presidents, advisers, and foreign policy the effect

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Presidents, Advisers, and Foreign Policy: The Effect of Leadership Style on ExecutiveArrangementsAuthor(s): Margaret G. Hermann and Thomas PrestonSource: Political Psychology, Vol. 15, No. 1, Special Issue: Political Psychology and the Workof Alexander L. George (Mar., 1994), pp. 75-96

Published by: International Society of Political PsychologyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3791440

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Political Psychology,Vol. 15, No. 1, 1994

Presidents, Advisers, and Foreign Policy: The Effectof Leadership Style on Executive Arrangements'Margaret G. Hermann and Thomas PrestonMershonCenter,Ohio State University

How does a president's leadership style influence the nature of his advisorysystem?Thispaper examineshow thepresident'sworkhabits, the ways he likesto receive information, hepeople he prefersaroundhim, and how he makesuphis mindare all key to understanding he manner in which the WhiteHouse isorganized.A survey of the literature inking eadershipstyle to advisory systemsrevealedfive characteristicsthat seem important o shaping what kinds of ad-visers are selected and how theyare constituted.Buildingon thesefive charac-teristics, we develop a typology indicatinghow presidentsprefer to coordinatepolicy andthedegree of controltheyneed overthepolicy-making rocess. Recentpresidentsare classified and discussed using this typology.KEY WORDS: U.S. Presidency;political leadership; foreign policy; decision making; leader-adviserrelations;White House organization

As the worldgrowsmorecomplex, interdependent,ndfilledwithuncertain-ties, presidents ace anincreasingdilemma n themakingof foreign policy.Moreparts of the governmenthave become involved in the foreign policy-makingprocess and increasing numbers of agencies, organizations,and people havedeveloped some interestin what happensin the internationalarena. Presidentsinevitably are drawn into the "whirlpoolof foreign affairs"(Fallows, 1981,p. 147).At issue is how presidentsmaintain ontroloverforeignpolicy while stilldelegating authority o otheractors in the government o deal withproblemsandtake advantageof opportunities.Moreover,how do presidentsshapethe foreignpolicy agendawhen situationsarebeing defined andproblemsas well as oppor-tunities are being perceivedand structuredby others in the political system?'This paperwas written with support rom a National Science FoundationGrant(DIR-9113599)totheResearchTrainingGroupon theRole of Cognition n Collective PoliticalDecision Makingat theMershonCenter,Ohio State University.

750162-895X ? 1994 International ociety of Political PsychologyPublishedby Blackwell Publishers,238 MainStreet,Cambridge,MA 02142, USA, and 108 Cowley Road, Oxford,OX4 IJF, UK.


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Hermann and Preston

This dilemma has precipitatedan increasein the size of the White Housestaff as presidents have worked to improve coordinationamong the variousentities that can define and shape foreign policy (cf. Crabb& Mulcahy, 1988;Hess, 1988). As a result, the presidencyhas becomean organizationor advisorysystem (cf. Burke & Greenstein, 1989; Feldman, 1990). In effect, as in anorganization, the president's staff extends his capabilities by increasing his"availableattention,knowledge, andexpertise"andby coordinating hebehaviorof the otherunitsinvolved in makingandimplementing oreignpolicy (Feldman,1990, p. 17). Because the presidentparticipates n the selection of membersofthis organizationand sets into place the norms and rules determiningorganiza-tionalculture,what the president s like can influence whatthe advisersare likeand the way the organization ackles foreign policy issues. In effect, what thepresident is like helps to shape the relationshipsamong the advisers and hisrelationshipwiththe advisers.As Greenstein 1988, p.352) hasobserved:"Lead-ership in the modem presidencyis not carriedout by the presidentalone, butratherby presidentswith their associates. It dependsthereforeon boththe presi-dent's strengthsand weaknesses andon the qualityof the aides' support"-thatis, on the natureof the relationshipbetween presidentand associates.In this paper we are going to explore how a president'sleadershipstyleinfluences the kinds of advisers he will select and the relationshipshe willestablish with his advisers. First, we will explore a numberof proposals thatothershave made for classifying the ways presidentshave structuredheir rela-tions with their advisers. Second, we will abstract rom these proposalswhatappearto be a set of common underlyingcharacteristics hat help to define apresident's eadershipstyle. Finally,we will show how these underlyingcharac-teristics can be integrated nto a model for understandinghow presidentswillstructure heir advisory systems. The model uses personalitycharacteristicsasindicatorsof variousaspectsof leadershipstyle.

WAYS OF CLASSIFYING ADVISORY SYSTEMSTableI shows a numberof classificationschemes that have developed toindicate how presidentsstructure heirrelationswith advisers as well as severalsets of categoriesdescribinghow political leadersmoregenerallydevelop advi-sory systems. In each case we have identifieda leadership style variable thatresearchershave linkedto certaineffects on how advisorysystemsareorganized.If the presidenthas thatparticularypeof leadership tyle, his advisersarelikelyto be organized n a specific mannerand exhibitcertaincharacteristics. neffect,the president's leadership style helps to shape the kinds of advisers that areselected as well as how they are organized. We will explore several of these

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Presidents, Advisers, and Foreign PolicyTable IInfluence of PresidentialLeadershipStyle on AdvisorySystems

Source LeadershipStyle Variable Effectson AdvisersDegree of partisanresponsive-ness

Degree does businessperson-ally or through nstitutional-ized routinesDegree of active involvementin foreignpolicy making,distrustof bureaucracy, xpe-rience in foreign affairs, fo-cus on personal diplomacy,popularitywith public and

congressCognitive style

Sense of efficacy

Orientation owardpoliticalconflictGeneraloperatinggoalCommonlyused strategiesforcoping with uncertaintyWillingnessto tolerate conflictPreferred trategiesfor resolv-ing conflict

Degree of tolerance for conflictPreference or "best"versus"doable"optionPreferencefor evaluatingratherthangeneratingoptionsInvolvement n decision mak-

ingDegree willing to take respon-sibility for decisions

Degree of emphasison loyalty,set of sharedobjectives,willingness to go aroundbu-reaucracyDegree of centralization,open-ness to new ideas & options,delegationof authorityDegree presidentwill dominateforeignpolicy making, dele-gate authority,demandloy-alty, seek advice

Waypresidentwants informa-tion networkorganized,openness to informationandadviceInterestsfocus on foreign poli-cy making, natureof agenda,involvement in foreign poli-cy makingDegree of control and loyaltypresidentneedsFocus of agenda, priorities,andtype of advisers needDegree work from principles,interested n consensus, will-ing to satisficeDegree of control needed overprocessDegree to which leader'spref-erences prevail, emphasisonunanimityversus majorityrule

Degree of control over processDegree of hierarchyand for-mality in advisory systemOpennessof system to outsideideas, organizationof infor-mationprocessingnetworkDegree of coordinationof poli-cy making, focus of attentionon foreignpolicy makingDegree focus on loyalty andadvisersversus implementors(continued)

Campbell, 1986

Crabb & Mulcahy,1988

George, 1980

Hermann,1987

Johnson, 1974

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Hermann and PrestonTable I (Continued)

Source LeadershipStyle Variable Effectson AdvisersKotter& Lawrence, How active leaderis in deci- Issues focus on, type of plan-1974 sion making ningGoals tryingto achieve Who need as advisers, howbuild coalitions

Waysaccomplishtasks Degree of emphasison person-alistic, entrepreneurial, rbureaucratic esourcesSmith, 1988 Preference or strongchief of Degree of hierarchy,natureofstaff vs. free-wheelinginner organization or gathering n-circle formation,patternof delega-tion of authorityPreference or proactiveversus Degree of consensus neededreactivepolicy making among advisers

classification schemes in more detail to provide the readerwith the rationalesbehindthe linkages.Johnson's 1974) classificationschemefocusingon how the White House ismanagedremainsthe classic in this field. Johnsonproposedthatthere arethreeways of managingthe White House that are found among modern-daypresi-dents:the formalistic,collegial, andcompetitivestyles. The leadershipvariablesindicatedin TableI are those Johnsonused in differentiating mongthese threetypes. The formalisticstyle of organization s designedto reduce the effects ofhumanerrorthrougha well-designed managementsystem that is hierarchical,focused on issues rather than personalities, nonconfrontational,and orientedtowardevaluatingrather hangeneratingoptionsandmakingthe "best"decision.Interest s on preservingthe president'stime for the "big"decisions. Across avariety of analyses of the presidents, scholars have considered the Truman,Eisenhower,Nixon, andReaganadministrationso haveexhibitedthis style (cf.George, 1980; Johnson, 1974).The collegial and competitive styles, on the otherhand, emphasize a lesshierarchicalorganization.The collegial style focuses on working as a team,sharing responsibility,and consensus-buildingwith an interest in generatingoptions, openness to information,and reaching a doable as well as the bestdecision. Presidentswho organizetheir advisers around he collegial style wantto be involved in policy makingand are uncomfortablewhen they are not in themiddleof things. Kennedy,Carter,and Bush appear o havehadcollegial styles(cf. Johnson, 1974). Whereas the collegial style is based on collaboration; hecompetitivestyle centers aroundconfrontation.Thepresidentwith a competitivestyle sets uphis organizationwithoverlappingareasof authority o maximizetheavailabilityof informationanda varietyof perspectives.Emphasis s on advocat-ing positions anddebate, with the presidentplayingthe role of the final arbiter.

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Presidents, Advisers, and Foreign PolicyTheobjectiveis a decision that s politicallyfeasible andbureaucraticallyoable.FranklinRoosevelt is the presidentgenerallyconsidered to have exhibitedthisstyle (see Johnson, 1974).

George (1980) builton Johnson'swork, abstractingout threestylistic vari-ables that seemed to shape what presidentialadvisers do. The first, cognitivestyle, refersto the way the presidentgathersandprocessesinformation romhisenvironment.Does the presidentcome with a well-formulatedvision or agendathathelps to shapehow he perceives, interprets,and acts on informationor is heinterested n soundingout the situation and political context before defining aproblem and seeking options?The way this question is answeredsuggests thetypes of advisersthepresidentwill havearoundhim andthe kinds of informationthe presidentwill want in makinga decision. In the first instance, the presidentseeks advisers and information hat are supportiveof his predispositions; n thesecond instance, he is interested in experts or representativesof his variousconstituencieswho will providehim with insights into the political context andproblematanypointin time. At issue in this secondinstance s what fits with thecontext;what is doable at this particularmoment.The second stylistic variablecenters around sense of efficacy or compe-tence. Sense of efficacy for George relates to how the president's agenda isformed. The problemshe feels most comfortable n tacklingand the areas he ismost interested n are likely to dominate his agenda. If, like George Bush, thepresidentfeels more at ease with foreign than domestic policy, his presidencywill probably avorforeignover domesticpolicy. If, like RonaldReagan,he hasan arena of problems that are of particular mportancesuch as building themilitary strengthof the United States vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, these issuesmay dominatemuch of the time of his administration.ThethirdstylisticvariableGeorgecalls orientationowardpoliticalconflict.How open is the president to face-to-face disagreementsand confrontationsamonghis advisers?The moreopenthepresident s to such debateandcrossfire,the easier it is for him to forge an advisory systemexhibitingthe characteristicsof Johnson'scompetitive model; the more uncomfortable uch a milieu makeshim, the more likely the president is to want an advisory system that eitheremphasizes teamwork(all of us work together)or formal rules (here are thegatekeeperswho manage what gets to the president).George argues that thisorientation endsto shapethepresident'sdealingswith his cabinet andtheexecu-tive bureaucracy s well as the WhiteHouse staff. It colors the way he wants hisadvisory system to run. Moreover, it helps to define the type of control thepresidentwill want overthepolicy-makingprocessandhow muchloyaltyhe willdemandfromthose aroundhim. If conflict is to be minimized,the presidentwillhave to expend resources to keep it undercontrol; one way to achieve suchcontrolis to choose adviserswho areloyal to the presidentand have served himfor some time. If conflict can be toleratedand,perhaps,even used, the president

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may see high turnoveramonghis staff as egos are bruisedor tempersflare. Butadvisers are more likely to be policy advocates and know what they want thepresidentto do.Other scholars particularly nterested n the presidency (Campbell, 1986;Crabb& Mulcahy, 1988; Smith, 1988) have added to what JohnsonandGeorgehave described. These writershave been interested n leadershipstyle variablesthat are relationalin form;that is, they focus on what the presidentdoes vis-a-vis his advisers and the bureaucracy.One such variable s the degreeto whichthepresidentdoes businesspersonallyorthrough nstitutionalized outines.Is thepresidenta hands-onperson like Lyndon Johnson, who wanted to talk to thecommanders n Vietnam or the ambassador n the Dominican Republic aboutwhat was reallygoing on, or is he morelikely to want what comes upthrough hebureaucracy o be culled and organizedbefore it gets to him for his reflection?Anyone can become an adviserto the first type of president; he gatekeepersatthe end become the advisers for the second type of president.Anotherrelationalvariableconcernshow proactiveversus reactivethepres-ident'spolicy makingis. Is the president nterested n shapingpolicy andenlist-ing the aid of others in selling the policy, or is the presidentmoreresponsivetowhatcomes to him fromothersrather hansearchingout activities?Theproactivepresident s morelikely to want a loyal staff with similarpredispositionswho aresold on the president'sprogramand readyto enlist support or it. Consider thestaff that supportedReagan in seeking the release of American hostages inLebanonby selling armsto Iran.The reactivepresidentbecomesmoredependenton how others define andrepresentproblemsandthe pressure hey place on himto act. The issues that the more reactivepresidentfocuses on are a functionofwhom he has on his staff.A third relationalvariablecenters arounddistrustof the bureaucracy.Howmuch does the president rust the executive branchbureaucracyo carryout hisdecisions andprogram?Those presidents ike Nixon with an inherentdistrustofwhat the bureaucracywill do to theirpolicies often centralizeauthority o thatitrests with those they can trust, or they endrunthe bureaucracyaltogetherbybringingpolicy making ntothe WhiteHouse andunder heircontrol.Withmoretrust of the bureaucracycomes more interestin recommendations rom thosefurtherdown in the hierarchyandmore interest n interagencycommissions andtask forces.

Twoscholarswritingaboutpolitical leadership n general(Hermann,1987;Kotter& Lawrence,1974)havestressedseveralfurthereadership tyles that caninfluence how advisers are chosen. The first focuses on the leader'spreferredstrategies orresolvingconflict. Whichof thefollowing strategiesdoes the leadergenerallyuse to resolve conflict amongadvisers: eaderpreferences,unanimity/consensus, or majorityrule? Each strategysuggests a differencein the advisorysystem. If the strategyfocuses on insuringthat the leader'spreferencesprevail,

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Presidents, Advisers, and Foreign Policythe leader is going to play a more forceful role in the proceedingsthan if thestrategy nvolves buildinga consensusor engaginga coalition to make a major-ity. Consensus-buildingdemands more of a facilitative role from the leader,while engaging in coalition formationsuggests an emphasison negotiationandbargainingwith trade-offsand side payments.Moreover,the advisers the leaderselects may differ with these strategies.If the leadergenerallywants his prefer-ences to prevail, he will probablyseek out adviserswho have a similarphiloso-phy, are loyal, and predisposedto please him. If consensus is the name of thegame, the leader will seek out advisers who are, like himself, interested infacilitating he processof bringingdifferentviews togetherandmore conciliativethan confrontational.Advisers to leaders whose preferredstrategyis coalitionbuilding probablyneed skills at ascertainingwhere constituentsstand and per-suadingothers to join with them.The last leadershipstyle variablecenters around he generaloperatinggoalof the leader-what is drivingthe leaderto accepta leadershipposition. Whyis aperson interested n runningfor president?The type of goal indicateswho theleaderorpresident s likely to seek for advisers.Leaders nterested n a particularcause seek advocates aroundthem;those interested n supportseek a cohesivegrouparoundthem;those interested n power and influence seek implementorsaroundthem;those who want to accomplishsome task or change some policyseek experts around them. Advisers are sought that complementthe leaders'needs, that facilitate the leadersdoing what they perceive needs to be done.

TOWARD AN INTEGRATED CLASSIFICATIONSCHEMEAn examinationof the leadershipstyles listed in TableI suggests overlapamongthe categories.Althoughstated n differentwords, some of the categoriesfocus on similartypes of characteristics.The classificationschemes in TableIappearto emphasize five types of leadershipstyle variables. The five are in-volvementin the policy-makingprocess, willingnessto tolerateconflict, a presi-dent's motivationor reason for leading, preferred trategiesfor managing nfor-mation, and preferred trategiesfor resolving conflict.Involvementin the policy-makingprocess focuses on both the president'sinterest and expertise in foreign policy making as well as his preferenceforpersonal versus institutional decision making. Involvement in the making offoreignpolicy is correlatedwithbeing interested n foreignpolicy, experienceinforeignpolicy making,and a desire to do businesspersonallyrather hanthroughinstitutionalizedroutines. As George (1980) has observed, the president'seffi-

cacy is enhancedwhen he is either interestedor experiencedin foreign policymaking,andhe finds this partof thejob satisfyingandeasy. Involvement s alsosuggestive of a focus on personalengagement n the processanda desire to be a

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archy,and centralization. n therest of this sectionof thepaper,we would like toarguethat the five leadershipstyle variableswe havejust discussedmay help toshape the way specialization, hierarchy,and centralizationare defined in anyparticularpresident'sadministration.Weproposethatpresidential nvolvement n the foreign policy-makingpro-cess is indicativeof specialization n foreign policy. Such presidential nvolve-mentsuggests a focus on foreign policy andpresidential nfluenceon the natureof the foreign policy agenda.Preferred trategies or managing nformationandresolvingconflict are indicativeof the amountof controlthe presidentwill trytoassertand the ways he will seek to motivate those under him-these strategiesinfluence the manner n which authority s structured n the White House. Andthe president'swillingnessto tolerateconflict and motivation or leadingsuggesthow he will go about coordinatingpolicy makingand where he will look forsupport or his policies-that is, the way in whichpolicy makingwill be central-ized in the White House. Table II indicates the linkages we seebetween the leadershipstyle variables and these organizational unctions. Thistable also indicates the categories that we will use to delineate the leadershipstyle variables n the rest of this paper.TableIIIdiagrams he interrelationshipswe perceivewhen we combineorganizationalunctionswith the leadership tylevariables. And TableIV describes the types of advisers and advisory systemspresidentswith these organizationalpreferencesare likely to use.

SpecializationAs noted in TableII, degree of involvement in the foreign policy-makingprocess is used here to denote specialization. For purposesof this paper, we

Table IILinkagesBetween LeadershipStyle Variablesand OrganizationalFunctions

OrganizationalFunc-tion LeadershipStyle VariableSpecialization Involvement n foreignpolicy-makingprocessHierarchy Control) Preferred trategiesfor managing nformation:Formalchain of commandHub of information-gatheringrocessPreferred trategiesfor resolvingconflict:Leader'spreferencesprevailDecisions madethroughconsensusor workingmajorityFocus of centralization Willingnessto tolerate conflict:(Coordination) Littlewillingness to tolerateconflict

Willing to tolerate conflictMotivationor reason for leading:Motivated to seek approvaland support(power/status)Motivatedto promotecause (completetask, do what is right)UlIII II I IIII~~~~~~~~~~


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Hermann and PrestonTable III

RelationshipsBetween OrganizationalFunctionsandLeadershipStylesHierarchy(Control)

Build concurrence/communityamong advisers (focus onpolitical process)

FormalLittle willingness to toler-ate conflictMotivated to seek approval& support power/status)Leader'spreferencesprevail

Formalchain of commandFocus of centralization

(Coordination)

Accomplishtask (focus onsubstanceof problem)

Willing to tolerate conflictMotivated to promotecause (completetask, dowhat is right)Leader'spreferencesprevailFormalchain of command

InformalLittle willingness to toler-ate conflictMotivated to seek approval& support power/status)Decisions made throughconsensus or workingmajorityHub of information-gatheringprocess

Willing to tolerate conflictMotivated to promotecause (complete task, dowhat is right)Decisions made throughconsensus or workingmajorityHub of information-gatheringprocess

Note: Above relationshipshave more influence on foreign policy, the moreinvolvedthe president sin the foreignpolicy-makingprocess.

propose that the relationships displayed in Table III are more likely when thepresident is involved in the foreign policy-making process-when he is inter-ested and experienced in the foreign policy arena. Under such circumstances, thepresident will want to organize the White House staff responsible for foreignpolicy, and his leadership style has a greater chance of shaping the nature of thatstaff. Moreover, such presidents are probably more likely to pay attention toforeign policy issues and be attuned to potential problems and opportunities inthe international arena. Foreign policy issues will become a central part of thepresident's agenda. As a result, who the advisers are who deal with foreignpolicy and how they are configured can influence the nature of the policy.

Focus of Centralization (Coordination)Presidents appear to differ in the way in which they coordinate their ad-visers. The focus of centralization in the White House seems to take one of two

forms-either a focus on having concurrence among relevant advisers or a focuson accomplishing a task. The group dynamics literature suggests that these aretwo major functions that leaders play in groups-helping the group work through

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Presidents, Advisers, and Foreign PolicyTable IVInfluenceof LeadershipStyle on AdvisorySelection andOrganization

Hierarchy(Control)

Build concurrence/communityamong advisers(ProcessFocus)

Focus of centralization(Coordination)

Accomplishtask(ProblemFocus)

FormalLoyalty important;Advisersused as soundingboard;Interested n focusing onimportantdecisions;Interested n evaluatingrather hangeneratingoptions;Leader-dominated roup-thinkpossible;Procedureswell-defined &

highly structured

Select adviserswho sharecause/concern/ideology;Advisersseen as imple-mentors& advocates;Adviserstailor informationto fit biases;One or two advisersplaygatekeeperroles for in-formationand access;Decisions shapedbysharedvision;

Disagreementscenteronmeansrather han ends

InformalAdvisers seen as partofteam;Sharingof accountability;Groupcohesion is valued;Advisersprovide psycho-logical support;Optionssoughtthatmini-mize conflict & dis-agreement

Wantexpertsas advisers;Advisers seen as providinginformation& guidance;Open to using bureaucracyto get information;Time spent on generatingoptions & consideringconsequences;Seek "doable"solutiontoproblem;Disagreement s valued

a task or facilitating group interaction, participation, and satisfaction (e.g., Bass,1984; McGrath, 1984; Stogdill, 1974). This theme also appears in the organiza-tion literature, where researchers talk about the twin goals of leadership asorganizational survival and policy achievement (e.g., Hargrove, 1989; Meier,1989; Miller, 1987). How comfortable presidents feel in an environment wherethere is conflict and disagreement and the presidents' motivation for leading areleadership style variables that are suggestive of which way a president is likely towant to coordinate policy.Facilitation of group satisfaction and organizational survival have as theirfocus building concurrence and a sense of belonging among members of a groupand developing a climate of cooperation and support. Conflict and disagreementare dysfunctional to such an environment because interest is centered aroundpromoting a sense of community. How does the leader help members feel a partof the group or organization and see their participation as valued and needed?

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The way members eel aboutthe groupor organizationbecomesimportanto theleader. Thereis little tolerancefor conflict andmuchattentionpaidto providingapprovaland support.Translated o the presidentialadvisory system, the desireof the presidentwith such a focus would be to have advisers who feel em-powered, who believe that theiropinionsand interestscount, but who also func-tion best in a climate of cooperationand trust. The advisory system becomes acommunityof interlockingpartswith a shared nterest n containingconflict anddisagreementand in enhancingthe sense of common interests and values.When the focus of coordination n a groupor organizationbecomes accom-plishinga taskor policy achievement,attention urns o getting somethingdone.The major impetus for action is not how members feel about the group ororganizationbuthow presentproblemscan be solved or how the currentproblemis defined. Thereis a changefromseeingthegroupas a community o perceivingthe groupas a producer.The emphasisis on solving problemsandtakingadvan-tage of opportunities oward some end. There often is a sense of mission and abottomline. Leadership acilitatesmovementon the missionand achievementofthe goal. Conflict and disagreementare generally valued with such a focusbecause they introduce differentperspectives into discussion and enhance thechances for innovative solutions as members wrestle with their differences ofopinion. Presidentialadvisory systems with this focus are interested n doing agood job, in addressing ssues facing the administrationn an effective mannerwith positive results. Membersof the administrationdo not have to like oneanotherbut they need to acknowledgeand admireeach other'sproblem-solvingcompetenciesand skills. The advisorysystem is like a well-oiled machine withmembersbothdefiningandcarryingout their roles andfunctionswiththe qualityof the product n mind.In theirdiscussion of the advisory systems of the Eisenhower andJohnsonadministrations,Burke and Greenstein(1991, p. 290) have differentiatedbe-tween two aspectsof politicalrealitytesting-"the politicalcomponentof sellingpolicies andmustering he supportnecessaryto win approvalandthe substantivecomponentof devising and analyzingpolicies and the means of implementingthem." These two componentsparallelthe two ways of coordinatingpolicy wehave proposedhere. The political componentis similar to the focus on concur-rence and community;the substantivecomponent is similar to the focus onaccomplishinga task orpolicy achievement.In one the emphasisis on buildingsupport; n the other, the emphasis is on developing a good policy. Burke andGreenstein 1991) observe thatEisenhowerandJohnsoneach felt morecomfort-able in dealingwith one rather han both of these and, thus, tendedto shapetheiradvisory systems with that focus in mind. Eisenhower was predisposedtowardtackling the problem, which meant a focus on substantiveand policy analysis;Johnsonwas predisposed owardthe process, whichmeant a focus on the politi-cal and building support.

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Presidents, Advisers, and Foreign Policy

Hierarchy (Control)Presidentsalso appear o differ in the degreeof controlthey need over thepolicy-makingprocess. As Downs (1967) noted, complexorganizations ncludepeople with differentgoals and interests-differences that cannot generallyberesolved throughvoting but can throughthe establishmentof a hierarchyand apatternof organizational uthority.How much control a presidentwantsover the

advisory system helps to shapethe natureof the patternof authority hatdevel-ops. Presidential nterest in control is evidenced in the strategiesthe presidentprefersfor managinginformationand conflict/disagreement.If the presidentwants to make the final decision-that is, have his prefer-ences prevail-he is likely to seek to control whathappens n the foreignpolicyarena. His is the ultimateauthorityand cannot be reversed. And he is likely toorganize authority nto a hierarchical ystemwith himself at the apexof a formalchainof command. Informationprocessing, problemdefinition, andoption gen-erationoccur at lower levels andcome up to the president.The advisorysystemis organizedinto a formal and rather nflexible hierarchy.In effect, there is acorrectway to do things and authoritypatternsare well-defined.But if the president s more comfortablewhen decisions are made throughconsensusor concurrence,he is less likely to use a formalhierarchicalpatternofauthority.Who will participate n decision makingand how structured he pro-cess is will vary with the situationand problem.There will be a looseness andinformalityto the patternof authority hat facilitates the president'sbuilding aconsensus. Often leadersin loose hierarchical ystemsbecome managersof theinformation n the system by puttingthemselves at the hub of the communica-tions network. In this way they can have some control over who gets whatinformation,andtheyhaveknowledgeaboutwhat information thersknow. As aresult, they have the basis on which to organizea decision-makingunit that canreach consensus. In effect, the patternof authorityis more informal and isstructuredand restructured n relation to the particularproblem at hand. Thepresident s still on top, but he has chosen to involve othersdirectlyin decisionmakingand to use informal channels of authority.Once more Burke and Greenstein (1991) in their discussion of theEisenhower andJohnsondecisions on Vietnamprovideevidence for the distinc-tion we aremakinghere.Theydescribe heessentiallyformalsystemof authoritythat Eisenhowerset up and nurtured,as contrastedwith the generallyinformalsystem of authority hatwas Johnson'sstyle. "No formalsystem in the moderpresidencywas more explicitly and extensively articulated han Eisenhower's.The formal componentof Johnson'sadvising was minimal"(Burke & Green-stein, 1991, p. 276). Eisenhowerhad rules, routines,and proceduresby whichpolicy choices were defined, discussed, and selected. Those involved in theprocess understood and workedby these rules. The system was organizedto

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presentEisenhowerwithwell-thought-outproblemsandoptionsfor his decision.ForJohnson,there were no explicit operatingrules andprocedures.People hadaccess because of whom they were and theirposition on the war.

TOWARD A NEW TYPOLOGYThe two types of authoritypatternsand the two ways of coordinatingpolicycreate a fourfoldtypology of advisory systems based on the president's eader-

ship style. TableIIIpresentsthis typology.Presidentscan have a stricthierarchi-cal or formalauthoritypatternwith a focus on buildingconcurrence;hey can bemoreloose and informal n theirauthoritypatternyet focus on buildingconcur-rence;they can organizea formalauthoritypatternbut want to work on policyachievement;and they can maintain an informalapproachwhile focusing onpolicy achievement. As we have noted, presidentswith particular eadershipstyles will choose these variousoptions in developing their advisory systems.What are the characteristics f the advisers and theirorganization hat we mightexpect from these distinctivetypesof advisory systems?TableIV providessomeanswers to this question.As TableIV suggests, these different ypes of advisorysystems contain adviserswith differentbackgroundsandcompetenciesand em-phasizedifferentkindsof processesand differentmissions. Let us examine eachof these advisorysystems in more detail.

Formal Control, Process FocusPresidentswhose leadership tyle leadsto a rather ormalpatternof authori-

ty and an interestin having concurrenceamong advisers as the way policy iscoordinated ook for adviserswho areloyal to themandreadyto be influencedbythem.Theywant adviserswho arepredisposed o workfor them and interested npleasing them. Such presidentsuse theiradvisers as a soundingboardon whomto try out their ideas and with whom to shape how proposals are phrasedtoencourageconsensus outside the White House. The focus is on developing anorderlypolicy-makingprocessthat has well-definedproceduresandreservesthemore importantdecisions for the president.Problems are defined and optionsgenerateddown in the chain of command and are refinedas they move up thehierarchy.The president'stask is to make the final decision amongthe optionsthathavemade it throughhis staffingprocess.Thepresident'spreferencesprevailand, if known ahead of time, may influence the kind of information,problems,and potentialoptions that reach him.Materialson presidential eadershipstyle suggest that this kind of advisorysystem was characteristicof Trumanand Nixon among recentpresidents(see,

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e.g., George, 1980; Hess, 1988;Johnson, 1974;Light, 1982). These two presi-dents had a rather low tolerance for conflict, were more interested in pow-er/status andapproval/supporthanpromotinga cause, wantedtheirpreferencesto prevail, and believed in a formal chain of command for the processing ofinformationas well as in the definition of problemsand the identificationofoptions. As a result of these leadership styles, they appearto fall into thecategory leading to a preferencefor a more formalpatternof authorityand afocus on process or on buildingconcurrenceamongadvisers. And the structureof their advisory system reflects many of the traits indicated in Table IV ascharacterizing uch an advisorysystem. They were interested n loyalty amongtheir advisers. Hess (1988) argues that loyalty was a unifying theme for theTrumanand Nixon administrations. ohnson 1974) notes how Trumanwantedtopreservehis time for the "big"decisions andwas interested n evaluatingratherthangeneratingoptions. George (1980) describeshow orderlyand well-definedthe rules and procedureswere in these administrations.

Informal Control, Process FocusPresidentswho work best when thepatternof authoritys more informalandless well-defined and whose centralconcernis buildingconcurrenceor consen-sus among those involved in the policy process are more likely to seek out

advisers who are trusted riendswho haveservedwiththem, albeit in a varietyofcapacities across much of theirpolitical careers.These advisers are viewed asmaking up a team, the membersof which shareaccountability or decisions andbelieve they are an importantpartof the policy-makingprocess. A sense of thegroupis important o its membersso that advisers as teamplayerstake prideintheir ob andin resultingpolicies. "Wedid this together; et's tackle thisproblemtogether"become mottoes for the advisorysystem. Advisersprovidepsychologi-cal andemotionalsupport or thepresident ince all are involved in what is goingon and sharehis concerns and are alertto his needs. With the emphasison groupcohesion and teameffort,problemsaredefinedandoptions soughtthat minimizeconflict and disagreementamong members in the group.The three moder presidentswho appearto exhibit this patternin theiradvisorysystem areJohnson, Ford, and Carter see, e.g., Burke & Greenstein,1991; Campbell, 1986; Crabb& Mulcahy, 1988; Hess, 1988; Johnson, 1974).These presidents wanted to be at the hub of the communicationnetwork-collecting and dispersinginformation; hey were interested n policies thathadreceived some form of consensual or unanimoussupportamong advisers;andtheyweremotivatedby powerand/orapprovalneeds while feeling mostcomfort-able exercisingleadership n a cooperativeandnonconfrontationalnvironment.Growingout of their eadership tyle preferences, hesethreepresidentsalso

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manifested the behaviors characteristicof the more informaladvisory systemwith a concern for processnotedin TableIV. Campbell(1986) andHess (1988)have discussed Carter'sdependenceon his Georgian riends as advisers-peoplewho had helped him move into politics, the governorship,and now into theWhite House. Burkeand Greenstein 1991) describethe importance f Johnson'sTuesdayLunch groupfor discussions and decision makingon Vietnam. Mem-bers of this groupwere advisers with whom he felt comfortableand on whomLBJ reliedfor advice andsupport.Burke and Greenstein 1991, p. 185) note the"consensus-pronequalities"of these meetings. They allowed the presidenttoblow off steam. Hess (1988) discusses the importance o Ford of havingconsen-sus and a sense of groupcohesion amonghis advisers. Foreach of these presi-dents, there was an emphasison workingwithin a team setting where optionswere soughtthat minimizedconflict anddisagreementand fostereda sharingofaccountabilityand a feeling of inclusion in the process.

Formal Control, Problem FocusPresidentsadoptingthis type of pattern or theiradvisory system are inter-ested in institutionalizing formalset of rules andprocedures n the organizationof the White House in the service of accomplishinga specific task. Such presi-dents can tolerate some conflict in theirdecision-makingenvironment; hey are

motivatedto accomplish something-be it solving a problem,achievinga goal,or moving the countryahead on some cause; butthey want theirpreferences oprevail and informationto flow upward througha formal chain of command.TableIV suggests that as a result of theirpredispositions,these presidentsarelikely to select adviserswho share heirconcern, cause, or ideology.The advisersbecome facilitatorsfor the achievementof a particular nd. They areadvocatesand implementorswho are committed to working toward a certaingoal. Keyadvisersserve the function of gatekeepers or informationandindividualaccessto the presidentto ensure thatproblemsrelevant to what he wants done reachhim. Moreover, decisions are generally shaped by the sharedvision that theadvisersand presidenthave with disagreements ocusing on how things shouldbe done ratherthanon what should be done. Timing also becomes a focus ofattention as advisers and presidentconsider when to do something to achievewhat they want.Reaganis the one moder presidentwhose leadershipstyle fits this catego-ry. As Light (1982) has observed,Reaganfocused the nation'sprioritiesaroundhis own ideology and pushedto see thatthe goals he set for his administration

were achieved. But he did so within a fairly formal hierarchicalsystem withgatekeepersduringhis firsttermanda dominantchief of staffduringthe second(see Hess, 1988). He was interested n aides whose opinions were like his and

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whom he trusted o evaluatespecific policies forhim (see Campbell,1986; Hess,1988).Informal Control, Problem Focus

Presidentswith this type of advisorysystem are interested n workingin anenvironment hat is rather nformalwhile focused on gettingthe taskdone. Theyare interested n being the center of the informationnetworkand in achievingaconsensus on policies that will work; they can tolerate conflict among thosearound hem as long as it is in the serviceof accomplishing hings. As TableIVsuggests, these leadership tyle characteristics aveimplications or the advisorysystem. Since information s importanto these presidents,they wantexpertsasadvisers and use their advisers to gather and organize informationregardingproblemsand opportunities.With their focus on wantingto know, such presi-dentsoften seek particulars ither frompeople on the scene or fromanywhere nthe bureaucracy.Everyonehas some piece of information hatmayproveuseful.Timeis spent generatingoptionsandconsideringwhat is feasible in theparticularsituation.Conflict is to be promoted f it providesa differentperspectiveor wayof thinkingabout a problem. Emphasisis placed on finding an alternative hatwill successfully accomplishan objective.FranklinRoosevelt is often used to exemplify this style (see George, 1980;Hess, 1988; Johnson, 1974). As Hess (1988) observes, FDR had an insatiableappetite or information.He wanted o have anopen, free-wheelingdiscussion ofproblemswith diverseopinionsandoptions puton the table(see George, 1980).As a result, he sought multiplechannels of communication,placing himself atthe center of the informationnetwork so that he knew more than anyone else.Often he promotedoverlapping urisdictionsof authority n order to hear howpersonswithdifferingperspectiveswouldtackle a problemor perceiveanoppor-tunity(George, 1980). In FDR's view, disagreement nsured hatproblemswithoptionswould be airedand consideredbefore a decisionwas made and an actiontaken. Thus, the chances for success were enhanced.

Mixed TypesWe have discussed these four advisory patternsas if they were mutuallyexclusive andpuretypes. An argument an be made thatsome presidents end toemphasizeone or the other of the two dimensionsthatmakeup this typology-control or coordination-and move across the other dimension dependingon

situationalandcontextualvariables.It can also be argued hatpresidentschangethe nature of the decision units they use as the natureof the problemor topicchanges. In each case our position would be that aspects of the president's

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leadershipstyle have become linked with characteristics f the context. When aparticular ontextualvariable s present, it changesthe natureof certainaspectsof the president'sstyle. Some examples are in order.Burkeand Greenstein 1991), as we have notedearlier,describeEisenhoweras mixing both formal and informalprocedures n his advisory system. In thelanguageof the typology,certainaspectsof his advisorysystemcould be charac-terized as formal and other aspects as informal.In both cases Eisenhowerwasinterestedin devising and analyzingpolicies-in focusing on problemsor thesubstance of issues. Inferring rom Burke andGreenstein'sanalysis (1991), weadvance the propositionthat Eisenhower nvolved advisersin an informalwaywhen he was "engagingin distilling availableinformation,statingoptions, andpreparingrecommendations"p. 288). In other words, the informaladvisorysystem was useful in the problem-definition r representation tage of decisionmaking-while Eisenhowerwas searchingfor informationon which to make adecision. He used theNSC PlanningBoard,as its namesuggests, fordevelopingplansandconsideringhardproblems see Burke& Greenstein, 1991, p. 277). Asone of Eisenhower'saides indicated,this groupdebated and argueda rangeofviews on majorissues in preparationor crises thatmight arise. A more formalsystem, however,was usedin thedecision-makingandimplementation hasesofdealingwith a problem.Eisenhowermade decisionson his own andexpectedhisaides to implementthemthrough heir variouspositions in the hierarchy Burke& Greenstein, 1991, pp. 287-288).

Ineffect, Eisenhower's ocus was on the coordinationof policy and he usedformal andinformalsystemsto deal with variousphasesof decision making.Heemphasizedone of the two variables in the typology while varying the otherdependingon where in the decision-makingprocesshe foundhimself. Problemrepresentation nddefinition, including he specificationof optionsandpotentialconsequences, was the prerogativeof a more informal planning and searchnetwork.The choice andimplementation tagesweremuchmoreformalizedandwithin a chain of command.Stage in the decision-makingprocess becomes thecontextualfactorthat is linkedto leadershipstyle. Eisenhower was more com-fortablebeing the hub of the informationnetwork and seeing if consensus waspossible in settingforthandanalyzing heproblem han n actuallydecidingwhatto do. In the choice-making stage, he wanted to be in command and have hispreferencesprevail.Bush is another nterestingpresident o consider in anydiscussionof mixedtypes. For many issues in his administration,his advisory system could beclassified as involving informalcontrol and a process focus. His was a teamapproachto decision makingwith consensus building and informationsharingthe mechanismsfor controland with a low tolerancefor conflict and a need forapproval and supportdefining what was a comfortableclimate in which tooperate see Winter,Hermann,Weintraub,& Walker,1991).Groupcohesionand

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minimizationof open disagreementswere the orderof the day amongadvisers.Of interest is what happenedto that advisory system when Bush felt himselfbacked into a corer-for example, priorto the Panamaniannvasion, aftertheIraqi nvasion of Kuwait,on his Chinapolicy. Bushappearedo shift his advisoryneeds to the type of systemcharacterized y formalcontroland a problemfocus.He became a man with a mission, wantingadviserswho would act as advocatesand implementorsof his policy decisions. Only advisers who shared in Bush'svision becamepartof the innercircle. Disagreements,whentheyappeared,weretoleratedon meansbutnot ends. Motivationchangedfrom the need for approvaland supportto promotinga cause, and, in turn, coordination switched fromconcurrenceamong relevant advisers to accomplishinga task. When he per-ceived a threatnot only to the policies of his administration ut also to policiesimportant o his political well-being and place in history(see Hermann,1979),Bush became more task-focused and more driven to see somethinghappenthatwould deal with the situationand save him face. He seemedmore certain hat heknew whatto do andwhatwas right.Problemswere defined more in moraltermsand drivenless by the polls and whatthe people wantedthanby the challengetohis integrityandexpertise.A certaintype of situation-a perceivedthreat o hissense of self-worth and political reputation-is the contextual variable thatchanged how Bush viewed the leadershipsetting and what he needed fromadvisers.What we are proposingis that presidentsprobablyhave a dominantstylethatfits within the typology we haveoutlined above. But theremaybe situationsor contextualfactors that lead presidentsto be more comfortable with anotherleadership style. Barber(1977) has argued that the presidents'first politicalsuccess helps to shapethe leadership tyle they will dependon in futurepoliticalsettings. If this style continues to be rewarded with success in the future, itbecomes even more a partof the president'srepertoire.Presidentsbegin to relyon this style, and it defines theway theywill approachdecisionmakingandtheirinterpersonal nteractions. There may, however, be certainsituations in whichpresidentshave not found their usualleadership tyle helpfuland havelearned oadapt t in orderto cope with suchevents. Knowingsomethingaboutpresidents'personalitiescan help shed some light on when such changes are likely.Inanotherplace, one of the authors Hermann,1993;Hermann& Hermann,1989) has shown how leaders' sensitivity to the political context can influencewhencontextual actors arelikely to shapehow theyengage in decisionmaking.Leaderswho show less sensitivity to contextual cues from their environmentstend to be top-downinformationprocessorsor cognitive misers;they are moreideological, more reliant on heuristicsto guide how they perceiveany problem,less willing to deal with discrepant nformation,andmoreinterested n advocat-ing a specific optionthan in learningaboutalternativepossibilities. Such leadersare morelikely to find a leadershipstyle thatis successful in gettingthem what

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they want and to rely on it in most situations.These leaders will probablybuildan advisory system that is fairly stable across time and situation.Leaders,on the otherhand,who are more sensitive to contextual nforma-tion appearto be bottom-up nformationprocessorsor hypothesis testers;theyuse contextual information o guide what they do, being more pragmaticandopportunistic, nterested n the cues discrepant nformationprovidesaboutwhatthey want to do, and concernedaboutoptiongeneration.If they have a position,such leaders use contextualinformation o gain informationabout timing andconstituentopinion. If they do not have a position, they use the information ohelp them decide where to look for a position. These leadersare likely to usedifferent ypes of advisorysystemsfor different ypes of problemsandarelikelyto use information rom the environment o guide whom they select to becomepartof the decision unit on any occasion. Cues about the natureof the advisorysystemcan be gleanedfromknowledgeaboutthe topicsor constituentsof impor-tancein anyparticular ituation.How the leaderreactsto thosetopicsorconstitu-ents will help to determinethe way leadershipstyle will have an impact onshaping the advisory system. Our earlier discussion of the Bush presidencyillustrates his point. When the topic was perceivedas threatening o him or hispolicies, Bushorganizedhis advisorysystem differently hanwhen the topic wasnot threatening.

CONCLUSIONSIn this paper we have focused on how the president's leadership styleinfluences the natureof his advisory system. As Hess (1988, p. 188) has ob-served, the president'sstyle, his work habits, how he likes to receive informa-tion, the people he prefersaroundhim, and the way he makesuphis mind areallkey to how the White House is organized. A survey of what has been writtenlinking the president's leadership style to the nature of the advisory system

revealed five leadership style variables that seem importantto shaping whatkinds of advisersare selected andhow they areorganized.These five variablessuggest how the presidentis likely to shape his advisory system to satisfy theorganizational unctions revolving aroundmasteryof the task, motivation andcontrol, and coordinationand coherence. We propose that the leadership stylevariables form a typology indicatinghow presidentspreferto coordinate theiradvisers and the degree of control they need over the policy-makingprocess.Each type relates a particular eadershipstyle to a differentkind of advisorysystem containing advisers with differentbackgroundsand competencies andemphasizingdifferentprocesses and missions. We have been able to fit mostrecent presidentsinto one of the types. Where such was not feasible we have

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Presidents, Advisers, and Foreign Policyraised the possibility of mixed types and indicatedhow one might determinefrom the context when the types would change.The typology proposed n this paperbuilds on previous presidential itera-ture on leadershipstyle and executive arrangements. t is an initial attempttosynthesizethis literatureanddevelop a morecoherentway of consideringwhataspects of leadershipstyle influence how advisersare selected and constituted.Much workremainsin examiningthe proposedrelationships.We need to studythe proposed inkagesacross a set of instancesof foreign policy decisionmakingand a set of presidents.A startat this kind of research s found in PrestonandYoung (1992). They examine the linkage between PresidentBush's leadershipstyle and decision making leadingup to andduringthe Gulf war.Of interest, also, is whetherthe typology will generalizeto other kinds ofpolitical leaders thanpresidents-such as, primeministers,mayors, governors,partyheads. Ourplanwas to considervariables hat weresufficientlybroadto beapplicable o the varietyof politicalleaderswho must set up advisory systemstoguide their administrations.We urge those doing research on other kinds ofpolitical leaders to examine the applicabilityof the typology.

REFERENCESBarber,J. D. (1977). ThePresidentialCharacter.EnglewoodCliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.Bass, B. M. (1981). Stogdill's Handbookof Leadership:A Surveyof Theoryand Research. NewYork:Free Press.Burke, J. P., & Greenstein,F. I. (1991). How PresidentsTestReality:Decisions on Vietnam,1954and 1965. New York:Russell Sage Foundation.Campbell, C. (1986). Managing the Presidency:Carter, Reagan and the Searchfor ExecutiveHarmony.Pittsburgh:Universityof PittsburghPress.Crabb,C. V., Jr., & Mulcahy,K. V. (1988). Presidentsand ForeignPolicyMaking. BatonRouge,LA: LouisianaState University.Downs, A. (1967). Inside Bureaucracy.Boston:Little, Brown.Fallows, J. (1981). National Defense. New York:RandomHouse.Feldman,M. S. (1990). OrganizationTheoryand theStudyof thePresidency.Paperpresentedat theInstitutefor Public Policy Studies, Universityof Pittsburgh.George, A. L. (1980). PresidentialDecisionmaking n ForeignPolicy:TheEffectiveUse of Informa-tion and Advice. Boulder,CO: Westview Press.Greenstein,F. I. (1988). Leadership n theModernPresidency.Cambridge:HarvardUniversityPress.Hargrove,E. C. (1989). TwoConceptionsof InstitutionalLeadership. n B. D. Jones(Ed.), Leader-ship and Politics. Lawrence,KS: Universityof KansasPress.Hermann, M. G. (1979). Indicators of Stress in Policy Makers During Foreign Policy Crises.Political Psychology, 1: 27-46.Hermann,M. G. (1987). Leaders'Policy Orientationsandthe Qualityof ForeignPolicy Decisions.In S. G. Walker Ed.), RoleTheoryandForeignPolicy Analysis.Durham,NC: DukeUniversityPress.Hermann, M. G. (1993). Leaders and Foreign Policy Decision Making. In D. Caldwell &T. McKeown(Eds.), Diplomacy,Force, andLeadership:Essays inHonorofAlexanderGeorge.Boulder,CO: Westview Press.

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96 Hermann and PrestonHermann,M. G., & Hermann,C. F. (1989). Who Makes Foreign Policy Decisions and How: AnEmpiricalInquiry. nternationalStudiesQuarterly,33: 361-387.Hess, S. (1988). Organizingthe Presidency.Washington,D.C.: The BrookingsInstitution.Johnson,R. T. (1974). Managingthe WhiteHouse:An IntimateStudyof thePresidency.New York:HarperRow.Kotter,J. P., & Lawrence,P. R. (1974). Mayors in Action. New York:Wiley.Light, P. (1991). The President'sAgenda: Domestic Policy Choicefrom Kennedyto Carter. Bal-timore: JohnsHopkinsUniversityPress.McGrath,J. E. (1984). Groups:InteractionandPerformance.EnglewoodCliffs, NJ:Prentice-Hall.Meier, K. J. (1989). BureaucraticLeadership n PublicOrganization. n B. D. Jones(Ed.), Leader-ship and Politics. Lawrence,KS: Universityof Kansas Press.Miller,G. J. (1987). AdministrativeDilemmas: The Role of PoliticalLeadership.PoliticalEconomyWorkingPaper,WashingtonUniversity,St. Louis, MO, June.Preston,T., & Young, M. D. (1992). An Approachto UnderstandingDecision Making:TheBushAdministration, he Gulf Crisis, Management Style, and Worldview.Paper presentedat theInternational tudies Associationmeeting, Atlanta, GA, April 1-4.Smith, H. K. (1988). The Power Game: How WashingtonWorks. New York: BallantineBooks.Stogdill, R. D. (1974). Handbookof Leadership.New York:Free Press.Wilensky, H. (1967). Organizational ntelligence. New York:Basic Books.Winter,D. G., Hermann,M. G., Weintraub,W., & Walker,S. G. (1991). ThePersonalitiesof Bushand GorbachevMeasuredat a Distance:Procedures,Portraits,andPolicy. PoliticalPsychology,12: 215-245.Woodward,R. (1991). TheCommanders.New York:Simon & Schuster.

presidents, advisers, and foreign policy the effect

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