pp01_deciding on wicked strategy problems_cv_031108

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Deciding on Wicked Strategy Problems

Presenting a practical tool-guide to improve strategic decision-making

Casper van der Veen

Research Associate

Strategy Academy

Contact address:Koningin Emmaplein 12

3016 AB Rotterdam, The NetherlandsE-mail: [email protected]

Tel: +31 10 4408522

Fax: +31 10 4408529

Abstract

This paper handles the intersections between opposing perspectives on strategy. It provides a

method to use these opposing views to generate resolutions to strategic issues during the

strategic decision-making process. Through research among 200 future executives the

dynamic synthesis model is developed, which serves as a practical tool-guide for executives

and their management teams.

Category: Paper Session

Track L: The Practice of Strategy

Paper for the 23rd

SMS Annual International Conference

Intersections: Strategy Across Conventional Boundaries

November 9-12Baltimore Marriott Waterfront Hotel

Baltimore, Maryland, USA

Key words: Tool-guide, strategic decision-making, strategy perspectives

Rotterdam, May 28th, 2003


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INTRODUCTION

Even though Wal-Mart is the biggest company in the world, it is struggling with a

fundamental tension in strategy. On one hand, Wal-Mart has the same strategy for all markets

it is active in around the world, with Craig Herkert, Chief Operations of Wal-Mart

International, stating Every day low prices, quality assortment, and exceptional service are

Wal-Mart principles that transcend borders, language and cultural differences. On the other

hand, Wal-Mart has encountered some hurdles along the way, in China, South America and

especially in Germany. It has trouble reaping global synergies throughout its business model:

Wal-Marts domestically grown corporate DNA cannot always be cloned (Govindarajan and

Gupta, 1999).

Wal-Mart is not the only one facing conflicting demands. In 2000, the top management of the

Dutch telecom provider KPN saw a giant market opportunity: UMTS was going to be the

driver of future market demand and the corporation should react on this before its

competitors did. At least, that was the perspective that KPNs top executives had. However,

the purchase of UMTS frequencies had a dramatic effect on the companys balance sheet and

consequently on its top management team. The latter was dismissed and Ad Scheepbouwer

took over as CEO the organization. The company now changed its strategy from a market-

driven side towards a more resource-driven side, by focusing on its current strengths in fixed

networks and business mobile communication (Bogaarts, 2002). Another example is

pharmaceutical company Merck. The company has been following the industry trend of

investing heavily in R&D to keep their pipe-line filled. Up untill now, Mercks philosophy

towards R&D has been decidedly do-it-yourself. Some of the big players in the industry,

however, have been building alliances with small bio-tech companies by contracting out the

development of new drugs to small specialist rival firms.

When top executives decide on strategy, they often face contradictory perspectives. Do their

businesses perform in markets that converge globally, or do customers needs diverge locally?

Should their business strategy build on opportunities in the marketor on existing resources?

Do they have to choose a strategy that leans towards the competition side, or should they


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cooperate more with players in the field? These conflicting perspectives reflect fundamental

tensions in strategy, which might be at the heart of every strategy issue (De Wit and Meyer,

1999). When facing strategy issues, people will have different cognitive maps and will

embrace divergent values, morals and ideas to make sense of their confusing information

environment. At the intersection of seemingly contradictory perceptions, it would be essential

to bridge these tensions within strategic issues.

When deciding on strategy issues, executives need a way to handle inherent tensions.

Tensions are fundamental to wicked problems; strategic issues are often characterized by

organized complexity and cannot be solved easily. To deal with this complexity, executives

employ different frames of reference. During the decision making process, top management

teams will be confronted with the matter of choice: which perspective should they use? Yet,

perspectives actually seem valid at the same time, so should there be a choice at all? Cant

there be a combination that embraces the best of both worlds? Top executives need a

handhold to help them with these questions. However, the literature in the academic field

does not provide much help in a consistent way yet. The objective of the research as presented

in this paper is to answer the following overall question:How can top managers take strategic

decisions when there are contradictory perspectives on a strategic issue?

Aim is to provide managers with a practical tool-guide that they can use during the strategic

decision-making process, in order to connect the perspectives they have on a strategic issue.

To develop this tool, explorative research was conducted in a laboratory type of setting at the

Rotterdam School of Management Executive MBA-program. The model was tested in a

different setting with a large international financial service provider.

THE RESEARCH: AT THE INTERSECTION OF THEORY AND PRACTICE

One of the most important issues in strategy research is the research on the process in boards

(Pettigrew, 2002). If strategic issues are the nails that managers have to hit, and strategy

theories are the hammer, then how does the toolbox, or practical application, look? Tsoukas

and Knudsen (2002) point to the absence of effective praxeology in strategy research.


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Whittington (2002) stresses the importance of research into the how to of the strategy process.

Strategy research should actually use consultants and business executives in research settings,

in order to help these people to think better. However, even though there should be more

research into the actual conduct of top management teams, according to Pettigrew (2002) no

one has been researching this, as this is very hard to do.

The research as conducted here reacts to these notions by integrating theory with a simulation

of practice, using grounded theory methodology. The context for the practical research will be

set first, in order to embed the research in theory. This is compatible with Straus and Corbins

(1998) view on qualitative research and grounded theory: a researcher does not begin a

project with a preconceived theory in mind, unless his purpose is to elaborate and extend

existing theory. Thus, grounded theory is not always purely derived from empirical study:

theory and practice can go hand in hand during academic research.

RESEARCH CONTEXT: AT THE INTERSECTION OF THESES

The context of the research involves three theoretical themes: strategic decision-making,

strategy tensions and strategy perspectives. During the strategic decision making process top

executives define the course of action on a strategy tension by employing strategy

perspectives. The model that is developed will serve as a bridge between these three themes.

Deciding on wicked strategy problems

The firms management team must choose the strategic direction of the organization (Rumelt

et al., 1994). Strategic decision-making means handling various strategy problems. The

process of forming strategy is by its very nature subject to multiple kinds of uncertainty,

ambiguity and complexity (Szulanski and Doz, 1995), where managers increasingly face

poorly defined problems that are interdependent and changing (McCaskey, 1982). Top

managers are often required to anticipate, define, and solve these wicked problems

(Schweiger et al., 1986).


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Rittel and Webber (1973) classified societal and policy problems as being wicked, as opposed

to easy solvable tameproblems that were characteristic of the industrial era. Wicked problems

are problems of organized complexity, and most strategy problems are wicked problems of

this kind, according to Mason and Mitroff (1981). They are not necessarily wicked in the

sense of being evil, but rather like anensnarled web of tentacles (Mason and Mittroff,

1981). Strategic problems that are wicked cannot be easily and objectively defined, but they

are open to interpretation from a limitless variety of angles (De Wit and Meyer, 1999)

Simple problems can be bound, managed and tamed (Rittel and Webber, 1973). Wicked

problems, on the other hand, are hard to solve. They produce decision environments in which

single right recommendations are rarely apparent (Schweiger et al. 1986). In strategy, there

will be more than one choice to make in defining the course of action on a strategic issue. The

top management team will need to deal with this.

Strategy tensions

At the heart of every strategy issue, a fundamental tension can be identified (De Wit and

Meyer, 1999). Historically, Adam Smith (1776) saw a major tension between integration and

differentiation underlying the rise of the modern industrial organization, while Mary Parker-

Follett (1941) showed how the assumptions of autonomy and control produce a contradictory

strategic challenge to leaders. Furthermore, nowadays managers are asked to deal with the

tensions of increasing efficiency while fostering creativity, teamwork and individualism, and

global playing and local acting (Lewis, 2000). They also have to deal with forces as

coherence and diversity, courage and caution, and power and compassion (Hamel, 2001). In

an attempt to integrate views in the strategy field, De Wit and Meyer (1999) identify ten

tensions in strategy that confront top executives, as illustrated in figure 1.


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A manager must act in the face of ambiguity (McCaskey, 1982; Mason and Mittroff, 1981;

Lewis, 2000), Ambiguity goes together with multiple, conflicting interpretations of the

problem, and different values executives rely upon to make sense of a wicked situation

(McCaskey, 1982). According to Steinbruner (1974), as a general agreement in cognitive

psychology research, the mind actively imposes order on situations that are highly

ambiguous. Resolving wicked problems means dealing with this ambiguity.

Paradox: at the intersection of strategy perspectives

Following McCaskey (1982), to be effective, a manager may have to act before the situation

is entirely clear, while important elements of the issue can be interpreted in conflicting ways,

and while convincing arguments are made for and against different alternatives. In their ways

to resolve strategy issues, managers try to simplify their information environment.

Simplifying and understanding the complexity around them enables people to think clearly

about difficult issues, and enables them to communicate about complex business challenges

(Friedman and Gyr, 1998). There is little argument against the view that managerial cognition

plays a significant role in the problem-solving processes or decision making of a management

Strategy Process Strategy Content Strategy Context

Strategy Purpose

The individual

between

Logic and Creativity

The strategy

between

Deliberate and Emergent

The organization

between

Evolution and Revolution

Business level

between

Markets and Resources

Corporate level

between

Synergy and Responsiveness

Network level

between

Competition and Corporation

The organization

between

Control and Chaos

The world

between

Globalization and Localization

The industry

between

Compliance and Choice

The company between

Shareholders and Stakeholders

Fig 1 Strategy Tensions Source: De Wit and Meyer (1999)


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team (Walsh, 1995). Decision-making on strategic topics is influenced highly by the cognitive

frames of members of organizational upper echelons (Hambrick and Mason, 1984).

Conflicting assumptions are likely when dealing with complex problems (Schwenk, 1988).

Assumptions about the nature of tensions may differ significantly, giving rise to a variety of

opinions. With these assumptions, top executives form their view on a strategy issue. Baden-

Fuller and Pitt (1996) state that strategic management is characteristically a process of

tolerating and ultimately reconciling seemingly contrary ideas and perceptions. These

perspectives are formed by an ambiguous environment, and are ways to deal with a strategy

tension, emphasizing one side of this tension over the other.

Managerial cognition theory has introduced various synonyms for a perspective that a top

manager has on strategy. There has emerged an evocative language around the central

construct (Walsh 1995). A variety of researchers has given names to fundamentally same

entities: cognitive map (Huff, 1990), frame of reference (Westenholz, 1993), selective

perception (Hambrick and Mason, 1984), belief structure (Walsh, 1988), world view (Mason,

1969) or managerial lens (Miller, 1993) are all synonyms for the dominant way a top

executive views a certain strategic issue. This reflects the beliefs a manager has about the

issue as well as the way he acts upon it (Walsh, 1995). Here, the central construct is defined

as a strategy perspective: the way one thinks about and acts upon a strategy issue. During

strategic decision-making, top executives may have to deal with these contradictory

perspectives.

Research into the content and development of strategy perspectives has been abundant

(Walsh, 1995). However, research into the usage and consequences of knowledge structures

could provide some handhold to these managers, which is where managerial cognition

literature provides background (Walsh, 1995), yet does not seem to give ample suggestions

(Porac and Thomas, 2002; Whittington, 2002; Pettigrew, 2002). Strategy perspectives may

seem contradictory, but do not have to be necessarily so. This depends on the way managers

view a strategy tension.


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Fundamentally, there are three ways of approaching strategy tensions: as a puzzle, a dilemma

or as a paradox (De Wit and Meyer, 1999):

1. Strategy Puzzle. A puzzle is a problem with an optimal solution, so there is a best way

of solving it, although it can seem complex and hard to analyze (De Wit and Meyer,

1999). These seem typical, simple, organizational level issues. So, concerning opposing

strategy perspectives as a puzzle actually means denying there is a fundamental

embedded tension at all.

2. Strategy Dilemma. A dilemma is a problem with two possible solutions (Hampden-

Turner, 1990). Managers have an either/or choice, assuming the incompatibility of the

two opposites (De Wit and Meyer, 1999). According to Porter (1996) the generic

strategy framework introduced the need to choose, in order to avoid becoming caught

between the inherent contradictions in strategies. However, there are indeed dangers,

getting trapped in conflict or compromise, but not noticing the opportunities arising from

the tensions would be a shame (Hampden-Turner, 1990).

3. Strategy Paradox. A paradox has three overarching characteristics, according to Lewis

(2000). First, a paradox represents a wide variety of contradictory, yet interrelated

assumptions. Second, they are actors to make sense of an increasingly ambiguous world.

Thirdly, they become apparent through social interaction. Managerial choices are not

either-or, but both-and (Hampden-Turner, 1990). Viewing strategy tensions as paradoxes

will mean resolving wicked problems; not getting stuck in the middle but elevating the

center to a higher level.

Strategy perspectives may often seem contradictory and it would be human to take a stand

and make a choice. However, it has been proposed that wicked problems have no one best

solution; therefore, an either-or choice will not hold for a long time, as wicked problems ask

for dynamic resolution. Also, throwing away the conflicting strategy perspective might be a

waste. According to Eisenhardt (2000), the management of duality tensions centers on

exploring the tension in a creative way that captures both extremes, thereby capitalizing on

the inherent pluralism within duality. Viewing strategy tensions as paradoxes would be


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inherent to the organized complexity that top executives have to deal with in strategic

decision making.

In academic research, recognizing the fact that managers and their organizations live in a

world of paradox (Handy, 1994) is becoming increasingly popular (Lewis, 2000). Davis,

Maranville and Obloj (1997) found the term paradox used in over 300 major publications

from 1990-1997. Thurbin (1998) defines paradox as an apparent contradiction between

equally credible assumptions about a set of issues or conclusions. Poole and Van de Ven

(1989) define it as a situation in which two seeming contradictory, or even mutually

exclusive, factors appear to be true at the same time. Opposing perspectives, or factors that

Poole and Van de Ven speak about, form the strategic paradox; the assumptions that Thurbin

refers to cause the tension that underlies paradox. To combine theories, a strategy paradox is

defined as an apparent contradiction between two equally credible strategy perspectives.

The challenge for managers will be to bridge the gap between opposing poles. Because in a

paradox contradictory strategy perspectives are equally credible, combining the positives of

both perspectives seems a logical consequence. The dialectical movement of a thesis having

an antithesis, which will form a synthesis together, is at the base of this. First described in

Hegelian philosophy, it seems adequate to translate to the business world. A strategy

synthesis, that blends the insights from both perspectives, will necessarily be situation

dependent. As strategy paradoxes have no fixed set of answers, every synthesis of

perspectives will be a unique hybrid, fitted to the circumstances encountered (De Wit and

Meyer, 1999). A synthesis will combine the positive aspects of both perspectives into a best-

of-both worlds, as opposed to a bit-of-both worlds that can emerge from a puzzle-view on a

strategy tension, or to a best-of-one-world that can arise from a dilemma-perception.

During research A, theDynamic Synthesis Model was developed that might help executives in

choosing the strategic direction of their firm, when they have to deal with conflicting

perspectives on a strategy issue. This will be handled next.


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RESEARCH A: DEVELOPING THE MODEL

There are three categories in qualitative research and data analysis: description, conceptual

ordering and theorizing (Straus and Corbin, 1998; Locke, 2001). These three forms are

interdependent layers, constructed on one another (Locke, 2001).Describing in this case is

describing the research itself without stepping back to interpret events. The latter is done in

the second phase: conceptual ordering involves classifying events and objects along

explicitly stated dimensions, without relating the categories in an overarching scheme. This

explanatory scheme is created when theorizing: constructing an explanatory scheme that

systematically integrates concepts through statements of relationship. This theory, then, may

provide guides to action for users (Straus and Corbin, 1998). During Research A, a

comparable process was followed. As a consequence, sketching the research will be done

similarly here. In the description section, the research will be outlined. Then, in the

conceptual ordering part, the categories and related questions are formed. These categories

and relevant literature will be integrated in a conceptual scheme in the theorizing part.

Research Description

Research participants were 112 advancing middle-level managers from 100 different national

and multinational companies, enrolled in the Executive MBA at the Rotterdam School of

Management, in the 2nd year class Strategic Leadership. The program was designed to

prepare the students to assume executive positions in the near future. The research

participants averaged 34 years of age, and had an average of 8.6 years of full-time work

experience.The group of 112 participants was divided into 3 groups of 35-40 students, and

went through 6 sessions. in total the research comprised 54 hours. Memo notes were taken

from the various discussions during class.

Central in the class was the concept of strategy tensions as described by De Wit and Meyer

(1999). During the class discussions, students were asked frequently about their own strategy

perspective, which made clear that the two opposing perspectives that were considered were

often distributed equally (fifty-fifty) among participants. They were divided into smaller


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groups of six participants, and were asked to discuss and resolve the strategy tensions from

their own perspective using business cases and class discussions.

Conceptual Ordering

In the first sessions, it became clear that the participants had opposing perspectives on the

issues, but did not have a way to deal with this yet. In the beginning of the process, two issues

became clear. One issue was that the way the participants perceiveda strategy tension could

be very important. The second issue showed that the way the participants think about dealing

with various choices might also be important. These two issues come together in the question

of from where do we start? This question is answered classifying the two issues of tension

thinking and tension perceiving in category A:Drivers.

Furthermore, participants did not only really knowfrom where to start, they also did not know

how to engage in the process. This comes forward in accounts as How do we argument

different views?. The question of how do we do this? is answered in category B:

Guidelines. Along these guidelines, participants could not really make out generally whatto

do. On one side, it became clear that people who had to name the advantages of their own

strategy perspectives automatically started naming the disadvantage of the other when talking

about their own perspective. Students started to ridicule the opposing perspective

automatically. On the other side, there were also students making statements such as we

named pros but deliberately stayed away from cons. So, participants needed something to

hold on to. The question what should we do? is addressed in category C: Actions. After

every discussion the process and results were evaluated plenary. The matter of where should

this lead to is issued in the last building block of the model, category D: Outcomes.

Theorizing

After developing the four building blocks, the model could be developed further,

simultaneously integrating theoretical angles. During theorizing, the categories were filled in

further.


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Drivers

As a driver of the process, tension perceiving consists of a perception of a tension as a

dilemma, as a puzzle or as a paradox. For instance, various students pointed out We have to

make a choice, indicating these students viewed the particular strategy tension as a dilemma.

A statement like Solving this issue was easy, we just took a bit of both perspectives and we

had a quick answer indicates the perception of a strategy tension as a puzzle: students did

not recognize fully that a tension existed, thus did not perceive that both perspectives were

true at the same time. This was the case when participants started to perceive a strategy

tension as a paradox. Examples of this are accounts by participants such as I realized

outside-in and inside out is a strategic paradox, that cannot be settled by finding a

compromise or by convincing the other camp or Through paradox, the awareness of

alternatives increases. This way of thinking is fostered further by Ellinor and Gerard (1998),

who describe occurrences during their research in decision settings similarly: When people

make the choice not to choose, a transformation from dilemma to paradox is made. This

becomes a catalyst to expand perceptions and integrate them into an inclusive whole. This

strain between holding separate perspectives on one hand and trying to bring them together on

the other hand also comes forward from the sessions, which is the second issue concerning

the drivers of the process.

Accounts such as I tend to evaluate the opposite approach as being inferior, We

fundamentally disagreed, indicate the way participants thoughtabout tensions was in a mode

ofdivergence. Divergence in this case means focusing on separating options (Wells, 1998).

This mode of divergent thinking lies at the base of a dilemma. On the other side, there were

also participants that said We have to find a common ground or We need to combine two

perspectives. These statements indicate participants were more in a mode ofconvergence. In

this case, convergence means focusing on integrating options (Wells, 1998). Too much

convergence may take place when people do not see two opposing perspectives as

perspectives on a fundamental tension: in other words, convergent thinking may underlie the

perception of a strategic issue as a puzzle. TheDriverscategory is reflected in figure 2.


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Guidelines

From the research came forward that to be able to tap into the potential of paradoxes, the

perspectives needed to be clear to all members of the decision-making teams first. On one

side, the assumptions people take in their perspectives on a particular strategy tension are

sometimes not clear for themselves, which is indicated by participants stating Maybe I am

more in the other camp, or I do know what my perspective is, but I dont know what it

means explicitly. On the other side, to be able to perceive an issue as a fundamental strategy

tension, the fundaments of the opposing perspective need to be made explicit to others. This

appears from expressions from students such as So, what is the tension then? or Whats

the other side?. With this background, the concepts ofdebate and consensus seeking were

introduced. To ensure all assumptions were made clear, debate was set up as a conflict-

engendering approach, starting with a divergent mode of thinking. Participants were asked to

really take a stand creating win-lose situations and set their arguments into extremes. It

was observed that most participants took this step implicitly. Reactions to the debating

guideline were positive, from We could really see a tension to I am becoming aware of the

paradox here.

Debate lies at the hart of devils advocacy and dialectical inquiry approaches that have been

researched extensively in strategic decision-making research (Schweiger et al., 1986, 1989;

Schwenk, 1998, 1990; Tung and Heminger, 1993; Schwenk and Cosier, 1993; Schwenk and

Valacich, 1994). They both involve the introduction of conflict into the formulation process

Drivers

Divergence ConvergenceTension thinking

Tension perceiving

Fig 2 Conceptual Model Drivers

Paradox

PuzzleDilemma


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(Thomas, 1984). Whereas devils advocacy relies on critiques of single sets of

recommendations, dialectical inquiry involves presenting both plans and counter-plans, using

debates between opposing sets of recommendations and assumptions (Schweiger et al., 1986).

Dialectical inquiry is a way to resolve wicked problems, according to Mason and Mitroff

(1981). The debating method in both the structured conflict approaches leads to a set of well

thought out assumptions (Noorderhaven, 1992). However, too much divergence and debate

could have an undesired results (Schweiger et al, 1989; Eisenhardt, 1989; Schwenk, 1990;

Schwenk and Cosier, 1993). Participants needed another guideline, too, in order to help them

in bridging the tension that they perceived. This required convergence, and a behavior

towards consensus-seeking to possibly arrive at synthesis. The consensus approach

(Schweiger et al., 1989; Noorderhaven, 1992) is a sometimes unstructured, automatic process

that people obtain in search for harmony (Janis, 1972). The objective is to find a solution

everybody can agree with (Schweiger et al., 1989). Several authors have formulated

guidelines for decision-making by consensus (Hall, 1971; Noorderhaven, 1992; Innes, 1999).

Core to these are discarding win-lose notions, and seeing differences in views not as an

impediment to the decision-making process, but as the basis for solution.

The debate in devils advocacy and dialectical inquiry is more effective in the validity and

surfacing of assumptions, yet the consensus approach advocates freer group expression than

the structured conflict approaches (Schweiger et al, 1986). As a downside, consensus-seeking

behavior can have negative effects on the quality of the outcome if decisions are reached too

quickly (Hall, 1971; Janis, 1972; Schweiger et al., 1986; Innes, 1999). To deal with this issue,

the concept of dialogue was introduced. Dialogue involves a shift of mind from either-or

thinking to both-and thinking (Ellinor and Gerard, 1998), and is driven by the perception of a

strategy tension as a paradox. Van der Heijden and Eden (1998) refer to dialogue as a

strategic conversation, through which strategic cognitions can be compared, challenged and

negotiated. Dialogue could be a necessary guideline to entail the best of both strategy

perspectives, especially when a form of debate to surface assumptions that underlie

perspectives precedes it. In this way, it is a complimentary combination of both two


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structured conflict approaches, devils advocacy and dialectical inquiry, and the consensus

approach.

Actions

The question of what can we do to achieve this implicated there were some types of actions

needed. During the debate and dialogue parts participants frequently made statements like

we need something to hold on to and isnt there something to visualize the process. To

address this issue, some groups were asked to map their progression in a 2 by 2 matrix, using

four action stages steering them through both perspectives (A and B). This corresponds with

Van der Heijden and Eden (1998), who state strategic conversation may be stimulated by

interactive modeling techniques. To some extent, the actions incorporated in the model build

on Johnsons Polarity Map (1996, 2002).

The first action stage focuses on mapping the positive aspects of ones own strategy

perspective. Participants were asked to write down the qualities of their view on the issue.

Reactions from the participants were encouraging, as the first step helped them to elaborate

their perspective on the issue. The second stage follows the debate guideline further by

focusing on the negatives of the opposite perspective. As participants had the tendency to do

this already, this seemed a natural move for them to make. Students were asked to take a

stand and over-exaggerate their position, to make sure all underlying principles were

revealed. Reactions to the second step ranged from This helps to bring up and intensify the

tension to Do we have to stay in extremes, indicating that another set of actions could be

taken to help participants to move from debate towards dialogue.

The third stage involves a shift of mind from either/or thinking to both/and thinking, by

first focusing on the negative characteristics of participants own perspective on the issue. By

looking at the negative sides of students own objective, it is made sure that these pitfalls are

not omitted. Furthermore, it helped participants to get along the line of dialogue, without

moving to consensus too early. In the research this was named Embracing contradiction,

and made students state Through debate and dialogue, you start to feel a paradox. The


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fourth stage involves a progress towards a decision. To get to a win/win situation for both

sides of the tension, recognizing that this tension is indeed paradoxical, it seems people need

to be aware of the advantages of the opposite perspective. Because students knew their own

perspectives pitfalls, they saw the positive sides of the others perspectives as well. The

Action stages are summarized in figure 3.

Outcomes

The outcomes of the process are related to the drivers, guidelines and actions in the guiding

model. Perceiving a strategy tension as a dilemma and thinking divergent about that tension

has a pitfall when staying in this divergent mode too much: it may end in conflict, which may

result in an either/or choice or, to use a chess-term, a stalemate: an unsolvable conflict. From

the start of the process, participants did diverge during debate; however, it was also

recognized that at a certain point a change in tension thinking towards convergence needed to

be made. Yet, it was also perceived that getting to a type of consensus-seeking too quickly

also has a pitfall: a compromise decision that is taken too quickly. Compromise, in this case,

is seen as half a solution. This is exposed in statements as We ended a little towards

emergence, but also a little towards planning, but maybe more towards emergence, or We

realized quickly just to use a bit of both. Ross, in 1919, called compromise a premature

decision, an ad interim attitude. It is viewed as a halfway measure rising from impatience,

a provisional arrangement pending the emergence of a real decision (Ross, 1919).

Using ownpositives

Moving to othernegatives

Recognizing ownnegatives

Distinguishing otherpositives

Actions

Fig 3 Conceptual Model - Actions

+

-

+

-

+-

+-

A B A B A B A B


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Consensus that is reached quickly should be distrusted, according to Innes (1999) and

Schweiger et al (1986).

Through debate and dialogue tensions are enforced, recognized and might be resolved by

perceiving strategy tensions as paradox. At the fourth action stage, decision-makers start

distinguishing the opposing strategy perspectives advantages. This will increase the chance

of creating a best of both worlds in a synthesis of both perspectives, combining the positive

aspects of both. This corresponds with wicked problems that call for dynamic resolution. A

synthesis is not a static result that is at the end of the model: it involves permanent interaction

within a strategy tension, and so a continuous route through all four quadrants of the action

scheme. As one of the participants in research A remarked: synthesis is not about the

outcome, its about the process. The manager in his management team does not have to

change his perspective: he needs to be able to incorporate other opposing perspectives into

strategic decision making on a continuous basis. To do so, he can use the model as is

developed during research A. This dynamic synthesis model, which is provided in the

conclusion to this article, has been tested during research B.

RESEARCH B: TESTING THE MODEL

Research B was conducted in a different way than research A. As the focus of the research lay

on testing rather than developing the model, it involved only one strategy tension and one

case study, to make sure every group of results was obtained in the same manner. Research B

was conducted during an in-company Advanced Management Program of one of the Big

Four financial service providers. The research was carried out during the Strategic

Management module, which involved 77 employees. The age range of the participants was

between about 30 and 45.The group was divided into 3 smaller groups.

Every single class went through a five day-program of strategic management. The research

was conducted during the fourth day. Participants were familiar with the concept of strategy

paradoxes, but did not know how they could incorporate these into strategic decision making

yet. All the participants were introduced to the Merck case study, focusing on the network


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level tension between competition and cooperation (De Wit and Meyer, 1999). Again, there

was an equal distribution of the two strategy perspectives among students. A cross-selection

took place to end up in every class with 5 - 6 smaller groups, each containing 2 or 3

participants representing perspective A and 2 to 3 participants representing perspective B. In

total, there were 14 groups that were asked to decide upon the strategy issue that came

forward from the case study. Half of these groups, the control group, were asked to decide

upon the issue without any model guiding them. Half of the groups, though, were asked to

participate in a session that focused on working with the model as presented in the last

chapter. The participants in groups that worked with the conceptual model are labelled as test

group. All groups were asked to summarize their views on the process and the decision they

made. The summaries of the test and control groups were then analysed and compared.

There were considerable differences in both the process itself as in the form of the solutions

the teams decided upon. This became clear from the group end-presentations and observations

during the process. Teams that did not work with the model often ended up with an either/or

choice. Apparently, they still perceived the strategy tension as a dilemma. There was also one

group within the control group that seemed to have come to a deadlock: they went so far into

debate, they were not able to arrive at any conclusion at all. In addition, there were also

groups, working without any guiding tool, that apparently went into a converging mode from

the start of the process.

From the results of the test group it came forward from the research that the model could

enhance the likelihood of a sound and well thought off resolution. Furthermore, the test-

groups seemed to be more able to avoid the pitfalls of the process than the control-groups

were. These resolutions are often more thoughtful and substantiated, and have more of the

characteristics of syntheses than solutions that rise from unguided processes. The latter do not

fully tap into the potentials of paradox: the ability to bridge a tension by using the best of both

sides.

It should be taken into account that both research A and research B were conducted in

laboratory settings: participants were not top executives yet. However, this was probably was


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close as it gets. Also, research B involved only one case and one strategy tension, which

increased internal validity but does not provide a cross-tensional research method.

Furthermore, the participants all worked for the same organization, which could imply a slight

bias. Still, the goal of the research to connect strategic decision making and opposing strategy

perspectives in theory and practice was met, by means of the development of a conceptual

model that has been tested successfully.

CONCLUSION : THE DYNAMIC SYNTHESIS PROCESS

When executives find themselves confronted with wicked strategy problems, and thus have to

deal with contradictory perspectives on a strategic issue, they can use the dynamic synthesis

process model to facilitate the decision-making in their management teams. The model is

presented on the next page. Core to the model is the perception of strategy tensions as

paradoxes. By focusing on own positives and other negatives, managers take position to make

sure all assumptions are made clear. Through dialogue other positives can be synthesized with

the positive aspects of their own strategy perspective into a best of both worlds. The

dynamic synthesis process is a meta-synthesis in itself: it drives through the tension between

divergence and convergence, is guided by the tension between debate and consensus-seeking,

acts with the tension between positives and negatives, and may result in synthesis: a best of

both worlds, within the tension between conflict and compromise.

A synthesis is not just an end; its a dynamic process. If top executives and their team are able

to go through the model at anytime, they can use the action scheme to generate dynamic

resolutions into strategy. The model has been developed and tested in unique research settings

that are probably as close as it gets to real life boardroom behavior as possible. As became

clear during the test phase, the model increases the likelihood of a thoughtful and

substantiated combination of strategy perspectives into a decision, while providing both a

structure and leaving room for a dynamic resolution of a strategy issue to emerge from

strategy tensions. Furthermore, it serves as a guide to avoid pitfalls along the way.


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Synthesis Trade-offChoice

Drivers

Divergence Convergence

Tension thinking

Tension perceiving

Paradox

PuzzleDilemma

Dialogue

Guidelines

Recognizingown negatives

Distinguishingother positives

Actions

Fig 4 Dynamic Synthesis Process

Using own

positives

Moving to othernegatives

Conflict

Debate

Outcomes

Compromise

Best of both perspectives

ConsensusSeeking


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