preparing: the sixth task of crisis leadership

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Media headlines in recent years are rife with depictions of crises demonstrating the fragility as well as the re-silience of contemporary societies and those who lead them. Th ese crises serve as poignant reminders of the crucial role of leadership in cultivating resilient com-munities—communities equipped to respond to and recover from crises. Devastating tornadoes, derechos, hurricanes, fl oods, and volcanic eruptions have re-minded us of our vulnerability to the vicious whims of nature. Th e Newtown, Aurora, and Oslo massacres as well as the recent Boston Marathon bombings and manhunts stemmed from the ill intentions of human perpetrators. Events like these (and others such as the massive industrial explosions at the fertilizer factory in West Texas) provide extreme tests of the ability of com-munities to absorb and recover from shocks (Aldrich, 2012; Comfort, Boin, & Demchak, 2010).

When the moment of truth arrives—as it did for Boston during the Marathon bombings, for New Orleans and New York during hurricanes Katrina and Sandy—it becomes apparent not only that strong leadership in the moment is needed (and sorely missed when it is lacking) but also that many of the key preconditions for eff ective crisis/emergency management and community resilience have been set long before the crisis (Lebow, 1981).

Crisis Leadership Tasks: Before, During, and AfterIn Th e Politics of Crisis Management: Public Leader-ship Under Pressure (Boin, ‘t Hart, Stern, & Sundelius, 2005), my coauthors and I argue that crisis manage-ment can be usefully broken down into fi ve key chal-lenges that appear over and over again in the hundreds

PREPARING: THE SIXTH TASK OF CRISIS

LEADERSHIP

ERIC STERN1

of crisis cases from around the world that we studied. Th ese are sensemaking, decision making and coordina-tion, meaning-making (crisis communication), ending (“accounting” and terminating the crisis), and learning.

Sensemaking in crisis refers to the challenging task of developing an adequate interpretation of what are often complex, dynamic, and ambiguous situations (cf. Weick 1988). Th is entails developing not only a picture of what is happening, but also an understanding of the implications of the situation both from one’s own vantage point and from that of other salient stakeholders. In the words of Alberts and Hayes (2003, p. 102), “Sensemaking is much more than sharing information and identifying patterns. It goes beyond what is happening and what may happen to what can be done about it.”

Decision making refers to the fact that crises tend to be experienced by leaders (and those who follow them) as a series of “what do we do now” problems triggered by the fl ow of events. Th ese decision occasions emerge simultaneously or in succession over the course of the crisis (Stern, 1999; Stern & Sundelius, 2002; cf. Hermann & Hagan, 1998). Decision-making processes may take many forms displaying various forms of (more or less functional) interaction between leaders and their advisors (Preston, 2001). Protecting communities tends to require an interdependent series of crucial decisions to be made in a timely fashion under very diffi cult conditions.

Meaning-making refers to the fact that leaders must attend not only to the operational challenges associated with a contingency, but also to the ways in which various stakeholders and constituencies perceive

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52 JOURNAL OF LEADERSHIP STUDIES • Volume 7 • Number 3 • DOI:10.1002/jls

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enable eff ective functioning under crisis conditions and to select suitable staff for key functions in that crisis or-ganization. Th ere is no single optimal form of organiz-ing for crisis management; rather a crisis organization should be designed taking into account the character-istics and context of a given setting. Organizations that fail to develop a specialized crisis organization in fact make a design choice as well—often by default. Th at choice is likely to be suboptimal as most organizations are not designed and have not “organically” developed in ways that facilitate coping with the extraordinary pressures, information fl ows, and pace associated with crises. Even organizations—such as media and fi rst-responder organizations—used to rapid real-time op-erations may be overwhelmed when the scale, scope, complexity, and pace of the operational tempo increas-es dramatically. Key challenges include specifying the role of top leadership (Do they keep running the ev-eryday organization, the crisis organization, or both?), developing surge capacity, developing means of coping with information defi cit and overload in periods of acute crisis, cultivating sustainable staffi ng and stress monitoring functions, among others. Selecting senior and midlevel leaders for crisis management roles is also challenging. Many leaders are promoted on the basis of skills, personality traits, and management styles that are primarily demonstrated and enacted under “steady state” operational conditions. Such leaders may, or may not, be equipped by personality, background, previous education and training (discussed later) for managing eff ectively in crisis. If, as is often suggested, we are liv-ing in increasingly crisis-prone times, it may be that crisis management aptitude should play a larger role in leader selection in general.

PL ANNING TO IMPROVISE

In much of the literature (and among some practition-ers) there is a great deal of skepticism about the value of crisis planning. Planning is subject to many pres-sures, obstacles, and constraints that can easily detract from the utility of the planning function and products. As Clarke (2001) pointed out in his provocative book Mission Improbable, there are countless examples of crisis/emergency plans based on fl awed assumptions di-vorced from the reality of crisis operations and resource availability—resulting in so-called fantasy documents.

and understand it. Because of the emotional charge associated with disruptive events, followers look to leaders to help in understanding the meaning of what has happened and place it in a broader perspective. By their words and deeds, leaders can convey images of competence, control, stability, sincerity, decisiveness, and vision—or their opposites.

Terminating refers to the nontrivial task of fi nding the appropriate timing and means to end the crisis and return to normalcy. Attempting to end a crisis pre maturely can endanger or alienate constituencies who may still be in harm’s way, traumatized, or otherwise emotionally invested in the crisis. Crises may be particularly diffi cult to terminate if the operational challenges lead to a “crisis after the crisis,” in which serious recriminations are launched against those who failed to prevent, respond to, or recover from a negative event.

Eff ective learning requires an active, critical process that recreates, analyzes, and evaluates key procedures, tactics, and techniques in order to enhance perfor -mance, safety, capability, and so on. Th e learning process has just begun when a “lessons learned” document has been produced. To bring the learning process to fruition, change management/implementation must occur in a way that leaves the organization with improved prospects for future success (Deverell & Olsson, 2009; Stern, 1997; cf. Boin, McConnell, & ‘t Hart, 2008).

PreparingTh ough the fi ve leadership tasks outlined here are help-ful in understanding the core challenges for leaders confronted with crises, further research and refl ection suggest that something is missing. Another crucial re-sponsibility of leaders (inside and outside of government alike) begins well before the fi rst indications of a poten-tial crisis. Th erefore, the fi ve leadership tasks outlined in Boin et al. (2005) should be complemented by a sixth: Preparing. Preparing consists of several subtasks, which are discussed in turn next. Th ese are Organizing and Se-lecting; Planning; Educating, Training, and Exercising; Cultivating Vigilance: and Protecting Preparedness.

ORGANIZING AND SELECTING

A key responsibility of leaders with regard to crisis man-agement is to ensure that an appropriate set of organi-zational roles, structures, and processes are in place to

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Still, when approached, packaged, and implement-ed properly, planning may have great value. Vigilant planning proceeds from several key insights discernible in the literature and evolving practice. First, it is im-portant to distinguish between planning for structured, well-understood contingencies (e.g., plane crashes by airports and airlines) as opposed to other relatively less structured and somewhat less familiar challenges (e.g., traffi c disruptions associated with volcanic ash clouds). Although coping with plane crashes may be facili-tated by very detailed, scripted plans that ensure that key actions are resourced and implemented in proper sequence, unexpected challenges require enactment of problem identifi cation and application of creative problem solving. Given the propensity for unantici-pated problems to arise in crisis, a modular, capability-based approach tends to be best. A key planning func-tion is to identify capabilities and resources that can be deployed in novel and creative ways—much like chil-dren’s Lego pieces can be combined in a wide variety of constellations for diff erent purposes.

Planning does not have to be rigid and should not be an obstacle to improvisation. Rather, like training (dis-cussed next) it can provide a platform and a basis for building confi dence and achieving more qualifi ed im-provisation (Kendra & Wachtendorf, 2003). Th ough it has become something of a truism, the planning process (which builds familiarity with organizational contexts, capabilities, social networks, and enhances psychological preparedness) is often far more valuable than the plans themselves (Brown & Eriksson, 2008). It is also impor-tant to note that the current leadership of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) has helped to revitalize planning eff orts by “thinking bigger” about potential threats, encouraging leaders and emergency managers to plan and prepare for “maximum of maxi-mums” (MoMs, i.e., worst case) scenarios.2 Th e logic is based on the plausible assumption that systems prepared for MoMs will be able to cope eff ectively with a broader range of challenges than those prepared for more mod-erate and commonly occurring types of contingencies.

EDUCATING, TRAINING, AND

EXERCISING

Leaders must be (and try to ensure that their team members, key subordinates, and key partners are)

educated, trained, and exercised in preparation for cri-sis management. It is increasingly recognized in many countries that crisis/emergency/disaster management represents a specialized political/administrative subdis-cipline. One approach is to emphasize the need to educate and develop a cadre of professionals equipped to manage or facilitate the management of crises and emergencies (Stevens, 2013). Such a profession could depart from military, medical, legal, or other profes-sional models. Professionalization entails the identifi ca-tion of a body of knowledge, core skills, and standards, including a code of ethics. Suitably specifi ed, this can be helpful; care must be taken, however, to prevent the emergence of a static orthodoxy and excessive homoge-neity. Professionalization is, in fact, one aspect of what is a more complicated equation. When facing major crises, partnership between political leaders and “pro-fessionals” is essential. Th is means that political leaders who are not “professionals” must be educated as to the nature of crisis management, informed of what is re-quired of them in crisis, familiarized with crisis planning and organization, and equipped to engage in meaning-ful communicative interaction with others inside and outside of their organizations. In this sense, crisis man-agement education must be both conceptual and prac-tical. Individual and collective crisis management skills are best acquired and honed through hands-on practice. Th ere are a wide variety of powerful instructional de-signs and techniques (both traditional and technology enhanced) suitable for crisis management training and exercises. Instructional designs and techniques should be consciously and explicitly adapted to the goals and pur-poses of a given training or exercise. One size (and one instructional design) does not and cannot fi t all.

CULTIVATING VIGIL ANCE AND

PROTECTING PREPAREDNESS

One of the great challenges, especially in organizations and communities that have been spared from frequent exposure to disasters and crises, is to break through in-ertia and defense mechanisms that detract from psy-chological and organizational preparedness (Parker & Stern, 2005; Parker, Stern, Pagila, & Brown, 2009). A common mentality is the “it won’t happen here” syn-drome, in which threats and hazards that have aff ected other organizations and communities are dismissed as


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irrelevant. In order to motivate (and secure funding for) preparedness eff orts, leaders must cultivate an “it could happen here” mentality for themselves and those who follow them. Th is entails actively monitoring the crisis experiences of others and asking the tough ques-tions of “Are we ready to cope with a contingency like this?” and “What can we do now to be more prepared when it is our turn?” In the absence of or in between crises such as those mentioned earlier, leaders must protect preparedness budgets and provide resources—a particularly diffi cult task in the contemporary climate of budget austerity.

Th e resilient community response to the Boston Marathon bombings is suggestive. Despite the fact that Boston (unlike New York, Madrid, and London—cities with a history of terror attacks well before 9/11, 3/11, and 7/7, respectively) had not previously suff ered a terrorist attack of this magnitude, Greater Boston demonstrated an impressive capacity to absorb a devastating blow, come together, collaborate with state and federal partners, and emerge from the crisis as a community more than worthy of the slogan “Boston Strong.” However, we should keep in mind that many of the preconditions for this response were created by leaders, sociopolitical conditions—and considerable investments in preparedness—long before the Marathon bombs went off (Lebow, 1981). For example, FEMA Deputy Commissioner Serino suggested in testimony to a Senate subcommittee that an eff ective emergency medical response to the event—like other aspects of the resilient response—was the direct result of many years of preparation and signifi cant prior local, state, and federal collaborative eff ort:

As the medical incident commander in Boston for more

than 35 mass casualty incidents and for all of Boston’s

major planned events, including the Boston Marathon,

I can tell you that the fact that the response was so well

executed wasn’t an accident—it was a result of years

of planning and coordination. It was no accident that

not a single hospital in the city was overwhelmed with

patients in the aftermath of the bombings. It was no

accident that patients were appropriately triaged and

transported in an orderly manner to the appropriate

hospital based on their needs. And it was no accident

that a Medical Intelligence Center was fully staffed and

operating on race day to keep track of patients, coordi-

nate resources and share information with the medical

community throughout the region. All of these are

tangible results of disaster planning that has gone on

in Boston for more than 20 years. I’m here today to

discuss, in part, how FEMA played an important role in

making the people on the ground more prepared for

that day. (Serino, 2013).

Despite the apparent success story, for many communities (and organizations) maintaining readiness and building resilience over the long term is a very challenging endeavor. Investments in preparedness are popular (and politically attractive) in the immediate aftermath of major events—and often far less so as time goes on and other issues and priorities come to dominate headlines and budgets (Kingdon, 2010). Leaders must remember and be able to persuade others that the cost of preparedness is an insurance premium to be paid in times of austerity as well as prosperity, in times of calm as well as turbulence. Failure to do so represents a signifi cant failure of leadership.

ConclusionPresident Harry S Truman famously displayed a sign on his desk with the slogan “Th e Buck Stops Here,” to re-mind his visitors (and himself ) that he was ultimately accountable for the current state of aff airs and the future viability of the nation.3 It has long been understood that when it comes to grappling with (and explaining) crises and emergencies, strategic and operational leaders alike have crucial roles to play. More recently, it has been rec-ognized that leaders have a responsibility to appropriately terminate crises and ensure that they and their organiza-tions learn from—and change appropriately after—ma-jor events (Boin et al., 2005). Th is is a tall order, but, in fact, the responsibility of leadership extends even further. Leaders are responsible for ensuring that the entities they lead are prepared to rise to future challenges—challenges foreseen and unforeseen alike. Th is is no easy task.

When we assess our leaders’ and their organizations’ eff ectiveness in the domain of crisis leadership, it is important not only to look at how they performed on “Game Day,” but also to what extent they empowered and prepared their followers, partners, and fellow citizens long before the moment of crisis.

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Notes1The author would like to thank a number of colleagues and organizations for encouragement, constructive criti-cism, and fi nancial support of the research reported here. Special thanks to Bengt Sundelius, Paul ‘t Hart, Arjen Boin, Fredrik Bynander, Lars Hedstrom, Par Daleus, Jalal Mapar, Dan Stevens, P. A. Mortensson, Tom Preston, Peg Hermann, Catherine Jones, Robert Bach, and Brad Kieserman, as well as to the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency, the Swedish National Defense College, the Disaster Research Center at the University of. Delaware and the LIVE Leadership Network. Th anks also to Joseph Trainor and Lucia Velotti for useful editorial feedback on a previous draft.2“FEMA Administrator Craig Fugate Urges State Emergency Managers to Prepare for the Worst and Consider the Entire Community While Planning for Disaster,” press release, Federal Emergency Management Agency, retrieved from http://www.ready.gov/press-release/release-1010203For a picture of Truman’s desk sign, see the website of the Truman Presidential Library, http://www.trumanlibrary.org/buckstop.htm

References

Aldrich, D. (2012). Building resilience. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Alberts, D. S., & Hayes, R. E. (2003). Power to the edge: Com-mand…control…in the Information Age. Washington, DC: Com-mand and Control Research Program.

Boin, A., McConnell, A., & ‘t Hart, P. (Eds.). (2008). Governing after crisis. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

Boin, A., ‘t Hart, P., Stern, E., & Sundelius, B. (2005). Th e politics of crisis management: Public leadership under pressure. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Brown, C., & Eriksson, K. (2008). A plan for (certain) failure: Possibilities for and challenges of more realistic emergency plans. International Journal of Emergency Management, 5, 292–310.

Clarke, L. (2001). Mission improbable: Using fantasy documents to tame disaster. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Comfort, L., Boin, A., & Demchak, C. (2010). Designing resilience. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press.

Deverell, E., & Olsson, E.-K. (2009). Learning from crisis: A frame-work of management, learning, and implementation in response to crises. Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management, 6(1). doi:10.2202/1547-7355.1574

Hermann, M. G., & Hagan, J. D. (1998). International decision making: Leadership matters. Foreign Policy, no. 110, 124–137.

Kendra, J. M., & Wachtendorf, T. (2003). Elements of resilience in the World Trade Center disaster: Reconstituting the EOC. Disasters, 27, 37–53.

Kingdon, J. (2010). Agendas, alternatives and public p olicy (2nd updated ed.). London, UK: Longman.

Lebow, R. N. (1981). Between peace and war. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Parker, C., & Stern, E. (2005). Blindsided? September 11 and the origins of strategic surprise. Foreign Policy Analysis, 1, 301–331.

Parker, C., Stern, E., Pagila, E., & Brown, C. (2009). Preventable catastrophe: Th e Hurricane Katrina disaster. Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management, 17, 206–220.

Preston, T. (2001). Th e president and his inner circle. New York, NY: Columbia University Press.

Serino, R. (2013). Written testimony of FEMA Deputy Administra-tor Richard Serino for a Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Aff airs hearing titled “Lessons Learned from the Boston Marathon Bombings: Preparing for and Responding to the Attack.” Retrieved from http://www.dhs.gov/news/2013/07/10/written-testimony-fema-senate-committee-homeland-security-and-governmental-aff airs

Stern, E. (1997). Crisis and learning: A conceptual balance sheet. Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management, 5, 69–86.

Stern, E. (1999). Crisis decisionmaking: A cognitive institutional approach. Stockholm: Swedish National Defense College.

Stern, E., & Sundelius, B. (2002). Crisis management Europe: A regional research and training program. International Studies Perspec-tives, 3, 71–88.

Stevens, D. (2013). Redefi ning the emergency manager: A proposal for change. Retrieved from http://www.emergencymgmt.com/training/Redefi ning-the-Emergency-Manager.html.

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Eric Stern is professor of political science/crisis management at the Swedish National Defense College, where he served as director of the National Center for Crisis Management Research and Training (CRISMART) from 2004–2011. He is also adjunct professor at the University of Delaware School of Public Policy and faculty affiliate of the Disaster Research Center. Dr. Stern holds a PhD from Stockholm University and a


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BA from Dartmouth College. He has published extensively in the fi elds of crisis and emergency management, security studies, executive leadership, foreign policy analysis, and political psychology. Among his monographs and edited volumes are Th e Politics of Crisis Management: Leadership Under Pressure (Cambridge University Press, 2005) and Beyond Groupthink: Political Group Dynamics and Foreign Policymaking (University of Michigan Press, 1997). He is the winner of the

American Political Science Association’s 2007 Herbert Simon Award. Particular areas of expertise include crisis analysis, postcrisis evaluation and learning, interactive education, and instructional design. In addition to his scholarly work, professor Stern has collaborated closely with many government agencies and international organizations around the world on a wide range of consulting, educational (including training and exercise development), and applied research projects.

preparing: the sixth task of crisis leadership

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