Politics, States andSocial Contracts

Paul Nugent, Director of Centre of African Studies, University of

Edinburgh

The Ubiquity of ‘Good Governance’

‘Good Governance’ and Social Contracts

• Governance = not simply about the choice and implementation of policies, but about political environment. ‘Good policies’ that clash with political norms are unlikely to get very far

• Social contracts are about the sets of understandings that underpin the relations between rulers and ruled… for good or ill

A Few Basic Points

• 1. A social contract does not imply an inherently harmonious relationship, merely that those who exercise power and those who on the receiving end share a common understanding of what that relationship entails.

• 2. Social contracts are not necessarily written down, or are not necessarily found in the places where you might expect to find them

• >> In many countries, the way that politics is actually contracted may has little to do with the formal constitution and much more to do with deeply-rooted understandings of ‘rules of the game’

• . 3. Contacts often have an uneven application across national space>> regions and districts may relate differently to the centre, and may be almost forgotten

• .

• 4. social contracts can only exist where there is communication flow between rules and ruled>> hence role of media is as crucial for authoritarian regimes as democratic ones (e.g. Mobutu)

Four Types of Social Contract

• 1. Coercive: regime claims the right to rule either through the application (or threat) of coercion, or the promise of protection [‘Le Guide’, President as head of family writ large]. These might sound like opposites, but are actually flip sides of the same coin because the offer of protection contains an implicit threat

• >> Note: This has risky foundations. Insurgencies can weaken the moral authority of the centre and warlords may stake own competing claims to offer their own ‘protection’

The Coercive Contract According to Siyad Barre

• “I, Mohammed Siyad Barre, am singularly responsible for the transformation of Somalia and Mogadisho from a bush country and scruffy hamlet into a modern state and commodious city, respectfully. Consequently, I will not allow anyone to destroy me or run me out of here; and if they try, I will take the whole country with me.”

• 2. Productive: contract is based on some conception of active performance. Consent is traded against the effective delivery of public goods

• (i) State delivery: roads, schools, hospitals• (ii) state facilitation: e.g. legal frameworks that

make economic activity possible; currency• In European & US history, contracts arose out

of a ‘creative friction’ encapsulated in slogan ‘no taxation without representation’

Representation without taxation?

• In African colonial systems, direct taxes typically borne by subjects, not citizens (e.g. Senegal, Kenya)>> but taxes on trade were the largest contributor to revenues (typically import duties)

• At independence, most nationalist parties embraced versions of social contract forged in late colonialism >> DEVELOPMENT

• Quest for revenue led to focus of taxes switching to agricultural exports

•

• Direct taxes effectively died out (seen as illegitimate), income taxes hardly got off the ground>> in some countries, aid flows became more important than domestic revenue collection (e.g. Tanzania)

• All of this made allocation of resources less transparent

• … with implications for social contracts

• By the mid 1980s, many countries had arrived at the worst of worlds: minimal delivery of public goods coupled with very little transparency. At this time, there was little chance of redress either because the one-party state or military regime remained locked into command mode.

• 3. Permissive: A permissive contract is one in which those who govern tolerate a range of activity that is formally illegal in return for being absolved from scrutiny>> e.g. ‘Article 15’ (débrouillez-vous) in Zaire, and border trade in micro-states (e.g. Gambia)

• 4. Liberational>> formulated during struggles for national liberation or against extreme forms of dictatorship (e.g the Dergue) and became frozen at the point when success was achieved.

• >> Recurring themes: primacy of the nation and the movement as the embodiment of the national interest (e.g. Eritrea, Zimbabwe). >>

Political Tenses….

• 1. Coercive contracts often have a peculiar conception of political time>> often a dysfunctional or traumatic past that justifies a suspension of political time for some purposes

• 2. Liberational Contracts begin as forward-looking (the achievement of liberation), but tend to become backward-looking

• 3. Permissive contracts are always lived in the present tense

• 4. Productive contracts>> African socialism was all about progress towards future experienced in hyper-time. These days still looking to future, but in slow-time (MDGs)

Co-existing contracts

• In particular countries, different modes may co-exist especially as regimes mutate e.g. Mobutu’s Zaire combined coercive and permissive; South Africa combines liberational and productive >> result is often rather confused state discourses

Back to Good Governance

For those promoting a ‘good governance’ agenda, the desired end would be gravitation towards productive contracts

Problems: (1) line of least resistance is towards permissive contracts which deflect potential conflict (but prevent traction in other areas) The line of greatest resistance is in direction of productive contracts due to (i) high risk of failure and (ii) the dangers of fuelling expectations

• (2) There may also be certain merits to other forms:• e.g. coercive contract may be necessary to hold the

ring in the medium term (e.g. South Sudan)• e.g. given the limitations of the state to provide

employment, permissive contracts may be expedient

• (3) Depends on which version of the productive contract one envisions

• - (i) state delivery<> taxation nexus• - (ii) state intervention

• ‘Good governance’ bears the signature of its SAP origins>>

• often linked to idea that state should actively intervene to liberate economic forces e.g. land titling

• Temptation of state to become more intrusive, upsetting the understandings that have been forged over decades.

• Crucial point: social contracts are not just about what states do, but what they DO NOT do

Limits of State

• Mot successful examples are those where the state has been forced to accept its limits e.g. Botswana, Ghana, Senegal

• Some of the least successful cases are those where state has attempted to impose its control over society (e.g. Guinea, Eritrea)

Some Specific Contexts

• 1. Rural Contexts: Over C20 land has become a crucial factor in configuring state-society relations

• - in some cases, chiefs allocate land and are important players in their own right (e.g. Ghana) or have re-gained powers (e.g. Mozambique)

• - in other cases, state agencies intervene in the context of weak traditional authorities

• State intervention in relation to land is risky>> can be used to build political constituencies, but can also become highly divisive (e.g. Kenya)

Chiefs inc.

Rural Contracts

• >>can also sour relations with nomads and pastoralists (typically the losers in state interventions)

• What has worked best is state supporting local agreements between pastoralists and agriculturalists>>> negotiated arrangements work better than heavy-handed state intervention

• …>> Limitations of State

Urban Contracts

• 2. Urban Contexts. Cities pose particular challenges>> increasingly the majority of the population: often politically volatile

• Striking a productive social contract is difficult>> states deliver roads, but often struggle to provide other public goods like housing, good sanitation.

• Hence permissive social contracts continue to thrive>> necessary to do a deal with people in informal sector

• …>> Limitations of the state

Levels of Urbanisation

Lagos in by-gone days

Lagos today…. Go slow

Levels and Rates of Urbanisation, 2010

Country Percentage Urban Rate of Urbanization

Algeria 92.0 2.4

Djibouti 87.0 2.2

Gabon 85.0 2.1

Republic of Congo (Brazzav)

61.0 2.7

South Africa 61.0 1.4

Botswana 60.0 2.5

Ghana 50.0 3.5

Nigeria 48.0 3.8

Kenya 22.0 4.0

Malawi 19.0 5.2

Ethiopia 17.0 5.4

Uganda 13.0 4.4

Africa’s Largest Cities, millionsCity 2010 1980 1970 1950

Cairo 11.0 7.4 5.6 2.5

Lagos 10.6 4.8 1.4 0.3

Kinshasa 8.8 2.0 1.1 0.2

Johannesburg & East Rand

6.1 2.8 2.2 1.5

Khartoum/3 city

5.2 1.2 0.7 0.2

Luanda 4.8 1.0 0.5 0.1

Alexandria 4.4 2.5 2.0 1.0

Abidjan 4.1 1.4 0.6 0.07

Nairobi 3.5 1.0 0.5 0.1

Cape Town 3.4 1.6 1.1 0.6

Kano 3.4 1.4 0.5 0.1

Dar es Salaam 3.4 0.8 0.4 0.07

World Development Report 2009

• Bretton Woods institutions are beginning to realize the downside of state-bashing for urban governance.

• “But the top priority is the set of aspatial policy instruments that apply universally to all places – establishing market institutions to regulate land use and transactions, and delivering such basic services as schools, streets and sanitation. So in the countries of sub-Saharan Africa and Central Asia, the role of national government is pivotal in laying the foundations of inclusive urbanization.”

Traction

• Intelligent urban planning requires enhanced capacity for state and municipal authorities, plus an efficient and equitable system for raising revenues - Traction

• In many cities, the claims of the ‘landowners’ is a real political issue that cannot be ignored

• social contracts have to involve two-way bargains in which urban land is freed up in return for service improvements

3. Borderlands• 3. Borderlands and Social Contracts: Border

populations have a peculiar relation to state• (i) often very few public goods other than a road>>

populations left to fend for themselves• (ii) a perceived security risk may mean heavy-

handed state presence.• Hence frequently a co-existence of coercive and

permissive contracts• States have capacity to create new productive

contracts based on cross-border agreements>>

• >> shared amenities, agreements guaranteeing access to land and grazing for pastoralists etc

• But still early days in the development of CBC• However, the potential for border regions to kick-

start new state-society engagements is considerable

• Crucially, around a third of Africa’s capital cities lie within 40 kilometres of an international boundary

Africa’s Borderland Capitals (15 on mainland)

REGION CAPITALS ON BORDER

WEST AFRICA BANJUL, BISSAU, LOME COTONOU

LOME

WEST-CENTRAL KINSHASA, BRAZZAVILLE, NDJAMENA,BANGUI

ALL 4

EAST AFRICA AND GREAT LAKES

BUJUMBURA, KIGALI BUJUMBURA

CENTRAL AND SOUTHERN AFRICA

LILONGWE, MAPUTO, MBABANE, MASERU, GABORONE

GABORONE, MASERU

Kinshasa-Brazzaville

Elections and Social Contracts

• 1. Role of Elections • How important are they to the promotion of new

social contracts?• Certainly not a panacea, but they provide way for

citizens to express their judgement about the performance of those in office

• >> and they may have cumulative effect (Lindberg) – a few successful rotations helps!

• << although bad habits catch on quickly (e.g. governments of national unity)

• Elections force governments to keep track off their population and to articulate their claims

• Some minimum requirements>> • (i) autonomous election commission• (ii) a credible voters’ register• (iii) a savvy electorate that is prepared to go

shopping• (iv) a modicum of trust amongst elites (the

difference between Ghana and Kenya?)

Ghana 2008

Popular interest • Although electoral participation typically falls

after the founding election, the rates of participation are not bad considering the conjuncture of logistics and the fact that governments are doomed to disappoint

• Average turnout for Africa, 1990-2001: 64% for Africa, vs 65% for North America and Caribbean, 78% for Western Europe and 79% in Oceania

Citizenship and Social Contracts

• 2. Citizenship and Belonging>> constitutions often start from the abstract citizen, whereas popular discourses of politics often follow different principles. National differences:

• (a) Francophone states have tended to import a state-centric model in which the state defines citizenship>> reflected in the passage of national domain laws … but does not always over-ride local conceptions

• (b) in some former British colonies, less uniform• >> in Ghana a strongly rooted idea of colonial state

having been constructed from the bottom upwards on the basis of primary units (‘native states’). While the post-colonial state has elaborated its own rules, it is an axiom that one cannot really be a citizen unless one claim identity through membership of a primary community.

• >> infuses all aspects of national politics and local administration

• (c) in South Africa, the state has effectively defined citizenship since apartheid days, but removing the apartheid legacy has also re-inforced state logics

• (i) internalised in popular conceptions of belonging defined by international border (hence the definition of foreigners)

• (ii) spatial claims internally less important than racial ones

Externality Externality: Does the externality of the African

states makes productive contracts effectively unattainable?

Depends on both the degree and nature of the externality: acute aid dependency is one form, the dominance of rents from the extractive sector is another, and remittances are a third.

• The track-record of oil-states is not good, but Botswana and Cape Verde demonstrate that some externality can be helpful in sustaining social contracts

• In Cape Verde, remittances accounted for 12% of GDP in 2006>> the importance of the diaspora raises questions of the boundedness of the national community> diaspora vote?

A final thought: Is small beautiful?

• Why is it that small states, and especially, island states perform much better in governance indices? Possible answers:

• (a) the level of demand on the state is more manageable>> In 2006, there were 145 million Nigerians (probably!) and only 1.8 million Botswanans.

• (b) elite tends to be much more compact and inter-connected.

Top of Ibrahim Table on Governance in Africa 2008-9

Country Overall Governance Ranking

Participation and Human Rights Ranking

Mauritius 1 2

Seychelles 2 5

Botswana 3 4

Cape Verde 4 1

South Africa* 5 3

Namibia 6 8

Ghana 7 6

Tunisia 8 35

Egypt* 9 39

Lesotho 10 7

Sao Tome and Principe 11 9

Benin 12 10

Bottom of TableCountry Overall Governance

RankingParticipation and Human Rights Ranking

Angola* 42 27

Guinea-Bissau 43 26

Cote d’Ivoire 44 46

Guinea 45 42

Equatorial Guinea* 46 52

Sudan* 47 48

CAR 48 30

Zimbabwe 49 44

Eritrea 50 50

DRC 51 45

Chad* 52 49

Somalia 53 53

• (c) closer proximity of borders tends to embed the economies of smaller countries within regional economies, creating less pressure on state

• (d) in small countries, the overall influence of diasporas is likely to be that much greater

• (e) Finally, there is argument that it is simply easier for the state to ‘broadcast’ its power in small countries.

Conclusion

• 1. If we take the long view, there is nothing inevitable about a transition to productive contracts. Indeed, this is often the line of greatest resistance>> the preference for permissive contracts may even be accentuated by governance reforms that parcellize the state and privatize resources

• 2. Coercive contracts are more difficult to sustain these days >> especially military regimes

• 3. Social contracts are grounded in political cultures than cannot simply be ignored or regarded as unfortunate obstacles>> in many cases a balance between group/individual rights and elected/’traditional’ authorities may be the most viable option>> institutional pluralism has its merits.

• 3. Growth of urban population is likely to effect social contracts, but not necessarily in the direction of productive ones

• 4. Borderlands are dynamic spaces where states have the option to re-invent themselves

• 5. Elections are an imperfect means of inscribing social contracts>> Successful elections tend to build trust in the process, but failed elections may create a climate of mutual suspicion that lingers

• BUT main point is that social contracts that work typically involve a process of negotiation between states and societal actors>> cannot be parachuted in from above or read off a governance manual