The feasibility of legalising international trade in rhino horn

Presentation to the Committee of Enquiry

The Endangered Wildlife Trust

Andrew Taylor

The Endangered Wildlife Trust (EWT): • Non-governmental, non-profit, conservation organization; • Founded in 1973.

Mission: Dedicated to conserving threatened species and ecosystems to the benefit of all people.

Wildlife in Trade Programme: Works to reduce the illegal trade in wildlife and wildlife products • Capacity building among law enforcement agencies; • Cooperation and strategy development with other conservation

NGOs; • Commenting on proposed conservation legislation; • Support for various rhino conservation initiatives.

The EWT: • Supports the sustainable use of wildlife resources, including the principle of

trading in wildlife products to achieve conservation goals; • Recognises that sustainable use of wild living resources has the potential to

provide social and economic incentives for people to conserve biodiversity; • Acknowledges that sustainable use models are becoming increasingly important

due to the growing population pressures across Africa.

The EWT: • Recognises and commends the contribution that private rhino owners have made

to the conservation of rhinos in South Africa; • Acknowledges that protecting rhinos comes at a major financial cost to private

rhino owners and that if the current poaching situation persists, many private rhino owners will not be able to continue protecting rhinos.

However, the EWT also takes the position that decisions to use wildlife resources commercially should be consistent with the aims of conserving biodiversity. • Use of wildlife resources must be sustainable; • There are many economic, legal, social and biological factors that could affect

whether the particular use of a wildlife resource will be sustainable.

The commercial use of wildlife resources must contribute to the ongoing survival of the species in the wild (i.e. free-roaming populations). The economic model should not be developed solely for the benefit of management systems that keep rhinos in small camps. This would shift the risk of poaching to other areas. The economic model must also work for: • State protected areas; • Extensive private game ranches and reserves; • Other rhino range states (Namibia, Zimbabwe, Botswana, Kenya, etc.).

To convince the Parties to CITES that international trade in rhino horn should be legalised, South Africa will need to demonstrate the following: • A sound economic model and implementation plan; • An understanding of time requirements, role-players and trading partners; • An understanding of the risks and plans to counter the risks; • An exit strategy if the economic model fails and a plan to deal with possible

escalating poaching.

Risk 1: Legalising international trade may lead to laundering of illegal rhino horn into legal trade • This illegal horn might be from poached rhinos or from unregistered horn of

private rhino owners.

CITES Resolution Conference 9.14 (Rev. CoP15): Urges all parties that have stocks of rhinoceros horn to identify, mark, register and secure such stocks. South Africa has legislation in place to deal with this: NEMBA 2004 (Act no. 10 of 2004): Norms and standards for the marking of rhinoceros and rhinoceros horn (Government Gazette No. 35248, 10 April 2012).

However, there are at least two reasons why South Africa is non-compliant with the CITES Resolution. These are: • There are (allegedly) some private rhino owners who are not complying with

these norms and standards;

The permitting of rhinos and rhino horns owned privately is managed by the provinces. This may cause at least two problems: • Private rhino owners do not trust the provinces and many are not willing to share

information about their rhinos; • There are widespread complaints that some provinces are not managing their

nature conservation permit systems efficiently.

Potential solution: • Centralise the authority for private rhino owner registration and take the

provinces out of the picture. • BUT: Schedule 5 of The Constitution says that nature conservation is a concurrent

national and provincial competence.

Risk 2: If legalising international trade does not stop a parallel illegal market, horn will continue to be smuggled out of the country We must recognise that wildlife crime is a very serious international problem. • Wildlife crime involves transnational criminal syndicates; • Wildlife crime involves international terrorist organisations. These groups are unlikely to give up their (illegal) share of trade easily.

Potential solution: • The economic model must be based on credible information on how the illegal

market will respond to competition from legal trade; • Secure the borders

• But we are already failing to achieve this; • Who pays for it?

• Much of the horn is reaching Mozambique through the Kruger National Park and is not transiting through border posts. How do we deal with this?

Risk 3: If trade is legalised, South Africa may not have sufficient capacity to enforce compliance with the law • South African conservation law enforcement agencies are already overloaded in

dealing with current poaching and smuggling; • A legal trade route for horn would place additional burdens on the system.

Potential solution: Increase capacity… (But, who pays for this?)

Risk 4: If trade is legalised, there will be additional opportunities for bribery and corruption • South Africa will have to demonstrate that it is dealing with this. Potential solution: ???

Risk 5: If the economic model is wrong, poaching could get worse • We cannot test the model before it is implemented; • The credibility of South Africa as a leading conservation nation will be at risk. Potential solution: Develop a robust model that considers all the risks.

The economic model must take into account the needs of communities, which are increasingly being implicated in poaching and protecting poachers. • If communities are excluded, no economic model will work. • Solutions must also address the criminal elements involved in communities.

Alternatives for incentivising private rhino owners • Tax rebates or deductions on expenditures for rhino protection • Tax credits that directly reduce the tax bill • Tax Allowances for Accelerated Depreciation • VAT relief for expenditures related to rhino protection • Taxation of some financial transactions • Revolving funds to provide special credits for investments associated with

enhanced protection

Summary • Using rhino horn commercially must be consistent with the aims of conserving

biodiversity. • An economic model for trading rhino horn needs to consider these risks:

• Laundering of illegal horn into legal trade; • The continuation of a parallel illegal market; • Insufficient capacity to enforce compliance with the law; • Corruption.

• An economic model must take into account the needs of communities.

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