbeextremelytraumatic.

A cousinwas inChamb in ’65 and returned traumatised.He narrated how abulletwentthroughhisturban,whichheobviouslyimagined.Insomeareasitwashand-to-handfighting.Henarratedastorywhichgavehimsleeplessnightsabouta

young Pakistani second lieutenantwhowas killed. ‘When I putmy hands in hispocket,outcamealetterfromhisfianceeandIfeltsoterrible,’hesaid.Thisguycameandspentacoupleofweekswithusafterthewar,andheusedtojumpoutofbedatnight,ofnightmareshe’dseenfirst-hand.

Actually,Generals don’twantwar.That’swhy an Indo-PakdialoguebetweentheGenerals or armies is necessary. That’s why I keep saying intelligence chiefsshouldalsotalk,becausewhateverhappensatthediplomaticleveldoesn’ttakeusfar.

Durrani: That’s true. Even army education is in this direction. But ultimately, ifyou’regoodatyour jobyoutrytoaccomplishitwithouttheuseofforce.Warismore destructive nowadays than before. Previously, a few hundred or a fewthousandpeopledied,nowacitycanbedemolished.Winningwithoutfightinghasbeen the idealmilitary strategy sinceSunTzu’s time.Thesedaysagoodcountrywouldfollowthatadvicebymanyothermeans.

Dulat:ThatgoesforgoodGeneralsalso.

Durrani:That’swhytheypreach:besopreparedthattheothersidethinksmanytimes before they take you on. Plans are based on deterrence, avoidance ofwar,minimumuseofforce.TheFrenchbelieveinit,theGermanssaythatonbalance,militaries donotmakewar. It happens forpolitical orhistorical reasons, butnotbecauseamilitaryisraringforwar.

The American army is an exception. When they are offered a non-militarysolution it says we haven’t created this mighty machinery for nothing. In theirculture,what caused your cousin sleepless nightsmight actually amuse them, asthey’ve been doing in Iraq, taking pot-shots. In Afghanistan they say they’resufferingfromboredom,sohowabouttodaygoingoutandshootingdowncivilians,since the Taliban is too tough a cookie. That’s why the distinction between thetrainingofAmericansoldiersandsoldierselsewhere.

ButIndiaandPakistanaredifferent,theyhavemutualrespect.

Sinha:Whataboutthe’71war?

Dulat:’65wasthemoreseriouswar.

Durrani:The ’71war broke out somewhere else and I rushed tomyunit in thedesert.Thedesert campaigndidnot gowell. Froma soldier’spointof view, andonewhohadrecentlylearnttheartofwarasIwasinQuettadoingthestaffcourse,itwasatremendoussourceoflearning.Fromyourownmistakesyoulearn.

The desert was wheremy unit was.Wewent very close to Jaisalmer, it wasdesert, khula hai, then returned because the operation could not be logisticallysupported.

Dulat:When I was in the PMO I was regularly called to the National DefenceCollege to talk on Kashmir. During one talk, a senior officer said, why did thepoliticianspreventthearmyfromgoingtowarin2001?Wehadeveryprovocation.Isaid,whatmakesyouthinkthepoliticiansstoppedthearmy?HowdoyouknowitwasnottheGeneralswhodidn’twanttogotowar?

Thepublicdoesn’tgettohearofthesethings,sothere’sthissillyperceptionthatweallwanttogotowarandfight.Whereaswaristhecraziestoption.

Durrani: Even those two former Mossad chiefs in Berlin at that PugwashConferencerepeatedlysaid,goingtowaragainstIranwasthestupidestidea.

Dulat: My Mossad contemporary, Efraim Halevy, was a votary of dialogue andpeace.Two-three years back hewas inDelhi, andwe spoke the same jargon ondialogue.PeopleweresurprisedthataMossadchiefsaidthat.ButHalevy,whowaschiefforfiveyears,wasthatkindofguy.

VI

NEWGREATGAMEGiven the fact that India’sandPakistan’sneighbourhoodhashistoricallyandalsolatelybeenofgreatinteresttocountriespursuingglobalpower,thediscussionlooksatAfghanistan.DurranispeaksonwhathebelieveshappenedintheclimaxoftheUSA’ssearchforOsamabinLaden,andheandDulatdiscusswhyAfghanistan isunsortable at the moment. They also assess how Donald Trump will treat theregion,andexaminehowRussia,whichwasonceIndia’sbestfriend,isnowcosyinguptoPakistan.

Settingthescene

Bangkok,October29,2017:Wesit inthe13thfloor loungeofourhotel toholdour conversations where we try to shake off the general negativity thatcharacterised the previous day’s Track-II dialogue. Coffee and cookies and MrDulat’sunshakeableoptimismrescuetheprojectfromfutilityandsurrender.

26

TheDealforOsamabinLaden

A.S.Dulat: I creditedPakistanwithmanaging things in thepast, choreographingthings.WhicheverwayyoulookatOsamabinLaden’scapture,1itwashuge.IfeltPakistancooperatedinsomeway,butevenifitdidn’t,andsomebodycouldenteryour country and take outwhoever theywant, then Pakistanmanaged the thingwell.

AdityaSinha:That’swhatSeymourHershsays.

AsadDurrani: I got a call fromBBConMay2,2011. Iwas inAbuDhabi for ahigh-profileAfghanistan-relatedTrack-II.ThecallwasaboutaspecialprogrammeonOsamabinLadenwhohadbeenkilledthepreviousnight.Ididn’tknowmuch,butIwasinvitedontheshowbecauseforafewyearsIhadbeensayingOsamabinLadencouldnotbe in the tribal areasbut inabigcity.Since Iwasproven righttheyprobablyassumedIknewsomething.

Itwas justanassessment that forOsamabinLaden tohide in the tribalareaswas not feasible. Iwasn’t interested in knowingwhere hewas. They said itwasgoing tobea specialepisodeofHardTalkbecauseunlike theusualone-on-one itwouldhaveformerBritishmilitarychiefMichaelJacksonandmaybetheirformerforeign secretaryDavidMiliband. In away theywere conveying that IwouldbedefendingPakistan.

AtthestudiotherewasnoMiliband.AformerdeputyNSAfromtheUStookhis place. I said, I don’t know but I think Pakistan has cooperated. Withoutcooperation the operationwould have been risky. The riskwas so high that theotherconsideration,thatwewouldalertsomeone,wassacrificedinreturnforourcooperation.

Thenwhyareyounotowningit?Forpoliticalreasons,Isaiditwillnotgodownwell in Pakistan that we cooperated with the US to eliminate someone manyPakistanisconsideredahero.

There was no uproar over my version. Two years later, I probably repeatedmyself elsewhere but by this time another curse had caught upwith theworld,calledthesocialmedia.IwasonAlJazeerainOxford,anaudienceof400,andthemomentIgavemyassessmentthatPakistancooperated,400messageswentoutofthathall,mostdistortingwhatIsaid.Theysaid:GeneralDurrani,formerheadoftheISI,saysPakistanwasharbouringOsamabinLaden.Ididn’tsaythat.Isaidwe

probablyfoundoutatsomestageandcooperated,handedhimoverinawaythattheygotallthecredit.

Seymour Hersh, whom I hadmet a couple of times and was in touch with,calledme.Again Iwasoutof thecountryonaTrack-IImeeting.Hesaid, Ihaveevidence thatPakistanand theUScooperatedbutnooneherewillbuy it.Whatcan we do together? I said please send me whatever you write, I’ll send mycomments.Hedid.

TheUScontrolofthisnarrativeandmediawasmarvellous.Hershisafamous,respectedandaccomplishedinvestigativejournalist.He’swrittenbooksonVietnamand Abu Ghraib, for which he’s been duly acknowledged. But no one inWashingtonopenlyendorsedhisreportonOsama.

There are several other investigations of Osama bin Laden’s assassination, byHershandbyGarethPorter;onebya retiredPakistani,BrigadierShaukatQadir;and one by a retired Brigadier living inCanada.Allmake the same point aboutcooperation. For Pakistan, being blamed for incompetence was more acceptablethan complicity; how could it not know the US helicopters ingressing 150 kminsidethecountry?

Thelastpoint,importantforIndia,PakistanandallthosewhodealwiththeUS,wasthataftertheoperation,Americadidnothonouritscommitments.

Nothingunusual.It’salwaysbeenlikethis.Sometimeinthe1960swhenAyubKhanwas in power, Kennedy himself told him that if he helped the US createassets in Tibet and East Pakistan, directed at southern China, they would dosomething about Kashmir. This is documented by Bruce Riedel, who is by nostretchpro-Pakistan.

AfterAyubKhanreluctantlyagreed,Americadidnotfulfilitsobligation.Post-Afghanistan,post-Osama,therearesomanyinstancesofunfulfilledcommitments.It’s in their DNA. They admit it: when it comes to honouring commitments,parachutesarebetter.

The four-five months after the Osama raid was a particularly bad period inPakistan-USrelations.Wedidmanagesomesortofnormalcyin2012.It’snotover.TheircriticismintheregioncontinuesbecauseofthedifficultiesinAfghanistan.

Dulat:SowhatwasthedealonOsama?

Durrani: I donot know.Thiswasonlymyassessment.The then armychiefwasAshfaq Kayani.Hewasmy favourite student at theNDC. Professionally sound.Thoughretired,heiskeepingawayfrommelestIaskifhemadeadeal.

Idon’tthinkthereisanyreasonforhim,orforPashawhowasheadingtheISIatthat time, for keeping quiet.Get the secret out becausewe’ve been getting the

worstofbothworlds.Weareblamedforincompetence,forplayingadoublegame;andwhatdidwegetinreturn?ThatiswhatIwanttoknow.

ButonthatBBCprogrammetheyaskedmewhatthedealwas.Ididn’tknow,butIpresumeditmusthavebeenaboutexitingAfghanistan.

Money isn’t themain factor.Once youhaveOsamabinLaden, if there’s anysense at the helm, andAshfaqKayaniwas sensible, you settle for nothing otherthananagreed,reasonableexitstrategy.ValiNasr,2whowasonHolbrooke’steam,alsospokeofanexitplan.

If Kayani settled for some farms or a billion dollars then Imyselfwill start acampaignagainsthim,whoIoncelikedandfeelwasoneofourthinkingchiefs.

Dulat: A couple of days before Osama was lifted, Kayani met with somebody,wherewasit?

Durrani:Onaship.

Dulat:Or at an airbase. Therewas ameetingwhich I thought significant in thecontextofwhathappeneddayslater.WhydidKayanigotothemeeting?WhowastheUScommanderinAfghanistanthen?

Durrani:In2011?(David)Petraeus.

Dulat: It seemed like toomuchof a coincidence3 because twodays later,Osamawasbumpedoff.

Durrani:Iagree,it’sareasonabledeductionthatthesemeetingsconcernedtheraid.My criticism of the Pakistani side is that just a fewmonths earlier, another dealmadebyKayaniandPasha4wasnotkept.ACIAcontractor,RaymondDavis,shottwoPakistanis inLahore.5Oncehewas safelyoutofPakistan’s airspace, adroneattackonajirgainthetribalareastargetednon-combatants,tosendusamessage.

Panetta,theobnoxiousCIAdirectorandlaterthedefencesecretary,wasourill-wisherandonereasonIdidn’twantHillaryClintonelected.Aftertheattackhewasasked:thatwasatribal jirga,whydidyouhitit?Heheartlesslyresponded:itwasnotagleeparty.Hehadtogiveusamessage:howdarewekeeptheirguyinprisonforsixweeks.

Dulat:Whatwastheroleofthedoctorwho’slockedup?

Durrani:UnderthecoverofapolioprogrammehefoundwhereOsamabinLadenwas.

Dulat:Sohewasworking for theAmericans. It seems tome that theAmericansfoundOsamaviathedoctor,andtoldKayanithatnowweknow.Areyouwillingtocooperateorshouldwedoitonourown?

Durrani: Yes, they said play ball.Kayani says,wewill do it in thismanner, andwhatdowegetinreturn.TheyfoundoutnotonlybecauseofDrAfridi.IhavenodoubtthataretiredPakistaniofficerwhowasinintelligencewalkedinandtoldtheAmericans.Iwon’ttakehisnamebecauseIcan’tproveitandalsoIdon’twanttogivehimanypublicity.Howmuchof the50milliondollarshegot,whoknows.ButheismissingfromPakistan.Ishouldknow.

Dulat:Hemusthavegotsomefarms.

Durrani:Yes.

Dulat: Therewas a story of a CIAmole in the ISI. You’re saying he’s a retiredofficer.

Durrani:AtthetimehewasnotwithISI.Afterretirementhehadapettybusinessandstumbledonthis,orworkedonthisoperation.MychargeagainstthetwoisnotthattheyworkedfortheUStotrackdowntheworld’smostwantedman.Inourbusiness,theworstcrimeapersoncancommit—especiallythewalk-in,amilitaryman, an intelligence man—is to work for another country’s intelligence agency.Evenafriendlycountry.

Sinha:That’swhypoorDrAfridiisinjail.

Durrani: Pollock remained in US custody for years, and could not be releasedbecausehewasworkingforanothercountry’sintelligenceagency,eventhoughit’sthemostalliedally.Thesecondcrime(DrAfridi)committedisthatbecauseofhisfake programme, polio vaccination6 got a bad name and children were goingwithoutit.Somepolioworkerswereeventargeted.

Dulat:Polioprogrammewasafake?

Durrani:Itwasfake.Butonthatpretexthewentaround,knockedonmanydoorsandaskediftherewereanychildren.

Dulat:Andthat’showhefoundOsama.

Durrani:HefoundOsama.

27

SelfishSelf-interestsinAfghanistan

AdityaSinha:CouldAfghanistanbeaCBMbetweenIndiaandPakistan?

AsadDurrani:OnceuponatimeIdidbelievethatiftherewasanareawherebothcountriescouldmeaningfullycooperate,it’sAfghanistan.Whyisn’tittakingplace?It’s,amongstotherreasons,becauseofthemindset.

A.S.Dulat:AhmedRashidsaidifIndiaandPakistancansortoutAfghanistan,thenKashmirwouldbeacakewalk.

WhatintriguesmeisourpolicyinAfghanistan.WhenIwasinserviceitseemedthat we put most of our eggs in the Northern Alliance basket. The NorthernAlliance,Russia,Iran,theywerecooperatinginwhateverlittleweweredoing.Nowthere’snoNorthernAllianceleftandtheRussiansandIraniansarestillaround,butwedon’thaveaproperconnectwiththemeither.

Thecivilwar inAfghanistanwillcontinueendlesslyunlessthemainparty,theTaliban, is involved in talks. Talks are essential. Even theAmericans have comearoundtothatview.

WemissedoutbecausewhentheTalibanwasinpower,werefusedtorecognisethemandthenagainin2000or2002.WewillneverhavethecloutthatPakistanhas, because Pakistan is right there. If we had links with the Taliban and otherleadersinAfghanistan,itwouldhavehelped.

EventheAmericansagreethatPakistaniskeytothisdialogue.Itwon’thappenorprogresswithoutPakistan.Becausekeyplayersarewithyouandsoyouholdthekeycards.

WhyhavewebeensquabblinginAfghanistan?Whyarewenotcooperating?

I’mclearthathowevermuchwehavedoneorinvested,wearehandicappedandthat’s why it makes sense to work together. If the younger brother is themoreactive brother in the game, then why would I not concede that tomy youngerbrother?Let’smoveon.

Durrani:WearetimeandagainblamedforwantingtokeepourbackyardfreeofIndian influence. I know that Indians have influence, their cultural influence isgreat. To think we’re playing the game to keep the Indians out is not smart.Thoughenoughnumberofpeoplebelieveinit.

Themain issue is that theUS—regardlessof its aimsandobjectives thathave

been discussed elsewhere in the book—wants us to go after theTaliban and theHaqqani network who are fighting against—according to them—the ‘foreignoccupation’.Theproblemisthatevenifwecould—thatisiftheinsurgentswereonPakistaniterritory—itwouldbeabiggerdisasterthanwhenwefirstemployedthemilitary inour tribal areas in2004,which led to the formationofTTP.There issympathy amongst our tribesmenaswell as the generalpublic for those resistingtheAmericanoccupation.Andthenbygoingagainstthem,wewouldnotonlyturnsomemore of our own people against us but also these groupswho have neverharmedus.

Theydohold a grudge forwhenwe joined theUS-led coalition in 2001, butthey’repreparedtoforgetthatastheyunderstoodourcompulsion.Afteracoupleofyears,Pakistandidtrytohelpwithwhateverwaspossibledespitethepressure.Tolosethatcapitalwouldbesomethingfromwhichyoumaynotrecover.Wearestillsufferingfromtheblowbackof2004.

Ifthathappens,wewillharmourselvesmorethaneitherIndiaortheUSevercan.

TheBollywoodinfluenceinAfghanistanistremendous.SomespeaktomeinmylanguagebecauseofBollywood.WhenAzizKhanandIwere inHerat in2015,aten-year-oldgirloverheardusspeakinginUrdu,sosheturnedaroundanddidthis(palmsjoinedtogether).Isaid,kyunbhaikahansesikha.TVperdekhtehainna,shesaid.

You’re right, we have clout. Our geography is God-given. Pakistan is thestrategicdepththatAfghanshave,eventhosewhodon’tlikeus.

ThisiswhereAfghanscomeandfindwork.Karachihasbeentheworld’slargestPushtuncityformanyyearsandisnowthesecondlargest‘Afghan’citywithmaybe2.5 million Pushtuns. They come and go. Those who do Paki-bashing in themorning,byeveningareinPeshawarforthedentistorbusinessorfamily.Someofthemhavetoldusthattheyhaveacarwithafulltankandloadedboot,andtheydon’t use it except occasionally to start the engine to keep the battery alive. ‘Ifsomething happens, we’re making a beeline for Peshawar,’ they say. There arehospitals in thenorth that treatAfghans for free.Thosewhocanaffordcome toPeshawarbecausetheytrustthehospitalstheremore.

WhenAslamBaigsaidPakistanprovidesstrategicdepth,hemeantitmilitarily.Likeweused to talkof Iran as a relief zone, thatwewould in caseof an IndianattackshiftourairforcetoIran,astheIraqisdidinthe1991war.PeoplethoughthewantedtooccupyAfghanistan.Seewhathappenedtothemightiestarmiesthattried;Pakistanwouldbefoolishtoeventhinkaboutit.

Welight-heartedlysaywenowknowwhattodowithIndia.IftheIndianarmy

attacks,we’llgetoutof thewayand let themmarchthroughtoAfghanistan, forthatiswhereallbigarmiesgetburied.

TheclassicalstrategicdepthisthatwheneverAfghansareattackedbyaforeignarmy,theycometoPakistan.Theycontinuetostay,work,getabsorbed.Thishashappenedoveraperiodoftime;evenmyownclancamefromthere150yearsago,inadifferentcontext,wenttoKashmir,andsomeofthemtravelledasfarassouthIndia.

Itisn’ttruethatPakistan’sAfghanpolicyisIndia-centric.ThecomplexityoftheAfghan situation is such that Ikeep revisingmyknowledgeandassessmenteverysixmonths.

Dulat:WhyhasPresidentAshrafGhanisuddenlyturnedhostiletoPakistan?

Durrani:Hewasalwayshostile.Theproblemwithhim,animportedandimposedpresident surrounded by whiz-kids who areWestern-educated and ambitious, isthat they do not belong in Afghanistan and don’t have a firm footing or aconstituency. This government can’t sustain itself without American military,financialandpoliticalsupport.

TheTaliban,on theotherhand,havewithstood theworld’smightiestallianceforover16years.It’sanimportantfactorandanintra-Afghansettlementwillbeonitsterms.OnecantalktotheTaliban,ashasbeendoneintworoundsofDoha1andlastyearinMurree.2NowondertheAmericansandtheKabulregimescuttledthesecondMurreeround.

Dulat:Likeyousaid,AshrafGhanihadonhisowncrash-landedoftheGHQ.

Durrani:Thatwasanunhelpfulgimmick.Ithought,mygod,thismanhascreatedasituationforpoorRaheelSharif,3asimplesoldier,thatwillbedifficulttosustain.Some Pakistanis are so stupid they considered Ashraf Ghani brave because heknockedatthegatesoftheGHQ.

After all, others have ruledAfghanistan beforeAshrafGhani, and even thoseinstalled by the Soviets, be it Daud, Hafizullah Amin or the Tarakis, wheneverMoscowtoldthemtotightenthescrewsonPakistan,theywouldshowreluctance,and some of them lost their jobs; others, their heads.AshrafGhani has no suchinhibition.Hebad-mouthedusinAmritsar.

AshrafGhaniismoreharmfultoPakistanthanKarzai4everwas.AtleastKarzai,forwhomIhavesympathyandadmiration,hadhis feetonthegroundandknewhow to play these games. He even had the guts to tell the Americans what hethought of them even though he was president for 13 years, dependent on USmoneyandsecurity.LatelyheevenaccusedtheUSoflaunchingandsupportingIS.

Dulat:DowetakeitforgrantedthatAshrafGhaniisanAmericanman?

Durrani:Heis.

Dulat:That’showhegotelected?

Durrani: Yes, but worse, he belongs to Zalmay Khalilzad’s group.5 An Afghan,representingKhalilzad,dependentonUSmilitary,political,andfinancialsupport.He’sabigdisasterforusandforAfghanistantoo.

Dulat:IfheissoAmerican,whyshouldhebehostiletoPakistan?

Durrani:BecauseAmericaisnothappywithPakistan’spolicyinAfghanistan.EveryUSreportonAfghanistan talksaboutUSdeficiencies,but the last fewpageswillfocusonhowtheywouldhavesucceededbutforPakistananditscomplicitywiththeTaliban, itsdouble-game,etc.Theycontinuetodothatthoughwe’veofferedmanytimes,let’sworkoutastrategysothatyoucanleaveandblamePakistanforthemessyouwouldleavebehind,justsolongasyougetthehellout,becauseyourcontinued(military)presencemeans:warcontinues.

Dulat:TheymaynotbehappybuttheAmericanscandealdirectlywithyou.WhyuseAshrafGhani?

Durrani:AshrafGhaniwill probably continue to use them as the bad cop. ThisAfghanpresident,aftermeetingRaheelSharif,nextwenttotheUSandsaid,pleasedon’t leave in 2014. Just for that alone he put off the Taliban, whose solepreconditionfornegotiationandsettlementisafirmUScommitmenttowithdraw.Worse, he said he’d like to express his gratitude to the American military’ssacrificesinAfghanistan.

Even theanti-TalibanAfghanswereupset, and sowas I.TheAfghanshave inthe last ten years lost 300,000 people to US bombing, compared to the 2,000-3,000Americans‘sacrificed’.

AshrafGhaniisanembarrassmentforAfghanistan.It’sdifficulttoconsiderhimPakistan’sfriend.Sixmonthslaterhetolduswehaven’tplayedourrole:‘Imadeapoliticalsacrificecomingtoyou,PakistanisunpopularinAfghanistan,’hesaid.Sixmonths!TheAfghansinsixmonthsdon’tevenstartmoving.Theyhaveplentyofpatienceandtime.AnyonewhoknowstheTalibanalsoknowsthattheywillwaitsixmonthstoseehowseriousyouare.

For AshrafGhani to think that after one visit to Pakistan, he could turn theregiononitsheadis fatuousatbest.WehavenoreasontokeepAshrafGhani ingoodhumour.

Dulat:HowdoyouseeAfghanistanplayingout?

Sinha:AnyrealignmentswithTrump?

Durrani:Realignmentshavebeentakingplacethepastfive-sixyears.In2011,for

example, one could see a new axis emerging: Pakistan, Iran, Russia and China.Duringmyvisit toMoscow in2012, I could see these countries closing ranksoncoordinatingpolicyonAfghanistan.Both the Iranians andRussians are talking totheTaliban.TheChinesehaveessentiallysaid,youleadtheway,andifitledtotheregionalcountriescomingtogether,thenwecanprobablyplayarole.

Letmealsomentionherethat inmid-2016,IwasonAlJazeerawithMichaelFlynn before he briefly became Trump’s NSA, for a discussion on Afghanistan.When he said, Pakistan and theUSwere pursuing their ‘selfish self-interests’—adoublenegativemustbe theAmericanway toemphasiseapoint, like ‘youdon’tknownothing’—Ithoughtherewasanhonestmanonecoulddobusinesswith.Hewasknowntoberabidly‘anti-Muslim’,buttheRussianstoomusthavemissedhimwhenhewasfired.

Dulat: The obvious thing is the Indian side cosying up to Trump to countervailagainstthisGangofFour,whichcameintobeingevenduringObama’stimewhenwehadaspecialrelationshipwiththeUS.TheIndia-USrelationshipwillgetcosier.Whetherwe gain anything out of it, I don’t knowbecausewehave been losing,otherthanthenucleardeal.WestillhavethesamepolicyonAfghanistan.WearebecomingoverdependentontheUS.LikeAshrafGhani, Indiansarenothappy iftheAmericansleavebecauseweseemtothinkAmericaprovidesrelieforsupportforusthere.

ThemomenttheChineseannouncedtheywerepreparedtotalktotheTaliban,I’vewonderedwherewefigureinthis.Somanyyearsandopportunitiestobeginarelationshipwith theTalibanandwe’venotdone so.Wedon’t in thebelief thatwhatevertheAmericansdoisrightandeverybodyelseiswrong.

Sinha:SoIndiadoesnotfollowselfishself-interest?

Dulat:No,wearealsoconfusedaboutthisselfishself-interest.Itmakesnosense,notevenselfishsense.

Whowas that friend of ours, that tall fellow,whomyou sent toAbuGhraib(Guantanamo?)?MullahZaeef.AzizusedtosayZaeefisthirdclass,butwhereishenow,inKabul?

Durrani:ZaeefisinKabul.

Dulat:We had a long conversation at Pugwash in Berlin and even he said Indiadoesn’tseemtotakeinterest,doesn’tbother.NowtherewasthatthatBritwho’sbeendeclaredpersonanongrata,thebeardedfellow,‘LawrenceofArabia’?WithaPakistaniwife?

Durrani:Yes,yes,MichaelSemple.HeisanIrishman.

Dulat:Well-informedaboutthatarea.IaskedhimatthatBerlinmeetingifitwas

worth talking toZaeef.Andhe said,yes,Zaeef’s stationed inKabul to listenandreport.

Durrani: On India’s Afghanistan policy, Bhadrakumar, another man withconsiderableexperienceinregionalaffairs,isalsoworried.Indeed,itisanupshotofourbilateralrancour.IncaseAfghanistansettleddown,Pakistanofcoursewouldbeahugebeneficiary.WheneverIteasetheretiredIndiandiplomatsduringourTrack-II encounters that theywere still inKautilyanmode, the violent reaction clearlyindicates that one had touched a raw nerve—unki dum par paer aa gaya. UsingAfghanistantoneedlePakistanisabsolutelyinlinewith‘aneighbour’sneighbour’concept, first floatedbyChanakya.They losenoopportunity to tell theAfghansthattheirproblemswerewithnooneexceptwithPakistan:‘theywantyouastheirfifthprovince’.I’vebeendealingwithAfghanistanforthelast25years,directlyorindirectly, andnoone inhis rightmindever talkedabout the fifthprovince.Wehaveenoughproblemswiththeexistingfour.

Oneofyourformerforeignsecretariesisindeedthemasterofthecraft.HehasrepeatedlytoldtheAfghans:‘Youhaveruledoverusfor200years(orwasit400?),so we have no problemwith you; only these Pakistanis vainly believe that theywere the real inheritors of theMuslim ruleover India.’Regardless of the reality,thisapproachworksbetterwiththeAfghans.Wemayhavedonethemafavourormerely fulfilled a good neighbourly obligation by hosting millions of Afghanrefugees, but whenwe demand gratefulness from them, all our investment goesdownthedrain.I’mwaitingforanotherrefugeeinflux—Taliban,Daesh,orhunger-driven—tomakeupforourpreviousdeficitsashosts.

Dulat: Thinking Pakistan can be wished away from Afghanistan is like PakistanthinkingwehavenoroleinNepal.AfghanistanisascrucialtoPakistanasNepalisto us. If Pakistan were to meddle in Nepal, it would be a matter of concern. IservedinKathmanduforfouryears,andalwayslookedatNepalasacountryveryclosetous.Buteventhatrelationshipoflateisnotsogreat.

Durrani: When I was the ambassador at Riyadh and I visited Yemen, which Irememberoften after theSaudimisadventure, Iwaswell looked after in theTajhotelsinSanaa.TherewereallIndiansandtheysaid,ambassadorfromPakistanishere.

Sinha:Indiahasnopolicy-makingonAfghanistan?

Dulat:IthasbeentoodependentonAmericanpolicy.AslongastheAmericansarethere, we’re fine.We never believed the Americans would start withdrawing. IfTrumpweretosay,okay,out,thenIndiawouldgetashock.

Durrani:Indiahascreatedautonomousassets.Mediatosomeextent,journalismtoalargeextent.Heratculturally,sinceitisdistant.

Dulat:IndiahaseveryrighttotryandbuildinfluenceinAfghanistan,thewayyouarefreetotryandbuildinfluenceinNepalorSriLanka.

Durrani:Policy-wisetheymaybekeepingacoupleofcardsuptheirsleeve,butonthewhole,IndianpolicyinAfghanistanisneighbour’sneighbour…

Dulat:Enemy’senemyismyfriend?

Durrani:To return to theTrumpadministration, there’snochange in itsAfghanpolicy.None. PreviouslyObama spoke softly and the stickwas delivered by theminionshesentacross,theSecretaryofStateandtheGenerals,etc.,whocameandreadustheriotact.ThesamemessagecomesacrossloudlynowbecauseitcomesfromthePresident.

ThecoreoftheactualpolicyinAfghanistanremains:keepthebases.Thewaythey’re built, as underground fortresses or silos. They’ve spent billions on thesehugefortresses,andtheideaistohangontothembecausethey’llnevergetanotherchance in Afghanistan, a place that armies have historically crossed through.Geopolitics terms it ‘the heartland’. It provides the ability to influencedevelopments aroundAfghanistan, in Pakistan, in China, in Iran, and inCentralAsia,allimportantplaces.Thisistheworld’sbestnodalpoint.

ForAmericatherestdoesn’tmatter:Iran,Afghanistan,PanjsherValley,whetherthere’s peace in and aroundHelmand. So long as you are there and you have aclientinKabulandafriendinDelhi,it’llbeallright.Thatisthepolicy,andIdon’tseeanychange.

Sinha: Tillerson spoke of an enhanced role for India, and a century of Indo-USpartnership.

Durrani: Indiahasa role,and spacewasprovided,notby theUSbutbecauseofIndia’sclout,culture,financialassistance.America’sabilitytoprovideanenhancedroleisascamwehavesuffered.Yes.Itcan’tevenprovideanenhancedroletoitsfriendsinKabul.Theyremainconfinedintheirfortresses.IfanyoneexpectsIndiawillsendbootsonthegroundbecauseofTrump’sdesire,theIndiansaretoocleverto get militarily involved. It would start a downward trend in India-Afghanrelations.

Dulat:It’sinterestingandmakessensethattheAmericansplaycarrot-and-stick,I’msure General Saheb is right. I also see no change in American policy. The onlydifferenceisGeneralSaheblookingatthosedeep-dugbases,that’snopolicyatall.

IsensetheAmericanshavebeendesperatetotalktotheTalibanbutdon’tknowhowtogetthere.I’vebeentoLondontwice(inthesummerof2017)andIthinkthey’ll use the Brits much more in Afghanistan. The Brits are sharper, moreexperienced,indealingwiththesethings.Evenintheirowncountrytheydealwith

theseproblemsbetter than theAmericansdo.TheCIAandMI6have this thingwherewhatwecan’tdoyoupleasedoforus.

ThebossiswronginunderestimatingPakistan.TheAmericansknowyoucan’tmove inAfghanistanwithout Pakistan’s help. I don’t knowhow they’ve becomeIndia’sbuddieswhenthereisalong-standingUS-Pakistanrelationship.Inasense,thePakistanishavetheAmericansbytheballs.

ThesadpartismanyhavesaidthatIndia’sstrengthliesinitssoftpower.Whenwe try to be muscular or demonstrate our hard power, we are missing a trick.Somebody said themost important thing is your smart power. By not using oursmartpower,wegettheworstoutofPakistan.

Durrani: About bases being no policy, hope also isn’t a policy. Ultimately themessagemustbethatthingscanhappen.True,there’snopointinspreadingdoomandgloom.That’swhypeopleareeagertolistentoMrDulatwhenhespeaksonanything,onKashmir,onPakistanoronIndia,hisbookisallaboutthesethemes.

Butifyouaskmewhythisisthepolicy,formetherejustmightbearationale.TheUSistheonlyworldpowerwithatrulyglobalreach,notjustwithmoneybutalsomilitarily. It isacountry likenoother.China is inadifferentclassandplaysthingsdifferently.Indiaiscertainlyapowerandplaysthingsdifferently.

Americaalsoknowsinwhichregionsitcan’texercisetheinfluenceitwantsto.Europeans arewilling allies, someunwilling. Indiahas an allianceof conveniencewiththeUS.ButtheMiddleEastandCentralAsia,withPakistanandAfghanistanattheirjunction,areregionswhereAmericaninfluencehassomeseriouslimitations—acceptance,forexample.

Even in aNATO ally like Turkey, 95 per cent of Turks are historically anti-Americanpolicy,notanti-America.Fora long time ineverypoll,80-90percentPakistanisdidnotlikeAmericanpolicy,eventhoughtheywantedtogoandworkinAmerica.LiketheAfghanswhospewvenomagainstusbutwanttocomeandworkinPakistan.

Ever since America became the sole superpower, has it not preferredconfrontationoveranegotiatedsettlementintheseareas?

InAfghanistan,Talibanwanted to reconcilewithAmerica, and in2002madethe firstmove.Each effort by theTaliban to reachout and each effortmadebyPakistan to facilitate it was spurned. Rumsfeld refused. Obama wanted an exitpolicyandnegotiatedsettlement,buttheDeepStatesubvertedit.

The latest occasion where the effort was to reconcile Kabul and the TalibancameafterthefirstMurreemeeting.Then(AfghanintelligencechiefRahmatullah)Nabil revealed that Mullah Omar had died two years earlier but the news was

underwraps inthe interestof theTalibanunity.ThatwasaroundJuly30,2015,justbeforethesecondround,whichgotscuttled.

Then Mullah Akhtar Mansoor, the man who had sent Taliban delegates toDoha,onrecord,whosentthedelegatesforthefirstMurreeroundonJuly7,2015,whotookoverafterMullahOmar’sdeathwasannounced,andwasgettingreadytobringtheTalibantothetableagain.Instead,onMay21,2016,hewaseliminatedbyanAmericandrone.Negotiationsonceagainstalled.

It’s quite clear that the US will not allow a negotiated settlement in Kabul.Ashraf Ghani has no constituency and virtually no choice but to submit toWashington.Karzai,Sayyaf,Dostumandothersareconfidentoftheirposition,andtherefore they don’t mind a settlement. The US does, because it is only inconditionsofconflictthatitcanplayonecountryorafactionagainsttheother(s).

Turmoil also helps theUS in another crucial area. If there’s peace inCentralAsia,themineralscanbeexploitedbyChina,whichiscloseby,theRussianswhohave influence, and India has cultural influence, even India because of historicaland, in due course, reasons of proximity.America has none of this. In theNewGreatGame,Americaloses—ifthere’speace.

Dulat:Youhavebeenabeliever,andI’mafollowerinthis,thatwithouttalkingtothe Taliban there is no other way. But I don’t believe the American policy inAfghanistan is just to dig holes and stay there. If it is, and Indian policy inAfghanistanissodependentonAmericanpolicy,thenit’ssad.

I learned from you andRustam Shah,6 who’s a great believer inAfghanistan,thattheonlywayoutwasreconciliation.Whatotherwayisthere?Thiscivilwarwillcontinueendlesslyunlessthemainpartyisinvolved.TheTalibsarepreparedtotakeeveryoneonboardprovidedthegorasgetthehellout.

Durrani: No disagreement on that. It’s the core condition. You make acommitmenttoleave,we’llsortouttherest.

Dulat:MullahZaeeftoldme,weknowhowtodoit,we’llgettheTadjiks,Uzbeks,everybodyinit.

28

DonaldTrump,Nudger-in-chief

A.S.Dulat: I’ll tell you ofmy experience of theAmerican role in India-Pakistanrelations.Howmuchdotheynudgebothsides,howoften is itdone? If theytellyousomethingwouldyoudoit?

InthePMOthiswasaquestionIwasasked—even,intriguingly,byAmericans:Are you guys pressurised in anyway? I said, I’ve never felt that anybody in thePMOwasunderpressureorthattheAmericanswereputtingpressure.

My job was different, and pressure might have come on Brajesh Mishra, ifanybody, not me. But the nudging happened occasionally. Sahay and Ehsanacknowledgeit,sayingthatwhenthe2003ceasefiretookplaceandtheymet,therewasanAmericanhand.

I got a lot of messages asking why we didn’t talk to the Pakistanis. I said toBrajeshMishra:‘Whydon’twegiveitatry?Somanyaresuggestingit.’

Hesaid,‘Nahin,abhitimenahinhain,abhiruko.’

My only direct evidence was when Cofer Black, the director of the CIA’scounter-terrorismcentre,visitedDelhi.HehadcometomeetBrajeshMishra,whopassedhimalongtome.Asusual,theRAWgaveapresentation.Hesaid,‘Iwantfiveminutesalonewithyou.’

Wewent and had a cup of tea. ‘We’re putting pressure on the Pakistanis tobehave,sowehopeyouwon’tdoanythingsilly,’hesaid.

‘Nowedon’tdothosethings,’Isaid.‘OnlythePakisdothosethings.’

Thenit’sokay,hesaid.

IwasthinkingofitinthecontextofModiji’svisittoRaiwind.CoulditbethatinhishugwithBarack,Obamamayhavesaidwhydon’tyougohugMianSaheb?

Howmuchofthishappensaccordingtoyou?

AsadDurrani:Ithappensprobablyallthetime.

Dulat:Allthetime.Ah.That’swhatIwantedtohear.

Durrani: All the time. They are pressuring, requesting, suggesting. It goes onforever.Butthat’snottheimportantthing.

Dulat:Iknowyour‘buts’,Sir!Itmeansitdoesn’taffectusonebit.

Durrani: Essentially it is about the state of our country and our leader’s bent ofmind.Somecantakepressure,otherssuccumb.Butwheneveritaffectedourcoreinterests,ourcorepolicies,wealwaysresisted,andsucceeded.

An example of managing pressure was President Ghulam Ishaq Khan, whowouldnotevenconcedewhathadalreadybeendoneinthenuclearprogramme.Jobananatha,thathadalreadybeencompleted.Andhewouldstillsay:‘No,wewillnotevencapit,thereisnoquestionofgoingback.’Thisisthehardballthatoneplays.

Aditya Sinha: If Trump withdraws from the world, how does a strategicpartnershipworkforIndia?

Dulat:Evennowit’snotworkingtoanygreatadvantage.

Durrani:IgiveMrDulatcreditthathesaidTrumpislikelytowintheelection.Iwaswishy-washyaboutitthoughIwantedhimtowin,becausehewasoneofthosewhocouldshakeuptheestablishment.TheestablishmentsintheUS,PakistanandIndia are usually working for their own good rather than for the good of theirpublic.Shakingthemupmightnotbeabadidea.

Two, I considered Hillary Clinton a known disaster. Get rid of the knowndisasterandeveniftheotheroptionwastobeabiggerdisaster.Atleastthat’snotknownyet.

Itsoonbecamecertainhewouldalsobeaknownandestablisheddisaster.

Dulat:Thedaytheresultswereout,GeneralSahebcalledme.Itwasaninterestingconversation.FranklyIwasdisappointedwiththeresult.Buthesaid,‘Goodresult.Forbothofus.’Ireplied,yesabsolutely.Goodforyouhastobegoodforus.

My hunchwas because I was in Londonwhen the Brexit vote1 happened. ItsurprisedtheBritsandshookupLondon.WhatthecountrysideortheNorthvotedis another matter. If (David) Cameron could be defeated in a referendum thatwasn’tneeded,itmadesensethatTrumpcouldbeelected.

My question to General Saheb would be, how do you propose to deal withTrump?WhicheverwayheplaysittherewillbepressureonPakistan.Thetargetswill be terrorism in general and theHaqqani network, etc.,whatever specificallytheyhaveinmind.PossiblythatpressurewilldoPakistannoharmbecausewhenyoudeliveronorfocusonsomethingthattheywant,you’llalsogetsomethinginreturn.

Theremightbepressureonusaswell,logically.Pakistanisboundtosay,whatabout those guys? That’s how it usually happens. Will Trump appoint anotherHolbrook?Hashe got aGeneral inmind?WhenHolbrookwas appointed, Indiawasapartofhisbeat.Weprotestedandsaidno,howdowecomeintothis,thisis

AfPak.So Indiawas left out, butwhoknowswhatmighthappen this time.Theguy’snuts,nodoubtaboutthat.

Sinha:ButTrumpdoesn’toperateaccordingtooldtemplates.

Dulat: It’llbebothknownandunknown.Onoursidepeoplearegung-ho.PrimeMinisterModiinparticularthoughthisownbuddywasinplace,somebodymuchlikehim.

Trump appointed a businessman as Secretary of State, a pleasant fellowapparently.ThatmightbefinebecauseMrModimaynothaveaproblemdealingwithapleasantbusinessman.But there are also toughGenerals in the team, andthat’swherePakistanwillhaveanadvantage,ultimately.

TheseGeneralshaveworkedinAfghanistan,sothere’satheorythattheyknowwhatPakistanisupto,etc.ButwealsoknowthatforyearsPakistanhashadagoodrelationshipwiththePentagon.(SecretaryofDefenceJames)MattiswasCentcomchief,sohe’sknowntoPakistan.

SouthBlockforgetsthattraditionallythereisaspecialrelationshipbetweenthePentagonand thePakistanimilitary.That relationship is still there and still solid.When George Tenet visited Pakistan soon after Musharraf took over, whatevermessagehemighthavecarriedhealsowentbecausetherewasonceagainaGeneralincommand.

Durrani: If Trump doesn’t deliver on his disengagement from foreign militaryventures, or with doing things differently, it would increase chaos, disorder,confusionandinternalstrife intheUSandwiththeallies.Scepticallyseen,that’sallrightforusbecauseitmeansnomorebigbrotherlyattitude.

With the Generals it can play both ways. They know of our problems inAfghanistanandwhywecan’tdoopenlywhatisasked,whichovertimesomehaverecognised. Mattis served in Afghanistan, and I expect him to continue playingdoublegames:you’rehelpingus,you’renothelpingus. I’veunderstoodthewhysandthelimitsoftheirpressure,andthelimitofwhatwecando.

Idon’tthinkthistypeofrelationshipisforever,butIhopeASDisrightandtheAmericanGenerals have a sympathetic viewof Pakistan, not just because of ourpastrelationshipbutalsofromarealisticassessmentoftheAfPaksituation.Intheirsystem,however,goodcopsarealwaysfollowedbybadcops.

Yes,ultimatelytherewillbepressure.Butotherscanonlypressureyoutotheextent thatyouallow them. Ifyoudon’t,beyond soundand fury,whatcan theyactually do? A few bombs here and a few drones there. In 2011 and 2012 westoppedtheirgroundlineofcommunication,theAmericansreturnedtothetabletoworkoutanarrangement.

Dulat: Pakistan knowshow to build a relationshipwith theAmericans, it’s beendoingsoforlong,itknowstheAmericanweaknesses.

PakistanisalsoabletohandoversomeonelikeOsamabinLadenandthengetasmanydollarsastheywantinreturn.That,again,excitesIndia.Somethinglikethatwillhappen,anditwon’tbeone-sided.

Thisisourproblem.Everythinglookshunky-dorybutwe’renottoogoodwhenitcomestoarelationship.Nowwe’resupposedtohaveaspecialrelationship.Whathavewegainedoutofit?Inthebargainyou’vescrewedupyourrelationshipwiththeRussians,thereisnonewiththeChinese,andthere’snogreatrelationshipwithanyneighbour.

We’resupposedtohaveastrategicrelationshipwiththeUS.ProbablywhattheAmericanshaveinmindisthatIndiawillprovideacounterbalancetoChina.Thisalso iswishful thinking.Because (a)we’renot in aposition todo so, and (b)nogovernment inDelhiwouldoffend theChinesebeyondapoint.Theywon’tplayproxyforsomebodyelse.

Sinha:WhatifthereisamajorterroristattackonUSsoil,whatwouldTrumpdowithregardtoPakistan?

Durrani:IfitoriginatesinPakistanhisresponsewillbedrastic.Tocomeandbombafewplacescanevenbechoreographed;it’spossiblethatIndiaisaskedtotightenthescrewsonPakistan.Theycancutoffaidwhenevertheywant. Isupposetheyknow thatno country canbeheld completely responsible.After9/11 theSaudiswerenotattacked,thoughtherewaspoliticalpressureonthembehindthescenes.

An invasion or spectacular attack is usually against a weak and indefensiblecountry that can’t retaliate.WhatcanPakistando?Weneednot talk about that.ButseeingthepowerthatPakistanhaswithinthecountryandregion,IdoubtanAfghanistan-typeattackwilltakeplace.Afewbombshereandtherewe’dexpect.

A disengagement also lowers the possibility of a terrorist attack. Of the fewAmericans focussedon the subcontinent, a fewgooverboardon the subjectof apossible terrorist strike whose roots are traced to Pakistan. They talk of makingPakistananolongerfunctioningstate.Notonlyisthatidiotic,itmeansAfghanistanandIraqmaynotbeterriblyfunctioningbuttheyceasedtobeproperlyfunctioningstates. I believe Pakistan canweather a possible storm, but the point is to put aworldlyfearinourheart.

Dulat:IusedtooftensaytotheAmericans,enoughisenough,whydon’tyouputpressureon thePakis?Theywould reply,wedoputpressurebut there’sonlyXamountwecando.Beyondthat,we’rehelpless.

Durrani:True,andthereforeIbelievethereisabigfallacyinPakistan,thattheUS

cangetour issueswith India resolved.Becauseeven if theAmericanswere tobeseriousandsincere,ifDelhitellsthemtobuzzofftheywill.

Dulat:You’re rightbut I can’t imagine anyone inDelhi telling theAmericans tobuzzoff.

Durrani:Youdon’tsayitlikethat.

Dulat: Becausewehaven’t had the kind of relationshipwith theAmericans thatyouhad.Wethinkwehaveaspecialrelationship,soIdon’tthinkModijiwouldsaybuzzoff.

Durrani:Buzzoffisnotsaidinthatway,whatissaidis…

Dulat:Sir,hewillnotsaythattalksandterrordon’tgotogether.Thathewillsaytoyou.That’swhatI’mtryingtosay.

Durrani:HewillsaymanythingstoTrumpbutessentiallyitwillmean,dependingonhowhesaysit,thankyouverymuchforallyourconcern.

Dulat:IfyouthinkthatPrimeMinisterModithoughtBarackObamawasabuddy,henowthinksDonaldTrumpwillbeabiggerbuddy.Sohowwouldhe resistordenyhimanything?

Durrani:Bysaying,youareagreatfriend,thankyouverymuch,andnowthatyouhave told us we must work hard. Foreign secretary, begin work on what thePresident says and let me know what screws we can tighten on Pakistan. InMusharraf’s case, for example, the pressure put on him after 9/11 amounted to:you’dbetterbehaveandcooperate.Hewantedto,butheknewtherewouldbeflakbackhome.Sohemadeupa story.Whatcould Ido? Iwas threatened;Pakistanwastobebombed;theKashmircausewasindanger;ournuclearassetswouldhavebeentakenout;andoureconomywasinruins.That’swhyIacceptedit.

Ofcourse,hewasnotthreatenedinthatsense.

Dulat:Hewasreadtheriotactpublicly.Bushsaid,eitheryou’rewithusoragainstus.

Durrani: Yes, but it was also expected that along with cooperating, Musharrafwouldnegotiatesomeoftheirdemands.Acoupleaccepted,acoupledenied,andtherestnegotiated.That’showitshouldhavehappened.

Dulat: But as you mentioned, the first casualty was General Mehmud. TheAmericanssaidhe’sbadnews,offwithhishead!

Durrani:Bilkultheekhai,correct.

Sinha:WillTrumpdoadealwiththeTaliban?

Durrani:Hispeoplewill.Mattis is supposed tobe sensible andhasbeenputting

pressureonPakistanandtheTalibanforthepasttenyears.TheywilltryandfindawaywithoutsayingtheyhadsuccumbedtotheTaliban.

Dulat:TheAmericanshavebeentalkingtotheTaliban.

Durrani:Allthetime.

Dulat:IfTrumpthinkstalkingtotheTalibanhasbeentherightpolicythenbeingadoerhe’llsaylet’sgetdowntobusiness.Dothedeal.Whatisitthattheywant,andwhatisitthatwewant?

Sinha:Hecanselliteasilyasadeal-maker.

Dulat:Trumpseeshimselfasadeal-maker,soatthestartIwondered:wouldthedealsbemadethroughtheGenerals,orbyhisdaughterandson-in-law?Ifyouhaveason-in-lawasadvisor,it’sanadvantageandadisadvantage,soitdependsonhowitpansout.

Durrani: I’mnot awareof anyonewhodoesnotmakedeals.Even thePakistanismakedeals.

Dulat:EventheIsraelis.Everyonemakesdeals.

Durrani: Trump as a deal-maker may want a business-like deal, it isn’t aboutbusiness-like deals. It is about negotiating hard, public threats, conveying othermessages.

Dulat:ForAmerica,though,it’seasiertonudgePakistan,becausewhenrequiredtodeliver,youdeliver.

We’reabletoexplainthenudgingasasuccessofourdiplomacy,that,see,wegottheAmericanstointervene.Butthefactis,anudgeisanudge.

Durrani:Post-9/11wetriedtodeliverbutfoundnothingwasgoodenough.Theyalwaysdemandedmore,evenif itwasagainstournational interestorbeyondourcapability.

ButtheIndianswillnotevenmakeasymbolicgesture.NopressureonIndiawillcomefromtheUS.

Dulat: IfPakistanisbeingnudged,thenlogicallyIndiawillbenudged.Pakistanisboundtosay:Whattheheck,whydon’tyoutelltheIndians?Lookatwhatthey’reuptoinKashmir.Whyareyoublamingus?Ifthereisincreaseinturmoil,itistheIndianswhoareincontrol,andtheyrefusetotalktoanyone.Theythinktheyareabreedapart,becauseoftheirrelationshipwithyou.

Sinha:WhatwouldbetheAmericans’interestorroleinKashmir?

Durrani: They show an interest in every possible place, but their ability tocontributeanythinginKashmirislimited.One,theycan’tdoanything.Theyhave

often failed to arm-twist Pakistan. They can’tmake India dowhat India doesn’twant. Two,God forbidwe ever got intowar and accepted theUS asmediator.TheywillfavourIndia.

Dulat:Whatever interest theAmericans had in Kashmir, and therewas a lot ofAmerican coming and going in the 1990s, it all stopped after 9/11. That was agame-changer,somethingasseriousasPearlHarbour.ItshooktheAmericansup.Eventhejargononterrorismchanged.Freedomfightersbecameterrorists.TheUSambassador inNewDelhimade itapoint to saynobody fromtheembassyvisitsSrinagaranylonger.Thesameambassadorandoneofhispredecessorsearliermadeit a point to lunch with Shabir Shah on a houseboat, got him sacked from theHurriyat.

My only differencewithGeneral Saheb here iswhat I heard fromKashmiris:that theAmericans have the capacity to arm-twist Pakistan. But thatmay be anincorrect perception. I would generally agree that both India and Pakistan arebeyondarm-twisting.

Durrani: Inanycase,wemustremindourselves thatwhenwe inviteoutsiders tomediateourdisputes,thesettlementwouldbeintheirfavourandontheirterms.Remember the fableof themonkeywhowas invited tobroker apieceof cheesebetweentwoquarrellingcats,andateallofit.

Dulat: Iagree, theAmericansarehappyto seekhatpatcontinuingbetween IndiaandPakistan.SothemostpositivewayofseeingitisthatthereismuchgoingforIndia-Pakistan to think together in the right direction. And I like what GeneralSahebsaid,thatitwouldbeonourterms.

Durrani:OneshouldnotforgetHenryKissinger’sfamous,most-quotedstatement:beingenemieswiththeUSisdangerous,beingfriendsisfatal.It’sbeenprovenincases likeMusharraf, Saddam,Mubarak,Shahof Iran, and itwill continue.EvenwithEuropeans,attimes.

29

Pakistan’sPal,Putin

AdityaSinha:CanRussiaplayaroletohelpPakistanandIndiamoveforward?

A.S.Dulat:Russianscan,buttheywon’t,whateveroneknowsofthemandofthegreatPutin.Hewouldbehappywatchingthetamasha.

WeusedtohaveagreatrelationshipwithRussia.I’dliketobelievethatthere’sstillarelationshipbutIdon’tknow.TherehavebeenRussianambassadorswho’veservedforeverinDelhi.Onediedrecently,(AlexanderMikhailovich)Kadakin,andmostwhostayedlonghadaKGBbackground.Kadakinhad.Beforehim,Trubnikovhad.LikePutinhas.

ThingsbegantochangeinYeltsin’stime.TheColdWarwarriors,astheywerecalled, felt theywere losing their importance.TheseoldKGBguyswereused tolivinginstyle,indachas,etc.,withluxuriesandprivileges.InMoscow,alaneinthemiddle of the road is reserved for these elitists.Only thosewith better cars candrivethere.

TheoldSovietUnionwentoutofitswaytosupportIndia,likeinthe’71war.TherelationshipwasbestunderIndiraGandhi.ItmayhaveslippedabitwithRajivGandhibutevenduringVajpayee’stimeitwasgood.

WhenIvisitedMoscow,Trubnikovwastheintelligencechiefandhesaid,howwouldyoureacttoaRussia-India-Chinaaxisonintelligence?Isaidthatit’sagreatidea;betweenusthere’snoproblem,buthowwouldtheChinesereact?Trubnikovlaughed and said: you leave the Chinese to us, just think of how the Pakistaniswouldreact.Welaughedandleftitatthat.

WhenIwenttoChina, Imentionedit.TheChinese intheirtypicalstylesaid:‘Verygoodidea.Wemustexamineit.’Asifithadtobesenttotheuniversityforresearch.

The Russians always made much of our relationship. Trubnikov was in theIzvestia inDelhi, thenyears laterhereturnedasambassador; inbetween,hewasthe intelligencechief inMoscow.WhenPutin tookover fromYeltsin,Trubnikovwas kicked upstairs and made minister of state in the foreign office. He visitedDelhiandIwasintheRAW.Isaid,chief,you’vebecomesupremechief,howdoesitfeel?Hesaiditdidn’tfeelgood,itwasn’ttherealthing.

TrubnikovvisitedDelhiasintelligencechiefandwaskeentomeetVajpayee.I

toldhim,Vajpayeedoesn’tmeetintelligencechiefs.Hesaid,haveyouforgottenItookyoutomeetPutin?YouhavetotellVajpayeeyouknewmeandinterviewedmewhenIwaswithIzvestia.VajpayeewaskindenoughandmetTrubnikov,whowasdelighted.

WhathasgonewrongisthatwehavemadesomuchofourrelationswiththeAmericansafterthenucleardealthattheRussiansfeelasifwe’veforgottenthem.WithPutininpower,somesaythemostpowerfulmanintheworld,he’snotgoingtobebullshitting.All right, if you thinkyouhavea special relationshipwith theAmericans,we’llmakefriendswithyourfriends.

Sinha:Whatwasmeetingthemostpowerfulmanlike?IsPutintheonlyspooktoheadgovernment?

AsadDurrani:Andropov.1SeniorBush.2

Dulat: Putinwas primeminister.Quiet, correct anddidn’t saymuch.Trubnikovwas interpreting, so out of 30minutes, you’re only talking for about ten-twelveminutes.Whataspecialrelationshipwehave,howmuchwevaluefriendshipwithIndia,thatkindofstuff.

WhatstruckmeinMoscowishowimportantpoweris.Trubnikov,despitebeingintheKGB,hadbecomeclosetoYeltsin.OnedayinDelhiweweretohavelunchathishotel,theTaj.FromthemorningIgotmessagesthatTrubnikovhadanupsetstomach.At1:30Iwastoldhisstomachwasbetter.WhenIgottotheTajIaskedifhewasallright.I’mfine,hesaid,todayisYeltsin’sbirthdayandIhadtospeaktohimbeforeIspoketoyou.

That’s the thingwith theRussians: they’ve always looked towhere power is.Thecontrols are important. In fact,Trubnikov askedmeapeculiarquestion:Doyoucontrolthesaleofarmaments?Isaidno.Well,wedo,youshouldtoo,buyingandsellingarmamentsshouldbeunderyourcontrol.

That’showpowerfultheseguysare.Somewhatbetter,moreeffectivethantheCIA.

Sinha: How did you slip in, General Saheb, considering you bruised them inAfghanistan?

Dulat: There are no permanent friends or enemies in this business, Putin andPakistanrealised.

Durrani:ASDisafascinatingstorytellerinthetraditionofQisaKhwaniBazaarinPeshawarorAlafLailainBaghdad.Incidentally,IalsometTrubnikovataPugwashConferenceinAstanathatASDwasunfortunatelyunabletoattend.Muchtothediscomfort of the Kabul regime’s representatives, Trubnikov supported thePakistaninarrativeintheIndia-Pakistan-Afghanistansession.

WeinPakistanknewaboutthechemistrybetweentheSovietsandtheIndiansfrom various accounts, including our Leftists (surkhas) like Ibrahim Jalees, whooffered to buy Raj Kapoor a round of drinks in Moscow. Raj Kapoor declined,sayinghehadplentyofmoney in thatcountrybecausehis filmswerepopular inRussia. Incidentally, his films were also popular in pre-revolution Iran, and inAfghanistan theyactasa forcemultiplieragainstus. I also recallwatchinga filmwithPrithvirajKapooronarivercruiseupnorthandcrossingpathwithaRussianship.Thefilmwasfamousforitsleadsong.

WehadaproblematicrelationshipwiththeSovietUnionbecause,tooffsettheadvantageofourbiggerneighbour,wejoinedtheWesternbloc.Afterthe’65war,when the Soviet Union playedmediator at Tashkent, our relations were on themend; but then we played bridge between the US and China in 1971, and ofcoursetheyopposedusinthe’71war.

TheSoviet invasionofAfghanistan in1979pitchedus against eachother likeneverbefore,andaftertheSovietswithdrewacrosstheOxusandthentheirempireunravelled, therewas naturally rancour against Pakistan, even thoughwe helpedtheirtroopswithdraw.

Butnothingisforever.Moscowhasrecovered.IthasmadeupwithChinaandrevivedtheoldShanghaiFive3toprovideequilibriumagainstthesolesuperpower.After9/11,withapowerfulWesternalliancesittingintheheartofAsia,itfoundmore allies in the region. Other developments in the Middle East made RussiareachouttoPakistan,andtheISIrespondedpositively.WithIndiaseenasclosertotheUS,itcouldnotblockcloserRussia-Pakistanrelations.

Therelationshiphasevolvedoverthepastdecade,andIhavebeenabeneficiary.During twovisits formega-non-proliferationconferences inMoscow in2012and2017,IgavemyviewsontheNewGreatGame.Rightduringthefirstvisit,Icouldsensethatourbilateralrelationswereonthemend.

Dulat: One other thing that’s important to the Russians has been the Congresspartyrelationship.TheCongresswas inpowerforso long in India that there isanatural friendship.Now, theCongress has becomemore of a centrist party.ThebilateralrelationshipisamessagetotheCongresspartyonwhereitisheaded,whatitstandsfor.

No matter how big Modiji is, the Russians would feel uncomfortable. WhatGeneral Sahebwas saying coincides with our US nuclear deal. The communistsdidn’t support that deal, and Sonia Gandhi had strong reservations for a whilebecauseshedidn’twanttoantagonisethem.

All this has impacted our relationship.How India fits into Putin’s thinking isdifficulttosay,exceptit’snotthatcosyarelationship.That’sobvious.

Durrani:Wheninvitedtoconferences,therewereonlyfourplaceswhereIwasabletotakemywifealong.ToDelhiin2004becausewedidn’twanttomissthechanceof seeing the TajMahal. Then theDead Sea in Jordan,where she firstmet theDulats. In December 2016 we went to Uzbekistan, on the invitation of theambassador,whereevenmywifegotaladytranslator.Presumablythatwasforourhistorical,ideological,intellectualandlatelyourgeopoliticallinks.

TwicemywifewenttoRussiaontheinsistenceofmyhosts.Onbothoccasionsmy talks at the civil and military universities found a surprisingly enthusiasticaudience.Itgavemetherareopportunitytoimpressmywife.

Incidentally,onnooccasioninRussiadidanyoneshowinterestinIndia-Pakistanacrimony.UnliketheAmericanswhotakepleasureinpittingcountriesagainstoneanother,theRussiansseemedpainedthatwewentforeachother’sjugular.

Sinha: You passed on an article by a Russian academic/expert about theCPEC,whichhasemergedforIndiaasamatterofconcern.ThearticleitselfwaspositiveandsawPakistanasthefulcrumofvariousrelationships.

Durrani:Iwaspleasantlysurprisedin2015whenIreceivedthesetwoarticles.OnewasbyAndrewKorybkoattheRussianInstituteforStrategicStudies.HistakeonPakistan is positive, no doubt about that. The otherwas by PolinaTikhonova, aLondon-basedwriterwhotookusbysurprisebysayingthere’sanewsuperpoweraxis emerging, of China, Russia and Pakistan. She also mentioned Iran in duecourse.

OverthelastfewyearsIfeltthatthesefourcountriesweretryingtocreateanunderstandingamongstthemselves.Thearticlestookamoreoptimisticviewthananyofuswould.Andno,they’renothiredbytheISI,whichisn’tinapositiontohiresuchpeople.

Sinha:GeneralSaheb,tellusaboutyourmostrecentRussiavisit(justbeforeourfinalsession).

Durrani: The Russians were keen to talk to me. They invited me for a nuclearconference in2012,butbefore thatwemet inDubai and itwasmade clear thenuclearconferencewasacover,fortheywantedtodiscusspost-SovietAfghanistan.ThistimewhenIwasinvitedIaskedtoseeStPetersburgaswell,andtheyarrangedatalkatPetersburgStateUniversitywhichPutinattended.TheuniversityisalmamatertothemajorityofNobelPrize-winningRussians.

Igavea talk, came toMoscow,attendedanuclearconferencebut spentmoretimetalkingtotheAfghanhandsatthemilitaryuniversity.ForeignMinisterSergeyLavrovwasthere. ImightalsopointoutthatwhilePakistanhadthethird largestdelegationat thenuclearmega-conferencesafter theRussiansandtheAmericans,bothin2012andin2017,Indiawasrepresentedbyasingledelegate.Onthefirst

one, itwasLieutenantGeneralV.R.Raghavan,whorana think-tank.Marvellousman,soundprofessional,andusefultotalkto.ThistimeIndiasentsomeonefromtheforeignoffice.

Dulat:TheGeneralsaidalotofmeaningfulthings,andIcan’thelpreiteratingthatinAfghanistanwe’velosttheplot.

Putin is the world’s big toughie with amuscular policy, that we’ll show youwhatwewilldo;that’showhekeepstestingTrump.Hetakesgreatprideinit,herecorded congratulating his intelligence officers.He’s even congratulated Russianillegalswholivearoundtheworld.He’smaybeavariationofModi.

Durrani: True. Putin has played his cards well. America has helped him regainmuscle. He was getting unpopular domestically. Even in Petersburg, his homeconstituency,theydidn’tseemtoohappywithhim.

Dulat:Peopleareopposedtohimbutnooneischallenginghim.

Durrani: The opportunity to regain popularity came when he annexed Crimea.UkraineandCrimeaareofpremierimportancenotonlyhistoricallybutsincemanyRussiansarethere.IthelpedRussiagaininfluenceintheLevant,totheextentthateven the Turks, after they shot down a Russian plane,4 patched up. Putin hasplayedhiscardssowellthatheisregaininggroundamongsthisownpeopleaswell.

Dulat:DuringYeltsin’s timemanyof theseoldKGBhandsmellowed.ButPutinhasn’t.ItmaynotbecalledtheKGB,buthisboysarestillaroundforbothmuscleanddirtytricks.

Durrani:True.

Sinha: Xi Jinping in 2017 consolidated power for another five years. China hasambitiousplansforthefuture.Putinismerelytryingtorecapturepastglory.Isn’tXiactuallytheworld’smostpowerfulman?

Dulat: I can’t disagree with that. The Russians and Chinese have a goodrelationshipandunderstandeachotherwell.ThedifferenceisthattheChinesearenotinahurry.Xiislookingaheadandhasplannedlotsofthings.WithPutinitisnow,today,yesterday,tomorrow.I’mgoingtomakethingshappennow.He’sallovertheworld;lookatSyria.ThesituationissuchthateventheAmericansrealisethatunlesswecooperatewiththeRussians,wecan’tmoveinSyria.Youcan’tputboots on the ground, the Russians are in control. And because of Russia-Iranrelations, the Iranianspreadhasbecomemorenoticeable in Iraq,Syria, theGulf.Suddenly,Trumpisthreateningthemagain.

Durrani:ChinaandRussiaplaytheircardscarefully.Theydon’tbecomeeuphoricbecause today they are on one platform, and they don’t become hostile. Theirreactionsareslow.Idon’tthinkthetwoofthemevertrustedeachother.Buttheir

interestscoincidetotheextentthatnow,it’snotonlySCObutbilaterallytootheydon’twanttosplit.Theywon’tactaswedo,immediatelybringingourswordsout.Eveniftheyhavereservationstheytaketheirtime,otherwiseAmericawouldgetafootinthedoor.

Sinha:SoIndia-PakistanshouldbemorelikeRussia-China.

Durrani:Yes,whynot?Easyandrelaxed,patient,donotontheseconddaycomeoutwithabigstatementandthenretractsoonthereafter.Thisiswhatwedo.

Incidentally, the theme of the non-nuclear conference I attended was NorthKorea.

Dulat: I was just about to say that North Korea is doing whatever it is doingbecauseitknowsthatbehindthemaretheRussiansandChinese.

VII

LOOKINGAHEADThefinalchapterslookatthevariouswaystobreaktheimpassebetweenIndiaandPakistan. The two former chiefs have differing approaches: Dulat favoursconfidence-buildingmeasureswhileDurranifavoursdurablestructuresfora long-term breakthrough. The wildest ideas are discussed; these are so out-of-the-boxthat hawks in both countries may feel surprised. In conclusion, there is oneunmistakablepointofagreement:thatthemadnessbetweenthetwonationsmustend.

Settingthescene

Bangkok,October30,2017:Thelastsessionofourdiscussionswrapsthingsupona positive note (and we even meet an intriguing Russian gentleman), so wecelebratewithlunchandthensomeThaiicecream.

30

ForgeStructureorBreakIce?

(Note: For away forward, both former chiefswere asked to submit a roadmap.Thesearereproducedfirst,followedbythediscussions.)

A.S.Dulat:

Encourage/facilitatepeople-to-peoplecontact.Easevisaregime—considervisa-on-arrivalnotonlyatairportsbutatWagahaswell.IncreaseflightstoLahore/Islamabad/KarachifromDelhi/Mumbai.Encouragecultural,arts,literary,sportsmeets.CricketcouldberesumedbetweenIndiaandPakistaninathirdcountry,ifnecessary. Pakistani players could be included in IPL. Formercricketers/commentatorsspendtimeinIndia,sowhynotyoungsters?GreaterPunjab-to-Punjabinteraction/trade.Confidence-building gestures—why is MFN held up when it was a donedeal?Increasedcommunicationbyopening/softeningborders.Kashmirgetspriorityinconfidence-buildingintrade,currency,banking.Kashmirshouldbeaddressedfirst;terrorism,low-hangingfruitlikeSiachen,SirCreek,etc.wouldautomaticallyfollow.Let’stalk,bothIndo-PakandIndia-Kashmir,withoutone-upmanship.Foreignsecretary-leveltalksandmoreimportantlyNSAs,intelligencechiefs,army chiefs shouldmeet, institutionally. As there’s no dialogue—why notinviteAjitDoval?Intelligence cooperation would be a confidence booster—let the stationchiefsbeopenpostsinbothcountries.Facilitateregionalcooperation—SAARCmustconsiderrevivaloftheGujralDoctrine.We could consider cooperation in even international forums.OurMuslimpopulationoughttogiveweightinIslamicforums.Openmedia on both sides.More Indian cinema.More Pakistani actors inBollywood.

AsadDurrani:

Formalise the ‘on-again off-again’ back channel. It should be hidden fromthepubliclimelight.

Insteadof a confidantof eachprimeminister, a teamheadedby someoneconsideredsuitablebythemajorpoliticalparties,theforeignofficeandthemilitary(toensuretheirlong-termrelevance).Heshouldselectasmallteamwithexpertiseonforeign,securityandregionalaffairs.Itsprimarytaskswouldincluderegularcommunicationwiththeotherside,exchangeofideasoncrisis/conflictmanagement,establishingrapporttogainthe confidence of decision/opinion makers, and pre-empt/prevent panicreactionsbyeitherside.In a bad situation—e.g., the Mumbai attack—the team should makeimaginativenewsuggestionsonwhichthetwocountriescouldcooperate—e.g.,ahydelprojectinKashmiroronAfghanistan—toassurebothsidesthatdetractorsdidnothaveahandleontheprocess.Incrisissituationsitshouldpreventanyharmfulmovesthatmaybeseenaspoliticallyexpedient.Conceptually, it isn’t different from the conventional wisdom of taskingwise-men to arbitrate between conflicting parties. It can be considered amodifiedversionofOSCE,1aColdWarbodycreatedtopreventconflictsinEuropewhichhadrepresentativesfrombothsidesoftheEast-Westdivide.All countries including the Warsaw Pact gave it the mandate to act asmediator. It can also be considered a manageable form of the traditionalJirgathatusedtofacilitatereconciliationbetweensquabblingparties.Ifitiswellselected,hasrelevantsupport,andkeptintactovertimebothtolearntheropesaswellasestablishtrustwiththeotherside,thisbodycouldevolveanincrementalprocesstomovefromconflictmanagementtoconflictresolution.Themembersmustnotpromisetoomuch,scorebrowniepoints,orseekthelimelight.This body’s most important attribute would be to not be stuck in aningrained approach or preconceived objective; and it should calibrate itsassessmenttoevolvingcircumstances.

Durrani:LikeamilitarymanIhavegivenastructuredanswer.

Dulat:Structureshavescrewedus,Sir.

Durrani:Simplysayingweshoulddothis-thathasnothelped.Youmayask,how?What’stheway?Thewayisinaconcreteconstruct,andamock-up.We’vedoneitbefore.

Dulat:You’reright,whileyouhaveprovidedthesemodelsI’vetalkedofgestures,andyou’lltellmethatI’vecomebacktomybloodygestures.Youhavetobreaktheicesomewhere.Thisbloodyiceissosolidthatyouneedtotakepeoplebysurprise.That’s why at the time I gave full marks to Modi, although some in Pakistan,

includingyou,calleditgimmickryandcalledhimcircus-man.

Isaidfullmarks,hehadthegumptiontogotoRaiwind.ThePakistanmediawasgung-ho.

Durrani:Wohtohpaagalhain.

Dulat:Humsabpaagalhain.

Durrani:Lookatthestructuresuggested.It’snotforthefirsttime,butnotancienteither. Idon’t say thatafter fiveor tenor20,000yearsofhumanhistorywecancomeupwithsomethingnovel.I’vesuggesteditinAfghanistan,inDohaduringtheUS-MuslimWorlddialogue.InIndia-Pakistan’scase,facelesspeoplearebehindthescenes,preferablyasadvisors tochiefexecutives,whoseearsandconfidencetheyhold.Andtheycanalsoreachouttotheotherside.

Dulat: Would you then advocate that instead of our six-member dialogue, wereduceittotwo?

Durrani:Inawargameyoucanhavetwoorfour,thatdoesnotmatter;thepeopleandtheirroleisimportant.

Dulat:Whydon’tyoutakethegesturesseriously?

Durrani:Itneedsacontext.AfterMumbai,forexample,whenbothgovernmentswerestuck,IsympathisedwiththeIndiangovernmentoverwhatshouldtheydo.Evenwith best intentions and the best leadership inDelhi, they can’t say forgetaboutMumbaiandgetonwithPakistan.That’swhenthisgroupgets intoaction,communicate, and say that the environment is such that no visiblemovement ispossible.However, let’s think of something not diversionary but at least anothertrackonwhichtostartmoving.

For instance, at the time someone could have suggested, since Kashmir is anissueas isterrorism,whynotajointprojectinKashmir,tobenefitKashmirisanddownstream Pakistanis? Itwould have lowered temperatures a bit, and providedyouanothertalkingpoint.

Callitafirebrigade,callitwise-menbehind-the-scenestokeepmattersontrackandprevent theprocess fromderailment. Insteadofanout-of-box solution, I sayout-of-boxarrangement.Intribalsocietythisisthewayofresolvingthings,thoughtheirconflictsaremoreserious;they’redeadlyandgoonforhundredsofyears.Yetwhen reconciliationhappens it’sbecauseof two-threepeople,withcredibilityonboth sides,whocan reachout inbothdirectionsandprevent things fromgettingoutofhand.

AninternationalexampleisonethattheSaudisled,thoughI’mnogreatfanofhowtheyhandledYemen.Post-9/11,thefocusisonterrorism,Afghanistanandthe

MiddleEast.PrinceAbdullah,2wholaterbecameKing,saidfourweeksafter9/11:We shouldbeprepared to recognise Israelprovided this-that, etc. Itwasnothingnew,butunbelievablyformanymonthspeopletalkedofhisformula.Hesprungitattherighttime,createdtherighteffect,defusedpressureonthekingdomandputpressureonAmericaandIsrael.

Dulat:Sowhydon’tyouacceptmysuggestionandinviteAjitDovaltoLahore?

Durrani: I’mnotmaking that gesture, not forAjit. I’ll behappy if someone elsedoesbutrightnowtheballisinyourcourt.

Dulat: It’sthesamethingwhenwesaywe’llplayhockey,notcricket.Andwe’veplayedhockey.ButthewholeworldnowplayscricketwithPakistanamidterroristandsecuritythreats.Butwearecussedaboutit:whyshouldweplaycricketwithPakistan,ofallpeople?

Likewise,GeneralSahebsays,whyshouldweinviteAjitDoval?Thepsycheisthesame.WhyshouldIdoanythingforthatso-and-so?

Durrani:ThisisdependentonapersonandI’mtalkingofapermanentstructureinwhichnonewleaderwillcomeanddisbandit.Theymaychangepersonnelbutnotdestroythecitadel.Thatbodyorsystemisinstitutionalised.

Dulat:SoyouwouldsuggestsomeonelikeSatiLambah?

Durrani:SatiLambahshouldserveforaslongashe’screative,constructive.Oncehe runs out of ideas and is close to 70+, bring anotherman.He’s not there forperpetuity,thestructureis.Thechangeoverdoesn’ttakeplaceinonego.Wehavesuggestedittoourowngovernment,notIndia-related,butestablishment-related.

AdityaSinha:Youspokeaboutdoingthingsawayfromthelimelight.ButinIndiaone needs public support behind a policy. If you suddenly spring something onthem,willitwork?

Dulat: Itwill if youhave faith in it.BeforeVajpayee took thebus toLahorehedidn’tpubliciseit.HejustdecidedandtookalongalotofpeopleincludingMilkhaSingh,KapilDev,DevAnand;asifeveryPunjabiwastakentoLahore.

Durrani:Youworkoutaconclusionoraprovisionandthenthinkofhowtogetthefeedback.Thatstrategyshouldalsobeuptothisgroup.Ifyouputittothepublicormediabefore finalising anything, you canbe certain someof themwill shout,‘sell-outoffalana,areversal,nowaU-turn’.

Sinha:Itsoundslikeaperpetuationofstatusquoforthenext50-100years.

Dulat: I’mnot at all for perpetuation of the status quo. I’m saying onemust dosomething.

Durrani: It’snotgoing tobeeasy tobreak the statusquo.Probablyeachofus is

suggesting that yesterday’s status quo need not be tomorrow’s, whichmay lookbetter.

Sinha:Itcouldstillbeastablestalemate.

Dulat:Anditcouldalsolookworse.

Sinha:Let’stalkaboutyourlist.

Dulat:GeneralSaheb’s suggestedaway todo it,whereas I’ve said theseareeasythingsthatshouldbedone.

For instance, inMarch 2014whenAbdul Basit had just arrived, I said, ‘HighCommissioner, Ihopeyou’rebringinggoodtidingsfromIslamabad.’Hesaid,yes,goodnewswasintheoffing.IhearditwastheannouncementoftheMFN.ButtheBJPgotintotheact,andsomebusinessmenwenttoLahoreandIslamabad,andthisthingwas stalled. It stillhasn’thappened.Nowourguys inDelhi say,what’s thebigdealaboutMFN?Wedon’tneedit.

There’sacussednessherebutthequestionis,ifitwasadonedealin2014,thenwhyhasitstillnothappened?YetthisistypicalofIndia-Pakistan,sadly.

Mylistisalist.Ithasbasicthingsthatareeasy.

Like facilitating people-to-people contacts. We keep talking about it but itdoesn’thappenbecauseevengettingavisaispainful.Atonetimeitwassuggestedthat senior citizens get visa-on-arrival. These would be great if Pakistani seniorcitizens, on arrival inDelhi orMumbaior atWagah,would get a visa.Andviceversa.

Nowflightshavealmost totally stopped.Evenwhen therewasaPIA flight, itwasjustaPIAflight.ThehighcommissionersaidhetalkedtoJetandtoIndigoandthey’rereadytofly.Butnothinghappens.

Sinha:What’sthestumblingblockonflights?

Dulat:Cussedness.IfAirIndiadoesn’tfly,whyshouldJetorIndigo?It’srubbish,nothingmore.

Sinha:Yourlistgivesusaprofoundsenseofthecussedness.They’reallsodo-able.

Dulat:Andthey’vebeentalkedaboutumpteentimes.Butneverdone.

Interestingly,ifaKashmiriwantsavisalikeanyotherIndianhewon’tgetitinahurry.ButifGeelaniSahebortheMirwaizrecommendavisa,it’llcomethrough.Mywifecanpossiblygetavisaeasily,butImaynot.

Sinha:YoucanalwaysgotoGeelaniSahebforarecommendation.

Dulat: Someone actually suggested that. I said: ‘Shaayadhume visa namile.’Hesaid:‘HumdiladengeGeelaniSahebsebolenge.Unkisifarishsehojayega.’It’sas

madasthat.

Sinha:Cricketteamsdon’tevenplay.

Dulat:Yes,ithastoberesumed.IftheBritsandAustralianscanfeelsecure,what’sso special about us? If we feel that insecure, why don’t we play Pakistan inEngland?OrinAbuDhabi?

Sinha: They held a T20 leaguematch in Lahorewithout incident. People jokedtherewasmoresecuritythanspectators,buttheydidit.

Dulat: Yes. If we hesitate going to Lahore or Karachi, what’s the problem ininvitingthePakistanteamtoIndia?They’repreparedtocome.

Nowwe’vehadthiscircuscalledIPLonforthepastsevenyears,andtherearesome outstanding Pakistani cricketers who’d be great entertainers. Afridi hasprobably retired, but people come out especially to watch him bat. But suchplayers aren’t included in the IPL.What’s the reason? The reason is cussedness:WhyshouldaPakistanimakemoney?

TheironyissomeseniorPakistanicricketersliveinIndiaalmostallthetime,likeZaheerAbbas,who’smarried to an Indian.Orcommentators likeWasimAkramandRameezRaja.WasimAkramevenmanagestheKolkataKnightRiders.Iftheycanbearound,thenwhynotyoungsters?Andsomeofthemareexcitingplayers.

Sinha:Whythecussedness?

Dulat: Who knows? If you sat a German friend of General Saheb’s and aFrenchmanhereandletthemlistentothis,they’dbeastounded.

Thenwhy can’t we open or soften the borders?We have borders in Punjab,RajasthanandGujarat,andallcouldbeconsideredforeasiermovementofpeople.

I suggestedKashmirbegivenpriority inconfidence-building.MuftiSahebhadsuggested a common currency.3 A common currency would make bankingimportant. People don’t realise that the J&KBank has been an asset not only inKashmirbutotherpartsofIndiaaswell.OnethingIlearnedaftertheUPelectionswasthatonereasonforbackwardnessamongMuslimsisthatnobanksareavailableinMuslimlocalities.Bankingisabigproblem.

Sinha:SoareyousayingtheStateBankofPakistanshouldcomeandopenbranchesinIndia?

Dulat:And the J&KBank in POK. I agreewithGeneral Saheb that the startingpoint shouldbeKashmir.Let’s sitdownand talkKashmir.Thereneeds tobeanIndia-Pakistan dialogue, an India-Kashmir dialogue, and a Pakistan-Kashmirdialogue.LikewhathappenedinformallyduringVajpayee’stime.

Then the more formal diplomatic talks. Foreign secretary-level talks, General

Saheb’s favouritecompositedialogue.Whyshould itnotberevived?Butset thatasidefornowsincewearen’ttalkingatall,andwhateverishappeningisbetweentheNSAs,inahush-hushmanner.

GeneralSahebhasmentionedhowweshouldgoaboutit.Forme,thestartingpointwouldbethatletDovalgotoLahore.Whencivilityreturns,thenextspecialguest at ourRepublicDay shouldbe theprimeminister ofPakistan. In fact, thePakistan primeminister should be a regular guest inDelhi.When theweather’sgood,heshouldbehavinglunchwithModijiatHyderabadHouse.

SAARChasbeenstalledandshouldberevived.TheGujralDoctrineneeds tobetakenintoconsideration.

If the relationship got going we could even consider cooperation at theinternationallevel.It’softenforgottenthatourMuslimpopulationis,what,secondintheworld?Sowhyshouldn’tIndiabeamemberoftheOIC?

Sinha:Indiahasneverbeeninvited?

Durrani: Once.4 Pakistan objected. We said, why India? This conference is forMuslimsandthey’llhaveaturbanedSikhsittinghere.

Dulat:IfyoucanhaveturbanedMuslimsthenwhynotapoorturbanedSikh?

Durrani:Funnythingsweresaid,buttheideawasthatwewouldnotletIndiastallusinthisforum.

Dulat: Lastwas the opening of themedia.We can’twatchPakistaniTV thoughthey can watch Indian TV. Even that has dropped of late.Bollywood films arepopular in Pakistan, as is Indianmusic. Pakistan has good actors and somewerecomingtoBombay.Nowit’sbeenstopped.

Peopleatlargewouldappreciatecooperationinthis.Ourhighersociety’smosthawkishlovePakistaniserials.

Sinha: The additional problem is that whoever wants to do these things has topreparepublicopinion.

Dulat:That’swhywhatGeneralSahebhaswritten is important,becausehe sayslet’snotmakeitpublic,let’sdoitquietly.

Sinha:GeneralSaheb’sturn.

Durrani:Thatthesethingsdon’thappenhasbeendiscussedsooftenthatItakeitfor granted that for now, these good ideas won’t make an impression on thedecision-makers. There must be hurdles, and these begin with the bureaucracy.Theyarebytrainingnit-pickers.Theyplaysafe.Inourenvironment,itpaystoplayhawkish.Andtheyforeverlookovertheirshoulders—attheirowncolleagues,whoarereadytobringdownanyonegoing‘soft’onthearch-adversary.

Still,thedecisionhastobetakenbythepoliticalleadership.ManmohanSingh,even with his heart in the right place, was vulnerable to flak from his politicalopponents, the media, and his own peers.We could get lucky and get anotherVajpayee,whocouldoverruletheestablishment,thoughevenhecouldbescuttledbyimplementers,orfallvictimtodevelopmentsonourside.

To illustrate thesystem,SharatSabharwal,whohadthegoodof theregionatheart,hadatalkinIslamabadafewmonthsbeforeheleft.IaskedhimabouttheGujral Doctrine. Letme just say that whatever his answer was would not havecausedproblemsinhishierarchy.

That’s why we’ve spoken of a process away from the limelight. It wouldcomprise people who would think of small yet substantive steps that aren’tvulnerabletothesystem’sshenanigans.Myfavouriterecipeistocreateacouncilofwise-men:peopleofstatuswhoarepatient,discreetandknowtheartofsoundingouttherightearattherightmoment.

Dulat:PeterJoneshasdoneusagoodturnwhiledoinghimselfagoodturnaswell.Therearethreeformerintelligenceofficersfromeachsidewhositdownandhaveagoodtime.Theycarrybackmessagestotheirsides,becausewehavepeoplewhohavethispotentialorcapability.

Somysuggestionis,supposewereducedthistotwoeach,andinsteadofdoingitforPeterJoneswediditunderthesupervisionofAjitDovalorGeneralJanjua.

Let’s start quietly, addressing important issues that are acceptable to the twogentlemen.Ifsomethingemergesitcouldbeputoutintheopen,ortotheprimeministers.Thenwecouldhaveforwardmovement.

Durrani:It’scertainlyagoodwayofgoingaboutit,butthisisoneway.Iagreethatonce we’re back we can convey this message to our respective NSAs. It’s apossibility.

Dulat:I’mnotsayingit’sapossibility,I’msayingit’sapossibilityworthexploring.

Durrani:TrustedmeanstrustedbyAjitDoval.

Dulat:TrustedpeopleforAjitDoval,peoplethatAjitmaytrust.

Durrani:AndJanjuaappointstwowhomhetrusts.I’msureEhsanwillbeoneofthem.I’llbehappyifmynamecomesup,buthecansuggestothers.

Dulat:Oncewe’vemadeabeginningwiththetwoNSAs,andwhentheyhavetwolieutenants each, they can temporarily rope in experts for specific subjects. Bothcountrieshavenodearthofexperts.

Durrani:Therearetoomany.

31

CouncilofSpies

Aditya Sinha: Intelligence agencies operate in ‘grey’ areas. Other governmentdepartments have defined dos and don’ts. How does this fit into your idea forintelligencecooperation?

A.S.Dulat:Wedotalkfromtimetotime,sowhyshouldn’titbeinstitutionalisedwhenwetalktoeverybodyelseintheworld?Youalwaysseemtohaveissueswithyourneighbours,especiallyPakistan,sowhynottalktoPakistan?

Theyalsohavethisbigissue,terrorism,whichbyitselfcallsforcooperationoratleastinstitutionalinteraction.Becausewhenyousitdownthefirstthingyousayislet’stalkaboutterrorism:whatareyouguysupto?Ifthatbethecase,shouldwenotbedoingitonaregularbasis?Someonewouldhavesomeexplainingtodo,butinteractingmakesiteasiertosimplifythings.

I’ve been pleading that the station chiefs in Islamabad and Delhi should bedeclared open posts. That would make it easier for the gentleman to ask formeetings and interactmore easily.These things, in this day and age, are known,who’s who. Every intelligence agency has officers in embassies which aren’tdeclaredopen,sotheopenpostcouldbethestationchieforhis/hernumbertwo.

FromtheIndianpointofviewourchaphasatoughtimeinIslamabad,wherethe surveillance is farmore aggressive than it is inDelhi. Some of them end updoing nothing. So why have an officer in Islamabad if he’s doesn’t achieveanything?By the same logic,notmanywant to go to Islamabad thoughourbestofficersshouldbegoingthere.

GeneralSahebandIinourpaperdidmentionthegreyareas.Manythingscanbedonethataren’t intheopenglareandaren’t immediatelyaccountable,thoughwithpoliticalbacking;wedon’thaveautonomythoughtheISImight.Wouldyouagreewithme?

AsadDurrani:Absolutely.Themorecomplexthesituation,themoreistheneedfor this.Theseare theonlypeoplewhocan,atamoment indifficultconditions,ensuresomesanity.

There are problems, however, of sharing or cooperating in the field ofintelligence,evenwithinacountry.Notonlybecauseyouwanttotakecreditforacertainoperation,butattimesyou’renotsurewhetheroneshouldsharedoubtfulintelligencewithothers.Itwouldbeembarrassingandalsomisleadtheotherparty.

But it is in that critical field where cooperation would help against certaingroups that are out to derail any efforts at peace. It would be better than thecooperationgiventoso-calledfriends.

Dulat:Therealityisthatalotofwhatgoeswrong,andterrorism,doescomefromPakistan.Butifwehaveanunderstandingorinteractionbetweentheagencies,thenthiswouldbe easier tohandle.Letus say the ISI runsormaintains theLashkar.They may not hand over Hafiz Saeed but if we were cooperating, other thingscouldhappen.

Sinha:Likewhat?

Dulat:Imaginewhateveryoulike,it’snotdifficult.

We earlier spoke of liaison with foreign services. The important point thatGeneralSahebmadeisthatwhileyouhavegreatliaisonandhavelonganalysesofthings, rarely does an agency share anything worthwhile or operational. On theotherhand,thewaywefunctioninSouthAsia, itwouldbemucheasiertosharethiskindofinformationandhelponeanother.

If the US had got a hold of Kulbhushan Jadhav, for instance, it might beimpossible to get him back. It’s not so difficult from Pakistan. A senior RAWofficerdefected1totheUSin2004,andwehavenotraceofhimthoughsomesayhe’s living on a farm in Virginia or even dead. It might seem ironic but withPakistanitwouldhavebeeneasiertogethimback.

Durrani:IagreewithmyfriendthatJadhavwouldeventuallybeback,despitethepoorhandlingofhiscasebyus.AbetterwaywouldhavebeentosendamessagetotheRAWthatwehadhim,extractalltheovertandcovertbenefits,andatsomestagereturnhim‘attherightprice’.

Sinha: If there can be intelligence cooperation thenwhy not just end the use ofterror?WhynotjuststopLashkarinyourterritory?WhynotjusthandoverHafizSaeed?Orisitjustalubricantforwhenthingsgethot?

Dulat:It’snotalubricant,butitwouldhelpwhenthingsgethot.HafizSaeedisanextremecaseandIdon’tthinkPakistanwouldhandhimover.

With cooperationwe could sit down and say,why arewe taking terrorismorinfiltration,etc.sofar?Whycan’twecontainitorstopit?Keepittoacertainlevel.In 2003 India andPakistan agreed to a ceasefire. BothC.D. Sahay andEhsan ulHaqclaimedtheirtwomeetingsbroughttheheatdownontheborder.

Inaninstitutionalarrangement,thestationchiefsinbothcapitalswouldbeopenposts. The ISI officer in the high commission in Delhi would be known and inregularcommunicationwiththeRAWorIBchiefs.OrwithAjitDoval.

Whenyouareinregularcommunication,alotofthingsarepossible.Todaywecan’tevengetavisa.I’vebeentoPakistanfourtimesanditneveroccurredthatImaynotgetone.RecentlyIfeelthatImaynotgetit.GeneralSahebwaskeentovisitDelhiinthewinterandwantedaninvite.Ispoketocolleaguesandtheysaidthetimenowisnotright.It’sanunfortunateatmosphere.

Durrani:Weknowtheirguyandtheyknowours,soopenpostsforcontactmakessense.

Dulat:Openpostswillclearalotofair.

Durrani: True. In the case of Hafiz Saeed, for example, we may come to aneffectiveunderstandingandthenletthecourtsolvetheproblem.Thereareotherslikehiscasethatarelesscomplicated.

Dulat:There’sMasoodAzhar.Every timehisnamecomesup inourdiscussions,EhsanimmediatelysaysMasoodAzhariswantedbutnottraceable.Iftrue,here’saprominentmilitantwanted by both Pakistan and India. Thiswould be a naturalcaseforcooperation.EvenifPakistandidnottransporthimtoDelhi,oncetheyhadhim,someonefromIBcouldgoandtalktohim.Itshouldnotbeabigproblem.

Thesethingscanhappenonceyouhaveconfidence.

Durrani:True, itwould also be important in thatChinawould stop vetoing theaction on Masood Azhar at the UN. If he was wanted by both of us and weprovidedjointdirection, itwouldnolongerbean issue.ChinadoesthevetoasafavourtoPakistanbutI’msureitfeelsembarrassedbyit.

Dulat: As a result of our not talking or cooperating, when the Pakistanis andChinesegettogethertheybitchaboutIndia,andwhenIndiaandtheAmericansgettogether they bitch about Pakistan.We all think we’re buddies, that we have agreat relationshipwith theUS, thatPakistanhas anall-weather relationshipwithChina,notrealisingthatourownrelationshipcouldbethebestrelationshipofall.

Durrani:Yes.It’spatheticattimeswhenreasonablecountrieslikeoursinvokethebigbrothercardinourrelationship.

Dulat:Theywouldn’tthenbedesperateforanall-weatherfriendship.

Durrani:Itcouldbedonewithoutchanginganypolicy.Youneedn’tsayKashmirisnolongerinthelimelight.Itcancontinuetoremainwhateverstatusyouprefer.

Dulat: Instead we have an impasse when six officers from the Pakistan HighCommissionweresenthome,andfive-sixfromoursweresenthomeaswell.TheAmericansandRussiansweregoodatthisduringtheColdWarbuttheystillneverstoppedtalking.

Talkingmakesmoresensethannottalking,howeveradversethecircumstances.In fact, themore adverse the circumstances, themore reason for talking. If Urihappened,asGeneralSahebearliersaid,wewouldtalkaboutasurgicalstrike.Duetothislackofcommunicationandunderstanding,themediapouncedonit,sayingnowwehavethecapabilitytoblowMuzaffarabadup,etc.

Durrani:Iagree,onbothsidesthepeoplemanagingthesurgicalstrikecouldhavegiven statements to keep tempers down. The Falklands war is a good example.England goes some 18,000 km and takes back the islands fromArgentina.Welldone.Afterwards,theEnglishsaid,it’soverandthere’snothingmoretobedone,no compensation, endof episode.Theydidn’twant to rub it in so that itwouldflareupagaintenyearslater.Thisisthematurewaytosettleit,butwewouldnot.

InthecaseofJadhav,it’spathetichowmuchshoutingfromtherooftopstherewas,as if itwasacricketingvictory.We justcannotcontainourselves. Ihavenogoodwordsforourmedia,atleastyoursisbetterorganised.

Dulat:Ourmediaisworsethanyours.

Sinha:Maybeit’ssomethinginourcommonDNAthatmakesustooemotional.

Dulat: When we had problems in Punjab and then in Kashmir, there wascooperation from the agencies,more in relation to Punjab. It happens if it suitsboth sides or whoever is giving the information. In the case of 26/11, theAmericansprovidedusintelligencebutnothinghappened.Whendidtheyprovideit?Whatdidtheyprovide?Whywasnoactiontaken?

Theguyinvolvedinthisoperation,DavidHeadley,wasworkingfortheISI,hewasworkingfortheAmericans;andwhenhelandsinjailintheUS,heconfesses.Theseinputsobviouslydidn’tfigureinwhateverwasgiventoorsharedwithus.

Tell me General Saheb, when the Mumbai attack happened and it wasannouncedthattheDGISIwouldgotoIndia,whydidhenotcome?

Durrani: Idon’tknowthedetails,butitwasasillystatementbyZardarithatthearmy should send theDG ISI.All hehad to dowas tell the chief hewanted tomakethisstatement;thechiefwouldhaveagreedandthensentsomeonesuitable.IfyoumentiontheDGISI,allattentionwouldfocusonhim.Thenitbecomesaprecedentforeverysuchincident.

Dulat:SoallZardariorGilanihadtosaywaswearesendingourintelligencechief.

Durrani:IntelligencechiefwouldmeantheheadofISI.

Dulat:Notnecessarily.

Durrani:TheIBchiefortheDG…

Dulat:Hisnumbertwo,three,etc.

Sinha:Amissedopportunity.

32

AkhandBharatConfederationDoctrine

A.S.Dulat:I’manoptimistandIsayyoucan’tgiveuponthis.Otherwisethere’shopelessness:justsitbackandsay,forgetit,nothingcanhappen.Youwereaskingaboutthestatusquoforthenext20years,butwe’llremainlikethisthenext100yearsbecausewearedestinedtoremainus.

GeneralSahebsayswecan’trisetothisoccasion,butyoucan’tgiveuptrying.Vajpayee always said: this madness cannot go on indefinitely. I can say, havingwatchedclosely for fiveyears, thatVajpayeehadmoreproblemsduringhis timethanManmohanSingh orModi did.Yet despite that,Vajpayee continued to tryandmoveforward.

Onemustkeep trying,and themostbasicwayofdoing this is thatyouneverstoptalking.Evenifitistoabuseeachother.

AsadDurrani:Yourdescriptionofmadnessisinteresting.NowIknowwhyyou’regoodfriendswithHamidAnsari.Hesaidtome:‘Yehdeewangikabkhatamhogi.’

Dulat: When you said India-Pakistan can’t rise to the occasion, it implies thatneithercountryhasgottenoverthebaggageof1947.Wewereonecountry.WhydoesthePunjabigetexcitedaboutpeople-to-people,etc.?Becausetherehasbeencloseness, but it’s the same baggage thatweighs you down. ‘Do you knowwhatthese fellows did in ’47? How many people they killed? Do you know whathappenedtomyfamily?Doyouknowwhathappenedtomytown?Ihadtoleaveallmyproperty there. I couldn’t bringmy cart even.Hum toh kapron kebagairaaye.’

Thisisthenarrativethatcontinues.

Durrani: But inKashmir, itwas started byKashmiris. It had nothing to dowithPunjab.

Dulat: It was started by Kashmiris where there had never been a riot. In 1947,Mahatma Gandhi said if there is an island of peace on the subcontinent, it isKashmir.

Durrani:Nothingisforever.That’swhyIsuggestthat’47maynotbeforever.Forexample, the Bengalis revolted against Pakistan, and people had said, oh yehBengali,yehtohviolentnahinhai.Theycanagitateorcrib,butnotbemilitant.

Aditya Sinha: General Saheb, can we discuss Gujral Saheb’s approach to India-

Pakistanrelations?

Durrani: TheGujralDoctrine1 had somuch of sense in it: if you can’t improveyour relationship with every country then start with the smaller countries. AndevenwithPakistanyoucouldstartbyimprovingrelationsatthelowerlevels:sub-regionalisationbetweenthetwoPunjabs,thetwoKashmirsandacrosstheborder.

OneprecedentisBavariaandAustria,whicharemuchcloserthanGermanyandAustria.They’reneighbours,theycomeandgo.TheBavarianwillevensometimesthreatenBerlinthatifyouonedaydecidetochangeBavaria’sstatusfromtheStateofBavaria toanotherprovinceofGermany,we’ll join theAustrians,whowearemorelikeanyway.IthasbroughtEurope’sneighbouringcommunitiestogether.

Sub-regionalisation means giving autonomy to the two Punjabs, the twoKashmirs,etc.Aapasmeincricket,hockeykhelnihai;evenacrosstheLoCputupanetandplayvolleyball.Peoplearecapableofcomingupwiththingslikethis.Oncetheydo,confidencecomesandtheysay,wecanlivelikethistoo.

ButnoonewantstoeventalkaboutGujral’ssub-regionalisationanymore.YourMaharaja (Amarinder Singh) and Shahbaz Sharif were for a time doing the twoPunjabthingwithoutrealisingGujralhadsuggestedit.

It stopped on the Indian side because of the establishment’s paranoia. Delhimightlosecontroloveritsborderregions;thepeoplewouldhappilyspeaktoeachotherinPunjabiorexchangeKashmiridishes.Theestablishmentfearsgivingthemlatitude,intheireyeseventradersareunreliable,alongwithChristians,Kashmiris,Punjabis.Theycanneverbetrusted,they’llgooutofcontrol.

Dulat:HewastalkingSAARCoronlyIndia-Pakistan?

Durrani:My understanding is that the two Punjabs havemore to do with eachother,SindhonourpartandtheareasborderingSindhonyourpart.

Dulat:Yes,youcoulddothat.

Durrani:ThenthetwopartsofKashmir.Withoutrufflingfeathersifyoustartwiththatyouultimatelyfindthattheregionsthathavecomeclosertotheircounterpartsproduce a synergy. The bus could have synergised the process, but then: HueemudattkemargayaGhalib,paryaadaatahai,wohharbaatpeykehna,keyoonhotatokyahota.ThatiswhatIunderstandaboutsub-regionalisation.

Dulat:ThelasttimetheCongresslostanelectiontotheAkalisinPunjab,thoughtheMaharajawas a good chiefminister you could see hewas going to lose.Hisadmirers said, just open the border with Pakistan and he’ll win hands down.BecausehehaddonealotforPunjab-to-Punjabrelations.HeevencamebackwithahorsefromShahbaz.Therewereinter-Punjabgames.Alothappened.

Sinha:GeneralSahebhasalsobeentalkingaboutAkhandBharat.

Dulat: Akhand Bharat is a crazy, impractical idea. It has emanated from theextremeright,andatsomestageAdvaniji subscribedto it.Theonewhoset it torestwasVajpayee,duringhisvisit toPakistan inFebruary1999,whenhevisitedtheMinar-e-Pakistan.

The NDA after that didn’t seriously talk about Akhand Bharat. But nowwehaveagangthatismoretotherightandhasthisobsession.Idon’tblameitentirelyon Modiji and his adviser Amit Shah. It’s a worldwide phenomenon, this madobsessionwithnationalism.

Sinha:It’spossiblyanelectoralcardforthefuture.

Dulat: It is,but it is also thatweareagreatpower.We’renot the softiesof thepast.Modiisadifferentkindofprimeminister.

Durrani:AkhandBharat isn’ta fantasythatnowadayssomearethinking.Enoughused to say M.A. Jinnah’s uncompromising objective was not Pakistan, that hefloatedthisideatogetthebestdealfortheMuslimswhentheBritishwereleaving.Hefelt thebest formulawasmaximumautonomyfor theregionswithaMuslimmajority. This is essentiallywhatThe Idea of Pakistan by the best India-Pakistanhand in theUS,StephenCohen, says.He says that thedivisionof Indiawasnotinevitable.

Many people would call Partition a mistake, in that what did it gain forMuslims? In united India they were a big minority; would they have beenthreatened?Wouldtheyhavebeenabletonegotiatetheirposition?EvenminoritiesinIraq,BahrainorSouthAfricacouldnotbeoppressed.

Partition, or trifurcation, led to many problems: Bangladesh, the Kashmirproblem.Andnowthecountriesareforeverfighting,whereasiftheydidnot,theycouldbenefitfrompeaceinAfghanistan,orthegaspipelinefromIran.

Imentioned theTehelkadialogue I attended inLondon in2008.The co-hostwasaSikhrestaurantownerwhoprovidedusdinnerandalsoinvitedustohisownplace.Marvelloushospitality.Atonepoint,inmypresence,heasked:‘Whydon’tyouPakistanispresshomethefactthatJinnahacceptedtheCabinetPlan?2Indeed,hewastryingtopreventtheviolationofaunitedIndia.It’sactuallytheCongresswhocreatedPakistan,thinkingitwouldnotsurvive,jaanakidharhain.’

I’m glad the credit of breaking India up still goes to the Indian NationalCongress.

Dulat: Maulana Abul Kalam also argued that Pakistan or Partition was notinevitable, in his book India Wins Freedom. He said our own leaders wereresponsible for Partition, that theywere not fair to Jinnah.Hedid notwant the

extremestep,butthattheCongresstookarigidposition.

Sinha:PakistanihistorianAyeshaJalal saysJinnahwasthesolespokesmanforhispeople,tryingtobargainthemaximumgainsforthemwithinIndia.

Durrani: Partition led to certain problems but it isn’t possible right away to doawaywithborders andcreateaunited India.Pakistanis enjoy their independenceandinacombinedIndiawouldperhapsnotbedependentbutcertainlywouldnotbeenjoyingthesameindependence.Youcannotundohistory.

Myideawasthatifweunderstandthereservationsoncertainthings,thatwearetryingtoresolvethroughbackchannels,wecanaddressthem.Wecannotgobackto pre-1947 butwe can gradually create a situation inwhich those concerns areaddressed.We can also address the desire of thosewho say, Bharatmata ka patanahinkyahogaya.

So we create a situation in which all these requirements, not entirely butpartiallyorpredominantly,aremet.Rightnowit’simpossibletocreateacoalitionoraunionliketheEuropeanUnion,whoserelevanceisitselfindoubt,butatsomestagewecanthinkofacommoncurrency,orlawsapplicabletowhenwedevelopthenewSouthAsianUnion:aConfederationofSouthAsia.

Wecandoitat leastaswellastheEuropeanshave.Ifnot,wecanbecontentthat some of our disputes are sorting out, and it benefits Punjab, Balochistan,Kashmir, Tamil Nadu, etc. This is thinking aloud, we might reach a commonminimumconsensus.

Maybewe’renotreadyforsuchabigprojectbutwecanworkonitselements,by softening the India-Pakistanborders, as inKashmir, andmake them irrelevantovertime.Thenfiveortenyearslater,we’lllookatthenextstep.

Delhi as the capital of aUnion.Armed forces integrated.Reduction of forcesnumbersby ratio. In ahundredyearsmostof thedemandsof anAkhandBharatmayhavebeenmet.

The reasonone shoulddiscuss this is tonot ruleoutanypossibility.ForWestGermans the reunification of East andWest Germany did not seem possible intheirlifetime.

The same corollary holdswhen I talk about a unified independentKashmir. Iknowit’sunpopularinbothcountries,probablymoreinIndia,it’sabiggerpoliticalandsentimentalissue.Pakistanhaslivedwithoutitfor70years,butyouhaven’t,sohowdoyouconceiveofit?

IspokeofAmanullahKhan.I’msorryInevergaveenoughthoughttohisideaofindependence. Now I assess that if not a majority then certainly a considerablenumber ofKashmiris, possibly onboth sides but certainly on your side,will say:

‘Pakistan,aaplogokalocusstandikyahai,we’vehadenoughofbothofyou,poxonbothhouses,wewantindependence.’

It’snotpossible,however.

Yet if there’s a sentiment, why not war-game it? Now let’s look at anindependentKashmir,onwhosesidewill itstandorwill itbouncebetweenIndiaandPakistan?For the last70years ithasbeen in India.Theymay likely say,no,we’vesufferedenoughwithIndia,weshouldseewhatwecandowithPakistan.

But what if it becomes a hub of international conspiracy? All this can bediscussed.Andwhenadiscussionbegins,questionsandideaswillemerge.OnedayitmaybeaninescapablerealityneitherIslamabadnorDelhiwillbeabletoresist.

Dulat: Thoughmy idea ofAkhandBharat is different, Iwould endorsewhat hesuggests. A union or federation between the two Punjabs—can you imagine?MaharajaAmarinderSinghrulingfromLahore?Asamilitaryman,hisregretwasthat in ’65 India didn’t take Lahore. Today he would have other emotional orsentimentalreasonsforwantingLahore.

Durrani:Jinnah’sdreamsdidnotmaterialisebuthesaid,okay,ifinthebargainthisiswhathashappened,I’lltakeit.SoAkhandBharatwalaswouldhavetosaythisisnotexactlywhatwewanted,butwe’lltakeit.3It’snotunprecedented.

InmyownmomentsofmadnessIthreatensomeofmyIndianinterlocutorsthatPakistanwasprepared to rejoin andundoPartition, so thatwe candestroy Indiafromwithin.They’llsay,that’snotwhatwemeanbyAkhandBharat.Twopersonswon’t have the same view. In any case, conventional wisdom is that you don’talwaysgetwhatyouwant.

Bytheway,whatistheirviewofAkhandBharat?

Sinha:AkhandBharatextendsfromPersiatoIndonesia,orsomething.

Dulat:ThenewIndianCaliphate.

Durrani:ThepoorDa’eshenvisionedaKhorasancaliphate,butdidn’tgetit.Youaskforitandhopethatyouwillgetinitsplace—Sy-raq.SyriaandIraq.

Dulat: These sorts of things have been debated at the UN, where someoneconcludedthatchangingboundariesshouldnotbeencouraged.

Good old Musharraf and Dr Manmohan Singh talked along these lines.Musharraf may have had different reasons but he said, now you can’t changeboundaries.DrManmohanSinghendorsedthat.

Durrani:Thereisdebateonwhattheydiscussed,butthefactis,thereisaconstantadjustment of borders throughout history. Three years ago, Ukraine’s internalborderschanged,andCrimeawascarvedout.Nooneknowswherethebordersin

the Levant will be. Don’t forget Bangladesh. Sikkim’s international bordersdisappeared.

To claim that we will not let this happen is nonsense. Boundaries change.ManmohanSinghoncesaidthatborderscan’tberewritteninblood.Itisapoliticalstatementthatdoesnotstandscrutinybecausebordershavealwaysbeenrewritteninblood.

Dulat: No, they won’t be rewritten in blood. When you’re talking peace, asManmohanSinghandMusharrafweretryingtodo,thenit’snoteasytoredotheseboundaries.

Durrani:Therefore,neitherhadasenseofhistory.Bordersaredrawn,redrawn,andre-redrawn. If you’re trying tomakepeace, thenat timespeacewill come if youagreetoredrawborders.

My point is why aren’t people even ready to discuss it, academically ortheoretically? Today we do that and tomorrow it may become reality. If thesituationissotenuousthatitcanbecomerealitythenIrestmycase.

Dulat:Ifyoulookatitrealistically,thenifKashmirweretogo,lifeforMuslimsintherestofIndiawouldbedifficult.Thatisarealitythatyouhavetoface.Alreadysome at the drop of a hat say, send him to Pakistan. If Kashmir were to go toPakistanorbecomeindependent,alotofpeoplewillsaysendthisbaggagealong.

Durrani:ThisargumentismadeabouttheplightofMuslimsbutIdon’tthinktheycanbecomehostagetothesituation.TheKashmirisarepayingtheprice.

Dulat:That’stheunfortunatepart.Kashmirisarenotwillingtopaytheprice,andMuslims in the rest of India are alsonotwilling topay aprice forKashmir. I’veraisedthismatterwithIndianMuslimsandsaid,youguysdebatemanythingsbutneveraboutKashmir.Theyareyourco-brethren.

Durrani: Let me switch tack for a moment and talk about an independentPashtunistan. There are twice the number of Pashtuns in Pakistan than inAfghanistan. The chances of an independent Pashtunistan are slim because allAfghans would choose to remain within Afghanistan’s present boundaries, andPashtunsvirtuallyrunmycountry.Butifithappened,itwouldbecomeaprovinceof Pakistanwith Peshawar, or evenKandahar, as its capital. I’ve always believedthereweremorechancesofanAf-PakconfederationthananIndo-Pakone,theideais50yearsold.

Dulat:What’stheconclusioninallthis?AkhandBharat,noBharat,independenceforKashmir?

Durrani:Theconclusionisnothingisforeveranditpaystokeepanopenmind.

Remember that Advani, when he visited Karachi (in June 2005) madeconciliatorynoises.Suchathingcansetthestage.Hispartybeganbreathingdownhisneck,that’sanothermatter;butforusitbecameanexampletofollow.

Sinha:Whatspecificallydidhesay?

Durrani: Not so much on cooperation but he had words of praise for Jinnah.Jaswant Singh’s book on Jinnahmade him a persona non grata in his party. Butthesepeoplehadtherightidea,that’stheimportantthing.Wedonothavetosay,wherewillyoustart?

We start by addressing the humanitarian problem, which does not ruffle anyfeathers.Noonehastochangepositions,thatisimportant.

Dulat:Ifullyendorsetheboss.InasenseitisadilutedversionofMusharraf’sfour-pointformula,whichisagoodwaytostart.

Sinha:Musharrafisnowafugitive.

Dulat:Hisideasdon’tneedtobefugitive.

AzizSaheb isnothereandthesedayshe’s inadifferent frameofmind,but Iremember when he was high commissioner in Delhi, we discussed Kashmirumpteen times. He said: ‘Why doesn’t Delhi understand that if we meet theHurriyatwe’reonlyhelpingyou,becausewhatwetelltheHurriyatisthatitmusttalktoDelhi.’

Sinha:Whenitcomestodialogue,isn’ttheGenerallookingforawaytokeeptheestablishmentonice?Whereasyouwanttheestablishmenttogetintotheact.

Dulat:I’msayingthatthepoorKashmiriissorattledthatifyouweretotellhimtogoaheadanddowhatyoulike,hewon’tbelieveit.Hewillsaysomething’sfishy.

Durrani:Theestablishmenthastobeinvolvedbecauseitwillsendthemessagethatifyouwanttodosomething,goahead.Butbeingintheroomduringtheprocess,that’snotfortheestablishment.

Dulat:Wewanted a stage to come,which had actually started, this coming andgoing,andtrade.PeopleinKashmirwerehappy.

Durrani: These actually impede establishment goals. The establishment weighswhether each thing is more in favour of India or Pakistan, and that’s where itappliesbrakes,refusesvisasandpermits.

Dulat:IsthereanAmarkotinSindh?

Durrani:Umerkot,yes,inPakistaniSindh.

Dulat:IthasasubstantialHinducommunity.

Durrani:True.

Dulat:MainlyThakurs.OneofourgirlsfromJaipurismarriedthereandImetherfather-in-law few years back in Delhi, a towering man with a booming voice. Ialmost said,ThakurSaheb,youneeda silencer, youcanbeheardwaydown thecorridors.

Hesaid:WeHindusdominatethatareaasbiglords.Wehavenoproblem.WecelebrateHoli,Diwali,likeinRajasthan.Allourleaderscome,allPPPsupporters.

What’sIndia’sproblem?Whynotsettle?

Durrani:Jocheezaajnaho,wohyenakahekikabhinaho.

Dulat:IwouldlovetomeetMaharajaAmarinderSinghinLahore.Hewouldthinkhe’sfollowingMaharajaRanjitSingh.

Durrani:WhowillaccompanyhimasMaharani?

Dulat:OurMaharajaalreadyhasaMaharani.

33

DeewangiKhatam

AsadDurrani:Theideabehindmyenthusiasmforthisprojectisbasedondifferingperceptions. Ever sincemy retirement I’ve been exposed towhat people outsidesaid, and how it differed from information I was privy to. I reflected on it.Sometimesitwasverydifferentandattimesthevariancewasduetoadeliberatetwistorspin.

Whatever version people want to accept is not the problem. I just want toconveythatthiswashowIsawthings.Peoplecantakeitorleaveit.

AdityaSinha:Well,we’rehopingforreasontobeabitmoreoptimistic.

A.S.Dulat: It’sbeenaprivilege talking,manya timesarguing,with theGeneral.It’sbeenagreatidea,wespenttimetogether,wetalkedaboutthings.

My only reason for getting involved in this is the same as being in Track-II:India-Pakistanrelations.ItmaybejustadreambutIbelieve,asVajpayeeusedtobelieve,thatthismadnessbetweenIndiaandPakistanhastoend.Thisbookwillbeabout that, and that in the India-Pakistan relationship, going forward, thingswillimprove.

We’vetalkedaboutalotofthings,butourmainthemehasbeenthatIndiaandPakistanneedtorealiseandgettogetherbecausethereissomuchtobegainedbyunderstandingeachother.

That’swhyweyappedaboutintelligencecooperationandwe’vegivenitalotoftimeandfocus.That’soneofthemainthings.Howimportantitisforpeoplewhoareinapositiontobeconstantlytalking.Doyouagree,Sir?

Durrani:Absolutely.Thispointaboutmadness.Iwanttotellyouofoneepisode.In2015,wemadea jointcallonHamidAnsari. I reached fiveminutesearly.Assoonas Idid,hello,hello, thevice-president, a very fineman.Hisopening salvowas, ‘Yehdeewangikabkhatamhogi?’Suchaprofoundsentence,andamandateforourbook.

Dulat:That’sexactlywhatIhavestressedonthroughout.

Sinha: From your discussions it seems, Dulat Saheb, that even more than thepeople of India and of Pakistan, you want to do something for the people ofKashmir.

Dulat: When I talked about the people of India and Pakistan, it includes the

Kashmiris. Kashmir has always been inmymind, it’s become an obsession. Thethemeofmylastbookwasthattherewasnootherwaybuttotalk,andthatiswhyIgetelatedwheneversomebodyisappointedtotalktotheKashmiris.Itgivesmehope.

Mostofall,thisbook,whenitisout,willexciteKashmiris.Theyhear,andworddoes travel fromIstanbulorBangkokorNewYork,etc., that these twomadcapsaremeetingandkeepmeeting,sosomethingisup.SomethingisupbetweenIndiaandPakistan.Whentheyseephotographsofthetwoofustogether,orwhentheyhearofthetwoofustogether,theygetexcited.

Yes,oneofthemotivationsisthatthisbookisalsoabouttheKashmiris.

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Notes

1:‘Evenifweweretowritefiction,noonewouldbelieveus’

Kashmir:TheVajpayeeYearsbyA.S.DulatwithAdityaSinha,2015,HarperCollinsIndia,NewDelhi.

ThePugwashConferencesonScienceandWorldAffairsbringtogetheracademicsandpublicexpertstooffersolutionsonglobalsecurity.

AUS-sponsoredsecuritymeetingofUS,IndianandPakistaniretiredofficials,inPakistan.

ForeignSecretary,India,1995-97.

AStrategicSecurityInitiativefocussedonIndiaandPakistan.ThisonewassponsoredbytheJinnahInstitute.

TheguerrillaresistancewhichfoughtforBangladesh’sindependencefromPakistanin1971.

VikramSood,Secretary,RAW,2001-03.

Alsoreferredtoas26/11.OnNovember26,2008,tenLashkar-e-Toiba(LeT)terroristscamefromPakistanbyseaandattackedseveralpointsinMumbai.Theattackendedafterthreedays,leaving164deadandover300wounded.

FormerdiplomatandanacademicattheUniversityofOttawawhoorganisedthe‘IntelDialogue’meetingsofretiredintelligencechiefsfromIndiaandPakistan.

MuftiMohammadSayeed(1936-2016):India’sUnionHomeMinister(1989-90),Jammu&Kashmirchiefminister(2002-05,2015-16).FoundedthePeople’sDemocraticParty(PDP).

MehboobaMufti,ChiefMinisterofJ&K,daughterofMuftiMohammadSayeed.

FarooqAbdullah,ChiefMinisterofJ&K(1982-84,1986-90,1996-2002).SonofJ&KNationalConferenceleaderSheikhMohammadAbdullah.

2:TheAccidentalSpymasterTheUnionofSovietSocialistRepublics(USSR)invadedAfghanistanattherequestofthelocalcommunistregimeinDecember1979.Themujahideenresistance,supportedbyISI,theUSAandSaudiArabia,forcedtheUSSRtowithdrawadecadelater.

GeneralMohammadZia-ul-Haq,militaryrulerofPakistan(1977-88).HewaskilledinaplaneexplosioninAugust1988.

BenazirBhutto(1953-2007),formerPrimeMinisterofPakistan,headofthePeople’sParty.

4:Pakistan’sDeepStateSeeChapter26.

AghaMohammadYahyaKhan(1917-80),Commander-in-Chief,PakistanArmy(1966-71);thirdPresidentofPakistan(1969-71).

SheikhMujiburRehman(1920-75):ThecentralfigurebehindBangladesh’sliberationfromPakistan.

Z.A.Bhutto(1928-79):Pakistaniprimeministerfrom1973to1977,deposedinamilitarycoup.

InJuly2007,aconfrontationdevelopedbetweentheGovernmentofPakistanandterroristsinsideIslamabad’sLalMasjid.Ittookcommandoeseightdaystoendthesiege;thegovernmentclaimed154

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militants,securitypersonnelandcivilianswerekilled.

OnDecember16,2014,terroristsattackedtheArmyPublicSchoolinPeshawar,killing141including132schoolchildren.

DG,ISI,1987-89.

Secretary,RAW,1987-90.HeandGulmetinInterlaken,Switzerland,todiscussKhalistanandSiachen.

TheBearTrap:DefeatofaSuperpower(1992)byMohammadYousafandMarkAdkin.

AkhtarAbdurRahmanKhan,DG,ISI,1979-87.HeperishedinthesameflightasGeneralZia-ul-Haq.

AmanullahKhan(1934-2016),oneofthefoundersofthepro-independenceJammu&KashmirLiberationFront,thegroupthatstartedthe1989militantinsurgencyagainstIndia.

Tomarkinprotestthedayin1947whenIndiasenttroopstoKashmirafterJ&KrulerHariSinghsignedaninstrumentofaccession.PakistanwouldstoptheprotestattheLineofControlwheneverithappened.

Actually,onNovember3,1988,theMaldivesexperiencedanattemptedcoupd’etat.PresidentAbdulGayoomrequestedIndia’shelp,andtheIndianArmyfoiledthecoupattempt.

PrimeMinisterofIndia,1984-89.

NepalandIndia’snegotiationsonatransittreatybrokedownatthesametime,leadingtotheembargo.

J.N.Dixit(1936-2005),HighCommissionertoPakistan(1989-91),ForeignSecretary(1991-94),NationalSecurityAdvisor(2004-05).

AbdulQadeerKhan,fatherofPakistan’snuclearprogramme,dismissedaftertheUSsuspectedhisinvolvementinanuclearcomponents’blackmarket.

5:ISIVsRAWIndiraGandhi(1917-84):PrimeMinisterofIndia,1966-77,1980-84.

IndependentIndia’s2ndDirector,IntelligenceBureau(1950-1964).

RamNathKao(1918-2002):FounderandSecretary(1968-77)oftheResearch&AnalysisWing.

Director,IB(1987-89,1991-92);NationalSecurityAdvisor(2005-10);Governor,WestBengal(2010-14).

Director,IB(2004-05);NSA(2014—current).

AllPartiesHurriyatConferencewasa30-plusconglomerateofKashmiriseparatistgroups,formedin1993.

DawoodIbrahim,fugitivewantedbyIndiaforthe1993serialbombblastsinMumbaiwhichclaimed257livesandover700injured.HeisontheFBI’s‘world’stenmostwanted’list.

ChiefoftheJama’at-ud-Da’wah,co-founderoftheLashkar-e-Toiba.TheUSAhasabountyonhisheadformastermindingthe2008Mumbaiattack.

FounderandchiefoftheJaish-e-Mohammed,MaulanaMasoodAzharwasoneoftheterroristsfreedbyIndiainexchangeforthepassengersheldhostagebythehijackersofflightIC-814.Indiaholdshimresponsibleforthe2001Parliamentattack,andthe2016attackontheairforcebaseinPathankot,Punjab.

Hizb-ulMujahideen,thepro-PakistanterroristgroupinKashmir.Ittookovertheseparatistmovementfromthepro-independenceJKLFin1990.

SeeChapter6.

ShyamalDatta,DirectorIB.

FieldMarshalMohammadAyubKhan(1907-74):PresidentofPakistan(1958-69).

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6:TheCIAandOtherAgenciesUSADeputyNSA(1989-91);DirectorofCentralIntelligence(1991-93);SecretaryofDefense(2006-11).

VladimirV.Putin,KGBofficer(1975-91);PresidentofRussia(2000-08,2012-current);PrimeMinister(1999-2000,2008-12).

AseriesofterroristattackstookplaceinLondononJuly7,2005,killing52andinjuringover700.

OnMarch22,2017,aterroristdroveavehicleintopedestriansnearWestminster,London,killingfourandinjuringover50.

JamesWoolsey,DirectorofCentralIntelligence(1993-95).

Shariah:TheThreattoAmerica,2010.

LeonPanetta,DirectorCIA(2009-11),SecretaryofDefense(2011-13).

GeorgeTenet,DirectorofCentralIntelligence(1996-2004).

7:TheIntelligenceDialoguesGauriShankarBajpai,Secretary,RAW(1990-91).

C.D.SahaymetLtGenEhsan-ulHaq;P.K.HormisTharakanmetLtGenAshfaqPervezKayani.

GeneralMahmudAhmed,DG,ISI(1999-2001),tookoverafterMusharraf’scoup,wastransferredoutafter9/11.

SeeChapter15.

End-January2017,IntelDialogueinBangkok,Thailand.

C.D.Sahay,Secretary,RAW,2003-05.

FormerIBSpecialDirector,servedinKashmirasadditionaldirector,2000-02.

October2017.

8:StatusQuoSeeChapter15.

TherulingallianceinJ&KsinceMarch2015.

BurhanMuzaffarWaniwasa21-year-oldKashmirimilitantcommanderoftheHizbulMujahideen,whosedeathinanencounterwithsecurityforcesinJuly2016ledtoseveralmonthsofunrest.Over100residentswerekilledandthousandsinjuredbypellet-shots.

ChiefMinisterofJ&K(2009-15),sonofFarooqAbdullah,grandsonofSheikhAbdullah.

InJune1961,USPresidentJohnF.KennedyandSovietPremierNikitaKhrushchevwentfor‘awalkinthewoods’,alonewithinterpreters,todefuseacrisisoverBerlin.Twomonthslater,constructionoftheBerlinwallbegan.

9:TheCoreK-wordCapt.Liddell-Hart’s1920paperontheExpandingTorrentSystemofAttack:Likeflowingwater,anattackingarmylooksforabreachagainstadefenceofdepth.Thatbreachiswidenedasthepenetrationisdeepened,byautomaticallyprogressivesteps,enlargingthedeployment.

TheHeartofAsia—IstanbulProcessisanannualdiscussionbetweenAfghanistananditsneighbours.OnDecember3-4,2016,itwasheldinAmritsar,India.Inhisstatement,AfghanPresidentAshrafGhanisaid:

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‘TalibaninsurgencywouldnotlastamonthifitlostitssanctuaryinneighbouringPakistan.’

10:AmanullahGilgiti’sDreamsofIndependenceSyedMohammedYusufShah,contestedthe1987J&KassemblyelectionfromSrinagar,thenheadedHizbulMujahideenfromtheothersideoftheLoC.

SardarMohammedAbdulQayyumKhan(1924-2015).Formuchofthepost-1947periodhewaseitherPrimeMinisterorPresidentofPakistan-administeredKashmir.

J&K’ssocio-religiousorganisationthatfavouredKashmiraccessiontoPakistanandwasthusabletotakethepost-1989movementoverfromthepro-independenceJ&KLiberationFront(JKLF).

Article370oftheConstitutionofIndiaguaranteesJ&Kspecialstatus,withcertainexclusiverights,suchasonstateresidentship.

OneoftheearlyleadersoftheJKLFinKashmir,chargedwithmurderingIndianAirForcepersonnelin1990.

RavindraMhatrewasa48-year-oldIndiandiplomatkidnappedandmurderedbytheJKLFinBirmingham,UK,in1984.

MirzaAfzalBegwasakeylieutenantofSheikhAbdullah.HeformedthePlebisciteFrontafterhisleader’sremoval(asJ&Kprimeminister)andarrestin1953.

SyedAliShahGeelaniistheseniormostKashmiriseparatist.HewasforlongtheheadoftheJ&KJamaat-e-Islami.HewasalsothriceastatelegislatorfromSopore.

11:Kashmir:TheModiYearsTheJ&Kassemblyhas87seats,so44meantamajorityforgovernmentformation.

InApril2017,assemblyelectionsinUttarPradeshproducedathree-fourthsmajorityfortheBJP,andagovernmentwasformedunderreligioushardlinerYogiAdityanath.

RexTillerson,USSecretaryofState,2017.

JammuisthewintercapitalofJ&KfromNovembertoApril.Theothersixmonths,thedarbarmovestoSrinagar.

ProfessorAbdulGhaniButtisaleadingfounder-memberoftheAllPartiesHurriyatConference.

13:TakeWhatYouCanGetThenegotiationstookplaceatCampDavid,hostedbyUSPresidentBillClinton.Arafathasbeenblamedforitsfailureashemadenocounter-offertoBarak’sconcessions.

InMarch628(6AH),thistreatycalledforaten-yearpeaceandauthorised‘TheFirstPilgrimage’.ItwassignificantintheformationofIslam.

14:IndiaandPakistan:‘Almost’FriendsLaluPrasad,IndianRailwaysMinister(2004-09),BiharChiefMinister(1990-97).

L.K.Advani,DeputyPrimeMinisterofIndia(2002-04).

OnDecember24,1999,IC814fromKathmandutoDelhiwashijacked.Onehostagewaskilled,theothersreleasedinKandahar,Afghanistan,onDecember31,inexchangeforthreeterroristslodgedinIndianjails.

IndiaandPakistanagreedtoabusservicebetweenDelhiandLahore.ThefirstbusarrivedinLahoreonFebruary20,1998withVajpayeeonboard.

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Inearly1999,PakistaninfiltratedarmedpersonnelintotheKargilheightsoverlookingtheSrinagar-Lehhighway.ItledtoamilitaryconflictfromMaytoJuly1999,whenPakistanwithdrew.AlsoseeChapter21.

VajpayeeandMusharrafhadasummitonJuly14-16,2001.Itproducednoagreement,however.

LtGen(retd)NaseerKhanJanjua,NSA,Pakistan,2015-current.

InthemidstofcivilianagitationoverthedeathofBurhanWani,onSeptember18,2016,fourterroristsattackedanIndianarmybrigadecamp,killing19soldiers.Elevendayslater,IndiaquietlyconductedasurgicalstrikeonsuspectedterroristcampsontheothersideoftheLineofControlinKashmir.

15:LonelyPervezMusharrafLtGenM.L.ChibberheadedNorthernCommandoftheIndianArmy.

LtGen(retd)IftikharAliKhan,PakistanSecretaryofDefence(1997-99).

LtGen(retd)SikanderAfzalwasDG(analysis),ISI,inthemid-2000s.HewasinitiallypartoftheOttawaprocess.

16:Modi’sSurpriseMovesSujathaSingh.AftertheModi-SharifmeetingshestatedthatIndiaexpectedPakistantopreventterrorismandshowprogressinthetrialonthe2008Mumbaiattack.

NepalhostedaSAARCsummitinNovember2014,whereModiandSharif,amidsttenserelations,shookhands.

ModiandSharifstayedatthesamehotelinNewYorkduringtheUNGeneralAssemblyinSeptember2015,butdidnotmeet.

ModistoppedinPakistanonDecember25,2015,onthewaybackfromRussiatoIndia.DuringastopoverinKabulModiinformedPakistanofhisproposalforabriefvisit.ItwasSharif’sbirthdayandthetwoleadersproceededtoSharif’sRaiwindPalaceforSharif’sgranddaughter’swedding.

BurhanWani’sdeathinJuly;UriattackinSeptember;surgicalstrikeacrosstheLoCannouncedinOctober.

ModicriticisedPakistanforfomentingterrorismintheregion,inaspeechatDhakaUniversityinJune2015.

OnthewaybackfromRussiaandbeforehelandedinLahore,inDecember2015,ModistoppedinKabulwherehecriticisedPakistanforitsroleinterrorismintheregion.

17:TheDovalDoctrineIndia’sfirstConsul-GeneralinKarachi,1978-82,laterjoinedtheCongressparty,servedasministerindifferentgovernments.

JohnleCarré,2017.

InApril2016,theAnantaAspenCentreorganisedaTrack-IIwithsixformerPakistanhighcommissionersandnineformerIndianhighcommissionersinDelhi.Thegroupalsometvariousfunctionariesanddignitaries.

LambahwasPrimeMinisterManmohanSingh’sspecialenvoytoPakistan,2004-13.HewasHighCommissionertoPakistan,1992-95.

Bangkok,end-October2017.

18:TheHardliners

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GovernmentofIndiabuildingonRaisinaHillinNewDelhi,housingtheforeignoffice,thedefenceministryandthePrimeMinister’sOffice.

Bangkok,October2017.

19:BB,MianSahebandAbbasiRajivGandhivisitedinJuly1989.HehadalreadybeentoIslamabadonceinNovember1988foraSAARCsummit.

ThisisfromthesessioninBangkokinOctober2017,beforetheNovembersiegeofIslamabadbythereligiousright.

ImranKhanNiazi,formerinternationalcricketer,headofthePakistanTehreek-e-Insaf,memberofPakistan’sNationalAssembly.

MohammedShehbazSharif,chiefministerofPunjab(2013-current).

20:GoodVibrations,India-PakistanIndiaconductednucleartestsonMay11and13,1998.PakistanconductedtestsonMay28and30,1998.

AcityinGujratdistrict,Punjab,Pakistan.

FieldMarshalSamHormusjiFramjiJamshedjiManekshaw,1914-2008,IndianArmychiefduringthe’71war.

MorarjiDesaiistheonlyIndiantobebestowedtheNishan-e-Pakistan.ItwasconferredbyPresidentGhulamIshaqKhanin1990.

21:HafizSaeedand26/11HafizSaeedfoundedtheLeTandisamiroftheJuD.

ThispartoftheconversationtookplaceduringFebruary1-3,2017,inBangkok.

HewasreleasedonNovember24,2017.

ThereportoftheUKinquiryintothe2003Iraqinvasion,publishedin2016,foundTonyBlairguiltyofexaggeratingthethreatposedbySaddamHusseinandofgoingtowarbeforeexhaustingallpeaceoptions.

22:KulbhushanJadhavOnMarch3,2016,Jadhav,anex-navalofficer,waseitherarrestedinBalochistanorsnatchedfromIran.PakistansaidhewasfromRAWandchargedhimwithaidingtheBalochinsurgency.Indiadeniedthis.PakistaniauthoritiesreleasedavideoinwhichJadhavconfessedtoespionage.Indiasaiditwasmadeunderduress.PakistansentencedhimtodeathonApril10,2017.TheInternationalCourtofJusticestayedtheexecutiononMay18,2017.

ByIndia’sNSAinNewDelhi.SeeChapter17.

SonofassassinatedPunjabGovernorSalmanTaseer.ShahbazwaskidnappedinAugust2011andwasrecoveredfromBalochistanfourandahalfyearslater,onMarch8,2016.

MalikMumtazHussainQadri,SalmanTaseer’sbodyguardwhoshotthePunjabGovernorinJanuary2011.Shahbazwasawitnessinthetrial.QadriwassentencedtodeathandhangedinFebruary2016.

Listofinsurgencies:1948,1958-59,1962-63,1973-77,2003-current,thoughtheintensitywanedafter2008.

MullahOmar’ssuccessorasSupremeLeaderoftheTaliban.SeeChapter27.

SeeChapter17.

8.

9.

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3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

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2.

AmemberoftheBalochRegitribe,RigiwascapturedandexecutedbyIraninJune2010.

AnagreementwasalmostreachedattheEgyptianresortinJuly2009betweenPrimeMinistersManmohanSinghandSyedYusufRazaGilani.

23:TalksandTerrorFormerUSassistantSecretaryofStateforSouthAsianAffairs,whoin1993becameunpopularinIndia.

IslamicStateofIraqandSyria,alsoknownasIS(IslamicState)orDa’esh(inArabic)orISIL.

Tehrik-i-Taliban,Pakistan:apro-Talibanumbrellagroupofanti-StateterroristsoperatingalongtheAfghanistanborder.

DonaldRumsfeld,SecretaryofDefense(2001-06),authorofKnownandUnknown:AMemoir,2011.

TheMeadowbyAdrianLevyandCathyScott-Clark,2012.

MahmudAliDurraniwasNSA,Pakistan,2008-09.

BJPpresidentduring1991-93.Heundertookan‘EktaYatra’toSrinagarin1992,whenmilitancywasatapeak.

24:SurgicalStrikeSeeChapter1.

InJanuary7,2013,afteraconfrontationjustinsidethebordernearMendhar,twoIndiansoldierswerebeheaded.

AsdefinedbyAirCommodoreJasjitSingh,thesheerexistenceofnuclearweaponswithbothadversariesimposesmajorlimitationsonthewayforceandviolencecanbeusedagainsteachotherwithoutriskinganuclearwar.

26:TheDealforOsamabinLadenOsamabinLaden,headofalQaeda,waskilledinaraidbyUSNavySEALcommandoesathishouseinAbbottabad,Pakistan,onMay1,2011.

ValiRezaNasrwassenioradvisor(2009-11)toRichardHolbrooke,Obama’sspecialenvoyforAfPak.HisbookTheDispensableNation:AmericanForeignPolicyinRetreatgoesintohowHolbrookeandteamunsuccessfullypushedforapeaceplan(involvingtheTaliban)toendthewarinAfghanistan.

USofficialswhometKayaniinApril2011:CentcomchiefGeneralJamesMattisonApril8;ChairmanoftheJointChiefsofStaffAdmiralMikeMullenonApril20;UScommanderforAfghanistanGeneralDavidPetraeusonApril26.OnApril28,PresidentObamasignedordersforPetraeustobethenextCIAdirector.OnApril29,ObamasignedtheorderfortheOsamaraid.

LtGenAhmedShujaPasha:DG,ISI(2008-12).

January27,2011:Daviswasreleasedafterpaying‘bloodmoney’tothekinofhisvictims.

DrShakilAfridihasbeenchargedinPakistanwithrunningafakeHepatitisBvaccinationprogramme.OtherHepatitisBworkershavebeentargetedaftertheOsamaraid.

27:SelfishSelf-interestsinAfghanistanQatarallowedTalibantosetupanofficeinDohain2013,forquietdiplomacy.TworoundsoftalkswiththeAfghangovernmenthavetakenplacethere.

ThefirstroundoftheMurreepeaceprocess,betweentheAfghangovernmentandtheTaliban,tookplaceonJuly7,2015.

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4.

5.

6.

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1.

2.

3.

4.

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3.

4.

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2.

Pakistanarmychief,2013-16.

HamidKarzai,PresidentofAfghanistan,2001-14.

FormerUSambassadortoAfghanistan(2003-05),toIraq(2005-07)andtotheUN(2007-09).HeisaPushtun.

RustamShahMehmandservedasPakistan’sHighCommissionertoAfghanistanandasChiefCommissionerforAfghanRefugees.

28:DonaldTrump,Nudger-in-chiefOnJune23,2016,51.9percentoftheUKelectoratevotedtoleavetheEuropeanUnion.

29:Pakistan’sPal,PutinYuriAndropov(1914-84)headedtheSovietUnionfrom1982tillhisdeath.KGBchairman,1967-82.

GeorgeH.W.Bush,USPresident,1989-93.Director,CentralIntelligence,1976-77.

TheShanghaiFivewascreatedinApril1996comprisingChina,Russia,Kazakhstan,KyrgyzstanandTajikistan.InJune2001itbecametheShanghaiCooperationOrganisation,ofwhichIndiaandPakistanbecamefullmembersinJune2017.

OnNovember24,2015,TurkeyshotdownaRussianSu-24MmilitaryaircraftneartheSyria-Turkeyborder.PutinaccusedtheTurksofwantingto‘licktheAmericansinacertainplace’.InJune2016,TurkishPresidentRecepErdogansentalettertoPutinexpressingsympathyanddeepcondolences.

30:ForgeStructureorBreakIce?OrganisationforSecurityandCooperationinEurope.

AbdullahbinAbdulazizalSaud,KingofSaudiArabia(2005-15).

ForthetwopartsofKashmir.

TheOICwasfoundedin1972butwasprecededbyanIslamicsummitinRabat,MoroccoinSeptember1969.IndiawasinvitedthroughAmbassadorGurbachanSingh.DelhidecidedtosendadelegationledbyFakhruddinAliAhmed.PresidentYahyaKhanrefusedtoattendsayingthatPakistanhadagreedtotheparticipationoftheMuslimsofIndia,notitsgovernment,asrepresentedbythenon-MuslimGurbachanSingh.

31:CouncilofSpiesRabindraSingh.HewasunderinvestigationandslippedoutviathelandroutetoNepal.

32:AkhandBharatConfederationDoctrineThefive-pointGujralDoctrinesoughttoremovequidproquosfromdiplomacywithIndia’sneighbours:(1)WithneighbourslikeBangladesh,Bhutan,Maldives,NepalandSriLanka,Indiadoesnotaskforreciprocity,butgivesandaccommodateswhatitcaningoodfaithandtrust.(2)NoSouthAsiancountryshouldallowitsterritorytobeusedagainsttheinterestsofanothercountryintheregion.(3)Nocountryshouldinterfereintheinternalaffairsofanother.(4)AllSouthAsiancountriesmustrespecteachother’sterritorialintegrityandsovereignty.(5)Theyshouldsettlealltheirdisputesthroughpeacefulbilateralnegotiations.

The1946CabinetMissionPlanoftheBritishImperialgovernmentsoughttokeepIndiaunitedbyproposingapower-sharingarrangementbetweenHindusandMuslims.ItenvisionedIndiacomprisingthreegroupsofprovinceswithstrongdecentralisationofpower,andDelhicontrollingnation-wide

3.

subjects:defence,currencyanddiplomacy.TheCongressParty,however,wantedastronglycentralisedgovernment.

SeeChapter13.

Index

Abbasi,ShahidKhaqan

Abdullah,DrFarooq

Abdullah,Omar

Abdullah,Sheikh

Adityanath,Yogi

Advani,L.K.

Afghanistan

Americanpolicyin

Bollywoodinfluencein

Indiapolicyin

Pakistanpolicyin

AfghanTaliban

Afridi,Dr

Afzal,LtGen(retd)Sikander

Agrasummit

Ahmed,GeneralMahmud

Aiyar,ManiShankar

AkhandBharat

AkhandBharat,ideaof

AlFaran

alQaeda

Americanarmy

Amin,Hafizullah

Andropov,Yuri

Ansari,Hamid

ArabSpring

Arafat,Yasser

AspenCentre

Austria

Azhar,Masood

Aziz,General

Aziz,Tariq

Babar,Naseerullah

BabriMasjiddemolition

Baig,Aslam

Bajpai,GauriShankar

Balochistan

BalusaGroup

Bangladesh

Basit,Abdul

Bavaria

Baweja,Harinder

TheBearTrap

Beg,GeneralMirzaAslam

onGulfcrisis

Beg,MirzaAfzal

Bhadrakumar,M.K.

Bhattistudios

Bhutto,Benazir

Bhutto,Z.A.

BJP

BJP-PDPcoalition

Blair,Tony

Britishintelligenceagency

BrookingsInstitute

BurhanWani’skilling

Bush,GeorgeH.W.

Butt,ProfessorAbdulGhani

Carter,Jimmy

ChaoPhrayaDialogue

ChaoPhrayariver

Chibber,LtGeneralML

Chilcotreport

China-PakistanEconomicCorridor(CPEC)

CIA

assessments,ratingof

Clinton,Hillary

coercivediplomacy

Cohen,StephenP.

compositedialogue

CorpsofIntelligence

countries’cooperationandconflict

Davis,Raymond

Dawood

DeepState

defectors

democracyinPakistan

demonetisation

Desai,Morarji

devolutionpolicy

DGMilitaryOperations(DGMO)

Dixit,Mani

doubleagents

Doval,Ajit

Dubey,Muchkund

Durrani,Mahmud

Durranis

Ehsan-ulHaq,General

electronicsurveillance

Fernandes,George

Flynn,Michael

four-pointformula

Gandhi,Indira

Gandhi,Rajiv

Gandhi,Sonia

GangofFour

Gates,Robert

GatesMission

Gauri,Aamir

Geelani,SyedAliShah

Gentlemen’sCricketClub

GermanBND

Ghani,Ashraf

GHQofIndia

Gill,‘Pompy,’

Gujaratriots

Gujral,I.K.

GujralDoctrine

Gul,Hamid

GulfWar

Gurdaspur

Gurdaspurincident

Haidar,Salman

Haider,Ejaz

Haider,Salman

Halevy,Efraim

Haq,Fazle

Haqqaninetwork

Harkat-ulMujahideen

Hassan,DrMubashir

Hassan,SyedFida

Headley,David

Hersh,Seymour

Hindutva

Hizb-ulMujahideen

Hurriyat

IB

Ibrahim,Dawood

IDSA

India-Pakistan-Afghanistansession

India-Pakistanrelationship

Americanrolein

blockonflights

cricketmatches

establishmentofnuclearhotline

HafizSaeed’shousearrestand

KulbhushanJadhav’sarrestand

positivesofbilateralrelationship

roadmap

Russianrolein

terrorandtalks

treatmenttoPOW

India-USrelationship

Indo-PakistaniWarof

Indo-PakistaniWarof

IndusWaterTreaty

intelligenceagencies

assessments

bureaucraticnatureof

comparisonbetweenIndianandPakistanibureaucracies

dosanddon’ts

intelligencecooperation

TVchannelsby

intelligencework,imageof

Iqbal

Iran-Pakistanpipeline

IraqiWMDs

ISI

Afghanistaninvolvement

failureagainstIndia

organizationalstructure

onsendinginfiltrators

tenureofchiefs

ISIS

Israel

IstanbulProcess

Jackson,Michael

Jadhav,Kulbhushan

Jaish-e-Mohammed

Jaitley,Arun

Jalal,Ayesha

Jamaat-e-Islami

Jamaat-ud-Dawa

Janjua,NaseerKhan

Jirga,Loya

J&KBank

J&KLiberationFront(JKLF)

Jones,Peter

Joshi,MuraliManohar

Jundallah

Kadakin,AlexanderMikhailovich

Kakakhel,Shafqat

Kalam,MaulanaAbul

Kao,RamNath

Karamat,Jehangir

Kargil

Karzai,Hamid

Kashmir

Modiyears

realitiesin

specialstatusof

‘KashmirbanegaPakistan,’

Kashmirissue

statusquosituation

KashmirMuslimConference

Kashmir-relateddevelopment

Kashmiruprising

Kathmandu

Katju,Vivek

Kaul,Vinod

Kayani,Ashfaq

Kennedy,JFK

KGB

Khalilzad,Zalmay

Khalqis

Khan,AbdulQadeer

Khan,AkhtarAbdurRahman

Khan,Amanullah(Gilgit)

Khan,Ayub

Khan,GhulamIshaq

Khan,LtGenIftikharAli

Khan,MerajMohammed

Khan,RiazMohammed

Khan,SardarMohammedAbdulQayyum

Khan,Yahya

Khar,Mustafa

Khare,Harish

Khokhar,Riaz

Khomeini,Ayatollah

Khrushchev,Nikita

Kissinger,Henry

K2Kashmir-Khalistanplan

Korybko,Andrew

Kumar,Prabhat

Laden,Osamabin

LalMasjidepisode

LaluPrasad

Lambah,Sati

Lashkar-e-Toiba

Lavrov,Sergey

ALegacyofSpies

Leghari,Farooq

Levy,Adrian

Liddell-Hart’sstrategyof‘expandingtorrents,’

LineofActualControl

LineofControl(LoC)

LondonSchoolofEconomics(LSE)

Madhav,Ram

Mahajan,Pramod

Mahmood

Maldivesinvasion

Malhotra,Jyoti

Malik,Yasin

Manekshaw,FieldMarshalSam

Mansoor,MullahAkhtar

Martyrdomcults

Mattis,James

Mehmood,Khurshid

Mengal,Ataullah

Menon,ShivShankar

Mhatre,Ravindra

MI

MI5

MI6

MI6chief,tenureof

milestoneagreement

Miliband,David

militarybureaucracy

military-industrialcomplex

MilitaryIntelligence(MI)

military-to-militarydialogue(betweenIndiaandPakistan)

Mishra,Brajesh

Mission

Modi,Narendra

Pakistanpolicy

reactioninPakistantoelectionof

Mohajirs

Mohammed,Gul

Mohmand,RustomShah

Mossad

mostfavourednation(MFN)

Mufti,Mehbooba

MuktiVahini

Mullik,B.N.

Mumbaiattack,26/11

Musharraf,GeneralPervez

Nabi,Ghulam

Naqvi,Tanveer

Narayanan,M.K.

Nasr,Vali

NationalDayfunctions

NationalDayreception

nationalism

NATOgroup

Nawaz,Asif(Janjua)

NeemranaDialogue

Nepal

Nepalesecricketteam

NewGreatGame

NorthernAlliance

NorthKorea

NSA

nuclearisationtheory

Obama,Barack

OfficialSecretsAct

OIC

Omar,Mullah

OperationBrasstacks

OperationGibraltar

OperationParakram

OperationTopac

OsamabinLaden’sassassination

Osman,rescueof

Padmanabhaiah,K.

Pakistan

Afghanpolicy

Bollywoodinfluencein

cooperationbetweengovernmentdepartments

democracyin

politicalinstabilityof

religionin

statusquowithstateofaffairsinKashmir

Pakistanicoupd’état

PakistanPeoplesParty(PPP)

Panetta,Leon

Parchamis

Parliamentattack

Parrey,Kuka

Parrikar,Manohar

Parthasarathy,G.

Parthasarathy,Malini

Pashtunistan

Patel,Praful

Pathankot

‘PartnershipforPeace,’

PDP-BJPalliance

people-to-peoplerelationship

PersianGulf

Peshawarschoolincident

PML(N)

Pokhrannucleartests

Porter,Gareth

PugwashConference

Punjabis

PunjabiTaliban

Punjab-to-Punjabrelationship

Putin,Vladimir

Qadir,BrigadierShaukat

Qadri,MalikMumtazHussain

Qayyum,Sardar

Qazi,AshrafJehangir

Raghavan,T.C.A.

Raghavan,V.R.

Rahim,J.A.

Rahman,GenAkhtarAbdur

Rahman,Mujibur

Raman,B.

Rao,P.V.Narasimha

Raphael,Robin

Rasgotra,RajKumar

Rashid,Ahmed

RAW

Reagan,Ronald

Rehman,SheikhMujibur

religioninPakistan

Riedel,Bruce

Rigi,Abdolmalek

Rumsfeld,Donald

Russia

RussianSu-24Mmilitaryaircraft,shootingof

7/7attack

SAARC

SAARCsummit

Sabharwal,Sharat

Saeed,Hafiz

Sahay,C.D.

Sandhu,Nehchal

Sattar,Abdul

Savan,Benon

Sayeed,MuftiMohammad

Scowcroft,GeneralBrent

Sen,Samar

Shah,Amit

Shah,Rustam

Shah,SyedMohammedYusuf

ShanghaiFive

Sharif,MohammedShehbaz

Sharif,Nawaz

intellectualcapability

Sharif,Raheel

Sharma,Dineshwar

Sharma,O.P.

Sharmel-Sheikhstatement

Shekhar,Chandra

Shimlasummit

Shyamal

Siachen

Sikander,Afzal

SikhandKashmirimilitants,casesofinteractionbetween

Singh,DrManmohan

Singh,Jasjit

Singh,Jaswant

Singh,K.M.

Singh,MaharajaAmarinder

Singh,Rajnath

Singh,Tavleen

Sinha,Yashwant

SmashingLists

Sood,Vicky

SouthAsiaForumfortheFuture

SovietUnioncollapse

Subrahmanyam,K.

surgicalstrike

Swaraj,Sushma

Taliban

Taseer,Salman

Taseer,Shahbaz

Tehelkaconference,London

Tehrik-i-TalibanPakistan

Tejpal,Tarun

Tenet,George

terrorism

9/11attack

Thapar,Karan

Thatcher,Margaret

think-tanks

Tikhonova,Polina

Tillerson,Rex

Tomsen,Peter

Track-IIdialogue

TreatyofHudaybiyyah

Trubnikov

Trump,Donald

TudehParty

UnitedStates

Uri

Vajpayee,A.B.

Verma,A.K.

VivekanandaFoundation

Wani,Burhan

WarsawPact

Woolsey

Woolsey,James

world’stenbestspyagencies

XiJinping

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AbouttheBook

SOME TIME in 2016, a series of dialogues took place which set out to find ameeting ground, even if only an illusion, betweenA.S.Dulat andAsadDurrani.OnewasaformerchiefofRAW,India’sexternalintelligenceagency,theotherofISI,itsPakistanicounterpart.Astheycouldnotmeetintheirhomecountries,theconversations,guidedbyjournalistAdityaSinha,tookplaceincitieslikeIstanbul,BangkokandKathmandu.OnthetableweresubjectsthathavelonghauntedSouthAsia, flashpoints that take lives regularly. Itwas in allways a deepdive into thepoliticsofthesubcontinent,asseenthroughtheeyesoftwospymasters.

Amongthesubjects:Kashmir,andamissedopportunityforpeace;HafizSaeedand26/11;KulbhushanJadhav;surgicalstrikes;thedealforOsamabinLaden;howtheUS and Russia feature in the India-Pakistan relationship; and how terrorunderminesthetwocountries’attemptsattalks.

When the project was first mooted, General Durrani laughed and said nobodywouldbelieveitevenifitwaswrittenasfiction.Atatimeoffraughtrelations,thisunlikely dialogue between two former spy chiefs from opposite sides—a projectthatisthefirstofitskind—maywellprovidesomeanswers.

AbouttheAuthors

A.S.DulatwasSecretaryoftheResearchandAnalysisWing,1999-2000.

General Asad Durrani was Director-General, Inter-Services Intelligencedirectorate,1990-91.

AdityaSinhaisawriterandajournalistlivingontheoutskirtsofDelhi.

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FirstpublishedinIndiain2018byHarperCollinsPublishers

A-75,Sector57,Noida,UttarPradesh201301,Indiawww.harpercollins.co.in

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Copyright©A.S.Dulat,AsadDurraniandAdityaSinha2018

P-ISBN:978-93-5277-925-3EpubEdition©May2018ISBN:978-93-5277-926-0

Theviewsandopinionsexpressedinthisbookaretheauthor’sownandthefactsareasreportedbythem,andthepublishersarenotinanywayliableforthesame.

A.S.Dulat,AsadDurraniandAdityaSinhaassertsthemoralrighttobeidentifiedastheauthorsofthiswork.

AllrightsreservedunderTheCopyrightAct,1957.Bypaymentoftherequiredfees,youhavebeengrantedthenonexclusive,nontransferablerighttoaccessandreadthetextofthisebookon-screen.Nopartofthistextmaybereproduced,transmitted,downloaded,decompiled,reverse-engineered,orstoredinorintroducedintoanyinformationstorageandretrievalsystem,inanyformorbyanymeans,whetherelectronicormechanical,nowknownorhereinafterinvented,withouttheexpresswrittenpermissionofHarperCollinsPublishersIndia.

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