Towards Greater Efficacy for the Private Member:

Possibilities for the Reformof the

British Columbia Legislative Assembly

Commissioned by Mr. Jack Weisgerber, MLA, Peace River South

Written by Jay Schlosar

August 2000

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Table of Contents

Forward 4

Preface 6

I. Introduction 10

II. The Role of the MLA in British Columbia 19

1. Theories of Representation 232. The Collision of Responsible and Representative Government 273. Public Perceptions of the Representative’s Function 344. Conclusions 42

III. Options for Parliamentary Reform 44

1. Asserting Individual Efficacy: Free Votes and the Private Member 49i. Free Votes and Party Discipline in Context 51ii. Assessing the Impact of Confidence 59iii. Other Possibilities for Reform 74

2. Encouraging Individual Efficacy: Re-evaluating the Committee Process 79i. The Committee Process in Context 81ii. The Possibilities for Reform 90

3. Expanding Individual Efficacy: Contributing to the Legislative Process 104a. Private Member’s Business

i. Private Member’s Business in Context 106ii. The Possibilities for Reform 113

b. Question Periodi. Question Period in Context 123ii. The Possibilities for Reform 127

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4. Enabling Individual Efficacy: Creating Certainty through Fixed Schedules 136a. Legislative Calendar

i. Calendars in Context 138ii. The Possibilities for Reform 142

b. Fixed Election Datesi. Fixed Elections in Context 149ii. The Possibilities for Reform 154

5. Extending Individual Efficacy: Giving Caucus the Power of Appointment 160i. Caucus and Appointment in Context 162ii. The Possibilities for Reform 166

IV. Summary and Conclusions 173

Selected Bibliography 180

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Forward

As a veteran member of the BC Legislature, the need for fundamental change in the way

our parliaments function has become increasingly evident to me. Our elected members and our

political institutions suffer under ever diminishing respect that too often borders on contempt.

Good people with the best intentions are elected both provincially and federally and are

soon frustrated by practices that concentrate power and authority with the Premier or Prime

Minister and their respective cabinets.

Having been a vocal advocate for change here in British Columbia, I am delighted to

have been able to commission this independent examination of various reforms that have been

implemented by parliamentary democracies around the world, especially those in the

Commonwealth. A clear understanding of these reforms will be of great help as Canada and

British Columbia are forced to modernize their political institutions. Sadly, party leaders seem to

lose their enthusiasm for change once they are successfully elected to govern. Pressure from

government backbenchers who enjoy strong voter support is essential to achieve even modest

reforms.

This paper identifies the advantages of a wide range of parliamentary reforms and the

difficulties that may be encountered during implementation. The author, Jay Schlosar has a

degree in Political Science from the University of Victoria and is currently working on his

Master of Arts in Political Science.

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While I fully support the vast majority of the recommendations and very much enjoyed

our discussions around these issues, Jay was completely free to come to his own conclusions. His

background and objectivity have helped prepare a paper that is interesting, useful and, most of

all, thought provoking.

Jack Weisgerber

Independent MLA

Peace River South

November 1, 2000

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Preface

My professor of Canadian Constitutional studies had a saying: “In Canada and the

provinces, we like to practise democracy as little as possible.” After five years of successful

university study in Political Science, I have concluded this statement to be absolutely correct.

Today in British Columbia, although we all participate in general elections and elect individuals

that promise to represent our interests, we practise very little democracy. Instead, we are

perpetually witness to a top-heavy system in which the direction of the promise is under the

exclusive control of the political executive while our individual members are both professionally

coerced and procedurally unequipped to substantively participate. Their public aspirations soon

fade in the face of absolute disregard.

It was under the burden of trying to come to terms with this unfortunate realization about

my chosen profession that a friend contacted me with a unique opportunity. Mr. Jack

Weisgerber, MLA for Peace River South (and quasi-celebrity in the eyes of a political junkie

who knew him only by textbook reputation), was looking to commission a report. The subject:

reforming the parliamentary system in British Columbia to allow the Private Member greater

opportunity and means to effectively fulfill their roles as representatives. Two short interviews

saw me quickly immersed in the project, with the leisure to pursue the subject in whatever way I

saw fit and with all resources at my disposal. For Mr. Weisgerber, it was an opportunity to more

fully examine these major issues. For the recently disillusioned political idealist like myself, it

was an exceptional opportunity to fight back and forestall my growing cynicism.

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After three months of research, writing, and countless reconsiderations, the combination

of opportunity and self-reflection has resulted in the creation of this report. In my mind, it

satisfies two aspects of parliamentary reform that I feel a number of commentators on the subject

have sorely neglected. First, it frames the subject within a larger and more fundamental context:

democratic representation. Often we ask for ways to make our system of representation and its

representatives better, yet we are uncertain about precisely how we want this to take place. What,

exactly, do we see our representatives as representing? This is an essential question that most

reformers have not bothered to confront, likely for reasons of neglect, indifference, or fear of

what they might discover. For that reason, I felt it necessary to confront these basic principles

before mustering the hubris to approach reform.

Second, this report takes the issue of reform one step further than the majority of

commentators. Most observers are quick to note that a problem exists, and even quicker to

suggest a remedy. But they neglect to explain why that remedy is the most appropriate, how that

remedy can be reasonably applied, and what impact those remedies may have on our political

culture as we have grown to know it. In researching this project, I often referred to the

anonymous adage, “The denial of complexity is the first ingredient of tyranny.” The majority of

those propounding reform have explicitly denied the complexity of the subject. They have denied

the tangled path that connects the problem and solution, and the simple impossibility of

espousing change without consequence. With that, I believe they have committed a significant

disservice to the very reforms that they support. It was therefore my intention with this report to

ensure a balance between the optimism for reform and the reality of application, and

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consequently embracing instead of erasing the inevitable complexity that exists within this

research area.

My professor had another saying. “In politics,” he would declare with only a hint of irony

in his voice, “virtue is always punished.” I am not an expert in this field. Unlike the majority of

you who will be reading this, I have not had the benefit of extensive experience in British

Columbia politics. Nor have I personally felt the sting of many of the structures that I propose to

change. I offer these admissions not as an excuse, but as a context for understanding. Much like

the process of reform, my writing of this report is an acknowledgment that no exercise is without

inherent limitation, and that it is by appreciating those limitations that we can best apply theory

to practice. In both cases, we must accept that we are working with imperfect tools towards a

perfect goal. This is no simple task.

This report is, if nothing else, an honest contribution to an area of research that has been

vastly understudied in British Columbia. It is my hope that, even if the content of this piece

inspires little response, the spirit of this report will stimulate all readers to more carefully

consider the subject of parliamentary reform and compel those with the ability and means to

enact change to step forward. It is with this small expectation that I hope that my energies in this

project – my virtue – will not feel the full brunt of its inevitable punishment.

I would like extend my thanks to Mr. Weisgerber, Ms. Louise Denis, Assistant to Mr.

Weisgerber and the Legislative Assembly of British Columbia for their support in

commissioning this report and, more importantly, their faith in allowing me to pursue this subject

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on my own terms. Although this report is solely a reflection of my own research, and does not

necessarily reflect the views of Mr. Weisgerber or the Legislative Assembly, their involvement

has been invaluable. I have considered it both an honour and a privilege to serve the province of

British Columbia in this capacity.

Jay Schlosar

August 3, 2000

(Jay Schlosar is a recent graduate from the University of Victoria with a B.A. in Political

Science and Literature. He is currently enrolled in graduate studies in Political Science at the

University of Victoria as of September 2000 in conjunction with the Legislative Internship

program commencing in January 2001.)

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Chapter I

Introduction

I don’t know if there is any other legislature in Canada or indeed the world that is quite asdysfunctional as we are here…. There are lots of things about the conduct, the processes and therelationships that we have in this chamber that need to be improved.1

In 1991, the federal Royal Commission for Electoral Reform and Party Financing (the

“Lortie Report”) conducted a study to measure the level of political cynicism held by Canadian

voters. The results were staggering. Only 23% of respondents believed that politicians were

intelligent and able. 79% believed that those elected have lost touch. And 70% determined that,

above all else, the government does not care about its citizens.2 It was clear to many at that time

that the citizenry was experiencing a state of severe alienation. For that reason, the federal

government set out on a campaign for reform, determined to find ways to contain this alienation

and allow citizens to re-connect with government.

Almost ten years later, a similar poll was released. After ten years of posturing about

reform by Canadian governments, this poll found that 69% of respondents still felt that those

elected soon lost touch with the people. Furthermore, 63% were resigned to the fact that, as

individuals, they had absolutely no say in what government did.3 These recent numbers can only

1 George Abbott, British Columbia, Debates of the Legislative Assembly, 1998 Legislative Session: 3rd

Session 36th Parliament, 11.15 (July 8, 1998).2 Study conducted by Andre Blais and Elizabeth Gidengil, Making Representative Democracy Work: The Views ofCanadians (Toronto: Dundrun Press, 1991) 35.3 Study conducted by Paul Howe and David Northrup, “Strengthening Canadian Democracy: The Views ofCanadians,” Policy Matters 1.5 (July 2000): 9.

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lead us to the unfortunate conclusion that, despite our efforts, the current relationship between

citizens and the political process continues to face a monumental erosion.

Most observers would concur that it does not take such a study to reveal the obvious:

respect for government and its members is on a steady decline with little indication of reversal.

Where once government was seen as a bastion to serve, foster, and guide the lives of its citizens,

today’s government is now a structure to be avoided, to be circumscribed, and to be resented. To

many, today’s democratic institution has become the enemy.

Some opinions hold that this malaise is less a problem in itself than it is merely a

symptom of a larger problem.4 And with every opinion comes a myriad of reasons and potential

solutions for this malaise. Some look towards our system of election – which disproportionately

favours the winners of elections over the losers – as the cause of our grief. Others point towards

our parliamentary institutions, which continue to serve only those at the pyramid’s apex while

the majority can barely divine the summit. Others look towards the corruptive influence of

money and media, and the social over-valuation of political power as an end in itself. And some

have merely determined that all politicians are crooks, every institution is flawed, and grudgingly

accept such realities as simply concomitant with the world’s other injustices. All of these views

betray partial truth and each requires a unique approach in their remedy. There is no all-

encompassing resolution.

4 Canada West Foundation, Re-Inventing Parliament: Conference on Parliamentary Reform Summary Report:February 24 and 25, 1994 (Lethbridge: University of Lethbridge and Canada West Foundation, 1994) 5.

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Common amongst all of these concerns is the sense of increasing powerlessness as the

citizen feels the degree of separation from the government exponentially increasing. In a

democratic society where we once confidently elected people to work in our best interests, we

are now sadly realizing an inherent and endemic imbalance. Power is by no means evenly

distributed amongst those who are elected, and this democratic deficit has resulted in a

“profound gap” between the governors and the governed.5 As one writer explains,

The pervasive sense of political impotence, or being reduced to the role of sideline spectator, fuelsthe corrosive admixture of frustration and cynicism which underlies the hostility of so manyCanadians toward political elites and the system within which they function. This hostility isheightened by the fact that, unlike most spectators at a sporting event, the overwhelming majorityof electors are no longer aware of either the rules of the game or the meaning of any particularpiece of the action. The arcane rituals of political elites provoke fear and loathing among thegeneral populace.6

The increasing dissociation between those in power and those who (supposedly) empower has

resulted in such a high degree of alienation that many – specifically the youngest voters – have

taken to acts of protest and civil disobedience as their only points of access to the democratic

system. It would not be unreasonable to suggest that this “corrosive admixture” in British

Columbia and Canada is quickly approaching critical mass. The dysfunctional system we face

today in British Columbia is in dire need of repair.

One way that our particular system manifests this problem is through the imbalance of

opportunity between the Government and the members of the Legislature. Newly elected

Members arrive at the doors of the House expecting an environment of cooperation, consensus

building, and a commitment towards making government an effective tool for reflecting the

desires of the province’s constituents. Instead, what they often find is an environment steeped in

5 Frank Graves, “The profound gap of governed and governors,” Vancouver Sun 22 July 1995: A17.6 David Marley, “Legitimacy and Efficacy,” Submission to the B.C. Unity Panel, 16 December 1997.

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party conflict and executive domination, in which only the blessed few Members in the Cabinet

are given the tools, resources, and respect to participate in any substantial activity.

Circumscribed by parliamentary practices that are more tradition than necessity, the remainder of

Private Members (Opposition, Independent, and “backbench” representatives) are relegated to a

remedial role in governance. The executive remains the dominant species, and as one former-

Prime Minister of Canada bluntly put it, the remainder of political actors are merely “trained

seals,” who are “nobodies 50 feet from the Hill.”

By no means is this the sole reason for today’s cynicism. Yet it is an aspect, a particular

dysfunction that contributes to the grander dysfunction in which the basic principles of

democracy – rule by the people – are thrown into disrepute. Subsequently, the alleviation of this

particular problem may, in some small way, begin to heal the wounds that have been inflicted

upon the public psyche.

It is with this belief that this report was commissioned. The terms of reference were

broadly phrased: to find ways in which British Columbia’s parliamentary practices can be

reformed so that Private Members can reclaim the efficacy they once held. The ultimate goal

of such empowerment of the Private Member is twofold. First, we desire to introduce reasonable

changes to standard practices so that citizens can once again develop faith in their respective

representatives to ensure that their needs are met and thus see government as an ally and not an

enemy. Second, we desire to create a system in which the Private Member can feel valued and

useful, thus alleviating the measurable stress that their inefficacy currently creates.7 Ideally, by

7 See “Stress and the MP,” Occasional Papers on Parliamentary Government 9 (November 1999) 3-5.

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increasing the opportunity for these Members to play an active role in governance, such reforms

would ameliorate the malaise on both of these frustrated fronts.

To do this, this report approaches the central question of reform in two main stages.

The first stage of the report explores how we understand the role of the individual MLA

as both a Member of the House as a whole and as a representative of a smaller constituency of

citizens. It briefly outlines various theoretical approaches to representation and then places them

within the context of British Columbia’s tradition of responsible government. Understanding this

role, we will weigh this traditional role against the contemporary understanding of that role as

interpreted by British Columbia’s citizens. As this section will show us, the traditional

understanding of MLAs as primarily vehicles for expressing approval or dissatisfaction for

government activity – which responsible government has come to foster – has given way to a

stronger perception of MLAs as also constituency representatives and personal actors (more

closely akin to American Members of Congress). Moreover, the argument will show that it is

through this new view of representation as an activity that ultimately eludes dogmatic description

that our proposals for reforms are legitimized.

The second stage of this report – the main stage – is a detailed analysis of the various

options available in reforming parliamentary practice with the Private Member in mind. These

options are outlined in five different sections covering these basic subjects:

• Free Votes

• The Committee System

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• Private Members’ Business and Question Period

• Legislative Calendars and Fixed Elections

• Caucus Control Over Appointment

Within each of these headings, this report outlines how these mechanisms work in British

Columbia and how, through reference to other jurisdictions, these practices could be most

reasonably reformed for maximum benefit to the Private Member. Research for these

mechanisms stems from a number of sources: academic analyses, governmental reports,

legislative debates, popular media analysis, and relevant jurisdictional rules and ordinances

(including legislation, constitutions, and Standing Orders). Using these tools in combination with

a positive ambition towards asserting reform, this report uses this research to balance the

successes of other parliaments with our own particular needs in British Columbia. Ultimately,

the result is a practical formula that must give pause to even the most skeptical reformers.

It is important for us to highlight what this report is not about. Primarily, the goal of this

report is one of balance. While we want to enhance the power of the Private Member, we must

also acknowledge that this must be weighed against the right of a government to perform and

fulfill its agenda. By privilege of winning an election, a government rightly deserves to hold

power that is greater than the sum of the powers of its individual Members. With this in mind,

while these reforms aim to elevate the Private Member, they do not reasonably expect (or desire,

for that matter) to deny the government the right to govern. As such, the underlying emphasis of

this report is the elevation of the Private Member, not a reduction of the executive’s right to

govern.

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Second, despite the recent trends, this report will not discuss the issue of electoral reform.

There is little doubt that the single-member plurality system currently used in British Columbia

creates distortions between the actual popular vote and the resulting representation in the

Legislature, which in turn influences the behaviour of the elected Members. This

acknowledgment has made the concept of Proportional Representation or a variation of a

Preferential Ballot highly salient amongst reformers. While electoral reform may be a necessary

change for British Columbia, the scope of this report has narrowed its focus to only cover issues

of parliamentary reform – that is, changes to procedure after election has occurred. As such, this

excludes discussion of alternate electoral systems, electoral finance reform, and related subjects.

Hopefully, if recent trends continue as they have, we will see many initiatives for electoral

reform that could complement the proposals put forward in this report.

Third, while this report will take advantage of reform proposals initiated on both federal

and provincial fronts, all proposed reforms will be directed primarily towards the British

Columbia Legislature. For example, in the British Columbia context we must keep in mind our

specific historical development, our regional concerns, and our highly polarized partisan climate

throughout our discussion. As such, all reforms recommended are essentially “made for BC” and

are not intended to be universal to the Canadian federal Parliament or other Canadian provinces.

In addition, a practice that is understood to be successful in another system by no means implies

its equal success in British Columbia. Each jurisdiction has its unique features that cannot be

ignored, even when the political systems appear similar in principle. All discussion of

comparative advantage and disadvantage must be conducted with this reality in mind.

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Fourth, this report will not be propounding any serious structural reforms, most notably

recent calls for the adoption of an American republican-style form of government in which the

executive and legislative functions are separate. While this system does offer many advantages in

terms of increasing a representative’s efficacy, we are not prepared to share in the hubris of some

critics who would see our pedigree of parliamentary government discarded for only moderate

benefits. As such, all discussion of legislative reform will be mindful of our province’s long-

standing heritage and only recommend changes that the flexibility of the present system and

parliamentary legacy would allow. Our concern is with reasonable micro-level changes, not

disruptive macro-level changes.

Finally, these reforms cannot survive on their own. As each section will reveal, true

reform depends on a careful mixture of procedural revision and party participation in order to

succeed. While these new procedures are necessary to create formal mechanisms for the Private

Member, all efforts are lost unless the respective parties agree to put these mechanisms into

practice. Similarly, neither public, media nor Private Member support can be hoped to be gained

unless all parties are prepared to co-operate. In the end, the rise or fall of these reforms will

depend upon the collective willingness to let them succeed.

Parliamentary reform is a subject that is increasingly occupying the agenda of most

parliamentary political systems. Many have failed at attempts to put forward even the most

reasonable innovations, mainly because the institutions that they wish to reform are the very

institutions that restrict their ability to promote change. Yet it is becoming apparent that we live

in a privileged period where reform is gaining credibility as the first step towards alleviating

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many of people’s grievances with government. Whether or not this is true is yet to be seen. But

with pending elections on both federal and British Columbian horizons, the resurrection of a new

party of reform through the Canadian Alliance, and pledges of innovation by both the BC Liberal

and Reform parties, it appears that the time may be opportune for change in this province.

Otherwise, the “dysfunctional” nature of the British Columbia Legislature may quickly approach

the level of completely “malfunctional”. The democratic imperative demands that reforms take

place soon. As former MLA David Mitchell put it, “Democracy is like love. It can survive

almost any abuse except indifference or neglect.”8

8 British Columbia, Debates of the Legislative Assembly, 1992 Legislative Session: 1st Session 35th Parliament, 1.6(March 23, 1992).

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Chapter II

The Role of the MLA in British ColumbiaMr. Speaker, when a bill’s before this house I always ask what’s it going to do for Charlotte. Iain’t got anything to do with the Province. I sits here for Charlotte and if they tells me it’ll do goodto the Province but do harm to Charlotte then says I, “I go in for Charlotte.” If they tells me it’llharm the Province but do good to Charlotte then too says I, “I go in for Charlotte.”9

Before we can approach the subject of parliamentary reform vis-à-vis the individual

MLA with any legitimacy, we must first attempt to clarify precisely what the role of that MLA is

in British Columbia. For many, Mr. Gilmour above included, the MLA is seen as a

representative of his or her constituency who stands in the Legislative Assembly and acts as a

conduit between citizens and the government-at-large by voicing their concerns. Yet at the same

time, most citizens would admit that this is an over-simplified understanding. Most would recall

instances where the Member has succumbed to other influences in performing his or her duties.

Most obviously, there are the demands of the party that the Member must follow, and a

responsibility to contribute to a party solidarity for the sake of a collective goal. And one could

not deny the influence of a Member’s personal feelings, or conscience, when confronted with

issues that are questions of personal values or morality. In short, despite what we might want to

see, realistically there is no single job description for a MLA. Unlike the certainty felt by Mr.

Gilmour above, average MLAs in British Columbia are caught in a perpetual struggle over “the

threefold nature of their responsibility: to constituents, conscience, and caucus.”10

9 A.H. Gilmour MLA, New Brunswick, Debates of the Legislative Assembly (1864).10 Patrick Boyer, Hands on Democracy (Toronto: Stoddart Publishing Co. Ltd., 1993) 83.

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Understanding the specific mandate of the elected representative is one of the more

complex problems explored by political scientists. While the mandate to represent in some

capacity is easily understood, exactly what to represent remains a serious dilemma. Is there a

single responsibility that overrides the others? Or does each responsibility demand equal

attention and consideration? What does a representative do when these responsibilities come in

direct conflict? All of these questions have, at one time or another, become essential to each

MLA in making their decisions. Often, their ultimate decisions, by trying to balance and

reconcile these demands, can leave much to be desired.

This discussion is not purely academic – it has a serious impact on all proposals for

parliamentary reform. Within this mosaic of representation lies a fundamental dilemma of

identity that has often rendered the average representative susceptible to executive control. This

has led to the modern political reality of most Members, facing insecurity about what they

actually represent, becoming mere creatures of their party – a perception buttressed by the

practical demands of responsible government. Values of party solidarity, national vision, and

collective benefit come to shadow constituency and conscience, and the institutions of such a

system are quickly closed off to reflect this understanding. This is where the “trained seal,”

voting machine image of the Private Member is fostered. And if the Member comes to accept

that this is indeed his or her actual role, then all pursuit of reform is pointless.

Thus, it is the goal of this chapter to challenge the myth of representation that places the

party as the paramount consideration and has emasculated our parliamentary institutions and

practices to reflect as much. By re-affirming the multiple and equal roles of the MLA, we will

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open the door for reform of these institutions and practices that allow the Private Member a level

of autonomy beyond mere party voting.

If we are to believe that the individual Member has a right to see parliamentary practices

reformed in order to enhance his or her efficacy, then we must prove that such Members are able

to properly utilize these new mechanisms. Furthermore, we must see their roles as not just

deserving of reforms, but by their very nature demanding these reforms in order to fulfill their

true representative responsibilities. In doing this, we will eliminate the common belief that the

Member acting independently is not a “maverick,” but simply doing what he or she was elected

to do.11 If we can fully understand the multiple roles of the MLA both implicit and explicit, then

we can legitimately begin a dialogue on reforms to best make effective use of these roles.

This Chapter explores this issue through four sections. The first section outlines the

theories and problems that surround “representation.” It is intended to provide us with a number

of possible arguments for a representative’s multiple roles, and identify the problems inherent in

understanding this problem. The second section places representation within the context of

British Columbia’s specific practice of responsible government. In this context, the pervasive

forces of party over other duties become apparent. The third section puts previous sections into a

non-theoretical context by attempting to ascertain how the role of the MLA is perceived in

practice by the public. As will be shown, the traditional “party-centered” role is not as pervasive

as traditional thinking would have us believe. Finally, as we shall conclude in the fourth section,

11 Canada, House of Commons, Report of the Special Committee on Reform of the House of Commons, (Ottawa:Ministry of Supply and Services, 1985) 2. [McGrath Report]

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all of this analysis creates a window of opportunity for reforming the role of the Private Member

of the Legislative Assembly that we would be remiss to ignore.

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1. Theories of Representation

As one author aptly puts it, most Members come to understand a “kaleidoscopic

definition of their representational roles.”12 Not only do they appreciate the many colours that the

kaleidoscope provides, but also the way the colours shift and blend with each specific activity.

Rarely is there a time when a single responsibility stands above all others. In most cases, the

concept of representation remains a fuzzy and insubstantial concept that defies any attempts at

pigeonholing. It is this crisis of identity that can ultimately lead to a representative’s unsatisfying

and subsequently ineffectual role as a mere party servant.

According to political scientist Anthony Harold Birch, there are three main usages of the

term “representative”:

• To denote an agent or spokesman who acts on behalf of his principal

• To indicate that a person shares some of the characteristics of a class of persons

• To indicate that a person symbolizes the identity or qualities of a class of persons13

The first usage expresses a duty of defending or advancing the interests specified by the

principal, such as would a sales representative or a lawyer. This does not mean that they must

behave like the principal; rather, their main function is to achieve the goals set by the principal

by the means they (the agents) deem most appropriate. The second usage parallels the concept of

the “representative sample” in statistics, in which the representative stands as a sociological

reflection of the principal. This has little to do with the representative’s function or behaviour,

12 Paul G. Thomas, “Parties and Regional Representation,” Parties and Regional Representation, ed. Herman Bakvis(Toronto: Dundurn Press, 1991) 237.13 A.H. Birch, Representation (London: Pall Mall Press, 1971) 15.

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but merely their human characteristics. The third usage is the most distant representation, as the

representative merely stands in place of a something larger, such as a spokesperson for a cause.

How does political representation fall into this framework? The short answer is that it

does not. Although the first option – as agents for principals – would certainly apply in some

levels, it is by no means absolute. In terms of the second option, it is humanly impossible for one

to be a social reflection of a group. Nor is the third option of symbolic reflection a useful quality.

So the question of political representation remains somewhat impervious to any singular

scholarly classification. Birch suggests that the political sense of representation is a permutation

of these descriptions, and deserves a specialized usage.14

In this area of study, perhaps the best understanding of a Member’s role comes from

author Hanna Pitkin, who gives this classic definition: “Representation means acting in the

interests of the represented, in a manner responsive to them.”15 This definition implies a number

of roles. Certainly, it embraces the agency model – what some have called the trustee role of

working towards collective, national (or provincial) goals through one’s own best judgment or

conscience. At the same time, the “responsive” aspect indicates a strong relationship with the

constituency, in which the representative’s judgment must be congruent with the collective

constituency beliefs and justified when it is not. In this sense, the representative is also a

delegate of the constituents, a single figure reflecting the wishes of the whole. Thus, there are at

least two simultaneous roles the Member must fulfill – one of exercising their best judgment and

one of reflecting the judgment of their constituency.

14 Birch 19.15 Quoted, in Bakvis 188-189.

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Yet this analysis tells only half of the story. In the early days of representative

government in Britain, representation was seen as a purely constituency-based practice.

Discarding the Greek tradition of individuals standing for themselves in the ecclesia, the Magna

Carta of 1215 propounded a system under which a common council of the realm composed of

individuals representing specific geographic areas would exist to voice respective opinions on

taxation and personal grievances to the king. As such, the welfare of a representative’s specific

constituency was his main concern and all activity was directed towards reflecting that concern.

However, a new perception of the representative’s role developed in the 17th century.

This view, often called the Whig theory of Parliament, was best expressed by English MP

Edmund Burke in his 1774 speech to the electors of Bristol:

Your representative owes you, not his industry only, but his judgment; and he betrays, instead ofserving you, if he sacrifices it to your opinion… Parliament is a deliberative assembly of onenation, with one interest, that of the whole; where, not local purposes, not local prejudices ought toguide, but the general good, resulting from the general reason of the whole.16

Burke was appealing to the elitist view that the representative’s own judgment is far better than

that of his constituents. But more importantly, under this interpretation Burke was viewing the

role of the Member in absolute terms as one not dictated by the constituency connection, but by

the responsibility as a trustee to serve as a part of a larger deliberative group which ruled for the

nation as a whole. More than a mere check on the power of the king, Parliament became a body

that endeavoured to form an all-encompassing collective interest. Members were elected for their

ability to serve the country as a whole, and the local interest was seen as a subversive force to

16 Quoted, in Birch 39.

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this will, and contrary to the representative’s true role. As such, service to the constituency

became merely ancillary to a representative’s real duty.

This theory came to dominate the evolution of the British Parliament from that point on,

an evolution that inevitable trickled down to the colonies. Oddly enough, it should be noted that

Mr. Burke soon realized the error in his over-simplified qualification of his job. In a later

election, he acknowledged the real demands he faced:

I was not only your representative as a body; I was the agent, the solicitor of individuals; I ranabout wherever your affairs could call me; and in acting for you I often appeared rather as ashipbroker, than as a member of parliament. There was nothing too laborious or too low for me toundertake.17

It did not take Burke long to fall in line with Birch’s argument and acknowledge the complexity

of his role. It was not enough to simply proclaim an allegiance to a single approach to

representation; the practical demands of the job required a flexibility that was far beyond any

singular job description. This would be the first real indication of the serious conflict that the

issue of representation would present to future figures, in which a duty to the collective interest,

constituency needs and one’s own judgment would all come into conflict.

It should be noted that this discussion of representation leaves out an essential factor: the

role of parties and the demands of the Westminster parliamentary system. As we shall see in the

next section, when our understanding of representation accompanies the traditions of responsible

government and the party system, the role of the Member becomes more complex than even Mr.

Burke would ever presume.

17 Quoted, in C.E.S. Franks, The Parliament of Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1987) 38.

27

2. The Collision of Responsible and Representative Government

Democracy in Canada is rooted in a different history. Its origins lie not in the debates of thefounding fathers, but in the less absolute recesses of the British tradition. Our forefathers did notrebel against the English tradition of democratic government as did the Americans; on thecontrary, they embraced it and changed it to suit their own perceptions and needs.18

It is not uncommon for citizens in a parliamentary system to profess that they have a

“representative government.” Through the practice of popular elections that result in the

selection of individuals as representatives, citizens naturally assume that the government itself is,

as a whole, representative of the people. This concept of popular sovereignty is assumed to be a

cornerstone of all democratic systems.

Yet this is a fundamentally incorrect assumption, particularly in the British, Canadian, or

British Columbian contexts of parliamentary democracy. As the opening quote denotes, Canada

experienced an evolution entirely different from that of the United States. While the Unites

States propounded a system in which executive and legislative branches were separate, and

members of the legislature were given the sole duty of standing for the interests of their

constituents, Canada and the provinces adopted a very different system known as the

Westminster model. While it is true that we have a representative institution through this model,

it does not denote a representative government. Rather, we have a system of responsible

government. The differences between the two systems are subtle, and it is through the confusion

in defining that difference that many citizens and representatives alike have lost sight of exactly

how an elected Westminster-style Member is mandated to behave.

18 Dixon v. British Columbia (1989), 59 D.L.R. (4th) 262.

28

In a representative system, the role of the representative is simplified. The separation of

powers means that the members of the executive (the President and staff) do not rest their

authority on the approval of the elected legislative branches. As such, members of the legislative

branch are not responsible for the national interest, but only their local interests. Their role is

purely constituency-based, and there is very little conflict over where their loyalties lie. Should

these loyalties prove contrary to the executive priorities, then the legislative branch has the

ability to act in accordance with local wishes without any formal means of discouragement.

Furthermore, should the actions of the executive prove contrary to the national interest, then they

are removable through an electoral mechanism separate from the legislative branch. Popular

sovereignty (government essentially controlled by the citizen) is the core principle of

representative government.

In a system of responsible government, the representative does not have such a simple

line of accountability. The executive is not separate, but drawn from the ranks of the legislative

branch. Thus, there is a fusion rather than separation of powers. Under this system, the executive

is responsible to the elected legislature – that is to say, they must maintain the confidence of the

legislature in order to remain in power. Should the executive lose this confidence (through a vote

of non-confidence), a dissolution of the Legislature and general election must be called. Whereas

under popular sovereignty the burden to support the executive is directly based on the citizen’s

wishes, under parliamentary sovereignty the burden is placed on the representatives themselves.

As such, there is an extra degree of separation between the citizen and the government – the

29

customs and demands of the parliamentary system – that seriously distorts the dynamic of

representation.

Under this structure, the individual Member is suddenly cast into the position of not only

representing constituents, but also taking part in the approval or disapproval of the executive’s

actions. While in itself this added role would not overtly confuse the representative function, due

to the party system this role can become a serious liability. Parties, by nature, emphasize

solidarity. When a particular party forms the government or opposition, there is an expectation

that their individual Members will behave in a manner most conducive to their respective party’s

success. Because the executive lives or dies by the approval of the individual Members, the

pressure to fall into line becomes exponentially more essential. Due to the nature of responsible

government, the representative is suddenly confronted with another area of responsibility that

will not always peacefully coexist with the representative duties.

As British Columbians, we must come to terms with this difficult position that the

Westminster model creates for the representative. Not only is there the pressure on a local level

to act as both a trustee and a delegate, but there is also a serious pressure to act as a geographic

representative for and a voting member of a party. When we add to the mix the increasing

influence of parties in the election process, it is easy to see why Members would be unable to

deny this aspect of their role. Parliamentary, not popular, sovereignty reigns in this system, and

when the Parliament becomes a battle between those supporting and those opposing the

executive, the citizen’s claim on the representative can appear insignificant. The fate of the party

30

becomes the most pertinent role, even when it means that the individual Member must merely

become a voting instrument.

Perhaps the reason that party concerns have become paramount in modern British

Columbia politics is that responsible government, unlike the other representational functions, is a

practice that we are traditionally and legally bound to observe. On a national level, responsible

government has become understood as a constitutional convention through the Constitution Act,

1867, which guarantees in the preamble “a Constitution similar in Principle to that of the United

Kingdom.” In British Columbia, we are even more strongly bound to the practice through section

14 of the Terms of Union, 1871, which guarantees “the introduction of responsible government

when desired by the inhabitants of British Columbia.” We continue to respect such a practice to

this very day, as Standing Order 1 of the Legislative Assembly of British Columbia provides for

the continuation of “the usages, customs and precedents, firstly, of this house and, secondly, of

the House of Commons of the United Kingdom of Great Britain…” Since the 1872 resignation

of Premier McCreight, when responsible government principles were first observed, this practice

has become inalienable.

Overall, it would seem evident that by the adoption of responsible government over

American representative government the founders anticipated a specific role for the

representative: to act and vote as a member of a party. Local representation was not a value that

they embraced. Therefore, under this model, our present system of the “all-powerful executive”19

19 Norman J. Ruff, “The British Columbia Legislature and Political Framework,” Politics, Policy, and Governmentin British Columbia, ed. R.K. Carty (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1996) 86.

31

and party-focused Private Members seems logical. Weak individual members are a virtue, and to

reform this model would be a perversion of our traditional values and colonial legacy.

However, there are two details that we must take into consideration to balance this view.

First, we must observe our method of election. The single-member plurality system of election,

despite its many serious shortcomings, is intended to provide for certain values that a democracy

understands as essential. For our interest, one of those values is that of constituency

representation. Seats in British Columbia’s Assembly are divided so that they reflect particular

geographic communities of interest. At present, we acknowledge 75 of these communities.20 This

is not a value that is natural to all parliamentary systems. Countries such as Israel and the

Netherlands elect all members of parliament at large (without any constituencies). Germany,

New Zealand, and Russia elect a portion of their members at large. Even Britain is now toying

with some non-constituency seats.21 What this tells us is that the practice of locating elected

accountability within a geographic area is not an institutional by-product; it is a conscious

preference. This understanding must give pause to the assumption that an elected Member is

merely a servant of the Assembly. A relationship with the constituency was obviously intended

by the founders, and as resistance to electoral reform at present suggests it remains a value today.

Second, we assume that responsible government and the party system were established

hand-in-hand and intended to be concomitant. This is a misconception. In 1839, Lord Durham’s

20 After the Wood Commission recommendations of 1999 and subsequent legislation to that effect, this number hasincreased to 79.21 The Jenkins Commission, in response to the directive of the 1997 Labour Government, has recommended a voteof preferential vote with a non-constituency-based “top-up”. A referendum is anticipated to approve this proposal inthe near future.

32

Report to the Crown, which first recommended responsible government for the colonies,

anticipated an executive which would be controlled by “leaders of the Parliamentary

majority.”22 He was not anticipating a party majority, because parties had not been formally

established until 1878.23 Similarly, it was not until 1903 in British Columbia that an official party

system under Premier Richard McBride had been established – well after responsible

government had been established as common practice. Naturally, there was an informal process

of voting blocs in the early 1800s Lower Canada Legislative Assembly24, and British Columbia

is argued to have had a “proto-party system”25 prior to 1903. Yet we cannot be confident that

parties were seen as necessary to this system. In fact, Durham’s Report suggests to us that parties

were not even desired. The need for a leader to command a Parliamentary majority amidst a

scattered group of representatives implies a desire for leaders that can create instead of coerce a

national interest around local interests. Therefore, to assume a natural and necessary connection

between responsible government and partisanship would be incorrect.

Thus, we are left in a difficult position. While British Columbia’s system of responsible

government conventionally portrays a singular, party-centered role for the elected Member, the

realities behind this system and our basic understandings of democracy (as influenced by the

American system) demand a far more complex and variegated role to be understood. In terms of

22 Jennifer Smith, “Responsible Government and Democracy,” Taking Stock of 150 Years of ResponsibleGovernment in Canada, eds. F. Leslie Seidle and Louis Massicotte (Ottawa: Canadian Study Of Parliament Group,1999) 21.23 Canada, Royal Commission on Electoral Reform and Party Financing, Reforming Electoral Democracy Vol. 1,ed. Pierre Lortie (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1991) 211. [Lortie Report]24 See Rejean Pelletier, “Responsible Government: Victory or Defeat for Parliament,” Taking Stock of 150 Years ofResponsible Government in Canada, eds. F. Leslie Seidle and Louis Massicotte (Ottawa: Canadian Study OfParliament Group, 1999) 59.25 This has been argued by Dr. Norman J. Ruff in University of Victoria lectures in an analysis of electoral resultsprior to 1903. Such an opinion has not been published to date.

33

parliamentary reform, this is a progressive step against critics who dismiss any Private Member

empowerment as alien to parliamentary practice. Yet it also points towards an inherent systemic

bias against reform as incompatible with parliamentary complexities.

For this reason, we must look to our final section for more substantial affirmation: public

opinion. In the end, despite traditions, constitutions, and principles, it is really our modern

understandings of representation that betray the acceptable role of the representative. In this final

section, we will attempt to measure the popular opinion of representation in British Columbia in

order to gauge the salience of possible reforms and to what degree responsible government truly

dominates modern perceptions. As we shall see, popular opinion from both the public and

politicians reveals that the kaleidoscopic view of representation is alive and well, and ripe for

reform.

34

3. Public Perceptions of the Representative’s Function

If votes for a representative are primarily expressions of support for the party leader and the partyplatform, then party discipline is a virtue, and a weak legislature most desirable.26

This statement accurately underscores the pith and substance of the discussion up to this

point. Under the formal mechanisms of our present parliamentary system, the ability for a

representative to act independently as a Member of the Legislative Assembly is hindered by the

rigidity of responsible government. We must admit that we cannot hope to fundamentally alter

our longtime parliamentary traditions. Nor can we exercise equal flexibility with the party

system. On a purely formalistic level, any attempts at parliamentary reform are nearly impossible

to envision within these narrow constraints.

Yet we cannot understand our parliamentary system on a purely formalistic level. Much

like the “living tree” approach to the Constitution held by many members of the Supreme Court

of Canada, so too is there an opportunity to cultivate the Westminster model to better respond to

the needs of British Columbia’s citizens. If government is indeed a reflection of the society it

represents, and not the other way around, then the most logical place to start is to find out what

that society believes. What roles do the voters see the representative fulfilling? How do the

popular institutions reflect this understanding? How has the political system responded to these

beliefs? These questions are all essential to our problem. One can speak of party discipline and

responsible government as sacrosanct to our political system, but if they are not accepted by the

popular will, then there is a democratic imperative for reform to take place.

26 Nick Loenen, Citizenship and Democracy (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 1997) 56.

35

Obviously, the largest draw away from the values of responsible party government is the

American example. Parliamentary sovereignty and popular sovereignty continue to contend with

each other. As one author has put it, most Canadians today retain “the façade of parliamentary

supremacy but living with the growing reality of popular sovereignty.”27 Yet this is a difficult

phenomenon to measure.

One way to indirectly measure support for popular or parliamentary sovereignty is to

look at the circumstances under which people vote. By observing whether they cast their votes

on the merits or stance of a party as a whole, or whether they cast their votes based upon the

merits of their individual MLAs, we can glean an understanding of how they perceive the

breadth of the representative function. Those who would vote on a party level would likely

perceive the Private Member’s role as part of a larger voting block, as consistent with

responsible government. Those voting on the merits of the particular MLA would likely perceive

the role as one of a constituency agent or conscientious trustee, suggesting a larger role desired

for the Private Member. It is this latter sounding that would be most encouraging for our

purposes.

The most recent polling to this effect in British Columbia took place during the 1996

provincial election. One study by the Angus Reid Group of Vancouver asked a sample of people

at various stages prior to the election to name the most important considerations in deciding how

to cast their votes.28 The May 3 polling determined that only 48% saw the party’s stand on issues

27 Canadian Study of Parliament Group, Responsible Government (Ottawa: Canadian Study of Parliament Group,1989) 7.28 The question was specifically as follows: “In deciding which party to support in the next provincial election,which of the following considerations would you say is most important to you in making up your mind?”

36

to be the deciding factor, while 22% regarded the qualities of the individual candidate as

instrumental.29 These numbers tell us a great deal. Contrary to the standard assumptions, a

representative’s role in a party was by no means the decisive factor in this election. Rather, there

was a general understanding of multiple representational roles with a strong acknowledgment of

individual capability as essential to proper representation. While these numbers do not allow us

to deny partisanship as important, they do allow us to question partisanship’s supremacy in

representation. Obviously, the citizenry is not particularly attached to the traditions of the

Westminster system. When we also take into account that the question allowed only singular and

not preferential answers – that is to say, respondents were allowed only one choice, and were

unable to express their further support for the other principles in any substantive way – the

representative’s paramount duty to party is cast in further disrepute.

There have also been studies at the federal level, mainly done in conjunction with the

1991 “Lortie Report” on Electoral Reform and Party Financing. In an associated text, a

whopping 87% concluded that parties merely confuse issues.30 Furthermore, when the same

authors asked if MPs were elected to follow the public interest (i.e. national interest) or follow

the views of their constituents, 63% supported the latter constituency role.31 Yet we must balance

this anti-party sentiment with other polls taken in the same study, including 74% who agreed that

“without political parties, there can’t be true democracy.”32 Taking these strong opinions into

consideration, we must conclude that, like British Columbia, Canada celebrates no absolute view

29 This number climbed as high as 27% on May 23 in the Interior BC region.30 André Blais and Elizabeth Gidengil, Making Representative Democracy Work: The Views of Canadians(Toronto: Dundrun Press, 1991) 42.31 Blais and Gidengil 59.32 Blais and Gidengil 16. The 2000 study by Howe and Northrup (see note 3, Chapter I) asked this question again,and received a 69% affirmative response.

37

of representation. Without question, a strong ambivalence towards a party-centered

representation clearly presides.

While direct public opinion is always preferred, we can also learn a great deal about the

popular psyche through the behaviour of public institutions. One institution of note would be the

Supreme Court of Canada and of the provinces. In the 1989 Dixon case, while presenting her

judgment on the legality of BC’s electoral boundaries in light of the Charter “right to vote,”

Chief Justice Beverley McLachlin (now Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Canada) asserted

the following role of the elected Member:

The most fundamental function of elected representatives is to represent their constituency. Theyfunction in two roles – legislative and what has sometimes been termed the “ombudsman role”….In the legislative role, it is the majority of elected representatives who determine who forms thegovernment and what laws are passed. In principle, the majority of elected representatives shouldrepresent the majority of the citizens entitled to vote. Otherwise, one runs the risk of rule by theminority. Moreover, party majorities may be small and coalitions or minority governmentsformed. Governments may stand or fall depending on the decisions of one or two members of thelegislature.33

For Justice McLachlin, the role of the individual Member is clearly defined – to represent the

constituency, not vote for the party. Furthermore, in the Court’s view the principles of

responsible government – the standing or falling of government according the legislature’s

wishes – remain conditional on the MLA being allowed to fully exercise his or her primary role

of constituency advocacy.

Even the government of British Columbia itself has come to agree with McLachlin’s

view of the representative function. In accordance with the consequent amendments included in

33 Dixon 266.

38

the Electoral Districts Act (1999), the British Columbia Constitution Act was amended to

include the following statement:

Members represent electoral districts18 (1) For returning members of the Legislative Assembly, there are to be the number of electoraldistricts established by the Electoral Districts Act, with the names, boundaries and areasdetermined in the manner provided for by the Electoral Boundaries Commission Act.(2) The Legislative Assembly consists of the members elected in the manner provided for by theElection Act(3) A member represents the electoral district for which the member was elected [italics inserted]

In reference to the elected Member, the only responsibility clearly mandated is towards the

constituency. We must assume that this statement, being part of BC’s primary constitutional

document, is more than a mere platitude.

Perhaps the most interesting reflection of public belief comes through the recent

platforms of the parties themselves. On a provincial level, the BC Liberals have put forward a

number of proposals that imply a non-partisan role for the MLA.34 More directly, Reform BC

has made the following proclamation in Article 8 of their draft BC Constitution: “MLAs shall

vote according to the wishes of their constituents…” On a federal level, the newly re-named

Canadian Alliance offers a similar position on representation in Article 7 of their Constitution:

We believe that political parties should be guided by stated values and principles which are sharedby their Members; that the people's elected representatives exist to serve their electors honestly,ethically, and with concern for all; that their duty to their electors supersedes their obligations totheir political parties or personal views … [italics inserted]

34 These proposals are contained in the 1999 “A New Era for British Columbia” document, and will be dealt withspecifically in Chapter III of this report.

39

This position has been proven on numerous occasions, including Reform MP Ted White’s 1995

decision to forgo his party’s position and support Liberal gun control legislation after a self-

commissioned poll showed his constituents strongly in favour of the legislation.35

The Canadian Alliance stance sits in blatant juxtaposition to the practices of the present-

day federal Liberal party. Despite 1993 Red Book promises to let MPs follow the demands of

their constituents36, their unofficial policy has come to be best characterized by the following

statement made by Prime Minister Chrétien in House debates over use of referendum:

We were elected under a program…. I said yesterday, and it is very simple, that this notion that weshould be replaced by polling is revolting to me. And I repeat it today, we have been elected to useour judgment. Members of this party use their judgment knowing they belong to a party that waselected with a program. This is what a political party is …37

Clearly, the Liberal position remains narrow. As one commentator reported, M. Chretien “has

warned dissident Liberals that he may not let them run under the party banner in the next election

if they continue to break ranks.”38 It is little wonder that their current track record for reform has

been relatively weak.

Of course, this analysis would be incomplete without the input of the key players in this

debate: the representatives themselves. The most prominent view of representation in recent

years was put forth by former MLA Cliff Serwa, who made the following response to the Speech

from the Throne:

As a backbencher on the government side, I often stated my order of priorities: (1) theconstituents, who indeed elected me; (2) the party that nominated and worked so hard – literally a

35 Peter O’Neil, “Reform MP breaks ranks to support gun control,” Vancouver Sun 21 May 1995.36 Liberal Party of Canada, Creating Opportunity: The Liberal Plan for Canada (Ottawa: Liberal Party of Canada,1993) 92.37 Quoted, in Preston Manning, “Obstacles for Parliamentary Reform,” Canadian Parliamentary Review, 17:2 (1994)np.38 Joan Bryden, “Whose vote is it anyway: yours, your MP’s or the party’s?” Vancouver Sun, 24 June 1995: B1.

40

small army working to have me elected; and (3) my government – and as I indicated, that had tobe earned on a continued basis to deserve my support.39

There is little confusion as to how the role of the MLA is ideally structured. This view is

similarly forwarded by former MLA David Mitchell:

The people of British Columbia want their legislators to represent them – not blind devotion toparties, not blind devotion to dogma or rhetoric. The people of British Columbia want to berepresented by their members. They want to have constituency-based politics, not party-basedpolitics any longer.40

Although these opinions are nearly ten years old, the sentiment remains largely unchanged in

recent years. As Opposition member Gary Farrell-Collins more recently noted in reference to the

backbencher’s role:

Those members never get a chance to bring the issues of their constituents to the Legislature – thejob they were hired to do. They weren’t hired to just attend caucus meetings; they weren’t hiredjust to go on bended knee to ministers. They were hired by their constituents and sent here to raisein a public way issues that are important to them.41

Even in our most recent Speech from the Throne, the government acknowledged the complexity

of the role by demanding reforms to “ensure a proper balance between member responsibilities

in this assembly and within their constituencies.”42 With nearly 50% of a representative’s time

spent on constituency work43, there is little wonder why this sentiment prevails. The ability to

make an impact, prove their effectiveness, and increase chances of re-election are far greater at

this level than in the House. Much like Mr. Gilmour, our New Brunswick legislator from a

century ago, it is obvious that today’s MLAs still believe that their main duty is to “go in for”

their respective constituencies alongside party and government concerns.

39 British Columbia, Debates of the Legislative Assembly, 1993 Legislative Session: 2nd Session 35th Parliament, 8.9(March 26, 1993).40 British Columbia, Debates of the Legislative Assembly, 1992 Legislative Session: 1st Sesssion 35th Parliament, 7.7(December 4, 1992).41 British Columbia, Debates of the Legislative Assembly, 1998/99 Legislative Session: 3rd Session 36th Parliament,12.3 (July 22, 1998).42 British Columbia, Debates of the Legislative Assembly, 2000 Legislative Session: 4th Session 36th Parliament, 18.1(March 15, 2000).43 A poll of individual MPs (including cabinet ministers) showed that an average of 42% of their time was spent onconstituency-related matters. Cited in David Docherty, Mr. Smith Goes to Ottawa: Life in the House of Commons(Vancouver: UBC Press, 1997) 186.

41

What we can conclude at this stage is that there is a growing public realization of a

complex role for the elected Member that cannot be ignored. While we are not seeing a

wholesale rejection of the Member-party relationship, we are seeing an acknowledgment that the

Member has a far greater role to play in parliamentary proceedings than merely vis-à-vis their

respective party. As one MP phrased it, “An MP must always balance his beliefs, the wishes of

his main constituents and his party’s policies.”44 We may take this new appreciation of balance

to be ample justification and opportunity for legitimate parliamentary reform.

44 Editorial, “MPs still hear crack of whip,” Times Colonist, 8 May 1995: A5.

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4. Conclusions

[R]epresentatives must have the freedom and means to act for, and on behalf of, the represented.They must have as much power as the people would have were they present in person. Whereallegiance to party or political leaders takes precedence over the interests of the represented,representation is weakened. Where a political party, Prime Minister, premier, and cabinet diminishthe independence of the representatives, the channel through which citizens are to engage in self-rule is obstructed. Where a representative is impotent, the represented are impotent. Parliamentand the legislatures must have a significant role if the people are to be heard.45

For many, the discussion in this previous section would be discounted as purely

academic, esoteric and irrelevant to the practical issues of parliamentary reform. This is a

superficial assumption. If we are to fully empower the individual Member – be it an Opposition

member, Independent, or backbencher – then we must be clear on precisely how that power

would be exercised. The degree and extent of a Member’s present abilities and the expectations

placed upon said Member are both questions which are essential to our vision of exactly how far

a Member can evolve. Within our present system, what is the individual capable of when given

the necessary tools? This is the fundamental issue at stake when dealing with parliamentary

reform.

In this chapter, we have explored the theoretical, traditional, and practical understanding

of present-day representation in British Columbia. As we have discovered, the representative’s

role is by no means simple to express. In reconciling these three approaches (as explained

through each section), we come to the conclusion that the MLA has the potential and

professional duty according to the true dictates of their position to perform with greater efficacy

for the sake of their constituents and personal satisfaction. At present, it is sadly apparent that the

MLA’s true raison d’être has been persistently denied by the absence of the necessary tools. In

45 Nick Loenen, Citizenship and Democracy (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 1997) 55.

43

this light, reform of parliamentary practices is essential. When we realize the multiplicity of roles

the representative should be serving, any system that frustrates any of these parts must be

considered a perversion.

There has been a recent study released that discusses the serious problem of stress among

MPs, highlighting both the consequences (mainly, the impediment of day-to-day activity) and

possible remedies for the problem. As the author notes, one of the main causes of stress is the

restricted role for the Member and the frustration that inevitably follows. Consequently, relief for

this source of stress can only come through reform of parliamentary practices:

Undeniably a most effective form of institutional assistance would be some relaxation of partycontrol, enabling MPs to make a greater personal input into the formation of public policy. [Forexample], if Members could review and propose changes to draft legislation and vote for somemodification of departmental estimates, their sense of self-worth would grow.46

This is not merely a question of professional obligation on the part of parliamentarians to bring

forward reforms; clearly, there is a moral obligation as well. Ideally, with the growth of

representative self-worth will come the growth of the citizen’s self-worth, and the democratic

gap will be significantly narrowed.

46 Peter C. Dobell, “Stress and the MP,” Occasional Papers on Parliamentary Government 9 (November 1999): 12.

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Chapter III

Options for Parliamentary Reform

During my time in Parliament I managed a stint on the government backbenches (1978-1979), aperiod in Opposition when I chaired the Public Accounts Committee (1979-1980), over four yearsin Cabinet (1980-1984) and now find myself once more on the benches of the Official Opposition.From these vantage points I have reflected upon the undeniable truth that the House of Commonshas become more an object of scorn and sardonic humour than an institution respected as aninstrument of public policy.47

As the previous section outlined, (by nature) the British Columbia parliamentary system

is not conducive to a high degree of activity by individual Members. The realities of responsible

government have placed a high valuation on parties as the main political actors. Even more so,

this structure has resulted in a disproportional allocation of power to an Executive branch that is

loath to give back any influence to the Legislative branch. “The Legislature is not,” notes one

commentator, “the hub of the political world.”48 Despite our assertions that they have a natural

right to expanded powers as representatives, in practice Private Members still remain “little more

than voices in the wilderness.”49

The expanded powers of “King Cabinet”50 stem from a number of sources. As we have

already discussed, responsible government depends upon a constant upward pull of influence. To

ensure this influence, over the years the trend has been towards the accumulation of power with

the Premier and his ministers through both constitutional and political channels. Constitutionally,

through the British North America Act, 1867 and British Columbia’s Constitution Act, 1996, the

47 Donald Johnston, Up the Hill (Toronto: Optimum Publishing International, 1986) 242.48 R. Jeremy Wilson, “The Legislature,” The Reins of Power, eds. J.T.Morley et al. (Vancouver: Douglas andMcIntyre Ltd., 1983) 16.49 Cliff Serwa, British Columbia, Debates of the Legislative Assembly, 1993 Legislative Session: 2nd Session 35th

Parliament, 8.9 (March 26, 1993).50 Terence Morley, “The Government of the Day,” Politics, Policy and Government in British Columbia, ed. R. K.Carty (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1996) 147.

45

convention of the Premier possessing the powers of the Lieutenant-Governor with extensive

control over appointment, elections, and spending that gives the executive powerful tools to

control all House activities. In his seminal work on the subject, Campbell Sharman concluded

that in British Columbia, “The velvet fist of partisan ascendancy is covered with an iron glove of

constitutional authority.”51 As a result, political powers ranging from supervision over all

postings to major boards, commissions and regulatory agencies to absolute control over all

policy direction (through cabinet committees, the Treasury Board and the Planning Board) have

succeeded in making the Legislature nothing more than a rubber stamp. Finally, the

psychological weapons of experience and authority over individual Members succeed where

other mechanisms leave off, virtually guaranteeing subordination. What we have today can be

considered nothing short of an “elected dictatorship,”52 in which the government is denied

nothing – often at the expense of the Legislature.

Many would argue that such an arrangement is ideal in the name of efficiency. A

government that dominates is a government that can successfully fulfill the agenda under which

it was elected. Yet this can often be a mistaken face of tyranny, as one author notes:

Examples of “bold government” and “decisive leadership” have in fact too often been the story ofgovernment by just a handful of individuals, or even one powerful leader, and around this patternor tradition has developed much supportive analysis and self-justifying mythology about thenature of political leadership.53

51 Campbell Sharman, “The Strange Case of the Provincial Constitution: The British Columbia Constitution Act,”Canadian Journal of Political Science 17.1 (1984): 98.52 Peter Aucoin, “Responsible Government and Citizen Engagement at the Millennium: Are Political PartiesIrrelevant?” Taking Stock of 150 Years of Responsible Government in Canada, eds. F. Leslie Seidle and LouisMassicotte (Ottawa: Canadian Study of Parliament Group, 1999) 71.53 Patrick Boyer, Hands on Democracy (Toronto: Stoddart Publishing Co. Ltd., 1993) 66.

46

Our concern in this report is not with efficiency; it is with democracy. And from a democratic

standpoint, the imbalance between the executive and legislative branches is nothing short of

unjust.

It is this realization that has triggered extensive movements for parliamentary reform in

other jurisdictions. Britain and Australia have undergone extensive reform of their committee

processes over the last twenty years. This trend has swept through New Zealand, India, and other

parliamentary systems. Closer to home, the Alberta government since 1993 has endeavoured on

a continuing review of its practices with the ongoing work of its Select Special Committee on

Parliamentary Reform. Most of the other provinces (British Columbia excluded) have followed

this lead. Perhaps the most surprising example is Canada, which has spent the last twenty years

in a perpetual review of the problem of parliamentary inefficacy. In fact, the 1985 “McGrath

Committee” on Reform set out its mission statement as follows:

The purpose of reform of the House of Commons in 1985 is to restore to private members aneffective legislative function, to give them a meaningful role in the formation of public policy and,in so doing, to restore the House of Commons to its rightful place in the Canadian politicalprocess.54

This successful commission (in which most proposals were accepted) was followed by continued

review through the Standing Committee on House Management and its subsequent sub-

committee on Procedure and House Affairs. These bodies continue to review issues for reform

and report regularly and often successfully to the House of Commons.

54 Canada, House of Commons, Report of the Special Committee on Reform of the House of Commons (Ottawa:Ministry of Supply and Services, 1985) 1 [McGrath Report].

47

In contrast, British Columbia has approached reform at a snail’s pace; as one MLA noted,

“we’re out of date; we’re behind the times.”55 Despite the Speaker’s authority to continually

review the practices of the Legislative Assembly (both through the Legislative Procedure Review

Act and the Constitution Act), very few serious initiatives have been put forward. In 1972, under

the new NDP government, long-awaited changes such as Hansard services and Question Period

were put in place. This was followed by the subsequent creation of the ombudsman and auditor

general, and a new financial administration act to control budgeting in the 1970s and early

1980s. In 1985, the Select Standing Committee on Standing Orders and Private Bills reported a

series of reforms to the Assembly including a private members’ day, abolishing appeals to the

Speaker, time limits on speeches, provisions for the use of select standing committees, and

televised Hansard. Only some of these many recommendations have ever been put into practice.

Aside from these two periods, with the exception of the modifications to the estimates process

and Freedom of Information legislation in 1992, and the election of the Speaker in 1994, the

British Columbia system has remained largely sedentary on serious parliamentary reforms.

As such, Private Members in British Columbia have remained largely ignored and

increasingly obsolete, “poor cousins” to the members of the executive.56 In terms of democratic

evolution, British Columbia’s practices are anachronistic – a throwback to colonial times in

which the paternal governors dragged the citizenry kicking and screaming into campaigns of

province building. Yet the time appears ripe for change. The release of the BC Liberal “New

Era” policy document in late 1999 – which put forth numerous commitments to serious reform

55 Murray Coell, British Columbia, Debates of the Legislative Assembly, 1998/99 Legislative Session: 3rd Session36th Parliament, 12.9 (July 28, 1998).56 David Docherty, Mr. Smith Goes to Ottawa: Life in the House of Commons (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1997) 5.

48

including free votes, a legislative calendar, and a re-evaluation of committees – has put reform in

British Columbia on the immediate agenda. The continuing activities of the Reform/Canadian

Alliance Party, with their commitments to free voting and committee advancement throughout

the 1990s, has given such issues salience on a national level. Clearly, British Columbia is

currently on the crest of a parliamentary reform wave. As David Lam noted in the 1993 Speech

from the Throne, “Our world is changing; and traditions, while being honoured and respected,

must also change to make institutions relevant in today’s time.”57 The question now no longer

remains when change will happen – it only remains how change will happen.

This Chapter closely examines the how. The following sections outline the major areas of

reform currently being discussed and propose specific methods to attain maximum compatibility

with British Columbia’s needs. Despite the constraints of constitutions, the power balance of

federalism, and the implicit resistance by the executive to empower the Private Member, there

are many subtle changes that can make a pronounced difference to the individual MLA without

substantially upsetting the executive power structure. This is a delicate balance to tread. Yet the

public benefits of concrete institutional reforms through a re-invigorated democratic process

could far outweigh the executive sacrifices. All parties in British Columbia have made the

commitment to change. The remainder of this report will now explain how to best achieve these

changes and ensure that these commitments are kept.

57 Hon. David C. Lam, British Columbia, Debates of the Legislative Assembly, 1996 Legislative Sesssion: 1st

Session 36th Parliament, 1.2 (June 25, 1996).

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1. Asserting Individual Efficacy: Free Votes and the Private Member

The pervasive dominance of parties over all aspects of an MP’s career, and all aspects ofparliamentary life, is an overwhelming obstacle to real reform. It is easy to say that there ought tobe fewer votes of confidence, or that private members ought to have more freedom, but almostimpossible to make the change. The iron discipline of party is a consequence, caused by factorsoutside the ability of procedural and even attitudinal changes to reform.58

The concept of free votes is perhaps the most frequently discussed parliamentary reform

in contemporary Canadian politics. In 1993 and 1997 respectively, both the Liberal Party of

Canada and the Reform Party of Canada brought forward this reform to increasing enthusiasm

from the electorate.59 Today, we can see this trend carried on by the Canadian Alliance and the

BC Liberal Party, both of which have promised to enable free votes.60 It is a promise that is

easily made by parties of all colours, and professed to be just as easily kept.

There is the perception that it merely requires the conscious will – the verbal fiat – of any

party to make free voting a reality in our institutions. Yet we have seen very little progress on

either the national or provincial level. While oppositions have practised free votes on occasion

(as we shall see, it is much easier for oppositions to do so), government free votes have been

virtually non-existent. In British Columbia, the most recent “free vote” proclaimed by the NDP

government was on the controversial Nisga’a Treaty in 1999.61 To no one’s surprise, the vote

divided precisely along party lines. This suggests to us that, much like the epigraph suggests, the

issue of free votes is more complex than most of its proponents would like to admit.

58 C.E.S. Franks, The Parliament of Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto, 1987) 141.59 See Liberal Party of Canada, Creating Opportunity: the Liberal Plan for Canada (Ottawa: Liberal Party of Canada,1993) 92, and Reform Party of Canada, Blue Book: 1996-1997 Principles and Policies of the Reform Party ofCanada (Calgary: Reform Party of Canada, 1997) 38-39.60 See Canadian Alliance, Policy Declaration (2000) and BC Liberal Party, A New Era in British Columbia (1999).61 Prior to Nisga’a, the last official NDP free vote was in 1988 when, as Opposition, they allowed a caucus free voteon the ratification of Meech Lake.

50

In the following sections, we will attempt to investigate and better understand this issue

that appears so easy in principle yet remains so difficult in practice. By examining the dynamics

that underscore the exercise of voting in the parliamentary system in general and British

Columbia in particular – mainly through the discussions of party discipline – we will develop a

more robust awareness of the complications that accompany this particular reform. With this in

mind, we will then draw upon the experiences of the United Kingdom and other progressive

jurisdictions in order to help us re-imagine both the principles and mechanisms of party voting as

we know it by providing alternative models for emulation. Ultimately, this analysis will leave us

with a much stronger understanding of the complexities that free votes inspire and the means by

which to effectively foster their implementation and success in British Columbia.

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i. Free Votes and Party Discipline in Context

Simply put, free votes are votes cast in the parliamentary chamber which are based purely

on a Member’s personal feelings or on the interests of his or her constituents and are not

constrained by partisan pressures to vote as leadership dictates. The presumption is that, with

free votes, a Member would become more responsive to local needs and their own feelings when

judging legislation, thus enabling them to most accurately fulfill their representative functions.

Because governments would no longer be able to depend on parties voting as groups, legitimate

consensus and proper disclosure or inquiry would be necessary to assure majority support. The

result would be better legislation and a more cooperative legislative process. Furthermore, the

increased involvement would compel Members to better educate themselves on policy (Walter

Bagehot’s “educative function”62). Voters’ cynicism about parliamentary government would be

mitigated as the power structure became more balanced, and the now-independent Members

themselves would benefit from the increased dignity of feeling “less like a number, less like a

cipher... [but] bigger, more independent, more self-reliant.”63 And most importantly, the resulting

activity of the government as a whole would be a product based on consensus of the Legislature

as a whole, who would then be collectively responsible and accountable for the results.

Traditional democratic principles instead of executive government would once again become the

norm. As one supporter noted,

[W]ith free votes, for the first time ever we would be able to construct arguments in debatedesigned to actually change the minds of members in this Legislature. That is an element thatreally is missing in the Legislature. It does not utilize the potential, the ability and the knowledgeof individual members.64

62 John Hyde,”Is Party Discipline Harming Democracy?” IPA Review 45.2 (1992) 38.63 Robert Stanfield quoted in Ontario, Legislative Library, Party Discipline and Legislative Voting (Toronto:Legislative Library, 1984) 5.64 Cliff Serwa, British Columbia, Debates of the Legislative Assembly, 1992 Legislative Session: 1st Session 35th

Parliament, 7.7 (December 4, 1992).

52

It is evident that both the public and parliamentarians alike support these changes. A

1991 poll noted that 78% of Canadians supported the ability for Members to vote freely65; in

1997, a similar sounding of parliamentarians noted 85% in favour.66 Most recently, a 2000 study

determined that 77% of citizens continued to favour “voting freely” as a desirable reform.67

Widespread support for this reform by Members and citizens alike is beyond question.

Yet despite this affirmation, resistance to this reform by governments in power has

remained formidable. Primarily, free votes – by intensifying the fear of non-confidence – could

create a perpetual instability and endanger the government’s ability to implement its program.

Ministers would be unable to formulate long-term goals without an assurance that their

legislation would pass. Accountability and responsibility would cease to rest with the

government, instead diffused amongst all Members to the voters’ confusion. Free votes are

deemed by some fearmongers to represent the critical change that would convert our traditional

parliamentary system to a full-blown congressional system and with it the problems of standstill

legislation, logrolling, and intensive lobbying. Finally, free votes would weaken the centrality of

parties in the parliamentary system, undermining the concepts of collective ideology, loyalty,

emotional belonging, and legitimacy that characterizes a singular governing (or potentially

governing) body.68

65Royal Commission on Electoral Reform and Party Financing, Reforming Electoral Democracy, Vol. 1 (Ottawa:Minister of Supply and Services, 1991) 226 [Lortie Report].66 David Docherty, Mr. Smith Goes to Ottawa: Life in the House of Commons (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1997) 161.67 Paul Howe and David Northrup, “Strengthening Canadian Democracy: The Views of Canadians,” Policy Matters1.5 (July 2000): 23. This poll also recorded a surprising 83% for in support of free votes that specifically mandatedvoting according to constituency wishes, and 82% in support of free voting according to the representative’spersonal views.68 Murray Mincoff, “Party discipline and the legislative process in Canada,” Parliamentary Weekly March 1997: 38.

53

Clearly, the arguments for and against free votes fall along the lines of democracy versus

efficiency. While the efficiency arguments are legitimate, this report does not embrace them as a

viable concern to override democratic imperatives. And from a democratic vantage, it is clear

that free votes offer a number of opportunities for Private Member efficacy that cannot be

ignored.

The question still remains – if free votes are so logical, then why are they not the standard

practice? Clearly, even when governments announce “free votes” (such as the Nisga’a vote in

BC), in practice Members do not often take the initiative. The reason for this unusual situation is

the power of party discipline – the ability of a party to exert pressure on its Members (through

various sticks and carrots) to accord with the party’s stance on a subject irrespective of

constituency or conscience interests. The office of the “whip” in parliamentary jurisdictions is

designed primarily to represent this force in any party. In principle, when a free vote is called

this discipline is lifted. But in practice, as this section’s epigraph suggests, discipline is not so

easily dismissed. While party discipline invades every aspect of Private Member activity, it is in

the area of legislative voting that its power is most clearly felt.69 For that reason, it remains the

largest barrier to free voting in British Columbia and the “bane of democracy”70 in general.

Many proponents of free voting look towards Congressional voting in the United States –

with its weakened party discipline – as the ideal model for British Columbia. Yet this denies

69 Lucinda Flavell and Philip Kaye, “Party Discipline and Legislative Voting”, Canadian Parliamentary Review 9.2(Summer 1986) 6.70 Hyde 38.

54

substantive systemic differences, including the separation of powers in the United States.71 The

executive branch does not depend on the legislative branch for approval. As such, there is no

need to exert pressure to assure congressional support. In British Columbia, with a strong yet ill-

defined sense of responsible government, the reality is starkly different. The executive needs

legislative support, and party discipline will be used be assure that support is unwavering. Since

1903, when the party system started in British Columbia, free votes have been rare while party

discipline has been pervasive.

How exactly does party discipline work? This is a difficult question to answer. Many

speak of it as if it is a tangible force that, like a partisan watchdog, can be trained to attack on

command. This is not the case. It is a force that is omnipresent, ever- changing, and as much a

symptom of other parliamentary problems as it is a cause.

There are several key realities that help foster the principles of discipline. First, party

discipline stems from the relative “amateurism” in all Canadian parliaments.72 Due to a number

of issues including lack of respect, long hours, unstable voting patterns, and (of course) lack of

efficacy, every election sees a high number of defeated candidates and the subsequent

introduction of many inexperienced legislators. In British Columbia, for example, the current

Legislature holds 36 newly elected Members (including by-elections) since 1996. Federally, 84

of the 301 MPs elected in 1997 were new to Parliament. The result of this dynamic is that there

71 Despite perceptions, even the United States Congress is beginning to betray signs of increased party discipline.Most notable examples have included the level of control exerted on Republicans under former Speaker NewtGingrich, and the internal decision by the Republican party to deny committee chairmanships to Members votingcontrary to the party. See Claudia Dreyfus, “Being Frank,” Mother Jones 20.3 (May/June 1995): 70 and RowlandEvans et al., “Evans and Novak,” Human Events54.25 (July 1998): 10 for further information.72 Docherty 10.

55

is a heavy dependence on parties by these Members for guidance and education. Depending on

the party for survival, these individuals are reluctant to break the umbilical cord by voting

against their mentors, even when the consequences are minimal. A sense of duty and debt to

party prevails, making new Members more than susceptible to executive party discipline.

Second, party discipline exerts control because, deep down, Members are aware that they

are indeterminately beholden to their parties for their election. Parties supply candidates with an

identifiable label, secure funding, and a platform to “ride” upon. These are all difficult for

independent Members to establish independently. Furthermore, as Chapter II revealed to us,

party is the most common (although not absolute) reason that voters vote for a candidate. With

this in mind, it would be unreasonable to assume that Members would want to bite the hand that

fed them through their voting. A good example is the federal case of MP John Nunziata, whose

expulsion from the Liberal caucus to protest the continuation of the GST, and his subsequent

difficulty performing as an Independent, highlights that Members need parties to succeed more

than vice versa.73 Thus, party discipline is easily imposed at the party leadership’s choosing.

Whipping is barely needed when survival is at stake.

But most importantly, it is the sticks and carrots that give party discipline such a toehold

in British Columbia politics. Party leaders hold a number of potential rewards and punishments

that can be bestowed or inflicted on party Members, especially when that party happens to

73 Barbara Yaffe noted that “As an Independent MP, Nunziata now sits in the back row of the Commons, has nopolitical clout, zero chance of chairing a parliamentary committee or winning a parliamentary secretary’s job and isassigned the worst office in Ottawa” (Vancouver Sun, 29 November 1997: A12). In addition, MP Dennis Millsresigned from caucus in support of Nunziata. He soon realized the disadvantages of non-partisanship – andgrudgingly re-joined caucus a short time later.

56

occupy government. Benefits can include arranging for chairmanships or membership in

committees, boards, and commissions, elevation within the party structure (including

ministerial74 and secretarial positions for governing parties), assured re-nomination in subsequent

elections, patronage appointments in government or corporate institutions, and trips and travel.

In a business where job security and notoriety can be fleeting, these are appealing benefits to the

average Member and can easily sway even the most resolute representative.

Conversely, party discipline can work through punishments as well. Aside from the

denial of all the above benefits, a party can remove members from any position, deny them

nomination in the next election, restrict their access to Question Period, and even expel them

from caucus. Obviously, the sticks and carrots are greater for government parties, thus explaining

the lessened likelihood of government Members voting against most policy. Nevertheless, for

any party member a free vote is clearly not a “free-from-responsibility”75 vote. A Member must

always face inevitable consequences politically and publicly with every vote that he or she casts.

This is a heavy burden for any Member to shoulder, and considering the consequences of

toeing anything but the party line, there is little wonder that free votes are so scarce. One

inherent difficulty in free voting is that it creates a black and white response to complex

problems: either you go with the party or against the party.76 Framed in such terms, the choice

for most Members who wish to succeed is obvious. Furthermore, when the possibilities of future

74 For more information on and solutions to this aspect of party discipline, see Section 5, “Extending IndividualEfficacy: Giving Caucus the Power of Appointment.”75 Jennifer Smith, “Responsible Government and Democracy,” Taking Stock of 150 Years of ResponsibleGovernment in Canada, eds. F. Leslie Seidel and Louis Massicotte (Ottawa: Canadian Study of Parliament Group,1999) 32.76 Peter C. Dobell and Hon. John Reid, “A Larger Role for the House of Commons,” Parliamentary Government 40(April 1992): 12.

57

power are dangled in front of the Member – and with that the chance to possess real influence in

government – the sacrifice of the moment’s autonomy becomes easily justifiable in the name of

long-term efficacy. The political adage, “To get along, go along” clearly applies in this instance.

Logically, we can conclude that a great deal of discipline is ultimately self-imposed through the

fear of potential party reprisal and the hope of potential party reward.

This is not merely theoretical. MLAs frequently see the negative consequences of

bucking the party line, even in parties that profess to respect Private Member autonomy.

Federally, voting against the GST has resulted in three members losing their membership in both

the Conservative and Liberal caucuses.77 Even the former Reform Party, which propounded free

votes in their platform, did not allow deviation from the party line in either the case of gay rights

(Bill C-33) or approving the United Alternative.78 In British Columbia, the most recent example

of party discipline came with the May 2000 expulsion of backbench MLA Steve Orcherton from

the BC Buildings Corporation’s board of directors after he abstained from supporting his

government’s back-to-work legislation.79

These are by no means exceptional occurrences, and in each example, none of these

deviations by Members seriously endangered the position of their parties. But they show that

even simple acts of voting dissent are susceptible to disciplinary measures. Having to tread such

a fine line between what is and isn’t subject to discipline is an amazing pressure on Private

77 Alex Kindy and David Kilgour were expelled from the Conservatives; John Nunziata was expelled from theLiberals.78 In the former, 3 caucus members (David Chatters, Bob Ringma, and Jan Brown) were disciplined for speaking outagainst gay rights, thus compromising Reform’s moderate image. In the latter, Reform MP Jake Hoeppner wasexpelled from caucus after attacking Manning’s platform.79 Michael Smyth, “The Taste of Revenge,” Vancouver Province, 7 May 2000: A5.

58

Members, and as such they almost always end up voting on the side of caution. This insecurity

about how and when discipline is applied remains one of the main limitations facing free voting.

The conclusion that we reach is that free voting cannot be safely practised in British

Columbia under the present system that fosters such extensive party discipline. Furthermore, this

unfortunate state gives no indication of subsiding by its own volition. As one author notes, party

discipline is but the by-product of underlying and perhaps irremovable causes:

Problems in the security, independence, and the role of the representative put him in a position ofweakness and dependence that cannot be changed either by wishful thinking or by proceduralreform.80

Therefore, the expectation of curbing party discipline is somewhat low (although, as subsequent

sections will show, not unreasonable in some cases). Furthermore, considering the amazing

constructive force of party discipline for an executive, there is little hope of seeing them commit

to any noticeable restraint by their own accord.

As such, pragmatically the goal of reform must be to find ways to lessen the demand for

discipline to be imposed while still allowing parties, particularly those in government, to

maintain stability in their positions. As well, reform must look at ways to move a measure of

Private Member activity beyond the purview of party discipline. To deal with this first aspect of

reform, we will reconsider the confidence convention as it stands in British Columbia.

80 Franks 33.

59

ii. Assessing the Impact of Confidence

As previously mentioned, the cornerstone of responsible government is the

confidence convention. Any government that does not maintain the formal confidence of

the Legislature must cease to be the government. Hence, it is in confronting this potential

occurrence that party discipline is most readily imposed in government and Opposition.

On the government side, party Members are rallied to support the government; on the

Opposition side, Members are rallied to try and depose the government. Confidence

remains the most logical reason for party polarization and coalescence to take place. And

despite the loss of autonomy for individual Members, it can be judged as more than fair

that when a party’s future is clearly at stake on a single vote a party should use whatever

means necessary to ensure its survival.

The term “confidence” goes beyond the formal vote of non-confidence. Also at stake is

the issue of public confidence. A government that projects division or weakness at any time

perpetrates an informal vote of non-confidence amongst citizens. Philosophically, a government

cannot legitimately govern if the public suspects that they are incapable of doing so. Confidence

can begin to take on a much broader connotation in this context. Obviously, as we have seen in

the federal Reform and provincial NDP examples, a public sense of division is treated just as

seriously as a formal division. No party wants to appear insecure in its position, and when a fear

of insecurity persists, the formal and informal confidence conventions become indistinguishable.

As former Conservative MP Benno Friesen notes,

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Experience has been that the longer a government is in office the more every vote is maybe not avote of confidence but a vote of reputation, which is close to confidence, and therefore you haveuniformity.81

The result is a situation in which every act by government is considered a de facto confidence

motion. Thus, party discipline is constantly at work to mobilize all sides almost irrespective of

the specific issue.

Such is the case in Canada and British Columbia. As a result, the confidence convention

has become too broad to define and, consequently, it has come to be understood as an all-

pervading principle. And with this pervasion, the party whip automatically comes down on every

vote. Private Members are ultimately given very little opportunity to vote their concerns on any

legislation, and they soon come to fulfill the “trained seal” legacy that we wish to discredit.

Although we must admit that stability has prevailed under this all-encompassing notion of

confidence in British Columbia (the last government to fall under non-confidence was W.A.C.

Bennett’s short-lived 1952/53 administration, and before that Robert Beaven’s government in

1883), the voting Private Member has been rendered powerless in the process.

This situation represents a fundamental deficiency in our present system. Therefore, it

makes sense that the first step towards making free votes more acceptable would be to impose

strict definitions on what specifically constitutes “issues of confidence” as opposed to the

prevailing assumption that all votes in the House are implicitly expressions of confidence.

Logically, issues of confidence should only include those explicitly proclaimed to be as such by

the parties involved or else those relating to only specific aspects of legislative activity. Ideally,

this would then leave a number of opportunities beyond the purview of confidence where both

81 Dobell and Reid 13.

61

the parties and individual Members would be under no formal or public duress to promote a

unified party line. Confidence as implicit in every aspect of legislative activity must discontinue

in order for free votes to thrive.

The key to this proposal is the notion that there must be a definable distinction between

lost votes on legislation and lost votes of confidence. This is an essential differentiation to be

made if party discipline is to avoided, as one author points out:

The distinction between the defeat of a measure and the defeat of or loss of confidence in agovernment is crucial for the private member. Unless that distinction is understood in Parliamentand by the public, the influence of backbench members is diminished. The principal weapon theyhave is their votes. Unless they are free to withhold it or to threaten to do so without underminingthe party they supports their influence is greatly curtailed.82

In the absence of defined limits to confidence, the status quo has prevailed. And that status quo

does not fall in favour of free votes or Private Member efficacy.

The specific qualification of the confidence convention is a concept that has been put

forth on numerous occasions by the Canadian Alliance, BC Liberals, and even the federal

Progressive Conservatives83, as well as strongly recommended in the quintessential McGrath

Report of 1985. Furthermore, 79% of federal MPs in 1993 agreed that such specific reforms

would increase free votes.84 Clearly, this is a reform warranting serious consideration.

Furthermore, precedent has acted ardently in its favour.

82 Peter C. Dobell “Some Comments on Parliamentary Reform,” Institutional Reforms for RepresentativeGovernment, ed. Peter Aucoin (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985) 47.83 Canada, House of Commons, Shaping Canada’s Future Together: Proposals (Ottawa: Ministry of Supply andServices, 1991) 16.84 Docherty 161.

62

The concept of disavowing implicit votes of confidence has been best put into practice in

the United Kingdom, a jurisdiction touted by most free-vote proponents as the ideal model for

parliamentary institutions. Under this system, it is a common occurrence for a government to be

defeated on a vote, even on important government legislation. Between 1972 and 1979, the

government suffered sixty-five legislative defeats.85 Yet only one of those defeats ended in the

subsequent dissolution of the government. Furthermore, between 1974 and 1979, 89% of

Conservatives and 81% of Labour Members formally registered dissent at least once.86

How could such things occur? Most simply, it occurred because under the British model

a confidence motion can only take place when it is explicitly declared. That is to say, in order for

a defeat of legislation to parlay into a defeat of government, a separate non-confidence vote must

be taken immediately after to confirm this fact. For example, from 1972 to 1979, the only

dissolution came when the government lost the confidence vote that followed their legislative

defeat. Under no circumstances does a piece of legislation constitute an implicit vote of

confidence. As a result, Members are free to vote as they choose on any piece of legislation

without question on their own or on their party’s part as to whether or not it is a reflection of lost

confidence. In the end, the government decides how it will treat its losses and this has remained

the practice. Subsequently, both the public and the media have resultantly learned to dissociate

individual votes from questions of party stability, which has allowed parties to significantly relax

their disciplinary powers on both formal and informal confidence questions.

85 By 1986, the number of defeats on legislation had grown to 115.86 Anthony Birch, The British system of Government: Eighth Edition (London: Unwin Hyman, 1990) 119.

63

Ideally, it is this model of purely explicit confidence that most British Columbia

legislators would like to see imitated. If anything, Premier Dosanjh’s unequivocal portrayal of

his balanced-budget legislation in July 2000 as a confidence motion would imply that such an

arrangement is already preferable in most minds. However, to assume that it would work in

British Columbia as easily as it has in the United Kingdom would be to deny fundamental

differences between the two jurisdictions in terms of political culture and systemic realities. As

one author put it, “dissent does not occur in a vacuum”87 – other factors must also work in its

favour. For example, Britain’s political history has shown a high level of “safe seats” in each

jurisdiction, in which incumbents are continually re-elected irrespective of party assistance.

Furthermore, the party has no control over the continuing nomination of these members (it falls

purely under the discretion of the constituency association)88. Therefore, we can see a breed of

“career politicians” that do not depend on their parties for success. As well, it is not considered a

conflict-of-interest for MPs to hold outside employment (such as consulting, etc.). Ultimately,

the promise of future employment or threat of lost elections that makes British Columbia’s party

discipline so prevalent is not relevant in the United Kingdom.89

The number of MPs in Britain also points towards a considerable disparity. With 659

Members currently in the British House of Commons, the individual MP has less overall impact

on the general workings of Parliament. At the same time, this makes each vote less crucial to the

government’s larger agenda. An MP can vote against his or her party with the general assurance

87 Philip Norton, “Behavioural Changes: Backbench Independence in the 1980s,” Parliament in the 1980s, ed. PhilipNorton (London: Basil Blackwell, 1985) 36.88 Between 1942 and 1987, not a single British Conservative MP was denied candidacy, regardless of votingbehaviour. The Labour Party has had the same record since 1960.89 Franks 112.

64

that the fate of the government does not rest on their exercise of freedom. Parties give their

Members sufficient leeway in acknowledgment of this notion. The fact that caucus meetings are

simply held between whips, and do not involve individual Members, shows a low expectation by

party leaders that their Members should consistently fall within the “loop” on every issue.

Similarly, the high number of MPs mathematically lowers the odds of receiving the much

smaller number of executive or patronage appointments. At any one time, only 14% of MPs can

expect membership in government.90 Therefore, the chances of receiving a “carrot” for party

obedience are too low to compel any MP to vote in line. British Columbia, with only 79

Members to be returned in the next election, does not give the Member such freedom in

numbers.

Finally, on a cultural level, there is a long tradition of non-partisan activity in the British

House of Commons. The Speaker is elected as an Independent.91 All-party committees dominate

the majority of the legislative process. Internal factions prevent parties from developing a unified

platform that Members would be forced to toe. The media and general public are highly tolerant

of dissent and do not treat it as an indication of weak government. In British Columbia, party

centricity is the key, and thus is reflected in its current confidence conventions. There is an

expectation that all defeats mean non-confidence, and this is a habit that is so deeply entrenched

that it would be almost impossible to completely overcome.

90 “Remember the PBI,” The Economist 320.7718 (August 1991): 58.91 If elected in a new administration, a Speaker will often discard all party affiliation and subsequently sit as anIndependent member.

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Clearly, the level of party discipline in the United Kingdom is considerably less than that

of British Columbia, and as such the comparison of jurisdictions resembles that of apples and

oranges. An attempt to directly adopt the British system was put forth in 1923 by the Progressive

Party and was quickly disregarded as incongruent with Canada’s practices.92 But the implicit

differences between Canadian and British systems did not go unrecognized by the McGrath

Committee. They realized that cultural and systemic incongruities rendered direct imitation

unreasonable, and as such chose an intermediate route for reform. Instead of completely

removing implicit votes of confidence altogether, they decided that the most suitable

compromise would be an explicit declaration of precisely what types of defeats would be

considered implicit confidence motions. As a result, the Committee felt that Members would

have greater opportunity to vote freely as the necessity for discipline would be decreased.

The Committee suggested that general confidence in an administration had already been

decided through an election. Therefore, implicit votes of confidence should be restricted to

defeats on supply or matters essential to the government’s program.93 Having proclaimed these

parameters to the House, it would then be concluded that defeats on any other measures would

be considered confidence-free. Should either party wish these further measures to become issues

of confidence, they would then have to hold a formal confidence vote immediately after. In

making these recommendations, the Committee acknowledged that cohesive voting remained an

ingrained practice in Canada (as it is in many other countries94) and that any reform would have

92 William Irvine of the Progressive Party put forth the following motion on February 23, 1923 in the House ofCommons: “That, in the opinion of this House, a defeat of a government measure should not be considered as asufficient reason for the resignation of the government, unless followed by a vote of lack of confidence.”93 Canada, House of Commons, Report of the Special Committee on Reform of the House of Commons (Ottawa:Ministry of Supply and Services, 1985) 61.94 Cohesive legislative voting remains the norm in the German Bundestag, the Italian Chamber of Deputies, and theAustralian Parliament (Flavelle and Kaye 6).

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to allow for this pattern to continue operating in some contexts. The resulting solution was, in

this report’s opinion, a reasonable balance between respecting tradition and permitting

innovation. Unfortunately, the House did not accept these reforms.

Clearly, this model may be the most appropriate route for British Columbia to take. It

admits that governments must necessarily practise a level of discipline (as British members are

currently finding out95), yet restricts the scope of when such methods may be used. In 1992 and

1996, then-Reform MLA Jack Weisgerber put forward the Free Votes Enabling Act which

sought to amend the Constitution Act to limit confidence votes to “fundamental government

policy,” supply bills, and anything explicitly asserted as a confidence vote. Much like the

McGrath recommendations that undoubtedly inspired Mr. Weisgerber’s initiative, this legislation

did not pass. Obviously, both past and current administrations in British Columbia have been

hesitant to bring forth these changes.

However, British Columbia could learn a great deal from its neighbour, Alberta – a

province that has had significantly more luck in implementing such reforms. In August 1993, the

Alberta government signed a Memorandum of Agreement with the Liberal Party of Alberta. In

what has been called “a quantum leap” towards reform96, this Memorandum outlined, among

other things, a formula for defining votes of confidence. Section 8 of the Memorandum affirmed

that confidence votes would only include: money bills, Reply to the Speech from the Throne,

95 Many sources indicate that Tony Blair’s Labour party is forgoing the explicit vote of confidence and not toleratingdissent on major legislation. Clearly, this is an indication that the limited confidence convention has considerablemerit. For more, see “A Question for Tony Blair,” The Economist 343.8018: 53. Furthermore, analysis of theLabour Party Standing Orders reveals an ordinance to not “cast votes contrary to the decision of the Party Meeting,”thus circumscribing the tolerance of dissent to a serious degree.96 Hon. Stan Schumacher, QC, MLA, “Unpopular Forum: Revising the Standing Orders to reform Alberta’sLegislature,” The Parliamentarian 74.2 (April 1994): 107.

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explicit motions of non-confidence or censure (including those that the government initiates),

any measure a government declares to be one of confidence (as fundamental to party policy), and

budget motions. No other types of business would be considered inherent issues of confidence.

Furthermore, the Memorandum proclaimed that, in particular, all “private members’ business”

should be conducted free from whips (i.e. party discipline). Clearly, the spirit behind these

changes is in line with McGrath: to plainly define and minimize the areas of legislative activity

where confidence is implicit.

This Memorandum is extraordinary in a number of ways. Although signed in 1993, it has

continued to act in force to this day. Evidence suggests that it has been highly effective. If we

examine the Private Members’ Bills passed over the last ten years, we can see a definite trend in

which – due to the free votes – more and more of this legislation has reached Royal Assent. For

example, in 1990, 1991, and 1992, there were no successful Private Members’ Bills out of the

352 introduced. However, there has been a steady increase in successful Bills, most notably in

1998 when four out of 32 reached Royal Assent. Between 1993 and 1998, a further 12 of these

Bills were passed. While these numbers are small, they do indicate a dramatic change in attitude.

Furthermore, cross-voting by government Members on minor legislation has become more

acceptable. For example, during 1997 and 1998, Progressive Conservative MLA Gene

Zwozdesky voted against third reading on government legislation three times without censure.97

Yet confidence still runs high in areas of major policy, most noticeably of late the final vote on

Bill 11 (Health Care Protection Act) which clearly fell along party lines despite fragmented

97 In 1997, he voted against third reading of the Registries Statutes Amendment Act (Bill 11). In 1998, he votedagainst third readings for the Electric Utilities Amendment Act (Bill 27) and the Colleges, Technical Institutes andUniversities Amendment Act (Bill 35).

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support across constituencies. According to most sources98, it is apparent that this qualification

of confidence has been successful in this province.

Perhaps part of the success of this reform has been the method of implementation. Unlike

British Columbia’s attempts, Alberta has realized that such rules cannot be legislated. Discipline

is an instrument belonging to parties, and as such parties themselves must agree on a standard set

of conduct governing when its application is necessary – at least until such practices become

convention. No party can be coerced into such an arrangement; it must join willingly. Through

signing a Memorandum of Agreement with the Opposition, the Alberta Conservatives have

secured all-party participation, and the resulting positive public response has given it “the force

of public opinion.”99 It is clear that this method has far more benefits that any single party trying

to formally coerce free voting through legislation.

Taking all of this into consideration, it is possible that the best way to reduce party

discipline and foster free voting in British Columbia would be to imitate the Alberta reforms.

This would involve the signing of a type of all-party agreement (such as the Memorandum) that

specifically outlines the terms of the confidence convention, narrowing implicit questions of

confidence to “money” and budget bills, the Speech from the Throne, and issues fundamental to

government policy. All other votes, by elimination, would intrinsically be deemed as “free votes”

in the Legislature in which use of party discipline would be unnecessary unless formally deemed

98 See Michael Jenkinson “The new permissiveness in Alberta politics,” Western Report May 15, 1995: 15 andThomas Bateman and David Thomas “The Rhetoric and Reality of Parliamentary Reform in Alberta,” CanadianParliamentary Review (Winter 1993-1994): 16.99 Schumacher 106.

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otherwise by a party. And of course, a formal vote of non-confidence would remain wholly

permissible under such changes.

While this qualification of confidence would obviously be a fundamental shift in standard

practice, the spirit of this reform would not be wholly alien to British Columbia’s habits. During

the latest Parliament, for example, the BC Liberals have adopted an informal type of

qualification by allowing free votes on subjects they qualify as “morality issues” such as abortion

bubble zones in 1995 (Bill 48) and, more recently in this past session, the re-definition of

“spouse” to include same-sex partners (Bill 21). While the action on the former bill was harshly

scrutinized by the media, by the time the latter was dealt with most observers were comfortable

with this stance.100 Clearly, this informal position on confidence votes has proven acceptable to

both politicians and public alike. This affirms this report’s belief that the formal adoption of such

rules would be appropriate and agreeable in British Columbia.

Obviously, the active ingredient to this solution will be, as one author put it, a “simple

and unambiguous formula” for determining confidence.101 Yet there is one aspect of this formula

that remains problematic. Precisely what is an issue that is “fundamental to government policy”?

This is a non-specific qualification, yet appeared in some form in both the Alberta formula and

Mr. Weisgerber’s bill. Unless it is further clarified, the same uncertainty about confidence that

has prevailed in British Columbia could very well continue to prevail despite new rules.

100 See Justine Hunter, “Abortion protest bill approved,” Vancouver Sun, 28 June 1995: A1 and “NDP extendssame-sex couple rights,” Vancouver Province, 13 June 2000: A1.101 Dobell and Reid 14.

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Therefore, a further mechanism is needed to solidify this aspect of the confidence convention.

The United Kingdom Parliament has a traditional model that may prove useful in this respect.

In Canada, the duty of the party whip is intimately tied to party discipline. It is no

accident that the individual who arranges for offices, trips and committee membership – the

“carrots” of party discipline – is the same figure that assures that all party Members will vote a

certain way on legislation. Yet in Britain, the whip fulfills a different duty. Due to the relative

disinterest most MPs have in toeing the party line regardless of potential carrots, the whip’s job

has become one of a two-way relay of communication between executive and caucus. Should a

large number of MPs disagree with executive policy, then the whip must communicate the

necessary compromises to the executive. Often, their success is determined more by persuasion

of Members than by threats, and when persuasion fails, “Whips are seen to be men of straw.”102

While in Canada and British Columbia the whip is an executive agent, in Britain the whip clearly

belongs to the Members.103

One way the whip communicates with Members is to distribute a weekly notice also

called a “whip.” This notice outlines the agenda for the week and signifies the relative urgency

of each piece of business. A “one-line whip” indicates simple business with no expected

divisions. A “two-line whip” indicates a likely division that MPs must attend unless they have

arranged a pair104. A “three-line whip” indicates a division on an issue of vital importance to the

government, making attendance imperative by all Members. On one level, the written whip is

102 Peter G. Richards, The Backbenchers (London: Faber and Faber, 1974) 62.103 This is affirmed by the Labour Party practice of letting the caucus elect its Chief Whip.104 Pairing is the practice whereby a Member who knows he or she will be absent arranges for the absence of aMember from the alternate party so that the voting balance is not changed.

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merely a means of ensuring attendance. But it has a more substantial function in that it also

“indicates the strength of party commitment on each item of business.”105 The physical document

becomes a concrete manifestation of the free voting potential, as each MP is explicitly informed

of when and where dissent is inappropriate. The fact that from 1970 to 1979 only three votes of

confidence were held on defeated legislation is evidence that the three-line whip is generally

accepted by most MPs. According to Nigel Forman, British Labour MP, “Voting against one’s

party on the three-line whip is very, very unusual.”106

In Alberta, the three-line whip has been suggested as an excellent accompaniment to their

confidence convention107, although it remains largely unused. Yet it is sensible to conclude that

if British Columbia were to include issues “fundamental to party policy” under its definition of

confidence, then a version of the British “whip” system would be very desirable in order to

inform Members of precisely what these fundamental issues entail. Members could then easily

conclude when and where dissent would be tolerated. The whip may be merely figurative –

priorities could be outlined in caucus meetings and committees – yet the acknowledged presence

of the mechanism itself would clarify the use of party discipline in some areas, and the complete

absence in other areas. To a limited extent, this system has found success in Canada’s House of

Commons, such as in the recent debate over Hepatitis C compensation.108 Although Canada still

lacks the qualification of confidence desperately needed, this use of the whip has proven helpful

in clarifying such important policy at the federal level for certain Members.

105 Philip Norton, The Commons in Perspective (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1981) 29.106 “Party Discipline,” Parliamentary Government 6.4: 10.107 Bateman and Thomas 19.108 See Mike Scandiffio, “Was Trudeau right?” The Hill Times, 5 March 1998: np.

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Finally, in addition to these established practices, a further qualification of the confidence

convention may prove advantageous in British Columbia. In many of the world parliaments,

including Germany, Spain, Papua New Guinea and Belgium, no party can introduce an explicit

vote of confidence in the House without first having assembled a viable alternative government

that could decisively replace the existing government. This is known as a constructive vote of

confidence.109 By including this added step in the confidence convention, these jurisdictions

prevent superfluous motions of confidence and assure that in only exceptional circumstances will

a government be in danger of defeat. When included with the other reforms suggested

constructive confidence could bring added security to those in power, thus ensuring even looser

application of party discipline. British Columbia could benefit by adding this practice alongside

its revised confidence convention and whip system.

As already mentioned, changes such as those that we have discussed are difficult to

implement through legislation or lesser codification. Rather, their success depends on agreement

by parties to adopt the system and use it in the spirit in which it was intended (as has been done

through the Alberta Memorandum of Agreement). To this extent, it is admitted that we are

putting our faith purely in the parties to secure the proper use of free votes through a more

judicious application of party discipline.

Nevertheless, there are some purely procedural ways that we can help secure continuing

good faith from these parties. In the final part of our analysis, we will examine some additional

109 Arend Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999) 101.

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reforms to the voting process that may help further facilitate free voting by making it more

difficult to apply party discipline, even when the party executive desires to do so.

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iii. Other Possibilities for Reform

As the last section has shown, there are proven ways to qualify the issue of confidence to

ensure that party discipline, when it comes to voting, can be circumscribed. Nevertheless, there is

always the apprehension that discipline will be covertly at work on the Private Member each

time a vote is cast, regardless of the actual possibility of lost confidence. Therefore, in order to

ease this apprehension, we will now look at alternative methods of voting. The hope is that under

these new mechanisms, those using party discipline would have more trouble holding their

Members responsible for their votes. When placed next to the changes in confidence, these

alternative voting procedures could provide added security for the Private Member and make

free voting the rule rather than the exception in the Legislative Assembly.

The present voting practice in British Columbia is archaic by most standards. Aside from

the election of the Speaker, every vote cast in the Legislature during a division is a vote cast in

full view of all other Members, including leaders and whips. These “roll call” votes are

immediately printed in Hansard records. By the next morning, the media has analyzed, judged,

and reported any deviations from the norm to the public. It is a highly scrutinized process, and

this scrutiny elevates the political stock in every vote taken. Although citizens have confidently

voted in elections with complete secrecy for decades, the very Members that they elect are

denied the same simple privilege when voting in the Assembly.

As mentioned before, public confidence is part of formal confidence, and parties do not

respond well to surprise deviations by Members at delicate moments. In these cases, party

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discipline cannot help but follow, regardless of the specific issue. Therefore, the natural remedy

would be to find ways in which the voting process could be changed so that the scrutiny of these

deviations was limited. At the same time, it must balance the right for voters to have a record of

how their Member voted, especially at election times. This has remained the key argument in

support of public voting.

To fit this balance, certain models have been propounded that deserve consideration. The

Canadian Alliance, during its leadership campaign, endorsed a process where all votes (barring

money bills) would be cast by secret ballot. The results would remain secret until published right

before an election campaign.110 This process would remove the party’s ability to discipline

members for dissenting votes by keeping individual voting patterns secret until a time when

discipline would have the least effect. At the same time, this proposal is both time consuming

(through the balloting procedure) and would leave the Member only living a private life of

dissent and unable to reap the political rewards of individual advocacy. While the spirit and

principle of this innovation was clearly in the right direction, its execution remains wanting.

To solve the problems of execution, we would be wise to examine the method of

electronic voting as practised in the United States Congress. First installed in 1973, this method

of voting replaces the tedious process of roll call voting with a very efficient system. Upon a

division, the Speaker will call for a vote. Each Representative has a plastic ID card, and is given

15 minutes to use that card on one of the 40 voting stations located on the backs of chairs in the

chamber. Upon voting, a large display board reveals the Representative’s name and allows them

110 “Keith Martin: a prescription for Canada” Vancouver Sun, 16 June 2000: A4.

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to register YES, NO, or PRESENT. After the time expires, votes are tallied and the results are

released.

This process would not be alien to a parliamentary setting; in 1995, a similar system of

electronic voting was introduced in India’s parliament with positive results.111 Similarly, efforts

are still in motion to install such a system in the Canadian House of Commons.112 The

advantages of this process are easy to identify. Most noticeably, the 15-minute period to register

votes would remove some of the immediate scrutiny by party leaders that often occurs when

voting. Nor is a Member expected to follow the example of the party leader, as voting would be

sporadic and not conducive to a “bandwagon effect.”113 Finally, the recording of abstentions

would allow Members to make their presence in the House known by party and voters alike

without having to support a stance on policy to do so.

Perhaps the best system for British Columbia would involve a combination of this

electronic system with a traditional practice in the United Kingdom. In the House of Commons,

when a division is called, the House is cleared. Members are then asked to file back into the

chamber through either of two doors. As they enter, they record their vote with a clerk. After this

process is complete, the tally is completed and names officially entered. Evident in this

procedure is that by physically busying Members during voting this process effectively keeps

each vote secret until the final tally, thus creating a quasi-secret ballot. Consequently, party

111 The Parliamentarian, 76.3 (July 1995) 226.112 Kady O’Malley, “House could get electronic voting as early as September,” The Hill Times, 7 December 1999:np.113 This is similar to a recommendation put forth in the Thirteenth Report of the federal Standing Committee onProcedure and House Affairs, which recommended a variation of roll call voting in which the back rows wouldstand first to vote (before leaders and relative cabinets) in order to avoid an expectation of imitation. Thisrecommendation has yet to be accepted.

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leadership cannot inflict immediate influence on the Member and responsibility for intentionally

voting contrary to party cannot be proven. It is evident that under this system MPs are much

more willing to buck the party line and parties more cautious in dispensing discipline.114 It is the

principle of permitting secrecy in the immediate act of voting that could prove most conducive to

extended use of the free vote.

Ideally, a combination of this British principle with the process of electronic voting could

offer the ultimate voting freedom for British Columbia’s MLAs. By simply waiting until all

Members have cast their electronic ballots before revealing the results (and thus making the

immediate act secret), party discipline could be measurably evaded and free voting would

undoubtedly increase. A party cannot discipline a Member with any legitimacy unless it can be

assured of wrongdoing. These voting mechanisms would bring this assurance into question,

much to the Private Member’s benefit and that of his or her constituents. Under such an

arrangement, it is the belief of this report that free voting would be substantially advanced.

Certainly, as indicated in the March 2000 innovation in which Members were allowed to cast

absentee votes for the Speaker due to a funeral115, the British Columbia Legislature has proven a

procedural flexibility to allow such innovations should the desire exist.

This final area of reform is, above all else, an acknowledgment of a reality unfortunately

expressed throughout this analysis: that party discipline will always be a considerable force in

Private Member activity. Although reforms of the confidence convention and alternative voting

procedures can act to circumscribe party discipline, by no means is the actual power defeated or

114 Dobell and Reid 15.115 The funeral was that of Mr. Joe Mathias, Squamish Aboriginal Chief, March 14, 2000.

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even reduced. Party discipline ultimately depends on its enactors – the parties themselves – for

its reasonable and appropriate use. No changes to the formal rules can change this simple fact.

The parties must continually act in good faith with their Members in order for success to be

achieved in this area. This dependence on party cooperation remains an essential problem in

parliamentary reform for British Columbia that occurs in every aspect of reform discussed in

these pages.

The rest of the reforms explored in this report will move away from examining party

discipline directly and look at ways in which its effects can be further circumscribed through

other enhancements of Private Member activity. In each case, emphasis is on further ways to

return efficacy to Private Members so that they can function autonomously and successfully. In

the next section, we will look at reforms to the Committee system as a unique and successful

way for Private Members to become effective actors beyond the immediate scrutiny of leaders

and discipline.

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2. Encouraging Individual Efficacy: Re-evaluating the Committee Process

I have found… that, if the government has its mind set that this is the direction they are going totake, it borders on being useless to be on the committee. It’s just an absolute waste of time.Conversely, if the government is prepared to consider alternatives, the work can be productive.116

In terms of direct institutional reforms, a re-evaluation of the committee process has been

the central hobbyhorse of British Columbia parties for the last 20 years. The British Columbia

NDP party, having been in power since 1991, has mottled its yearly Throne Speeches with

promises to “expand the roles of committees”117 and “seek the assistance of committees”118 in

the daily workings of government. Similarly, the BC Liberals have promised to “restore

Legislative committees to their proper place”119 should they form government in the next

election. Clearly, this subject is a priority among all major parties in British Columbia. Yet no

progress has been made in this area since 1985 when the Standing Committee on Standing

Orders and Private Bills began to test the waters of committee capabilities.120

While the will exists and the mechanisms are potentially in place, the ability to put both

into practice has been continually circumvented by fears of lost accountability, limited resources

and the assumption that party forces are too much in control to assure success. Parliamentary

purists look with apprehension at any proposals which may detract from the democratic majesty

and pure functions of the Committee of the Whole, where more than a select few Members can

116 This statement was made by an anonymous Canadian MP in Peter C. Dobell, “New MPs,” ParliamentaryGovernment 1 (September 1996): 11.117 British Columbia, Debates of the Legislative Assembly, 1992 Legislative Session: 1st Session 35th Parliament, 1.1(March 17, 1992).118 British Columbia, Debates of the Legislative Assembly, 2000 Legislative Session: 4th Session 36th Parliament,18.1 (March 15, 2000).119 BC Liberals, “A New Era for British Columbia” (1999).120 The Committee recommended that the Standing Orders be amended to allow the House to refer bills andestimates to select standing committees. Although the amendments were accepted, as we shall see futuregovernments have not chosen to utilize these potential powers.

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potentially contribute. However, it is the opinion of this report that these concerns can be

alleviated. By examining the structures and successes of other jurisdictions, including the United

Kingdom, Canada, and even the provinces, we can construct a legitimate model for British

Columbia in which the benefits can far outweigh the concerns. Ultimately, this new model will

fulfill the executive’s demands for efficiency and, more importantly, the Private Member’s right

to efficacy.

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i. The Committee Process in Context

The parliamentary committee process was conceived as a means of both increasing

efficiency in the House and encouraging the involvement of Private Members in substantive

matters of policy and inquiry. By establishing a system of committees to closely examine

legislation, the specific activities of departments, supply estimates, or merely general areas of

interest for potential legislative activity, a government has the opportunity to move a great deal

of time-consuming work away from the legislature as a whole – where partisan debate often

reigns – to a forum that promotes careful consideration by a small group of Members with

experience in particular fields working towards an all-party consensus. Time can be used more

wisely, allowing for extensive and constructive debate while avoiding the adversarial party

posturing over the minutiae of specific policy, spending, or amendments. Witnesses can be

called, public consultation can take place, and investigations can be conducted to ensure that no

stones go unturned. As a result, legislation can be produced that benefits the largest number of

citizens, departments can function efficiently and with accountability, estimates can be dealt with

quickly yet carefully, and the potential for positive future activity is always on the horizon. And

within this process, Private Members become experienced, distinguished, educated, and effective

actors in governing.

This description of committees is the portrayal of an ideal. It stems from our

understanding of the benefits found under the United States’ congressional committee system.

These are bodies that, due to the separation of powers, can act independently of the executive in

dictating their own agendas, schedules, and procedures. As one columnist notes, this allows them

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to be “free wheeling and unafraid to look into all nooks and crannies.”121 Chaired through a

seniority system, these committees are composed of long-serving and experienced

Representatives with equally learned staffs.122 They meet of their own accord, and pursuant to

their specific subject areas cover the spectrum of departmental review, legislative approval, and

public inquiry. They can subpoena and jail for contempt. They can travel and make inquiries.

They may resume or discontinue proceedings at their leisure. And most importantly, every

decision they make is considered binding on the House of Representatives and not subject to any

post-committee manipulation.

The result has been a highly active and powerful committee system – so powerful, in fact,

that some committees (such as the House Judiciary Committee) even have the authority to

effectively depose a president. Furthermore, it is generally acknowledged that within this system

individual Representatives have become influential, educated, and established participants in

government. They have become confident in their abilities to enact change as committees

provide them with “the beguiling prospect of a stronger, more independent role for

parliament.”123 This is somewhat confirmed by the fact that, on average, 90% of Representatives

run for re-election, with 90% being returned to office. If increased experience as a legislator is

indeed a function of how effective that legislator can be, then clearly the committee system in the

United States has produced exponential returns for both the individual Representative and the

121 Rafe Mair, “What do Americans have that we don’t? A better government,” Vancouver Province, 7 February1999: A43.122 Currently, there are over 20,000 persons employed as committee staff in Washington.123 C.E.S. Franks, The Parliament of Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1987) 160.

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Congress as a whole.124 Furthermore, the high rate of individuals pursuing re-election points

towards an equal level of professional gratification that also stems from this system.

Comparably, in the last (1996) British Columbia election, only 68% of Members ran for

re-election of which only 76% were returned.125 Clearly, the congressional model offers

something to its participants that British Columbia’s does not, and the committee system is a

substantial contributor to this phenomenon.

The American system portrays many of the attributes that most jurisdictions value in

committees. However, we cannot be too hasty in assuming that such a system is without

limitations or easily emulated. As British Columbians, we must balance these benefits with the

realities of non-separated powers as sacrosanct to our parliamentary system that make it virtually

impossible to directly “impose congressional trappings on a parliamentary system.”126

Furthermore, populations and the specific demands on the U.S. Congress have necessitated an

undesirably “byzantine”127 structure of almost 250 committees and subcommittees – an

excessive number for most jurisdictions that must surely give us pause. And naturally, extensive

work on committees has led to a measurable neglect of other representative duties, mainly due to

the time that these committees require.

124 Franks 74.125 According to Elections BC, 51 of the 75 MLAs from 35th Legislative Assembly (1991) ran for re-election in1996. Of those, 39 were returned to office.126 Norman C. Thomas, “Inquiry into Presidential and Parliamentary Government,” Parliament, Policy andRepresentation eds. Harold D. Clarke et al. (Toronto: Methuen, 1980) 313.127 J. Hook, “Committee System: The Labyrinth,” Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report 50.23 (June 1992): 1584.

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Despite these problems, this system does provide us with a core set of values for

committee success should that underscore our inquiry. An effective committee should be

independent, self-starting, and have their work treated seriously by peers and superiors. While

the congressional and parliamentary systems are inherently incongruent, these values remain

constant, and it is these ideals that in principle British Columbia must look towards. It is also

these ideals that British Columbia is perhaps furthest from achieving.

In British Columbia, although it has existed in principle for quite some time, the

committee system has been extremely slow in development. Even when they are performing

their functions properly, these structures have been seen by many to be “moribund”128 – caught

in a state of slow decay. The first serious attempt at the resurrection of committees came in 1979,

when then-Deputy Clerk of the House George MacMinn published a Report on Committees of

the Legislature that looked at the possible structural revisions that might be appropriate for

British Columbia’s changing practices and needs. Mr. MacMinn proposed two functions for

committees – legislative review and estimates review129 – that would both be executed through a

series of “standing committees.” The recommendations of the Report were largely ignored.

The impetus for the development of committees to relieve work from the Committee of

the Whole has been intermittent during the last two decades since the MacMinn report.

Highlights include the short-lived but powerful Crown Corporations committee in the early

1980s, the 1985 reforms formally assigning committees the powers of legislative and estimates

128 Vaughn Palmer, “Legislature committees are moribund,” Vancouver Sun, 20 May 1986: np.129 See George MacMinn, “Committees of the Legislature,” (Victoria: Legislative Assembly of British Columbia,1979). A duplicate report of the same name was re-released in 1982.

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review (which have sat unused), and the 1992 decision to divide the Committee of Supply into

two sections (A and B) to speed up estimates debates.130

Today, the British Columbia Committee system is in a precarious position. While the

structures are in place for their use, their practical application has been so lacklustre that these

mechanisms face inevitable extinction. Standing Order 68(1) allows for the creation of 15 select

standing committees at the beginning of session that represent various aspects of the

Assembly’s business and interests. These committees are designed to “investigate and report on a

particular set of government operations.”131 In practice, these activities take place only when the

House refers them to a specific task through a formal Terms of Reference. Their activity ceases

upon fulfillment of this task. Standing Orders 60A and 78A, established in 1985, allow

somewhat more flexibility for these committees through the option of having estimates and

legislation referred to them. These mechanisms have never been used. As a result of these

limited powers, in the last three sessions only four committees have actually been active with

specific duties.132

Furthermore, Standing Order 69(1) allows for the creation of special committees to

examine specific, single issues. Once again, they are created and expire upon the fulfillment of

their Terms of Reference by the House. Yearly, a Committee of Selection is created under this

authority to assign Private Members to all other committees. As well, special committees have

130 A motion was put forward in June 2000 by the House Leader to divide Estimates into three committees: A, B,and C. This motion has not yet been passed.131 The Legislative Assembly of British Columbia, The Committees of the House (Victoria: Legislative Assembly ofBritish Columbia, 1999) np [pamphlet].132 The following four select standing committees have been active: (1) Agriculture and Fisheries, (2) Forests,Energy Mines and Petroleum Resources, (3) Public Accounts, and (4) Parliamentary Reform, Ethical Conduct,Standing Orders and Private Bills.

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been created to examine unique issues such as inquiry into Information Privacy in the Private

Sector and to Appoint a Child, Youth, and Family Advocate (established on July 14, 1999 and

July 6, 2000 respectively).133

In both types of committee, membership is re-constituted yearly by the Special

Committee of Selection and the 10 to 12 chosen for each committee approximately mirrors the

partisan balance of the House. Since the NDP has been in government, the informal practice has

been that only Private Members (not cabinet ministers) can be committee members.134 Chairs are

elected by the committees themselves, and aside from the convention of an Opposition chair for

Public Accounts, they are usually government backbench members (a practice secured by the

presence of government-party majorities in each committee). A limited staff (usually a clerk and

one or two general researchers provided by the Clerk of Committees) is provided to brief

Members on relevant business and prepares information for ongoing activities. These committees

are allowed to tour the province and meet with the public, compel any witness to attend135, and

usually convene weekly all year round (depending on the committee). Furthermore, each

committee can create subcommittees (although they rarely do beyond a standard management

committee). The final submission of their report (which, unless specified, must be unanimous136)

133 Previous years have seen special committees on the appointment of the Auditor General, Ombudsman, and PoliceComplaint Commissioner, international trade and investment agreements, the MAI, and the Freedom of Informationand Protection of Privacy Act.134 Prior to this, it was not uncommon for ministers under Social Credit administrations to sit as members ofcommittees.135 This power is exercised upon the recommendation of the House under Section 3 of the Legislative AssemblyPrivilege Act.136 The exception to practice was the Select Standing Committee on Aboriginal Affairs in 1997. Chaired by IanWaddell, the July report produced by this committee was permitted to include a minority dissenting opinion. Thiswas mandated specifically through the committee’s Terms of Reference. Although a commendable improvementand lauded by most participants, this practice can still only be used when directly permitted by the House and hasyet to become the norm for future reports released (as it has in Canada).

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marks the end of that committee’s mandate, and the treatment of those reports is solely left to the

discretion of the House.

Even from this simplified description, we can see a number of problems within this

system. Although a functional committee system exists in principle through the Standing Orders,

in practice it has not been properly utilized. Committees rarely meet, and when they meet, their

scope is extremely limited. Their chairmanship and composition assures a government majority

and hence control, inspiring inevitable partisanship where non-partisanship is the ideal. The

Special Committee of Selection is equally partisan, also falling under the government’s control.

Resources (mainly staff) are minimal and, by nature of the short life of committees, rarely

specialized. The options for increased involvement such as estimates or legislation review have

gone completely unused by the House.137 The requirement for a unanimous report (there being

no regular mechanisms to register dissent other than resignation138) leads to extended squabbling

and inevitable membership turnover. And perhaps most importantly, should a report somehow be

produced from this convoluted system, the government-controlled House has absolutely no

obligation to respond to, let alone follow, the committee’s recommendations.

Clearly, this is a deficient system – contrary to almost every ideal we explored in the

congressional model. At every stage, the committee system seems to fall at the mercy of the

party-dominated House if not its own impotence. The values we discussed – the ability to self-

start, act independently, and expect serious treatment of their work – are noticeably absent from

137 The only exception to this would be the Select Standing Committee on Parliamentary Reform, Ethical Conduct,Standing Orders and Private Bills, which has Private Bills automatically referred to it by virtue of S.O. 105.138 For the exception, see footnote 21.

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this system. The tangible result of these limitations is a process that “provides little scope for the

energetic B.C. member,”139 who is systematically denied the opportunity, resources, and respect

to put their energies towards any substantive committee work. They are denied the chance to

specialize in these fields and channel their viewpoints and experiences into a fundamental point

of access for monitoring and influencing the actions of government. In every instance,

government (as controlling the House) is readily able to trump the Private Member’s actions,

leaving each merely with wasted time and uncertain futures. It is in this final state of frustration

that the individual Member looks to the party for fulfillment and party discipline once again

takes over.

The solution to this situation is complex. The first stage of reform involves a re-

evaluation of the particular mechanisms in place, and concrete changes to the Standing Orders to

implement these changes. However, as the ill success of the 1985 implementation of Standing

Orders 60A and 78A has shown, the formal mechanism alone is not enough. Therefore, the

second stage of reform must involve compelling those in power to accept these mechanisms and

the devolution of party influence that reform would inevitably foster. This latter aspect is the

difficult part. However, it is the opinion of this report that the surest means of persuasion is

through concrete example. Therefore, in the next section, we will look at the success of

committee use and innovations in other jurisdictions. Not only will this provide models for

potential imitation, but the inherent logic of these processes should be ample indication that

committee reforms are to the benefit of all those involved. Hopefully, when the widespread

139 R. Jeremy Wilson, “The Legislature,” The Reins of Power: Governing British Columbia, eds. J.T. Morley et al.(Vancouver: Douglas and McIntyre, 1983) 18.

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success of committees in other parliaments is acknowledged, no logical arguments against their

empowerment can be reasonably considered.

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ii. Possibilities for Reform

In assessing the possibilities for reform, we must take a number of factors into

consideration. Once again, we must acknowledge the distinct qualities of the British Columbia

Legislature, with its small number of Members and bipartisan atmosphere. It is clear that no

committee system from another jurisdiction will fit British Columbia without refinement.

Therefore, in order to construct an ideal model, we must combine the advantages of numerous

systems as they fit our needs. Furthermore, while no alternative jurisdiction is without its

inherent difficulties, we may find that their procedures may work even better within our context.

Consequently, we must engage in a careful system of evaluation that balances apparent

deficiencies in some systems with their possible success in our system. And of course, when

there is a success in another system, we must not anticipate immediate success in our own.

To begin this inquiry, we start with what has been broadly endorsed as the most

successful committee process in a parliamentary system: that of the United Kingdom. In

particular, the success can be attributed to the reforms starting in 1979 that established an

extensive network of “select committees” to scrutinize executive activity. The result has been

met by an increasing respect for these parliamentary creatures, especially amongst Private

Members. As one author remarks:

The select committees have earned such a great reputation for extending the bounds ofparliamentary scrutiny of the executive that committee membership is now hotly contested and theselection process has proven controversial in two consecutive Parliaments.140

140 “Impartial Choices: Selecting the select committees,” The Parliamentarian 70.2 (April 1989): 77.

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Other observers have noted British committee achievements as “solid, unspectacular but

undeniable,” and “the most significant parliamentary reform of the past 80 years.”141 This

committee structure has proven successful in providing MPs with specialist expertise, a less

partisan atmosphere under which to perform, and a meaningful role for Parliament in the

direction of government. Unquestionably, a system with such positive endorsement deserves

careful consideration.

Under Standing Orders 84 and 121 of the British House of Commons, the House is

allowed to create two types of committees: standing and select. Standing committees are

responsible for the consideration of public bills, delegated legislation, European Community

issues, and regional issues (embodied in the three “Grand” committees of Scotland, Northern

Ireland and Wales). Each of these committees is appointed afresh when a particular bill,

delegation or regional issue presents itself to the House. A maximum of seven of these scrutiny

committees can exist at one time, and membership ranges between 16 and 50 MPs (S.O. 86).142

For our purposes, it is the model of public bill scrutiny that is the most valuable.

Public bills are automatically committed to a standing committee after second reading,

unless the House otherwise specifies. Under S.O. 63(3), a Member opposing referral to

committee must do so in the House, and first explaining the reasons for their opposition after

which the question is put. Therefore, the status quo is in favour of committal, and as such

committal is rarely denied. Once committed, the committee debates amendments to these bills

141 Phil Goff, “Reform of parliamentary select committees in Britain and New Zealand: A comparative analysis,”The Parliamentarian 74.3 (July 1993): 165.142 In special cases, standing committees responsible for public bills may have as many as 80 members.

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already passed in principle by the House, and then reports back to the House. Under S.O. 65, the

committee has exclusive power to make any amendments it chooses, which the House

conventionally accepts. As well, pursuant to S.O. 90, upon request by the House a bill may be

sent to committee prior to second reading so that the general spirit of the legislation may be

subject to the same level of scrutiny. The committee then reports back to the House with either a

recommendation that the bill should get second reading or that it should be dropped. In the latter

case, the burden rests on the committee to explain why the bill was insufficient. Furthermore,

under this system the House can request a “special standing committee” at any stage for a bill,

which sits as a normal in camera standing committee but allows for several meetings involving

public consultation. This hybrid is usually restricted to important and often controversial

legislation in which public transparency is desirable.

Standing Order 121 also permits the creation of select committees. These are by far the

most exceptional examples of positive committee use. These committees are appointed by the

House to perform a number of relevant tasks for the House including scrutiny of the work of

government departments, investigation into areas of potential interest, and advisement on House

procedures. Select committees fall into several categories. Domestic committees assist in

providing services to the House, such as Broadcasting or Liaison (which allocates time for

debates, reports for debate, and other committee functions). Scrutiny committees are involved in

the scrutiny of proposed legislation, such as initiatives for deregulation or examination of

consolidated bills. As well, this category includes the Public Accounts, Public Administration,

and Environmental Audit (which looks into the environmental impacts of policies) committees.

Finally, there are the departmental select committees. With each DSC shadowing a government

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department, they act as advisory bodies to Parliament in examining the work and progress of

various departments, review legislation at the committee stage (when it doesn’t warrant a

standing committee), develop legislation to introduce to the House, and investigate matters

related to their areas of scrutiny. And perhaps most logically, they have become the venue for the

debates of estimates for each department that are subsequently presented to the House.

In total, there are 33 of these select committees at work in the British Parliament today.

Most have 11 members that are assigned by a Committee of Selection that is mandated to take

into account the background and interests of each member. Only Private Members are eligible to

participate143, and the continued combination of new and old members selected by the

Committee ensures continuity in the work of each committee. This is necessary because select

committees are always at work. When they are referred an issue directly by the House, they must

confront it. Otherwise, they are free to proceed in the manner they see fit either through

examining their department, looking into relevant issues, or slowly constructing legislation. To

ensure that each committee is perpetually busy, it is not unusual for them to meet with

departments or offices to outline priorities for inquiry, which the committee may either accept or

reject.

To ensure that these duties will be executed in a non-partisan manner, chairmanship, as

well as general membership, is distributed by the Committee of Selection in accordance with the

House party balance, giving the official Opposition a proportional amount of chairmanships to

the government party. Independence is further assured by the provision of large staffs for each

143 As well, select committees can also include secretaries and under secretaries on occasion. Cabinet ministers arenot customarily permitted to hold membership at any time.

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committee (up to five or six) and for the related subcommittees that they are allowed to create so

that all committees can function autonomously and without party influence. Because committees

are perpetual (working both during and outside of session with unlimited Terms of Reference),

these staff members subsequently become highly skilled in their particular areas of work.

Equipped as such, these committees are free to travel, inquire and interview as they see fit. They

are even allowed to meet outside of Westminster. And because budgets are approved directly by

the Liaison Committee, the House and government cannot directly refuse these bodies the

funding to perform independently.

In the end, these committees produce unanimous reports to the House or their relevant

departments. In essence, while these committees are essentially advisory bodies144, practice has

shown an increasing amount of respect being accorded to their reports. Departments regularly

respond within 60 days, and these responses are often proceeded by follow-up inquiries by the

committees to ensure compliance. The House is mandated to respond to larger reports within two

months, and the public pressure of unanimous bipartisan reports is often hard to ignore. Present

Standing Orders allow for three days for estimates to be debated in the House and three hours on

three Wednesdays during each session where respective types of reports are debated. While the

House does not have to accept these reports (which are usually on areas of major public policy),

the exposure is often enough to compel the government to justify their rejection. At present,

more than a third of reports produced end up seeing debate on the House floor.

144 Nizam Ahmed, “Select Committees in the British House of Commons,” Canadian Parliamentary Review 20.4(1997): np.

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Perhaps the greatest benefit of this system of committees lies in its ability to comfortably

respond to most of Parliament’s needs:

The UK Commons select committee system is marvelously flexible. It can be used for immediate,one-off hearings, for probes of alleged wrong-doings, for handling issues when the Governmentfinds it cannot… or for raising completely new ideas, often garnered by well-prepared overseasvisits.145

Clearly, the system has been carefully conceived to ensure that every area of government activity

has some responsive mechanism for Private Members to participate in. As one British observer

notes, this process has “given members a new role and [has] encouraged the view that Parliament

really does have some control over the administration.”146 As a result, this system has been

successfully implemented in many other parliamentary systems, including Australia, New

Zealand, and even Zimbabwe. New Zealand, despite its small Assembly, has most successfully

reproduced both the departmental and legislative aspects through 12 select committees, to the

point where they are now the exclusive avenues for inquiry.147 Logically, it is this miniature

mechanism that British Columbia must strive to emulate as well.

The question then becomes one of how congruent this British Committee system would

be with British Columbia, considering the specific qualities of the British system. To help answer

this, we can look at the success of Canada’s committee system, which adopted many aspects of

the British model. Adopted in 1985 pursuant to the McGrath Report, the focus was to give

standing committees the same broad authority as the British select committees, particularly by

allowing for committee scrutiny of legislation and estimates. The ultimate goal was to give these

145 David Howell, “The power of influence,” Article source unknown.146Lisanne Radice et al., Member of Parliament: The Job of a Backbencher (London: MacMillan Press, 1987) 159.147 See Goff.

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committees “the full departmental policy array to review and report on.”148 However, Canada

had to approach this issue with less than half the MPs of Britain. The result was a miniaturized

version of the British committee structure.

Standing Order 104(2) allows for the creation of 17 standing committees that mirror

government departments like British select committees. Under S.O. 108, these 16-to-18-Member

committees (which also contain no cabinet ministers) are empowered to report on issues referred

by the House, with all of the powers to meet, form sub-committees and investigate that their

British counterparts possess. Most importantly, this includes continuing observance of all

activities, priorities, and successes of their relevant department areas. They are not restricted to

act only when directed by the House. Secondly, they are the main point of committal for the

majority of legislation after second reading. As such, these committees may report to the House

at their leisure and membership continues from session to session. In accordance with S.O. 109,

the government must table a comprehensive response to these reports within 150 days with either

a commitment to implement or a commitment to reject the committee’s findings. As an added

note, a dissenting opinion may be included in any of these reports without explicit permission by

the House. Furthermore, all departmental estimates are also referred to the relevant standing

committee (S.O. 81). Finally, to contend with specialized issues not falling under the purview of

these standing committees, the House of Commons allows for the striking of special committees

(S.O. 105) with powers equal to the permanent committees.

148 Canada, House of Commons, Report of the Special Committee on Reform of the House of Commons (Ottawa:Ministry of Supply and Services, 1985) 16. [McGrath Report]

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To parallel the British system of standing committees, Canada has implemented a system

of legislative committees that are individually created to deal with important legislation referred

after second reading from the House (as mandated by S.O. 73(3)). Composed similarly to the

permanent standing committees, these legislative committees are entitled to call for all relevant

witnesses (including all officials), travel, and form sub-committees. The report they return is

considered by the House, then followed by third reading. In addition, the House may refer a

government bill to committee prior to second reading under S.O. 73(1). Finally, under S.O. 68(4)

a Minister may instruct any type of committee to draft legislation directly, a power that includes

committee discretion over the scope, principles, and specific wording of such bills. Overall, these

committees have remained restricted to highly volatile legislation and, as a result, are rarely

used. For example the recent federal “clarity bill” (Bill C-20) was reviewed after second reading

by a legislative committee in response to the high political salience that this bill had for the

governing Liberal party.

The success of this committee structure can be gauged in different ways. Clearly the

procedures are in place for the intensive review of estimates, departments, and legislation. This is

evident in the fact that in the last session a total of 103 reports were released by standing

committees. Furthermore, out of the 46 government-sponsored bills put forth in the same

session, 27 were referred to standing committees. Clearly there is a slow but steady trend

towards increased use of these mechanisms. At the same time, this must be balanced with the

general understanding that Canada still has a long way to go in treating these reports seriously or

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allowing them to work without government control.149 Although verdicts vary, it is evident that

Canada’s committee system is becoming a successful work in progress.

As already shown, in theory British Columbia is equipped with the essential mechanisms

to contain such a committee system. However, in order to obtain the desired results it is clear that

they need to be both reorganized and then aggressively utilized. It is this concept of a “work in

progress” that must dominate our understanding of this subject. It is evident that committee

activity is increasing in Canada, and that slowly more authority is being devolved to them just

out of necessity. While it is clear that the Liberal government remains suspicious of this

devolution150, Britain shows us that the potential is there for successful mechanisms to be

utilized should a progressive executive allow such changes to occur. Therefore, the first step

must be to accept the basic principles of committees, after which the specific mechanisms and

the will to use them will hopefully follow.

With this understanding, it is the opinion of this report that British Columbia consider

adopting a renewed committee structure similar to that of the British and Canadian House of

Commons, extending all the rights, privileges, and mandates held by their select and standing

committees to equivalent structures in British Columbia. This includes the powers of

departmental scrutiny, investigation and consultation, legislative review and creation, and the

requirement of mandatory response from the House and departments in question. Furthermore,

all practices that encourage independence from party influence – including (but not limited to)

149 See “Parliamentary Reform: Making it Work,” Canadian Study of Parliament Group: Conference, (Ottawa:Canadian Study of Parliament Group, 1994).150 See Alan Toulin “Iron fist of the PMO,” Financial Post, 9 May 1998: np.

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perpetual constitution, purely Private Member composition, an implicit permission of dissenting

opinions (as in Canada) and multi-partisan chairmanships (as in Britain) – should also be

considered and appropriately adopted.

Clearly, there are many elements in both the original and replicated systems that may be

incongruent with British Columbia’s needs. Such details are difficult to predict, and will only be

identifiable as these practices are slowly adopted. However, in more general terms, the question

of whether or not such a system is appropriate to British Columbia can be easily resolved by

looking at other small-scale adaptations of British committee principles in other provincial

contexts. With these examples, we can see that a wholesale rejection of these practices can no

longer be a justifiable option for British Columbia governments.

To find examples of success, we can first look at British Columbia in the early 1980s. At

that time, there was a committee known as the Crown Corporations Committee. In response to

increasing public concerns about accountability and responsiveness in these corporations, this

committee was created to monitor their activities, progress and priorities and to help establish

long-term goals in accordance with the public good. In essence, this was an infant manifestation

of the British departmental select committee. This committee had a permanent and educated

staff, a large budget, a continuing intersessional membership, the automatic referral of all annual

reports and business plans, and a continuing mandate to produce reports for government

consideration.151 They could summon all relevant witnesses, including Corporation executives,

and the resulting recommendations were rarely pleasing to the government. In 1983, this

151 R.S. Milne “The British Columbia Crown Corporations Committee: Comparisons and Implications,” BC Studies68 (Winter 1985-86): 39.

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committee was abolished because, according to one observer, “the all-party committee proved so

effective at exposing waste and wrongdoing within the province’s various taxpayer-supported

companies that the government was regularly embarrassed by its investigations.”152 Whether or

not this is true, this example shows that a British-style committee would easily fit within British

Columbia’s parliamentary framework. Unfortunately, the 1996 incarnation of this committee

under the subsequent NDP government was denied all of these advantages, constituting little

more than “mere window dressing”153 compared to its predecessor.

The British Columbia example is one from the past. However, other provinces have

shown equal success emulating this style of committee system by devolving a variety of powers

to their own committees that continues today. Since 1984, Quebec has allowed its nine select

committees to consider bills, review estimates, supervise public bodies, control delegated

legislation and examine departmentally related issues. Each committee holds ten Private

Members, chairmen are elected by secret ballot, and the committees continue from session to

session on perpetual Terms of Reference. The results have been very positive, as these

committees have undertaken an increasing number of mandates by their own initiative and

departmental scrutiny has continued to grow.154

Even more encouraging is the present system in Ontario. This province allows its eight

nine-Member standing committees to review legislation both before and after second reading.

Furthermore, with a two-thirds resolution of the committee membership they can initiate

152 David Mitchell, “Public Money,” Business in Vancouver, 13-19 August 1996.153 Ibid.154 Lucie Giguere, “Reform of the Committee System in Quebec,” Canadian Parliamentary Review 21.2 (1998): np.

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committee research on a subject, which can result in drafted legislation which the House must

introduce.155 In the last session, this procedure resulted in the referral of 25 government bills to

standing committees, two of which were referred before second reading. As well, two

committee-made bills were drafted and passed as law. And last but not least, Ontario has also

devolved the power of departmental and estimates scrutiny to these committees in a manner

similar to Quebec.156 The results have been equally successful.

It is clear that both systems have been very successful and offer the most reasonable

model for observers who wish to fit the British system into a provincial context with relative

ease. What obviously sets both of these provincial examples apart from the British system is that

the number of committees, and the membership of committees, is significantly smaller. Taking

into account the size of most provincial legislatures and the resultant pool of Private Members,

this makes sense. In this report’s opinion, it would be wise for the British Columbia Legislative

Assembly to reduce the number of select standing committees to less than ten, with ten or less

members on each committee, in order to compensate for a smaller number of Private Members.

These committees could be re-defined to cover all major policy and department areas – so that

more than one department could fall under each committee – and could take responsibility for

departmental review, legislative review and estimates review in a manner similar to that of

Canada and the United Kingdom. This could all be achieved through amendments to the

Standing Orders. Regardless of the specific way in which a new committee structure might be

155 Hon. Norman W. Sterling, “Recent Committee Reforms in Ontario,” Canadian Parliamentary Review 23.2(Summer 2000): np.156 Graham White, “Ontario Reforms Likely to Enhance Accountability” Parliamentary Government 9:1 (1989): 17.

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implemented, emphasis must be on assuring a broad committee mandate, accessible resources,

and proper governmental response as proven successful in other jurisdictions.

However, as Standing Orders 60A and 78A have shown us, the codification of new

committee procedures does not necessarily constitute compliance. As the President of Quebec’s

National Assembly warned with the introduction of their 1984 reforms,

The proposed reform will be genuine only to the extent that Members of the Assembly agree toadapt themselves to the proposed new mechanisms. This reform is founded upon the hypothesisthat such is the wish and the ability of Members and that such will be the exigencies ofparliamentary democracy in Quebec in years to come.157

Clearly, what is needed on top of formal reforms is a commitment by all parties to properly

utilize the committee mechanisms in the daily process of governing. Therefore, as inspired by the

Alberta process, having all parties sign a Memorandum of Agreement affirming their

commitment to the Standing Orders and the committee system that it espouses might be a useful

addition to other changes. Much like Alberta’s experience with free votes, hopefully the force of

public opinion would come to also control this aspect of practice.

Obviously, the following discussion and subsequent recommendations have been

extremely broad, framing the desired reforms in only general terms. The subject of committees is

highly complex, and successful systems have taken years of refinement to perfect. The main

concern is that we find a system where a balance can be struck between efficiency and the ability

of Private Members to participate. Certainly, the core British model fulfills these needs, and

other jurisdictions prove their potential in a local context. For that reason, a high level of

committee restructuring is clearly warranted with all of these values in mind.

157 Quoted, in Giguere 27.

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However, this process cannot succeed without a further level of cooperation from parties

through their application of party discipline. It is evident that, in the Canadian setting, the trend

is towards most members working in committees solely with the intention of supporting the whip

and the party line.158 When this occurs, any benefits for the Private Member through committees

are negated and the trained seal stereotype prevails in a new context. Once again we must admit

that this process cannot proceed without a commitment by parties to let the committee system

behave autonomously.

In essence, committees are a chance to move the Private Member out of the formal

legislative sphere where governments and parties dominate. However, there are times when

participation in this sphere can be very important. Therefore, in the next section we will turn to

the issue of the Private Member in the legislative process. Through examining reforms to both

Private Members’ Business and Question Period, the report will once again show that changes in

this area are reasonable and workable through the simple observance of other jurisdictions.

158 Peter C. Dobell and Hon. John Reid, “A Larger Role for the House of Commons,” Parliamentary Government 40(1992): 18.

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3. Expanding Individual Efficacy: Contributing to the Legislative Process

I do, in all sincerity, have a great deal of sympathy for members of the government back bench…[T]hey never get or rarely get a chance to stand up and grill a minister, to stand up and ask toughquestions, to stand up and speak on behalf of their constituents. They’re always sitting there. Iknow they want to get up, because they heckle so loudly. I know they’ve got strong concerns, soyou would hope that there would be some opportunities… We have the most restrictive standingorders in opportunities for individual MLAs to bring stuff before this House and actually debateit.159

In the activities of the Legislative Assembly, the central ambition of every Member is the

opportunity to control time.160 Whether in Question Period, estimates, private statements, or

general debates over legislation and adjournment, all Members discern themselves to both peers

and public alike through their ability to occupy the House’s time with their individual agendas.

Time is the key to ensuring that local, personal, and partisan interests are fulfilled. It is also the

path towards distinguishment, recognition, and personal satisfaction. There is little wonder why

the government chooses to possess so much of it, and why the Private Member is often allowed

so little.

It is the subject of “time” – and its control thereof in the Legislature – that is the central

concern of this portion of this report. In this section, we will look at two aspects of using time in

the House: Private Members’ Business and Question Period. The first discussion closely

examines the realities of private members’ bills, statements, and “days” and their current

treatment (or disregard) in British Columbia. The second discussion examines how Question

Period (and indirectly the role of the Speaker) has also come to foster a similar disregard. And in

159 Gary Farrell-Collins, British Columbia, Debates of the Legislative Assembly, 1998/99 Legislative Session: 3rd

Session 36th Parliament, 12.3 (July 22, 1998).160 Norman Ruff, “The British Columbia Legislature and Parliamentary Framework,” Politics, Policy, andGovernment in British Columbia, ed. R.K. Carty (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1996) 92.

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the middle of both of these subjects sits the Private Member – virtually invisible, virtually all of

the time. In both cases, the goal is once again to present models that could successfully reverse

this insubstantiality.

As in previous sections, the objective of this section is one of Private Member efficacy.

The goal is not to assure success for the Private Member, but to create an opportunity for those

Members to succeed or fail on their own merits instead of automatically failing due to procedure.

As one panel noted,

It is possible to create opportunities for members to bring forward their concerns, but privatemembers are on their own from then on. Their success and clout will depend on how they choosetheir issues, do their research, develop expertise, and use the system to pursue their interests.161

In the opinion of this report, it is access, not success, that is the most appropriate vehicle towards

proper efficacy. It is this basic principle that will guide the content and goals of the following

discussions.

161 The Canadian Study of Parliament Group, “Liberating the Private Member,” Canadian Study of ParliamentSeminar (Ottawa: Canadian Study of Parliament Group, 1986) 4.

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a. Private Members’ Business

i. Private Members’ Business in Context

As a Private Member, the opportunities for influence in the legislative sphere are limited,

at best. Due to the Westminster system and government control of the House, it has become

traditional for all relevant legislative activity to come from cabinet – mainly through the form of

public bills, and to a lesser extent government motions and ministerial statements. Due to party

discipline and the House Leader’s control over the House agenda, almost all time in the House is

occupied in the execution of government initiatives. As such, the role of Private Members is

often relegated to merely responding to these initiatives, either through caucus discussion (in the

case of backbenchers) or public opposition on the floor of the House (by the remainder of Private

Members). Realistically, the future success of government legislation being both introduced and

passed is purely in the hands of the government itself, regardless of Private Member

involvement. While a legislature is meant to be the central law-making body in a jurisdiction,

this current imbalance in British Columbia’s Legislature has turned it into nothing more than a

law-approving body in practice.

Most Private Members are resigned to the fact that the power to legislate is a tool held

only by the privileged few. However, there are a number of mechanisms – collectively falling

under the title of Private Members’ business – that formally allow Private Members the

opportunities to make a direct impact on legislative activity in the House. In theory, these

instruments are supposed to put the Private Member’s abilities in this area nearly on par with

those of government Members. The most common avenue is that of the public bill in the hands

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of a private member (also called a private member’s bill). Under this qualification, instead of

trying to change government legislation, Private Members can put forward their own legislation

that is subject to the same deliberative process as government bills. The private member’s

motion offers a similar avenue, whereby motions for House activity are introduced and

accordingly adopted at the House’s discretion. Finally, there is the private member’s statement,

through which a Member can give a brief address to the House on any topic of their choosing.

All of these mechanisms exist in principle to allow Private Members a direct influence on the

House’s legislative agenda to balance the abilities of the government. Collectively, these

mechanisms of Private Members’ business should represent “the best arena [for Members] to

flex their legislative muscles and make a name for themselves.”162

Potentially, the most effective of these mechanisms is the private member’s bill, as noted

by one author in the Canadian context:

First of all, private members’ bills are devices by which Members of Parliament are able tocriticize the Government. Private members’ bills provide backbenchers, especially those to theSpeakers’ left, with the opportunity to discuss certain defects or omissions in the Government'sprogrammes [sic]. The prime motive is probably not to have the private members’ bills enacted,but to publicly bring the Government to task. Secondly, such bills also enable a subject to bediscussed and publicized and thus help to educate and mobilize public opinion in their favour.163

To an extent, these benefits extend to all aspects of private business. Evidently, it is not the

guarantee of success but the opportunities that these mechanisms provide for Private Member

involvement that underscore their importance to the general pursuit of efficacy.

Yet in British Columbia, as in most parliamentary systems, these mechanisms are highly

defective. Despite the existence of formal mechanisms for Private Member involvement,

162 Editorial, “Freeing MPs,” The Hill Times, 18 November 1996: np.163 David Blatt, “Can M.P.s be Law-Makers?” House of Commons Reform, eds. Magnus Gunther and Conrad Winn(Ottawa: Parliamentary Internship Program, 1991) 69-70.

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successive governments have succeeded in circumscribing their use through control over the

House proceedings and agenda. In reality, while the power to legislate and control time is

coveted by Private Members, such powers are loathed by governments who are unwilling to

relinquish control of one of their most effective agenda-advancing tools. Giving the same

opportunities to Private Members (it is argued) occupies House time that could displace

important government business. It could introduce issues not central, and even contrary, to the

government agenda. And it could provide the Opposition with another opportunity to stall

proceedings and embarrass the executive. In an arena where the control of time is the greatest

weapon, it is easy to understand why these mechanisms have been sidelined or “de-clawed” by

most British Columbia governments.

The marginalization of these tools has proceeded on two fronts. First, in practice, the

Private Member is constrained by a number of formal practices – particularly concerning bills –

that cannot be ignored or circumvented. Primarily, by virtue of sections 90 and 54 of the British

North America Act, 1867, section 47 of British Columbia’s Constitution Act, 1996, and Standing

Order 66, bills proposing the expenditure of supply must be accompanied by a message from the

Lieutenant-Governor. Since this authority is exercised exclusively under advisement by the

Premier, in practice only executive members may introduce “money bills.” Secondly, S.O. 25

outlines a number of limits on Private Members’ business, including specific times for bill

presentation, debate, and statements (as discussed later). Finally, S.O. 76 bars anyone but

executive Members from proposing bills that would enact constitutional amendments.

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While these limits are restrictive, they are by no means overly prohibitive. However, the

executive also limits Private Members’ business through far more damaging informal means.

Mainly, it is through the duty of the House Leader to arrange House business (via the Orders of

the Day) that these mechanisms are most seriously constrained. By choosing which bills get

debated and which motions will be voted on, the House Leader (under the executive’s direction)

can leave Private Members’ business unresolved at first reading until it fades into obsolescence –

left on the Order Paper but never on the agenda until the session ends and that Order Paper is

discarded.

Note the following examples in British Columbia. In 1997, ten bills were introduced and

read a first time by Private Members. In 1998/1999, 14 bills were introduced. In both cases, not a

single one of these bills was called for second reading by the House Leader. As a result, they all

“died on the Order Paper” at the end of the session. As the House adjourned in July 2000, 11

such bills had been introduced and left at first reading. It is likely that the same fate awaits them

upon session conclusion. In fact, the last time that a Private Member’s bill even went beyond

first reading was in the 1995/1996 session.164 Even more unfortunate is the fact that a Private

Member’s bill has not been successfully passed in British Columbia since 1984, when three

amendments miraculously received Royal Assent.165 Motions have faced similar lack of interest

with even worse results.

164 These bill were: Dual Elected Office Prohibition Act (M 201) An Act to Promote Reuse of Construction andDemolition Materials (M 202), An Act to Designate a Provincial Heritage Site at the Inaugural Plantation of GreenTimbers (M 203), the Libel and Slander Amendment Act (M 204) and the Parliamentary Calendar Act (M 205). Nota single one of these bills passed second reading.165 These bills were: Motor Vehicle Amendment Act (M 202), An Act to Amend the Builders Lien Act (M 205) andPatients Property Amendment Act (M 206).

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Facing such an unfortunate track record, Private Members have virtually given up on

these mechanisms as a reasonable means of expressing their individual needs – much to the

disappointment of both themselves and constituents. Those who do introduce bills under such

rules rarely do so with the genuine intention of having them passed. The result is superfluous and

poorly drafted bills that are purely designed to clutter House business or act as partisan political

statements against the government. While we would not conclude that such applications are

illegitimate in parliamentary practice, they are certainly not in keeping with the spirit of such

tools and threaten to erode the opportunity for their proper use in the future by those truly

wishing to create legislation.

Private Members’ statements are given comparable disrespect in the House. Being the

primary vehicle for individual members to voice their grievances or concerns over an issue

(usually related to their constituency), these statements are essential to providing House time for

all elected Members to speak. Despite this fact, Standing Order 25A allows only one hour per

week for these statements to be made, with each statement and response allotted only 15

minutes. Formally slotted for Friday mornings and then moved to Wednesday evenings pursuant

to recent sessional orders, in practical terms these times have not been conducive to optimum

attendance in the House. Nor do they afford enough time for serious issues or serious

consideration to occupy debate. Most statements merely echo in a near-empty Assembly,

provoking little or no reaction on the bare quorum present. Furthermore, due to S.O. 25A(5),

these statements are not allowed to be political in nature.166 The appeal of long weekends and

166 Standing Order 25A(5) mandates that these statements “shall not revive discussion on a matter which has beendiscussed in the same Session” and “shall not anticipate a matter which has been previously appointed forconsideration by the House…” As such, virtually all political issues are excluded from reference in Private Memberstatements.

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early evenings combined with the benign content demanded in all of these statements make this

mechanism equally toothless for the Private Member. Consequently, the content begins to reflect

this context as the speeches that are presented have become more akin to rhetorical musings than

the insightful and provocative challenges to the House that this report believes they were

intended to promote.

All of these sad realities for Private Members’ business point towards a larger concern –

mainly the elimination of “Private Members’ Days” in British Columbia’s legislature. First put in

place by the 1985 reforms, these days were intended to bring relevance back to Private

Members’ business. Standing Order 25 mandates that Fridays be put aside to allow for an hour

for statements and precedence for private members’ bills and motions in the order of business.

Such changes were optimistically set aside as means of seeing private members’ bills actually

receive full readings, and high-quality statements being presented to a full House. These Days

were the “gift of time” for the Private Member. However, under the auspices of wanting to

extend weekends for constituency service, the government has abolished Friday sittings in recent

sessional orders, and with that Private Members’ Days and the last prospects for serious Private

Member involvement.

Clearly, we can see two key problems with the present system. First, the time that these

mechanisms deserve to have has been taken away by successive governments. Second, even

when the time is allowed, it has been rendered useless because the government does not allow

any substantive treatment of this business. In both cases, the Private Member has been

systematically excluded from opportunities to put forth their own issues and create tangible

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results. In the next section, we will examine jurisdictions that have overcome this executive

control and created means by which to provide both time and ability for Private Members and in

the end attaining results where British Columbia has progressively failed.

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ii. The Possibilities for Reform

Reform in this area of study is relatively simple – when governments are prepared to treat

the subject seriously. It merely requires two things: the codified allocation of time and

opportunity, and a willing executive to respect the spirit of this codification. British Columbia

has shown potential for the codified aspect in a motion put forward in June 2000 which provided

for a “Private Members’ Time” on Monday mornings from 10 a.m. to 12 p.m. to replace the

opportunities lost when Friday sittings were discontinued. During this time, bills and motions by

private members would be the only priorities. Furthermore, the hour for Private Members’

statements on Wednesday afternoons would be eliminated in favour of three two-minute

statements right before Question Period every day. Both of these proposals show promise. By

mandating two hours for bills and motions without the option to move to government business,

the House would be forced to confront these issues in some manner. As well, by placing the time

for statements before Question Period, there is also the assurance that they would receive the

optimum attendance (purely through its proximity to QP) which the content would hopefully

reflect. In short, British Columbia would be clearly moving in the right direction by adopting

these proposals.

Yet despite these promises, British Columbia still remains behind the majority of other

jurisdictions. The use of Monday mornings and brief daily statements (assuming that the motion

carries) still holds a strong possibility of government disregard. While the time has been put

aside, clearly the opportunity is still questionable. Primarily, it is the treatment of Private

Members’ bills that remains the paramount concern. Let us look at two jurisdictions that have

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gone beyond the mere allocation of time and have successfully worked towards assuring fair

treatment of both statements and bills put forth by the Private Member.

For British Columbia, the most relevant model for dealing with Private Members’

business would be that of Alberta. Through a combination of their 1993 amended Standing

Orders and the Memorandum of Understanding of the same year, the potential influence of both

bills and statements has been greatly enhanced. Statements are allowed twice a week on

Tuesdays and Thursdays after Question Period under Standing Order 7, and within these times

three two-minute statements have been permitted. As an added convention, the Memorandum

demands that these statements be divided between government backbenchers and the Opposition.

It is this last detail that positively sets this practice apart from that proposed in British Columbia

(while maintaining all of the same advantages).

More relevant to our needs is the way in which Alberta treats its Private Members’ bills.

Tuesday afternoons, directly after Question Period and Private Members’ statements, and

Wednesday evenings after government business, are considered the de facto “Private Members’

Time.” Mandated under Standing Order 8 and lasting approximately 2 hours per week in total,

within these allocated times non-governmental legislation and motions are given sole attention.

This is similar to the time proposed on Monday mornings in British Columbia, yet more

delicately placed to assure more-than-quorum attendance. What makes this system superior,

however, is that S.O. 8(5) mandates a requisite amount of time for each non-governmental bill.

Should this attention not be given, the bill must remain on the Order Paper until the requirements

are fulfilled. The time allocations is as follows:

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• 115 minutes for debate on second reading plus five minutes to close debate

• 120 minutes for Committee stage debate, usually Committee of the Whole (in

Alberta’s case)

• 55 minutes for debate on third reading plus five minutes to close debate

Should the bill pass any of these stages prior to the time allocation, the House can move to the

next stage upon a motion. Similarly, should the bill be defeated at any stage, further time would

not be allocated. But in the end, unable to leave these bills to simply wallow on the Order Paper,

the Alberta government cannot simply ignore a Private Member’s bill (as is the norm in British

Columbia). Confronted with the prospect of these bills haunting the agenda and committed to

respecting the passage of Private Members’ bills (due to the 1993 Memorandum), the

government has responded positively by allowing these mechanisms to be used without serious

limitation.

The results of this process show success on many levels. Primarily, the success of Private

Members’ bills (PMBs) has been the most substantial, as the following chart reveals:

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Year Total PMBs # passed # defeated # not proceeded with

1990 80 0 0 80

1991 60 0 0 60

1992/93 112 0 0 112

1993 58 1 6 49

1994 34 2 14 17

1995 27 3 9 14

1996/97 25 3 3 11

1997 19 3 3 10

1998 37 4 13 12

1999 29 3 6 17

This chart needs some qualification. Those “not proceeded with” are those bills left at

first reading; those “defeated” are those that the House debated and subsequently rejected. The

bills not accounted for are those that have been adjourned or hoisted – in either case still in

process. Overall, it is evident that the 1993 reforms have produced measurable advances. First,

the number of bills passed has increased since 1993 to the point where almost 10% of those

introduced have reached Royal Assent in recent years. More importantly, note the difference in

bills “not proceeded with.” Prior to 1993, it is clear that Alberta echoed the British Columbia

practice of letting all Private Members’ bills stagnate after first reading. Since 1993, a far greater

number have been formally dealt with, either by being passed, defeated, or adjourned. They have

not merely stalled after introduction. Finally, the decreased number of bills introduced overall

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since 1993 suggests that the legislation being produced is more carefully considered and less

superfluous as its chances for adoption have far improved. As noted before, it is not the success

of this business that is important, but the opportunity for success. Clearly these mechanisms have

resulted in that opportunity. The bills have been allowed to pass or fail on their own merits, and

in some cases their merits have proven them worthy of Royal Assent.

Taking these results into account, it is evident that British Columbia should consider

emulating Alberta’s example in combination with its proposed June 2000 reforms. First, in terms

of Private Members’ statements, this report suggests that a combination of a daily period for

brief statements before Question Period (as per the June 2000 proposal) and a formal division of

these statements between parties (as per the Alberta Standing Orders) might provide the

optimum results in British Columbia. With this combination, we could assure a regular time and

a favourable opportunity for all Private Members to present their views to the House that would

be both well considered and constructive on their part and well received on the part of the House.

Second, in terms of Private Members’ bills, British Columbia would be well advised to

revise its Standing Orders to more closely resemble those of Alberta. These revised Orders

would mandate both exclusive times for these bills to be dealt with (Private Members’

Time167) that can assure optimum attendance, and requisite time allocations for debate of these

bills that must be fulfilled at each bill stage. As the evidence shows, this combination has led to

167 This practice is not limited to Alberta. In Saskatchewan, the Private Members’ Time lasts for 75 minutes onTuesdays. In Manitoba, it goes from 5 to 6 p.m. daily. In Ontario, Thursday mornings from 11 a.m. to 12 p.m. aremandated. In each case, they are conveniently integrated in the weekly schedule to ensure the attendance andattention of most Members.

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ample opportunity for Private Members to legislate in Alberta and suggests an overall higher

quality of bills presented.

Despite the rules in place, it is obvious that this process is still dependent on the will of

the executive. In Alberta, it is still the executive’s prerogative to proceed after first reading.

Should a bill be particularly displeasing, they can easily disregard it if not defeat it. The current

administration’s willingness to engage these mechanisms in any jurisdiction is an essential factor

that all Private Members need to succeed in this area. In British Columbia, compliance by the

executive must somehow be assured.

While the Alberta process is enviable, clearly it leaves many elements very dependent on

executive cooperation – mainly in the treatment of bills. We must assume that immediate

compliance may not be as forthcoming in British Columbia. For that reason, we should look

towards another jurisdiction – Canada – for ways to further ensure government cooperation. In

Canada, the issue of advancing Private Members’ bills came into focus with the McGrath Report

that endeavoured to “enhance the role of the private member” through reforming “the method of

dealing with private members’ business.”168 As a result, throughout the 1980s and 1990s, mainly

through the efforts of the Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs, this aspect of

business has received increasing attention with noticeable results. In the last session of the House

of Commons, three private members’ bills received Royal Assent while 40 further bills of this

168 Canada, House of Commons, Report of the Special Committee on Reform of the House of Commons, (Ottawa:Minstry of Supply and Services, 1985) 40 [McGrath Report].

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nature were considered by the House in some other way.169 Taking into account the fact that the

House had 291 bills submitted by Private Members during this time, this is a substantial

achievement.

Canada has a unique set of rules governing bills introduced by Private Members, almost

identical to the rules followed in the United Kingdom. At the session’s opening, Members

wishing to submit bills enter their names in a draw. Thirty names (or ballots) are drawn, and

these Members are allowed to submit bills. The ballot drawing creates an order of precedence by

which the House will look at these bills over the session.170 These bills are then placed before the

all-party Subcommittee on Private Members’ Business. This Committee examines these bills,

rejecting those that are unreasonable (for example, unconstitutional or beyond the powers of a

Private Member). The remainder are then voted on by the Committee so that ten of these bills

can be deemed “votable.” Votable items are mandated to receive up to five full hours of debate,

while the remaining “non-votable” items can be dealt with after only one hour of debate. After

these times expire, the business must be disposed of, adjourned, or forwarded for further

readings. In practice, it is only the votable items that truly receive adequate consideration.

We can see a number of problems with the Canadian process as a whole, most noticeably

the “serious obstruction to the ability of backbenchers to legislate” through deeming some items

169 “Consideration” includes dropping from the Order Paper, referral to Standing Committees prior to 2nd reading,rotated or dropped from the order of precedence, waiting in order of precedence, failed motion for second reading,or carried over and waiting from a previous session.170 Should a Member wish to introduce a bill after this period, they must wait to be drawn as the House cyclesthrough prior bills. Under S.O. 87(6), should a Member get 100 signatures from other Members (with at least tenMembers each from a majority of the recognized parties), the proposed bill can be put directly into the order ofprecedence.

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votable while others not.171 At the same time, the sheer number of bills in the House of

Commons can show the necessity of some sort of streamlining (just as has been discovered in the

British House of Commons). Nevertheless, if we look beyond this one questionable aspect of the

process, the Canadian model offers some interesting additions to the Alberta model that British

Columbia should consider.

In particular, the process of submitting all Private Members’ bills to an all-party

committee is especially intriguing. While the number of these bills in British Columbia would

not warrant a need for assigning “votability,” the concept of scrutiny of all such legislation prior

to introduction in the House could be beneficial. Under this scrutiny, the legislation introduced

would have to be serious, complete, constitutional, and somewhat acceptable by all parties – all

of those qualities demanded by Canada’s Subcommittee on Private Members’ Business before

any bill can be considered for votability. Emphasis could be placed on ensuring that a minimum

number of bills equally shared between backbenchers and Opposition is presented to the House,

after which they would be mandated for full debate (as under the Alberta system). Chaired by an

Opposition Member, this committee (possibly a subcommittee of the Legislative Assembly

Management Committee) would confirm that all bills subject to the debate system would be

worthy of House time. Furthermore, any rejected bills would have to be justified before the

House (much like British standing committees must do if they reject bills prior to second

reading).

171 Suhas G. Deshpande, “Removing Barriers to Private Members’ Business,” Canadian Parliamentary Review 18.1(1994): np.

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According to one expert, “the quality of private members’ bills has improved” under the

intensive scrutiny of the Canadian committee process.172 Those submitted were drafted with

more care and pandered less to partisan posturing than under previous systems, obviously due to

the increased possibility that they could become law. This improved quality is a desirable

complement to Private Members’ business that British Columbia should make some efforts to

secure if it is prepared to expand the legislative powers for Private Members with any legitimacy.

Ideally, this added legitimacy would bring the force of public opinion to this process as

governments would have to be answerable to the House if they tried to ignore bills that had been

deemed appropriate by this committee.

Perhaps the most innovative rule in Canada deserving consideration is the recently (1998)

implemented S.O. 86.1. This new Order allows Private Members to re-introduce bills from the

previous session in a new session and have them stand at the same stage that they stood when the

previous session ended. Effectively, this means that the government cannot allow these bills to

expire without debate. Private Members’ bills can theoretically continue indefinitely throughout

an entire Parliament, thus eliminating the government’s tyrannical ability to let them die on the

Order Paper. It is the opinion of this report that if British Columbia adopted a system similar to

Alberta, it would be wise to also include this aspect of the Canadian system. With this added

rule, the one remaining downfall of Alberta’s process – the government’s ability to let bills

expire – would be completely alleviated. Private Members’ bills would have to be dealt with in

the House or else they would clutter the Order Paper for a government’s entire life. This rule

would also lessen our dependence on the executive will to see bills read past first reading.

172 The Canadian Study of Parliament Group, 4.

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Ultimately, it is a combination of the above aspects of both the Albertan and Canadian

systems – at least in spirit if not in actual process – that would most successfully supply British

Columbia’s Private Member with two valuable tools in legislative activity: time and opportunity.

With these tools, we can expect that their efficacy will also increase. However, we must also

keep in mind that this is only a means towards access. In the end, success can only be achieved

through a Member’s own abilities and the ways in which their business is drafted, presented, and

defended in practice.

Let us now shift our focus to a related topic of interest: Question Period. Once again, this

is an area that is also concerned with issues of time and opportunity for contribution in the

Legislature. And much like what we have just discussed, it is an issue that British Columbia has

sorely neglected at the Private Member’s expense.

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b. Question Period

i. Question Period in Context

Unlike the last section, which tried to increase influence in the Legislature through the

broad legislative process, this section looks at ways of improving Private Member influence in

one particular House activity: Question Period. Like the previous issue discussed, Question

Period is also an issue that revolves around the pursuit of time.173 A Member that commands the

attention of the House during Question Period is perceived, by nature of the extensive media

scrutiny and public observance, to hold the attention of the entire province. Consequently, the

amount of time any one Member receives during this Period is weighed as proportional to the

importance of what is being said. Furthermore, equal attention is given to the government that

has to respond to those questions, and the force of public opinion ensures either their agreement

or their embarrassment – a hot commodity for Private Members in either case. In short, during

Question Period the world is watching. As such it has become the forum for the airing of most

grievances in need of remedy. Quite obviously, optimum participation in Question Period is an

absolute necessity for any Member trying to fulfill the many needs of representation.

It is then surprising that British Columbia has such a limited process for Question Period

in place. Under Standing Order 47A, in accordance with the modernizing 1973 Barrett reforms,

the House is permitted a mere 15-minute Question Period every afternoon (now barring

Fridays) shortly after 2 p.m. At this time, the House is full, the media are perched in their seats

with pens in hand, and the questions begin. It is during this time that Members can distinguish

173 C.E.S. Franks, The Parliament of Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1987) 147.

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themselves as clever and active debaters, and Ministers as educated and competent. Questioning

usually starts and ends with the Opposition front benches, whose questions and supplemental

questions usually occupy the entire period. Despite the mandate of the Speaker to ensure that

only “urgent and important” debate ensues and only “brief and precise” questions and answers

are allowed174, the passion and drama of the Question Period has come to provide a select

number of participants with ample opportunity for verbose, partisan, media-friendly tirades on

virtually any matter. By the time the 15-minute bell rings, only a choice few have spoken and

responded. The majority of remaining Members once again witness their opportunities for

relevant questioning evaporate. Those who are fortunate enough to have asked questions are

reduced to sound bites in the news; the same holds true for the government’s responses. Rarely

are any aspects of this exchange either well-considered or particularly useful. It has merely

become a chance for a few privileged members of parties to perform for the attentive crowds.

In general, most present-day observers do not expect a great deal of productivity from

Question Period. Clearly, throughout Canada it has become purely a soapbox for media exposure

and party posturing. It has ceased to be seen by most participants in the way that this report feels

the mechanism was originally intended: as a forum for all Members to voice substantive private

issues. Instead of acting as a true medium for questioning government, it has become an arena

for “juvenile delinquency.”175 Note the following description of Canadian Question Period:

Amid applause and shouts of encouragement from his caucus colleagues, and catcalls and hecklingfrom those opposite, the Opposition Leader calls on a member of the cabinet to respond to somematter of urgent and pressing need, some great calamity that has befallen Canada since the daybefore, a question about which the Government has received no official notice.Usually, to similar noise and action, that cabinet member, or the Prime Minister, will rise andrespond, stating that whatever has so exercised the Member opposite has been solved already, will

174 Under Standing Order 47A.175 Jim McNulty, “MPs transform House of Commons into House of Horror,” Vancouver Province, 18 February2000: A30.

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be taken under advisement, or, most often, is not really of any consequence or importance to anyexcept those who have been less favoured by the voters. The rhetorical barbs fly both ways,reminding us why the benches of the House are set two sword-lengths apart.176

As the sarcasm denotes, very little actual progress is expected from this institution in today’s

Parliament. As one MP explains it, “It’s poor theater, used as a sound bite tool; frequently

destructive, rarely constructive. QP represents the worst of parliament, with all the parties

jockeying for position.”177 To an extent, it is the expectation of anarchy and superficiality by all

parties involved that has de-legitimized most calls for increased Private Member involvement

and intellectually discourages most efforts towards reform.

Clearly, Question Period today suffers under serious deficiencies regardless of who it

favours and who it does not. It has come to serve fundamentally different needs than it was

perhaps originally intentioned in 1973. Yet despite this realization, we must admit that Question

Period once had, and continues to have, the potential to provide invaluable opportunities to the

Private Member for privileged access to the House. Therefore, it is reasonable that we would

want to find ways to return some of these equalizing aspects to the institution of Question Period

as it now stands without essentially changing its modern function.

To revisit this potential, there are two issues that must be confronted. First, there is the

issue of formal time allocation. The fact that Question Period rarely gets past the first few

questions by front-benchers is proof that either the time limit or the procedures using that time

must be re-evaluated. The time must come to fit the nature of debate, or the nature of debate

must come to fit the time. Secondly, and more importantly, the procedures as they stand are too

176 Michael Kalnay, “Managed Mayhem,” Parliamentary Government 8:4 (Summer 1989).177 Keith Martin quoted in Kady O’Malley, “No QP Extension For Worried Backbench MPs,” The Hill Times, 16June 2000: np.

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strongly conducive to partisan control, and as a result the natural function of Question Period –

the free and equal exchange of ideas – is suborned to control solely by the major players (the

Government and Opposition executives). The fact that all Members, not just the Opposition front

bench, have local and personal concerns deserving consideration has been sorely neglected.

Practices need to change in order to incorporate this fact.

To help solve these problems, we will once again look towards alternative jurisdictions

for ways to overcome both of these problems. In both cases, we can once again see reasonable

and proven alternatives that may help push Private Members towards effective involvement and

representation in Question Period that today’s House has ceased to engender.

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ii. The Possibilities for Reform

As mentioned, Question Period is plagued by two central issues: time and partisanship. In

terms of time, the problem is not just the lack thereof, but also the type of procedure that should

take place within that time.

At present, almost every parliamentary jurisdiction in the Commonwealth has a daily

Question Period longer than that of British Columbia. Canada allows for 45 minutes each day

(under Standing Order 30(5)). Great Britain puts aside between 45 minutes and one hour (S.O.

21). Australia allows between 50 and 60 minutes. New Zealand permits between 45 and 50

minutes. Even Germany allows for one hour. Closer to home, Ontario has a 60-minute Question

Period (S.O. 36), Quebec has 45 minutes (S.O. 74), and Manitoba has 40 minutes (Rule 22).

Finally, Alberta has 50 minutes set aside each day for the questioning of Ministers (S.O. 7).

Clearly, British Columbia’s Question Period is unnecessarily short, especially

considering that, at least within Canada, the function of Question Period is exactly the same. This

is a deficiency that cannot be denied. Therefore, British Columbia should look towards extending

this Period to at least 45 minutes in order to more closely resemble that of other comparable

provincial legislatures. Although it may remove much of the drama and intensity that party

executives thrive upon, for the Private Member additional involvement cannot be reasonably

expected unless a larger window for participation is provided. It does not take extensive

argument to see that an extended Question Period, for the sake of Private Member efficacy if

nothing else, is an essential reform.

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However, this is not the only reform needed in this area. Although the time would be

extended, the nature of Question Period would undoubtedly remain the same adversarial and

party-controlled creature that it has become since 1973 unless changes could be made that truly

reconsidered the nature of Question Period itself.

One way to approach this deeper dilemma would be to look more closely at Britain,

Australia and New Zealand. In each of these cases, Question Period is treated as a genuine

opportunity for the exchange of information. As such, this mechanism has taken on a

fundamentally different nature than its Canadian counterparts. These jurisdictions embrace a

view of Question Period that most closely resembles what this report believes is its natural

purpose, and the positive results are noticeable:

Backbenchers in all three legislatures – and most notably government Members – have a muchmore prominent role than they do in the Canadian House of Commons. The result is greateremphasis on regional and constituency concerns. In general, questions tend to be shorter and moreto the point, and answers are more informative and less evasive.178

With such an endorsement clearly in line with our ultimate goals of Private Member efficacy,

these jurisdictions warrant closer consideration.

The Question Periods in these jurisdictions offer interesting variations on the practices

presently found in British Columbia. In the British system, questions are primarily submitted ten

days in advance and randomly selected to be asked by the Speaker. On the tenth day, the

question is then formally asked by the submitting Member in the House, and the relevant

178 Peter C. Dobell and Hon. Jon Reid, “A Larger Role for the House of Commons,” Parliamentary Government 40(April 1992): 9.

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minister is amply prepared to deliver a succinct and informed response. Supplemental questions

(which have not been submitted in advance) are then permitted under strict supervision by the

Speaker. In New Zealand, this type of questioning is modified, permitting a combination of

written questions demanding five-day notice, two-day notice and “questions of the day” which

are submitted only a few hours prior. Only Australia uses the standard “question without notice”

as is familiar in British Columbia and Canada.

More interestingly, the British system follows a “rota system”179 of questioning. Under

this system, individual ministers’ attendance in Question Period is set out in a schedule so that

they only appear to answer questions on set dates in a rotation. Through this practice, all of the

questions are directed towards the single minister of the day, and thus a single department. In a

sense, it is a condensed version of the lengthy estimates process currently at play in British

Columbia.180 To balance this usually serious and respected use of Question Period, two days

each week the Prime Minister and Opposition Leaders face off for 15 minutes to debate national

policy. These interludes represent the closest approximation of Canadian Question Period that

exists in Britain, and provide us with a familiar measure of drama and media fodder in an

otherwise purely functional parliamentary process.

Obviously, these models offer a number of options that are somewhat alien to the

Question Period as it now stands in British Columbia. However, if combined with existing

179 Dobell and Reid 8.180 This aspect of Question Period gives an element of public debate to the scrutiny of departments that is otherwiseconducted in select committees during estimates. Should British Columbia ever adopt such a committee structure(see Section 2, “Encouraging Individual Efficacy: Re-evaluating the Committee Process) and abandon full Housedebate of estimates, this process would become almost essential to making public various departmental foibles.

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practices these models could drastically change the balance of influence in Question Period. It

would be unreasonable, for example, to expect Members in British Columbia to accept having to

give notice for every question. However, increased use of the written question, and a set time

limit for its answer in the House, would be very useful. For example, British Columbia could

follow the British and New Zealand models by permitting Members to submit written questions

that would have be formally dealt with at the beginning of Question Period within five days

(instead of the present practice which allows indefinite time limits for answers). If conducted

through random selection (as in Britain), this could provide an opportunity for Private Members

to ask important questions with guaranteed and well-considered answers. In addition, British

Columbia could adopt a mechanism for introducing questions with two hours’ notice that would

have to be formally introduced at the beginning of Question Period on the same day. By

conducting this on a random system as well, and limited to perhaps only one question per day,

Private Members would have another opportunity for participation. Regardless of the shape such

reform might take, the intrinsic value evident in these jurisdictions (but not in our own) is the

free exchange of carefully considered information in the House by all Members without

succumbing to the forces of high drama and partisanship that usually accompany questions

without notice.

As well, it would not be unreasonable for British Columbia to adopt a semi-rotational

system (like that of Britain) under which individual ministers would participate in questioning by

Private Members focused solely on one department. This could be casually introduced in British

Columbia by, for example, occupying the last 15 minutes of Question Period two days a week.

This version of the British hybrid system would maintain the basic Question Period as British

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Columbians know it, yet include a time when Members seeking specific remedies (which is

usually the case with Private Members) could effectively pursue their goals. Also, because it

would be outside the more combative aspects of Question Period (and thus not observed as

closely by media or public) this process would foster a less overtly partisan atmosphere. As such,

it could provide a forum whereby scrutiny of a department by all Members could take place

without fear of publicly casting aspersions on the party and potentially incurring discipline.

Clearly, this has been successful overseas and warrants some emulation in British Columbia.

However, even with these mechanisms, it is still apparent that the bulk of Question

Period would continue to be dominated by the major parties and their major players. It is the

opinion of this report that part of the reason and solution for this problem involves confronting

the partisan nature of the Speaker in directing debates. Traditionally, the purpose of the Speaker

in a parliamentary system has been to perform “a quasi-judicial function”181 – ensuring that

debate proceeds in an orderly and dignified fashion. Within this function lies control over how

debate is conducted including which Members can speak, when they can speak, and for how long

they can speak. Despite varying understandings of this role that fluctuate between “indifference

and a lack of comprehension,”182 most Members are in agreement that this position should be

executed with complete impartiality.

One major hobbyhorse of reform has been the desire to secure independence in the

Speaker’s chair. For this reason, in 1994 the British Columbia Legislature adopted the practice of

181 Hon. John A. Fraser, “The Office of the Speaker,” The Advocate 46.3 (May 1988): 365.182 George MacMinn, “The Speaker and the Legislative Assembly of British Columbia,” Legislative ProcedureReview Act, (Victoria: Legislative Assembly of British Columbia, 1982) 23.

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electing the Speaker by secret ballot, thus discontinuing the practice of appointment by the

government. Furthermore, Opposition calls to elect Independent MLA Jack Weisgerber to the

position in 1998 and 2000 betrayed a strong desire to confirm this impartiality.183 Nationally, this

trend has continued with demands for alternating Government and Opposition Members in

Speaker, Deputy Speaker, and Assistant positions as is done in Britain.184 Even Alberta has tried

to secure this impartiality through the additional secret ballot election of the Deputy Speaker and

Deputy Committee Chairman (Standing Order 55). The overarching goal has been to distance the

Speakership as far from the government as possible.

Such reforms would certainly be embraced by British Columbians185, and are likely

pertinent in terms of general House reforms. However, it is the opinion of this report that in

terms of Private Member efficacy, the Speaker experiences a far more damaging type of partisan

pressure – from the Opposition party front bench, not the government – that can negatively

impact on the Private Member. In British Columbia and the rest of Canada, the preparation for

Question Period is standard. The Opposition House Leader submits a list of its Members that will

speak, which the Speaker conventionally follows when calling questioners. These Members are

usually the main Opposition critics, and it has become further convention that the Speaker allows

as many supplemental questions as necessary. Only in extreme circumstances will the Speaker

enforce brevity, urgency, or even relevancy rules (as mandated in the Standing Orders). When

183 This preference stems from the British practice of the Speaker not only being from the Opposition party but alsoresigning all partisanship upon taking the position. In subsequent elections, the Speaker runs under the title of“Speaker seeking re-election.” The most recent Speaker, Betty Boothroyd, was re-elected in 1996 under this system.184 See David Dingwall et al, Reviving Parliamentary Democracy: The Liberal Plan for House of Commons andElectoral Reform (January 1993).185 Calls for such changes have been frequent. Most recently, in Debates of the Legislative Assembly, 10 April 2000,MLA Barry Penner reiterated the demand for “an independent person in the Legislature to hold the position ofSpeaker and/or Deputy Speaker.”

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the process is understood in this light, it is clear why the majority of Private Members are denied

access to Question Period. And even those who are allowed access by the Opposition are rarely

encouraged to pose questions of a local nature, instead opting for more general, party-oriented

questions for the government.

With this understanding, the ideal situation would be to have the Speaker exercise

absolute discretion over how Question Period proceeds. First, the Speaker should decide who

will ask questions without direction from parties. For example, in Australia the Speaker (under

full personal discretion) alternates between Opposition and government backbenchers,

prohibiting all supplemental questions. As a result, a standard Question Period will hear up to 14

different questioners,186 the majority being non-front bench Private Members. In the 1993

Memorandum of Agreement, Alberta took a moderate approach to this process by asking both

Opposition and Government House Leaders to submit lists of Members, from which the Speaker

would alternate between Opposition and government back benches. Members not recognized in

the previous day would be given priority by the Speaker for questions the next day. Furthermore,

to curb domination by Opposition Leaders (or their designates), the Speaker is mandated to limit

them to three main questions with two supplementaries.

Ultimately, it would be preferable for British Columbia to adopt the Australian model of

pure Speaker discretion. However, with the pervasive quality of parties within this system and

the inherent partisanship held by the British Columbia Speaker, the Alberta compromise is

186 Richard Lucy, The Australian Form of Government: Models in Dispute, 2nd Ed. (South Melbourne: MacMillan,1993) 175.

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clearly preferable with its emphasis on participation by both benches and greater opportunity for

Private Member involvement. Combined with an expanded time frame and revised procedures,

this reform would be very successful in the British Columbia context.

To augment these changes, it is clear that the Speaker would need more authority to

assure that questions and answers are succinct so that time limits and bipartisan participation

could be adequately provided for. For example, as a rule in Canada, Speaker Gil Parent has

strictly limited questions and answers to 30 seconds. It has been agreed that participation has

greatly widened due to this rule187. British Columbia could easily emulate this exercise by

providing for specific time limits for questions and answers in the Standing Orders. Thirty

seconds (as followed in Canada) would be an appropriate limit. To further ensure brevity, the

Alberta Memorandum offers a good example through the following directive: “Any member

who, in the opinion of the Speaker, abuses the opportunity to give a preamble shall be called to

order.” If British Columbia wanted to provide similar assurances, Standing Order 47A could be

easily amended to provide the Speaker with discretion over “lengthy preambles” in addition to

the other discretionary measures outlined in that Order.

Ultimately, the success of all these Speakership reforms will depend on the parties.

Unless there is agreement to be fair in the lists they submit, the questions they pose, and their

observance of and respect for the Speaker’s authority, none of these Question Period reforms can

be truly implemented. Much like the other reforms proposed, the signing of a Memorandum of

Agreement as done in Alberta may be sufficient to secure party cooperation with these changes.

187 “Strict limits give more MPs a voice in question period,” Vancouver Sun, 2 October 1997: A7.

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Once again, the force of public opinion could be harnessed to ensure that these reforms would be

utilized properly.

Overall, it is once again clear that reform in the legislative sphere – be it Private

Members’ business or Question Period – will only succeed if procedural reform is accompanied

by a conscious decision on the part of the parties involved (mainly the government) to

remain faithful to these goals and avoid excessive party discipline or agenda-setting in their

execution. Furthermore, all participants must be secure in the knowledge that when using these

mechanisms their respective parties will resist the urge to immediately impose discipline or

sanctions. Finally, while all of these reforms promise opportunity, their success in the House and

with the public will ultimately depend on the skills of the Member and the legitimacy of their

concerns. These reforms once again provide access, but by no means guarantee success.

In this section, we were concerned with the expansion of time and opportunity in the

Legislature itself. Yet the concept of time is not specifically limited to its use within the House

itself. In the next section, we will look at two ways in which time has been controlled by the

government beyond the internal workings of the House – through yearly calendars and

intermittent elections. As we shall see, by “fixing” these powers over scheduling so that they are

no longer under the government’s total control, the Private Member can turn time into an

advantage instead of a liability and regain substantial efficacy in the process.

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4. Enabling Individual Efficacy: Creating Certainty through Fixed Schedules

I think its high time, like other legislatures around this country and other parliaments that use theBritish system, that British Columbia get into the notion of adopting a calendar. That takes a bit ofcourage on behalf of the government. It’s the government that benefits from the lack of regimen inour parliamentary year.188

One of the greatest tools that remains available to the government of British Columbia is

its control over scheduling. In a forum where (as the previous section noted) the possession of

“time” is the greatest ambition, it is the executive’s continuing command over the allocation of

time that has reinforced their dominance over the majority of Private Members. This control is

exerted through two aspects of time in the Legislature: the yearly calendar and the timing of

general elections. In both cases, the day and place of their respective commencement,

continuation, and conclusion has fallen purely under the discretion of the government. And with

this control has come the ability to leave the Private Member in a constant state of uncertainty.

When will a session resume? When will it end? When will campaigning for re-election have to

take place? In a month, will the same Members still hold office? All of these questions are

answerable only by the government itself. As a result, the Private Member is perpetually denied

the ability to look ahead with certainty towards any long-term political strategy, or even

guarantee attendance at his or her child’s birthday party.

The implications of this reality are extremely damaging for the Private Member on both a

political and a psychological level. The chronic uncertainty that the government’s control over

scheduling fosters relegates the Private Member to a lifestyle that is completely unstructured.

188 Jack Weisgerber, British Columbia, Debates of the Legislative Assembly, 1996 Legislative Session: 1st Session36th Parliament, 2.21 (August 13, 1996).

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Every promise made can only be conditional. Every strategy is privy to a myriad of

contingencies. Not knowing when sittings or elections will occur these Members must

necessarily live one day at a time. And as a result, their efficacy is drastically inhibited and their

personal sense of professional fulfillment is soured. They soon come to fulfill the stereotype of

the lying politician that cannot follow through on his or her election promises, and cynicism

prevails.

In this section, we will confront this problem in its two forms. As we will come to see,

especially in the area of legislative calendars, British Columbia and its Private Members are far

behind most parliamentary systems, all of which have come to realize the importance of

scheduling reforms in creating better government. It is these other models that we must once

again look towards for both evidence and inspiration.

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a. Legislative Calendar

i. Calendars in Context

Few people would contest that in recent decades the responsibilities of and demands on

governments have grown. And with those responsibilities has come an increasing demand on a

government’s time. Despite the best efforts of most legislatures, the reality has become that as

session progresses there is inevitably a growing pressure on all involved to complete House

business and adjourn for constituency time and a well-earned rest. Therefore, conventionally the

executive is permitted to structure when and for how long the House would sit in order to most

practically expedite all of these responsibilities. Ideally, this ability was intended to ensure that

necessary business had been completed before Members could leave. Often this cannot be

determined until the final days of session.

In theory, this control could be seen as a legitimate tool for governments to ensure that no

important issues are neglected during a session. But in practice this responsibility has become an

executive tool used to dominate the Legislature’s behaviour for their own partisan benefit. It is a

means of ensuring that their agenda can be completed while that of the remaining Members can

remain on the Order Paper. Furthermore, with no requirements for multiple sittings in a session,

the government can take care of a great deal of controversial business during lengthy

adjournments without the accountability of scrutiny by the House. Control over the calendar is

also a means of “legislating by exhaustion,” whereby the government drags out proceedings until

the Opposition is too fatigued to put up resistance. And perhaps most importantly, the ability to

decide when the House will sit and rise and the length of time in between has placed the Private

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Member completely at the mercy of the government to determine how their House agenda,

constituency work, and personal lives will be structured. The Private Member comes to be held

hostage by the government’s agenda. Often, it is the pervasive uncertainty that accompanies this

control that is so damaging to the Private Member and their efficacy in planning or executing

their representative responsibilities.

This is precisely the situation in British Columbia. At present, there is no fixed schedule

by which the House sits or adjourns. Every year it has become common for the House to delay

its rise until the end of March with its resultant sitting lasting well into the summer with only a

few days’ warning on either end. Some years have fall sittings; some do not. There are even

some examples of sessions lasting longer than a year. Note the fragmented sitting schedule for

British Columbia’s 36th Parliament:

Session Year Sitting Dates Actual Sitting Days

1996 June 25 – Aug. 15 34

1997 Mar. 24 – July 30 82

1998/1999 Mar. 15 – July 30

Nov. 30 – Dec.14

Jan. 13 – Feb. 1

Mar. 29 – July 15 161

2000 Mar.15 - July 9 50

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As is evident, there is little consistency from year to year in either the number of days sat or

when those days occur.189 Clearly, we can see how such a fractured system can make optimum

performance extremely difficult for the average Member.

It is within this present situation that there have been countless calls by most Members of

British Columbia’s Legislative Assembly for a fixed yearly calendar with fixed sitting dates,

adjournment dates, and days off. Such a promise was made in this year’s Speech from the

Throne, which envisioned a parliamentary calendar that would “end legislation by attrition,

establish workable time lines and ensure a proper balance between member responsibilities in

this assembly and within their constituencies.”190 This sentiment has been echoed by the BC

Liberals who have promised a set legislative calendar with a set budget date, thus explicitly

determining how long MLAs would have to fulfill their duties in each session.191 Accompanied

by countless calls for such changes from individual MLAs in speeches to the House, it is clear

that this reform is perhaps the most eagerly anticipated reform at this time.

The benefits of this reform would create a noticeable difference in the workings of the

Legislative Assembly. As one author notes,

No longer would the house convene in spring for a single, marathon session that invariably dragswell into summer, amid late-night sittings and raucous high jinks of the kind witnessed in recentdays.192

189 As of writing, the 2000 session has not been prorogued. A fall sitting is still a distinct possibility for this session.190 British Columbia, Debates of the Legislative Assembly, 2000 Legislative Session: 4th Session 36th Parliament,18.1 (March 15, 2000).191 BC Liberals, “A New Era for British Columbia” (1999). Their proposal suggests that session would begin on thethird Thursday of February, with the budget tabled ten days later (well before March 31, the end of the previousyear’s spending authority).192 Vaughn Palmer, “A fixed calendar could fix some of the legislature’s faults,” Vancouver Sun, 15 July 1997: A8.

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By removing the guesswork and subsequent animosity that the uncertain scheduling has

presently fostered, a calendar would allow the Legislature to “gain a measure of predictability

and stability, plus that most elusive of qualities in BC’s legislative zoo – dignity.” Furthermore,

it would reinstate a level of security for the Private Member that is a necessary foundation for

any effective participation in daily governance.

Let us now turn to ways in which such changes could be put in place. As we shall see,

British Columbia is one of the few jurisdictions still clinging to this executive power while most

others have come to realize the benefits that stability can provide.

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ii. The Possibilities for Reform

The need for a legislative calendar, as we can see, is both sensible and plainly obvious.

Yet, British Columbia has been very silent in this area – much akin to its stance on the majority

of other reforms. This is in stark contrast to the number of other jurisdictions that have

comfortably adopted such schedules.

Internationally, the majority of parliamentary jurisdictions have set days for sitting and

adjournment. For example, Article 28 of the French Constitution mandates two sessions each

year. The first must begin on October 2 and end on the third Friday of December, thus lasting a

total of 80 sitting days. The second sitting must open on April 2 and can only last for a maximum

of 90 days. Being constitutionally mandated, these dates cannot be changed by either

government or Parliament as a whole.193 In Australia, the House of Representatives also meets

in two separate sittings. The autumn sitting starts in the beginning of February and ends in mid-

June. The spring sitting begins in mid-August and ends before Christmas.194 The specific pattern

of sitting and non-sitting days and weeks is established months in advance. More recent practice

has included a four-week cycle with three weeks sitting and one week adjourned.195 In Britain,

the Standing Orders mandate that session proceed all year with a three-to-four-week adjournment

in December and January and an eleven-week adjournment from late July to mid-October – thus

creating de facto spring and autumn sittings. Finally, every single state in the United States has a

193 The only allowable change is if starting dates fall upon a holiday, in which cases the sitting begins the firstworking day pursuant.194 Interestingly enough, the Australian cycle is also set up so that the budget is introduced in the second sitting,giving the House a chance to acclimatize to the government’s agenda before issues of supply are debated.195 See J.A. Pettifer, House of Representatives Practice (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Serve, 1981)257-267.

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set calendar, with all states having a set day for sitting commencement and the majority with a

set day for session end.196

Domestically, most jurisdictions within Canada have come to accept the benefits of fixed

calendars. The Canadian House of Commons, by virtue of Standing Order 27(2), has divided the

session into two sittings. The first sitting of the session runs from the day after Labour Day to the

second Friday preceding Christmas. The second sitting runs from the first Monday in February to

June 23 (with the option for a ten-day extension). In addition, to speed up this process the House

of Commons has limited debate to six days for the Speech from the Throne (S.O. 50(1)), four

days for debate of the budget (S.O 84(2)) and 21 days in total for supply (S.O. 81(10)).

Furthermore, they have informally adopted the four-week cycle of three weeks of sitting and one

week of adjournment as used in Australia.

Provincially, Quebec has utilized a fixed calendar since 1984. Standing Order 19 allows

for two sittings – the first runs from “the second Tuesday in March until not later than the

twenty-third of June," while the second runs “from the third Tuesday in October until not later

than the twenty-first day of December.” In Ontario, there are also two sittings mandated under

Standing Order 6. The spring sitting runs from the end of Spring Break in March to the fourth

Thursday in June; the fall sitting runs from the fourth Monday in September to the second

Thursday in December. Furthermore, this jurisdiction publishes their set calendar up to a year in

196 See The Council of State Governments, The Book of States, Vol. 26 (Lexington: The Council of StateGovernments, 1986-87) 83-85. Among those states without a set day for session end include California, Idaho,Illinois, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Jersey, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania and Wisconsin.

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advance so that all Members may plan accordingly.197 Finally, Alberta has even adopted a

partially set schedule for two yearly sittings under the 1993 Memorandum of Agreement. The

first shall begin on or before February 15; the second will begin on or before October 21. In this

case, adjournment is still subject to executive manipulation.

Clearly, all major jurisdictions that we have covered have a type of calendar established

well in advance to their Houses sitting. While in every case the executive remains with some

discretion to extend these periods in times of urgency, in general these pre-set times are strictly

adhered to by most governments. The general consensus by all Members involved has been

overwhelmingly positive.

This can only make one wonder even further why the British Columbia Legislative

Assembly has yet to adopt such a model. This disbelief was evidently expressed by David

Mitchell in 1994 and 1995 as he introduced Bills M-210 and M-205 – the “Parliamentary

Calendar Act.” Both stipulated for the following pattern, excepting holidays and other logical

limitations:

There shall be two sessions of the Legislative Assembly each year, the first being a maximum offour months’ duration commencing in the first Monday of March and the second being amaximum of two months’ duration commencing the second Tuesday in October.

The intended objective was twofold. First, there was the desire to create certainty for Members in

terms of when sittings started and finished. Second, it was an acknowledgment of the fact that

most other jurisdictions were already aware of – that for better government, two sittings were

better than one. They would allow for the adoption and reconsideration of legislation and supply

197 As of writing, Ontario has posted a calendar for all observers outlining both the days of House sittings and thedays of committee sittings (which also sit during adjournment) until the end of 2001.

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in the following fall, and an opportunity for all Members to respond to problems that would

inevitably arise in the interim. However, this ideal model put forth by Mr. Mitchell met the same

fate as most private members’ bills – total disregard.

However, it appears that the tide may be turning. In June 2000, government House

Leader Dale Lovick put forward a motion on the Order Paper that proposes several changes for

January 2001. First, there is an amendment to Standing Order 2 that would provide for two

sittings each year. The first would sit from the first Monday in February to the last Thursday in

May. The second would sit from the first Monday in October to the last Thursday in November.

Paralleling Mr. Mitchell’s proposal, these dates would allow for early budget consideration on

top of further supply consideration in the fall. Second, this motion recommends further

amendment allowing for the Australian four-week cycle model to be adopted. This was

informally put into use during the latter half of the 2000 spring session. Third, this motion

creates a limitation whereby all new legislation in the fall session would have to be introduced

no later than the second week of the fall session.198 Finally, under this motion estimates would be

limited to 235 hours of debate.199 Combined with the present Standing Order provisions for an

eight-day limit on both the Throne Speech and the Budget (S.O.45A), this motion collectively

endeavours to ensure greater efficiency and certainty in daily proceedings.

198 In May and June 2000, both parties attempted to reach an all-party agreement on a calendar through theLegislative Assembly Management Committee. All measures were agreed upon except for this measure, which theLiberals wanted changed to accept no new legislation in the fall. The government refused, and the negotiations weredissolved. The resulting motion was put forward by the government without all-party support.199 These estimates would be discussed in three Committees of Supply labeled A, B, and C.

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Most observers would note that this motion by the NDP government is an obvious

response to the Liberal “New Era” platform that made almost identical promises. Nevertheless,

from a non-partisan standpoint it is evident that this motion contains the essentials for a good

calendar. Ideally, the fixed calendar adopted in British Columbia should change the Standing

Orders to include provisions for two yearly sittings commencing and concluding on fixed dates.

These dates should reflect a requisite period for a budget to be presented before the previous

year’s spending authority ends and continued limitations on Throne, Budget and Estimates

debate. Clearly, the model presented in British Columbia this year fills most of these needs, with

the exception of a further need for expedited estimates debates, which this report maintains could

best be achieved through a reconstituted committee system.200

Yet the need for a calendar must go a bit further. While this model would allow for

security over the course of the year, Members would still remain in the dark as to the nature of

daily proceedings. Ideally, it would be most beneficial to the Private Member (mainly those not

part of the government caucus) to have a clear idea about immediate upcoming business. At the

same time, the power to control and obfuscate this agenda remains a powerful tool for the

government in controlling the House’s business. To ask that they fully relinquish this control

would be unreasonable and success unlikely.

An appropriate compromise between complete disclosure and complete secrecy would be

a model similar to that in place in Alberta. Under Alberta Standing Order 7(5), on Thursdays the

daily routine allows for “Projected Government Business” right after Private Members’

200 See above, Chapter III, Encouraging Individual Efficacy: Re-evaluating the Committee Process.

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Statements (but before the daily Order of Business). During this time, the Official Opposition

House Leader may ask one question of the government pertaining to the following week’s

agenda. The government is obliged to respond to this question. Conventionally, it has become

very informative for the Opposition. Note the following example of the application of this

mechanism:

MR. DICKSON: Thanks very much, Mr. Speaker. Pursuant to Standing Order 7(5) I'd ask theGovernment House Leader to outline the course of business we might anticipate commencingTuesday, May 23, please.THE SPEAKER: The hon. Government House Leader.MR. HANCOCK: Thank you, Mr. Speaker. On Tuesday, May 23, at 4:30 p.m. under GovernmentBills and Orders for third reading, Bill 24, if necessary; for second reading, Bill 20 and Bill 22;and in Committee of the Whole, Bill 3 and Bill 19. At 8 p.m. under Government Bills and Ordersfor second reading, Bill 20 and Bill 22; Committee of the Whole, Bill 3, Bill 20, Bill 22, Bill 18,Bill 19, and as per the Order Paper.201

As can be seen, this practice has met much success in Alberta and has been respected by the

government as a legitimate right for non-government Members. Resultantly, the Opposition has

found itself much better equipped to prepare their priorities for the following week, while the

government has maintained general control over the House direction. In this report’s opinion,

British Columbia would be well advised to include a similar provision in the Standing Orders to

give Private Members a clear idea about the upcoming week’s business so that they can plan

accordingly. This is a simple change that could bring about, as Alberta has shown us, very

constructive results.

Clearly, this reform is very important for the Private Member. Without a firm grasp on

their immediate futures, all other opportunities could be wasted as they wallow in uncertainty.

They cannot be effective unless they can be confident that their efforts will not be in vain. At

present, it is obvious that this confidence does not exist.

201 Alberta, Debates of the Legislative Assembly, 2000 Legislative Assembly: 4th Session 24th Legislature (May 18,2000).

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Like all other reforms, both approaches to scheduling will be highly dependent on all

parties involved. Yearly calendars can only work when neither the government nor the

Opposition attempts to stall proceedings with partisan issues, thus allowing ample time for the

necessities of governance to be fulfilled. Similarly, the weekly calendar depends upon good faith

on the government’s part to answer as truthfully as their Alberta counterparts. In either case, both

parties must once again be in agreement. But unlike other issues that could require an Alberta-

style Memorandum of Agreement, it is likely that Standing Order amendments may be enough to

secure that these processes become practice.

This aspect of scheduling leads us into another: fixed election dates. Unlike calendars,

fixed election dates are mired in constitutional and traditional difficulties that bring added

complexity to their enactment. Nevertheless, there are precedents set that can make these

changes wholly reasonable.

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b. Fixed Election Dates

i. Fixed Election Dates in Context

The concept of fixed elections is one that stems from the same problems of uncertainty

and potential abuse by government of the election mechanism that plagues the issue of legislative

calendars. Much like the calendar, no Private Member can be certain of the date of upcoming

elections. Aside from the five-year constitutional limitation on all elected governments in

Canada (which we will discuss), the executive has the power to call an election any time before

this limit without the consensus or even prior knowledge of the House. As such, it is not

uncommon for governments in this position to hold the threat of calling an election (and

therefore the threat of campaigning and possible electoral defeat) over the heads of all Private

Members as a means of discipline, and to use the anticipation of upcoming electioneering to

discourage their long-term planning.

Quite obviously, for this reason the Private Member lives in a state of constant

unpredictability where at any moment they may be forced to drop all of their plans, begin

campaigning, and call their future into question. Such a state of anticipation is good for neither

the Private Member’s efficacy as a representative nor the people themselves who have needs that

the representative must fill. It is little wonder that, in a recent poll, those surveyed supported

fixed elections above government control over elections more than two to one.202

202 54% of those polled supported fixed dates for election; 20% felt that the government should decide. Poll found inPaul Howe and David Northrup, “Strengthening Canadian Democracy: The Views of Canadians,” Policy Matters1.5 (July 2000) 12.

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In principle, the concept of fixed elections seems quite simple. Much like the American

practice under Article 1, Section 1 of the United States Constitution that allows for four-year

fixed presidential terms, it would seem that our parliaments could simply add similar clauses to

their respective constitutions and achieve similar effects. However, the nature of the

parliamentary system itself creates additional complexity through both constitutional and

traditional limitations. All parliamentary systems, including British Columbia, are bound by

similar constraints that can make reforms such as fixed elections extremely difficult to

implement.

British Columbia’s constitutional limitations lie in the British North America Act, 1867,

the Canadian Constitution Act, 1982, and British Columbia’s own Constitution Act, 1996. Under

the authority of all of these documents, the following facts have been established as formally

inalienable.

First, under the authority of all documents, the responsibility for the dissolution and

prorogation of successive parliaments falls solely with the Lieutenant-Governor. With the

exception of the limitation of British Columbian parliaments to a maximum of five years (under

section 4 of the Canadian Constitution Act, 1982 and section 23 of British Columbia’s

Constitution Act), the precise timing of elections is purely under the purview of this figure. As

mentioned in prior sections, convention has become that the Lieutenant-Governor acts only

under the advice of the Premier. This essentially gives the Premier total control over the calling

of an election. Therefore, from a constitutional standpoint, any attempt to formally secure set

election dates (as in the United States) would remove such a power from the Premier, and as

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such undeniably come into conflict with the formal powers of Lieutenant-Governor. As such,

fixed election dates irrespective of this authority would be wholly unconstitutional and repugnant

to central parliamentary principles. In this case, American-style fixed elections and the

parliamentary system are completely incongruent principles.

Second, we must take into account traditional aspects of the parliamentary system,

mainly the practice of responsible government. Under this system, should a government be

defeated on a vote of non-confidence, that government must give up office. In the event that no

other group can reasonably be appointed to form a government, the Lieutenant-Governor must

call an election. Obviously, if elections are fixed and not flexible, then the convention of the non-

confidence defeat followed by an election would be rendered moot. Therefore, American-styled

fixed election dates would likely be rendered unconstitutional on a second dimension as

responsible government is clearly a constitutional convention. As one author notes, “the idea of

fixed elections challenges directly the principles of responsible government,”203 which cannot be

compromised by any reforms.

Certainly, the concept of fixed election dates would also strike a serious blow to one of a

Premier’s main tools of party discipline. Unable to call elections at their whim, Premiers would

be unable to use the threat of imposing arduous campaigns on Private Members. For an

executive, it would eliminate their ability to keep the House (mainly the Opposition) perpetually

off balance. However, the constitutional and traditional restrictions on British Columbia’s

203 Murray Mincoff, “Party discipline and the legislative process in Canada,” Parliamentary Weekly March 1992: np.

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parliamentary system make it obvious that such a model would be highly incongruent in a non-

republican system, therefore keeping this power safe from any formal compromise.

Nevertheless, the issue of fixed terms has remained a considerable hobbyhorse in most

discourse on parliamentary reform. Nationally, the Reform-now-Canadian Alliance Party put

forth the concept of four-year fixed terms in its 1997 platform204 and still propounds it in its

current platform. Provincially, the BC Liberals promise four-year fixed terms for British

Columbia should they become the government.205 Obviously, both parties feel that such a change

would not be contrary to a parliamentary structure if enacted properly. It is finding the delicate

balance between constitutionality and efficacy that makes this particular reform so difficult.

The other issue that often confounds the reform of fixed elections is questions about

whether the advantages they bring to Private Members and the House would be proportionate to

the obvious restrictions it would place on the executive. In the Royal Commission on Electoral

Reform and Party Financing (the Lortie Report), fixed elections were discussed as potential

reforms. Mainly, opposition to the idea was constitutional in nature:

To implement a system of fixed terms with no exception, a constitutional restructuring of ourfederal legislative and executive institutions would be required.206

Furthermore, while noting that the diminished advantage held by governments in choosing

opportune times for re-election would obviously favour other parties to a degree, the report was

quick to cite numerous potential problems notwithstanding the constitutional issues. For

204 Reform Party of Canada, Blue Book: Principles and Policies of the Reform Party of Canada, (Calgary: ReformParty of Canada, 1997) 41.205 BC Liberals, “A New Era for British Columbia” (1999).206 Canada, Royal Commission on Electoral Reform and Party Financing, Reforming Electoral Democracy, Vol.1,ed. Pierre Lortie. (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1991) 78

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example, in order to maintain constitutionality a parliamentary system would have to create a

hybrid system in order to allow for non-confidence votes. This hybrid would likely be difficult

and complicated, and the allowance of non-confidence votes would simply let governments

engineer their own defeats at opportune times. Thus, the system would not change in any

fundamental way. Conversely, public pressure for an unpopular government to have an election

could be more easily ignored on the principle of fixed elections than on traditional parliamentary

principles. Finally, prior knowledge of elections would allow for lengthy and expensive

campaigns in which money would have an even more disproportionate role in success – a

common problem in the congressional model.207

All of these criticisms are legitimate and clearly support the impulse to maintain the

status quo. On the other hand, they do admit that fixed elections in a parliamentary system are

certainly possible. And as we shall see in the next section, by looking at other parliaments we

can determine that fixed elections can also be very successful.

207 Today, it is becoming increasingly clear that even with our present election practices, money has a powerfulinfluence over electoral success. In a July 2000 poll, 60% agreed that the party spending the most money during anelection is guaranteed to win that election (see Howe and Northrup 38).

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ii. The Possibilities for Reform

As we have seen, there are certain limitations that must be taken into consideration when

contemplating fixed elections in a parliamentary system. First, they must not directly impinge on

the abilities of the Premier to request dissolution by the Lieutenant-Governor. Second, they must

allow for early dissolution on a successful vote of non-confidence. Only when these two

important principles are fulfilled will a fixed election survive constitutional scrutiny. The

American model as it stands would not endure this gauntlet.

Most constitutions in parliamentary jurisdictions have a maximum time limit for a

parliament, usually between three and five years. Therefore, there is a de facto fixed term in

place in all of these parliaments in that they are limited in length. The issue then becomes one of

preventing early dissolution prior to that term expiring. This is the central problem about fixed

elections that must be solved before British Columbia can adopt such changes.

To establish an ideal model, we must look at the two main jurisdictions that claim to have

fixed elections: Australia and New Zealand. It should be noted that there is no parliamentary

jurisdiction in the world that can formally restrict their executives from requesting early

dissolution.208 Therefore, we must look beyond the formal rules in each jurisdiction to find the

real solution to balancing constitutionality and practice.

208 See Parliaments of the World, 2nd Edition: A Comparative Reference Compendium (Great Britain: Inter-Parliamentary Union, 1986) 1325.

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Australia’s Constitution, under section 5, allows for a three-year limit on each

Parliament. New Zealand’s Constitution has a similar limitation. Like most parliaments, both

countries invest the power of dissolution in the hands of the Queen’s representative, and in both

countries this power is exercised on the request of the Prime Minister. Therefore, at the request

of the government leader, parliament is dissolved (just as is the practice in Canada).

Nevertheless, both jurisdictions claim to have fixed election dates. How is this possible?

The answer is quite simple. Both systems follow what is known as a “qualified fixed

term”209 system. Under this system, elections are set at fixed three-year intervals. However, in

accordance with the principle of responsible government, should a government suffer a non-

confidence defeat prior to the term limit, the House would be dissolved and an election would

follow. The new administration would then begin a new three-year term upon election.

However, this does not solve the main problem: preventing a government’s early

dissolution. This power is still alive and well in both jurisdictions and cannot be formally

circumvented. To overcome this, the circumvention of this power has had to become purely

informal. Most simply put, the power of early dissolution is rendered moot by the parties simply

agreeing not to use it.

For example, in New Zealand the Labour party’s Caucus Rules mandates that three-year

elections must be held “as nearly as practicable to the beginning of December in the year prior to

209 Peter C. Dobell and Hon. John Reid, “A Larger Role for the House of Commons,” Parliamentary Government 40(April 1992): 16.

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the General Election.”210 As such, for a government to dissolve the House prior to the expiration

of the three-year term for purely political reasons would be completely contrary to that party’s

practices. When this self-imposed restriction is combined with the perpetual use of this practice –

New Zealand has been doing this for over one hundred years211 – it is obvious that the practice

soon becomes convention both politically and constitutionally. No government in New Zealand

has acted against this rule, and chances are that popular opinion would never allow such an event

to occur. Australia, although newer to this practice, has achieved an equal force of public

opinion. For these reasons, both of these parliamentary systems are seen to have fixed election

dates in practice that do not formally compromise either the power of dissolution or the

confidence convention.

There are slight variations on this procedure. For example, Article 45 of the Japanese

Constitution allows the Japanese parliament (called “The Diet”) to sit for four years unless

terminated by House dissolution due to a non-confidence motion (secured under Article 69). The

German Bundestag, under Article 30 of their Constitution, follows the same four-year term and

dissolution pattern. In both cases, dissolution for any other reason has become unacceptable.

Obviously, jurisdictions in which the government can practically dissolve legislatures at their

will are becoming the exception and not the rule in larger jurisdictions.

We can see that there is great merit in fixed elections when informally reconciled with

parliamentary practices. The codified aspects of its implementation would also be surprisingly

210 Elizabeth McLeary, The Cabinet and Political Power in New Zealand (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1995)54.211 Dobell and Reid 16.

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simple. For example, let us say that we wished to create a framework for fixed four-year terms in

British Columbia (as the BC Liberals have proposed). To do this, the British Columbia

Constitution Act Section 23 would have to be amended to limit terms to four, instead of five,

years. This would be easy to do; in fact, until 1913 the time limit was four years until the

executive amended the Act to extend the limit. Although British Columbia is also constrained by

section 4 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which places a five-year term limit on all

Canadian legislatures, this section only secures a maximum term length. It is generally

understood that the powers of dissolution held by the Premier would not be in any way altered

under this section,212 and as such a government’s informal practice to dissolve only after four

years would not be contrary to the Charter. Therefore, it seems that the framework for fixed,

“qualified” four-year elections could easily be adopted in British Columbia by the party in power

and secured by amendment of the provincial Constitution Act to place a four-year time limit on

all subsequent parliaments.

Yet this is the easy part. It is the delicate problem of preventing an executive from using

its constitutional power of early dissolution – the informal component of fixed elections – that

remains more complex. One option would be to legislate such a prohibition. As an example, in

1996, Bill C-250 was put forth in the Canadian House of Commons that sought to amend the

Parliament of Canada Act to secure a fixed election “every four years on the third Monday of

October.” Furthermore, it mandated that the Prime Minister could not seek dissolution except in

the case of a successful non-confidence vote. It was this Member’s opinion that the Prime

Minister’s constitutional power could be circumscribed by a simple legislative ordinance. This

212 See Peter Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada: 3rd Student Edition (Toronto: Carswell, 1992) 1002.

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assumption was incorrect, and no doubt had a role in this Bill’s failure. It is the opinion of this

report that the constitutional authority would easily prevail and that, had this Bill actually

become an Act, this legislation would have been struck down as unconstitutional.

Clearly, the spirit of this legislation was correct, but the appropriate formula for success

requires more unconventional and informal methods. Rather than attempt to restrain the

executive power through legislation, this report believes that British Columbia should utilize a

combination of party agreement and the force of public opinion to secure fixed elections – as

proven successful in New Zealand and Australia. Like many of the other reforms in this report,

restraint on the executive power for dissolution can only come through an explicit

acknowledgment by that executive that the power will not be used (except on a non-confidence

measure). As such, an Alberta-style Memorandum of Agreement securing all-party commitment

to fixed elections and the executive’s commitment to restraining the power of dissolution would

not be unreasonable. It would only be through such a show of good faith that fixed elections

could genuinely take place. With any luck, the electorate and elected would soon become so

accustomed to such practices that they would take on the force of convention, much like it has in

New Zealand.

Once again, we must acknowledge the need for a combination of procedural reforms and

party cooperation in order to affect the desired changes. In one sense, fixed elections may indeed

be a step closer towards a dangerous parliamentary-congressional hybrid of limited executive

power loathed by most parliamentary purists. But at the same time, the potential benefits of

stability and certainty for the Private Member would be considerable, and both the government

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and electorate would have reason to appreciate a measure of predictability and security in

parliamentary terms. Furthermore, the removal of the threat of election as an instrument of party

discipline would also go a long way towards easing the passage of the other reforms we have

discussed. If the parliamentary system in British Columbia proves itself as flexible as the other

jurisdictions explored, then clearly the benefits warrant such changes.

With this note, we will shift our focus away from the general subject of time. In the next

and final section, we will revisit the issue of party discipline by looking at ways to reform one

key aspect of executive dominance: the power of appointment. At issue is the executive’s ability

to control the bestowal of key positions in government – mainly, ministerial positions – and the

ways in which this authority has become a coercive tool to ensure executive control over Private

Members. As we shall see, it is again through a combination of procedure and party participation

that we can explore reasonable ways to neutralize this power and return efficacy back to the

Private Member.

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5. Extending Individual Efficacy: Giving Caucus the Power of Appointment

[G]ive to the caucus the right to name those of their colleagues who will be in cabinet, leaving thePrime Minister to select their positions.Right there you have given Parliament back much of its lost control.213

The caucus as a body is a political entity that often goes largely unnoticed by political

spectators. If it is the caucus of a party currently in power, it comes to be eclipsed by the actions

and responses of the government itself. If it is the caucus of an Opposition party, they are

eclipsed by the actions and responses of the front-bench members who speak for the group. In

both cases, oftentimes the role of the caucus in the daily workings of governance can be

perceived as virtually irrelevant. More times than not, party executives can ensure that this

perception quickly becomes self-fulfilling.

In actuality, the caucus is far from irrelevant. Any party that wishes to succeed needs to

garner the continuing support of all of its Members. They are a party’s main vehicles for publicly

supporting the party’s agenda and conveying that message to their respective electorates. These

Members can also offer useful policy input in the creation of better legislation or responses to

legislation. And of course, these members are essential to any party, whether government or

Opposition, on the House floor as they vote for the party’s respective positions. It is very

difficult for any party to succeed without a caucus that is unified and supportive of its executive.

213 Rafe Mair, “Put the government back in the hands of people who elected it,” Vancouver Sun, 19 May 2000: A36

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As mentioned in conjunction with free votes, it is the caucus role in House voting that

reveals the pervasive nature of party discipline in parliamentary jurisdictions. Every caucus

member is put under constant pressure to primarily toe the party line. Acknowledging such a

reality, it is the ambition of almost every caucus member to be part of the design of that party

line instead of merely a supporter of it. For this reason, the desire for advancement to higher

positions is foremost in the minds of almost all caucus members. It is for this reason that the

power of appointment, when placed solely under the discretion of the party leader, can be a

highly effective tool of party discipline. To control this function is to control a Member’s future.

And with this control, Members can be persuaded to act in any interest but their own.

Clearly, like all instruments of party discipline, the control over appointment held by the

party leader is rarely in the best interest of Members or their constituents. For this reason, it has

become a serious impediment to individual efficacy. In the following sections, we will explore

ways of taking this power of appointment away from party leaders and place it in the hands of

the caucus. As we shall see, in these new hands appointment can become an instrument to reward

merit instead of loyalty and provide satisfaction instead of coercion to the Private Member. And

ultimately, it can significantly reduce the power of party discipline that so brazenly hinders all

other aspects of parliamentary reform that we have discussed.

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i. Caucus and Appointment in Context

The power of appointment exists on both sides of the House in a parliamentary system.

Whether the party be occupying the government or Opposition ranks, in either case there are

both formal and informal opportunities for a leader to promote a deserving caucus member to a

position of higher status, higher pay, or both. For the Opposition, this can include shadow

cabinet posts, the positions of caucus chairman or Opposition House Leader, or a number of

coveted postings on all-party committees (as presented to the formal selection committee). On

the government side, there are the more glamorous opportunities to become cabinet ministers,

committee chairs, and governmental delegates on top of those afforded to the Opposition. In the

majority of cases, it is under the sole discretion of the party leader that these positions are

assigned

For the Opposition leader, this discretion is merely customary. But for the Premier, this

discretion is constitutionally bestowed. Under the authority of the British North America Act,

1867 and British Columbia’s Constitution Act, 1996, the power of appointment is vested solely

in the Lieutenant-Governor. Like all other powers this figure possesses, they are conventionally

exercised only on the advisement of the Premier. As such, in practice all major appointments

such as cabinet positions are chosen by the Premier and consequently enacted according to those

choices. This constitutional power makes appointment by any authority other than the Premier

extremely rare. Much like fixed elections, any deviation from the parliamentary norm would

have to be purely informal and done so only with the Premier’s complete cooperation and

discretion.

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Yet if that control over appointment could be diluted, then the instrument of party

discipline would be largely reduced in favour of an empowered Private Member. Furthermore, if

that power were diluted through its devolution to the Private Members themselves, their

individual efficacy and professional dignity would be enhanced immeasurably. In particular, this

would be most true in reference to the appointment of cabinet. As one author notes,

One of the most effective ways to diffuse power, and make it more accountable to the people,would be to elect cabinet ministers by the caucus.214

The question of how to execute this within constitutional grounds is the central question.

In one sense, being that the majority of appointments on both government and Opposition

sides are mostly informal, it is easy to see the remedy itself as being equally informal. The party

simply agrees to devolve this power to the caucus that then votes for the person who would best

hold that position. To a certain extent, this is already done in certain circles in Canada. For

example, all BC parties elect their caucus chairman, which the leader accepts. The Quebec

Liberal Party has made a practice of electing its chief whip, the only party in Canada to do so.215

There has also been talk of leaving appointment to committees to be selected by the caucus, and

then presented to the Selection Committee.216 All of these are reasonable reforms and easily

executable through informal party mechanisms.

The real difficulty comes in diffusing this power of appointment over the constitutionally

mandated and politically sensitive areas of appointment such as that of the cabinet. Cabinet

positions are particularly important carrots for a leader to bestow. Not only do they offer the

214 Patrick Boyer, Hands on Democracy (Toronto: Stoddart Publishing, 1993) 75.215 Howard Gold, “Revitalizing Caucus,” Parliamentary Government 4.1(Year unknown): 13.216 Canada West Foundation, Re-Inventing Parliament: Conference on Parliamentary Reform Summary Report:February 24 and 25, 1994 (Lethbridge: University of Lethbridge and Canada West Foundation, 1994) 9.

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average Member a chance for more money and notoriety, but for the leader this power is an

opportunity to assemble an “inner circle” of soldiers to help complete a specific agenda. It is not

unreasonable to see why most Premiers would be hesitant to relinquish such a power.

Yet the advantages to having the caucus elect the members of cabinet are not only

numerous but immediately evident. As discussed, there is naturally the weakening of party

discipline that would result as popularity amongst caucus members and merit in work suddenly

displaced patronage by the leader as the central means towards advancement. But this

mechanism would also engender a unique relationship between cabinet and caucus. Cabinet

members would suddenly be beholden to the caucus for their election and subsequent re-

elections, therefore compelling them to be more responsive to the individual needs and demands

of Private Members. Conversely, caucus members would suddenly be responsible for the success

of those ministers and thus feel a positive need to work towards collectively forming and taking

responsibility for all decisions. They would behave “like mountain climbers fastened together by

the same rope: they get to the summit as one, or all tumble into the abyss together.”217 Finally,

the province as a whole would benefit from what would surely be a continuous fine-tuning of

cabinet through election instead of the major disruption and dislocation that comes from sudden

cabinet overhauls.

Certainly, the benefits warrant further investigation. Yet how can they be reconciled with

the Premier’s constitutional power of appointment? In the next section, we will look specifically

at this possible reform as currently practised in other parliamentary jurisdictions. By examining

217 Boyer 77.

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the specific process that is used in these instances, we can see how the constitution and practice

can both be satisfied. As well, the resultant procedures will be easily transferable to any other

areas where caucus might control appointments.

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ii. The Possibilities for Reform

It is clear that this reform is desirable for a number of reasons. Yet there are a number of

important questions that accompany this reform. Most obviously, how is the constitutional

authority over appointment reconciled? Furthermore, how are issues of gender, minority, and

regional parity reflected in an elected cabinet? And how does a government handle such

elections when the caucus is composed of many newly elected and inexperienced members or,

conversely, a relatively small caucus in relation to cabinet size?

To answer these questions, we will examine this practice in action through the Labour

parties of Britain, Australia, and New Zealand. In Britain, the Labour party has long used its

caucus to elect its shadow cabinet members when it was in Opposition.218 The caucus would

simply vote for the members it wanted to hold these elected positions in general, and then the

leader would assign specific shadow portfolios to these members. Not only a means of

empowering the Private Member, this practice of elected shadow cabinets has been used by

leaders as an indicator of a leader’s popularity through the public success of his or her avowed

compatriots after caucus election.219 However, this model has never been used by a British

Labour party once it has held government. Once elected as an administration, the Prime Minister

of all British Labour governments has retained full constitutional control over selection and

appointment of cabinet ministers.

218 Jack Brand, British Parliamentary Parties: Policy and Power (Oxford: Clarendan Press, 1992) 31.219 Paul Anderson, “The Next Cabinet,” New Statesman and Society, 8.376 (October 1995): 22.

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However, the power for caucus to also elect cabinet ministers that has been neglected in

Britain has become the standard practice for Labour party governments in both Australia and

New Zealand. In both of these jurisdictions, caucus elects the Members it would like to see in

ministerial positions just as it would shadow cabinet positions. Then, in the exercise of their

constitutional authority over appointment, Prime Ministers will accept these “recommendations”

and appoint each elected Member to a specific portfolio under the Crown’s authority. As such,

the constitutional aspects surrounding appointment are maintained while the election takes place

on an informal level. In practice, these elections have become binding on the Prime Minister

through the party mandate.

To understand the specifics of this election process, we can look at the New Zealand

Labour model, which offers a procedure that could be easily emulated in British Columbia by

any of the parties in power.220 First used by the Labour government in 1935, it was the belief of

that party (since resolved in 1920) that by electing the cabinet it would consequently be made

more responsive to the caucus and its needs. However, the specific process of election met

constitutional and procedural limitations. As such, it was not until 1949 that the process was

made workable, and finally put into action after Labour’s 1957 electoral victory.

This process put into use in 1957 was conducted as follows. Upon taking office, the

Labour caucus immediately elected its Speaker, Leader, and full cabinet. All of these elections

utilized a secret “exhaustive” ballot – that is, multiple balloting until all Members elected had

attained a majority of votes. On the first vote, ballots were distributed to all caucus members,

220 All analysis of the New Zealand model is taken from Elizabeth McLeary, The Cabinet and Political Power inNew Zealand (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1995) 51-68.

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who were then asked to record the names of those they wanted in cabinet. The number of

Members to be chosen was pre-determined by the Prime Minister, which dictated the number of

names a caucus member could record on each ballot. After this ballot had been tabulated, all

Members that had received a majority of votes were accepted by the Prime Minister as ministers

without portfolio. In the 1957 case, the results of this first ballot did not yield a full complement

of cabinet ministers with a majority of votes. Therefore, a second ballot was presented to

“exhaust” the selection. The names of those already elected and those with the lowest number of

ballots from the first ballot were eliminated, and each Member was asked to record as many

names as cabinet positions remained. Those achieving a majority on this ballot were then also

accepted by the Prime Minister as ministers without portfolios. Should a full cabinet complement

have still been wanting (although this did no happen at this time, nor has it ever happened), a

third ballot could be conducted along the same principles as the second.

After this process was complete, the Prime Minister then used his constitutional authority

through the Crown to appoint these elected cabinet Ministers to specific portfolios. The result

was a cabinet responsible primarily to the caucus yet still connected to the Prime Minister’s

authority through their specific assignment.

While this process was complete, it did not take long before Labour governments realized

that additional rules would be needed to confront some of the finer aspects of appointment. For

example, how long should an elected caucus last before it is re-elected? What should happen if

an elected minister dies, resigns, or is removed from cabinet? How would that cabinet minister

be removed? And finally, how would regional, gender, and ethnic issues be reflected in these

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cabinets? It was not until 1971221 that these issues became problematic for Labour, as polls

showed that the following year’s election would once again return them to government. At a

subsequent party conference, several resolutions were made. First, balloting for ministerial

positions would be continued as proven successful in 1957. Second, if Labour should win a

second term, a complete cabinet re-election would have to occur. Should a Leader also change

(through a leadership election by caucus), a cabinet re-election could also occur upon the new

Leader’s request. Finally, if a minister dies or resigns, the Leader could fill the position alone,

but the decision would have to be approved by a majority ballot of the caucus. Similarly, if a

Leader wished to remove a minister, that removal could only be done with similar approval by

the caucus. It was these additional concepts that Labour carried with them into their 1972

electoral victory.

Once in power in 1972, Labour leader Norman Kirk made additional modifications to

solve the other problems we have noted. Immediately after obtaining office, Kirk commenced

cabinet balloting. But before commencement, he issued four directives to his caucus. First, voters

should select according to the Member’s ability to do the job. Second, cabinet must reflect the

reality of Maori and female membership. Third, there should be a geographic balance with

adequate South Island representation. Fourth, in addition to cabinet, under-secretaries should also

be elected. To the further surprise of caucus members, Kirk then produced ballots that explicitly

listed MPs’ names arranged geographically, grouped according to geographic zones. Under these

directives, caucus voted. The result was a cabinet with adequate gender, minority, and

geographic representation. By the end of their term in 1975, Labour had basically perfected this

221 Prior to this date (in 1963) the Labour party made additional resolutions in this area due to its large success, mostnotably the decision to add caucus elections for the Senior Whip, Junior Whip and Secretary of the Party.

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selection process. As MP Ted Keating noted at the time, “One of the greatest battles of the

caucus of the first Labour Government had been to win caucus selection of Cabinet.”222

It is this successful model of caucus electing officials that the Australian Labour Party

subsequently adopted with similar success. Although only a portion of ministers elected are

officially Members of Cabinet223, the process of appointing them all is essentially the same. The

only noticeable difference in place is that a Leader can dismiss a minister with only the

agreement of his or her three “parliamentary leaders” – the Deputy Leader for the House of

Representatives and Leader and Deputy Leader of the Senate. However, in this rare event (which

has happened only once in 25 years224), the minister in question is allowed to appeal to the

caucus which can overturn the Leader’s decision.225 As well, it has been acknowledged that,

should the issue ever arise, the Prime Minister still has the final authority to appoint or dismiss

any minister. Yet despite this extreme consideration, it is evident that in Australia this pattern has

led to a “doctrine of Caucus supremacy”226 that few Leaders would dare contravene.

Clearly, this New Zealand/Australian system of devolving the Leader’s power to appoint

is highly effective and easily implemented. Furthermore, while localized to cabinet selection, this

specific procedure could easily be transferred into other areas of appointment. There is little

question that British Columbia parties could adopt a system of cabinet election by caucus

222 McLeary 65.223 The formal “Cabinet” is usually comprised of only half of the elected ministers and forms the core governmentexecutive. See Richard Lucy, The Australian Form of Government: Models in Dispute, 2nd Ed. (South Melbourne:MacMillan, 1993) 118.224 Patrick Weller, Menzies to Keating: The Development of the Australian Prime Ministership (London: C. Hurstand Co. Ltd., 1993) 22.225 Patrick Weller and Michelle Grattan, Can Ministers Cope? Australian Federal Ministers at Work (London:Hutchison Group, 1981) 15.226 Lucy 124.

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paralleling the New Zealand and Australian Labour models. This system would permit the

Leader to appoint specific portfolios after general election, the use of an exhaustive secret ballot

to elect, caucus participation in dismissal and re-appointment, and recognition of regional and

gender priorities through ballot structure. By fulfilling these considerations, the efficacy and

importance of each caucus Member in British Columbia would be significantly enhanced while

preserving constitutional sanctity and maintaining each party’s individual values in cabinet

selection.

It is important to note that the New Zealand model leaves some unanswered questions.

For example, should a caucus comprised of both senior and amateur members be allowed to vote

in the same capacity? Will the results of that vote have the party’s best interests at heart? This is

not directly confronted in the New Zealand model, which leads one to conclude that such cases

have not caused major problems for successive Labour governments. Cabinets are still formed

with the most able members often meeting success. There is no evidence that allowing amateur

members to vote on par with senior members has caused any problems or resulted in a less

desirable cabinet structure. Should this occur, however, the powers of the Leader would still

allow for a certain amount of discretion. In addition, it should also be noted that neither

jurisdiction has had problems with varying caucus sizes. Whether a government’s majority has

been weak or strong, there is no evidence to prove that the cabinet structure has been left

wanting.

Perhaps for British Columbia’s needs, there should be a slight modification to this

practise. Our political culture has become accustomed to frequent shuffles in cabinet. The idea of

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“new blood” has a great appeal to many individuals. Therefore, it should not be unreasonable

that in British Columbia we could modify New Zealand’s practice by making cabinets subject to

re-election at the beginning of every session, or at any time upon the discretion of the party

Leader. Able ministers would likely remain in power, and should they excel in a certain area the

Leader could assure that they remain in that position. However, less-able or non-responsive

ministers would be quickly weeded out through this process, allowing for new Members to test

the waters as ministers and find their strengths. British Columbia would benefit from this slight

modification to the otherwise ideal New Zealand model.

Overall, there is no formal way to secure this method. As New Zealand and Australia

have shown us, it has been the initiative of the individual parties that has led to this practice. The

Liberal parties in both countries still follow the traditional methods of appointment. In both

cases, constitutional reality dictates that any changes to the practice of appointment must be done

so on a purely informal level. Therefore, while this procedure is sound, its implementation is

solely the responsibility of the party is power. Like all other reforms discussed, party

participation in securing this intra-party process of election is absolutely essential to this

reform’s success.

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Chapter IV

Summary and Conclusions

Too often, parliamentary reform suggestions are put forward as a way to fix a system that issomehow broken, as if instantly, we fix this place, then it would elevate the opinion of the publicabout all of us parliamentarians. But it’s not the parliamentary system that lacks flexibility, but weas members who sit here, those members who have sat here before us and, I fear, perhapsmembers who might sit after us.227

It will be clear to most observers at this point that reform of British Columbia’s

parliamentary practices cannot occur in a vacuum. As the previous sections have shown us, while

institutional reforms are sorely needed in most aspects of parliamentary practice, not a single one

can take place without the cooperation of the parties involved. Furthermore, as Ms. Sawicki

points out, in order for true reform to occur there also needs to be an acknowledgment on the part

of individual Members that procedure can only be useful when accompanied by the will to utilize

these tools towards their own success and the courage to assert their independence. It is only

through these successive steps that we can achieve our ultimate goal: a level of efficacy for the

Private Member that can alleviate the harsh cynicism of the electorate and prove that government

can be a friend to every citizen in British Columbia.

Without question, the will to reform is growing in parliaments around the world. Britain

is facing exciting times as it devolves powers to the new Scottish and Welsh parliaments,

confronts the possibility of removing the 759 hereditary peers in the House of Lords, and even

looks towards a referendum on electoral reform. New Zealand has just adopted a fundamentally

227 Joan Sawicki, British Columbia, Debates of the Legislative Assembly, 1995 Legislative Session: 4th Session 35th

Parliament, 21.24 (July 7, 1995).

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different electoral system introducing a level of proportionality to its House’s composition that

has received high praise from observers and legislators worldwide. Even less visible jurisdictions

such as Zimbabwe and India have hosted formal inquiries into modernization such as improved

committee systems and innovative voting procedures, both resulting in concrete reforms. Closer

to home, the Canadian Committee on Procedure and House affairs is working perpetually in

conjunction with all parties of the House of Commons, producing multiple reports each year that

attempt to refine a variety of voting, legislative, and committee-related practices. Many of these

proposals have become reality. As we have seen in the provinces, Quebec, Ontario, and Alberta

have adopted fundamental changes in all main areas of reform with laudable success. Clearly,

any parliamentary jurisdiction today that is not involved in some manner of intensive self-

exploration and re-evaluation cannot consider itself progressive in any light.

But the question must be posed: is institutional parliamentary reform the panacea for all

of British Columbia’s problems? Will these changes truly result in a more effective Private

Member, a non-cynical electorate, and a reduced gap between governed and governors? In part,

we must admit that the answer is no. As one author noted, the pursuit of parliamentary reform

may only provide “technical fixes to what is in fact a cultural problem.”228 Faced with long-

standing traditions of powerful executives and compliant representatives, it is difficult to believe

that structural changes alone can make any ultimate difference in the way that British Columbia

politics performs.

228 Neil Reimer, “Fragile connections doom our parliaments,” Vancouver Sun, 28 April 1995.

175

To answer this, we can only defer to the visions of those who have come before us. As

Winston Churchill once prophesied, “We shape our buildings, and afterwards our buildings

shape us.”229 It is the belief that by changing the institutions and practices of any structure, a

slow but steady cultural change will inevitably follow. As these mechanisms are established in

principle, future practitioners will recognize their value and slowly move towards the ideal

models that we have provided for. It is this belief that ultimately inspires the pursuit of

parliamentary reform and has inspired the people behind these reforms in every jurisdiction for

centuries.

It has been this belief that has inspired this report. In each section, we have explored

ways in which the British Columbia Legislative Assembly could reasonably adopt a number of

reforms to its institutions which could allow the Private Member greater opportunities to fulfill

the many roles that all representatives are compelled to embody. The result has been a number of

basic frameworks that this report believes could reconcile British Columbia’s specific needs and

values with traditional, constitutional, and political limitations while significantly empowering

the Private Member.

For free voting, this report examined the difficulties of party discipline and responsible

government in British Columbia, and the potential benefits of clear confidence rules that would

make confidence cease to be an issue implicit in all actions of the government. We saw potential

ways of executing this through the adoption of the Alberta-style rules of confidence, the British

“whip” system of communication, and the European qualification of “constructive” votes of non-

229 Quoted, in C.E.S. Franks, The Parliament of Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1987), 145.

176

confidence. In addition, this report also looked at ways of revamping the system of voting within

the House, combining transparency with the avoidance of direct party pressure to construct a

potential model to complement the confidence convention.

For the committee system, this report envisioned a British Columbia version of the

British committee structure that would allow for, among other things, departmental scrutiny,

legislative scrutiny, the ability to autonomously investigate and legislate, and the assurance of

governmental response. Subsequent national and provincial models have proven the wisdom in

enacting such changes on a smaller scale. The overall potential for such changes in British

Columbia is positive in this light.

For the role in the legislative process, this report investigated and endorsed the

jurisdictions of Alberta and Canada, aspects of which collectively allow for increased time and

access for both Private Members’ statements and bills, as well as specific structures for bill

consideration that assure both high quality and reasonable consideration by governments.

Furthermore, this report looked into the comparable treatment of Question Period worldwide and

revealed benefits in both extending the time allowed and the opportunities for participation by

the Private Member, in no small part through re-considering the role of parties vis-à-vis the

Speaker of the House.

For scheduling reforms, this report concluded that a fixed yearly calendar that

predetermines the exact times that the House will sit, when budgets will be produced, and

ensures that two sittings will be held each year is clearly an enviable norm in numerous

177

international and domestic jurisdictions. As well, weekly schedules were also proven to be both

effective and easy to attain through the Alberta model. Furthermore, this report determined that

the practice of “qualified” fixed elections as followed in Australia and New Zealand would be

both logical to implement and beneficial to Private Members in British Columbia in terms of

stability and certainty.

Finally, on the issue of appointment, this report explored the New Zealand/Australia

Labour method of cabinet appointment through which the cabinet is elected by the caucus. Much

like the other reforms, it was determined that such practices would be both easily transferable to

British Columbia and provide a privileged role for Private Members and a substantial restraint on

party discipline in general.

These investigations effectively endorse a series of mainly procedural reforms. However,

as noted in every section, each successful reform explored is contingent on a minimum level of

party support. In some cases, support within the individual parties would be enough to make

these reforms succeed. In other cases, success would depend on all parties collectively agreeing

to respect such changes through a Memorandum of Agreement (as done in Alberta) or some

equivalent all-party declaration of good faith. Procedure alone is not enough. Will on the part of

the parties involved to make change happen is a fundamental requirement in both the genesis and

execution of reform.

Unfortunately, it has been a far too regular occurrence that parties profess to implement

change during elections only to settle comfortably into the status quo once they obtain office. It

178

is the hopes of this report that such a combination of procedure and participation could be

achieved despite this legacy, especially given the accomplishments outlined in other jurisdictions

and the logical desire to emulate such successes. According to former NDP MP Jim Manly, “No

amount of parliamentary reform will substitute for the courage of MPs who are willing to stand

up and be heard.”230 It will be up to the individual Members to collectively ensure that their

parties stand by their promises and have the courage to use the tools provided, even when the

pressures to fall into old habits seem undeniable. We can only trust, not guarantee, that this will

occur.

With this element of trust must also come the realization that, even in a procedural sense,

parliamentary reform cannot achieve all of the changes needed to make our governments

function democratically. As one author points out in the Canadian context, parliamentary reform

is but one part of a grander scheme:

[R]eforms to one state structure (for example, Parliament) cannot be accomplished in isolationfrom other structures. Parliamentary reform has ramifications for party and electoral system. Andunderstanding of why members of parliament make the career choices they do, therefore, cannotbe confined to an examination of the House of Commons but must include an understanding of theparty system, the electoral system, and the very nature of Canada’s system of responsiblegovernment.231

It is not until each of these issues is fully understood and explored that we can hope to construct

an ideal model for governance. This process will be long and frustrating, but with each passing

change, the next will appear even more possible. Successes and failures must be kept in

perspective. As one expert notes, “Institutions are not perfect any more than people are.”232

230 Robert Miller, “Party Discipline,” Parliamentary Government 6.4: 7.231 David C. Docherty, Mr. Smith Goes to Ottawa (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1997) 19.232 Franks 8.

179

Finally, we must once again return to the central problem of representation. We now

know that a representative has multiple roles that demand procedural changes. But at the end of

the day, are we asking too much of the lone representative? In demanding absolute commitment

to their roles as constituency figures, party supporters, and personal advocates, are we ultimately

setting ourselves up for disappointment? The time has come to reconsider the burdens that the

parliamentary tradition places on these individuals and to admit to the benefits that may be

derived from a non-parliamentary model. Perhaps the parliamentary system is inadequate to

fulfill our representational demands in these modern times and fit our new perceptions of what

the “good life” really entails.233 Perhaps we should commit the ultimate Canadian sin and

explore the options for a congressional model of government where the burdens of both the

executive and legislative survival do not rest on the shoulders of the same representatives. It is

possibilities such as this that make parliamentary reform at once both an exciting and frightening

prospect for British Columbians and the people who have the opportunity and the will for

change.

233 Colin Campbell and Harold D. Clarke, “Conspectus: Some Thoughts on Parliamentary Reform,” Parliament,Policy and Representation, eds. Harold D. Clarke et al., (Toronto: Methuen, 1980) 317.

180

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