populism 2007 for pozorblog

The Dynamicsof Populis m in S lovakia

and the Czech Republic

Ke vin De e g a n-Kra us eWa yne S ta te Unive rs ityDe tro it, Mic h ig a n, US A

A Brie f Agenda

Populis m in General•De fin itions•Cons e que nc e s•P opulis m a nd Is s ue Dim e ns ions

Populis m in S lovakia and the Czech Republic•A B rie f His tory o f S lova k a nd Cz e c h P opulis m•S lova k a nd Cz e c h P opulis m Toda y•B a d G ue s s e s About th e F uture

My Ally+

Vote rs=

P opular

My Oppone nt+

Vote rs=

P opulist

Populis m in General: Definitions

• Inh e re nt P a th o log y

– La ng : Overs im plific a tion– P a pa dopolous : Overprom is ing– Tis ma ne a nu: False re a lity


• E mpiric a l Ana lys is

–Kurt We yla nd:“le ft-out” vote rs , d ire c t a ppe a l, bypa s s ing in s titu tions

–Ma rg a re t Ca nova n:“a ppe a l to th e pe ople , against th e powe r s truc ture ”

–Ca s Mudde :“pure pe ople v. c orrupt e lite ”


• OrganizationalS trong le a de r wh o s e e ksd ire c t tie with vote rs

• Stylis ticAppe a ls th a t a re m ora lis tica nd id ios ync ra tic

• ProgrammaticAtta c ks a ll e lite s per seon be h a lf o f “th e pe ople ”


• NotCons e ns ua l le a de rs h ipor pa rty ins titu tiona liz a tion

• NotP ra g m a tic c om prom is eor s ys te m a tic prog ra m s

• NotAtta c ks on ly on some e lite sor on be h a lf o f some g roups


Programmatic

Wea

k In

stitu

tions

Stro

ng

Lead

er

Organizational

Moralistic

Idiosyncratic

Stylistic

Against

All ElitesOn Behalf ofAll people


•Is “P opulis m” a c onc e pt worth us ing ?

•On one hand•It is ta in te d•Th e re is little inherent linka g e

•On the other hand•E ve rybody doe s it•Conne c tion pra c tic a l if not inh e re nt

Populis m in General: Cons equences

•Is P opulis m worth fe a ring ?•Ca nova n’s S h a dow of de m oc ra c y. Th e s e c h a ra c te ris tic s h a ve pos itive s a nd ne g a tive s .

S trong le a de r

Dire c t Approa c h

Mora lity

S e le c tiv ity

Oppos ing “B a d” E lite s

De fe nd ing th e P e ople

S trong le a de r

We a k Ins titutions

Mora lis m

Id ios ync ra c y

Oppos ing “G ood” E lite s

P a nde ring to th e Ma s s

Populis m in General: Cons equences

“The People” Not “The People” Compatible Pos itionP oor R ich E conomic Le ft

Co-e thnic s Dome s tic e thnic g roups a nd co-e thnic “tra itors ”

Na tiona lis mR a dica l R ig h t

Co-c itiz e ns F ore ig n powe rs a nd the ir dome s tic “a g e nts ”

Is ola tionis mE uros ke ptic is mAnti-Ame rica nis m

B e lie ve rs Non-be lie ve rs F unda me nta lis m

We ll-be ha ve d Crimina ls La w a nd Orde r

“The B e s ie g e d” “The Obs truc tionis ts ” Authorita ria nis m

•Is P opulis m worth fe a ring ? De fin ing “Th e P e ople ”

Impre c is e te rminolog y to cove r th e notion of a n unde fine d “us ” wh o ne e d th e tra ins to run on time , a nd a “th e m” wh o b lock it in th e na me of de mocra tic proce dure s th a t we s imply c a nnot a fford

Populis m in General: Is s ue Divides

Other Is s ue Pos itions of Populis t PartiesNa tiona lis t 70%Auth orita ria n 60%Xe noph ob ic 43%S oc ia l 37%None 30%

•P opulis m a nd Oth e r Is s ue s : P e tr Uc e n’s Ana lys is


Is s ue Combinations of Populis t PartiesAuth orita ria n/Na tiona l 60%Auth orita ria n/Xe noph ob ic 43%Xe noph ob ic /Na tiona l 43%S oc ia l/Na tiona l 37%S oc ia l/Auth orita ria n 27%S oc ia l/Xe noph ob ic 10%

•P opulis m a nd Oth e r Is s ue s : P e tr Uc e n’s Ana lys is


•P opulis m a nd No Oth e r Is s ue s ?•P e tr Uc e n•Ala n S ikk


Programmatic

Wea

k In

stitu

tions

Stro

ng

Lead

er

Organizational

Moralistic

Idiosyncratic

Stylistic

Against


Anti-elite program hard to sustain while in power

• Dyna mic s : P opulis m ’s Tra g ic F la w

Time in powe r


P opulis t P rog ra m ma tic Appe a l

• Dyna mic s : Com pe ns a ting for P opulis m’s Tra g ic F la w

Time in powe r


P opulis t P rog ra m ma tic Appe a l

Clie nte lis tic or Oth e r

Appe a l

• Dyna mic s : Com pe ns a ting for P opulis m’s Tra g ic F la w

Time in powe r


P opulis t P rog ra m ma tic Appe a l Oth e r P rog ra m m a tic

Appe a l

C lie nte lis tic or Oth e r

Appe a l

• Dyna mic s : P e rma ne nc e

le ft rig h t


• Dyna mic s : P e rma ne nc e

na tiona l c os m opolita n


• Dyna mic s : Th e pe rma ne nc e o f th e e ph e m e ra l

non-populis t populis t


Time in power


• Dyna mic s : Th e pe rma ne nc e o f th e e ph e m e ra l

Populist Party 1 Populist Party 2 Populist Party 3

• Ma c ro Le ve l E vide nc e ?– R a p id De c line Onc e in P owe r– R a pid R e pla c e me nt


• Ma c ro P a tte rns : R a p id De c line Onc e in P owe r


0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

120%

140%

0.00 1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 5.00 6.00

Support as a percentage of most recent electoral result

Years since election

Bulga ria : Simeon II Lithua nia : New Union Lithua nia : La bor

Estonia : Res Publica La tvia : New Era

Figure 3. Support for selected populist new pa rties in postcommunist Europe over time a s a percenta ge of most recent electora l resultFigure 3. Support for selected populist new pa rties in postcommunist Europe over time a s a percenta ge of most recent electora l result

• Ma c ro P a tte rns : R a p id R e pla c e me nt-Lith ua n ia


Libera l Union

New Union

Coa lition for Order and Jus tice

Labour Party

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

1992 1996 2000 2004

Colore d boxe s de note ne w pa rtie s

• Ma c ro P a tte rns : R a p id R e pla c e me nt-B ulg a ria


Ataka

Demokrati za Silna Bălgarija

Ba lgarski Naroden Sa juz

Simeon II

Simeon II

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

1991 1994 1997 2001 2005

• Ma c ro P a tte rns : R a p id R e pla c e me nt-E s tonia


Greens

Res Publica

Res Publica & Pro Patria

Reform Reform

Reform

Reform

Our Home is Es tonia Our Home is Es tonia

Our Home is Es tonia

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

1992 1995 1999 2003

• Ma c ro P a tte rns : R a p id R e pla c e me nt-La tvia


Harmony CenterLa tvia 's Firs t Party

La tvia 's Firs t PartyNew Era

New Era

People's Party

People's Party

People's Party

Socia l Democratic Alliance

Socia l Democra tic Alliance

New Party

La tvian Unity Party0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

1993 1995 1998 2002 2006

Populis m in S lovakia and the Czech Republic

Populis m in SK and CZ: As s es s ment


Programmatic

Wea

k In

stitu

tions

Stro

ng

Lead

er

Organizational

Moralistic

Idiosyncratic

Stylistic

Against


F ra me work


Moralistic

Against


Idiosyncratic

Stylistic

Wea

k In

stitu

tions

Stro

ng

Lead

er

Organizational

Programmatic

F ra me work


Moralistic

Against


Idiosyncratic

Stylistic

Wea

k In

stitu

tions

Stro

ng

Lead

er

Organizational

Programmatic

ZR S 1994S c ore =18or 100%

S DL 1994S c ore =12or 50%

E xa mple

Populis m in SK and CZ: (Tentative ) As s es s ment

HZDS

KDH

DU

SDK

SDKU

ANO

SNS

SDL

ZRS

SOP

Smer

KSS

SMK

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006


Year Characteristic HZDSKDH DU SDK SDKU ANO SNS SDL ZRS SOP Smer KSS SMK1992strong leader 3 2 2 2 1

avoids constraining organization 2 2 2 1 2places morality over pragmatism 3 3 2 2 3offers idiosyncratic program 2 1 2 1 1claims to represent "whole people" 3 1 3 3 2attacks all elites 2 1 2 2 2Sum 15 10 13 11 11

1994strong leader 3 2 2 3 2 3 1avoids constraining organization 1 1 2 2 1 3 1places morality over pragmatism 3 3 2 3 2 3 3offers idiosyncratic program 2 1 2 2 1 3 1claims to represent "whole people" 3 1 2 3 3 3 2attacks all elites 2 1 2 2 2 3 2Sum 14 9 12 15 11 18 10

1998strong leader 3 2 3 1 2 1avoids constraining organization 1 2 2 3 3 1places morality over pragmatism 2 2 3 2 2 3offers idiosyncratic program 2 2 2 1 3 1claims to represent "whole people" 3 2 3 2 3 2attacks all elites 2 1 2 1 2 2Sum 13 11 15 10 15 10

2002strong leader 3 1 2 3 3 3 1 1avoids constraining organization 2 1 2 3 3 3 2 1places morality over pragmatism 2 3 2 3 3 2 3 3offers idiosyncratic program 2 1 1 2 3 3 1 1claims to represent "whole people" 2 1 2 3 3 3 2 2attacks all elites 3 1 1 2 3 3 3 2Sum 14 8 10 16 18 17 12 10

2006strong leader 3 1 2 3 3 1avoids constraining organization 2 1 2 2 2 1places morality over pragmatism 1 3 2 3 2 3offers idiosyncratic program 3 1 1 3 2 1claims to represent "whole people" 2 1 2 3 3 2attacks all elites 3 1 1 3 3 2Sum 14 8 10 17 15 10

ODS

ODA

US

SZ

KDU-CSL

CSSD

KSCM

SPR-RSC

LSUHSD-SM S

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006



Year Characteristic ODS ODA US SZ KDU-CSL

CSSD KSCMLSU HSD-SMS

SPR-RSC

Dek. Od.

1992 strong leader 2 2 1 3 1 2 2 3 avoids constraining organization 2 2 1 2 1 2 2 3 places morality over pragmatism 2 2 3 2 3 2 2 3 offers idiosyncratic program 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 3 claims to represent "whole people" 2 2 1 2 2 2 1 3 attacks all elites 1 1 1 3 3 2 2 3 Sum 10 10 8 13 11 11 11 18

1996 strong leader 2 2 1 3 1 3 avoids constraining organization 1 2 1 1 1 3 places morality over pragmatism 2 2 3 2 3 3 offers idiosyncratic program 1 1 1 1 1 3 claims to represent "whole people" 2 2 1 3 2 3 attacks all elites 1 1 1 3 3 3 Sum 9 10 8 13 11 18

1998 strong leader 3 2 1 3 1 avoids constraining organization 2 2 1 1 1 places morality over pragmatism 2 2 3 2 3 offers idiosyncratic program 1 1 1 1 1 claims to represent "whole people" 2 2 1 2 2 attacks all elites 1 1 1 3 3 Sum 11 10 8 12 11

2002 strong leader 3 1 1 2 1 2avoids constraining organization 2 2 1 1 1 3places morality over pragmatism 2 2 3 2 3 3offers idiosyncratic program 1 1 1 1 1 3claims to represent "whole people" 2 2 1 2 2 3attacks all elites 2 1 1 1 3 3Sum 12 9 8 9 11 17

2006 strong leader 2 3 1 2 1 avoids constraining organization 2 2 1 1 1 places morality over pragmatism 2 3 3 2 3 offers idiosyncratic program 1 2 1 1 1 claims to represent "whole people" 2 2 1 3 2 attacks all elites 2 3 1 1 3 Sum 11 15 8 10 11


Slovakia

Cze ch Re public

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006

Populis m in SK and CZ: Is s ue Divides

• Is Th e re a P opulis m Is s ue Divide ?

Wh a t would we e xpe c t to s e e if th e re we re ?


• Ma c ro P a tte rns : R a p id R e pla c e me nt?


• Ma c ro P a tte rns : R a p id De c line Onc e In P owe r?


ZRSSOP

ANO

Smer

• Mic ro P a tte rns : S a tis fa c tion fo llowe d by d is illus ion

-0.1

-0.05

0

0.05

0.1

0.15

0.2

1994 1995 1996 1997

Representatives lose touch with people (Among ZRS loyalists)

Representatives lose touch with people (among ZRS defectors)


Departing members of ANO more like ly than continuing members to be lieve that:

•P owe rfu l do not c a re a bout me (16% )

•E le c tions o ffe r a c h a nc e for pe ople like m e to h a ve a s a y (16% )

•P olitic ia ns be h a ve with re s tra int (13% )


Departing members of Smer not more like ly than continuing members to be lieve the s ame propos itions



0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

120%

140%

0.00 1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 5.00 6.00


Years since election

Bulga ria : Simeon II Lithua nia : New Union Lithua nia : La bor

Estonia : Res Publica La tvia : New Era

Figure 3. Support for selected populist new pa rties in postcommunist Europe over time a s a percenta ge of most recent electora l resultFigure 3. Support for selected populist new pa rties in postcommunist Europe over time a s a percenta ge of most recent electora l result

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

120%

140%

0.00 1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 5.00 6.00


Yea rs since election

Bulga ria : Simeon II Lithua nia : New Union Lithua nia : Labor

Estonia : Res Publica La tvia : New Era Slova kia : Smer

Figure 3. Support for selected populist new pa rties in postcommunist Europe over time a s a percentage of most recent electora l resultFigure 3. Support for selected populist new pa rties in postcommunist Europe over time a s a percentage of most recent electora l resultFigure 3. Support for selected populist new pa rties in postcommunist Europe over time a s a percentage of most recent electora l result


Ha s S me r “routin iz e d” its populis m ?

E vide nc e :• In in s titu tiona l de ve lopme nt

– Ne w pa rty org a n iz a tion– Ne w na me : S me r-S oc ia l De moc ra c y– Ch oic e o f re d is tribution to le ra nt pa rtne rs

• In th e e le c tora te– Le ftis t le a n ing s– P oor v. ric h– S trong e r re d is tribution is t pro file a m ong a ll

vote rs

Populis m in SK and CZ: The Future

Ha s S me r R outin iz e d P opulis m ?

ZRS ANO

Smer

Time

Non-Routinized Populism


ZRS ANO

Smer

New Party or Parties

Time

Non-Routinized Populism



ZRS ANO

Smer

RoutinizedPopulism

Time

SOP



All material used here availalable at

www.pozorblog.com

Kevin Deegan-KrauseWayne State UniversityDetroit, Michigan, USA

[email protected]

populism 2007 for pozorblog

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