PART 1 OF 2-PART SERIES

T his article is the first of a two-part series. Part One provides an in­

troduction to Ponzi victim's third-party claims and the law on which they are based. Part Two will offer examples of such claims in practice.

From 2008 to 2013, over 500 Ponzi schemes1 involving over $50 billion were reported.2 Unfortunately, little remains for most victims to recover once the schemes unravel. Victims typically end up as claimants in a receivership, bankruptcy, or other formal dissolution proceeding where they may be fortu­nate to recoup ten percent of their initial investment. Where victims recover significantly more, third-party defendants often make up the difference.3 The goal of this article is to provide an introduc­tion to such third-party claims, which were bolstered by the Supreme Court's decision in Chadbourne & Parke LLP v. Troice4 earlier this year.

Inevitable Collapse In a traditional Ponzi scheme. an

organizer attracts investors with the

promise of high or steady returns via an illusory investment opportunity. No real investment is made, however; rather, unknown to the victims, their "invest­ments" are paid to other investors in the guise of gains or to fund redemptions of principal.5 After receiving steady returns or watching hearty growth, victims will typically let their money ride as they tell friends about their successful investment venture. That process helps the orga­nizer bring in more funds and delay the scheme's inevitable collapse. That col­lapse is certain because a steady stream of money from new investors is required to keep the scheme going.

When the inevitable happens, many investors are emotionally devastated, and some are financially ruined. Typical­ly, investors will learn about the scheme when federal authorities step in to halt the fraud, freeze any remaining assets, and enjoin or stay any investor suits against the Ponzi organizer or related en­tities. Whether as part of a receivership, bankruptcy, or other formal dissolution proceeding, the basic process that fol-

lows is essentially the same6 and fraught with uncertainty, particularly from the victims' perspective. In the meantime, victims will be prohibited by federal law - whether in the form of a federal court order or federal statute - from instituting legal action against the Ponzi scheme estate. Eventually, distributions will be made to the investors who lost money, often totaling less than ten percent of their losses.

Potential Third-Part)' Claims and Defendants

While Ponzi schemes never end well, claims against third parties can sig­nificantly contribute to the available re­coveries. Defrauded investors may have powerful and effective tools to prosecute claims against third parties involved with the underlying fraud. Whether pursued by the investor as an individual plaintiff or as part of a class action (or, occasionally, by the receiver or trustee), these potential claims deserve careful assessment. While it is sometimes stated and generally true that Ponzi-scheme

The Ponzi scheme gets its name rrom Charles Ponzi. whose Boston-based financial scam became national news when it collapsed in 1920 Charles Ponzi was not the inventor of the scheme, rather. it is an age-old fraud sometimes called a "Peter-Paur scheme. which is shorthand for Its means of operation - "robbing Peter to pay Paul · See generally Mrn:HEU. Zl.Jt;Klm . PoNZJ's Sc:HEME' THt TRUE $TOI!'( Of A Fl>WICIAI. LtGtNO (2005)

2 Jordon Maglich. A Ponzi Pandemic. 500+ Ponzi Schemes Totaling $50-r 817/ion in 'Ma doff Era. ' FORBES MAGAz111• (Feb. 12. 2014), http://www.forbes.com/sltes/jordanmaglich/2014/02/12/a-ponzi-pandemic-500-ponzi-schemes-totallng-50-billion-in-madoff-era/.

3 For instance, m connection with Al Parish's $100 million Charleston-based scheme. a group of defrauded investors recovered 100 percent of their losses plus attorneys· lees from a national brokerage firm. See Allyson Bird. Some Parish investors should get rest1tutto11. The Post and Couner (Sept 23, 2010) http://www.postandcouriercorn/article/20100923/ PCOS/309239881.

4 134 S. Ct. 1058 (2014).

5 While there 1s a perception that Ponzi schemes are ephemeral frauds inRicting harm only on those looking to get rich quick. many of the longest-lasting and most-devastating Ponzi schemes target conservative Investors. such as many of Al Parish's victims in his decades-tong fraud Indeed, a study of Ponzi schemes from 2002 to m1d-20U found. as one might expect that a loweT promised rate of return correlated with a significantly longer average scheme duration. Christopher T Marquet, The Marquet Report on Ponzi Schemes, Marquet lnt'I. Ltd. U 15 (June 2, 2011). http://www.marquelinternational.corn/pdtfmarqueUeport,_on_ponzLschemes.pdf (finding that schemes promising an annual rate of return between 5-10 percent lasted 9.9 years on average. whereas the median promised return rate and median duration were 38 percent and 4 years. respechvely)

6 The receiver (or trustee) will investigate. assess, and account for the Ponzi operator's personal estate and associated business entities. As part of that process. the receiver will calculate the money in and money out for each investor to determine winners and losers. The receiver will then make demands, attempt to negotiate, and sometimes initiate litigation against debtors and. at times. third parties. It may also have to defend against and negotiate claims by more-secured creditors.

24 THE JUSTICE BULLETIN · SUMMER 2014

claimants do not need an attorney to file claims with the receiver or bankruptcy trustee, an attorney may still be need­ed to properly evaluate any potential third-party claims. What follows is an introduction to the types of potential third-party claims and their legal bases.

Claims Under the Blue Sky Laws

A "blue sky law" is a state law regu­lating the offering and sale of securities to protect the public from fraud. The name comes from "the evil at which it is aimed ... speculative schemes which have no more basis than so many feet of blue sky." 7 Ponzi schemes more than

Recognizing whether a particular scheme is a Ponzi or pyramid scheme is a good first step in evaluating any potential third-party claims. While some consider Ponzi schemes a type of pyramid scheme, the two are fundamentally different. particularly when evaluating victims' potential third-party claims.

In a Ponzi scheme, a single person is usually in charge of organizing the scheme, fabricating one or more fraudulent business ventures or investment vehicles. selling associ­ated securities to investors, and unbeknownst to them, fraudulently allocating funds between them to create the appearance of gains. At the heart of every Ponzi scheme is the sale

fit the description because their associ­ated securities are not even speculative or in any way legitimate investments. Fortunately for victims. the blue sky laws of many states have powerful civil liability provisions that reach beyond the insolvent Ponzi schemer to others who were involved with his unlawful sales of securities.

Unlike their federal counterpart, "there is a robust tradition of aiding and abetting liability in most state blue sky statutes."8 Whereas federal securities fraud claims are based on an implied private cause of action that no longer extends to aiders and abettors,9 most blue sky laws have express secondary

of unlawful securities related to a fraudulent business venture or investment vehicle, the true nature of which is completely concealed from all investors, many of whom never with­draw illusory "gains· or any part of their initial investments.

By contrast. in the classic pyramid scheme, participants attempt to make money solely by recruiting new participants into the program. With an initial organizer at the top of a tiered hierarchical structure, pyra­mid-scheme participants are actively involved in, and directly benefit from, recruiting subse­quent participants. A new investor pays the person who recruited him, and the recipient

7 I-fall v. Geiger-Jones Co, 242 U S. 539. 550 (1917) (Internal quotation marks omitted).

liability provisions, and many are very potent.1° For example, the civil liability section of the South Carolina Uniform Securities Act of 2005 (the "2005 Act") is typical in this regard.11 A Ponzi scheme organizer is undeniably liable to de­frauded investors for his unlawful sales of securities under the 2005 Act,12 and it also provides for the joint-and-several-li­ability of particular classes of defendants and shifts to them the burden of proving their prudence and lack of knowledge as to the underlying misconduct.13

Under the 2005 Act~ any bro­ker-dealer. investment advisor, invest­ment advisor representative, or agent that ·materially aids" the conduct giving

shares a portion of those proceeds with the person who recruited her, and so on up the structure.

Accordingly, upon a pyramid scheme's collapse. the money has actually been distributed; victims above the pyramid's bottom-most tier have received other victims' money; and all victims necessarily had some understanding that they and other partici­pants earned money by recruiting additional participants. Accordingly, victims of a classic pyramid scheme, by its very nature, face impediments to bringing claims against third parties not necessarily shared by the typical Ponzi scheme victim.

8 Jennifer J. Johnson, Secondary Liability for SecuriHes Fraud. Gatekeepers fn State Court. 36 Oa.. J . CoR•. L 463, 466 (2011).

9 Federal securities fraud claims are based on a long-recognized but nonetheless implied private cause of action to enforce Section lO!bl of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 USC. I 78j) and Rule lOb-5 adopted by the Securities and Exchange Commission In 1942 (17 C.FR. 124010b-5). With its 1994 decision in Central Sank of Denver. NA v. First Interstate Sank of Denver. NA. 511 U.S 164, the Supreme Court declined to follow "hundreds of judicial and administrative proceedings in every Circuit In the federal system- and instead round that no Implied cause of action existed for aiding and abetting violations of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. Cent. Bank. 511 U.S. at 192 (Stevens. J .• dissenting).

10 Johnson. supra note 8, at 466

11 SC. Code Ann. l 35-1-509 (Westlaw through 2013 Reg. Sess.). The South Carolina Uniform Securities Act of 2005 Is based on the Uniform Securities Act of 2002. S.C Code Ann. I 35-1-101 The Uniform Securities Act of 2002 has now been adopted by 15 other states and the U.S. Virgin Islands Uniform Law Commission. Securities Act. http://www.uniform­laws.org/ (under Acts/Securities Act. last visited July 9. 2014). Previously. South Carolina's blue sky law was based on the 1956 version ot the Unlform Securities Act. which was adopted by 36 other states J Parks Workman. The South Carolfna Uniform Securities Act of 2005: A Balancing Act Under A New Blue Sky. 57 S.C. L REv. 409. 413 (2006); Uniform law Commission. Securities Act Summary (link from the same webpage above). Most state blue sky statutes are modeled generally on either the 1956 or the 2002 versions ot the Uniform Securities Act. and the secondary llabllily provisions of the 1956 and 2002 versions are largely the same See Johnson. supra note 8, at 475. 485, compare UNIF, Ste. /v::r I 410(b) (1956) with Unlf. Sec. Act I 509(g) (2002) (both available Ilia links from the Uniform Law Commission. Securities Act webpage cited above).

12 Under the 2005 Act. a "seller- is liable to the purchaser "if the person sells a security In violation of (the registration or anti-fraud provisions in] Sections 35-1-301or35-1-501 or, by means of an untrue statement of a material fact or an omission to state a material fact necessary In order to make the statement made, In light of the circumstances under which It is made. not misleading. the purchaser not knowing the untruth or omission and the seller not sustaining the burden of proof that the seller did not know and. In the exercise of reasonable care, could not have known of the untruth or omission." S.C. Coot ANN. I 35-1-5091bJ. The definition of a seller "Is not limited to the owner who passes title: however. a nonowner must (1) solicit the purchase and (2) be motivated at least ln part by a desire to serve his own financial interest or that or the owner of the security: Bia/es v. Young. 432 S.E.2d 482. 484-85 (1993). A third party who Is duped by the Ponzi schemer can also fall within the deftrntion of a seller under certain circumstances. See Cowburn v. Leventis, 619 S E.2d 437. 444 (SC. CL App 2005)

13 S.C. CODE AAN. I 35-1-509(g).

THE JUSTICE BULLETIN · SUMMER 2014 25

rise to the Ponzi schemer's liability is ·liable jointly and severally with and to the same extent as the !Ponzi schemer]" unless it can sustain its burden of proof. 14

To escape liability, such defendant must prove that it "did not know and, in the exercise of reasonable care could not have known, of the existence of conduct by reason of which liability is alleged to exist."15 Similarly, any person who had the ability to control the Ponzi schemer is likewise liable unless able to sustain the same burden.16

The 2005 Act's claims against broker-dealers can be particularly useful because they are amenable to class cer­tification, which allows class members to avoid otherwise-mandatory arbitra­tion. Broker-dealers are members of the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority ("FINRA").17 which requires members to have particular arbitration provisions in

14 Id I 35+509(g)(4).

15 Id

client contracts. While arbitration is gen­erally mandatory under those provisions, there is an important exception: the broker-dealer may not seek to enforce any pre-dispute arbitration agreement against a client who is the member of a putative or certified class with respect to the claims encompassed by the class action.18 Earlier this year, in what is regarded as a significant victory for retail investors. Schwab abandoned a two-year effort to challenge FINRA's authority to mandate this class-action exception.19

The 2005 Act also extends liability to persons outside of these categories under certain circumstances:

{A] person who, with actual knowl­edge that a person is committing acts sufficient to violate [the 2005 Acts anti-fraud provisions/, nonetheless intentionally furthers the violation with

actual awareness that the person is rendering substantial assistance to the person committing the violation . . . . thereby becomes an aider and abettor of the violation, and is therefore j ointly and severally liable with and to the same extent as the assisted person who engaged in the fraudulent activity, provided. however, this subsection . . . does not require any due diligence investigation nor impose liability for failure to perform any due diligence investigation otherwise required.20

While not as strong as the 2005 Act's other secondary-liability provisions. it is still far more favorable for defrauded investors than the federal securities laws. discussed in more detail below.

Last but not least. the 2005 Act provides for damages. interest, costs, and reasonable attorneys' fees determined by the court.21 No similar provision exists under the federal securities laws applica­ble to victims' claims.

Other State Law Claims Depending on the law of the ju­

risdiction and facts of the case, various common-law claims may be brought against third parties involved with the underlying scheme. Typical third-par-ty claims asserted include negligence (professional negligence, negligent misrepresentation, negligent supervision. and gross negligence). breach of fidu­ciary duty. aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty. breach of contract. fraud. constructive fraud. civil conspiracy, un­just enrichment. and unfair trade practic­es. among others.22 Myriad factors may

16 Id I 35+509(g)(l). While not as favorable to Ponzi Victims. rederal securities fraud laws likewise provide for ·control person· liability and shift the burden to a control-person defendant. however, that burden 1s lower 15 U.S.C. I 78t(a) rEvery person who. directly or 1nd1rectly. controls any person liable under any provision o f this chapter . . . shall . be 11· able iomtly and severally liable with and to the same extent as such controlled person . . unless the controlllng person acted in good faith and did not directly or indirectly induce the act or acts constituting the violation or cause of action: )

17 Nearly all U.S broker-dealers are members of FINRA. a non-profit self-regulatory organization ("SRO") empowered by the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to regulate Its members See Jonathan Macey. Caroline Novogrocl. Enforcing Self-Regulatory Organization's Penalt1es and the Nature of Self-Regulation, 40 HoFSTIIA L. Rtv. 963. 964 (20121

18 The typical provision reads as follows "No person will bring a putative or certified class action to arbitration. nor seek to enforce any predispute arbitration agreement against any person who has initiated in court a putative class action; or who Is a member of a putative class who has not opted out of the class with respect to any claims encompassed by the putative class action until, Ill the class certification is dented. (2) the class Is decertified, or (3) the client ts excluded from the class by the court·

19 Mark Schoeff Jr & Mason Braswell. Seeing writing on wall from Frnra. Schwab throws in towel on c/115s action lawsur~ INVtS'TMENT NEWS (Apr 25, 2014). available 111 http://www.lnvest-mentnews.com/artlcle/20140425/FREE/140429929

20 SC. Coot ANN I 35-l-509(g)(5).

21 Id I 35+509!bl(31.

22 See. e g. Myatt v RHBT Fin. Corp. 635 S E.2d 545, 546 (S.C Ct App 20061 (noting claims for breach o f contTact. breach ot fiduciary duty/constructive fraud. n eghgence/gross negligence. negligent supervision. unfair and deceptive trade practices. and aiding and abetttng breach of fiduciary duty); Cowbum v. Levenlls, 619 S.E.2d 437 (SC. Ct App. 20051 (d1scussmg claims for legat negligence. breach of fiduciary duty. violation of the South Carolina Unfair Trade Practices Act fraud. negligence; and c11111 conspiracy). Ashmore v. Cook. CIA No. 313-1449-MBS. 2013 WL 6283508 (0 S.C. Dec. 4. 2013) (addressmg claims for fraudulent conveyance and uniust enrichment).

26 THE JUSTICE BULLETIN • SUMMER 2014

determine whether and what common law and other state law claims to assert in a particular case. For example, the terms of a defendant's insurance policy may require careful pleading to ensure coverage;23 or class-certification and choice-of-law considerations may influ­ence claim selection;24 or the plaintiffs' standing and particular defenses may even require alternative forms of plead­ing.25 As in other types of cases, deciding what claims to bring (and not bring) can have important implications.26

Federal Securities Claims and Preemption

By comparison to blue sky laws in particular, federal securities laws are decidedly unfavorable to Ponzi victims. Unless a defendant fits the definition of a control person,27 a Ponzi victim must plead and prove each of the elements for primary liability against a third-party aid­er of the fraud:28 "(1) a material misrepre­sentation (or omission); (2) scienter, i.e., a wrongful state of mind; (3) a connection with the purchase or sale of a security; (4) reliance . .. ; (5) economic loss; and (6)

loss causation, i.e., a causal connection between the material misrepresentation and the loss."29 While these elements are easily proved (or presumed) against the Ponzi organizer, the same might not be true for a third-party defendant.

Until very recently, some Ponzi victims could only bring class actions under these less-favorable federal claims in some federal circuits, where courts had misinterpreted the scope of federal preemption under the Securities Liti-

gation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 ("SLUSA"). SLUSA forbids class actions based on state law that allege misrepre­sentations "in connection with" the pur­chase of a security traded on a national exchange (or a ·covered security" in SLUSA parlance).30 Some federal courts applying SLUSA had allowed defendants to remove cases and extinguish state-law claims where Ponzi securities had even a tangential, imaginary connection with unspecified publicly traded securities.31

Earlier this year in Chadbourne & Parke LLP v. Troice, the Supreme Court clarified the scope of SLUSA preemption in Ponzi victims' favor. Chadbourne holds that SLUSA preemption applies only when the unlawful securities at issue (the securities purchased by the Ponzi victims) trade on a national exchange, not where Ponzi securities purport to reference, be secured by, or otherwise relate somehow to ex­change-traded securities.32 Rarely if ever do Ponzi securities trade on a national exchange,33 so Chadbourne effectively prevents SLUSA from interfering with victims' state-law claims going forward.

Conclusion For the victims of Ponzi schemes,

claims against third parties are an im­portant means of enhancing available re­coveries, and the law applicable to some claims has improved lately. Part Two of this series will discuss examples of claims in practice. •!•

23 See, e.g. Conn Cas. Co. v. Battery Wealth Inc., No. 2:09CV00605 (WOB). 2011W1.11439128 (D.S.C. May 5. 2011).

a By comparison to blue sky laws in

particular, federal secun'ties laws are

decidedly unfavorable to Ponzi victims.

Badge Humphries practices with Motley Rice LLC where he represents institution­al and individual investors in shareholder and securities fraud litigation. Serving on behalf of Ponzi scheme victims, he has represented the receiver, individuals, and

multiple classes of investors prosecuting claims against third-party defendants.

24 See, e.g . Brown v. Charles Schwab & Co .• Inc .• CIA No. 2:07-CV-03852-DCN, 2009 WL 4809426, *8-9 (D.S.C. Dec. 9. 2009) amended, CIA No. 2:07-CV-03852-DCN, 2010 WL 424031 (0.S.C. Feb. 1. 2010).

25 See, e.g. Hays v. Pearlman, Civil No. 2:10-CV-1135-DCN, 2010 W1. 4510956 (D.S.C. Nov. 2, 2010).

26 Part Two will discuss common law and other claims in more detail within particular contexts.

27 See supra note 16.

28 Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta. 552 U.S. 148, 158 (2008).

29 Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo. 544 U.S. 336, 341-42 (2005) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). The Supreme Court ruled in the case of Gustafson v. A//oyd Co., Inc., 513 U.S. 561. 576-78 (1995) that the express cause of action under Section 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act of 1933 Is limited to the context of public offerings.

30 See Chadbourne & Parke UP v. Troice, 134 S. Ct. 1058, 1063-64 (2014).

31 See, e.g. id. at 1065 (explaining how the district court had improperly found a sufficient connection with an national-exchange-traded security based on allegations that the fraud 'included misrepresentations that the Bank maintained significant holdings in "highly marketable securities issued by stable governments (andl strong multinational companies .. (quoting to the complaint in the appellate record}}.

32 Id. at 1066 ('A fraudulent misrepresentation or omission is not made "in connection with' such a 'purchase or sale of a covered security" unless it is material to a decision by one or more individuals (other than the fraudster) to buy or to sell a 'covered security ... }.

33 Ponzi securities typically take the form of promissory notes, private placement offerings, interests in limited liability companies. or various and sundry other forms of 'alternative investments.'

THE JUSTICE BULLETIN • SUMMER 2014 27

Committee Updates Consumer & Securities Law by Badge Humphries

The U.S. Supreme Court issued two major opinions favorable to plaintiffs involving federal and state securities laws. In Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund Inc .. No. 13-317, 2014 WL 2807181. 2014 U.S. LEXIS 4305 (U.S. June 23, 2014). the Supreme Court reaffirmed the fraud­on-the-market theory with few of the changes advanced by the defense bar and conservative interest groups. A Wall Street Journal editori-al even deemed it a 'champagne day for trial lawyers at the Supreme Court: The theory makes possible federal securities fraud class actions by allowing plaintiffs to prove reliance (through a presumption) by showing that the relevant shares traded in an efficient market. Earlier in the year. the Supreme Court issued an important decision for Ponzi scheme victims

Technology Committee by Ben Stevens

If you are attending the Annual Convention, you owe it to yourself and your clients to at­tend "A Presentation on Presentations, or, How to Avoid Death by Powerpoint". This seminar will take place from 9:00am to 11:00am on Thursday, August 7th, and it is guaranteed to forever change the way you view and give presentations. Our presenter is attorney Randy Juip from Detroit MI. who is an expert

Employment Law by Jennifer Munter Stark

On a federal level. last year 2 Supreme Court decisions significantly hampered the ability of employees to achieve redress under Title VII. University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar. held that retaliation claims filed under Title VII must be proved according to the narrow but-for causation standard. Vance v. Ball State University, ruled that to hold a company vicariously liable for the acts of a supervisor, the supervisor must have ' the power to hire, fire, demote, promote, transfer, or discipline an employee," significant-ly narrowing an employee's ability to show vicarious liability under Title VII. There are also

in Chadbourne & Parke LLP v. Troice. 134 S. Ct. 1058 (2014), clarifying that SLUSA does not preempt state law claims unless the securities at issue traded on a national exchange. Prior to the decision. broker-dealers. advisers. accoun­tants. and others alleged to have aided such a scheme could completely escape liability to plaintiffs under state law in certain circuits.

Closer to home. recent decisions from the District of South Carolina in consumer cases deserve mention. In Thomas v. Ford Motor Co .• Civil Action No. 5:13-01417-JMC, 2014 WL 1315014. 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43268 (D.S.C. Mar. 31. 2014). the court denied defendant's motion to dismiss a case brought on behalf of all purchasers of Ford vehicles equipped with electronic throttle control systems between

on legal technology. particularly in the area of presentations.

Anyone giving presentations in this day and age- whether to clients, groups. judges, or juries-have to live up to high standards. Today's media-savvy clients. judges. and juries expect clean. coherent, and logical presentations. Un­fortunately many attorneys return. time and time again, to a ·Death by Powerpoint" style of

a number of cases affecting the rights on em­ployees that the Supreme Court will address this year which we are also monitoring.

Other hot topics for employees include the affects of and interpretations of the Af­fordable Care Act. wage and hour regulations such as the Fair Labor Standards Act -which many employers do not adhere to, work­place bullying and retaliation for reporting ha­rassment, discrimination or violations. privacy and safety concerns. and social media issues. Although unemployment on a national level is decreasing there is an epidemic of under­employment. part time employment. and a

2002 and 2010. Also, in Brooks v. GAF Materials Corp., Civil Action No. 8:11-CV-00983-JMC. 2014 WL 2548360, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77042 (D.S.C. June 6. 2014). the court recently denied a motion to decertify a class in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Comcast Corp. v. Behrend. 133 S.ct. 1426 (2013). Lastly, not quite so close to home. two excellent recent class certification decisions are worth reading: In re !KO Roofing Shingle Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 14-1532, 2014 WL 2958615, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 12684 (7th Cir. July 2, 2014) and Rodriguez v. It's Just Lunch Int'/. No. 07 CIV. 9227(SHS), 2014 WL 192.1187, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66409 (S.D.N.Y. May 14, 2014).

presentation. replete with 12-point font, bullet point after bullet point. and text-dense incoher­ence. This presentation will explore the art of slide design, the science of proper presentation. and the mechanics of giving your audiences the slick. professional. and visceral presentations they crave.

cash economy as many formerly middle class workers cannot find replacement work if they are terminated. Many of these workers are clients who seek assistance with benefits. termination based on discrimination or retal­iation or have disability issues. There are also an increasing number of Veterans returning to the workforce who are reporting discrimina­tion based upon the perception that they may have disabilities, PTSD, or other conditions that make them undesirable as employees, although a failure to hire based upon veteran's status or preconceived notions of disability is clearly illegal.

THE JUSTICE BULLETIN · SUMMER 2014 29