presented by: brian elbel, mph phd candidate yale school of public health with:
DESCRIPTION
Experience Goods and Expectational Traps: Bounded Rationality and Consumer Behavior in Markets for Medical Care. Presented by: Brian Elbel, MPH PhD Candidate Yale School of Public Health With: David Stuckler, MPH Mark Schlesinger, PhD - PowerPoint PPT PresentationTRANSCRIPT
Experience Goods and Expectational Traps: Bounded
Rationality and Consumer Behavior in Markets for Medical Care
Presented by: Brian Elbel, MPHPhD Candidate
Yale School of Public Health
With: David Stuckler, MPH
Mark Schlesinger, PhD
At: AcademyHealth Health Economics Interest Group Meeting
Outline• Background
– Physician Services as Experience Good– Dyadic v. Generalized Expectations
• Consumers’ Evaluation of Experience– Bayes Rule– Representativeness Heuristic– Expectational Traps
• Data—Consumer Experiences Survey• Estimation Strategy—Selection Model• Results• Conclusions
Experience Goods
• Nelson first recognized in the 1970’s
• In order to evaluate a good, you must “experience” or try it out
• Switch/Exit if dissatisfied– Provides incentives to improve quality
Experience Goods Literature
• Largely focused on how consumers evaluate purchased goods
• No focus on how consumers make inferences about the distribution of goods in the market
• Generally assumed:– Consumers know the distribution– They then act as Bayesians
Physician Services as Experience Good/Service
• Not many other means to assess physicians– Few quality measures– Those that do exist aren’t very good
(small n)– Some learning through social networks;
tastes very heterogeneous
Model of Evaluating Experience Goods
• When consumers are evaluating their physician/considering switching
– Assessment of Individual Physician— Dyadic Expectations
– Assessment of Physicians as a Class—Generalized Expectations
Consumers Compare Expectations
• Consumers compare Dyadic Expectations to Generalized Expectations
• If expectations are sufficiently divergent, they switch
• Problems arise when both expectations closely track each other
Expectations in Response to Problem
• Problems relatively common
• Could use information gained from problematic experience in two ways:– They act as Bayesians– They rely on the Representativeness
Heuristic
Bayesian Learning
Pr(MDbad | problem) = Pr(problem | MDbad) x Pr(MDbad)
Pr(problem)
• Expectations should diverge as long as consumer believe “bad” physician have more observable problems– Can’t say for certain what that ratio is
• Consumers likely have few “draws” by which to evaluate physicians– Generalized expectations may largely reflect
dyadic
Representativeness Heuristic
• Representativeness: assumption of correspondence, generally between an individual and a population
• Taking knowledge of one physician, and assuming it is representative of all physicians
• After experiencing a problem, generalized expectations equal to dyadic
Equal Revision of Expectations?
• Representativeness Heuristic would lead to equal revision of expectations
• Bayes rule maybe could
• Leaving little incentive to switch physicians
• Expectational Traps
• Market Doesn’t Punish Poor Physicians
We Find:• On average, following a problematic
experience dyadic expectations are revised downward as much as generalized expectations
• This matters: Divergent expectations predicts switching physicians in response to a problem
• Some evidence due to Representativeness Heuristic
Data
• Consumer Experiences Survey• N=5,000• We initially restrict sample to:
– Those with ≤ 1 problem (79.8%)– Those who saw MD in last year
(88.6%)– Those that didn’t switch physicians
(only 7.7% switched)
• Final N =3,071
Measures of Expectations
• Measured on 5 dimension for both Dyadic and Generalized Expectations– LEARN: take the time to learn about up to date
treatments– TIME: take enough time with their patients– INSURANCE: speak up for their patients in
disputes with their health plan – ERRORS: make too many mistakes in taking
care of the patients– FAIRNESS: treat all patients fairly regardless of
race• Standardized as a Z-score• Sum them then divide by 5
Measures of Problematic Experiences
• Asked if they experienced any of 15 problems in the last year
• Asked who was responsible for problem
• Three Groups– No Problem (55.0%)– Problem Blamed on Physician (13.2%)– Problem Not Blamed on Physician
(31.8%)
Model Specification I
• Where– PROB_BL = problem blamed on MD– PROB_NO= problem not blamed on
MD– X = vector of controls– λ = selection term– β = terms to be estimated
4321 __ XNOPROBBLPROBExpec
Model Specification II• Outcome = Aggregate Expectations
• Outcome = Individual Expacations– 5 Generalized Expectations– 5 Dyadic Expectations
• Specification same for each
• Controlling for:– SES, Health Status, Recency of Problem,
HC Knowledge, Severity of Problem, Social Support, Managed Care
Identification
• Potential Endogeneity of Problem Identification
• Control Function/Treatment Effects/Heckman without Truncation
• Need “instruments”– Otherwise identifying off functional form
• Our instruments:– Presence of Mental Illness, COPD, and an
index of “Don’t Know” responses
Results
Dyadic Generalized Difference
Blame NoBlame
Blame NoBlame
Blame NoBlame
AggregateExpectation
(n=3028)
-1.49(0.19)
**
-1.09(0.19)
**
-1.40(0.22)
**
-1.27(0.21)
**
0.09(0.24)
-0.19(0.24)
Influence of Problems on Expectations
Dyadic Generalized Difference
Blame NoBlame
Blame NoBlame
Blame NoBlame
AggregateExpectation
(n=3028)
-1.49(0.19)
**
-1.09(0.19)
**
-1.40(0.22)
**
-1.27(0.21)
**
0.09(0.24)
-0.19(0.24)
Influence of Problems on Expectations
Dyadic Generalized Difference
Blame NoBlame
Blame NoBlame
Blame NoBlame
AggregateExpectation
(n=3028)
-1.49(0.19)
**
-1.09(0.19)
**
-1.40(0.22)
**
-1.27(0.21)
**
0.09(0.24)
-0.19(0.24)
Influence of Problems on Expectations
Influence of Problems on Dyadic and General Expectations of Physicians
Dyadic GeneralizedDifference
Expec. Blame No Blame Blame No Blame Blame No Blame
Learn (n=3047)
-1.69 (.32)**
-1.28 (.32)**
-1.56 (.36)**
-1.51 (.35)**
0.12 (.41)
-0.23 (.41)
Time (n=3099)
-0.86(.34)*
-0.61(.32)
-1.16(.38)**
-1.09(.38)**
-0.31(.42)
-0.48(.41)
Insurance (n=2824)
-1.51(.32)**
-0.98(.34)**
-1.90(.39)**
-1.73(.37)
-0.39(.41)
-0.75(.41)
Errors (n=3034)
-1.24(.25)**
-0.80(.35)**
-0.99(.35)**
-1.01(.34)**
0.26(.50)
-0.21(.49)
Fairness (n=3071)
-1.90(.28)**
-1.37(.30)**
-1.28(.34)**
-1.11(.32)**
0.62(.46)
0.26(.47)
* - denotes p-value significant at 0.05 level; ** - denotes p-value significant at 0.01 level.
Both Expectations Revise Equally
• On the whole, expectations tend to revise equally
• But, does this really matter?
Switching• DV = Switch MD in response to problems• Selection Model
– Only those with a problem– This time, with truncation
• Made new variable to capture divergence of expectations=Generalized – Dyadic Expectations
• Three categories– >0 and ≤ 2 (34.0%)– >2 and ≤ 3 (4.2%)– > 3 (2.1%)– Excluded Category—Dyadic higher than
Generalized (59.7%)
Probability of Switch on Z-Score Difference across Generalized and Dyadic Expectations
=Generalized - Dyadic
>0 ≤ 2 > 2 and ≤ 3 > 3
Aggregate Expectation
0.02 (0.01)** 0.05 (0.01)** 0.09 (0.02)**
* - P-value significant at 0.05 level; ** - at 0.01 level
Probability of Switch on Z-Score Difference across Generalized and Dyadic Expectations
Difference between Expectations
Expectation >0 ≤ 2 > 2 and ≤ 3 > 3
Learn 0.05 (0.02)** 0.10 (0.03)** 0.63 (0.11)**
Time -0.01 (0.02) 0.03 (0.04) -0.01 (0.04)
Insurance 0.02 (0.02) 0.06 (0.06) 0.04 (0.13)
Errors 0.03 (0.02) 0.10 (0.04)** 0.14 (0.05)**
Fairness 0.05 (0.02)** -0.21 (0.29) 0.18 (0.05)**
* - P-value significant at 0.05 level; ** - at 0.01 level
Switching Responds to Expectations
• More divergent expectations leads to more switching for 3 of 5 expectations
• Divergent Expectations Matter
Bayesian Learning or Representativeness Heuristic?• Some Differences in Categories of
Expectations
• Responses of those with a greater sense of the base rate—Long-Term Medical Condition
• Blame v. No_Blame Results
Limitations
• Cross-Sectional Data
• Omitted Variables
• Noisy Measures
Conclusions
• Consumers revise Generalized Expectations essentially as much as Dyadic Expectations
• Expectational Traps: This likely does explain some of the low-switching rates
• Physician’s lack market incentive to improve quality
• Some consumers likely not acting as Bayesians