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Preliminary Hazards Analysis

for the

Emergency Operations Center

Project

Los Alamos National Laboratory

June 12, 2001

Prepared by

Jerry C. Bueck

ESH-3, Integrated Risk Analysis, Communication and Management Group

Document Control No. CGRP-0012-009, R0

Table of Contents 1. Executive Summary.............................................................................................1 2. Introduction .......................................................................................................2 3. Site Description...................................................................................................2 4. Facility Description ..............................................................................................6 5. Evaluation Of Past Safety Experience and Documentation.....................................7 6. Hazards Identification.........................................................................................7 7. Hazards Assessment.........................................................................................10 8. Hazard Classification ........................................................................................11 9. Natural Hazards Performance Category .............................................................11 10. Accident Analysis .............................................................................................11 11. Identification Of Required Safety Functions........................................................12 12. Identification Of Proposed Safety Controls .........................................................14 Attachment A Hazard Analysis Tables ....................................................................A-1 Attachment B HVAC Safe Operational Concept .......................................................B-1

1. Executive Summary

This analysis supports the conceptual development phase for the low hazard Emergency

Operations Center facility. This new facility consolidates a number of emergency functions

performed by the Laboratory and Los Alamos County into one facility equipped with adequate

space (about 33,000 sq. ft.) and systems to accommodate most emergency response activities

and the hazardous environments that might accompany the emergencies. The facility will be

able to operate up to 14 days without external utility support while housing up to 100 workers. A

ventilation system that provides protection to occupants from hazardous particulate releases

(such as most radioactive materials) and some toxic gases will be provided. Three tiers of back-

up emergency response management complement the EOC. These include a facility at TA-49,

one in White Rock, and a mobile command center.

The proposed EOC is located on the western edge of the Laboratory just off State Road 501 and

Anchor Ranch Road in TA-69. This location provides several escape routes and is outside most

hazard circles that represent the limits of severe hazard to EOC workers.

The EOC is a low hazard facility based on the operations that will be conducted within the facility.

However, the operational requirement to operable during most potential emergency situations

requires a level of safety consideration for both operational concepts and facility systems. Safety

functions and the systems that will perform the functions based on the CDR are identified.

Important administrative controls, such as monitoring the interior environment during an

emergency to ensure it remains safe, are identified. This PHA further looks at the impacts on the

ability to operate for the desired 14 days without external utility support and the hazards that

may threaten that objective.

External hazards due to site emergency conditions are assessed, as are requirements associated

with natural phenomena such as seismic activity or wildfires. The facility structure is designated

PC-2 based on its importance. Other systems are assigned a PC rating based on their importance

to the safety of workers or their importance to meeting the safety function of the EOC.

Protective systems and administrative controls are developed along with a HVAC operational

concept to help ensure EOC workers are protected from life-threatening situations associated

with potential emergency conditions.

1

2. Introduction

3.

This analysis is in support of the conceptual phase of the proposed Los Alamos National

Laboratory Emergency Operations Center (EOC) project. This PHA is to be used in conjunction

with programmatic documentation that details the objectives and scope of this project.

Summaries of the project to the level that makes the safety arguments sensible are provided in

the text that follows.

The EOC project results from post Cerro Grande Fire assessments that demonstrated that the

current EOC facility is inadequate to provide for the needs of a major emergency for both the

Laboratory and the surrounding community. The new LANL/LAC EOC is to be a permanently

manned facility providing Los Alamos County, Police, Fire and 911dispatch and administrative

offices for the LANL Emergency Management Support Staff. During emergency conditions, the

facility will be able to house LANL, county, state, and federal emergency staff on a 24 hours a

day basis for up to 14 days without external utilities support.

The facility will be approximately 33,000 sq. ft and include the Emergency Operations Response

Center, emergency technical support areas, a secure vault, with administrative support areas

consisting of staff offices, meeting rooms, and multi agency offices. Auxiliary support areas

including locker rooms, kitchen, copier/reproduction/plotting areas, and training rooms and the

like will be provided to allow the EOC to function during protracted emergency conditions.

Additional features will include a garage area for emergency response vehicle storage, dedicated

potable water storage, motor powered electrical generator with fuel supply, and parking and fire

standoff paved areas.

Site Description

The site chosen for this facility is at the intersection of State Road 501 and Anchor Ranch Road at

TA-69. TA-69 is shown within LANL in Figure A-1 while the proposed location within TA-69 is

shown in Figure A-2. This site was chosen for several reasons. Egress is possible in one of four

directions allowing evacuation away from most threatening hazardous conditions that may be

encountered, located on the edge of LANL property and therefore fairly far from LANL facilities

that might produce hazardous materials releases, and separated from an existing alternate EOC

such that it is unlikely that both centers would be unusable except for extremely widespread

disasters. The site is outside most emergency hazard planning zones for radioactive materials

release from any LANL facility. The site also lies outside explosive exclusion zones. The only

2

facility whose hazard planning zone will encompasses the EOC is the TA-3 Beryllium Technology

Facility when it becomes operational. Radiation emergency planning zones are shown in Figure

A-3 (except that the TA-8-23 radiography facility, a Category 2 nuclear facility, is not shown

although the potential impact of that facility is defined).

Figure A-1: LANL Technical Areas

3

Figure A-2: EOC Site Location

4

Figure A-3: Radiation Emergency Planning Zones

The site has been assessed for local seismic faulting which is described in a seismic report

prepared by the Laboratory. An independent seismic criteria review was also conducted by

Dr. Loring Wyllie, Degenkolb Engineering.

Nearby facilities and features with the potential to impact EOC activities include those nuclear

facilities listed in Table A-1 (radiation dose is calculated based on unprotected exposure with a

worst-case release from the nuclear facility), TA-3 Beryllium Technology Facility, TA-3 Gas Plant,

5

and the TA-3 Warehouse and Chemical Warehouse (these facilities are also listed in Table A-1).

State Road 501 is a major throughway on the western part of the laboratory with a variety of

hazardous traffic including inter-laboratory transport and commercial hazardous material

transport vehicles.

Table A-1: Facilities that Could Impact the EOC

Facility Approximate Distance and Direction from EOC Hazard(s) of Concern

CMR (TA-3-29) 2450 m (ENE) Radioactive particulates – 14 rem

Radiography (TA-8-23) 1400 m (S) Radioactive particulates - <2 rem (estimate based on preliminary analysis)

WETF (TA-16-205) 3350 m (S) Radioactive gas (tritium) – 3.2 rem

TSF (TA-21-209) 7070 m (ENE) Radioactive gas (tritium) – 1.2 rem

TA-55 (TA-55-4) 4250 m (E) Radioactive particulates – 2.7 rem

Gas Plant (TA-3) 2975 m (ENE) Hazardous gases and vapors Beryllium Technology Facility (TA-3-141)

2975 m (ENE) Beryllium particulates

Chemical Warehouse (TA-3) 2000 m ENE) Chemical vapors

Natural phenomena hazards associated with this site are identified in section 6.

4. Facility Description

The facility will consist of a major structure of approximately 33,000 sq. ft that will comprise the

EOC. A garage will be constructed to house emergency response vehicles. Potable water

storage and an electrical power generator with its associated fuel storage will be located near the

EOC. Parking for approximately 100 cars and trucks as well as a paved area to provide access

around the site will be included. A sanitary sewer holding tank to accommodate 14 days

discharge based on 100 people is provided with a lift-station for normal operation. Fire

protection water is provided by an elevated fire water tank located near the facility.

Facility features include an EOC structure designed to maintain a positive internal pressure, air-

lock type primary entrances, an HVAC system described in greater detail below, work and office

areas, training areas, locker rooms, kitchen, storage and technical equipment support rooms, and

utility support areas such as mechanical, telecommunications, and electrical distribution rooms.

Natural gas is provided for normal hot water and boiler operations. Back-up electrical hot water

heating is provided.

6

The EOC HVAC will provide the maintenance of positive pressure under most conditions. The

HVAC will have the capability to provide HEPA like filtering (these will not be nuclear grade HEPAs

but will be sized to filter harmful particlates that might result from a variety of credible accident

scenarios associated with external events). Charcoal filtering will also be available to remove

some toxic vapors that could be expected under selected credible accident scenarios. The

ventilation system can be operated in a recirculation mode with or without external make-up air.

A non-pressurized mode will be available where the ventilation system is sealed form the external

environment and air is circulated inside the building. The operational concept for the EOC HVAC

is shown in Attachment B.

5.

6.

Evaluation Of Past Safety Experience and Documentation

The existing LANL EOC is treated as a low hazard facility so there is no substantial safety

documentation except for the LANL required Facility Safety Plan that outlines general safety

requirements typical of all LANL office-type environments. Recent experience resulting from the

Cerro Grande Fire provide the basis for the construction of this new facility primarily in provision

of adequate space for the increased staff required during an emergency and the post emergency

recovery period.

Hazards Identification

Hazards associated with the proposed EOC project are listed in Table A-2 (construction hazards

are not included and no site hazards that would impact the construction or normal operational

activity have been identified). External hazards possible to be encountered during a laboratory or

area wide emergency are listed in Table A-3. These hazards are identified based on a review of

Laboratory facilities and operations that could provide the most significant impact to the EOC.

They include the Chemical and Metallurgy Research Facility (CMR), the TA-8-32 Radiography

Facility, and the TA-16 Weapons Engineering Tritium Facility (WETF), all Category 2 nuclear

facilities, the Sigma Complex which includes the Beryllium Technology Facility, the Laboratory

warehouse and chemical warehouse (SM 30 and 31), the gas plant, the steam plant, and a

variety of low hazard laboratories. The hazards of these facilities provide the information needed

to assess the external hazards likely to be encountered during LANL emergency situations.

Hazardous material transport activities in support of Laboratory functions as well as commercial

transport offer the potential for transportation accidents with associated hazardous material

releases. Hazardous materials under the control of Los Alamos County, particularly chlorine gas

used in water and sewage treatment activities is also considered.

7

NPH hazards that are considered as threats or significant potential impacts to the EOC are listed

in Table A-4.

Table A-2: EOC Facility Hazard List

Hazard Measure Comment

Electricity 220 and 110 Volts Utility systems and office use.

Some higher voltage (440 V)

may be needed for increased

efficiency of utility systems.

Solvents and cleaning

Materials

Janitorial and light

maintenance quantities

Required for maintenance of

the facility – toxicity,

flammability, or combustibility

concerns.

Combustible materials Office type quantities typical

of all LANL office areas

Typical needs for office

operations. See also solvents

and cleaning materials.

Electromagnetic Force (EMF) No levels determined Computer use and power

distribution.

Radio frequency (RF)

electromagnetic fields

About 500 w VHF transmitted

About 800 w UHF transmitted

VHF and UHF radios and

antenna systems for wireless

communication.

Natural gas LANL natural gas distribution. Located in separate attached

mechanical equipment room.

Distribution to have seismic

shut-off capability.

Fuel 14 day supply for generator to

produce facility electrical

power and fuel delivery truck

Buried diesel fuel tank located

outside but near facility. Day

tank for operation of

generator. Drive-through

provided for fuel delivery

Fueled vehicles

(Flammables and combustibles

hazard)

Up to 7 fully fueled truck type

vehicles with associated

emergency response

equipment.

Emergency vehicles are

housed in a proposed garage

adjacent to the EOC.

8

Hazard Measure Comment

Hydrogen gas

(associated with

uninterruptible power

supplies)

Dependent upon battery type

and quantity selected.

Potential fire or explosion

source if release of hydrogen

gas is not adequately

ventilated.

Common hazard with

established standards based

control methodologies

Table A-3: External Hazards List

External Hazard Hazard Concern Comments

Forest or Wild Fire Smoke, toxic or hazardous

smoke-borne particles, fire,

high temperatures, firebrands

and toxic gases. Secondary

effects such as loss of off-site

power and other distributed

utilities.

Threatens EOC workers and

possibly EOC structure.

Significant fires requiring EOC

operation have occurred

several times over the last fifty

years.

Tritium gas release Radioactive gas is EOC worker

hazard

Accident analysis indicates

that tritium concentrations

would be relatively low

however accumulation of

tritium in the EOC could

increase dose

Radioactive particulate

material

Radioactive materials release

from a nuclear facility poses a

potential worker hazard

Accident analysis indicates the

hazard level in the dispersed

cloud would much lower than

that experienced in the facility

where the release could occur.

Beryllium powder Beryllium powder poses an

EOC worker hazard

A worst case release could

produce dispersion cloud

concentrations above the

ERPG-3 level

9

External Hazard Hazard Concern Comments

Hazardous chemicals transport Chemical release of a variety

of chemicals can create

hazardous conditions for EOC

workers from exposure to

vapors or gases of –

• HCl

• HNO3

• Cl2

• Fl2

These chemicals are routinely

delivered to and within the

Laboratory and transport

vehicles containing these and

other hazard chemicals can

transit the Laboratory in

quantities limited only by DOT

guidelines.

Explosion/fire Explosions from explosives

laden vehicles, flammable

gases, fuels, and other

sources can produce shrapnel,

cause secondary fires, and

burn producing toxic fumes

that can be harmful to EOC

workers.

Explosives and explosive

potential gases are

transported and routinely used

in a variety of locations at the

Laboratory and on roads

transiting the Laboratory in

quantities limited only by DOT

guidelines.

Table A-4: Natural Phenomena Hazards Considered

Natural Phenomena

Hazard

Concern

Seismic activity EOC and external event initiator

High winds EOC and external event initiator

Floods Minor EOC concern, potential external event initiator

Snow loads EOC

Heavy rain EOC and possible external event initiator

Volcanism Area wide threat

7. Hazards Assessment

The hazards identified in Table A-2, Table A-3, and Table A-4 are evaluated in this section.

Hazards are evaluated with respect to the primary operational objective of the EOC, which is to

operate safely through emergency events and to support post-emergency recovery. Therefore,

the consequences of concern are not only significant injury to the workers or public, but

conditions that would prevent the operation of the EOC under the desired operational conditions.

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EOC workers may expect an elevated hazard level to be acceptable under emergency conditions,

as such is clearly not a condition of “normal operations.” Internal environmental monitoring,

provided by laboratory support groups on an as needed basis, is used to determine whether

hazardous conditions associated with external emergency events are unacceptable and EOC

evacuation would be required. This administrative process forms the framework for hazard

assessment for the EOC.

Although it is clearly possible to evaluate each hazard in Table A-3 these hazards can be grouped

into five areas, which exhibit some overlap. These areas are:

• Forest and/or wild fire (includes smoke, high temperatures, and firebrands)

• Hazardous particulate release (radioactive material, beryllium, smoke borne hazardous

particles)

• Tritium and other hazardous gases

• Chemical vapors

• Explosion generated missiles

The above hazards are evaluated in Table A-2.

Natural phenomena hazards impacts on the EOC are considered in Table A-3 along with design

considerations and the external hazards or hazardous conditions that might be associated with

the NPH.

In general, hazards of concern are those that threaten the EOC workers or prevent the EOC from

being occupied and performing its safety function.

8.

9.

10.

Hazard Classification

This is a low hazard facility based on the facility hazards, which include primarily standard

industrial hazards routinely encountered and accepted by the public (LANL LIR 200-00-05.1)

Natural Hazards Performance Category

This is an emergency facility and is classified as PC-2. Specific EOC design considerations are

identified in Table A-3.

Accident Analysis

No accidents are considered for this low hazard facility. Accidents that occur in other facilities

are captured as external events.

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11.

Identification Of Required Safety Functions

Safety functions of proposed safety systems are identified in Table A-2 and Table A-3 as a

function of hazard. As many design related safety function serve to prevent or mitigate more

than one hazard a cross walk of safety function and hazard is prepared (a safety function view

instead of a hazard view). In this way, the safety function is fully described and all its drivers are

identified in one place instead of being spread among many entries in several tables. The

required safety function, the CDR SSC(s) that satisfy this function, and the hazard(s) that

requires the safety function are identified in Table A-5.

In Table A-5 the terms “air-tight” and “air-lock” are used to describe the facility feature that helps

minimize hazardous gases or vapors that may not be filtered effectively from entering the EOC

during emergency events and causing a dangerous environment for EOC workers. These

features are also credited in helping to keep particulate hazards from entering the EOC. An

engineering evaluation1 has defined “air-tight” to include a specific allowable leakage rate that is

demonstrated by a post-construction test. The study additionally identified the “air-lock” as an

administratively controlled entryway with two sets of doors with a zoned ventilation capability to

help keep hazardous materials located outside the facility from coming inside when the facility is

entered.

The fundamental operational feature leading to the “air-tight” and “air-lock” requirements is the

need to be able to isolate the facility and maintain a reasonable expectation for a safe work

environment for about an hour’s duration. The hour is the time estimated to position support at

the EOC to establish monitoring of the particular hazards threatening the EOC.

1 Bridgers and Paxton Memo, Dorsey to Roberts, HNR, “Emergency Operations Center, PHA,” May 22, 2001.

12

Table A-5: Safety Function Requirements

Required Safety Function CDR SSCs that satisfy function Hazard(s) that drive function

Minimize hazardous particulates from entering the EOC to protect workers from harm

• EOC “air tight” structure • EOC “air-lock” primary entryway • HVAC particulate filter • HVAC particulate filter with

provision for adequate loading for smoke and smoke borne particles

• HVAC filtered recirculation • HVAC operational monitoring • Secondary entryways alert lights

to prevent opening during hazardous mode operations.

Radioactive particles Beryllium particles (powder) Smoke particles and smoke born hazardous particles Combustion particulates

Prevent or reduce hazardous gases from entering EOC to protect workers from harm

• EOC “air tight” structure • EOC “air-lock” primary entryway • HVAC isolation function • HVAC charcoal filter removes or

reduces some hazardous gases • HVAC operational monitoring • Secondary entryways alert lights


Tritium Forest or wildfire produced toxic gases Combustion products Hazardous chemical gases

Prevent or reduce hazardous vapor from entering to protect workers from harm

• EOC “air tight” structure • EOC “air-lock” primary entryway • HVAC isolation function • HVAC charcoal filter removes or

reduces some hazardous vapors (likely more effective on vapors than gases)

• HVAC operational monitoring • Secondary entryways alert lights


Hazardous chemical vapors

Prevent EOC structure from catching fire during fire related emergencies (loss of EOC function, workers subject to harm from fire)

• EOC fire resistant structure and fire suppression system

• Fuel storage designed to pose no fire threat

• Garage structure designed so as not to pose a fire threat if it catches fire

• Paved firebreak to reduce radiant heat load

• HVAC intake and filter system fire resistant.

• EOC fire detection • Natural gas source isolation

capability to reduce fire load

Forest or wildfire (heat and firebrands)

13

Required Safety Function CDR SSCs that satisfy function Hazard(s) that drive function

Isolate EOC from external environment if external airborne hazard is unknown or hazard cannot be managed before external air enters EOC (2-hour isolation capability –nominal lab emergency hazard cloud passage time)

• HVAC isolation even under no-power condition

• EOC “air tight” structure • EOC “air-lock” primary entryway • HVAC operational monitoring • Natural gas line with seismic

shut-off capability

All external hazards NPH caused external hazards

EOC to operate during and after most emergency conditions (14 day stand alone operation)

• Standby electrical power • Fuel for standby electrical power

for 14 days • Potable water for 14 days

operation • Sanitary waste storage for 14

days • Robust seismic design of EOC

and essential support structures (PC-2)

• SSCs (above) able to perform function given a PC-2 level flood, winds, wind driven missile, snow loads, and heavy rain conditions.

• EOC structure to remains “air-tight” after PC-2 level seismic event

• External EOC structure easy to decontaminate

Forest and wildfires NPH events Hazardous particulate releases that may contaminate structure Hazardous gases or vapors that may contaminate structure

12. Identification Of Proposed Safety Controls

Engineered safety controls are identified as being associated with their required safety functions

in Table A-5. Additional non-engineered or non-facility controls that are proposed in support of

the CDR concept and their functional requirements are listed in Table A-6.

Table A-6: Non-facility Engineered and Administrative Controls

Safety Function Safety Control Determine whether EOC remains safe to occupy during emergency events

Environmental monitoring performed by properly equipped support personnel

Safe evacuation of EOC residents under emergency conditions when required

Emergency evacuation plans Site location

Manage small local fires that might occur at the EOC during emergency conditions, particularly forest or wildfires.

Fire-fighting plans Hand-held fire suppression equipment appropriate for type of fire

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Attachment A Hazard Analysis Tables The hazard analysis format is taken from a draft FWO-OAB Hazards Analysis Technical Methodology Handbook (1/16/2001). The changes and the reasons for change from the handbook are listed in Table A-1.

Table A-1: Changes and Modifications to Recommended Methodology

Change BasisFacility hazards (Table A-2) are not evaluated This is a low hazard facility and all internal hazards are managed

adequately by codes and standards associated with Standard Industrial Hazards. Safety design drivers are external and natural phenomena hazard events.

Hazards are not evaluated one-by-one but grouped into logical classes The controls associated with the class of hazard are far more important than the individual hazards that comprise the group. This allows a greater focus on the design objectives rather than simply repeating the same controls for each hazard in the group.

Prevention controls do not apply to the hazard but to prevention of the outcome.

The EOC cannot function to prevent the occurrence of external events, however some design features can help prevent the consequences of concern.

Mitigation includes both administrative and design considerations The EOC cannot be made impermeable to all hazards with engineered systems. The effectiveness of the engineered systems must be considered in light of proposed administrative controls in order to judge the adequacy of the approach.

Loss of EOC function is considered as a safety consequence as the EOC serves a safety function when an emergency occurs. The existence of three alternative capabilities are in descending order of priority: the secondary EOC located at TA-49, the tertiary EOC located at the Community Building in White Rock, and the mobile command center.

The hazard classification approach used at the Laboratory considers impact from the facility to workers and the public. However, the EOC clearly is an important element in providing the coordination of emergency response and accident/emergency recovery functions relied upon by the laboratory in general and many hazardous facilities in particular.

A-1

Table A-2: Hazard Analysis Table – External Hazards

Hazard What-if Question Unmitigatedconsequences

Preventative feature Mitigative feature Comments or Action Items

Forest or wildfire (smoke and toxic combustion gases)

Smoke from forest or wildfire threatens Laboratory or LA community

Potential significant impact to EOC workers due to smoke or toxic gases

Design issues: HVAC filtering for smoke

particulates (smoke loading of filters to be accommodated);

HVAC charcoal filtering to remove some toxic gases;

HVAC to maintain internal positive pressure to minimize seepage of smoke and toxic gases into EOC;

EOC structure to be “air-tight” to reduce smoke and toxic gases entry into building;

EOC primary entryway to be “air-lock” to reduce smoke and toxic gas entry into EOC when personnel enter or leave;

Design issues: HVAC isolation if

HVAC ineffective; HVAC status

monitor and alarm to indicate loss or reduction of HVAC function;

HVAC filtered recirculation to

reduce effects of smoke or toxic gas leakage;

CO Monitor Administrative measures: Air quality

monitoring; Emergency

evacuation;

Forest or wildfire (heat or firebrands)

Heat or firebrands from forest or wildfire cause EOC or EOC support structures to catch fire

Potential significant impact to EOC workers due to direct fire exposure, loss of EOC, loss of EOC support functions

Design issues: Garage and fuel storage

to be located or protected such that they do not present fire hazard to main EOC building;

EOC main structure to be of fire resistant construction to prevent

Design issues: Fire detection in

EOC and support structures to alert EOC workers of facility fire;

Fire suppression systems to limit spread of fire or

A-2

Hazard What-if Question Unmitigated consequences


firebrands or nearby burning trees or structures from igniting EOC;

Area around EOC to be paved to provide adequate stand-off distance to prevent EOC from catching fire from radiant heat of burning trees and such;

Standby electrical power fuel source and motor generator protected from potential fire sources;

Natural gas supply isolation or shutdown capability;

HVAC inlet and exhaust fire resistant structure

extinguish small fires;

Administrative measures: Fire fighting plan; Emergency

evacuation;

Forest or wildfire (loss of support utilities)

Forest of wildfire causes loss of off-site electrical power and other externally supplied utilities

EOC operations cannot be conducted due to no electrical power, EOC cannot be effectively operated due to inadequate life support systems

Design issues; None (no prevention for these events occurring)

Design issue: Electrical power

supplied by local motor generator;

Fuel for local motor generator for up to 14 days with specified additional margin located at EOC site;

Potable water supply for 100 personnel to last up

A-3



to 14 days; Sanitary sewer

holding tank for up to 14 days discharge

Hazardous particulates (Radioactive materials, beryllium)

Hazardous particulates enter EOC environment

Potential significant worker impact, EOC cannot be occupied

Design issues: HVAC filtering of particulates; EOC structure is “air-tight” EOC primary entrance uses “air lock” EOC exterior surface is cleanable (reduce internal contamination during accident recovery phase); Alternative electrical power source for HVAC and associated loads (for loss of off-site power)

Design issues: Isolation of

building if HVAC fails;

HVAC status alarm

Tritium and other hazardous gases

Hazardous gases enter EOC environment


Design issues: HVAC isolation; HVAC hazardous gas

removal (limited effectiveness of charcoal filter);

EOC structure is “air-tight”

EOC primary entrance uses “air lock”

Design issues: HVAC isolation; EOC structure is

“air-tight”; EOC primary

entrance uses “air lock”;

HVAC recirculation (provides dilution)

The mitigative features are the same as some of the preventative features as a realistic measure of potential effectiveness. Positive pressure is not included for this class of hazards as the positive pressure

A-4



Administrative measures: Air quality


evacuation;

is supported by make-up air from the environment. The assumptions of less than full effectiveness to total ineffectiveness of charcoal filtering.

Chemical vapors

Hazardous chemical vapors enter the EOC environment


Design issues: HVAC isolation; HVAC hazardous gas

removal (limited effectiveness of charcoal filter);

EOC structure is “air-tight”

EOC primary entrance uses “air lock”

EOC exterior surfaces are cleanable to allow decontamination that prevents reintroduction of hazard into EOC

Design issues: HVAC isolation; EOC structure is

“air-tight”; EOC primary

entrance uses “air lock”;

HVAC recirculation (provides dilution)

Administrative measures: Air quality


evacuation

See previous comments on hazardous gas releases. The charcoal filter may more effectively filter vapors.

Explosives driven missiles

Missile caused by an explosion impacts the EOC

Penetration of structure with injury to EOC workers or damage of standby electrical motor generator

Design issue: Outside Laboratory

explosion hazard zones (siting)

Robust design of standby electrical motor generator assembly and associated fuel storage tank

None Explosions associatedwith transportation accidents are unlikely to occur near enough to the EOC to be a significant design concern

A-5

Natural phenomena hazards (NPH) assessment: This section tabulates the assessment of NPH identified in Table A-4. The NPH is identified and failure under the impact of the NPH is assumed. The consequence of failure is assessed and the desired functional response based on the guidelines in DOE-STD-1021 (Natural Phenomena Hazards Performance Category Determination) is defined. Additional design considerations supporting the continued operation of the EOC given the NPH has occurred are identified. Hazards from external events that might be expected given some level of NPH are identified.

Table A-3: NPH Assessment

NPH EOC NPH caused failure conditions

PC indicated Design considerations External hazards that may be initiated

Seismic activity • EOC structural damage • EOC standby electrical

motor generator fuel leakage

• EOC natural gas line rupture

• Loss of off-site power • Loss of telephonic and

other land-line communications

PC-2 (emergency facility)

EOC must maintain “air tight” structure and doors under PC-2 conditions;

EOC fuel storage must withstand PC-2 level event without loss of function or leakage;

EOC standby motor generator must be operational under PC-2 level event;

EOC natural gas line must be safe in excess of PC-2 level event

Facility fires, forest or wild fires, hazardous material releases, loss of off-site power, loss of utility natural gas distribution, loss of water distribution, road and bridge loss, vehicle accidents

High winds • EOC structural damage • Loss of off-site power • Loss of EOC external

features (generator and fuel source, VHF antenna, HVAC filter house)

• Loss of telephonic and other land-line communications

• Miss operation of HVAC positive pressure function

PC-2 EOC must maintain “air-tight” structure and doors under PC-2 conditions;

HVAC “positive pressure” requirement must be defined under high wind conditions to determine proper functioning;

HVAC external structures and filters must withstand PC-2 level winds. EOC fuel storage and standby

Facility, forest and wild fires due to downed power lines or falling trees, transportation accidents due to wind generated missiles, falling trees, or downed power lines.

A-6



generator must withstand PC-2 level winds without failure and motor must be able to operate under PC-2 level winds.

Floods • Water damage to internal EOC systems

• Water infiltration in fuel for standby motor generator

• Washout/damage of roads or EOC site

• Loss of off-site power and distributed utilities


PC-2 EOC not in flood plane (siting) EOC flood water flow design Standby electrical motor

generator fuel protected from flood conditions to PC-2 level.

Facility damage related hazardous materials release Transportation accidents

Snow loads • Structural damage of EOC (roof)

• Inaccessibility of standby electrical motor generator system and fuel system



• Unpassable roadways

PC-2 EOC structure (roof) to carry PC-2 level snow load Standby electrical motor generator and fuel supply accessible and operable with PC-2 level load.

Facility damage related hazardous materials release Transportation accidents

Heavy rain • Same as flood PC-2 Same as flood Same as flood

Volcanism • Ash load prevents operation of HVAC

• Loss of telephonic and

N/A HVAC filter loading capability from ash

Standby electrical motor

Many – unique type events not considered, as EOC and lab would be evacuated in the event of severe

A-7



other land-line communications


• Loss of roadways due to lava flows

• Severe EOC structural damage due to lava flows

generator and fuel ash tolerant (Note: EOC and rest of lab would be evacuated if volcanic activity became severe.)

volcanic activity.

A-8

Attachment B HVAC Safe Operational Concept

Emergency eventoccurs and EOC

notified

EOCthreatened?

Hazards toEOC known?

Normal operation

ParticulateHazard only?

Filter forparticulates

Isolate EOCHVAC

Determine natureof hazard to EOC

EOC internalenvironment

OK?

Yes

Yes

Yes

Evacuate EOC

No

No

No

Monitor internalEOC envornment

Yes

HVAC filteringeffective?

No

Filter using HVACYesIsolate EOCHVAC

Monitor internalEOC environemnt

No

Figure B-1

B-1

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