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Further Democratic Reform Further Democratic Reform for for

Hong Kong –Hong Kong –

Reflections from Reflections from International ExperiencesInternational Experiences

Ming SINGMing SINGCity University of Hong KongCity University of Hong Kong

Oct. 5, 2005Oct. 5, 2005

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Presentation OutlinePresentation Outline

1. Benefits of Full democracy for HK1. Benefits of Full democracy for HK

2. Costs of delay installing full 2. Costs of delay installing full democracy democracy

3. Problems of the 53. Problems of the 5thth Report Report

4. Legislative Reform: bicameralism4. Legislative Reform: bicameralism

5. Nomination & Election of CE5. Nomination & Election of CE

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Benefits of Full Benefits of Full DemocracyDemocracy Democracy promotes freedoms, rule Democracy promotes freedoms, rule

of law, political accountability, reducof law, political accountability, reduces corruption & eventually enhances es corruption & eventually enhances political stabilitypolitical stability

Democracy favors economic developDemocracy favors economic development (Feng 2003) and need ment (Feng 2003) and need notnot lead lead to welfarism (esp. given Hong Kongto welfarism (esp. given Hong Kong’s culture and weak unions)’s culture and weak unions)

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HK is now ready for full HK is now ready for full democracy with politicaldemocracy with political stabilitystability

When GDP per capita > USD When GDP per capita > USD 10,000 probability of breakdowns 10,000 probability of breakdowns of presidential democracies is of presidential democracies is virtually zero (my study of 79 virtually zero (my study of 79 nations between 1950 & 2000)nations between 1950 & 2000)

Hong Kong’s level of GDP per Hong Kong’s level of GDP per capita in 2003: US$28,800 capita in 2003: US$28,800 (purchasing power parity) (IMF, (purchasing power parity) (IMF, 2004)2004)

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Costs of delaying full Costs of delaying full democracydemocracy

Lack of electoral legitimacy for Govt. Lack of electoral legitimacy for Govt. Reluctance to launch controversial yet Reluctance to launch controversial yet urgent policies for HK’s developmenturgent policies for HK’s development

Cronyism, inequality, executive-Cronyism, inequality, executive-legislative tensions tend to persist: bad legislative tensions tend to persist: bad for stability & prosperityfor stability & prosperity

Sluggish or pseudo democratic reform Sluggish or pseudo democratic reform can undermine stability & prosperitycan undermine stability & prosperity

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Support for full democracy Support for full democracy persistspersists My survey in June, 2005: My survey in June, 2005:

– 73.5% agree/strongly agree electing govt. 73.5% agree/strongly agree electing govt. by universal suffrage “may have problems by universal suffrage “may have problems but it is better than any other form of but it is better than any other form of govt.” govt.”

– After the Central Govt.’s rejection of After the Central Govt.’s rejection of universal suffrage by 2008, 61% & 62% of universal suffrage by 2008, 61% & 62% of public prefer to have it held electing the public prefer to have it held electing the legislature & CE respectively in 2012legislature & CE respectively in 2012

-3 Surveys from early 2000’s to June 2005 -3 Surveys from early 2000’s to June 2005 find “Post-materialistic Culture” can find “Post-materialistic Culture” can explain mass support for universal explain mass support for universal suffragesuffrage

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Post-materialistic culture and Post-materialistic culture and democracydemocracy

Emphasize freedoms, greater politicEmphasize freedoms, greater political participation & govt’s respect of al participation & govt’s respect of public opinions in policy making. public opinions in policy making.

Culture doesn’t change overnight: Culture doesn’t change overnight: a solid basis of support for full demoa solid basis of support for full democracy exists, regardless of economic cracy exists, regardless of economic conditions. conditions.

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Hong Kong Ranked SixHong Kong Ranked Sixthth in Post-materialis in Post-materialismm

8.52% 6.40%

49.25%46.49%

38.91%

27.28%

21.54%19.04%

25.86%19.86%

30.37%

25.61%27.42%

21.38%

9.66% 8.09% 8.54%11.40%

28.84%

28.81%

25.00%

22.20%

22.15%

18.22%

17.68%

17.21%

16.08%14.80%

13.07%11.01%

10.83%3.72% 5.69% 7.07% 7.47%

10.45%

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Materialism Mixed Post-materialism

Source: 2000-2001 World Values Survey and HKGCC 2005 Survey on Poverty, Welfare, and Political Reform.

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55thth Report: no clear +ve effect on H Report: no clear +ve effect on HK’s democratization & developmK’s democratization & developmentent CE can’t be affiliated with partyCE can’t be affiliated with party No specification Closed ballot in noNo specification Closed ballot in no

minating CE minating CE No specification of system for electinNo specification of system for electin

g District Councilors to LegCo/ ECg District Councilors to LegCo/ EC No clear roadmap: can’t mobilize bNo clear roadmap: can’t mobilize b

usiness sector and other interests to usiness sector and other interests to prepare for faster democratizationprepare for faster democratization

Maintain appointed DC membersMaintain appointed DC members

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3 Crucial Obstacles for 3 Crucial Obstacles for Faster DemocratizationFaster Democratization

1.1. Business leaders prefer maintaininBusiness leaders prefer maintaining functional constituencies g functional constituencies

2.2. When both CE & LegCo elected by uWhen both CE & LegCo elected by universal suffrage niversal suffrage dual legitimacy dual legitimacy and minority government possibleand minority government possible

3.3. Central Govt.’s worries over HK’Central Govt.’s worries over HK’s becoming independent & subverss becoming independent & subversion against PRC.ion against PRC.

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A Democratically Elected A Democratically Elected BicameralBicameralLegislature: its Relevance for Legislature: its Relevance for HKHK

Some local business leaders accept Some local business leaders accept a “Bicameral” Arrangement”a “Bicameral” Arrangement”

Bicameralism may reduce a key Bicameralism may reduce a key obstacle to democratization & obstacle to democratization & encourage Central Govt. to speed encourage Central Govt. to speed up democratizationup democratization

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Bicameral Legislatures: Bicameral Legislatures: In 1999, 38% (=67) of In 1999, 38% (=67) of 178 legislatures in the world were 178 legislatures in the world were bicameral:bicameral:

Fully Elected Senates Partially Elected

/ Partially Appointed Senates

Appointed Senates

Direct Suffrage

Indirect Suffrage

Mixed Suffrage

Direct Suffrage

Indirec Suffrage

Australia Bolivia Brazil Colombia Czech Rep. Dominican Republic Haiti Japan Kyrgyzstan Liberia Mexico Nigeria Palau Paraguay Philippines Poland Romania Switzerland Thailand United States Uruguay

Argentina Austria Bosnia-Her. Burkina Faso Ethiopia France Gabon Germany Mauritania Morocco Namibia Netherlands Russian Federation Slovenia South Africa Yugoslavia

Belgium Spain

Chile Italy

Algeria Belarus Botswana Egypt India Ireland Kazakhstan Madagascar Malaysia Nepal Swaziland Tajikistan

Antigua & Barbuda Bahamas Barbados Belize Cambodia Canada Fiji (Isles) Grenada Jamaica Jordan Lesotho Saint Lucia Trinidad & Tobago United Kingdom

21 16 2 2 12 14

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Some justifications for Some justifications for bicameral system in Hong bicameral system in Hong KongKong

A middle-ground solution: enhance electoA middle-ground solution: enhance electoral legitimacy of LegCo while maintaining fral legitimacy of LegCo while maintaining functional constituencies unctional constituencies

Deepen debates on legislationDeepen debates on legislation Reduce chances of reckless legislation and Reduce chances of reckless legislation and

improve monitoring of the executiveimprove monitoring of the executive Help boost party development & nurture pHelp boost party development & nurture p

olitical leaders olitical leaders

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Composition & Powers of Upper Composition & Powers of Upper Chambers’ MembersChambers’ Members

Among the 67 upper chambers on earth, Among the 67 upper chambers on earth, – 23 were produced by direct election, in 23 were produced by direct election, in

whole or in part in 2000; whole or in part in 2000; – 39 of them are directly or indirectly 39 of them are directly or indirectly

elected; elected; – Others are by appointment/ mixture of Others are by appointment/ mixture of

appointment & elections.appointment & elections. Most lower chambers are more powerful Most lower chambers are more powerful

than upper chambers because of the than upper chambers because of the greater electorate mandate of the former.greater electorate mandate of the former.

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Types of Elections and Powers of Second Chambers ______________________________________________________ Method of Selection Power Total ______________________________________________________ Direct Election Greater or equal 13

Lesser 11 Indirect Election Greater or equal 2

Lesser 13 Appointment Greater or equal 2

Lesser 13 Other Greater or equal 0

Lesser 4 Total Greater or equal 17

Lesser 41 _________________________________________________ Source: Coakley & Laver (1997)

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Desirable TraitsDesirable Traits of 2nd Chambers:of 2nd Chambers: Lessons from 17 OECD bicameral Lessons from 17 OECD bicameral legislatureslegislatures

Both strong and weak upper chambers Both strong and weak upper chambers undesirable: ideally they should force undesirable: ideally they should force government to rethink problematic bills by government to rethink problematic bills by power to delay passage of bills, without power to delay passage of bills, without incessant legislative gridlocksincessant legislative gridlocks

Second chambers have less powers over Second chambers have less powers over financial legislation & more power over financial legislation & more power over constitutional amendmentsconstitutional amendments

Govt. should not control upper chamber to Govt. should not control upper chamber to maintain its maintain its independentindependent character character

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Roles and Functions of Second Roles and Functions of Second Chambers: lessons from Chambers: lessons from overseasoverseas Scrutiny of LegislationScrutiny of Legislation

– A core function of upper chambers. A core function of upper chambers. – Based on Based on 17 OECD countries17 OECD countries, the , the

upper house needs to have delaying upper house needs to have delaying powers uppowers up

• to few months at a maximum for ordinary to few months at a maximum for ordinary legislation, legislation,

• to 20 days in case of urgency for ordinary to 20 days in case of urgency for ordinary legislation,legislation,

Constitutional and Human Rights Constitutional and Human Rights ScrutinyScrutiny

Reflect Territorial PerspectiveReflect Territorial Perspective

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Implications on HK: Composition Implications on HK: Composition & Powers of its Second Chamber& Powers of its Second Chamber

Small franchises, limited representativeness Small franchises, limited representativeness & “excessively” pro-government stance of & “excessively” pro-government stance of FC members undercut their public supportFC members undercut their public support

If second chamber is composed entirely of tIf second chamber is composed entirely of the existing FCs, its power will be limited he existing FCs, its power will be limited

Reforms of FCs and introduction of other Reforms of FCs and introduction of other members required in order to boost public smembers required in order to boost public support and power of the upper chamberupport and power of the upper chamber

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i./ Reform existing Functional i./ Reform existing Functional Constituencies to make them more Constituencies to make them more democratic:democratic:

Replace corporate voting by Replace corporate voting by individual voting individual voting

Abolish small FCs that represent Abolish small FCs that represent insignificant sectorsinsignificant sectors

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ii./ Incorporate non-FC members to ii./ Incorporate non-FC members to Upper House: Indirect Elected Upper House: Indirect Elected MembersMembers

District Councilors will nominate District Councilors will nominate and elect District & non-District and elect District & non-District Councilors for Upper HouseCouncilors for Upper House

As those elected by the District As those elected by the District Councilors for the Upper House Councilors for the Upper House may not be District Councilors, may not be District Councilors, they may bring broader views they may bring broader views into upper chamberinto upper chamber

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ii./ Incorporate non-FC members to ii./ Incorporate non-FC members to Upper House: NPC and CPPCC Upper House: NPC and CPPCC delegatesdelegates

Stronger links between HK and the Stronger links between HK and the Central Government: some seats Central Government: some seats be produced via elections among be produced via elections among HK’s delegates to NPC/Chinese HK’s delegates to NPC/Chinese People's Political Consultative People's Political Consultative Conference.Conference.

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ii./ Incorporate non-FC members to Upper ii./ Incorporate non-FC members to Upper House: Appointed MembersHouse: Appointed Members

Most if not all of appointed members Most if not all of appointed members are preferably independents (from are preferably independents (from parties)parties)

– Under-privileged groups championing for Under-privileged groups championing for human rights & minority rights human rights & minority rights

– Retired judges, academics, senior lawyers, Retired judges, academics, senior lawyers, senior politicians, top civil servants can also senior politicians, top civil servants can also be includedbe included

An independent appointments An independent appointments commission with very strong public commission with very strong public support will make appointments to the support will make appointments to the Upper HouseUpper House

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Overall composition of the upper Overall composition of the upper househouse

FCs & indirectly elected members: 40% FCs & indirectly elected members: 40% each of the total seats each of the total seats

Appointees: 10% of the total number of Appointees: 10% of the total number of members to avoid undermining public members to avoid undermining public support of the entire chambersupport of the entire chamber

10% of the seats in the Upper House 10% of the seats in the Upper House delegated members to the NPC / delegated members to the NPC / Chinese People's Political Consultative Chinese People's Political Consultative ConferenceConference

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Powers of Upper Chamber in HKPowers of Upper Chamber in HK

FC & appointed members in upper FC & appointed members in upper chamber v. directly elected nature of chamber v. directly elected nature of lower chamber lower chamber upper chamber upper chamber should be mainly advisory & have the should be mainly advisory & have the power to delay instead of that to veto:power to delay instead of that to veto:

– Scrutiny and monitoring powerScrutiny and monitoring power

– Some initiation power (non-financial only) Some initiation power (non-financial only)

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Scrutiny and Monitoring Power of Scrutiny and Monitoring Power of Upper House in HKUpper House in HK

Based on 17 OECD bicameral legislatures, Based on 17 OECD bicameral legislatures, HK’s Upper House can delay up to: HK’s Upper House can delay up to:

– 6 months at a maximum for ordinary 6 months at a maximum for ordinary legislation, legislation,

– 3 months for financial legislation3 months for financial legislation

– 20 days in case of urgency for ordinary 20 days in case of urgency for ordinary legislation legislation

Under adequate media attention, a short Under adequate media attention, a short delay created by the 2nd chamber can delay created by the 2nd chamber can force 1st chamber to rethinkforce 1st chamber to rethink

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Scrutiny and Monitoring Scrutiny and Monitoring Power of Upper House in HKPower of Upper House in HK

Arming the upper house with the capacArming the upper house with the capacity to veto bills easily enhances legislatiity to veto bills easily enhances legislative deadlocks, dampen the monitoring ve deadlocks, dampen the monitoring power of the legislature vis-a-vis the expower of the legislature vis-a-vis the executive as a whole, & slow down the paecutive as a whole, & slow down the party development. rty development.

The scrutiny function of HK’s Upper ChaThe scrutiny function of HK’s Upper Chamber should remain its core one.mber should remain its core one.

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Bill initiation Power of Bill initiation Power of Upper House in HKUpper House in HK

Bills for ordinary legislation can Bills for ordinary legislation can be initiated in either Lower or be initiated in either Lower or Upper HouseUpper House

Bills for financial legislation, Bills for financial legislation, however, can only be initiated at however, can only be initiated at the Lower Housethe Lower House

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Constitutional GuardianConstitutional Guardian

An exception to the advisory role An exception to the advisory role of the upper house lies in the of the upper house lies in the constitutional arenaconstitutional arena

Upper Chamber Protect Upper Chamber Protect constitutional rights, by a veto or constitutional rights, by a veto or delaying power - amendments of delaying power - amendments of the Basic Law need to be endorsed the Basic Law need to be endorsed by 66.7% of members of both by 66.7% of members of both houseshouses

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How to Resolve Inter-cameral ConflictsHow to Resolve Inter-cameral Conflicts

Formation of an equal no. of Formation of an equal no. of representatives of parties in each house representatives of parties in each house based on percentage of seatsbased on percentage of seats

– Final decision of each committee rests Final decision of each committee rests on the simple majority of iton the simple majority of it

– If the proposed compromise is rejected by If the proposed compromise is rejected by the Lower House, the Lower House will the Lower House, the Lower House will have the last wordhave the last word

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Nomination & Election of Nomination & Election of CECE

The CE candidate should be The CE candidate should be allowed to be affiliated with a allowed to be affiliated with a political party political party to promote party to promote party development & fundamentally development & fundamentally improve executive-legislative improve executive-legislative relationshiprelationship

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Nomination & Election of Nomination & Election of CECE Election Committee (EC) shall Election Committee (EC) shall

become Nomination Committee become Nomination Committee (NC)(NC)

– Size of NC: 1600 in 2007, 3200 in 2012Size of NC: 1600 in 2007, 3200 in 2012

– Same 4 sectors as in current EC, each Same 4 sectors as in current EC, each sector with 400 members in 2007 and sector with 400 members in 2007 and 800 in 2012800 in 2012

– 11stst to 3 to 3rdrd sectors: same election sectors: same election methodmethod

– 44thth sector: add 200 members elected sector: add 200 members elected by directly elected District Councilors by directly elected District Councilors in 2007 via PRin 2007 via PR

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Nomination & Election of Nomination & Election of CE: smoothen exe.-leg. CE: smoothen exe.-leg. relationsrelations For NC elections, For NC elections, corporate votingcorporate voting

should be abolished in 2012should be abolished in 2012

At least At least 12.5%12.5% of the total members of the total members (i.e. 200 in 2007; 400 in 2012) in NC (i.e. 200 in 2007; 400 in 2012) in NC required for nominating one candidaterequired for nominating one candidate

For both 2007 and 2012 CE elections, For both 2007 and 2012 CE elections, each candidate should have each candidate should have nominations of at least nominations of at least 5%5% of members of members from from each sectoreach sector of the NC of the NC

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Nomination & Election of Nomination & Election of CECE For both 2007 and 2012 CE elections, For both 2007 and 2012 CE elections,

each candidate is required to secure the each candidate is required to secure the support of at least 25% of legislators (of support of at least 25% of legislators (of Lower House if bicameral and of the Lower House if bicameral and of the whole legislature if unicameral) whole legislature if unicameral)

In 2007 the NC will nominate and elect In 2007 the NC will nominate and elect the CE. In 2012 the NC will only the CE. In 2012 the NC will only nominate and the CE will be elected by nominate and the CE will be elected by universal suffrageuniversal suffrage

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Nomination & Election of Nomination & Election of CECE

Both nomination and election Both nomination and election will use closed ballotwill use closed ballot

One-round first-past-the-post One-round first-past-the-post system will be use: it is simple, system will be use: it is simple, efficient & can strengthen efficient & can strengthen executive-legislative party ties executive-legislative party ties and reduce chances of multi-and reduce chances of multi-partyismpartyism

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Minority Govt./Divided Govt. – Minority Govt./Divided Govt. – hurt democratic stability?hurt democratic stability? Empirically, minority govt. does not affEmpirically, minority govt. does not aff

ect chance of democratic stability ect chance of democratic stability Concurrent elections for CE and Concurrent elections for CE and

legislature, single-round plurality legislature, single-round plurality election for CE and a closed-list PR election for CE and a closed-list PR for electing some seats in for electing some seats in legislature, diminish chance of a legislature, diminish chance of a minority govt. and legislative-minority govt. and legislative-executive deadlockexecutive deadlock

– In 2012 concurrentIn 2012 concurrent elections for the CE and elections for the CE and LegCo and from then on the term of the CE LegCo and from then on the term of the CE will be shortened to 4 years will be shortened to 4 years

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Central Government’s Central Government’s worriesworries Will HK become independent or subvWill HK become independent or subv

ert PRC’s rule?ert PRC’s rule? Surveys since 1984 consistently show Surveys since 1984 consistently show

HK people agree HK belongs to ChinaHK people agree HK belongs to China– in 2004 survey: 73% agree/strongly agrein 2004 survey: 73% agree/strongly agre

e: “I am proud of being Chinese”.e: “I am proud of being Chinese”. HK depends on Mainland China: wateHK depends on Mainland China: wate

r, food and economic growth…...r, food and economic growth…...

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Institutional Institutional SafeguardsSafeguards CPG continues to have power of CPG continues to have power of

approval over appointment of CE & approval over appointment of CE & Principal OfficialsPrincipal Officials

A Nomination Committee including NPC A Nomination Committee including NPC & CPPCC members to guard against & CPPCC members to guard against radical candidates unacceptable to radical candidates unacceptable to Central Govt.Central Govt.

HK’s delegates in NPC & CPPCC are HK’s delegates in NPC & CPPCC are represented in Upper Houserepresented in Upper House

Amendments to Basic Law require Amendments to Basic Law require endorsement of two-thirds of members endorsement of two-thirds of members from both chambers & that of NPC.from both chambers & that of NPC.

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ConclusionConclusion 1. Given benefits of democracy, implemen1. Given benefits of democracy, implemen

t full democracy in 2012;t full democracy in 2012; 2. Consider bicameralism to accommodat2. Consider bicameralism to accommodat

e to business sector & improve governance to business sector & improve governancee

3. HK Community 3. HK Community should discuss & hammshould discuss & hammer out detailed arrangements for 2012er out detailed arrangements for 2012 as a as a roadmap to guide the political arrangemeroadmap to guide the political arrangements for 2007 & 2008.nts for 2007 & 2008.

4. Therefore, Govt. should delay the LegCo 4. Therefore, Govt. should delay the LegCo voting on 5voting on 5thth report till mid-2006, or else H report till mid-2006, or else HK will continue to pay a heavy price for wrK will continue to pay a heavy price for wrangles over political reformangles over political reform