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‘Power Led’ Outside Intervention inKurdish Politics in Iraq and Turkey inthe Early 1970sAyşegül Sever a

a Marmara University , Dr. Mithat Süer Sok. No: 21/8, Erenköy,Istanbul , TurkeyPublished online: 25 Mar 2013.

To cite this article: Ayşegül Sever (2013) ‘Power Led’ Outside Intervention in KurdishPolitics in Iraq and Turkey in the Early 1970s, Middle Eastern Studies, 49:2, 263-279, DOI:10.1080/00263206.2012.759100

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‘Power Led’ Outside Interventionin Kurdish Politics in Iraq and Turkeyin the Early 1970s

AYÔEG€UL SEVER�

Turkey’s long-running vulnerability to the possible spill-over effects of Kurdish devel-opments in its neighbouring states, given its own handling of the Kurdish issue, wasan enduring, but mostly unacknowledged, factor in Turkey’s Middle Eastern politicsuntil the 1990s. Of the scattered Kurdish population among Iraq, Iran, Turkey andSyria, Turkey has always had the largest share within its borders.1 In the early Repub-lican period Turkey witnessed a series of Kurdish rebellions (for example in 1925 and1937), but Kurdish identity was not recognized at state level until the 1990s. At thesame time, Turkey has also always been concerned about developments in other coun-tries with a significant Kurdish population, like Iraq and Iran, due to the possiblerepercussions of unrest for Turkey itself.

This article will focus upon one phase of this complex problem, as it confrontedTurkey in the early 1970s. Following a short honeymoon between Iraqi PresidentAbd al-Karim Qasim (1958–63) and the Kurds after the 1958 coup in Iraq, IraqiKurds under Mulla Mustafa Barzani fought a sporadic war for autonomy within Iraqbetween 1961 and 1975.2 This insurgency was politically and strategically importantfor Turkey, both as a neighbour, and because of its own large Kurdish population.This article explores Turkey’s response to the internationalization of the Kurdish in-surgency in Iraq.

It is well documented that intervention can take a number of forms, including in-volvement as mediator, involvement in support of the government, or involvement insupport of an ethnic insurgency. Motivations may typically include hegemonic calcu-lations, regional competition, concerns about regional stability, ethnic sympathy for acertain ethnic group, and humanitarian considerations.3 The growing interventionfrom Iran, the US, and Israel that manifested itself in varying degrees of military andeconomic assistance to the Kurds in the early 1970s, and Turkey’s reactions to this,will be explored here.4 Turkey’s attitude to this Kurdish mobilization led by Barzaniin the 1970s can generally be described as ‘watchful neutrality’ with few precautionstaken. Despite the important autonomy agreement between the Kurds and Iraq in

*Marmara University, Dr. Mithat Süer Sok. No:21/8, Erenköy, Istanbul, Turkey, E-mail:sever@superonline.com

� 2013 Taylor & Francis

Middle Eastern Studies, 2013Vol. 49, No. 2, 263–279, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00263206.2012.759100

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March 1970, and then growing support for the Kurds from outside powers againstBaghdad, especially in the wake of the 1972 Iraq–Soviet Friendship and CooperationTreaty, no Turkish government proved itself ready to become involved in the Bagh-dad–Kurdish confrontation either on its own or together with its allies. Did this atti-tude originate with Turkey’s vulnerability to the spill-over effects of Kurdishdevelopments? Or were there also other explanations, perhaps including a lack of stra-tegic aims towards Baghdad? Ankara had indeed been given convincing assurancesabout its own territorial and political integrity from almost all the external partieswho then intervened in the Kurdish–Baghdad conflict. This article will also explorethe extent to which Turkey was actually aware of other intervention, given the covertcharacter of US involvement in the Kurdish dispute in 1972.

This article first sets the problem of the Kurds in Turkey in its historicalcontext. It then reviews some of the general theoretical categorizations and explana-tions relating to outside involvement in conflicts between an ethnic group and thestate. Then it puts the Kurdish question in the Cold War context as seen by Turkeyand, lastly, focuses specifically on the Turkish response to outside support for theKurds from the 1970 Kurdish autonomy agreement and the 1972 Iraq–SovietTreaty.

Much scholarly work suggests that Turkey’s vulnerability to this trans-border influ-ence of the ethnic issue is not sufficient to explain the state’s non-involved positionvis-�a-vis the Kurdish mobilization in other countries, such as in Iraq during the 1970s.Stephen Saideman recognizes ‘that states vulnerable to ethnic conflict and separatismtend not to support separatist movements’ but also argues vulnerability has no totalexplanatory power on its own.5 Douglas Woodwell similarly points out that oneshould take multiple factors besides vulnerability into account in order to exhibit asound framework in which a state reaction to an ethnic issue can be fully understood.6

Besides vulnerability, state reactions to ethnic conflicts are generally accepted to stemfrom three motivations; instrumental (realist), affective (ethnic ties) or humanitarian.7

Instrumental motivations provide a realist interpretation of outside intervention:the pursuit of strategic interests, the desire to satisfy long-standing territorial ambi-tions, the objective to gain short-term military advantage or fulfil economic inter-ests may lead to one state’s intervention in another’s ethnic conflict. Iran’s supportof the Kurds of Iraq in the 1960s and 1970s, India’s backing of Bangladesh in1971 or Syria’s backing of the PKK (the Kurdistan Workers’ Party) in the 1980sand 1990s could be cited as interventions based upon instrumental considerations.Ethnic ties between the outside state and the mobilized group can also cause exter-nal intervention. Transborder ethnic ties might transform an internal ethnic conflictinto an interstate confrontation on behalf of the suppressed ethnic group if mem-bers of the ethnic group have access to power in one state and not in the other.8

Affective involvement (based on ethnic ties) and instrumental involvement (basedon strategic considerations) could also be in action together in some cases.9

States sometimes get involved in ethnic conflict on humanitarian grounds and thishas become more evident since the Cold War. Outside intervention in the event of se-rious human rights violations and widespread suffering caused by military conflictand ethnic oppression now appears more acceptable.10 In the post-Cold War era,where ideological and bloc politics matter less, strategic considerations are expectedto be increasingly given less weight in decisions over intervention. In line with this

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trend, states are more likely to intervene in ethnic conflicts as mediators than as alliesof either side. Notwithstanding these diversified motives for outside intervention in anethnic conflict, instrumental motives will be the centre of attention in this article, giventhe period and the actors concerned. In its response to the Kurdish insurgency in Iraqin the early 1970s, Turkey seemed not to have had particular instrumental, affectiveor humanitarian motives to actively intervene. Nor did it have an acute perception ofvulnerability that might have led it to get involved. However, all this may shed lighton what precluded Ankara from being party to the internationalization of the Kurd-ish issue.

The Baghdad–Barzani duel in the 1970s could have remained an Iraqi, or, at most,a regional affair but it turned into a Cold War confrontation with outside involvementdespite the initial reluctance of both the US and the USSR. The US had generallybeen careful not to get involved in ethnic conflicts until they reached a critical stage inbalancing Soviet influence during the Cold War years. Ideological or common blocinterests generally overshadowed ethnic issues and therefore using the ethnic card wasseen generally as a last resort by US administrations. Before the Nixon presidency,US administrations had been reluctant to back any Kurdish demands for autonomyin order not to incite any confrontation with the opposite bloc or discomfort amongstits pro-western allies like Turkey over an ethnic issue. In this light, the US short-termbacking of the Iraqi Kurds after the 1972 Soviet–Iraqi agreement could be regardedas a serious breach of the accustomed policy notwithstanding its minor character inscale. After the British declaration to withdraw from the Gulf in 1968, the US as-sumed the role of safeguarding western interests in the Gulf with the support of pro-western allies like Iran. So, the signing of the 1972 Soviet–Iraq treaty was regarded asa serious challenge to the US position in the Gulf. Under the treaty, both parties‘agreed not to enter into any alliance aimed against the other’ and committed them-selves ‘to develop the cooperation in the strengthening of their own defence capaci-ty’.11 This led to the extension of military aid to Baghdad and to Moscow lending itspolitical and economic support to Iraq’s nationalization of the western oil compa-nies.12 The treaty, therefore, became the leading incentive for US reassessment of itsstance on the Iraqi Kurds.

Unlike the Americans, the Soviets had a long history of close interest in Kurdish poli-tics. The Soviets played a crucial role in the foundation of the first ever Kurdish Repub-lic in Mahabad in 1946. After the collapse of this Republic, Kurdish leaderBarzani took refuge in the Soviet Union and lived there until Qasim assumed powerin 1958. For years the leadership and many members of the KDP (the KurdistanDemocratic Party) received training in exile in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.Officially the Soviets had refused to openly commit themselves to Kurdish political aspi-rations, but they generally sympathized with the Kurds.13 Ideologically, the Soviets alsohad a significant number of followers among Iraqi Kurds and Communist ideologyhad a special stronghold among the informed Kurdish community in the 1960s and1970s. However, the external challenge posed by Iran from April 1969 onwards broughtabout a Ba‘th–Soviet rapprochement and severed Soviet–Kurdish relations.14

When the Soviets seriously tipped the balance towards the Ba‘th regime after thetreaty, the US simultaneously started backing the Iraqi Kurds against Baghdad.Like previous administrations, the Nixon presidency (1969–74) first declined to sayyes to the Kurdish pleas for assistance against the Ba‘th regime. US officials rejected

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‘the overtures on grounds that Washington would not interfere in the internal affairsof other countries and that an independent Kurdish state was not an US goal. Offi-cials also felt that, regardless of Kurdish complaints of inadequate aid, the Kurdscould get the help they required from the Iranians and Israelis’.15 Throughout 1971,despite Barzani’s insistence that the pro-Soviet Ba‘thists could be toppled only by aKurdish-led insurrection, the Nixon administration maintained its refusal to assist,being reluctant to be seen as warmongering in the age of detente because of theKurds. Taking this into consideration, until the completion of the 1972 Soviet–Iraqitreaty Kurdish requests for aid fell on deaf ears.16 As late as April 1972, the Depart-ment of State opposed Kurdish support, arguing that Iraq’s alliance with Moscowwould endure a change of regime, and that the leak of news of US aid to the Kurdswould not only damage relations with Baghdad but the whole Arab world. Further-more, aiding the Iraqi Kurds would give hope to Kurds in countries like Turkey,thus weakening relations with allies.17 To assure the US about Turkish concern theKurds repeated several times that ‘the Barzani Kurds have never incited the Kurdsof Turkey against their government or otherwise intervened in Turkish affairs’.18

The 1972 Iraq–Soviet treaty, the nationalization of Iraqi oil and growing Russianarms sales to Baghdad, coupled with Iran’s consistent appeal, eventually changedNixon’s view of aid to the Kurds. Together with other arguments, this also fell shortof convincing the Americans until late May 1972. The situation only changed afterPresident Nixon visited Tehran on 30–31 May 1972 on his way back from the Mos-cow summit.19 In this crucial meeting, the Shah of Iran asked for joint American–Iranian assistance to the Kurds against Baghdad, especially drawing the president’sattention to the recent Soviet–Iraqi treaty. The shah told President Nixon that ‘theSoviets would establish a coalition of the Kurds, the Ba‘thists, and the Communists;the Kurdish problem, instead of being a thorn in their side, could become an asset tothe Communists’.20

At the shah’s request, the first contact between the Nixon administration andthe Kurds started in June 1972. Later on, Kissinger confessed that ‘the Shahpleaded with the President. We agreed in order to absorb Iraqi energies. The Pres-ident wanted to do it. We did it with special procedures’.21 Through arrangementsmade by the Shah of Iran, personal representatives of Barzani met with the direc-tor of the CIA, Richard Helms, Colonel Richard Kennedy and a CIA officer on30 June 1972. Other than those in Iran, no one was aware of the Kurdish–Americantalks in Washington. Barzani’s special representative spoke about joint Soviet–Iraqiefforts to bring the Kurds under the control of the Ba‘th regime in Baghdad.He said that aid to the Kurds should be provided without any delay.22 Throughhis envoys Barzani presented the situation as acute and alarming, stating that

the Soviets are now controlling events in Iraq and could exploit its strategic loca-tion and that time is running out for the West and its [pro-western] allies borderthat country. Barzani believes that Kurdistan, albeit small, could exploit its stra-tegic location and fighting potential as an effective tool in a free world effort toreverse the trend of Soviet expansion in the Middle East and to regain the initia-tive for the free world and its allies in that area. In this context, he noted thatIraqi oil resources are located primarily in the Kurdish area.23

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Based on his discussions with Barzani’s representatives, on 28 July 1972 Helms for-warded a proposal to the White House for covert assistance to the Kurds.24 Nixonand Kissinger took a quick decision to involve the CIA in a war with the Kurdsagainst Iraq without telling Congress, the secretary of defense or the Department ofState.25 Later on in 1976 the House Select Committee on Intelligence was to reveal inthe so-called Pike Report that President Nixon ordered the operation and bypassedthe system of having it approved by the Forty Committee, a secret subdivision of theNational Security Council that was supposed to pass on all covert operations.26 Un-der President Nixon’s orders, ‘the United States allocated 250,000 dollars a month indirect support for Fiscal Year 1973 plus another 2 million for ammunition, or some5 million a year’, From the very beginning the Kurds had to promise that the relation-ship with the Americans would be kept secret and the US would not be channelling itsaid to the Kurds directly but through other states like Iran.27 This was less than thelarge amount the shah contributed. Paramilitary support by the CIA to the Kurdishrebellion against the Iraqi government from 1972 to 1975 reached some $16 million.In his memoirs Kissinger described the aid mission as ‘not a major effort by ColdWar standards’.28

As explained, Iran was very effective in convincing the Americans to come forwardwith assisting the Barzani forces. In assisting Iraqi Kurds since the 1960s, Iran’s firstpriority had been to gain the upper hand in its problems with Iraq, especially in territo-rial disputes like the Shatt al-Arab border and Iran’s possession of the islands, AbuMusa and the Tunbs. Diplomatic relations between Iran and Iraq were severed on 1December 1971, the day after Iran took the three islands in the Gulf.29 The shah usedthe Kurdish card to see how vigilant the US could be towards continuing Soviet ambi-tions in the age of detente. After the 1958 coup in Iraq, Iran had frequently become in-volved in Kurdish politics in Iraq, providing direct military aid, cash transfers andshelter on the Iranian side of the border for Kurdish rebels. The more Iran gained influ-ence in the region the more demanding and more eager it became to intervene in the in-ternal affairs of Iraq. After the collapse of the Kurdish Republic of Mahabad the shahhad maintained tight political control over the Iranian Kurds, and Iranian Kurds gen-erally remained economically backward. On the other hand, the shah permitted theKurds some cultural expression like the publication of books in Kurdish and thebroadcast of some Kurdish programmes on radio. Iran, therefore, remained some-where in between giving political rights and absolute denial.30 The Iranians were con-siderably annoyed when the Kurds accepted the Baghdad government’s proposals fora ceasefire and settlement in March 1970, but Tehran maintained contact with Kurdishleaders on the premise that fighting with Baghdad might start again.31

Iran was not the only US ally that showed eagerness to assist the Kurds. Israel wasthe other forthcoming party. Starting from the early 1960s Israelis assisted the Kurdsin compliance with their traditional strategic choice of setting up alliances with non-Arab states and groups in view of their deepening conflict with the Arabs. Moreover,the Kurds were favoured because of their positive role in the exodus of the Jews fromIraq in the 1950s. The first contacts between Israel and Iraqi Kurds were establishedduring the short Ba‘th administration in the summer of 1963. In late June 1963, thepresident of Mossad met with his Iranian counterpart and offered him military aid forIraqi Kurdish rebels through Tehran. The aid was not as substantial as that of theIranians but the Israelis were in close consultation with the Iranians on this issue

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all the way. Israeli assistance initially started as medical aid, then expanded to includethe supply of light weaponry, and later on more advanced weaponry, including anti-tank and anti-aircraft equipment.32 Israeli aid was then reported to have reached$50,000 per month.33 In the period from 1965 to 1975 IDF officers Rafael Eitan,Rehavam Ze’evi and Yuval Ne’eman were sent to the Kurds on behalf of the govern-ments of David Ben-Gurion, Levi Eshkol and Golda Meir as part of the national poli-cy of backing non-Arab ethnic minorities in the Middle East.34

Kurdish mobilization under Barzani increasingly became a part of the regional bal-ance of power struggle with the involvement of regional and non-regional states suchas the USA, Israel, Iran, Britain, Jordan and Syria for varying purposes at varyingtimes. Eventually it was translated into a test case for the endurance of d�etente, espe-cially after direct involvement by the US. Whereas external players were keen on mak-ing the Iraqi Kurds a bargaining chip in their power struggle, Iraqi Kurds themselveswere also willing to make the best for their cause out of this Cold War competitionwhether on the regional or international level. Ideological differences between the blocleaders did not stop the Kurds from asking for US or USSR support according to thechanging state of relations between Baghdad and the bloc leaders. Encouraged by theCold War polarization and direct military assistance received from outside forces, Bar-zani believed that he could resist Baghdad’s attempt to impose its own version of an au-tonomy deal despite the 1970 deal. It was soon clear that the Kurds would be in need ofmassive outside aid and perhaps a much longer time to cope with Baghdad to gain theautonomy which they had sought under the 1970 autonomy agreement.

After the Ba‘thists came to power under Hassan al-Bakr in 1968, Turkey had sec-ond thoughts about both the 1970 autonomy agreement and the Soviet–Iraq treaty of1972. However, it was not prepared to take an anti-Iraqi position right away for anyof these developments. When the Ba‘th administration decided to give Iraqi Kurds au-tonomy on 11 March 1970 in order to ensure its consolidation of power, Turkey wasmoving towards the extraordinary political circumstances which would result in the12 March 1971 military intervention. At the time of the March autonomy declaration,a centre-right party, the Justice Party (Adalet Partisi), under Suleyman Demirel was inpower. The Demirel government was weak as the party had lost a significant numberof votes in the 1969 elections. The economy was undergoing difficulties and the politi-cal setting was seriously disturbed by unrest among workers, students and protests atuniversities. Mounting extremism across all ideological spectrums, especially on theleft, became militarized and reached a very critical stage. Following the Cyprus crisisin 1964, anti-Americanism gained momentum and was reflected by massive demon-strations and the kidnap of some American personnel serving in Turkey. Political in-stability and turmoil in the country became an excuse for an army intervention inpolitics on 12 March 1971. A military-backed government of technocrats under PrimeMinister Nihat Erim assumed power following this. Parliament was not abolished,but the government of technocrats would not function well enough under the shadowof the military until true civilian government came to power following the 1973 Octo-ber elections.

While Turkey was in search of stability in the early 1970s, Ba‘thist Iraq madeits most significant step towards Kurdish autonomy since the very short-lived 1966autonomy declaration by Prime Minister Abd al-Rahman al-Bazzaz. Baghdad recog-nized the Kurds’ right to have their own administration and to acquire some

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cultural, political and educational rights on the basis of decentralization. In contrastto what was happening in Iraq, the Kurdish question in Turkey at the time was nei-ther a question of identity nor an ethno-political demand for recognition, but mainly‘a problem of traditional, tribal and pre-modern reaction to modernity’.35 For yearsofficial statements had reiterated this point of view, presenting and considering theproblem solely as a question of underdevelopment. For example, this was very clearin the 1965 programme of the Demirel government. The programme stated that ‘inmany parts of the country, particularly in Eastern and Southern Anatolia, there aregreat differences in life styles and living conditions. We must ensure the prosperity ofour people living in poor regions, create jobs for them and build infrastructure andindustrial facilities to this end’. This point of view was confirmed once again in the1969 programme and continued to be in place in the following years’ programmestoo.36

The overtures the Ba‘th party made towards the Kurds in March 1970 had no par-allel in Turkey. In Ankara, the 1970 autonomy deal was received cautiously, as wasthe case in 1966. When Iraqi Prime Minister al-Bazzaz had declared his government’sreadiness to recognize Kurdish national rights in a de-centralized form of administra-tion in the Kurdish areas of Iraq on 15 June 1966, Turkey saw it as a step by the Iraqigovernment to ensure its national unity.37 Relying on its cordial relations Ankarathought that Iraq would not allow the developments in 1966 to go far enough to upsetTurkey. Nonetheless Turkey took some precautions such as closing its border withIraq. The National Security Council also decided that the activities of Kurds in 16provinces should be closely monitored and that cultural and economic developmentsin these areas be accelerated. At the time Ankara also paid attention to the possibleadverse influence of the Kurdish public campaign in Europe and the US over itsKurds. On 27 February 1968 Foreign Minister _Ihsan Sabri Ca�glayangil sent a circularto the Turkish diplomatic missions warning them against growing Kurdish propagan-da aimed at dismembering Turkey.38 Meanwhile, in the 1960s the governments werevery concerned about the entry into the country of any book written in Kurdish orabout the Kurds. This would continue into the 1970s.39

Against this backdrop, Ankara refrained from giving a clear and direct reaction tothe 1970 autonomy agreement. When the agreement was announced, Turkey issuedno official declaration in response. Apparently, Turkey once more preferred publiclyto interpret the 11 March declaration as a domestic Iraqi affair and seemingly over-looked any of its transnational character. Ankara was not alone in seeing the autono-my agreement as a domestic affair since Iran and the USA also reacted in the samemanner. In the meantime the Iraqi Kurds were also careful not to alarm the Turksover the declaration of autonomy.

News of the Kurdish autonomy agreement was not widely and comprehensivelyreported in the Turkish press, especially not the agreement itself.40 However,the Turkish press did report in April 1970 that Barzani had made a statement to theal-Akhbar newspaper, published in Cairo, stating that Iraqi Kurds had no connectionwith the Kurds in Iran or in Turkey.41 As the Kurds were assuring the Turks abouttheir Iraq-centred, limited objectives, there was no sign of worsening Turkish–Iraqirelations over the autonomy agreement. Mutual visits between Ankara and Baghdadwere in full swing. On 25 June 1970, Iraqi President Bakr visited Ankara and heldtalks with the Turkish leaders, which included the Kurdish issue.42 The following

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month Turkish Foreign Minister Ca�glayangil paid a state visit to Baghdad. The visitsuggests that there was no significant change in relations between the two countriessoon after the autonomy deal. During Ca�glayangil’s visit, particular emphasis wasput on the economic aspect of relations, and negotiations were held on the transporta-tion of Iraqi oil in collaboration with Turkey. A year later, Ankara’s reaction to the1970 autonomy agreement was to take a more robust line after the military-backedgovernment came to power on 12 March 1971.

The autonomy agreement of 11 March 1970 in Iraq corresponded to the timewhen urbanized, educated members of Turkey’s Kurds were becoming more politi-cized than ever before within leftist groups, especially in the more tolerant politicalatmosphere following the 1961 constitution. By the late 1960s, they gradually startedto differentiate themselves within the Turkish leftist movement. Until then, alongwith many non-Kurds, the Kurds had considered the eastern question in Turkeyonly in terms of regional, social and economic inequality. However, towards the endof the 1960s, some Kurds started to make reference to ethnic inequality in politics,and difficulties in exercising cultural and educational rights. In 1967, a series of meet-ings, the so-called Eastern Meetings (Do�gu Mitingleri) were held in various south-eastern cities and Ankara in order to draw attention to the problems of eastern Tur-key.43 In 1969, the first legal Kurdish organization, the Revolutionary Eastern Cul-ture Association (Devrimci Do�gu K€ult€ur Derne�gi), was founded in Ankara. Most ofthe members were Turkish Workers Party (T€urkiye _Isci Partisi, TIP) supporters. TIPwas then a leading political player in the Kurdish issue. At its fourth Congress in1970, the party adopted a text that recognized Kurds as a nation in themselves andcriticized the oppressive measures taken against Kurds. This meant that TIP was thefirst legal political party to publicly recognize the existence of Kurds in Turkey. Areference to the possibility of a country with two peoples was for the first timebrought up in Turkey within the limited political framework of a leftist party. AfterTIP openly raised the issue, its relationship with the Kurds happened to be one ofthe causes of military intervention in Turkey in March 1971. Besides the Kurds with-in the leftist movement, there was a much smaller Kurdish group in Turkey, that hadbeen directly inspired by the Barzani movement in Iraq. In 1965 this group set up theKDP in Turkey (T-KDP), modelled on the Iraq KDP, and collaborated with theIraqi and Syrian KDPs. It was clandestine and therefore had a limited number ofmembers. It remained marginal, but at the same time displayed the dual character ofKurdish politics in Turkey. The party represented a structure in the Barzani line,that is to say, somewhat conservative, respectful of the old form of charismatic triballeadership. On the other hand, the majority of politicized Kurds in Turkey were notready to accept such a pattern while expressing themselves as part of the leftist move-ment. Apart from T-KDP, another marginal influence of the Barzani movement wasobserved in the rise of cross-border activities and the modest logistical and financialsupport extended to Barzani by some Kurds.44 It was occasionally reported thatsmall Kurdish groups from Turkey secretly crossed the border to join the Barzaniforces. Basic necessities such as tea and sugar were also reported as being sent toIraqi Kurds from the Kurds in Turkey when border controls were loosened on theTurkish side of the border.45

After its initial, reserved reaction to the 1970 autonomy agreement by the Demirelgovernment, the military-backed government expressed more concern and increased

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security measures in the east of Turkey. In a statement on 30 April 1971, Ismail Arar,the minister of justice in the Erim government, declared the Kurdish issue to be one ofthe four dangers to the Republic of Turkey, which had made the 12 March coup inevi-table. These were the extreme leftists, urban guerrillas, the extreme rightists and even-tually the pro-Kurdish organizations who were trying to carve out a nationalterritory.46 In April 1971, the Turkish army was put on the alert in Kurdish areas. Inthe same month, a state of emergency was declared in 11 provinces includingDiyarbakır where large numbers of Turkish citizens of Kurdish origin live.47 Seventypeople were given jail terms for separatist activities in Diyarbakır.48 The DevrimciDo�gu Kültür Derne�gi (DDKD) was outlawed on 27 April 1971 and then in October1971 TIP was banned because of its identification of the Kurds as a separate ethnicgroup. After the 1971 military intervention, T-KDP members were also sued on thegrounds that they had exhibited a hostile attitude against a foreign country in such away as to cause the relations of Turkey with that country, namely Iraq, to deterioratewithout obtaining the consent of the Turkish government.49

It was not only the Erim government that reacted severely towards the regions witha Kurdish majority or their leftist partners, but the possibility of interaction betweenborder Kurds and the Kurds of Turkey was more seriously discussed during thattime. In April 1971, Justice Minister Arar stated that ‘there is a Kurdish nationalistmovement that provokes the people of the eastern provinces to cut them off from Tur-key as an independent state’. ‘It is Barzani’s intention to intervene in Turkey’, headded.50 The next day it was stated by the prime minister that the minister’s wordswere misunderstood. The interference of the prime minister mainly originated fromthe sensitivity Ankara held about the Kurdish issue even at the time of negligibleKurdish mobilization in the country. Prime Minister Nihat Erim stated that, ‘We canrecognise in Turkey only the existence of the Turkish nation. Our people living in var-ious regions are happy to be Turkish and did not ask for support from anybody to cutthemselves off from Turkey.’51 The prime minister wanted to put on a brave face rath-er than express real concern or any sign of interconnection with the Kurdish situationin Iraq. In an interview with the BBC, Prime Minister Erim said that the Kurdishquestion was not an actual problem, but ‘a potential problem’.52 His interpretationmost probably resulted from a desire to disguise any problem relating to the Kurds.There was also some truth in his statement that there was no serious threatening levelof Kurdish upheaval at the time. This was confirmed in several British and Americandiplomatic dispatches.53

The American Consulate in Adana reported to the State Department on 24 March1971, soon after the military intervention, that ‘there is no convincing indication thatTurkish–Kurdish relations between the two peoples have deteriorated in recentyears’.54 He added that:

Turkish apprehensions over a possible Kurdish insurgency increased dramatical-ly with the inception of Barzani’s revolt in northern Iraq. Turkish authorities arereported to feel that the region’s bandits have become Barzani foraging partieswhile the smugglers were transformed into his logical command. This seemsa bit extravagant to us. While there is no doubt that the revolt in Iraq hasattracted considerable interest and even some recruits, it is possible that many ofTurkey’s Kurds regard Barzani as nothing more than another of their grand

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bandit chiefs. A Kurdish student, who has been known to the Consulate for twoyears, told us that while there is a great deal of interest in the Kurdish revoltamong his villagers – and the majority of the young men have made a long tripfrom Adiyaman to Iraq to get a first-hand view of the conflict – most of hisfriends regard the political aspects of the campaign as irrelevant. For better orworse, he says, they feel that their future is tied to the Turkish nation. While theyare frequently irritated by Turkish heavy-handed actions and sometimes made tofeel a foreigner in their own land, they see no possible advantage in tying theirfates to an impoverished Kurdistan based in the barren Iraqi hills.55

Taking all this into account, even though Turkey was increasingly uneasy with grow-ing interest in the Iraqi Kurds, it was not so alarmed as to make a dramatic shift in itsKurdish policy or the state of its relations with any interested state in the wake of the1971 autonomy deal. It is not clear how aware Turkey was of the level of Iranian orUS involvement in supporting the Iraqi Kurds, but Ankara at least knew some of it, ifnot its entirety. Previously, when Turkey learnt of Iran’s initial contacts with the IraqiKurds in the 1960s, Turkish officials were privately critical of the Iranian position.56

In the light of former Iranian attitudes over the Kurds, Ankara possibly had no diffi-culty in being convinced of Iranian support for the Kurds in the early 1970s. Theworld press also widely reported Iranian involvement, leaving no doubt about it.Iran’s assistance to the Kurds therefore became an open secret. Especially after theBaghdad–Barzani talks over autonomy reached a dead end, the Iraqis themselves alsoopenly condemned outside assistance to the Kurds. For example, at the Eighth Re-gional Ba‘th Party Congress in January 1974 President Bakr accused certain Kurdishgroups of ‘openly cooperating with the reactionary states and imperialist forces in thearea to weaken and destroy the party’ and their administration, without naming theinterfering countries.57 His deputy Saddam Hussein was even more open about rela-tions between Barzani and outside forces, namely Iran and the US. In his interviewwith a group of Arab journalists in April 1974, he referred to a political report datedNovember 1972 where the Iranian and American assistance to the Kurds was men-tioned.58 He accordingly declared that:

We would wish to tell the subversives and others as well that if Iran possessedarms, we also have a far more effective weapon. In technical terms, ours is not atraditional weapon. Traditional weapons could be ‘purchased’ by the Iranian au-thorities from western markets, but they cannot purchase belief in them and intheir policies.59

In the bilateral talks with the Turks, the Iraqis also directly told the Turkish sideabout the Iranian involvement.60 There are therefore strong signs that Ankara wasaware of Iran’s assistance to the Kurds from the very beginning. On the otherhand, how much Turkey knew about the US involvement is not as clear as that of theIranians. In the past Ankara had sometimes suspected US and British involvementwith the Iraqi Kurds.61 For example, in February 1966 this issue of involvement wasraised by the Turkish General Staff, the Chief of Intelligence Sezai Orkut. In hisinterview with the British defence attach�e, Orkut expressed his conviction that theIranians together with the British and the Americans were helping the Kurds in

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several ways and felt the need to say he was ‘equally convinced that the Turkish Armycould keep the Kurds in Turkey under control’.62 At the time both the British andAmericans rejected the suggestion that they had been supporting the Kurds in Iraq.In the 1970s, knowing the closeness between Iran and the US, Ankara was possiblyaware of US approval of Iran’s aid to the Kurds and had strong suspicions.

Meanwhile Washington did its best not to make its involvement a matter of uneasein its relations with Turkey. The Americans knew how sensitive the Turks had beenabout any contact with Barzani. When CIA officials and Barzani’s representativesmet in the summer of 1972, the Kurdish side assured the Americans of Barzani’s spe-cial interest in preventing the Kurds in Turkey and Iran from being engaged in directconflict with their respective governments. In that context, they said ‘they were readyto sign any border guarantees desired by either the Turks or the Iranians’.63 Barzaniwas also warned by the US ‘to avoid dramatic moves that might trigger an all-outIraqi assault, such as declaring a separate Kurdish state’.64 The Kurdish leader wasaccordingly careful about taking the Turkish position into account. Like the US, Iranwas attentive to Ankara’s concerns. Being a CENTO (Central Treaty Organization)ally and a state with a Kurdish population, it was out of the question for Iran to allowthe Kurdish issue to get out of hand and lead to real independence with the resultingthreats for itself and Turkey. Turkish–Iranian relations had generally been good. Inaddition to their ongoing strategic cooperation in CENTO, they, together with Paki-stan, also took a more independent regional initiative to advance economic relationsand back in 1964 had set up a regional economic organization, RCO (Regional Coop-eration Organization). They had already engaged in various economic projects likethe Iranian–Turkish oil pipeline, and rail and road connections. Iranians were keenfor Turkey to be a stable country to do business with and cooperate with on variousissues. Iran even called for the US to assist Turkish stability as the radical left acceler-ated its influence.65 The rise of Iran in the region as the leading ally of the US, andIran’s assistance to the Kurds caused periodic misgivings, but overall relations gener-ally remained cordial. All sorts of contacts between the two neighbouring statesremained in place. For example, in 1971 Turkey was represented at the highest levelin the shah’s lavish celebrations for the 2500th anniversary of the monarchy by the at-tendance of Turkish President Cevdet Sunay.

Realizing that its allies’ support (even if not sure about its scale) to the Kurds inIraq was confined to the objective of pressurizing Iraq rather than achieving genuineKurdish independence, Turkey did not seem too much troubled. Along with these,cordial relations with the Soviet Union and Iraq also reassured Ankara regardingKurdish developments in neighbouring Iraq. Even after the 1972 Iraq–Soviet treaty,Turkey did not feel an imminent necessity to join in an anti-Iraq bloc spearheaded byIran. Ankara was not happy with the rapprochement between Baghdad andMoscow, but it did not perceive any danger of them supporting the Kurds. At thisjuncture, the Soviets ensured their treaty with Baghdad was not conceived as being atthe expense of Iraq’s neighbours. Just after the treaty with Baghdad, on 11–18 April1972, Nikolai Podgorny visited Ankara and proposed the conclusion of a similarfriendship and cooperation treaty with Turkey. No treaty was then concluded, but aneight-point declaration of friendship was issued after the visit.66 Relations were to be‘based on good neighbourliness and cooperation’ and ‘respect for territorial integrity,equality and non-interference in internal affairs’.67 This was not a radical shift in

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Turkish foreign policy but a good sign of cordiality in relations. Despite cordiality,Ankara was careful not to give the impression of being relaxed about the Soviet–Iraqirapprochement to its western allies. The Turkish ambassador to London, HalukBay€ulken, expressed his country’s concern about the Baghdad–Moscow axis to theBritish foreign secretary pointing out that ‘Turkey felt . . . in a sense badly surrounded,despite President Podgorny’s assurances that Russia was giving Iraq and Syria onlyweapons suitable for their national defence and nothing modern’.68 It seems that evenduring the period of detente and good neighbourly relations with Iraq and the Soviets,Ankara wanted to be assured about western interests in its security and surroundingsdespite its neutral position with regard to the Kurdish dispute in Iraq.

By 1974 problems over the implementation of the 1970 agreement reached its peakin Iraq. Four years after the offer of autonomy, the talks between Baghdad and Bar-zani brought about no final settlement. Instead, the Ba‘th administration unilaterallyannounced its new plan for the governance of the Kurdish region on 11 March 1974.This fell far short of Barzani’s demands because it did not cede Kirkuk to the Kurdsand, more critically, it introduced a more central government control over the regionextended to the Kurds under the March understanding.69

In the autumn of 1974, the Iraqi offensive against the Kurds was in full swingand therefore urgent Kurdish appeals for additional assistance were pouring intoWashington DC and other western capitals. At the time the US increasingly adoptedthe view that this Iranian-supported Kurdish–Iraqi war should be stopped. This viewwas reflected in reports coming from US officials in Tehran as well. Iranians alsocame to the same decision but separately and secretly. Without asking theAmericans first, Tehran engaged in a deal with the Iraqis. In view of this, Barzani’sappeal for further assistance fell on deaf ears and thereafter he had to deal with thechange of mind in Tehran and Washington. The critical figure in the decision to aidthe Iraqi Kurds, Kissinger, was eventually to say ‘covert action should not be con-fused with missionary work’.70 The US change of mind was to be an even furthershock to Barzani since the Kurdish leader had, on numerous occasions, expressedhis distrust of Iranians and the other allies but not the Americans. He even assertedthat if his cause were successful he was ready to become the fifty-first state.71 Un-known to Barzani, negotiations began between Tehran and Baghdad. In March1975, Iran and Iraq agreed to resolve their differences in Algiers. The Iraqis backeddown and made a concession by giving up their control of the Shatt al-Arab water-way. Instead they recognized the thalweg (deepest channel) principle concerning sov-ereignty over it. The outcome was a blow to Barzani and his followers. In March1975, $16 million of US aid to the Kurds was cut off and the Kurdish revolt wassmashed; 200,000 Kurds became refugees and no adequate aid was extended to themby either the US or Iran.72 It was reported that Iran ‘forcibly’ returned 40,000 refu-gees to Iraq.73

While the internationally backed Kurdish insurgency was on the brink of collapsewhen no agreement was secured in 1974, Ankara took some precautionary steps. Mili-tary exercises along the border with Iraq were held.74 Turkey closed the borders withIraq on 14 March 1974. This was received with appreciation in Baghdad.75 The clo-sure of the border was of great help to the Iraqis. In May 1974 Shealy Tekha, the sec-retary-general of the Iraqi Ministry of Foreign Affairs, brought a message toPresident Fahri Korut€urk on this issue. After complaining about the outside aid to

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Barzani from abroad and from Iran, he expressed appreciation of Turkey’s impartiali-ty. He offered compensation for the deaths and damage caused in Turkey by Iraqibombing and also requested the return of Kurds who had taken refuge in Turkey.76

In the course of the Baghdad–Kurdish confrontation some Turkish villages on theborder were accidentally bombed. However, for the sake of Baghdad–Ankara solidar-ity Turkey did not make this a big issue in relations. This had been Turkey’s generalattitude over border violations pertaining to the Kurds over the years. In addition tothe joint stand over the Kurdish issue, Ankara’s general foreign policy attitude of im-proving relations with the Arab world from the mid-1960s onwards also played a sig-nificant part in Ankara’s smooth handling of Baghdad. In the 1967 and 1973 Arab–Israeli wars, Ankara tipped the balance towards the Arabs and did not allow the useof the Incirlik base in Adana by the Americans assisting Israel. To get Arab supportover the Cyprus issue was then crucial in the absence of western support. Moreover,being one of the countries badly affected by the 1973 oil crisis, it was imperative to beon good terms with Arab countries like Iraq. In the first half of the 1970s, Turkeysigned important oil transportation treaties with Iraq.

The Algiers deal between Baghdad and Tehran in March 1975 was not a regrettabledevelopment for Turkey. Following the decision to halt support for the Iraqi Kurds,Istanbul initially became the venue for early talks between Iraq and Iran. Iraq in par-ticular wanted Istanbul to be the place of Iraq–Iran negotiations.77 The foreign minis-ters of both sides came together in Istanbul between 16 and 20 January 1975.78 Nofinal decision was reached, but the Istanbul meeting displayed Ankara as being ac-cepted as a neutral party in the Iraqi–Iranian disputes. Soon after the defeat of theBarzani forces became apparent, on 26 March 1975, the Council of Ministers, on therecommendation of the National Security Council, imposed martial law in Hakkari,Mardin, Siirt and Diyarbakır against any possible refugee crisis or transborder activi-ties.79 At the time of the Algiers agreement, Turkey was preoccupied with the Cyprusdispute and its wide-ranging consequences. A few months after the full-scale outbreakof war between Baghdad and Barzani in March 1974, Turkey engaged in a militarycampaign on Cyprus to safeguard the Turkish Cypriots against the new Greek regimeon the island. July 1974, when the Ecevit–Erbakan coalition took a decision to inter-vene in the island, was the start of a troublesome period in US–Turkish relations. Tur-key was condemned by its western allies over Cyprus and put under a US armsembargo.80 The paradox at the time was that whereas Ankara was dealing with theUS embargo, it learned all the details of Washington’s secret military assistance to theKurds following revelations through the Pike Report in 1976. The report was part ofthe secret, unknown account of covert operations in the Nixon period, but also clari-fied another breach of consensus in the Ankara–Washington Axis despite its rathermarginal nature.

In the 1970s nobody seemed to look at the Kurdish dispute in Iraq from a democ-ratization or human rights standpoint, but regarded it predominantly as having in-strumental motives like bloc interests, ideological rivalry or the regional balance ofpower. Ethnic issues and human rights concerns were not in the limelight of interna-tional politics during the Cold War years unless they were of use to keep the balanceof power or deal with the challenges to the then existing status quo. The attitude ofoutsiders to the Iraqi Kurds were conditioned by the state of Baghdad’s relationswith the US and the Soviet Union or Baghdad’s standing in Middle East politics on

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the side of pro- or anti-western actors. Outside support for the Kurds did not comeout of sympathy for the Iraqi Kurds, but mainly on the grounds of Iran’s bid for re-gional dominance through undermining its main rival, Iraq. Then the dispute overthe Kurds at the regional level was to be turned into a Cold War competition, withthe US and the Soviets undertaking to back their respective allies, Iraq and Iran. De-spite the predominance of power politics, Iran or US involvement in Iraqi politics viathe Iraq Kurds was still not commonly accepted or well-received behaviour inthe international arena. A state’s sovereign rights over its domestic matters, like theKurdish issue, was then seen as absolute and taken for granted. To see Iran or theUS getting deeply involved in Iraqi politics through the Kurds was not particularlyin line with the then state-centred character of international relations in general. Inthe meantime Turkey did not like seeing the Kurdish issue coming to the fore in in-ternational politics for whatever purposes. Nonetheless, as long as it was confined tothe Cold War struggle, not extended to ethnic politics by the safeguarding of Kurd-ish ethnic separatism, cultural rights or asking for any change of position from Tur-key over the issue, all the developments with respect to the Iraqi Kurds seemedbearable from the Turkish standpoint.

Turkey saw the Kurdish–Baghdad confrontation throughout the 1960s and early1970s as part of the Cold War confrontation and therefore was able to overlook itspossible implications for its own Kurds, especially in view of the assurances extendedto it by its involved allies and Barzani himself. International conjuncture, relationswith allies and domestic politics led Turkey to stand aloof from the internationaliza-tion of the Kurdish insurgency in Iraq and subsequently it was able to remain neutraland calm about its spill-over effects.

Notes

I would like to express my deepest gratitude to Professor Anne Deighton of Wolfson College, OxfordUniversity for her invaluable support and encouragement in the preparation of this article.

1. There is no reliable exact data as regards the Turkish citizens of the Kurdish origin then and now. Thisis also true for the Kurdish population in other countries as well. No census identfying ethnicity hasbeen held in Turkey since 1965. Therefore estimates vary. Martin Bruinessen estimated the Kurdishpopulation at 19 per cent in 1975. On the other hand some much later estimates give the rate as differ-ent as between 6.2 and 12 per cent in 1990. See the references in Kemal Kirisci and Gareth M.Winrow, K€urt Sorunu – K€okeni ve Gelisimi (_Istanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1997), pp.123–24.

2. There were two autonomy agreements, in 1966 and 1970. Both autonomy agreements promised theKurds a better political and cultural standing in a de-centralized state system, especially in the Kurdishmajority areas. The 1970 agreement recognized that Iraq consisted of two peoples, Arabs and Kurds.It secured an autonomous Kurdish administration in the north and education in Kurdish where therewas a Kurdish majority. It was also agreed that the Kurds would be given significant positions in thenational government and the control of three important oil zones in northern Iraq should be given toKurds as of 1974. Despite these extensive rights given to the Kurds in the treaty, disagreement over itsimplementation would soon arise. Not all the Kurds were followers of Barzani and his party, the Kur-distan Democratic Party (KDP), from the foundation of the party in 1946. However, by the 1960sMustafa Barzani gradually personified the movement in Iraq and became the unchallanged leader un-til his death. During the critical developments of 1972, Barzani’s prestige among the Kurds had neverbeen higher. Not only the former rival tribes like the Lolans and the Harkis, but all the factions withinthe KDP also came behind his leadership. In addition to tribal rivalries, a division existed within theKurdish movement between the tribal elements led by Barzani and the left-wing urbanized groups ledby Jalal Talabani and Ibrahim Ahmad came to an end under his leadership, at least for a while.

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3. R. Cooper and M. Berdal, ‘Outside Intervention in Ethnic Conflicts’, Survival, Vol.35, No.1 (1993),p.134; A. Suhrke and L.G. Noble, Ethnic Conflict in International Relations (New York: Praeger,1977), p.12.

4. There are generally two interpretations regarding the ‘internationalization’ of the Kurdish issue. Forsome the Kurdish conflict became internationalized as the Kurds received foreign assistance, as wasthe case in Iraq during the 1960s and 1970s. Others argue that the Kurdish issue has naturally beeninternationalized given that the Kurds have always been scattered accross more than one country; seeR. Premdas, ‘The Internationalization of Ethnic Conflict: Some Theoretical Explorations’, in K.M deSilva and R.J. May (eds.), Internationalization of Ethnic Conflict (London: Pinter, 1991), p.11; RupenCetinyan, ‘Ethnic Bargaining in the Shadow of Thirty-Party Intervention’, International Organization,Vol.56, No.3 (2002), p.649. In this article the first definition of ‘internationalization’ of the ethnic con-flict was preferred to explain the outside intervention in Kurdish politics in Iraq. More to the point,the term intervention here is used to refer any military or economic interference in a foreign countryaimed at altering the balance of power between a government and an ethnic group.

5. S.M. Saideman, ‘Discrimination in International Relations: Analysing External Support of EthnicGroups’, Journal of Peace Research, Vol.39, No.1 (2002), p.29. Stephen Saideman backs his argumentby looking into the foreign policies of some African countries with serious ethnic vulnerability ques-tions. Nevertheless, he says one should also take other factors into account because ethnic ties or rela-tive power/security concerns can influence the international relations of ethnic conflict more thanvulnerability. See ibid.; S.M. Saideman, The Ties That Divide – Ethnic Politics, Foreign Policy and In-ternational Conflict (New York: Colombia University Press, 2001).

6. D. Woodwell, ‘Unwelcome Neighbours: Shared Ethnicity and International Conflict During the ColdWar’, International Studies Quarterly, Vol.48, No.1 (2004), p.204.

7. D. Carment, ‘The International Dimensions of Ethnic Conflict: Concepts, Indicators and Theory’,Journal of Peace Research, Vol.30, No.2 (1993), pp.137–50; A. Heraclides, ‘Secessionist Minoritiesand External Involvement’, International Organization, Vol.44, No.3 (1990), pp.341–78.

8. D.R. Davis and W.H. Moore, ‘Ethnicity Matters: Transnational Ethnic Alliances and Foreign PolicyBehaviour’, International Studies Quarterly, Vol.41, No.1 (1997), p.174; P.F. Trumbore, ‘Victims orAgressors? Ethno-Political Rebellion and Use of Force in Militarized Interstate Disputes’, Internation-al Studies Quarterly, Vol.47, No.2 (2003), p.187.

9. Astri and Noble, ‘Ethnic Conflict in Interational Relations’, p.10; D. Carment, ‘The International Di-mension of Ethnic Conflict: Concepts, Indicators and Theory’, Journal of Peace Research, Vol.30,No.2 (1993), p.139.

10. Cooper and Berdal, ‘Outside Intervention in Ethnic Conflicts’, p.120.11. R.O. Freedman, Soviet Policy Toward the Middle East Since 1970 (New York: Praeger Publishers,

1975), p.70.12. O.M. Smolansky and B.M. Smolansky, The USSR and Iraq: The Soviet Quest for Influence (Durham

NC: Duke University Press, 1991), p.19.13. J.M. Landau, ‘The Kurds in Some Soviet Works’, Middle Eastern Studies, Vol.11, No.2 (1975),

p.195.14. H. Shemesh, Soviet–Iraqi Relations 1968–88 – In the Shadow of the Iraq–Iran conflict (London: Lynne

Rienner, 1992), p.46. With the signature of the 1972 treaty Iraq became the second Arab state, alongwith Egypt with whom the Soviets signed such a Friendship treaty in the Middle East.

15. Summary, Foreign Relations of the United States, (henceforth) FRUS 1969–72, Vol.E-4, Documentson Iraq–Iran, http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve04

16. The 1972 Soviet–Iraqi treaty became an important element in convincing the US to assist the Kurds.See C. Tripp, ‘Iraq’, in Y. Sayigh and A. Shlaim (eds.), The Cold War and the Middle East (Oxford:Clarendon Press, 1997); O.M Smolonsky and B.M. Smolonsky, The USSR and Iraq (Durham NC:Duke University Press, 1991); CIA – The Pike Report (Nottingham: Spokesman Books, 1977).

17. Memorandum, Assistance to Iraqi Kurdish Leader Mulla Mustafa Barzani, 18 July 1972, FRUS,1969–72.

18. Airgram222, From the Embassy in Lebanon to the Department of State, Request from MustafaBarzani for Clandestine Contact with USG, 16 July 1971, FRUS 1969–72.

19. H. Kissinger, Years of Renewal (New York: Touchstone Books, 1999), p.579.20. Ibid., p.582.

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21. Memorandum of Conversation, The White House, The Oval Office, Washington, 31 Oct. 1975, USDeclassified Documentary Reference System (DDRS).

22. Doc.319 Memorandum of Conversation, Washington Meetings with Kurdish Representatives, 5 July1972, FRUS 1969–72, Vol E-4, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/nixon/e4/69747.htm.

23. Ibid.24. Ibid.25. New York Times, 15 Oct. 1976.26. The Pike Report, pp.9–12.27. Doc.319 Memorandum of Conversation, Washington Meetings with Kurdish Representatives, 5 July

1972, FRUS 1969–76, Documents on Iraq–Iran 1969–72.28. Kissinger, Years of Renewal, p.584. In 1972, other than the US assistance, Israeli, British and Iranian

assistance for the Kurds reached $1 million a month.29. J.A. Bill, The Eagle and the Lion – The Tragedy of American-Iranian Relations (New Haven, CT: Yale

University Press, 1988), p.198.30. G. Harris, ‘Ethnic Conflict and the Kurds’, Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social

Science, Vol.433, No.1 (1977), p.112.31. Special National Intelligence Estimate 34–70, Iran’s International Position, 3 Sept. 1970, US Declassi-

fied Documentary Reference System.32. Jerusalem Post, 18 Feb. 1999.

Israel’s clandestine relations with the Kurds were not officially acknowledged until Prime MinisterMenachem Begin revealed them in 1980.

33. I. Black and B. Morris, Israel’s Secret Wars – A History of Israel’s Intelligence Services (New York:Grove Weidenfeld, 1991), p.328.

34. Jerusalem Post, 4 April 1991.35. F. Keyman, ‘Articulating Citizenship and _Identity – The Kurdish Question’, in F. Keyman and

A. _Icduygu (eds.), Change in a Global World: European Questions and Turkish Experiences (London:Routledge, 2005), pp.278–9.

36. M. S€onmez, Do�gu Anadolu’nun Hikayesi – K€urtler-Ekonomik and Sosyal Tarih (Ankara: ArkadasYayınevi, 1992), p.153.

37. Dennis Allen to Stewart, Visit to Turkey by the Prime Minister of Iraq, 14 July 1966, FO371/186757,National Archives of the UK (henceforth UKNA).

38. B. Ôimsir, K€urtc€ul€uk II 1924–1999 (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 2009), pp.576–7.39. Bakanlar Kurulu Kararnamesi, 8 March 1971, ‘_Isvicre ve _Isvec’te basılan K€urtc€ul€uk propogandası

yapan kitap ve dergilerin T€urkiye’ye sokulmasının ve da�gıtılmasının yasaklanması’, 30.18.1.2/262.14.11, Bakanlar Kurulu Kararnamesi, 9 December 1960, ‘K€urdistan Demokrat Partisi tarafındanyayınlanmakta olan Hebat-Ennidal adlı gazetenin yurda sokulmasının yasak edilmesi’, 30.18.1.2157.26.18, T.C. Basbakanlık Devlet Arsivleri Genel M€ud€url€u�g€u – Cumhuriyet Arsivi. The GeneralDirectorate of Turkish State Archives –Directorate of the Republican Archives (DRA).

40. R.G. Short, Ankara to P.R. Fearn, Southern European Department, 25 March 1970, FCO17/1237.41. Cumhuriyet, 8 April 1970.42. Memorandum, Attachment B, 18 July 1972, Prospects and Problems of Assistance to the Kurds,

FRUS 1969–72.43. K. Kirisci and G.M. Winrow, K€urt Sorunu – K€okeni ve Gelisimi (Istanbul: Tarih VakfıYurt Yayınları,

1997), p.115.44. M. Bruinessen, K€urdistan €Uzerine Yazılar (Istanbul: _Iletisim Yayıncılık, 1993), p.297.45. N. Kutlay, 21. Y€uzyıla Girerken K€urtler (Istanbul: Peri Yayınları, 2002), p.565. At the time of the US,

Iran support to the Iraqi Kurds became firm in the year 1972 and 1973 some diplomatic dispatchesreported Turkey’s loosening the border control with Iraq. See FCO 19/1605, 17 Nov. 1972.

46. R.W. Olson, ‘Al-Fatah in Turkey: Its Influence on the March 12 Coup’,Middle Eastern Studies,Vol.9,No.2 (1973), p.202.

47. H€urriyet (Turkish Daily), 27 April 1971.48. The Washington Post, 14 Dec. 1972.49. H.G€oktas, K€urtler II –Mehabad’dan 12 Eyl€ul ‘e (Istanbul: Alan Yayıncılık, 1991), p.117.50. H€urriyet, 29 April 1971.51. Milliyet (Turkish Daily), May 1971.52. Sarell, Ankara to FCO, Kurdish Situation, 8 May 1971, FCO9/1467.

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53. B.R. Berry, Ankara to E.E. Orchard, Research Department, FCO, The Kurdish Problem in Iraq,1963–71, 19 Oct. 1971; Report by Daniel O. Newberry, ‘Turkish Kurdistan’, dated 24 March 1971, inR.N. Bali, Turkey in the 1960s and 1970s – Through the Reports of American Diplomats (Istanbul:Libra Kitapcılık, 2010), p.238.

54. Report by D.O. Newberry, ‘Turkish Kurdistan’, p.238.55. Ibid., p.239. The reports of American diplomats do not reflect consistency about the Kurds or

Barzani posing any threat to Turkish political and territorial integrity in the 1960s and 1970s. In the re-port quoted in the text, Barzani was overlooked as any threat to Turkey in 1971. However, early in Oc-tober 1965 a report sent from Ankara to the State Department had stated that ‘it would seem that onewas not going very far out on a limb to suggest that Kurdish nationalism does pose a threat to the in-tegrity of Turkey as now constituted, and to suggest that should Barzani succeed in establishing an au-tonomous Kurdish area in Iraq, there are likely to be renewed separatist pressures north of theborder’. See Report by Robert S. Dillon, ‘Field Trip to Southeastern Turkey’, dated 19 Oct. 1965, inBali, Turkey in the 1960s and 1970s, p.228.

56. Denis Allen to Mr. Stewart, Visit to Turkey by the Prime Minister of Iraq, 14 July 1966, FO371/186757.

57. Revolutionary Iraq 1968–73, The Political Report Adopted by the Eighth Regional Congress of theArab Ba‘th Socialist Party – Iraq, January 1974, p.106.

58. Saddam Hussein on Current Affairs, Talks delivered by Saddam Hussein on Several Occasions be-tween September 1973 and April 1974, Ath-Thawra Publications, Baghdad, Iraq, Undated, p.75

59. Ibid., p.76.60. J.R. Leeland, Ankara to G.S. Wright, Southern Europe Department, 21 May 1974, FCO9/2115.61. Ibid.62. British Embassy, Ankara to FO, 29 March 1966, FO371/186747.63. Doc.319 Memorandum of Conversations, Washington Meetings with Kurdish Representatives, 5 July

1972. FRUS 1969–76, Documents on Iraq–Iran 1969–72.64. Kissinger, Years of Renewal, p.585.65. Doc.196 – To President From Kissinger – The Shah’s Specific Concerns, 18 May 1972, FRUS 1969–

76, Documents on Iraq–Iran 1969–72.66. R. Sarell, Ankara to Southern Department, Podgorny’s visit, 19 April 1972, FCO9/1611.67. Ibid.68. Record of a Conversation between the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary and the Turkish For-

eign Minister, 1 June 1972, FCO9/1612.69. K. Yıldız, The Kurds in Iraq – The Past, Present and Future (London: Pluto Press, 2004), p.20.70. New York Times, 3 March 2003.71. Pike Report, p.212.72. Pike Report, p.17.73. New York Times, 12 Feb. 1976.74. Squadron Leader A.E. Shephard, Ministry of Defence, 19 March 1974, FCO8/2307.75. There is some evidence that like the Iranians the Turks relaxed controls on the Iraq border during hos-

tilities in Iraq, but there is again nothing concrete to suggest that Turkish Kurds fought for Barzani al-though they probably gave him some financial or material aid. See FCO9/1605.

76. J.R. Leeland, Ankara to G.S. Wright, Southern Europe Department, 21 May 1974, FCO9/2115.77. 1974 Dıs Siyaset Faaliyetleri, T.C Dısisleri Bakanlı�gı Arastırma ve Siyaset Planlama Genel

M€ud€url€u�g€u, Ankara, 1975, p.125.78. Ibid., p.145.79. Bakanlar Kurulu Kararnamesi, T.C. Basbakanlık Kanunlar Kararlar Teknik Daire Baskanlı�gı,

Sayı7/9707, 030 18 01 02, 329 23 27, TC Basbakanlık Cumhuriyet Arsivi, Ankara.80. In response to the Turkish military campaign for Cyprus in July 1974, the US Congress began to dis-

cuss the possibility of imposing an embargo in September 1974. And the embargo decision eventuallycame into effect on 5 Feb. 1975.

Outside Intervention in Kurdish Politics in Iraq and Turkey 279

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