possession versus property in a tree plantation socioenvironmental conflict in southern cameroon

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Possession Versus Property in a TreePlantation Socioenvironmental Conflictin Southern CameroonJulien-François Gerber a & Sandra Veuthey ba Department of Economics, Harvard University, Cambridge,Massachusetts, USAb Institute of Environmental Sciences and Technology, AutonomousUniversity of Barcelona, Bellaterra, SpainVersion of record first published: 25 Apr 2011.

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Possession Versus Property in a Tree PlantationSocioenvironmental Conflict in Southern Cameroon

JULIEN-FRANCOIS GERBER

Department of Economics, Harvard University, Cambridge,Massachusetts, USA

SANDRA VEUTHEY

Institute of Environmental Sciences and Technology, AutonomousUniversity of Barcelona, Bellaterra, Spain

Industrial tree plantations are worldwide at the origin of a growing number ofconflicts between local populations and commercial planters. This case studyinvolves the resistance of local Bulu communities against a large-scale rubber treeplantation in Southern Cameroon. The aim is to understand the institutional rootsof the conflict. The methods used are historical analysis and anthropological field-work. The Bulu logic of possession and use-value corresponds to a multifunctionalforest management based on lineage institutions, individual productive investments,ecological cycles, and a broad metaphysical dimension. The economic logic based onWestern-type property titles—enabling bank credit that generates specific pres-sures—gave birth to the industrial monoculture model. Commercial tree plantationsare seen as the highest stage of the transformation of forest ecosystems in order tomatch the requirements of the financial economy in terms of repayment of interestand loans.

Keywords Bulu, Cameroon, commons, credit, customary forest management,environmental conflict, industrial tree plantations, institutional logic, peasantresistance, property economics

The management of natural resources in Southern countries, as well as the relatedconflicts, have been much studied within what Paavola (2007) has called the ‘‘newinstitutional approach to environmental governance’’ (Berkes 1989; Ostrom 1990;Bromley 1992; Baland and Platteau 1996). Under Ostrom’s (1990) influence, muchof this body of literature focuses on the characteristics of successful so-called com-mon property systems. This effort started as a necessary reaction to Hardin’s(1968) ‘‘tragedy of the commons,’’ where he recommended that the privatizationof land was the best solution for a sustainable use of resources, based on his con-fusion between ‘‘commons’’ and ‘‘open access.’’ A key priority of the common pro-perty literature has thus been to demonstrate that commons can be a rational andefficient arrangement in the conventional neoclassical sense (Burkett 2006). Yet

Received 13 July 2008; accepted 6 May 2010.Address correspondence to Julien-Francois Gerber, Department of Economics, Harvard

University, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA. E-mail: [email protected]

Society and Natural Resources, 24:831–848Copyright # 2011 Taylor & Francis Group, LLCISSN: 0894-1920 print=1521-0723 onlineDOI: 10.1080/08941920.2010.521887

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the nature of many customary systems classified as ‘‘common property’’ requiresfurther investigation. They are often complex systems that do not neatly fit into thiscategory, and are defined as opposed to private or state property, which still consti-tutes the tripartite classification used by most theorists (Wagner and Talakai 2007;for similar critiques from anthropology, see Le Roy 1997; von Benda-Beckmannand von Benda-Beckmann 1999; Diaw 2005). Accordingly, many environmentalconflicts occurring in the South cannot satisfactorily be understood as clashesbetween ‘‘common property’’ and private or state-owned property systems.

Emphasizing the need for understanding the institutions of noncapitalist socie-ties, Georgescu-Roegen (1976, 199) wrote that ‘‘like all understandings, this onerequires more than a mere recital of facts; it calls for discovering a rationale behindthe facts, which in the case of institutions means to discover their internal logic.’’ Inthis article, our aim is to offer a better understanding of the institutional logics atstake in an environmental conflict case study. We conducted fieldwork on the resist-ance of communities belonging to the Bulu ethnic group against an industrial plan-tation called HEVECAM (Hevea-Cameroun), one of Africa’s largest rubber treemonocultures, located in the district of Niete near Kribi, southwest of Cameroon.In fact, this antagonism can be regarded as typical since industrial tree plantationsare worldwide at the origin of a growing number of conflicts between local popula-tions and commercial planters, and thus represent one of today’s hottest issues inforestry (Gerber et al. 2009). While supporters of plantations argue that they havenumerous intrinsic qualities such as recreating ‘‘forests,’’ providing jobs, or fixingcarbon (UNFF 2003), many local populations suffer from the impacts of these sameplantations—through deforestation, displacement, and water pollution—and ques-tion their legitimacy, often by defending their own management of ecosystems(Martınez-Alier 2002).

After defining the analytical framework, we present an account of how Buluinstitutionally manage the forest and then provide an historical outline of propertyin Cameroon through the lens of the colonial and postcolonial system of large-scaleplantations. This conflictive institutional background is then exemplified through theBulu resistance to HEVECAM and followed by an analysis of the specificities of theactors’ institutional logics, before concluding with some remarks.

Analytical Framework and Methods

This article applies elements taken from the classical institutionalist tradition to acentral theme of political ecology—that is, socioenvironmental conflicts in the globalSouth. Our objective is to understand the specific institutional logic of the casestudy’s conflicting actors—that is, Bulu middle peasants versus an agroindustrialfirm. A good starting point is to look at property, the key institution of power. Hein-sohn and Steiger (1996; 2003) and Steiger (2008) have developed a property theory ofthe economy—or ‘‘property economics’’—emphasizing the fact that Western-typeproperty generates commercial credit associated with specific potentialities andconstraints; it hence generates a specific economic logic. These authors cruciallydistinguish between two broad types of institutional regimes: those based on‘‘possession’’ and those based on ‘‘property.’’1 Possession rules define the rightsand duties to the use and yield of resources, production technologies, products,and waste. Such possession rules—referred to as ‘‘property’’ in much of theliterature—exist in all societies in various forms and respond to the universal

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question of social reproduction. In contrast, property is an historical ‘‘oddity’’ (apoint shared by Brenner 2009) and exists in addition to possession (although it alsotransforms possession). Property rights—whether private or collective—are de jureclaims characterized by property titles, allowing the new economic potential to usesuch titles as security in credit relations. This far-reaching potential, fostering creditrelations in a broad sense (including, for example, shareholding), makes property thecore institution of capitalism and its ‘‘driving force.’’ It generates critical economicconstraints in terms of the time pressure for reimbursing loans, the obligation togrow in order to pay interest, and the perpetual improvement of cost–benefitconditions in order to be able to refund (see also Binswanger 2006; Steppacher2008; van Griethuysen 2010). This theory provides inter alia an interesting contri-bution to the substantivist versus formalist debate in economic anthropology byexplaining why Homo oeconomicus is only relevant in property-based societies(Heinsohn 2008).

This approach is explored in this article, as the distinction between possessionand property seems appropriate for understanding the conflicting specificitiesof the actors’ institutional logics in natural resource management (Gerber andSteppacher 2007). In our view, this opposition is at the roots of most politicoenvir-onmental movements that contest a certain type of economic development and thatMartınez-Alier (2002) has called the ‘‘environmentalism of the poor.’’

The case-study research methodology is used, combining data from interviews,documentation, and direct and participant observation. Anthropology-orientedfieldwork was carried out from October 2006 to February 2007 and in March2009. Local, provincial, and national documentation (archives, reports, letters,etc.) was researched and 64 semistructured or in-depth interviews were conducted(in French) with peasants, plantation executives, political authorities, legal experts,academics, and activists. Interviewees were selected to represent a broad spectrumof interests and knowledge regarding plantations.

The Bulu Forest Management Based on Customary Possession

Bulu are part of the Bantu macro-group and belong to the Sanaga–Ntem ethniccomplex (Alexandre and Binet 1958). The latter arrived in Southern Cameroon duringthe 18th century, originating from the Sahelian zone, and migrated slowly through theforest. Their migrations closed at the end of the 19th century, stopped by the colonialadministration (Laburthe-Tolra 1981). Even though most Bulu were rapidly Chris-tianized and sent to school, many of them pursue today a subsistence-oriented wayof life based on forest land and resources (van den Berg and Biesbrouck 2000). Theypractice shifting (or rotational) agriculture, with each family cultivating different crops(manioc, banana, yam, oil palm, groundnut) on a surface of 0.3 to 1.5 ha. The latter isexploited during two consecutive years before lying fallow during 3 to 10 years, some-times much longer. Hunting, trapping, fishing, and gathering still bring today a largepart of the food domestically consumed (van den Berg and Biesbrouck 2000).

Bulu forest management is rooted in the institutions of patrilineality and seg-mentarity,2 implying no central political authority. During the migrations, thesetwo principles—corresponding to the genealogical rights of lineages—played a cru-cial role in the establishment of new collective rights over forested territories (Diaw2005; see also Rey 1976, on the ‘‘lineage mode of production’’). Traditionally domi-nated by old men, the lineage often forms a hamlet while a group of hamlets

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constitute a village (or community) that sometimes corresponds to a clan. The prin-ciple of virilocal clan exogamy refers to the obligation for a wife to live in her hus-band’s clan. It represents the key institution determining the precarious land statusof women: They cannot inherit land in their lineage of birth, and their access to landin their lineage of adoption only transits from their husband to their sons(Laburthe-Tolra 1981). The control over social reproduction—the main source ofpower in lineage societies according to Meillassoux (1981) and Rey (1976)—is madethrough the circulation of wives and the institution of the dowry, which is notdeveloped in further detail here.

At this point, it is important to note that land tenure cannot be dissociated assuch from the rest of the Bulu society; it reflects kin relationships and the broaderbelief system (see later discussion). At the risk of simplifying, it is nonetheless possibleto isolate the most important institutions that specifically deal with the control overforest land. According to Diaw and Njomkap (1998), these institutions remain todayby far the prevailing mode of land tenure regulation in Southern Cameroon whereproperty titles are still very rare. Bulu land possession takes its roots in the genealogi-cal rights going back to the founding ancestor who first created possession throughthe axe rights—another fundamental principle of many customary possession systems(Shanin 1973; Georgescu-Roegen 1976). Axe rights are based on the principle thatlabor generates rights. All members of the community have the right to live off theirproductive investments. This broadly applies individually to all community members(and to nonmembers in some instances) but the system keeps a collective foundation:Natural resources, including land, ultimately belong to the past, present, and futuregenerations of the lineage. Resources are only temporarily ‘‘lent’’ to an individualthrough his=her domestic unit. In this context, land cannot be alienated—that is, itcannot be definitively given to someone outside the group (Diaw 2005).

Based on fieldwork evidence, we distinguish three broad categories of pos-session. There is, first of all, individual or domestic possession, rooted in the axe rightswithin a given lineage-owned area. Food crops, plantations, fallow lands, andswamps typically are individually or domestically possessed. However, the possessordoes not enjoy an exclusive land ownership and must allow, in some cases, other per-sons to use it (for example, for hunting). Trees such as wild mango (Irvingia gabonen-sis) or moabi (Baillonella toxisperma) can also be individually owned if they areplanted or discovered. Second, there is lineage possession, based on the genealogicalrights of a lineage over the agro-forest. It represents the fundamental form of landappropriation in Southern Cameroon. Third, there is community or clan possession,where several lineages coexist in a same village and share a wider forest area forhunting and collecting plants. Finally, open access is rare in the forested area; itessentially concerns some tracks and roads.

In fact, these categories of possession change according to the cycles of shiftingagriculture. When a forest is transformed into a field, a lineage or community pos-session becomes a domestic field; after about 10 years, this field becomes a secondaryforest and individual possession disappears. This space is then available again toother lineage members; if not, with enough time, it is available to other communitymembers or future generations. The implicit principle is that the individual pos-session of renewable resources can only be temporary as it depends on the enduringphysical evidence of personal work: When investments on a portion of land stop tovisible, individual rights disappear (Diaw and Njomkap 1998; van den Berg andBiesbrouck 2000).


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We end this outline of the Bulu possession-based forest management by brieflyexplaining the ideological (or religious) ties that Bulu have with the forest. Beliefs,taboos, and rituals are indeed essential institutions for understanding the economyof populations consciously dependant on ecosystems (Ingold 2000). In the Bulusociety, the forest provides the frame for many myths and popular tales involvinga multitude of beings and often expressing all sorts of norms and clan codificationsthat should be respected. The forest is also the setting of practices related to witch-craft and most medico-religious rituals are based on the use of forest resources(Oyono 2002). In particular, the sylvan world strongly determines cultural practiceslinked with death. The forest can for instance play the role of a refuge for thedeceased—for example, in the form of a termite nest or an animal. Moreover, thesouls of important ancestors take up residence in the trunk of certain largetotem-trees such as moabi. However, there are no ‘‘sacred forests’’ in SouthernCameroon as there are in other parts of Africa, but ancient village sites, the bilik,have a particular cultural meaning for many Bulu as they represent starting placesfor individual or collective processes of ‘‘purification’’ and contribute to the renewalof knowledge and powers within lineages and clans (Oyono et al. 2000).

This section is intended, first, to outline the institutional economy of popula-tions living near HEVECAM and to sketch the customary regime on the top ofwhich came along the property system imposed by European colonization. Second,this section aims to show that Bulu institutions do not neatly fit into the concept of‘‘common property.’’

The Property-Based Plantation Economy

Polanyi (1944) and others have shown that the incorporation of the ‘‘peripheral’’zones in the dominant capitalist system was not an automatic or self-evident process.In fact, as long as a given community can live of its own resources and make its ownmeans of production, it is very difficult to incorporate it into capitalism. The expan-sion of the latter presupposes a certain level of waged labor and market-dependencewithin precapitalist communities (Meillassoux 1981; Brenner 2009). Also, and per-haps above all, it requires the introduction of a Western-type property regime—private, collective, or state-owned—as well as of a coercive system capable to enforceit. In the first place, property is central in the dispossession process of local popula-tions in order to allow the exploitation of natural resources by more powerful agentsand to push them into wage labor (as in the 18th-century’s English ‘‘tragedy of theenclosures’’; Polanyi 1944; Marglin 2008). In Southern Cameroon where land isabundant, forced labor was preferred by the colonists over wage labor, and the insti-tution of a personal tax was also used to force people to enter the market economy(Geschiere 1982; Rey 1976). In the second place, Western-type property is also cru-cial in the functioning of capitalism itself by standardizing the economic system, byfixing the economic potential of resources in order to allow credit and selling con-tracts, and by protecting transactions, notably by making actors accountablethrough contractual arrangements (Soto 2000; Steiger 2008).

During the last decades of the 19th century, the problem of introducing a marketeconomy manifested itself everywhere in colonial Africa under different forms.Everywhere the solution was the same: European firms turned to the state for help(Geschiere 1982). The state indeed played a crucial role in the transition from aninstitutional regime based on possession to a regime based on property, despite


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the continuous resistance of local communities. In this respect, the history of theCameroonian land tenure legislation offers a good illustration of the whole tran-sition process and highlights the institutional nature of the conflict discussed here.This history can be seen as an endless clash between possession and property systems(Nguiffo 1998; Oyono 2005). There is no space here for more than a brief summary.

In 1884, under the auspices of Bismarck, the Hamburger trader EduardWormann signed the German-Duala Treaty with local chiefs. It was the first ‘‘col-onial law’’ in Cameroon. The treaty was interpreted from the German side as anagreed abandonment of sovereignty by indigenous people and is regarded as afounding piece of jurisprudence erasing preexisting institutions. Bismarck hadreceived several overt demands for subjugating the region from powerful business-men from Hamburg, Germany’s largest port (Geschiere 1982). A memorandumfor the attention of Bismarck, sent by the Chamber of Commerce of Hamburgone year earlier, clarifies the strategic role of the firms in the German colonizationprocess (Stoecker 1960). This memorandum notably mentions on one hand the needfor a colonial law (i.e., property), explicitly seen as necessary for opening the marketpotential of the region, and, on the other hand, the need for an administration and amilitary force to protect the interests of colonists (i.e., the enforcement of property).German creditors also pushed for control of Cameroon based on the necessity ofdefending local indebted kings against possible invaders in order to make sure thatloans would be repaid (Rudin 1938).

In 1896, an imperial prescription formalized the German interpretation of theGerman–Duala Treaty through the notion of ‘‘vacant and ownerless land’’ (herren-loses Land), which suppressed customary possession. This regulation constituted thebasis of all land tenure legislation under colonization. It stipulated that ‘‘vacant andownerless land’’ belonged to the Crown and that only the government was allowedto sell it or lease it as property. Following this, after an unsuccessful experience oflarge-scale concessions, the Germans launched the commercial plantation model.The first crops were cacao and rubber trees, the two main colonial products untilthe 1950s (Etoga Eily 1971). Natural rubber soon became, and still is today, a stra-tegic raw material for the auto, military, and pharmaceutical industries. In 1906, theGermans introduced the tree Hevea brasiliensis—industrial plantations of this treewere capable of meeting the requirements of a global property-based economy.The export monoculture model rapidly formed the backbone of the colony’seconomy (Rudin 1938).

In 1916, the British and the French took over Cameroon. By and large, theirlegislation, respectively based on the Common Law and on the Code civil, main-tained the so-called ‘‘vacant and ownerless land’’ notion on many customary lands(Oyono 2005). A number of former German plantations were sold to private compa-nies such as Unilever and Rivaud, while others were nationalized and transformedinto large agroindustrial complexes such as the Cameroon DevelopmentCorporation.

From 1960 onward, the independence of Cameroon was not associated with arupture in the philosophy of colonial law. Accordingly, the promotion of large-scalecommercial plantations continued, and between 1971 and 1981 no less than 60% ofthe public funds reserved for agricultural development were allocated to the agroin-dustrial sector. The main characteristic of these large-scale plantations was, and tosome extent still is, their domination by only a few firms, which are highly protected,oligopolistic, and, for several of them, state-owned (Konings 1993).


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Despite the resistance against the first postcolonial legislation, Cameroon’s tran-sition to a property-based regime enabling credit relations culminates with the 1974Land Ordinance, still the basis of today’s regime. This law rehabilitates the colonialnotion of ‘‘vacant and ownerless land’’ for the benefit of the state and private pro-prietors, while only recognizing a limited space for some customary institutions onfields and houses that have been occupied on a long-term basis (Fisiy 1992). In viewof the complex and costly requirements, the formalization of customary landremains very rare among traditional rural sectors. On the contrary, land acquisitionis facilitated for the elite and for agroindustries, whose establishment and expansioninvolve big investments mainly financed through public loans. Since the 1990s, stateincome has relied strongly on oil exports. However, the export bonanza has not pre-vented the state from borrowing heavily from France and Germany, Cameroon’stwo largest creditors, followed by the World Bank (Konings 1993). Indebtednesswas thus present at two levels: at the agroindustry and at the state level. In parallelto the debt-driven development of plantations, the considerable national debt forcedCameroon to enter into, as soon as 1988, a structural adjustment program whosefundamental objective is to make the country creditworthy, mostly through the pro-motion of raw material exports including monoculture products.

This section outlined the institutional (property-based) context that permittedand fostered commercial plantations in Cameroon to the detriment of possession-based customary institutions. Next, we exemplify this process by describing the caseof HEVECAM and the associated resistance of Bulu communities.

The Bulu against HEVECAM

Created in 1975, the HEVECAM plantation is located between the Campo-Ma’anNational Park, two forest concessions, and a large-scale oil palm monoculture.Neighboring HEVECAM, there are 10 Bulu ‘‘traditional chiefdoms’’ and 5 Bagyelicommunities,3 totaling together about 4,000 inhabitants. About 20,000 additionalpersons—including HEVECAM’s 5,200 workers—followed the establishment ofthe plantation and settled in 17 camps distributed in the monoculture itself. The firmenjoys a long lease of 99 years on a state concession of 42,000 hectares.4 Mainlyfunded by loans from the World Bank and the government, HEVECAM was astate-owned ‘‘development firm’’ until 1996, when it was privatized and bought bythe Singapore-based Golden Millennium Group (GMG). The latter is one of theworld’s largest rubber producers and an important supplier to Bridgestone,Michelin, and pharmaceutical firms. HEVECAM exports 100% of its productionto industrialized countries and launched a process aimed at raising its profitability,notably through several expansion plans.

The settlement of HEVECAM expelled local communities on the basis of the1974 Land Ordinance stipulating that most forests (National Lands) are state pro-perty available for such ‘‘public interest’’ mega-projects. The establishment of themonoculture plantation also foretold the destruction of the coastal rainforest, whichconstituted the livelihood basis of local populations. This coastal rainforest is alsoconsidered a major biodiversity hotspot. As a consequence, forest land cannot pro-vide the means for the traditional way of life of neighboring peasant communities.Fallow periods have markedly decreased in length, to the detriment of soil fertility,and the forest is not able to regenerate anymore.5 Game animals (porcupines,monkeys, antelopes) are now rare and several species have disappeared from the


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region. Before HEVECAM’s settlement, people used to have two living places: thevillage house, and a movable forest dwelling for hunting periods. This practice,aimed at reducing the pressure on the fauna, has been abandoned due to the declinein forest area.

The attack on local livelihoods and related customary institutions led to a broadunanimity among Bulu middle peasants6 against HEVECAM, which is said to havestolen their land and destroyed their forest. ‘‘These lands were our lands, those ofour ancestors. Before, it was original, virgin forest. It was very useful to us as we livefrom hunting and cultivating in it. The profits of HEVECAM rise, and yet at thesame time we become poorer and poorer.’’7 However, Bulu elites—that is, wealthypeasants and educated Bulu living both in the city and in their villages where theysometimes hold formal property titles—frequently take the side of the plantationas they are better able to negotiate individual advantages with the company, suchas loans for expanding their own resource exploitations. This sector has theknow-how to deal with Western-type economic practices, such as credit, and is lessembedded in the sociocultural relations of the lineage. Quite the reverse, many Bulumiddle peasants continue to live according to the customary possession-based logicand avoid getting indebted. In any case, without property titles, no bank would lendthem significant amounts of money—and women are even further disadvantaged astheir possession of land is more limited.

Yet the debt-driven growth of such plantations is opposed by the majority of theBulu middle peasants. They have not formed a unified front against the monocultureand mainly carry out sporadic, individual acts of resistance. For instance, plantationguardhouses are sometimes anonymously set on fire and some of the latex pro-duction is regularly stolen by villagers in a kind of ‘‘hidden resistance’’ (Scott1985). ‘‘As HEVECAM belongs to our customary territory, why shouldn’t we helpourselves with its products? Maybe they’ll understand eventually!’’8 Cases of moreopen or organized conflicts have also occurred. In 1997, the communities of Zinguiand Bifa carried out a peaceful protest march, involving about 200 persons, goingfrom Zingui to the HEVECAM head office, located 15 km away. They complainedabout the plantation’s expansion now overlapping their customary forests by morethan 500 ha. Since the end of the 1990s, the villagers have continuously been protest-ing against what they perceive as their marginalization by HEVECAM.

Several protest letters have been sent by villagers to the authorities. Forexample, in a letter dated August 8, 2006, addressed to Cameroon’s Minister ofthe Economy, a Bulu peasant writing in the name of his community, Afan-Oveng,wrote that ‘‘the lands [of HEVECAM] belong to the customary land possessed bythe populations of the [Bulu tribe of the] Essakotan, community of Afan-Oveng, liv-ing from the product of their crops, from hunting and from fishing, and curing them-selves with the products of the trees of these lands.’’ The letter then recalls thatHEVECAM destroyed, without compensation, fields and graves belonging to theEssakotan, as well as what they perceived as their forest. It also specifically refersto the fact that the plantation demolished the village’s bilik that was housing ances-tral tombs as well as other material, and symbolic resources whose conservation wasclaimed by local inhabitants. Mobilizing a ‘‘traditional’’ discourse that reflects valuesand beliefs that are in fact still in force, the letter also points out that the gravespossessed the power of the ancestors.

In 2003, an open struggle occurred between plantation guards and the inhabi-tants of Bidou III, a Bulu village increasingly short in forested land. Revealing a


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clash of institutional logics, a villager said: ‘‘[HEVECAM] invaded our lands. Theycame and installed fences and started to evaluate land in money terms.’’9 Thislong-term tension led to an explosion of violence after guards molested a womanworking in her field. In retaliation, a group of villagers attacked the guards usingmachetes. Severe injuries were reported and army forces arrested many neighbouringvillagers without being able to catch the persons responsible, who were probablyhidden by the local population. The whole episode had a double contradictory effecton the villagers: it certainly muffled further riots (‘‘we lost heart to lift up ourheads’’) but at the same time it exacerbated the resentment against the plantationsand what it represents (‘‘the revolt is imminent: the plantation is there and so arewe, and compromises are not possible’’).

The attitude of local middle peasants toward the state is ambiguous: On onehand, it is perceived as authoritarian regarding land tenure (‘‘it is not your landbut the land of the government’’ is the typical answer villagers receive from autho-rities), and on the other hand, the state is to a certain degree still respected (‘‘we arenot going to take up arms against our own government!’’). Referring to a compara-ble Javanese case, although in the context of greater peasant market-dependence,Peluso (1992, 199) writes that ‘‘this resistance is not fueled by incipient macropoliti-cal motives to overthrow the state apparatus, it derives from a strong desire to main-tain autonomy,’’ autonomy of lifestyle and customary institutions. Bulu do not claimthe control of the plantation territory as such, since the latter has now, in their eyes,become valueless. What they pragmatically claim is often, first, the nonextension ofHEVECAM—that is, the preservation of their remaining customary forests—andsecond, compensation in any form—monetary, village plantations, or infrastructure(roads, schools, etc.)—for the destruction of what they regard as their forest. It is forthis purpose that Bulu commonly claim the employment of some of them among thehigh executives of the company.

With the exception of one Bulu elite member who works in the company as a topexecutive—and who is also strongly criticized by local peasants for not doing enoughfor them—there is no neighboring Bulu among the managing personnel. The work-force is not composed of local peasants, although young Bulu sometimes get a job onthe plantation. This is explained by the fact that one of the main problems thatlarge-scale plantations have to face is the issue of how to maintain their workforceon a long-term basis. The strategy is thus to enroll nonnative, landless peasants,especially those from the densely populated area of the Western province ofCameroon, who have few other choices but to stay. On the contrary, local peasantsmay quit their jobs as soon as their situation does not force them to endure theplantation’s harsh working conditions.

Contrary to what one might think after a superficial examination of the conflic-tive situation, our point is that these instances of resistance are not simply punctualanswers to isolated land disputes (see also Diaw and Njomkap 1998; Nguiffo 1998;Oyono 2005). They have a deeper origin that we develop in the following finalsections.

Discussion

The present socioenvironmental conflict reflects an opposition of institutional logicsbetween how Bulu middle peasants customarily manage their agroforests and howHEVECAM runs its export monoculture. Table 1 summarizes this clash that is


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Table

1.Summary

oftheinstitutionalregim

escurrentlyin

forceover

Bulu

agroforestsandover

theindustrialrubber

plantation

Bulu

agro-forests

Industrialrubber

plantation

Productionsystem

sTypeof

agriculture

Small-scale

extensiveagriculture:rotational

slash-and-burn

mixed

cropping;

self-sufficiency

Large-scale

intensiveagriculture:industrial

commercialmonoculture;export

Typeof

resources

Bioticresources:manyservices

comingfrom

severalfunds

Bioticandmineralresources:oneservice

comingfrom

onefund

Institutional

roots

Customary

regulations:lineagepossession(as

thefundamen

talcategory)andindividual

possession

State

law:private

property

(asthestrategic

category)andstate

property

Main

constraints

Culturalandecological:to

respectbelief

system

,customary

institutions,

and

environmentalconditions;

embeddednessin

thesocioecologicalorder;use-value

Economic:to

honorcontracts;

solvabilityand

timepressure

(torepayloans)

and

profitability(topayinterest

anddividendsto

proprietors);exchange-value

Institutionalcharacteristics

andeffects

Agents

System

symbolicallyconcerned

withthe

collective(lineage)

System

essentiallyconcerned

withthe

individualproprietor

Legitim

ization

Work

(axerights)andkinship

(genealogical

rights)

State

legislations(concession,property,

contracts)

840

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Tem

porality

Naturaltemporality

definingagricultural

conversioncycles;symbolically

intergenerational

Tem

porality

imposedbythecontractual

conditionsdefiningtheperiodforwhich

creditare

granted

Power

Councilsoftheelders(traditionally);

communitycouncils

andchiefs

(today)

Foreignproprietors

(financialcapital);state

authorities

(governments,police,courts)

Ideology

Importantmetaphysicaldim

ension

Rationalistic

andreductionistproduction

Technological

effects

Technologicalstagnation,butuse

of‘‘viable

technologies’’;experientialknowledge

Stimulationofinnovationsin

order

toim

prove

cost=benefitconditions;

algorithmic

knowledge

Socialeffects

Supply

oflivelihoods;landredistributiveeffects

within

thecommunity;strict

masculine

domination

Supply

ofraw

materials

tobuyersandwaged

laborto

workers;proletarianizationandland

dispossession

Environmental

effects

Connected:possession-basedcommunitieshave

noalternativebutto

livewithin

agiven

environmentandto

takeinto

accountlocal

ecologicalinteractions;multifunctionalforest

managem

ent

Disconnected:property

canseparate

theowner

from

thematerialreality

oftheresource;

itallowsdelocalization,stim

ulatesgrowth

and

theshiftingofenvironmentalcosts;ecosystem

simplification

841

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discussed thereafter. As suggested, a theoretical approach in order to understand thenature of the conflict could be Heinsohn and Steiger’s (1996; 2003) distinctionbetween possession and property.

Both institutional regimes entail their own value systems, which come into con-flict and which generate specific outcomes: divergent uses of the forest as well asdivergent perceptions of the environment. HEVECAM’s management considers thatthe plantation has been created ‘‘in a neglected forest of poor economic value’’10 anddescribes the monoculture as a ‘‘forestry exploitation of rubber’’ or even as a‘‘planted forest.’’ For the Bulu, however, HEVECAM does not correspond to theirdefinition of a forest. Although both actors exploit biotic renewable resources, theagroindustry exploits one single service (latex production) originating from a singlesimplified fund (the plantation)—and also uses nonrenewable resources in the formof machinery, oil, and agrochemicals—while Bulu peasants use a multiplicity of ser-vices (use of animals, plants) coming from several funds (fields, forests, rivers)(Georgescu-Roegen 1971). Accordingly, the latter perceive the forest as diverse, mul-tifunctional, and closely linked to their way of life. In fact, many forest-dependentpopulations suffering from the impacts of industrial tree monocultures have preciselycome to protest against their official classification as ‘‘forests.’’ Their worldwide slo-gan has thus become ‘‘Plantations are not forests!,’’ thereby highlighting a clash ofenvironmental perceptions (Carrere and Lohmann 1996; Martınez-Alier 2002).

As we have seen, the Bulu customary management of the forest is symbolicallyrooted in lineage possession following a patrilineal and segmentary logic and there-fore finds its legitimacy in kinship, but also in individual work creating possession.In addition, Bulu agroforests are envisaged from a metaphysical and ethical contextwhere there is no clear separation between nature and culture. Ecosystems have abroader dimension than the instrumentalist vision that associates them with a setof natural resources and services. Ecological conditions also crucially constrain thelocal economy: In particular, the cyclic nature of shifting agriculture allows stableyields, forest regeneration, and (with enough time) potential land redistribution. Thisinstitutional arrangement has an ecosocial rationale, as successful systems are thosethat have developed resilience strategies able to absorb the consequences of change.Bulu have no alternative but to live within their environment and therefore to takeinto account local ecological interactions. Their economy is thus deeply embedded inthe sociocultural and ecological orders, and it is mainly concerned with use-value(Polanyi 1944). These characteristics are found in many other forest-dependentsocieties (Berkes 1989; Ingold 2000).

Quite the opposite, HEVECAM’s own logic, rooted in Western-type statelaws—that is, private and state property—can be described through the basic aimof monetarily satisfying the individual proprietors, whether shareholders or cred-itors. This fundamental objective can only be attained through commercialgoals—that is, the production and sale of raw materials from the viewpoint of theirexchange-value. Within this framework, industrialisation is very much appropriatebecause it increases productivity (economies of scale, mechanization) and thereforeallows for profits in a competitive international market context. However, the indus-trialization process always requires costly technologies and therefore importantinvestments mainly obtained through credit. Heinsohn and Steiger (1996; 2003)and Steppacher (2008) have argued that the strategic importance of the latter, froman economic, social, and ecological viewpoint, has not been totally understood byeconomists and social scientists in general. However, at a practical level, the


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consequences of credit are part of the main concerns of any entrepreneur and man-ager: credit contracts condition the start of most economic activities as well as theirsubsequent viability margins. Unsurprisingly, access to favorable credit was thusexplicitly a key preoccupation for HEVECAM’s chief executive when he explainedin 2002 that like all agroindustrial firms, GMG crucially requires adequate financingtools from banks and semipublic financial organizations.11

Credit contracts are indeed of strategic importance because of the qualitativenature of the obligations they impose: once an economic agent has engaged his orher property as collateral in a credit contract, the implications are such that theydefine the entire hierarchy of economic decision-making and the evaluation processassociated with it. The combined effect of the contractual conditions defines ‘‘thespecific economic pressure that prevails in property-based economies: the pressurefor exponential growth imposed by interest, the proverbial time pressure imposedby the period for which the credit is granted, the pressure to improve cost-benefitconditions in order to be able to refund’’ (Steppacher 2008, 12). In this context, tech-nological innovations are stimulated as long as they contribute to reduce productioncosts and foster productivity. Marglin (2008) has described the associated system ofknowledge as ‘‘algorithmic,’’ emphasizing its calculating and maximizing character.

The imperatives of credit relations—defining what is broadly referred to as‘‘economic rationality’’—are at the origin of the conflict between HEVECAM andthe Bulu. They drive profitability and growth, to the detriment of social and ecologi-cal considerations such as the land needs of local populations. They also clarify whythe concentration of capital and=or the involvement of foreign capital are typicalcharacteristics of commercial plantations in the South, including HEVECAM(Beckford 2000). Furthermore, such constraints provide an explanation for whymany agroindustries delocalize the production to periphery areas where land andlabor are cheaper, social, and environmental norms are less strict—therefore lesscostly—and where many governments have established subsidy systems such astax exemptions, cheap credit, and, when needed, political or union repression(Carrere and Lohmann 1996).

Besides benefiting from two centuries of growth and innovation stimulated bythe economic potential of property,12 HEVECAM has also always profited fromthe support of a state whose main mission was to introduce and secure a propertyregime. Indeed, the latter can fully work only when it forms a unified institutionalsystem—without any remains of informal or customary rules—thereby facilitatingeconomic transactions as well as sanctions against those who would not respect con-tractual engagements.13 Soto (2000) suggested that the economic use of propertytitles, and not of the resources themselves as in possession-based societies, allowsproprietors to get disconnected from the physical reality of the resources and tomake them live a disembedded life as capital.

On the contrary, the Bulu possession-based system does not foster the sameimpulsions and is therefore unable to compete technologically as well as coercively.It entails no institutional mechanism stimulating technological innovations, noreconomic growth, but has to remain closely connected to the material reality ofthe surrounding resources. It fosters ‘‘viable technologies’’ (sensu Georgescu-Roegen1984), based on ‘‘experiential knowledge’’ (sensu Marglin 2008), implying that theBulu economy has a much lesser impact on the environment (see also Toledo1990). Also, before social differentiation processes started due to the arrival of capit-alism, the segmentary and cyclic nature of the system promoted egalitarian values


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within the Bulu society (Shanin 1973), at least between men (as the regime is char-acterized by masculine domination through patrilineality and virilocal exogamy).Prior to the colonization, the Bulu society did not have property (only possession)and therefore no money as anonymous property titles (sensu Heinsohn and Steiger).Consequently—if one agrees with Heinsohn (2008) that indebted proprietors createdboth the market and Homo economicus—it should be expected that this society didnot know either institutions such as trade and markets (as exchange places), or anypositive social value associated with material wealth accumulation. These predictionsare confirmed by the available historical and anthropological literature on theBulu-Fang-Beti (Tessmann 1913; Bertaut 1935; Alexandre and Binet 1958;Alexandre 1965; Laburthe-Tolra 1981; Ombolo 1984). In his own summary of econ-omic research on tribal societies, Malinowski (1966, 45) detected ‘‘no regular market,hence no prices, hence no mechanism of exchange, hence no room for currency—stillless for money.’’

If it is true that things are changing with the arrival of property, it is equally truethat a large number of technocrats, developers, and even sociologists seriouslyunderestimate—or simply ignore—the still profound mark of the ancient institutionsrooted in a logic of use-value and possession.

Conclusion

The purpose of this article was to shed light on the institutional roots of a socioen-vironmental conflict between Bulu inhabitants and the HEVECAM plantation. Weargued that instead of being a clash between ‘‘common property’’ and ‘‘privateproperty’’ regimes, it is more accurate and fruitful to consider it as a clash between‘‘possession’’ and ‘‘property’’ (Heinsohn and Steiger 1996; 2003). Indeed, the insti-tutional regime of the Bulu is not exclusively ‘‘collective’’—it also includes wide-spread individual possession—and the legal system in which HEVECAM operatesis not only ‘‘private,’’ as state property is also present. Our points were that onlya Western-type property regime generates commercial credit to enterprises, suchHEVECAM, which was, and still is, financed through borrowing; that such creditrelations create specific pressures (such as strict time limits, solvency, economicgrowth) related to the repayment of loans and interest; and that the socioenviron-mental consequences of these pressures can explain why local populations—livingaccording to a different economic rationale (i.e., a possession-based logic)—maycome into conflict with HEVECAM.

In effect, the property-based logic of the agroindustrial firm contradicts inseveral points the principles of Bulu possession. First, while the company’s mainconstraint is to honor contracts, the peasants’ main concern is related to the avail-ability of food and thus to the local conditions of production. Borrowing proprietorsare forced to seek profitability in order to reimburse loans, a process that stimulatesgrowth, industrialization, and in this case a drastic simplification of ecosystems.Quite the reverse, possessors (as long as not indebted) are typically not constrainedby the same stimuli and their production tends to remain relatively stable within amultifunctional environment. Second, although proprietors can get disconnectedfrom the material reality of their resources through the economic use of propertytitles, possessors remain firmly embedded in the sociality and ecology of their com-munity. Third, being protected by the state’s monopoly of violence and definitions oflegality, the company is in a power position vis-a-vis local possessors who rely on


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customary regulations and thus largely remain powerless. Only a state-backed legalact can create property and not personal work per se as in many possession-basedsocieties. Fourth, property rights are permanent—not cyclic as in the Buluregime—and can be unlimitedly accumulated. And fifth, metaphysical aspects haveonly little influence on the rationalistic and reductionist cost=benefit analyses ofmanagers. This clash is at the roots of the resistance described here.

The approach to environmental governance focusing on so-called common pro-perty systems would benefit from integrating the distinction between possession andproperty. Common property theorists (e.g., Schlager and Ostrom 1992; Hanna et al.1996) have described helpful bundles of different rights (e.g., access, use, exclusion,transfer, etc.), but in so doing—to use Heinsohn and Steiger’s terminology—theytend to stay in the ‘‘possession’’ sphere (i.e., in the tangible management ofresources) and they tend not to discuss the ‘‘property’’ aspects (if any) of these bun-dles (i.e., the economic use of property titles as security in credit relations and in thecreation of money). In our view, these property aspects have crucial importancebecause of the key potentialities and constraints they generate for economic actors.Although it is not free from difficulties, the distinction between possession and pro-perty would contribute, first, to highlighting the complex nature of many customarysystems classified as ‘‘common property’’ as they generally also entail individual pos-session and generate specific values, norms, and logics that remain otherwise misun-derstood. Second, this approach usefully broadens environmental institutionalanalyses into new territories such as credit relations, political ecology, and economicanthropology. Finally, further research on the economic nature of property woulddeepen our understanding of the mechanisms and dynamics of property-based socie-ties—as opposed to possession-based economies. This is especially relevant in thequest for more sustainable and equitable institutional alternatives, as they may haveto be found within possession-oriented options.

Notes

1. Heinsohn and Steiger are not the first authors to make such a distinction (see, e.g., Hegel1821 or Proudhon 1840), but they are possibly the first ones to link it with interest andmoney. Soto (2000) develops comparable ideas, while Steppacher (2008) explores someof its socioecological implications.

2. Patrilineality: institutional principle where kinship and the corresponding rights aretransmitted through male lines going back to a founding ancestor. Segmentarity: systembased on an increasing genealogical ramification whereby a lineage is segmented intosublineages.

3. Bagyeli hunter-gatherers (‘‘Pygmies’’) are the region’s first colonizers. In this article, Ifocus exclusively on Bulu peasants.

4. This type of lease allows HEVECAM to use its concession as collateral in credit relations.5. Interview data with Bulu informants, November 2006–January 2007.6. ‘‘Middle peasants’’ refer to subsistence-oriented peasants who supply most labor to the

family farm (with no use of outside laborers).7. Bulu peasant, Nko’olong, November 19, 2006.8. Bulu peasant, Bifa, December 6, 2006.9. Bulu peasant, Bidou III, December 8, 2006.10. Management of HEVECAM, ‘‘Expose sur HEVECAM’’, February 3, 1995.11. HEVECAM’s chief executive, 2002, http://www.legicam.org/pdf/AG201120

Janvier202002.pdf (accessed on 6 March 2007).12. The actualization of this growth potential had historically been made possible through

the recourse to mineral resources (coal, oil), the physical driving force of capitalism(Steppacher 2008). It is also at the origin of today’s global environmental crisis.


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13. An objection to this could arise from the observation that the capitalist sphere has beenable to use for its own benefit the institutions of ‘‘social reproduction’’ of the domesticmode of production, the workforce being reproduced at low or zero cost to the capitalistsystem. While this observation (associated to Meillassoux 1981) contains much truth in,e.g., village plantations, my case study presents no articulation between Bulu communitiesand the company. On the contrary, the expansionary tendency of capitalist agroindustriesin a context of increasingly scarce natural resources is conflictive.

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possession versus property in a tree plantation socioenvironmental conflict in southern cameroon

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