positive political theory: an introduction general information
DESCRIPTION
Positive political Theory: an introduction General information. Credits: 9 (60 hours ) Period: 8 th January - 20 th March Instructor: Francesco Zucchini ( [email protected] ) Office hours: Monday 17-19.30, room 308, third floor, Dpt. Studi Sociali e Politici. 1. - PowerPoint PPT PresentationTRANSCRIPT
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Positive political Theory: an introductionGeneral information
Credits: 9 (60 hours)Period: 8th January - 20th MarchInstructor: Francesco Zucchini ([email protected] )Office hours: Monday 17-19.30, room 308, third floor, Dpt. Studi Sociali e Politici
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Course: aims, structure, assessment The course is an introduction to the study of politics from a
rational choice perspective. The course is an introduction to the study of politics from a
rational choice perspective.In the first two modules we will focus on the institutional effects of decision-making processes and on the nature of political actors in the democratic political systems. In the last module we will focus on the origin of the state, on the democratization process and on the collective action problems.
All students are expected to do all the reading for each class session and may be called upon at any time to provide summary statements of it.
Evaluation of students is based upon the regular and active participation in the classroom activities (20%), a presentation (30%) and a final written exam (50%).
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Positive political Theory: An introduction
Lecture 1: Epistemological foundation of the Rational Choice approachFrancesco Zucchini
What the rational choice is not
Theories without actors:
• System analysis • Structuralism• Functionalism (Parsons)
Theories with non rational actors:
• Relative deprivation theory• Imitation instinct (Tarde)• False consciouness (Engels)• Inconscient pulsions (Freud)• Habitus (Bourdieu)
“NON RATIONAL CHOICE THEORIES
What the rational choice isWeak Requirements of Rationality:
1) Impossibility of contradictory beliefs or preferences
2) Impossibility of intransitive preferences
3) Conformity to the axioms of probability calculus
Weak requirements of Rationality
1) Impossibility of contradictory beliefs or preferences:
if an actor holds contradictory beliefs she cannot reason
if an actor hold contradictory preferences she can choose any option
Important: contradiction refers to beliefs or preferences at a given moment in time.
Weak requirements of Rationality2) Impossibility of intransitive preferences:
if an actor prefers alternative a over b and b over c , she must prefer a over c .
One can create a “money pump” from a person with intransitive preferences.
Person Z has the following preference ordering: a>b>c>a ; she holds a. I can persuade her to
exchange a for c provided she pays 1$; then I can persuade her to exchange c for b for 1$ more; again I can persuade her to pay 1$ to exchange b for a. She holds a as at the beginning but she is $3 poorer
Weak requirements of Rationality3) Conformity to the axioms of probability
calculusA1 No probability is less than zero. P(i)>=0
A2 Probability of a sure event is one
A3 If i and j are two mutually exclusive events, then P (i or j)= P(i )+P(j)
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A small quantity of formalization... A choice between different alternatives
S = (s1, s2, … si) Each alternative can be put on a nominal, ordinal o
cardinal scale The choice produces a result
R = (r1, r2, … ri) An actor chooses as a function of a preference
ordering relation among the results. Such ordering is complete transitive
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Utility
A ( mostly) continuous preference ordering assigns a position to each result
We can assign a number to such ordering called utility
A result r can be characterized by these features (x,y,z) to which an utility value u = f(x,y,z) corresponds
Rational action maximizes the utility function
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Single-peak utility functions
One dimension (the real line) Actor with ideal point A, outcome x Linear utility function:
U = - |x – A|
Quadratic utility function: U = - (x – A)2
U
A x
U
A x
+
+
-
-
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Expected utility
There could be unknown factors that could come in between a choice of action and a result
.. as a function of different states of the world M = (m1, m2, … mi)
Choice under uncertainty is based associating subjective probabilities to each state of the world, choosing a lottery of results L = (r1,p1;r2,p2; … ri,pi)
We have then an expected utility function EU = u(r1)p1+u(r2)p2+ … u(ri)pi
Strong Requirements of Rationality
1) Conformity to the prescriptions of game theory
2) Probabilities approximate objective frequencies in equilibrium
3) Beliefs approximate reality in equilibrium
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Strong Requirements of Rationality1) Conformity to the prescriptions of game
theory: digression.. Uncertainty between choices and outcomes
could also result from the (unknown) decisions taken by other rational actors
Game theory studies the strategic interdependence between actors, how one actor’s utility is also function of other actors’ decisions, how actors choose best strategies, and the resulting equilibrium outcomes
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Principles of game theory
Players have preferences and utility functions Game is represented by a sequence of moves
(actors’ – or Nature – choices) How information is distributed is key Strategy is a complete action plan, based on the
anticipation of other actors’ decisions A combination of strategies determines an outcome This outcome determines a payoff to each player,
and a level of utility (the payoff is an argument of the player’s utility function)
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Principles of game theory (2)
Games in the extensive form are represented by a decision tree
which illustrates the possible conditional strategic options
The distribution of information: complete/incomplete (game structure), perfect/imperfect (actors’ types), common knowledge
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Principles of game theory (3)
Solutions is by backward induction, by identifying the subgame perfect equilibria
Nash equilibrium: the profile of the best responses, conditional on the anticipation of other actors’ best responses
A Nash equilibrium is stable: no-one unilaterally changes strategy
Strong Requirements of Rationality
2) Subjective probabilities approximate objective frequencies in equilibrium.Every “player” makes the best use of his previous probability assessments and the new information that he gets from the environment.Beliefs are updated according to Bayes’s rule.
• P(A) is the prior probability or marginal probability of A. It is "prior" in the sense that it doesnot take into account any information about B.
• P(A|B) is the conditional probability of A, given B. It is also called the posterior probabilitybecause it is derived from or depends upon the specified value of B.
• P(B|A) is the conditional probability of B given A. • P(B) is the prior or marginal probability of B
Bayesian updating of beliefs
Strong Requirements of Rationality
Bayesian updating of beliefs. ExampleSuppose someone told you they had a nice conversation with someone on the train. Not
knowing anything else about this conversation, the probability that they were speaking to a woman is 50%. Now suppose they also told you that this person had long hair. It is now more likely they were speaking to a woman, since most long-haired people are women. How likely ?Bayes' theorem can be used to calculate the probability that the person is a woman. W = event that the conversation was held with a woman, and L = event that the conversation was held with a long-haired person.It can be assumed that women constitute half the population for this example. So, not knowing anything else, the probability that W occurs is P (W) = 0.5 Suppose it is also known that 75% of women have long hair, which we denote asP (L | W) = 0.75 (read: the probability of event given event is 0.75).Likewise, suppose it is known that 30% of men have long hair, orP (L | M) = 0.3where M is the complementary event of W, i.e., the event that the conversation was held with a man (assuming that every human is either a man or a woman).
Bayesian updating of beliefs. Example
Our goal is to calculate the probability that the conversation was held with a woman, given the fact that the person had long hair, or, in our notationP (W | L)Using the formula for Bayes' theorem, we have:
where we have used the law of total probability. The numeric answer can be obtained by substituting the above values into this formula. This yieldsi.e., the probability that the conversation was held with a woman, given that the person had long hair, is about 71%.
Strong Requirements of Rationality
3) Beliefs should approximate reality
Beliefs and behavior not only have to be consistent but also have to correspond with the real world at equilibrium
Rational Choice: only a normative theory ?
Usual criticism to the Rational Choice theory:
In the real world people are incapable of making all the required calculations and computations. Rational choice is not “realistic”
Usual answer (M.Friedman): people behave as if they were rational: “In so far as a theory can be said to have “assumptions” at all, and in so far as their “realism” can be judged independently of the validity of predictions, the relation between the significance of a theory and the “realism” of its “assumptions” is almost the opposite of that suggested by the view under criticism. Truly important and significant hypotheses will be found to have “assumptions” that are wildly inaccurate descriptive representations of reality, and, in general, the more significant the theory, the more unrealistic the assumptions (in this sense). The reason is simple. A hypothesis is important if it “explains” much by little, that is, if it abstracts the common and crucial elements from the mass of complex and detailed circumstances surrounding the phenomena to be explained and permits valid predictions on the basis of them alone. To be important, therefore, a hypothesis must be descriptively false in its assumptions; it takes account of, and accounts for, none of the many other attendant circumstances, since its very success shows them to be irrelevant for the phenomena to be explained.
As if argument claims that the rationality assumption, regardless of its accuracy, is a way to model human behaviour Rationality as model argument (look at Fiorina article)
Rational Choice: only a normative theory ?Tsebelis counter argument to “rationality as model
argument” : 1)“the assumptions of a theory are, in a trivial sense, also conclusions
of the theory . A scientist who is willing to make the “wildly inaccurate” assumptions Friedman wants him to make admits that “wildly inaccurate” behaviour can be generated as a conclusion of his theory”.
2) Rationality refers to a subset of human behavior. Rational choice cannot explain every phenomenon. Rational choice is a better approach to situations in which the actors’ identity and goals are established and the rules of interaction are precise and known to the interacting agents.Political games structure the situation as well ; the study of political actors under the assumption of rationality is a legitimate approximation of realistic situations, motives, calculations and behavior.
5 arguments
Five arguments in defense of the Rational Choice Approach (Tsebelis)
1) Salience of issues and information2) Learning3) Heterogeneity of individuals4) Natural Selection5) Statistics
Five arguments in defense of the Rational Choice Approach (Tsebelis)
3) Heterogeneity of individuals: equilibria with some sophisticated agents (read fully rational) will tend toward equilibria where all agents are sophisticated in the cases of “congestion effects” , that is where each agent is worse off the higher the number of other agents who make the same choice as he. An equilibrium with a small number of sophisticated agents is practically indistinguishable from an equilibrium where all agents are sophisticated
Five arguments in defense of the Rational Choice Approach (Tsebelis)
3) Statistics: rationality is a small but systematic component of any individual , and all other influences are distributed at random. The systematic component has a magnitude x and the random element is normally distributed with variance s. Each individual of population will execute a decision in the interval [x-(2s), x+(2s)] 95 percent of the time. However in a sample of a million individuals the average individual will make a decision in the interval [x-(2s/1000), x+(2s/1000)] 95 percent of the time
Rational choice: a theory for the institutionsIn the rational choice approach individual action is assumed to be an optimal adaptation to an institutional environment, and the interaction among individuals is assumed to be an optimal response to each other. The prevailing institutions (the rules of the game) determine the behavior of the actors, which in turn produces political or social outcomes.
Rational choice is unconcerned with individuals or actors per se and focuses its attention on political and social institutions
Advantages of the Rational choice Approach
• Theoretical clarity and parsimony Ad hoc explanations are eliminated• Equilibrium analysisOptimal behavior is discovered, it is easy to formulate
hypothesis and to eliminate alternative explanations. • Deductive reasoning In RC we deal with tautology. If a model does not work , as
the model is still correct, you have to change the assumption (usually the structure of the game..).Therefore also the “wrong” models are useful for the cumulation of the knowledge.
• Interchangeability of individuals
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Positive political Theory: An introduction
Lecture 2: Basic tools of analytical politics
Francesco Zucchini
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Spatial representation
In case of more than one dimension, we have iso-utility curves (indifference curves)
Utility diminishes as we move away from the ideal point
The shape of the iso-utility curve varies as a function of the salience of the dimensions
Continuous utility functions in 1 dimensionUtility
Dimension xxi
Spatial representation
..and in 2 Dimensions
Iso-utility curves or indifference curves
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Spatial representation
In case of more than one dimension, we have iso-utility curves (indifference curves)
Utility diminishes as we move away from the ideal point
The shape of the iso-utility curve varies as a function of the salience of the dimensions
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Indifference curve
I
X
YP
Z
Player I prefers a point which is inside the indifference curve (such as P) to one outside (such as Z), and is indifferent between two points on the same curve (like X and Y)
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A basic equation in positive political theory Preferences x Institutions = Outcomes
Comparative statics (i.e. propositions) that form the basis to testable hypotheses can be derived as follows:
As preferences change, outcomes change As institutions change, outcomes change
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A typical institution: a voting rule Committee/assembly of N members K = p N minimum number of members to approve a committee’s
decision
In Simple Majority Rule (SMR) K > (1/2)N
Of course, there are several exceptions to SMR Filibuster in the U.S. Senate: debate must end with a motion of
cloture approved by 3/5 (60 over 100) of senators UE Council of Ministers: qualified majority (255 votes out of 345,
73.9 %) Bicameralism
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A proposition: the voting paradox If a majority prefers some alternatives to x, these set
of alternatives is called winset of x, W(x); if an alternative x has an empty winset , W(x)=Ø, then x is an equilibrium, namely is a majority position that cannot be defeated.
If no alternative has an empty winset then we have cycling majorities
SMR cannot guarantee a majority position – a Condorcet winner which can beat any other alternative in pairwise comparisons. In other terms SMR cannot guarantee that there is an alternative x whose W(x)=Ø
Condorcet Paradox
Imagine 3 legislators with the following preference’s orders
Alternatives can be chosen by majority rule
Whoever control the agenda can completely control the outcome
ranking Leg.1 Leg.2 Leg.3
1° z y x
2° x z y
3° y x z
ranking Leg.1 Leg.2 Leg.3
1° z y x
2° x z y
3° y x z
1,2 choose z against x but..
ranking Leg.1 Leg.2 Leg.3
1° z y x
2° x z y
3° y x z
2,3 choose y against z but again..
ranking Leg.1 Leg.2 Leg.3
1° z y x
2° x z y
3° y x z
1,3 choose x against y..
z defeats x that defeats y that defeats z.
Whoever control the agenda can completely control the outcome
Imagine a legislative voting in two steps. If Leg 1 is the agenda setter..
ranking Leg.1Leg.2Leg.3
1° z y x
2° x z y
3° y x z
x y
x
z
z
Whoever control the agenda can completely control the outcome If Leg 2 is the agenda setter..
ranking Leg.1Leg.2Leg.3
1° z y x
2° x z y
3° y x z
z x
z
y
y
Whoever control the agenda can completely control the outcome
If Leg 3 is the agenda setter.
ranking Leg.1Leg.2Leg.3
1° z y x
2° x z y
3° y x z
z y
y
x
x
Probability of Cyclical MajorityNumber of Voters (n)
N.Alternatives (m)
3 5 7 9 11 limit
3 0.056 0.069 0.075 0.078 0.080 0.088
4 0.111 0.139 0.150 0.156 0.160 0.176
5 0.160 0.200 0.215 0.251
6 0.202 0.315
Limit 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
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Median voter theorem A committee chooses by SMR among alternatives
Single-peak Euclidean utility functions
Winset of x W(x): set of alternatives that beat x in a committee that decides by SMR
Median voter theorem (Black): If the member of a committee G have single-peaked utility functions on a single dimension, the winset of the ideal point of the median voter is empty. W(xmed)=Ø
When the alternatives can be disposed on only one dimension namely when the utility curves of each member are single peaked then there is a Condorcet winner: the median voter
ranking Leg.1 Leg.2 Leg.3
1° z z x
2° x y z
3° y x y
y z x
1°
2°
3°
Utility
When the alternatives can be disposed on only one dimension namely when the utility curves of each member are single peaked then there is a Condorcet winner: the median voter
ranking Leg.1 Leg.2 Leg.3
1° x z y
2° y y z
3° z x x
x y z
1°
2°
3°
Utility
When there is a Condorcet paradox (no winner) then the alternatives cannot be disposed on only one dimension namely the utility curves of each member are not single peaked
x z
1°
2°
3°
Utility
ranking Leg.1Leg.2 Leg.3
1° z y x2° x z y3° y x z
y
2 peaks
When there is a Condorcet paradox (no winner) then the alternatives cannot be disposed on only one dimension namely the utility curves of each “legislator” are not ever single peaked
y z
1°
2°
3°
Utility
ranking Leg.1Leg.2 Leg.3
1° z y x2° x z y
3° y x z
x
2 peaks
In 2 or more dimensions a unique equilibrium is not guaranteed
ranking Leg.1 Leg.2 Leg.3
1° z z x
2° x y z
3° y x y
ranking Leg.1 Leg.2 Leg.3
1° x z y
2° y y z
3° z x x
Preference rankings that allow to dispose the alternatives in one dimension (Single peakedness condition) share one feature: one alternative is never worst among the three for any group member. Therefore we can affirm that for every subset of three alternatives if one is never worst among the three for any voter then majority rule yield a stable outcome ( the median voter most preferred alternative or median ideal point).Such a condition however is sufficient but not necessary to prevent the Condorcet Paradox ( namely the collective intransitivity and the cycling majorities)…
z y
SMR yields coherent group preferences ( a stable outcome) if individual preferences are value restricted. In other terms if for every collection of three alternatives under consideration, all members of the voters agree that one of the alternatives in this collection either is not best, not worst, not middling.
Sen’s Value-Restrictions Theorem
ranking Leg.1 Leg.2 Leg.3
1° x x z
2° y z y
3° z y x
x X is not middling for any voter and it is the winning alternative
There is no way to dispose the alternatives on only one dimension, namely to have single peaked utility curves for all voters. However there is Condorcet winner (a stable outcome).
Sen’s Value-Restrictions Theorem
ranking Leg.1 Leg.2 Leg.3
1° x x z
2° y z y
3° z y x
x is not middling for any voter and it is the winning alternative y x z
Utility
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Electoral competition and median voter theorem
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Theorems Chaos Theorem (McKelvey): In a multi-dimensional
space, there are no points with a empty winset or no Condocet winners, if we apply SMR (with one exception, see below). There will be chaos and the agenda setter (i.e. which controls the order of voting) can determine the final outcome
Plot Theorem: In a multi-dimensional space, if actors’ ideal points are distributed radially and symmetrically with respect to x*, then the winset of x* is empty
Change of rules, institutions (bicameralism, dimension-by-dimension voting) can produce a stable equilibrium
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Cycling majorities
Plott’s Theorem
Plott’s Theorem
Instability, majority rule and multidimensional space
How institutions can affect the stability (and the nature) of the decisions ? Example with bicameralism
ranking Leg.1 Leg.2 Leg.3 Leg.4 Leg.5 Leg.6
1° z x x z y y
2° x z z y w w
3° w y y w x x
4° x w w x z z
Imagine 6 legislators in one chamber and the following profiles of preferences.
ranking Leg.1 Leg.2 Leg.3 Leg.4 Leg.5 Leg.6
1° z x x z y y
2° y z z y w w
3° w y y w x x
4° x w w x z z
2,3,5,6 prefer x to z but..
ranking Leg.1 Leg.2 Leg.3 Leg.4 Leg.5 Leg.6
1° z x x z y y
2° y z z y w w
3° w y y w x x
4° x w w x z z
1,4,5,6 prefer w to x, but..
ranking Leg.1 Leg.2 Leg.3 Leg.4 Leg.5 Leg.6
1° z x x z y y
2° y z z y w w
3° w y y w x x
4° x w w x z z
all prefer y to w, but..
ranking Leg.1 Leg.2 Leg.3 Leg.4 Leg.5 Leg.6
1° z x x z y y
2° y z z y w w
3° w y y w x x
4° x w w x z z
1,2,3,4 prefer z to y, ….CYCLE!
ranking Leg.1 Leg.2 Leg.3 Leg.4 Leg.5 Leg.6
1° z x x z y y
2° y z z y w w
3° w y y w x x
4° x w w x z z
Imagine that the same legislators are grouped in two chambers in the following way (red chamber 1,2,3 and blue chamber 4,5,6) and that the final alternative must win a majority in both chambers.
2, 3, and 5, 6 prefer x to z
ranking Leg.1 Leg.2 Leg.3 Leg.4 Leg.5 Leg.6
1° z x x z y y
2° y z z y w w
3° w y y w x x
4° x w w x z z
However now w cannot be preferred to x as in the Red Chamber only 1 prefers w to x. …once approved against z , x cannot be defeated any longer
What happen if we start the process with y ?All legislators prefer y to w..
ranking Leg.1 Leg.2 Leg.3 Leg.4 Leg.5 Leg.6
1° z x x z y y
2° y z z y w w
3° w y y w x x
4° x w w x z z
However now z cannot be chosen against y as in the Blue Chamber only 4 prefers z to y. …once approved against w , y cannot be defeated any longer.
We have two stable equilibria: x and y. The final outcome will depend on the initial status quo (SQ)
1) If x (y) is the SQ then the final outcome will be x (y)2) If z (w) is the SQ then the final outcome will be x (y)