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Preliminary Report on the January 2013 Fires in the South-Eastern Tasmania Research Project

Jessica Boylan

University of Western Australia

Colleen Cheek and Timothy Skinner

Rural Clinical School University of Tasmania February 1, 2013

This research was funded by the Bushfire Cooperative Research Centre and University of Tasmania Rural Clinical School

Preliminary Report on the January 2013 South-Eastern Tasmania Research Project 2 This research was funded by the Bushfire Cooperative Research Centre and the University of Tasmania Rural Clinical School. Please note that the information contained in this report is preliminary only, and should therefore be interpreted as such. No causal claims are being made by the research team in this preliminary report.

1. Disclaimers

Please note that the information contained in this report is preliminary only, and should therefore

be interpreted as such. No causal claims are being made by the research team in this preliminary

report.

2. Background

From 3rd to 4th of January 2013, several bushfires devastated communities in the South-East of

Tasmania. The fire started in the township of Forcett and burnt across 20165 hectares1, destroying

approximately 200 homes and 21 businesses, with the township of Dunalley being the hardest hit.

The fire started as the result of an old fire that was smouldering in a burnt out tree stump and

intensified due to the weather conditions2.

On 3rd January the temperature in the Forcett area was in the mid-30s with strong West North

West winds of up to 78 km/hr3, helping to fuel the fire. The fire danger rating in this area was ‘Very

High’ and a total fire ban had been issued across Tasmania. The fire danger rating was increased

to ‘Catastrophic’ on the 4th of January, with maximum wind speeds of 81 km/hr and temperatures

reaching the low 40s4.

In response to these fires, the Tasmania Fire Service (TFS) and the Bushfire Cooperative

Research Centre (Bushfire CRC) commissioned the University of Tasmania to undertake a

research project aimed at gaining a better understanding of the community response to these fires

through a combination of the following methods:

1. Community interviews (n = 245) conducted in the fire affected area and surrounding

communities in the South-East of Tasmania; and

2. An iPad survey (n = 245) completed during the interview by the co-interviewer.

This project will provide information on:

individual awareness of bushfire danger in these areas

individual awareness of and preparation for bushfire in these areas

individual understanding of leaving early on days when bad fire weather is forecast

individual behaviours and decision making on the day of the fire

individual awareness of and response to bushfire messages and warnings, and

the factors that can assist people during a bushfire

1 Tasmania Fire Service, Fire Incident News,

http://www.fire.tas.gov.au/Show?pageId=incidentItem&h=false&viewIncidentUpdateID=83603133268096 (accessed February 11, 2013). 2 Tasmania Police Media & Communications, Forcett Fire – Cause Determined,

http://www.police.tas.gov.au/news/posts/view/3789/Forcett+fire+-+cause+determined/ (accessed February 11, 2013). 3 Bureau of Meteorology, Hobart Airport, Tasmania January 2013 Daily Weather Observations,

http://www.bom.gov.au/climate/dwo/201301/html/IDCJDW7022.201301.shtml (accessed February 11, 2013). 4 Bureau of Meteorology, Dunalley, Tasmania January 2013 Daily Weather Observations,

http://www.bom.gov.au/climate/dwo/201301/html/IDCJDW7061.201301.shtml (accessed February 11, 2013).

http://www.fire.tas.gov.au/Show?pageId=incidentItem&h=false&viewIncidentUpdateID=83603133268096

http://www.police.tas.gov.au/news/posts/view/3789/Forcett+fire+-+cause+determined/

http://www.bom.gov.au/climate/dwo/201301/html/IDCJDW7022.201301.shtml

http://www.bom.gov.au/climate/dwo/201301/html/IDCJDW7061.201301.shtml


3. Methodology

This project was approved by the Tasmanian Social Sciences Human Research Ethics Committee.

Sampling demographics

In consultation with TFS, we identified the townships that were within or close to the fire perimeter

and that would be suitable to conduct the interviews in. It was decided that the initial base for the

research team would be in the worst hit township of Dunalley, with participant numbers being

reviewed daily to monitor progress and ensure a representative sample was being collected.

From the base in Dunalley, research teams were deployed as teams of two and allocated streets

or areas within Dunalley or the surrounding townships. Teams also conducted in-field assessments

of suitable regions to interview. The townships within the fire perimeter that were covered by the

research team include: Boomer Bay, Connellys Marsh, Copping, Dunalley, Eaglehawk Neck,

Forcett, Murdunna, Primrose Sands and Taranna. The townships that were close to but outside the

fire perimeter included: Bream Creek, Carlton, Dodges Ferry, Kellevie, Koonya, Lewisham,

Nubeena, Port Arthur, Saltwater River, and White Beach.

Teams interviewed residents of properties that were damaged or destroyed and residents who

lived close to damaged or destroyed properties. These residents included permanent residents and

shack owners. The teams also interviewed people who were holidaying in the area at the time of

the bushfire.

Data Collection

An interview guide was developed to address a set of themes, pre-determined by TFS and

identified as important for understanding the community response to the 2013 bushfire in the

South-Eastern area of Tasmania (see Appendix 1). The interviewers used a digital recorder (with

the permission of the interviewee), to facilitate the timely and accurate reporting of data. In the

event that permission was not granted, interviewers took notes in a log book and/or on an iPad. An

interview checklist was also developed to accompany the interview guide and was entered into an

application located on an iPad (see Appendix 2). Interviewers were provided with a paper version

of the checklist as a back-up.

The research team’s initial base was set up in the car park of the Dunalley hotel and provided a

meeting point for the research team as well as a static base that residents could attend to

participate in an interview if they did not wish to do so on their property. During the data collection

process, trained interviewers were deployed in teams of two; one team member conducted the

interview and the second team member took note of relevant information and entered it into the

survey on an iPad. Teams were allocated an area in one of the selected townships and went door

to door seeking to engage householders in an interview. All participants who agreed to take part in

an interview were given an information sheet and asked to sign a consent form prior to

commencing the interview. Interviews were also organised with householders who contacted the

Bushfire CRC hotline or who rang or visited the research van.

When householders were unavailable for an interview at the time of the visit, the teams attempted

to arrange a suitable time with the householder. If householders were not home at the time of the

visit, the teams left a flyer on the property, inviting the householder to contact the research team.

The addresses of visited properties were recorded to ensure householders were not approached

more than once.


Timeframe

Interviews were conducted in the South-East of Tasmania between 14th and 24th January 2013.

During this time, 676 households were approached and 245 surveys and interviews were

conducted, with 5 householders not granting permission to be recorded. Over the 11 days, we left

approximately 299 flyers at properties within or close to the fire perimeter and we had 52

householders contact us requesting to be interviewed. Thirty two householders declined to

participate in the research.

Overall Sample

Table 1, shows the number of interviews and checklists that were completed between 14th and 24th

January, and the locations in which they were conducted. Figure 1, shows a map of the fire

perimeter and the townships that were visited within and close to the fire perimeter5. The sample

size is large enough to provide a representation of the behaviours and decisions of the broader

population within the South-Eastern Tasmania area.

Table 1. The number of interviews and interview checklists completed between 14th and 24th

January 2013 within the South-Eastern Tasmania area.

Township Interview & Interview Checklist

Towns within the fire perimeter

Boomer Bay 31

Carlton River 3

Connellys Marsh 16

Copping 13

Dunalleya 67

Eaglehawk Neck 40

Forcett 8

Murdunna 32

Primrose Sands 10

Taranna 6

Towns outside the fire perimeter

Bream Creek 1

Carlton 3

Dodges Ferry 2

Kellevie 2

Koonya 1

Lewisham 1

Nubeena 1

Port Arthur 3

Saltwater River 1

Sandfordb 1

White Beach 3

Total 245 aOf the residents living in Dunalley, 47 reported their house survived with no damage or minor damage, 4 reported their house had

survived but was damaged and 13 reported their house was damaged. Therefore, this sample is not a representative sample of the residents who lost their home. These residents were most likely seeking shelter with family or friends in other townships.

bPlease note that this participant was interviewed in the township of Sandford, a township well outside the fire perimeter, however their

place of residence within the fire affected area was not recorded.

5 GOOGLE EARTH (2013). Inala Road, Forcett 42

o48’33.22”S, 147

o43’05.29”E, elev 136m,

http://www.fire.tas.gov.au/gearth.jsp (accessed February 6, 2013).


Figure 1. The fire perimeter in the South-Eastern Tasmania area and the places visited by the

research team between 14th and 24th January 2013.


SUMMARY OF PRELIMINARY FINDINGS

4. Bushfire Preparations

Long term bushfire preparations

The three most frequently reported long term preparations by householders in the South-Eastern

Tasmania area were clearing vegetation from around the home, having an unwritten bushfire

survival plan and clearing a space around the home. The long term preparations that were least

reported include reviewing the local community protection plan, ensuring house structure

protection (enclosed under-floor, gutter guards, covered vents, safety-glass windows) and having a

written bushfire survival plan (see Figure 2).

The other long term bushfire preparations reported by householders and that were not included in

the list of long term preparations provided in the survey include:

Watched the TFS DVD

Organised a safety survival bag and reviewed annually

Installed taps on every corner of the house

Planted fire resistant plants on the property

Practiced fire drills

Wrote to the council to ask them to clear council land close to their property

Watered plants to keep green and moist

Kept an eye on rain records to monitor bushfire risk

Figure 2. The percentage of householders in the South-Eastern Tasmania area and their long term

preparatory actions (n = 225).

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

A w

ritt

en b

ushfire

surv

ival

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Short term bushfire preparations

The three most frequently reported short term bushfire preparations undertaken by householders in

the South-Eastern Tasmania area include packing a kit ready to leave, checking the fire danger

situation and clearing litter from the yard and gutters. The short term preparations that were least

reported include charging the mobile phone, ensuring protective clothing is ready, and filling

containers with emergency drinking water (see Figure 3).

The other short term preparatory activities that were reported by householders and that were not

included in the list of short term preparations provided in the survey include:

Filled roof gutters with water

Turned power off

Contacted friends and family for assistance

Prepared boat in the water

Started the generator

Drove cars to the waterfront

Made property accessible by fire trucks

Kept a look out to see if the fire was coming over the hill

Figure 3. The percentage of householders in the South-Eastern Tasmania area and their short

term preparatory actions (n = 173).

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

Ch

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Cle

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Fill

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Bushfire preparations and outcome

Table 2 and 3 show the long term and short term preparations6 reported by householders and the

outcome for the property. The most frequently reported long term preparation by householders in

all three outcome categories is “clearing vegetation from around the home” (see Table 2).

Table 2. Long term preparatory actions and property outcome.

Outcome

House survived, no damage or minor

damage only

House survived but damaged

House destroyed

n Column%

n Column%

n Column %

Total

Lo

ng

term

pre

pa

rati

on

s

A written bushfire survival plan 9 5.2 0 0 1 3.8 10

An unwritten bushfire survival plan 99 57.6 4 57.1 10 38.5 113

Checked insurance up to date 21 12.2 0 0 4 15.4 25

Water supply independent of mains 70 40.7 2 28.6 5 19.2 77

Pump with independent power source 46 26.7 3 42.9 2 7.7 51

House sprinkler system 16 9.3 0 0 2 7.7 18

Cleared vegetation from around house 122 70.9 6 85.7 18 69.2 146

Removed combustibles from near house 60 34.9 2 28.6 4 15.4 66

A clear space around home 93 54.1 6 85.7 10 38.5 109

House structure protection 7 4.1 1 14.3 1 3.8 9

Reviewed local community protection plan 7 4.1 0 0 0 0 7

Evacuation route and safe destination selected 55 32 1 14.3 4 15.4 60

Portable radio with fresh batteries 18 10.5 0 0 4 15.4 22

Other 67 39 2 28.6 11 42.3 80

Total 180 8 28 216

It can be seen from the data in Table 3, that householders who reported their house survived with

no or minor damage, most frequently reported packing a kit ready to leave. The householders who

reported that their house survived but was damaged, most frequently reported checking the fire

danger situation, discussing the fire risk with neighbours/friends/officials, and packing a kit ready to

leave. The householders who reported that their house was destroyed, most frequently reported

“other,” indicating that they undertook a short term preparatory action other than the actions that

were listed in the survey.

Table 3. Short term preparatory actions and property outcome.

Outcome

House survived, no damage or minor

damage only


House destroyed

n Column%

n Column%

n Column%

Total

Sh

ort

term

pre

pa

rati

on

s

Checked fire danger situation 60 42.9 3 37.5 6 35.3 69

Discussed fire risk with neighbours/friends/officials 45 32.1 3 37.5 6 35.3 54

Cleared litter from gutters/yard 57 40.7 2 25.0 5 29.4 64

Filled containers with water to fight fire 50 35.7 2 25.0 3 17.6 55

Filled containers with emergency drinking water 15 10.7 1 12.5 0 0.0 16

Arranged safety of pets/livestock 39 27.9 2 25.0 2 11.8 43

Protective clothing ready 14 10.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 14

Tested fire fighting system pump/sprinkler/hoses 22 15.7 0 0.0 2 11.8 24

Packed kit ready to leave 65 46.4 3 37.5 4 23.5 72

Car parked fuelled ready to go 29 20.7 2 25.0 1 5.9 32

Mobile phone charged 12 8.6 0 0.0 1 5.9 13

Other 38 27.1 0 0.0 9 52.9 47

Total 142 8 19 169

6 The two survey questions that ask about the residents long term and short term preparatory actions are formatted to

allow householders to provide more than one response. Accordingly, the column percentages shown in Tables 2 and 3 represent the percentage of householders who reported that particular preparatory action and for this reason the percentages sum to more than 100%. Furthermore, the total values in Tables 2 and 3 represent the total number of cases/householders who responded to the question rather than the total of the column or row.


Source of preparatory information

The key resources used to gain long and short term preparatory information by householders in the

South-Eastern Tasmania area were common sense, experience from living in a rural area and a

resource other than those listed in the survey. These other resources include:

Radio

TV (e.g. news)

Newspaper

Previous bushfire experience

Experience from training (e.g. safety training at work, army, SES, fire service)

TFS DVD

Jehovah’s witness

Social media

School program

The three least reported resources used to gain preparatory information were community

meetings, the official website, and official documents (see Figure 4).

Figure 4. The percentage of householders in the South-Eastern Tasmania area and the resources

used to gain preparatory information (n = 193).

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

50

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erie

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Factors that influenced the decision to prepare on the day of the fire

The most frequently recorded answer in response to the question, “what influenced their decision

to prepare?” was “other” (see Figure 5). These other factors that were reported by householders

and not included in the list provided in the survey include:

Family and friends

Desire to protect home

Common sense

Own research

Community meetings

Past training

Advice from locals

SES experience

Local knowledge

Awareness of risk

Council regulations

Figure 5. The percentage of householders in the South-Eastern Tasmania area and the factors that

influenced their decision to prepare (n = 134).

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

Tas Fire Service Media Past Fire Other

Perc

en

tag

e o

f H

ou

seh

old

ers


5. Action on the Day

Action taken on the day of the fire

The most frequently reported action undertaken by householders in the South-Eastern Tasmania

area on the day of the fire was “left just in time,” while the least reported action was “not at home –

deliberate decision based on the fire danger” (see Figure 6). Other actions that were reported by

householders and not included in the list of actions provided in the survey include:

Fighting fire as a fire fighter

Waited until told to evacuate

Stayed home, the fire did not reach the house

Watched the fire from the house

Stayed home, the house was unaffected

Figure 6. The percentage of householders in the South-Eastern Tasmania area and their reported

action taken on the day of the fire (n = 219).

Action on the day of the fire and group differences

The actions undertaken by male householders were found to be significantly different from those

undertaken by female householders (p = .000). Males most frequently reported a “successful

attempt to defend the home,” while females most frequently reported leaving well before the fire

impacted (see Table 4).

0

5

10

15

20

25

No

t at

hom

e just by c

han

ce

Le

ft w

ell

be

fore

th

e fir

eim

pa

ct

No

t at

hom

e -

de

libera

tede

cis

ion

ba

se

d o

n fire

da

nge

r

Succe

ssfu

l att

em

pt to

de

fend

ho

me

Un

su

ccessfu

l atte

mpt

tode

fen

d h

om

e

Le

ft just in

tim

e

Too

k last re

sort

she

lte

r

Oth

er

Perc

en

tag

ae o

f H

ou

seh

old

ers


Table 4. Cross tabulation of action taken on the day and gender.

Gender

Male Female

n Column % n Column % Total

Acti

on

on

th

e d

ay

Not at home just by chance 15 11.8 15 16.7 30

Left well before the fire impact 14 11.0 27 30.0 41

Not at home – deliberate decision based on fire 2 1.6 0 0.0 2

Successful attempt to defend home 34 26.8 13 14.4 47

Unsuccessful attempt to defend home 3 2.4 0 0.0 3

Left just in time 29 22.8 21 23.3 50

Took last-resort shelter 3 2.4 4 4.4 7

Other 27 21.3 10 11.1 37

Total 127 100 90 100 217

The actions taken on the day of the fire by householders who reported previous bushfire

experience were significantly different from those who did not have previous experience (p = .000).

Householders who reported having previous bushfire experience most frequently reported a

“successful attempt to defend the home,” while those who did not have previous experience most

frequently reported leaving just in time (see Figure 7). Of those householders who reported having

previous bushfire experience, 90.9% of them indicated that it influenced their planning.

Figure 7. Previous bushfire experience and the action taken on the day of the fire (n = 212).

A significant difference was also found between householders who had previous experience in

emergency services and those who did not (p = .003). Householders who reported having previous

emergency services experience most frequently reported an action that was not included in the list

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

No

t at

hom

e just by c

han

ce

Le

ft w

ell

be

fore

th

e im

pact

No

t at

hom

e -

de

libera

tede

cis

ion

ba

se

d o

n fire

dan

ger

Succe

ssfu

l att

em

pt to

de

fend

ho

me

Un

su

ccessfu

l atte

mpt

tode

fen

d h

om

e

Le

ft just in

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k last re

sort

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Perc

en

tag

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ou

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old

ers

Bushfire Experience(n = 141)

No Bushfire Experience(n = 71)


that was provided in the survey. Householders who reported no previous emergency services

experience most frequently reported leaving well before the fire impacted and a “successful

attempt to defend the home.” (see Figure 8).

Figure 8. Emergency services experience and the action taken on the day of the fire (n = 191).

Action on the day and outcome

Of the 178 householders whose house survived with no damage or minor damage only, the most

frequently reported action was “successful attempt to defend the home.” Of the 9 householders

who reported their house survived but with damage, the most frequently reported action on the day

was “left just in time.” Of the 27 householders who reported their house had been destroyed, the

most frequently reported action on the day was “left just in time” (see Table 5).

0

5

10

15

20

25

30N

ot at

hom

e just by c

han

ce

Le

ft w

ell

be

fore

th

e im

pact

No

t at

hom

e -

de

libera

tede

cis

ion

ba

se

d o

n fire

dan

ger

Succe

ssfu

l att

em

pt to

de

fend

ho

me

Un

su

ccessfu

l atte

mpt

tode

fen

d h

om

e

Le

ft just in

tim

e

To

ok last re

sort

she

lte

r

Oth

er

Pe

rce

nta

ge o

f H

ou

seh

old

ers

Emergency ServicesExperience (n = 75)

No Emergency ServicesExperience (n = 116)


Table 5. Cross tabulation of action taken on the day and outcome of the property.

Outcome

House survived, no damage or minor damage

only


House destroyed

n

Column %

n Column

% n

Column %

Total

Acti

on

on

th

e d

ay Not at home just by chance 25 14.0 0 0.0 4 14.8 29

Left well before fire impact 35 19.7 0 0.0 6 22.2 41

Not at home – deliberate decision based on fire danger 1 0.6 1 11.1 0 0.0 2

Successful attempt to defend home 43 24.2 2 22.2 1 3.7 46

Unsuccessful attempt to defend home 0 0.0 0 0.0 3 11.1 3

Left just in time 39 21.9 3 33.3 9 33.3 51

Took last-resort shelter 4 2.2 2 22.2 1 3.7 7

Other 31 17.4 1 11.1 3 11.1 35

Total 178 100 9 100 27 100 214

Action on the day of the fire and responsibility for dependents and pets

36% of householders interviewed in the South-Eastern Tasmania area indicated they were

responsible for dependents on the day of the fire. Of these householders, 79% had made

provisions for their dependents in their bushfire plan and 69% of them said that having dependents

affected their actions taken on the day. Some of the explanations given about how having

dependents affected their actions on the day include:

Evacuated because they had dependents

Some stayed to defend the home while others left to evacuate the dependent/s

Actions were hurried because they had dependents

Had to look after and calm the dependent/s from the stress of the fire

Returned home to collect dependent/s

Returned home to collect medication for dependent/s

A “successful attempt to defend the home” was the most frequently reported action undertaken by

householders who reported being responsible for dependents on the day of the fire. Of those

householders who were responsible for dependents and successfully defending their home, 50%

of them had intended to do so based on their bushfire plan (see Table 6). “Left just in time” was the

most frequently reported action undertaken by householders who reported no responsibility for

dependents (see Figure 9). Based on their bushfire plan, their initial intentions were to leave when

the threat became apparent (see Table 6).


Table 6. Initial intentions, actions taken on the day of the fire and responsibility for dependents.

Based on their bushfire plan, what were their initial intentions?

Stay and Defend

Wait and see how bad it is then decide

Whole family leaves early

Some people leave early, others stay and defend

Leave when threat is apparent

No concrete plan

Total

Acti

on

on

th

e d

ay

Yes,

resp

on

sib

le f

or

dep

en

den

ts

Not at home just by chance 1 0 3 0 1 2 7

Row % 14.3 0.0 42.9 0.0 14.3 28.6 100.0

Left well before fire impact 0 0 8 0 4 1 13

Row % 0.0 0.0 61.5 0.0 30.8 7.7 100.0

Not at home – deliberate based on fire danger 0 0 1 0 0 0 1

Row % 0.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0

Successful attempt to defend home 11 4 1 5 0 1 22

Row % 50.0 18.2 4.5 22.7 0.0 4.5 100.0

Left just in time 0 2 2 1 6 2 13

Row % 0.0 15.4 15.4 7.7 46.2 15.4 100.0

Took last-resort shelter 0 0 0 0 0 1 1

Row % 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 100.0

Other 2 0 3 0 5 1 11

Row % 18.2 0.0 27.3 0.0 45.5 9.1 100.0

Total 14 6 18 6 16 8 68

Row % 20.6 8.8 26.5 8.8 23.5 11.8 100.0

No

t re

sp

on

sib

le f

or

de

pen

de

nts

Not at home just by chance 4 7 1 0 3 4 19

Row % 21.1 36.8 5.3 0.0 15.8 21.1 100.0

Left well before fire impact 1 1 8 0 11 2 23

Row % 4.3 4.3 34.8 0.0 47.8 8.7 100.0

Successful attempt to defend home 17 2 0 0 2 2 23

Row % 73.9 8.7 0.0 0.0 8.7 8.7 100.0

Unsuccessful attempt to defend home 1 1 0 0 1 0 3

Row % 33.3 33.3 0.0 0.0 33.3 0.0 100.0

Left just in time 5 7 2 1 13 5 33

Row % 15.2 21.2 6.1 3.0 39.4 15.2 100.0

Took last-resort shelter 1 4 0 0 1 0 6

Row % 16.7 66.7 0.0 0.0 16.7 0.0 100.0

Other 3 6 0 4 7 2 22

Row % 13.6 27.3 0.0 18.2 31.8 9.1 100.0

Total 32 28 11 5 38 15 129

Row % 24.8 21.7 8.5 3.9 29.5 11.6 100.0


Figure 9. Responsibility for dependents and the action taken on the day (n = 210).

67% of householders interviewed in the South-Eastern Tasmania area reported they had pets. Of

these householders, 67% reported they had made provisions for their pets in their bushfire plan.

48% of householders mentioned that having a pet affected their actions taken on the day. Some of

the explanations about how having pets affected their actions on the day include:

Evacuated the pets the day before the fire

Stayed on the property because they had pets

Left property early because of pets

Returned to property to get or check on pets

Moved livestock from danger

Sent pets to family/friends

Affected where they selected to evacuate

Prepared early because of pets

Stopped during evacuation to attend to the needs of pets

Gathered provisions for pets

“Left just in time” was the most frequently reported action undertaken by both householders who

reported they had pets and those who did not have pets (see Figure 10).

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

No

t at

hom

e just by c

han

ce

Le

ft w

ell

be

fore

th

e im

pact

No

t at

hom

e -

de

libera

tede

cis

ion

ba

se

d o

n fire

dan

ger

Succe

ssfu

l att

em

pt to

de

fend

ho

me

Un

su

ccessfu

l atte

mpt

tode

fen

d h

om

e

Le

ft just in

tim

e

To

ok last re

sort

she

lte

r

Oth

er

Perc

en

tag

e o

f H

ou

seh

old

ers

Dependents(n = 71)

No Dependents(n = 139)


Figure 10. Responsibility for pets and the action taken on the day of the fire (n = 209).

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

No

t at

hom

e just by c

han

ce

Le

ft w

ell

be

fore

th

e im

pact

No

t at

hom

e -

de

libera

tede

cis

ion

ba

se

d o

n fire

dan

ger

Succe

ssfu

l att

em

pt to

de

fend

ho

me

Un

su

ccessfu

l atte

mpt

tode

fen

d h

om

e

Le

ft just in

tim

e

To

ok last re

sort

she

lte

r

Oth

er

Perc

en

tag

e o

f H

ou

seh

old

ers

Pets(n = 135)

No Pets(n = 74)


6. Awareness of the Fire & Emergency Warnings

Awareness of the Fire

The most common way in which householders initially became aware of the fire was by seeing or

smelling smoke. This was followed by being contacted by friends/neighbours/family and receiving

an initial warning on the radio (see Figure 11). Other ways in which householders initially became

aware of the fire and that were not included in the list provided in the survey include:

Salvation Army

RSL staff

Weather report from the night before

Knowledge about the Forcett fire

Felt heat

Arrived at a road block

Looked at the weather

Employer

Figure 11. The percentage of householders and the method by which they became aware of the fire (n = 233).

From the data in Table 7 and 8, it is apparent that smoke was the most frequently reported factor

for householders who became aware of the fire and took decisive action both immediately and

more than 2 hours before the fire arrived.

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

Saw

sm

oke

Saw

fla

mes

Re

ce

ived o

ffic

ial w

arn

ing

via

TV

Re

ce

ived o

ffic

ial w

arn

ing

via

radio

Re

ce

ived o

ffic

ial w

arn

ing

via

we

b

Warn

ed

by

Polic

e/S

ES

/Fire

fig

hte

rs

Offic

ial w

arn

ing

via

EA

,em

ail,

SM

S

Co

nta

ct fr

om

frie

nds/n

eig

hbo

urs

/fam

ily

Faceb

ook

Oth

erP

erc

en

tag

e o

f H

ou

seh

old

ers


Table 7. Cross tabulation of the factor that alerted the householder and the time it took for the householder to become aware of the fire before it

arrived.

How long before the fire arrived did they become aware of it

Immediately <5 mins 5 – 15 mins 15 – 30 mins 30 mins – 1 hr 1 – 2 hrs >2 hrs Precise time

n % n % n % n % n % n % n % n % Total

Ho

w d

id t

hey b

eco

me a

ware

of

the

fir

e

Saw smoke 2 40.0 1 33.3 1 20.0 4 44.4 4 57.1 7 29.2 38 34.2 3 42.9 60

Saw flames 2 40.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 2 22.2 0 0.0 1 4.2 7 6.3 0 0.0 12

Received official warning via TV 0 0.0 1 33.3 1 20.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 2

Received official warning via radio 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 2 28.6 1 4.2 20 18.0 0 0.0 23

Received official warning via web 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 1 4.2 1 0.9 0 0.0 2

Warned by Police/SES/ Fire fighters 0 0.0 1 33.3 1 20.0 1 11.1 0 0.0 2 8.3 8 7.2 0 0.0 13

Official warning via EA, email, SMS 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 3 12.5 6 5.4 1 14.3 10

Contact from friends/neighbours/family 1 20.0 0 0.0 2 40.0 1 11.1 1 14.3 9 37.5 20 18.0 3 42.9 37

Facebook 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0

Other 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 1 11.1 0 0.0 0 0.0 11 9.9 0 0.0 12

Total 5 100.0 3 100.0 5 100.0 9 100.0 7 100.0 24 100.0 111 100.0 7 100.0 171

Table 8. Cross tabulation of the factor that alerted the householder and the time it took for the householder to take decisive action.

How long before the fire arrived did they take decisive action?

Immediately <5 mins 5 – 15 mins 15 – 30 mins 30 mins – 1 hr 1 – 2 hrs >2 hrs

n % n % n % n % n % n % n % Total

Ho

w d

id t

he

y b

eco

me

aw

are

of

the

fir

e

Saw smoke 13 36.1 2 40.0 1 11.1 2 25.0 6 28.6 9 32.1 20 37.7 53

Saw flames 7 19.4 0 0.0 1 11.1 1 12.5 0 0.0 1 3.6 2 3.8 12

Received official warning via TV 1 2.8 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 1

Received official warning via radio 6 16.7 1 20.0 0 0.0 1 12.5 5 23.8 3 10.7 8 15.1 24

Received official warning via web 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 2 7.1 0 0.0 2

Warned by Police/SES/ Fire fighters 1 2.8 2 40.0 2 22.2 0 0.0 2 9.5 2 7.1 5 9.4 14

Official warning via EA, email, SMS 1 2.8 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 3 14.3 2 7.1 3 5.7 9

Contact from friends/neighbours/family 6 16.7 0 0.0 4 44.4 2 25.0 4 19.0 5 17.9 11 20.8 32

Other 1 2.8 0 0.0 1 11.1 2 25.0 1 4.8 4 14.3 4 7.5 13

Total 36 100.0 5 100.0 9 100.0 8 100.0 21 100.0 28 100.0 53 100.0 160


Emergency warnings

Figure 12, shows a summary of the preferred methods of warning reported by householders living

in the South-Eastern Tasmania area. The mobile phone was the most frequently preferred method

for receiving an emergency warning.

Figure 12. The percentage of householders and their preferred method of warning (n = 198).

Emergency warnings via radio and TFS website

Of the householders who used the radio to inform them of the fire, 54% of householders reported

the radio to be useful, 21% reported it to be timely and 12% reported the radio to be of the right

frequency.

Numerous householders mentioned they did not use the TFS website because their electricity was

cut-off however, of the householders who used the TFS website to inform them of the fire, 41%

said it was useful, 11% said it was timely, and 10% said that it was of the right frequency.

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

La

ndlin

e

Ra

dio

Mo

bile

pho

ne

Siren

or

pu

blic

an

nou

ncem

ent

Fam

ily TV

Pers

onal assessm

ent

of

surr

oun

din

gs

Face-t

o-F

ace

com

mun

ication

Inte

rnet

Co

mbin

ation

Sig

ns m

ea

su

ring

fire

dan

ger

levels

on th

e r

oad

Perc

en

tag

e o

f H

ou

seh

old

ers


7. Initial Intentions & Response to the Fire

Initial intentions

The most frequently reported initial intention, based on their bushfire plan, was to leave when the

threat became apparent (see Figure 13). The second most frequently reported initial intention was

to stay and defend the property. Of the householders who indicated their intentions were to stay

and defend, 64% believed that their preparations for this fire were adequate.

Figure 13. The percentage of householders and their initial intentions based on their bushfire plan

(n = 227).

Initial intentions and disagreements

Most householders reported that there were no disagreements between family members (89%

householders) or between adult males and females (89% householders) within the household

about the initial actions that ought to be taken. However, of those who said there were

disagreements between family members, 15% said that it significantly delayed their decisive

action, while 20% were unsure and 65% did not believe it significantly delayed them. Of those who

said there were disagreements between adult males and females within the household, 16% said

that it significantly delayed them taking decisive action, while 16% were unsure and 68% did not

believe it significantly delayed them.

The most frequently reported initial intention by those householders who reported disagreements

between family members and between adult males and females within the household was “stay

and defend (unambiguous)” (see Figure 14 & 15).

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

Sta

y a

nd d

efe

nd

(UN

AM

BIG

UO

US

)

Wait a

nd s

ee h

ow

bad

it

isth

en d

ecid

e

Whole

fam

ily leaves e

arly

Som

e p

eople

leave e

arly,

oth

ers

sta

y a

nd

de

fend

Le

ave w

hen t

hre

at

isap

pare

nt

No

co

ncre

te p

lan

Perc

en

tag

e o

f h

ou

seh

old

ers


Figure 14. Initial intentions and disagreements between family members (n = 188).

Figure 15. Initial intentions and disagreement between adult male and female householders (n = 181).

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

50

Sta

y a

nd d

efe

nd

(una

mb

igu

ous)

Wait a

nd s

ee h

ow

bad

it

isth

en d

ecid

ed

Whole

fam

ily leaves e

arly

Som

e p

eople

leave e

arly,

oth

ers

sta

y a

nd

de

fend

Le

ave w

hen t

hre

at

is a

ppare

nt

No

co

ncre

te p

lan

Perc

en

tag

e o

f H

ou

seh

old

ers

Disagreement(n = 21)

No Disagreement(n = 167)

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

Sta

y a

nd d

efe

nd

(una

mb

igu

ous)

Wait a

nd s

ee h

ow

bad

it

isth

en d

ecid

ed

Whole

fam

ily leaves e

arly

Som

e p

eople

leave e

arly,

oth

ers

sta

y a

nd

de

fend

Le

ave w

hen t

hre

at

is a

ppare

nt

No

co

ncre

te p

lan

Perc

en

tag

e o

f H

ou

seh

old

ers

Disagreement(n = 20)

No Disagreement(n = 161)


Preparatory actions taken after learning the fire was in the area

After learning the fire was in the area, the three most frequently reported preparatory actions

undertaken by householders in the South-Eastern Tasmania area was to turn on the radio for

information, collect valuables to take to safety, and telephone friends, neighbours, or family. The

three least reported actions were to email family, friends or neighbours, logged into Facebook or

Twitter, and look on a website other than the TFS website (see Figure 16.).

Figure 16. The percentage of householders and the preparatory actions they completed after

learning of the fire in their area (n = 211).

Action taken after learning the fire was a threat to them

Most householders took decisive action more than 2 hours before the fire arrived (33%

householders). However, this was followed by 22% of householders who did not take decisive

action until immediately before it arrived (see Figure 17).

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

Turn

ed o

n r

adio

for

info

Turn

ed o

n T

V for

info

Lo

oked o

n t

he T

FS

web

site

Lo

oked o

n a

noth

er

we

bsite

Tele

ph

one

dfr

iends/n

eig

hbo

urs

/fam

ily

Turn

ed o

n s

prin

kle

rs a

nd

ge

nera

tors

Went

on F

ace

boo

k o

r T

witte

r

Org

an

ised p

rote

ctive

clo

thin

g

Co

llecte

d v

alu

able

s to t

ake

to s

afe

ty

Arr

an

ged

safe

ty o

fpe

ts/liv

esto

ck

Blo

cked g

utt

ers

and

fill

ed

with w

ate

r

Em

aile

dfr

iends/n

eig

hbo

urs

/fam

ily

Oth

erP

erc

en

tag

e o

f h

ou

seh

old

ers


Figure 17. The percentage of householders and the time it took for them to take decisive action (n = 163).

The three most frequently reported actions undertaken by householders after learning the fire was

a threat to them was to gather valuables so as to be ready to leave, initialise home defences, and

call friends, family and/or neighbours. The three least frequently report actions were doing nothing

because of the fire, going back inside and waiting to see what happened, and travelling

somewhere to better see where the fire was (see Figure 18).

Although gathering valuables was the most frequently reported action, it was not the action that

householders reported as doing first. The action most frequently reported first was initialising home

defences, followed by calling friends, family, and/or neighbours, and then gathering valuables so

as to be ready to leave.

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

imm

edia

tely

< 5 m

inute

s

5 -

15 m

inute

s

15

- 3

0 m

inute

s

30

min

ute

s -

1 h

our

1 -

2 h

ou

rs

> 2

hours

Perc

en

tag

e o

f H

ou

seh

old

ers


Figure 18. The percentage of householders and the actions they completed after learning of the fire threat to them (n = 215).

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

Initia

lised h

om

e d

efe

nce

s(e

g s

prinkle

rs, g

ene

rato

rs)

Tra

vel so

mew

here

to b

ette

rsee w

here

fire is

Ca

ll fr

ien

d/fa

mily

/ne

ighbo

ur

Gath

er

the

fam

ily a

nd

le

ave

the h

om

e

Gath

er

fa

mily

AN

D p

ets

and

leave t

he h

om

e

Re

turn

to

ho

me (

if a

way fro

mho

me a

t th

e tim

e o

f th

e f

ire)

Go b

ack insid

e h

om

e a

nd

wa

it a

nd s

ee w

hat h

app

ens

Gath

er

valu

able

s s

o a

s t

o b

ere

ad

y t

o leave

Do

noth

ing b

ecause o

f th

efire

Oth

erP

erc

en

tag

e o

f H

ou

seh

old

ers


8. Triggers, Safe Places and Attribution to Survival

Factors triggering householders to leave their home

The three key factors that triggered householders to leave their home were that they could smell or

see smoke, they received an official emergency warning other than the emergency alert, and they

received an emergency alert telephone warning. The three least frequently reported factors that

triggered householders to leave were that their home caught fire, they had pressure from their

neighbours to leave, and they heard/saw helicopters/aircrafts (see Figure 19). Other triggers that

householders reported that were not included in the list of triggers provided in the survey include:

Information on the radio

Personally checked the fire

Noticed that no one was in the area

Followed the actions of others

Change in direction of the wind

Power went off

Sky started to glow and then turned black

Family members started to look unwell

Concerned for their child/children

Concerned for their pet/s

Directed by RSL staff

Family member was panicking

Figure 19. The percentage of householders and the triggers that influenced them to leave their

home (n = 172).

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

Co

uld

see/s

me

ll sm

oke

Co

uld

see f

lam

es in

the

dis

tance

Co

uld

see f

lam

es c

lose b

y

Re

ce

ived a

n E

me

rgency

Ale

rt t

ele

ph

one

warn

ing

Ho

me c

au

ght

fire

Pre

ssure

fro

mfr

iends/fa

mily

me

mb

ers

Pre

ssure

fro

m n

eig

hb

ours

He

ard

/saw

he

lico

pte

rs/a

ircra

ft

Re

ce

ived o

ffic

ial

em

erg

ency w

arn

ing a

bou

tfire

, oth

er

than…

Ha

d c

om

ple

ted a

llde

fen

siv

e a

ctions (

ie felt

they h

ad

do

ne a

ll th

ey…

Oth

er

Perc

en

tag

e o

f h

ou

seh

old

ers


Safe place

Householders in the South-Eastern Tasmania area most frequently reported that they went to a

nearby safe place other than the one they had identified in their bushfire plan and by TFS (see

Figure 20). These other places include:

Family, friends, or neighbours

Factory

Beach

Boat

Another town (e.g. Port Arthur)

Figure 20. The percentage of householders and their response to “did they go to a nearby place?”

(n = 201).

When householders were ask how they sheltered in their safe place, 32% of householders

sheltered in a building, 32% sheltered in a car, 26% sheltered in the open, 9% sheltered in the sea,

1% sheltered under a bridge and 12% indicated they sheltered in a place other than those listed in

the survey. The other places include:

On a boat

Tent

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

Yes, one identified intheir plan

Yes, one TFS hadidentified

No Yes, other

Perc

en

tag

e o

f H

ou

seh

old

ers


Householders were also asked whether they thought their shelter was adequate:

40 out of 43 householders who sheltered in a building thought it was adequate

20 out of 32 householders who sheltered in the open reported it to be adequate

23 out of 41 householder who sheltered in a car reported it to be adequate

10 out of 12 householders who sheltered in a place other than those listed in the survey

reported it to be adequate

9 out of 11 householders who sheltered in the sea reported it to be adequate

1 out of 2 householders who sheltered under a bridge reported it to be adequate

Use of a community fire refuge centre, evacuation centre or recovery centre

Approximately 46% of householders in the South-Eastern Tasmania area reported using a

community fire refuge, evacuation centre or recovery centre. Of the householders who reported

using a community refuge centre, evacuation centre or recovery centre, 83.9% of them reported

their house survived with no damage or minor damage only, while 13.8% reported their house had

been destroyed, and 2.3% reported their house survived but was damaged (see Table 9).

Table 9. Cross tabulation for the use of a community fire refuge, evacuation centre or recovery

centre and the outcome of the property.

Use of community fire refuge, evacuation centre, or recovery centre

Yes No

n

Column %

n Column

% Total

Ou

tco

me

House survived, no damage or minor damage only 73 83.9 89 84.8 162

House survived but damaged 2 2.3 4 3.8 6

House destroyed 12 13.8 12 11.4 24

Total 87 100 105 100 192

Attribution to survival

Figure 21, provides a summary of the factors that householders attribute to their survival. The three

most frequently reported factors were leaving early, planning & preparing, and emergency

warnings. Only a small number of householders couldn’t identify what they would attribute to their

survival, and the least reported factors include faith, luck and not being in the area on the day.


Figure 21. The percentage of householders and the factors they attribute to their survival (n = 104).

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

No

t be

ing

in

the

are

a o

n t

he

da

y

Bein

g a

ware

of surr

oun

din

g

Em

erg

ency w

arn

ings (

e.g

.S

MS

, ra

dio

, in

tern

et,

face…

Le

avin

g th

e a

rea

Bein

g a

ctive a

nd fig

htin

g th

efire

Know

led

ge a

nd e

xperi

ence

with b

ushfire

sW

arn

ings fro

mfr

iends/fa

mily

/ne

ighbo

urs

Pla

nnin

g &

pre

pari

ng

Faith

Do

n't

know

Re

so

urc

es (

e.g

. car,

wet

tow

els

)

Liv

ing

ne

ar

wate

r

Gut

feel &

co

mm

on s

en

se

Fire

brig

ade

& p

olic

e

Lu

ck

Ch

ang

e in th

e w

ind d

irection

He

lp f

rom

oth

ers

Oth

erP

erc

en

tag

e o

f H

ou

seh

old

ers


INTERVIEWER OBSERVATIONS

Please note that the following observations are drawn from informal interviews with the research

team and reflect only their views of the main themes. The final report will include more substantive

themes that will be derived from the interviews with the residents in the South-Eastern Tasmania

area.

1. Communication

Residents reported that the emergency information relayed to the public on the day of the fire

was often too general across the following forms of communication: Emergency Alert text

message and landline message, Tasmania Fire Service (TFS) website, and radio. Specifically,

residents stated that up-to-date information about the current location of the fire, and the

speed and direction of the wind and fire would have given them a better understanding of their

level of risk from the fire and in turn helped them to respond appropriately. It was also

commonly stated that it was misleading to call the fire the Forcett Fire, and this was reported

to have affected the immediate response of residents as they did not associate the fire with

their area.

The Emergency Alert voice messages sent to the landlines of residents in the South-Eastern

Tasmania area were generally reported as useful by those who received them on time.

However, one issue many residents reported with this method of warning was the length at

which the telephone rang to alert them of the voice message. Residents commonly reported

that their landline rang only once and as such they felt they were lucky to have received it.

The Emergency Alert text messages sent to the mobile telephones of residents in the South-

Eastern Tasmania area were generally reported as useful by those residents who received

them before the fire arrived. However, a common issue with this method of emergency

warning was its timeliness. Many residents indicated that they did not receive the message in

time, with some residents indicating they received it when the fire had already arrived while

others did not receive it at all or received it the following day. While there may be other

reasons for the delay in receiving the message, residents commonly attributed the delay to the

poor mobile telephone reception that is normally experienced in the area and also the damage

to the mobile telephone towers caused by the fire on 3rd January 2013.

Residents indicated that the TFS website lacked detail and did not provide the most up-to-date

information about the fire. Specifically, residents reported that the graphic of the fire needed to

represent ‘real time’. It was also stated that the warning message (i.e. ‘Watch’ and ‘Act’) left

some residents feeling confused and stressed about what they needed to do next. These

residents indicated that following the warning message, information about how to prepare

themselves would have helped them to respond appropriately and alleviate some of their

stress.

Battery-operated radios were the most common source of information used by residents in the

South-Eastern Tasmania area, particularly when the electricty was cut off and the mobile

telephone towers were damaged. Overall, residents generally reported that the messages

relayed by ABC Radio were useful and effective; however, it was stated that the pronunciation

of place names and the names used by the broadcasters were different from those used


locally. This led to confusion among some residents. The timeliness of the information was

also a concern, particularly for those living further south on the Peninsula, with some residents

indicating that the delays in providing the information left them feeling uncertain about the

safety of evacuation routes and places.

Those residents who did not have access to a radio commonly reported feeling stressed and

isolated when they were not able to receive information via landline or mobile telephone, often

relying on word of mouth from those around them. For this reason, many residents stated that

a mixed-method approach to warning residents is important in emergency situations, and

residents would like to see air sirens and a speaker system used in addition to those methods

that are already in place.

Residents commonly reported that door-knocking was an effective form of warning and they

were very positive about the efforts of the police and fire service in this regard. Many residents

reported that they were relying on the police and fire service to tell them when it was time for

them to leave.

Residents were critical towards commercial radio for providing misleading information. It was

stated that commercial radio caused much confusion because the commercial radio stations

were mixing official warning messages with call-ins from the public who were providing

incorrect information. Some residents recommended that during emergency situations, only

information that is provided by officials should be relayed to the public. Furthermore, residents

in the South-Eastern Tasmania area commented that Facebook was not useful as it also

contained misleading information provided by individuals.


2. Road Closures & Authorities

Residents who chose to stay and defend their property stated that the road closures caused

frustration and heightened stress because the closures limited their ability to access necessary

resources. For example, residents felt they were unable to leave the fire-affected area to get

fuel and water because they would not be able to get back into the area.

Road closures were also reported to have caused frustration and stress among residents who

chose to evacuate. Residents who chose to evacuate stated that they were unaware they

would not be allowed access to the fire-affected area immediately following the fire. This was

particularly stressful for those residents who wanted to gain access to check on pets they had

left behind or to return to defend their property from ember attack. Therefore, many residents

stated that they diverted around road closures and found alternative routes to access the area.

Residents reported that they felt the local police were too forceful in their attempt to evacuate

the area, and in this way the police denied residents the ability to choose to stay and defend

their property.

Respondents who considered themselves to be long-time residents commonly reported

disagreeing with the degree of safety of the ‘safer places’ identified by authorities. These

residents particularly felt uncomfortable about being told to evacuate further south, fearing

they would be trapped on the Peninsula.

While most residents commended the response of the fire service, stating they responded

quickly to save properties and lives, some residents blamed the fire service for not saving their

home and criticised them for standing back while houses were being destroyed.


3. Bushfire Plan & Preparation

Most residents in the South-East Tasmania area reported that they did not have a bushfire

plan prior to the fire that started on 3rd January 2013. Residents commonly stated that they

developed an unwritten bushfire plan as the fire approached their area and became a threat to

them. These bushfire plans were often minimalistic, including their intended actions for the day

(e.g. stay and defend, leave early, or wait and see) and the location of a safer place, which

was commonly a place that was close by and convenient, e.g. water or a cleared paddock.

However, in some cases, residents chose emotionally safer places, which placed them at

higher risk from the fire, e.g. a family member’s home.

Residents living in coastal regions in the South-East Tasmania area commonly reported that

their close proximity to the water led them to believe that they were at a lower risk from

bushfires. It was often stated that they had intended to go to the water during a bushfire;

however, they did not realise how tough it would be to shelter outdoors where they would be

exposed to heat, smoke and wind from the fire.

Long-term preparedness among residents in the South-East Tasmania area appeared to be

mixed, with some residents being very prepared and others not being prepared at all. The

most common forms of preparedness reported by residents include: clearing a space around

the home and incidental preparations such as mowing the lawn. Residents who were

knowledgeable and experienced with bushfires and who lived in rural areas (i.e. surrounded by

bushland) often reported more preparations than those who were not knowledgeable,

experienced or who lived in semi-residential areas.

Residents who stayed to defend their property commonly stated that they were not prepared

for the ferocity, heat, noise and speed of the bushfire. Many residents also stated that they

were unprepared for the impact that an electricity outage would have on their ability to defend

their home and for the time delay in the restoration of facilities (e.g. electricity and water).

Many residents stated that for these reason, in addition to the limited access to the area, they

ran out of fuel and water.

Many residents reported that they did not respond immediately to the warnings; rather, they

waited to see how threatening the fire was before deciding on an action. Residents often

indicated that the motivating factor to take action was seeing the fire or seeing or smelling

smoke.

Many residents blamed the ‘Greenies’ or the ‘Greens Movement’ for the lack of fuel reduction

in the area, indicating that there would have been less damage if they had been able to burn

off on their land. Residents also blamed the council and other residents for not clearing their

land and putting them at higher risk.


TRAINING EVALUATION

The following section provides a preliminary evaluation of the training that was given to the

research team prior to their deployment. These observations have been drawn from informal

interviews with the research team and the purpose of this evaluation is to provide insight into the

strengths and weaknesses of the training, and some recommendations for improvement.

1. Strengths

The overview that was provided about the bushfire by the Tasmania Fire Service (TFS) was

described as advantageous by many of the interviewers as it prepared them for the type of

environment they would be working in, the type of stories they were likely to hear; and it

provided them with a context from which to draw from when questioning residents. More

specifically, interviewers stated that having an understanding of how the fire started, where

it travelled and how much damage it caused, helped them when they needed to probe the

resident for further information, such as timing of events on the day of the fire.

While the safety training could have been better targeted, it prepared the interviewers for

the worst case scenario. This was particularly important as many of the interviewers had

never been deployed into a bushfire affected area, thus were not aware of the type of

hazards they could come across e.g. electrical hazards, unstable structures, ash holes, and

melted septic tank lids. Many interviewers indicated that they felt they were more observant

of their environment following this training.

The interviewers commonly stated that the information and skills provided about how to

interview householders who had been affected by a bushfire helped prepare them for the

type of stories and emotions they were likely to hear and see. This training also provided

the interviewers with skills in approaching and communicating with householders, and the

importance of personal wellbeing and where to find help if they needed it.

The interviewers commonly stated that the provision of the Bushfire CRC tabards, hard

hats and t-shirts helped them in approaching residents by being easily identifiable. The

association with a credible and professional research centre also helped them to build trust

with householders and gain participation.

The interviewers reported that they felt the three days on, one day off was important for

maintaining personal wellbeing and performance on-field.

Many of the interviewers stated that they felt the project was well organised and very

supportive. Furthermore, they felt the project leaders were encouraging of their

development and were available if they needed assistance.

Interviewers commonly stated that it was effective to deploy the teams in teams of two,

particularly when non-locals were teamed with locals. Non-locals often stated that it was

advantageous to be partnered with a local because their knowledge of the area made it

easier to find places, and it assisted with the correct pronunciation of place names.

Furthermore, the local’s knowledge of the area helped non-local’s develop a better

understanding of the fire and where it travelled, and in some cases the pre-existing

relationship between the local and resident helped them gain participation.


2. Areas for Improvement

The iPad survey was commonly described by the interviewers as difficult to use. The main

reason the iPad survey was described as difficult to use was because it was not sequential

with the interview guide. Consequently, the co-interviewer was constantly flicking back and

forth between the questions. This was problematic because it meant that some information

provided by the interviewee was missed while the co-interviewer was searching for the

relevant question. Two additional issues reported by the interviewers include the limitation

on the number of characters allowed in the text fields, and the inability to change responses

for some of the questions, leading to inaccuracies in the data. Finally, some interviewers

had never used an iPad prior to this project, and as such had difficulty using the touch

screen.

Many interviewers stated that they were uncertain about the purpose of the iPad survey

and how they should use it. That is, they were unsure as to whether they should be asking

the questions in the iPad survey that were not covered in the interview. This caused two

problems: firstly, it created discrepancy in the data with some interviewers asking all of the

questions from the iPad survey and others not asking them if not covered in the interview;

and secondly it meant that some questions in the iPad survey that would have provided

valuable information were not asked.

Interviewers reported some uncertainty about the type of interview style they should be

using. More specifically, whether they should be using a quantitative or qualitative

interviewing style. Some interviewers indicated they were asking direct, structured

questions with the intention of gaining a specific answer, mainly in relation to the survey.

Other interviewers stated that they were asking indirect and open-ended questions,

allowing the interviewees to structure their own answers and at times the conversation.

While the use of a mixed-method approach may be a positive for the research, it should be

made clear to the interviewers to eliminate confusion.

Some interviewers indicated that they lacked familiarity with the research area and were

uncertain of the type of information the research team were looking for. This was stated to

cause difficulty when they were required to probe the residents for additional information.

There was confusion among the interviewers as to the type of information required for

questions referring to the recorder, file number and address. Many interviewers did not

include the town name in the address and some interviewers wrote the names of the

interviewer in the recorder section rather than the recorder number. This made it difficult to

locate the recorded interviews.

It is apparent that some of the co-interviewers entering the data into the iPad had difficulty

understanding the type of information that was required for short term preparatory actions.

This confusion may have stemmed from the fact that later in the survey there is a question

asking what preparatory actions had been taken after learning of the fire in the area.

Furthermore, it appears that some of the co-interviewers entering the data into the iPad had

difficulty understanding the type of information that was required when asking householders

“Did they go to a ‘nearby safer place’?” particularly when the “other” option was chosen. It

appears that some co-interviewers interpreted the “other” option as “how did they shelter in

the ‘nearby safer place’?” However, this question is asked later in the survey.


Some of the interviewers indicated that there was a mismatch between their skills and the

role they were allocated. Accordingly, it was stated that the roles should be worked out

among team members because this mismatch could affect the quality of the data. It was

also commonly reported that team members should work together for the duration of their

stint as it took time for team members to learn each other’s style and approach to research.

While the safety brief was generally reported as useful, it was stated that it needed to be

better targeted towards the research team rather than fire fighters. It also needed to include

information about the locations in which the teams should be driving. For example, should

teams be driving off-road and in areas that have been burnt.

A number of interviewers found it difficult to follow question 12 (i.e. walk me through the

main things that happened on the day of the fire and what you decided to do as the day

unfolded…) of the interview guide when conducting the interview. This needs to be

shortened and re-formatted to make it easier to read.

Some of the researchers indicated that they unknowingly approached householders that

had already participated in an interview. For this reason, it was stated that a large

communal map, updated daily with locations that had been visited should be kept at the

research van.


3. Recommendations

To improve the useability of the interview guide and iPad survey, it is recommended that

the interview guide and iPad survey coincide with one another. Additionally, the interview

guide should be reformatted to make it easier to read, and the iPad survey should be

reformatted so that is easier to use. One suggestion is to cluster similar questions together

under relevant headings that are accessible via a home page, toolbar or tabs. It is also

recommended that a debriefing session be held at the end of the first day to clarify any

issues the interviewers may be having, and any discrepancies that may have appeared

between the interview guide and iPad survey. Furthermore, it is recommended that the

research team be given more time to familiarise themselves with the iPad survey and

interview guide during the training.

To assist the interviewers in familiarising themselves with the interview and iPad survey, it

is recommended that the interviewers be “walked through” each of the interview and survey

questions, providing examples of the answers they may receive and the type of information

the research team are looking for. Following this, the interviewers should be given the

opportunity to run through a mock interview and survey. It is also recommended that the

interviewers be provided with an information sheet outlining the purpose of the research,

the research questions and how the research will be used. Furthermore, this training should

also incorporate a section describing the type of interview style required and some

additional tips and skills that may assist the interviewers, particularly those who have not

interviewed before.

To assist teams in collecting high quality data, it is recommended that teams consist of one

person who has theoretical knowledge (e.g. researcher, research student) and one person

who has local and practical knowledge (e.g. agency member). The combined knowledge

can assist teams in using and understanding terminology (e.g. what is a safer place?),

using correct pronunciation of place names, understanding the research question and the

type of probes to gain additional information from interviewees, and building rapport with

community members. To assist with this partnering, it is recommended that a database be

developed which includes the names and contact details of researchers and agency

members who have expressed interest in assisting with future research projects.

To prevent residents from being approached more than once, it is recommended that each

team be given either a GPS or map on which they can mark the places they have visited

and need to be revisited. If maps are used, at the end of each day the teams should be

required to mark this information on a large communal map visible by all teams. If a GPS is

used, this may also assist the research leaders in locating the teams to ensure their safety.

Appendix 1 – Interview Protocol 38 This research was funded by the Bushfire Cooperative Research Centre and The University of Tasmania Rural Clinical School Please note that the information contained in this report is preliminary only, and should therefore be interpreted as such. No causal claims are being made by the research team in this preliminary report.

Appendix 1

Bushfire CRC Post Fire Interview Guide Version 11; 17/01/2013 - Tasmania

_____________________________________________________________________ Before the interview let people know that the interview has three components. In the first part, you will ask them about their preparations in the lead up to fire. The second part, you will ask them to tell you what happened on the day of the fire. In the third part, you will ask about their experiences following the fire. Emphasize that they are the experts and that they can take the time they need because everything that they have to say related to the fire is of interest to us. There are no right or wrong answers. 1. First do you mind if we get some demographic information. (E.g. who was in the house on the day, anyone have past experience with bush fire how long have you lived here?) 2. What were the main reasons you came to live here in this particular community? 3. What sort of a community would you say it is? (E.g. is it a strongly linked community, networked, do people know their neighbours etc., would others help you out if needed?). 4. When you came to live here, and prior to the fire, how concerned were you about the possibility of a bushfire threatening your home? (Did you think you and your family would be at risk? Do you think that others living in this area had a similar attitude towards bushfires as you?). 5. What preparations had you made to protect your home in the event that a bushfire broke out and threatened your home? (What were the main sources of information you used for making these preparations? What influenced your decision to prepare? – TFS, Media, Past fire, other). 6. Did you (and your family) have a bushfire plan? If so, what was the plan? What were the main reasons you decided on this plan? Were you responsible for dependents/pets? If yes - Was provision made for them in their bushfire plan? 7. Can you think back to the day before the fire? What fire danger weather predictions or warnings were there about the next day, the day of the fire? 8. IF APPROPRIATE: What preparations had you made on the day for a possible bushfire? (What were the main sources of information you used for making these preparations?). 9. Were you here, on your property, when the fire broke out? IF “YES”, PROCEED to Question 10; IF “NO” ASK ABOUT THE CIRCUMSTANCES. 10. How did you first become aware of the fire? (Were they expecting a warning? Did they call 000? How long before the fire arrived did they become aware of it? When you first knew about the fire, how concerned were you about possible danger for you (and your family)? What would you say was your main worry initially? How long before the fire arrived did they take decisive action? At what time did you first see spot fires? Where were you at the time and where were the spot fires? How long did it take these spot fires to develop flame about 4 metres high? Were you impacted by a fire front (wall of flames)? If so, at what time? How sure are you of the times? Did anything significant happen at or around the same time e.g. called 000, power failed? 11. What did you decide to do about the fire initially?

Appendix 1 – Interview Protocol 39 This research was funded by the Bushfire Cooperative Research Centre and The University of Tasmania Rural Clinical School Please note that the information contained in this report is preliminary only, and should therefore be interpreted as such. No causal claims are being made by the research team in this preliminary report.

12. Walk me through the main things that happened on the day of the fire and what you decided to do as the day unfolded, starting from before you knew about the fire. (INTERVIEWER: your aim is to get a narrative of the significant events which occurred for the interviewee. Pay particular attention to: (a) information about the fire: media warnings, calls/texts/visits from family, friends, neighbours, agencies; and environmental cues such as smoke, embers, (b) the effects of these items of information - how they changed the interviewee’s understanding of the situation, and the risks and concerns; (c) decisions about what to do; and (d) actions taken. IN PARTICULAR: BE ALERT TO FOLLOW-UP ISSUES OF: (a) COMMUNICATION, ESPECIALLY SOCIAL NETWORKING; AND (b) STRESS/ANXIETY AND THEIR EFFECTS ON DECISION MAKING. Did they go to a ‘nearby safer place’? - If Yes - one identified in their plan, one TFS identified, how did they get there? How did they shelter there? - In a car, building, in the sea, in the open, other? Was the shelter adequate? Did they use a community fire refuge, evacuation or recovery centre? 12a. Optional: Looking back, what information about the fire was most important in making your final decision about what to do? For official warnings via radio and web, did you find them Useful? Timely? Of the right frequency? If social media was used, who was the most relevant source? - TFS, n-scene fire-fighters, on-scene others, family/friends 12b. Optional: What information about the fire was missing that made it difficult for you to decide what to do? What is their preferred method of receiving a warning? Second preference? 13. knowing what you know now about the fire, what if anything would you do differently? What do they attribute their survival to? INTERVIEWER: be careful in discussing post-fire issues, do NOT cross the line into “counselling,” refer the interviewee to the Advice Sheet attached to the Participant Information Statement, if appropriate.

Appendix 2 – Interview Checklist 40 This research was funded by the Bushfire Cooperative Research Centre and The University of Tasmania Rural Clinical School Please note that the information contained in this report is preliminary only, and should therefore be interpreted as such. No causal claims are being made by the research team in this preliminary report.

Appendix 2 - Interview Checklist

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