political reflection vol.1 no2[1] davutoglu oxford

Published by the Centre for Strategic Research and Analysis (CESRAN)

PP LITICALLITICAL RREFLECTIONEFLECTION“Advancing Diversity”“Advancing Diversity”JuneJune--JulyJuly--August 2010 | Vol. 1 | No. 2August 2010 | Vol. 1 | No. 2

ISSN

204

2-88

8X

From Lehman Brothers’Collapse to the GreekDebacle: Exposing Shifts inthe World EconomicOrder

By Prof. Bulent GokayBy Prof. Bulent Gokay

Cameroon’s GoldenAnniversary ofIndependence: Anythingto Celebrate?

By Prof. Alpaslan OzerdemBy Prof. Alpaslan Ozerdem

For a Pro-ImmigrationArgument

By Dr. Ibrahim SirkeciBy Dr. Ibrahim Sirkeci

The Fear of a FreeKurdistan in the Middle Eastof the 21st Century

By Dr. Ayla GolBy Dr. Ayla Gol

Turkish Vision ofRegional And Global Order:

Theoretical Background And Practical Implementation

By HE Prof. Ahmet Davutoglu

QQuarterlyuarterly

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Executive EditorAlper Tolga BULUTManaging EditorHusrev TABAK

World Stories EditorAksel ERSOY

Europe Review EditorPaula SANDRIN

Eurasia Review EditorDuygu UCKUN

Caucasus Review EditorZaur SHIRIYEV

Middle East Review EditorMurad DUZCU

China Review EditorAntony OU

Brief History EditorTamer KASIKCI

Film Review EditorAlaaddin F. PAKSOY

Recent Books EditorsUmit CALIK

Tamer KASIKCIAbdullah UZUN

Senior ContributorsCan ERBIL (Dr.)

Kurtulus GEMICI (Dr.)Bulent GOKAY (Prof.)

Ayla GOL (Dr.)Bayram GUNGOR (Assoc. Prof.)

Alpaslan OZERDEM (Prof.)Ibrahim SIRKECI (Reader)

Murat TUMAY (Dr.)Talat ULUSSEVER (Dr.)

ContributorsGabriel Siles BRUGGE

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Arshad ISAKJEEDavid JAROSZWESKI

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A Multinational,Global Think-tank

For

“Advancing Diversity”

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June-July-August 2010

POLITICAL REFLECTIONContents

Commentary

From Lehman Brothers’ Collapse to theGreek Debacle: Exposing Shifts in theWorld Economic Order

By Prof. Bulent GokayCameroon’s Golden Anniversary ofIndependence: Anything to Celebrate?

By Prof. Alpaslan OzerdemFor a Pro-Immigration Argument

By Dr. Ibrahim SirkeciThe Fear of a Free Kurdistan in theMiddle East of the 21st Century

By Dr. Ayla GolTaming Rating Agencies

By Dr. Kurtulus GemiciPlatonic Lovers Chasing Nukes AroundThe World

By Ozgur TufekciDemocratic Opening, Martyrs andJournalism

By Cemil Cengiz

6

12

17

20

26

29

33

World Stories1

Turkish Vision of Regional And GlobalOrder: Theoretical Background AndPractical Implementation


36

Europe Review

51

55

62

The Development Of A European UnionSecurity Culture: Wishful Thinking orReality?

By Paula SandrinThe European Union As A NormativePower And The Western Balkans

By Dr. Dilek YigitEnhancing Peace, Security and Stability inWestern Balkans Through EU Member-ship and Kosovo Issue

By Assist. Prof. Fusun Ozerdem

6

12

36

www.cesran.org

June-July-August 2010

POLITICAL REFLECTIONContents

In the Deep Freeze? A Cold War LegacyAnd The Visa-Free ProgrammeBetween Russia and Japan

By Paul Richardson

69

The Demise of Arab Nationalism in IraqAnd Its Possible Alternatives

By Rahman Dag

93

A Brief Analysis Over The HistoricalFactors That Affect Today’s Iraq

By Tamer Kasikci

85

Hong Kong Democracy: A PessimisticReview

By Antony Ou

Regional Cooperation of South CaucasusStates: Illusions, Reality, Perspectives

By Zaur Shiriyev

75

81

Eurasia Review

Caucasus Review

Brief History

Middle East Review

China Review

Film Review

On Michael Haneke’s Funny Games USBy Enes Erbay

102

Recent Books 106

85

93

102

WORLD NEWS | By Aksel Ersoy

Political Reflection | June-July-August 2010

Thailand

Violence erupted during anti-government protests inThailand as one demonstra-tor was killed and the keyprotest leader was shot inthe head while being inter-viewed by journalists.

Tension soared amid the sound of explosions and gunfire and an anar-chic mob atmosphere in downtown Bangkok's Lumpini Park, where pro-testers had massed.

Video footage showed one protester dead on the pavement. There wasalso footage of Red Shirt movement leader Maj. Gen. Khattiya Sawasdi-pol lying on the ground, dressed in camouflage, as frantic protestersattempted to move him and get help. (13.05.2010)

England

Within hours of his appoint-ment, Britain's new primeminister, David Cameron,immediately began forminghis coalition governmentovernight, appointing severalLiberal Democrat leaders toCabinet posts along withmembers of his own Conser-vative Party.

Lib Dems leader Nick Clegg,who was named deputyprime minister, announcedearly Wednesday his party'sagreement into enteringsuch a partnership, saying,"I hope this is the start of thenew politics I have alwaysbelieved in: diverse, plural;where politicians of differentpersuasions come togetherto overcome their differencesin order to deliver goodgovernment for the sake ofthe whole country."

(11.05.2010)

Gulf of Mexico

American maritime au-thorities say crude oil ispouring into the sea atthe site where the hulk-ing rig once stood.

Officials said before the explosion there were 700,000 gallons of dieselfuel on board the platform and it had been drilling 8,000 barrels, or336,000 gallons, of oil a day.

The Coast Guard said a one-mile by five-mile slick had settled on the sur-face about 45 miles offshore from the Gulf states of Louisiana, Alabamaand Mississippi.

US President Barack Obama said the disaster was being treated as"the number one priority".

Mr Obama added: "The entire federal government is offering all assis-tance needed in the rescue effort as well as in mitigating and respond-ing to the environmental impact." (20.04.2010)

1



Jamaica

At least 60 people have died in battles between the police anda gang in Jamaica as the government attempts to extradite analleged drug lord.

Police have said civilians and security forces have been killedas soldiers battle the defenders of Christopher Coke. Coke,

known as "Dudus", is wanted by the US for alleged drug offences.

Heavily armed soldiers and police have conducted door-to-door searches in the hunt for him in the TivoliGardens neighbourhood of West Kingston.

Jamaican Prime Minister Bruce Golding has said he "regrets the loss of life" and has vowed to restore lawand order in the Caribbean nation. (23.05.2010)

Russia

The deathtoll from aR u s s i a ncoal minea c c i d e n thas reached 52, with 38 people still missing, theRussian Emergency Situations Ministry said Tues-day, 11th.

"The rescue operation to locate and recover themissing people is being carried out around theclock," Veronica Smolskaya, spokeswoman forthe ministry, told CNN.

More than 80 survivors are currently in hospi-tals, according to the Russian State Health au-thorities.

Russian officials are still displaying hope and opti-mism in public, but several sources at the minetold Russian reporters on conditions of anonymitythat finding anyone underground who survivedthe explosions would be a miracle.(11.05.2010)

Greece

Tens of thou-sands of pub-lic workers inGreece havewalked outon strike to protest against huge slashes in govern-ment funding.

The country's public services have been paralysedas doctors, nurses, teachers, tax officials and dock-ers downed tools.

They are demanding the government ends whatone union official called "bloodthirsty measures" aswages are cut, pensions frozen and taxes hiked.

It comes as new figures show Greece's public defi-cit for 2009 has shot up to 13.6% of GDP - and asa credit agency downgraded the country's sover-eign debt rating.

The new deficit statistics mean that the baselinefor calculations of massive budget cutbacks andreforms imposed by the EU on Greece is far higherthan had been estimated. (22.04.2010)

2



Poland

The plane crash that killed Polish

President Lech Kaczynski on Satur-day gutted a nation's leadership and

silenced some of the most potent

human symbols of its tragic and

tumultuous history.

The toll cut a swath through Po-

land's elite. The 97 dead included

the army chief of staff, the head of

the National Security Bureau, the

national bank president, the deputyforeign minister, the deputy parliament speaker, the civil rights commissioner and other members of

parliament.

The news came as a shocked and grieving Poland welcomed home the body of its president. Hundreds

of thousands lined the streets of Warsaw to pay their respects as Mr Kaczynski's cavalcade wound itsway through the capital to the presidential palace. (11.04.2010)

Palestine

Israeli air strikes on Gaza has left more than

a dozen people wounded.

The overnight raid was in response to cross

-border attacks by Palestinian fighters, and

targeted tunnels used by them.

The two strikes hit an abandoned airport in

Rafah in the south, where there were no

injuries, and a Hamas training camp in Beit

Hanoun in the north, where 15 people were lightly injured, Hamas security sources said.

Israel accuses Palestinians of using a vast network of tunnels to smuggle weapons into the territory;

Palestinians say the tunnels are a lifeline for bringing in essential supplies because Israel has

blockaded the territory since June 2007, when Hamas seized control from Abbas's Fatah faction.

(10.05.2010)

3



Iceland

Israel

Israeli commandoshave attacked aflotilla of aid-carrying ships offthe coast of theGaza Strip, killingup to 19 people onboard.

Dozens of others were injured when troops raided the convoy of six

ships, dubbed the Freedom Flotilla, early on Monday.

Israel said activists on board attacked its commandos as they boarded

the ships, while the flotilla's organisers said the Israeli forces opened

fire first, as soon as they stormed the convoy.

(31.05.2010)

4

China

A truck travelling on thewrong side of the road

ploughed head-on into a bus

that turned into a fireball on

impact, killing 32 people in

China.

The collision happened along

a section of road undergoing

maintenance in Fuxin City, in

the northeastern of provinceof Liaoning. The victims in-

cluded 29 bus passengers

and all three people aboard

the truck. Twenty-four other

bus passengers were in-jured, with three in a critical

condition.

The bus was heading from

Tianjin city near Beijing toHarbin, the capital of north-

eastern Helongjiang prov-

ince.

The cause of the accident is

under investigation.(23.05.2010)

It is Iceland's second volcano eruption in less than a month and the heat

is so fierce it has melted part of a glacier, in turn sparking huge floods.

At least 800 people have had to evacuate their homes in the island

state because of the flooding but there have been no reports of injuries.

Flight disruptions caused by ash clouds could last all summer because

there are no signs a volcanic eruption in Iceland is about to end. Last

month, the first volcano eruption at the Eyjafjallajokull glacier since

1823, and Iceland's first since 2004, briefly forced 600 people from

their homes in the same area. (14.04.2010)

* Compiled by Aksel Ersoy from Different World News

From Lehman Brothers’

Collapse to the Greek Debacle:

Exposing Shifts

in the World Economic Order

By Prof. Bulent Gokay*

COMMENTARY | By Prof. Bulent Gokay(L

) Geo

rge

Pap

andr

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Pri

me

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iste

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Gre

ece

(R) O

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Euro

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On 15 September 2008,the supposedly safe andperpetually prosperousworld of post-industrialglobal economic order

blew itself up when Lehman Brothers filedfor Chapter 11 bankruptcy in the UnitedStates. The 158-year-old iconic investmentbank was forced into this extreme act whenthe collapse of the US sub-prime mortgagemarket turned into the securitized mort-gage-backed debt obliga-tions into toxic assets(1).Today, 20 months afterLehman Brothers’ sensa-tional collapse, the entireworld economy is still inthe grips of the mostsevere synchronizedglobal recession, theworst in over 75 years.Growth in advancedeconomies remains verysluggish, and unemploy-ment continues to rise todangerously high levels.The enormous stockmarket bubble (massiveamount of money thathave been injected intothe financial system) thathas formed over the past20 months is considered the main sourceof another possible crash, reflected in DerSpiegel’s front-page headline, ‘The TrillionBomb’(2). The huge budget deficits inGreece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spainthreaten to break the euro’s back. Thehuge budget deficit of Britain, exposed re-cently during the general election campaign,is now nearing Greek territory, according tothe latest figures on government borrowing(3). The probability of an eventual Britishdefault on debt remains quite likely.

At the same time, without any real eco-nomic recovery in sight, with sharp declinesin household income and fast rising unem-ployment, social and political conflict is in-creasing in Europe. Greece offers the mostserious example of how the financial crisishas moved into a new phase and exposedthe deep-rooted contradictions within thecurrent global system. ‘The Greek financialcrisis has put the very survival of the euro atstake,’ Nobel laureate economist Joseph

Stiglitz wrote recently(4). It is feared thatGreece will be a windowinto the next phase ofthe global economiccrisis. That is becausethe global crisis, whichstarted with the col-lapse of the LehmanBrothers in September2008, was never reallyresolved. Huge statebail-outs simply trans-ferred all the debt to thepublic sector. Countriesin the weaker peripheryof the eurozone, such asSpain, Greece and Por-tugal, lack both thephysical and humaninfrastructure required

to make themselves more competitive inthe global marketplace. Yet, it is in thoseareas (spending on roads, telecommunica-tion, universities and skills) the IMF-imposedcuts will fall, which presents a serious prob-lem not just now but for the future, as theageing baby boomer generation presentsEurope with a steady decline in its workingage population. Europe is now facing a dou-ble-dip recession as debt crisis intensifies inGreece. All indications point out a scenariothat eurozone economies will fall into a long

Joseph Stiglitz

From Lehm

an Brothers’ Collapse to the Greek DebacleCOMMENTARY | By Prof. Bulent Gokay


prolonged no growth, or very low growth,period for the foreseeable future.

A 110 billion euro plan, accepted in May2010, to bail out Greece has reduced therisk of a debt default this year for the coun-try, but is unlikely to end the crisis of confi-dence shaking weak economies on Euro-pean Union’s periphery. The Greek crisisrisks destabilizing eurozone and marks thebeginning of the most serious crisis in thehistory of the European Union. The risk ofdefault is evident in countries other thanGreece. There are clear concerns aboutPortugal, and questions have been raisedabout Italy and Spain. But this profoundsovereignty debt crisis is not only a Euro-pean problem. It is merely another indicatorof a severe systemic crisis afflicting the US-centred Western economies and Japan.

“It began in Athens. It is spreading toLisbon and Madrid. But it would be agrave mistake to assume that the sover-eign debt crisis that is unfolding will re-main confined to the weaker eurozoneeconomies … it is a fiscal crisis of thewestern world”(5).

One of the most interesting results of theglobal economic crisis is the acceleration ofthe global economic power shift towardemerging economies. The economies towatch now are the E-7 (Emerging Seven):China, India, Brazil, Russia, Mexico, Indone-sia and Turkey. According to a Pricewater-houseCoopers forecast, their combinedgross domestic product could overtake thatof the G-7 countries this decade, but thisparity will not last for long, due to theirmuch stronger growth potential, E-7 econo-mies will break away from the G-7 with com-bined E-7 GDP being projected by PwC to bearound 30% higher by 2030 than total G-7

GDP(6). IMF predicts that ‘despite theemerging economies' cooling momentum,they are still expected to provide a source ofresilience, benefiting from strong productiv-ity growth and improved policy frame-works.'(7) In its November 2008 report,Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World,the US National Intelligence Council alertedthat ‘The international system as con-structed following the Second World Warwill be almost unrecognisable by 2025 ow-ing to the rise of emerging powers, a global-izing economy, and historic transfer of rela-tive wealth and economic power from Westto East, and the growing influence of non-

state actors’(8). It seems that emergingeconomies recovered more quickly androbustly: many producers in emerging mar-ket economies are not suffering as much astheir counterparts in the developed worldeconomies in the current global crisis. It isobvious that their exports have been hit, butmany of them have found that domesticdemand is relatively buoyant. That is be-cause their own economies are on an up-wards growth path that is not so cyclical, sothey can turn to the domestic market andexploit pent-up domestic demand. Of coursenot all emerging market economies are thesame, and the recent troubles have con-firmed that a separation is occurring be-tween the more and less robust emergingeconomies(9).

COMMENTARY | By Prof. Bulent GokayFr

om L

ehm

an B

roth

ers’

Col

laps

e to

the

Gre

ek D

ebac

le

“One of the mostinteresting results of theglobal economic crisis isthe acceleration of theglobal economic powershift toward emerging

economies.”


‘The data so far suggest the economies ofChina and India are growing (not as fast asin the past but still growing), while America'seconomy shrinks in absolute terms’(10).Thanks to its capital controls, its huge sav-ing surplus and its publicly owned and state-controlled banking system, China seems tobe well shielded from the Western financialand economic difficulties(11). Mortgageassets and the housing market in Chinashows much greater stability and strengthcompared to the shaky and risky mortgagesand lending structures set-up in the US andother Western econo-mies. China's banks arenow the strongest inthe world, with capitalratios far above al-most all other largebanks in the worldand debt levels thatare far lower(12).China has already be-come a major actor inworld currency and finan-cial markets. The country holds $1.8 trillionin foreign exchange reserves. In particular,China’s dollar holdings are a source of con-siderable financial leverage in the globalfinancial markets. China has an especiallyeffective financial system, which seems tobe well positioned to finance the next phasein its economic expansion. Many observersalso agree that the Chinese economy has amuch bigger margin of maneuver, becauseits exposure to those speculative toxic as-sets, which lay at the root of the recent fi-nancial crisis, is much lower than the expo-sure of the American and West Europeaneconomies. Furthermore, China's yuan re-mains basically stable at a reasonable equi-librium level, which helps to prevent the in-ternational financial and currency marketfrom further turbulence. In a way, China

faces the global crisis from a position ofstrength(13).

“In financial terms, China is little affectedby the crisis in the West. Its entire finan-cial system plays a relatively small role inits economy, and it apparently has noexposure to the toxic assets that havebrought the U.S. and European bankingsystems to their knees. China also runsa budget surplus and a very large cur-rent account surplus, and it carries littlegovernment debt(14).”

It seems that while therest of the world is

grappling with theglobal slowdown,China is figuring outways to exploit it.Squeezed betweenfalling profits andthe credit crunch, a

growing number oftroubled corpora-

tions and countries(including the IMF) are turning to cash-richChina for a bailout. China now appears tobe in a much stronger bargaining positionthan they have been in the last few years:Flush with cash at a time when most coun-tries and global corporations are strugglingto gain access capital, China has spentnearly 60-billion US dollars in less than aweek in February 2009 in a series of dealsthat will secure a long-term supply of ironore, copper, zinc and oil. Brazil signed adeal to supply China with 100,000 to160,000 barrels of oil a day in exchange forbillions of dollars of investment. Under theagreement signed in Brasilia, state-ownedChina Development Bank will provide fi-nancing to Brazil's state-run energy com-pany Petrobras to develop its massive oilreserves. In 2008, trade between China

From Lehm

an Brothers’ Collapse to the Greek Debacle

9

COMMENTARY | By Prof. Bulent Gokay

“China's banks are now thestrongest in the world, with

capital ratios far above almost allother large banks in the world

and debt levels that arefar lower.”


and Brazil totaled $36billion making ChinaBrazil’s second largesttrading partner(15).

Peter Dicken describesthis ongoing process as‘the changing globaleconomic map’, arguingthat ‘old geographies of production, distribu-tion and consumption are continuously be-ing disrupted and that new geographiesare continuously being created. In thatsense, the global economic map is always ina state of becoming …’(16). If one looks atChina’s economic figures for the last 20years, one realises a truly global power ris-ing at a stunning rate. If one considers thatultimately geopolitical power is built on eco-nomic power, then there exists every rea-son to anticipate that China will soon be-come one of the two or three super-players on the global arena. Former US dep-uty treasury secretary Roger Altman haswritten in Foreign Affairs: ‘the financial andeconomic crash of 2008, the worst in 75years, is a major geopolitical setback for theUnited States and Europe… No country willbenefit economically from the financial crisisover the coming year, but a few states mostnotably China will achieve a stronger relativeglobal position… Beijing will be in a positionto assist other nations financially and makekey investments in, for example, naturalresources at a time when the West cannot(17).’

To explain the current financial crisis andeconomic downturn, from the collapse ofthe Lehman Brothers to the recent Greekdebt crisis, within the context of an epochalshift in the world-system away from NorthAmerican/West European dominance andtowards emerging economies, to southeast

Asia in particular,would provide us alonger term anddeeper understandingof the global system inthe current century.The 21st century looksset to be fashioned bythe rise of China, India,

Brazil and other emerging economies at thestate level; and the formidable rise of Pacific-Asia (Chindia)(18) as the foremost eco-nomic zones at the regional level.

Notes:

* Bulent Gokay is a Professor of Interna-tional Relations at Keele University.

1) ‘Toxic security' has become shorthand forthe various asset classes hard hit by thefinancial crisis, such as sub-prime mort-gages. In simple terms, ‘toxic’ assetsmean things that may not be worth whatthe price tag says.

2) Spiegel Online, December 2009, http://w w w . s p i e g e l . d e / i n t e r n a t i o n a l /zeitgeist/0,1518,668729-3,00.html[accessed in January 2010].

3) The Independent, 19 February 2010,http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/news/shock-as-british-deficit-equals-that-of-greece-1904129.html[accessed in February 2010].

4) http://www.dayl i fe .com/topic/Joseph_Stiglitz [accessed in May 2010].

5) Niall Ferguson, ‘A Greek crisis is com-ing to America’, Financial Times, 10 Feb-ruary 2010.

6) ‘Shift in World Economic Power means adecade of seismic change’, 21 Jan 2010,http://www.ukmediacentre.pwc.com/c o n t e n t / d e t a i l . a s p x ?releaseid=3547&newsareaid=2

COMMENTARY | By Prof. Bulent Gokay

10

From

Leh

man

Bro

ther

s’ C

olla

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to t

he G

reek

Deb

acle


www.spiegel.de/international/

http://www.independent.co.uk/news/

http://www.daylife.com/topic/

http://www.ukmediacentre.pwc.com/

From Lehm

an Brothers’ Collapse to the Greek DebacleCOMMENTARY | By Prof. Bulent Gokay

7) IMF Survey Magazine, « IMF PredictsMajor Global Slowdown Amid FinancialCrisis »,: IMF Research, 8 October2008, http://www.imf.org/external/p u b s / f t / s u r v e y / s o / 2 0 0 8 /res100808a.htm.

8) National Intelligence Council, « GlobalTrends 2025 : The National IntelligenceCouncil’s 2025 Project, p.27, http://w w w . d n i . g o v / n i c /NIC_2025_project.html

9) The shift in global economic power is notjust reflected in GDP. The G-7 group ofrichest countries has already expandedto the G-20, a forum designed to pro-mote dialogue on financial and globaleconomic governance issues, while itwas the China and the US that took thelead in the Copenhagen climate changetalks.

10) Kennedy, Paul, «American Power Is onthe Wane », The Wall Street Journal,14 January 2009 , h t tp ://o n l i n e . w s j . c o m / a r t i c l e /SB123189377673479433.html.

11) China’s banking sector is controlled bythe so-called “Big Four” (China Construc-tion Bank Corp., Industrial and Commer-cial Bank of China, Bank of China Ltd,Agricultural Bank of China).

12) Chinese banks have recently cementedtheir position as the most highly valuedfinancial institutions, taking four of thetop five slots in a ranking of banks’ shareprices as a multiple of their book values.China Merchants Bank, China Citic,ICBC and China Construction Bank leadthe table, followed by Itaú Unibanco ofBrazil, all with a price-to-book multiple ofmore than three. Financial Times, 10January 2010, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/1c13f7f2-fe16-11de-9340-

00144feab49a.html?nclick_check=1.13) Keidel, Albert, « The Global Financial

Crisis : Lessons for the United Statesand China », Carnegie Endowment forInternational Peace, October 16, 2008,http://www.carnegieendowment.org/f i l e s / C h i n a _ a n d _ t h e _ G l o b a l_Financial_Crisis3.pdf.

14) Altman, Roger Altman, « The GreatCrash, 2008, A Geopolitical Setback forthe West », Foreign Affairs, January/F e b r u a r y 2 0 0 9 , h t t p : / /www.foreignaffairs.org/20090101faessay88101/roger-c-altman/the-great-crash-2008.html [accessed in January2010].

15) Simpkins, Jason, « China Continues itsCommodities Binge with Brazilian OilDeal », Money Morning, 24 February2 0 0 9 , h t t p : / /www.moneymorning.com/2009/02/21/china-brazil-oil/.

16) Dicken, Peter, Global Shift. Mapping theChanging Contours of the World Econ-omy, New York: Sage 2007, p. 32.

17) Altman, Roger, « The Great Crash,2008, A Geopolitical Setback for the

West », Foreign Affairs, January/F e b r u a r y 2 0 0 9 , h t t p : / /www.foreignaffairs.org/20090101faessay88101/roger-c-altman/the-great-crash-2008.html.’

18) In Mapping the Global Future, a reportby the National Intelligence Council, ana-lysts concluded: ‘In the same way thatcommentators refer to the 1900s asthe 'American Century,' the 21st centurymay be seen as the time when Asia, ledby China and India, comes into itso w n . ’ ( h t t p : / /www.foia.cia.gov/2020/2020.pdf, ac-cessed in January 2010)


http://www.imf.org/external/

www.dni.gov/nic/

http://www.ft.com/

http://www.carnegieendowment.org/

www.foreignaffairs.org/20090101faes

www.moneymorning.com/2009/02/2

www.foreignaffairs.org/20090101faes

www.foia.cia.gov/2020/2020.pdf

Cameroon’s

Golden

Anniversary of

Independence:

Anything to

Celebrate?

By Prof. Alpaslan Ozerdem*

As is the case for 16 otherAfrican countries, this yearis the 50th anniversary ofindependence for Camer-oon. The year of 1960 was

a remarkable turning point in the history ofthose countries(1), as it was the end ofcolonisation with many hopes and expecta-tions invested for a future in which theycould be their own rulers. To celebrate theoccasion, H.E.President PaulBiya of Camer-oon organizedan internationalconference enti-tled Africa 21 inYaoundé, thecapital city ofthe country, on17-19 May inorder to explorecontemporaryc h a l l e n g e sfaced by thecontinent. At-tended by anumber of headof states of Cen-tral and WestAfrican coun-tries; Jean Ping, Chairperson of the Com-mission of the African Union; Kofi Annan,former Secretary General of the UnitedNations; Mohamed El Baradei, former Di-rector General of the International AtomicEnergy Agency; many academics; and rep-resentatives of multinational banks andcompanies, and civil society organisations,it was a great and colourful occasion;though was slightly chaotic at times, asmany of such events which involve head ofstates and their entourages! However,watching the Independence Day parade of

military forces and civilians on 20th May, thequestion I had in mind was what there is forCameroon to celebrate in terms of itsachievements over the last 50 years.

In his inaugural ceremony speech of theconference, President Biya asked the samequestion for all of these 17 African coun-tries, stating that for them building theirstates had to start ‘from the bottom’ as

they lacked the nec-essary human re-sources, they were‘confined to subsis-tence and the infor-mal economy’, andthey ‘inherited vastterritories, withoutgeographical har-mony, without linguis-tic ethnic homogene-ity, without culturalcohesion...And eachone of us,...’ he con-tinued ‘...with dispa-rate puzzle pieces,has done what tookold nations centuriesto accom pl i sh . ’Therefore, it is alsoimportant to remem-

ber that Cameroon started its journey asan independent state on 1 January 1960against such a socio-economic background.

With a population less than 20 million anda territory twice bigger than the UnitedKingdom, Cameroon is bordered by sixcountries (in clock wise direction, Nigeria,Chad, Central African Republic, the Repub-lic of the Congo, Gabon and EquatorialGuinea) and the Atlantic Ocean. The Portu-guese explorers were the first to set footon Cameroon (the name Cameroon derives

Cameroon’s G

olden Anniversary of IndependenceCOMMENTARY | By Prof. Alpaslan Ozerdem


from Rio dos Camarőes – the river ofprawns) in the 15th Century. The Germansarrived in 1884 and eventually were thefirst to colonise Cameroon. The presentterritory was divided into two parts byFrance and Britain as League of Nationsmandates after the World War I, bringingthe Francophone and Anglophone dimen-sions to its present day culture, govern-ance and international relations. Moreover,due to its cultural (250 ethnic and linguisticgroups and several religions) and geo-graphic diversity, Cameroon is also knownas ‘Africa in miniature’. Moreover, withmany rivers and lakes, thick forest, largeagricultural land, and deposits of cobalt,iron, gold, diamond and oil, the country isrich with natural resources. In other words,the nature has been generous enough tomake this country a success story as anindependent state but has it really been sofar?

Let’s begin with the ‘achievements’: to startwith, Cameroon has enjoyed a long periodof social and political stability since its inde-pendence, which is a rarity for Africanstates, and the way that the power washanded over from its first President,Ahmadou Adijho to Paul Biya in 1982 ina peaceful manner played a significant rolein this. In a regional context, apart fromsome border issues with Nigeria and othersmall problems with Gabon and EquatorialGuinea, Cameroon has also been at peacewith its neighbours. The country with anover $2,500 GDP per capita (PPP) isrelatively richer than many other sub-Saharan African countries and againequipped with relatively good roads, com-mercial ports, international airports andother infrastructure, its economy has builta substantial manufacturing basis aroundtextile, timber, mining and food processing,

representing up to 30% of GDP in 2009.Since 1986, state education has consis-tently received the largest budget share inthe government; hence the primary schoolattendance rate in the country is close to100%(2). There are six national universitiessome of which are the best higher educa-tion institutions in Central Africa. Finally,one of the, if not the most, proudestachievements of Cameroon is probably itsnational football team – les lions in-domptables. Having qualified for the WorldCup finals four times and won African Na-tions Cup four times, Indomitable Lionshave probably become the best ambassa-dor of the country.

All these facts make a relatively positivereading for a country that has been inde-pendent for only 50 years, but the questionis ‘are they really enough?’ Considering thecountry’s natural resources and the fact ofa consistent political stability since its inde-pendence, the answer is probably ‘no, it isnot’. In his conference inaugural speech,the President was defiant about the lack ofachievements as he urged to consider thechallenges they faced in their state buildingover the last 50 years: ‘We have undoubt-

COMMENTARY | By Prof. Alpaslan Ozerdem


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“...due to its cultural(250 ethnic and

linguistic groups andseveral religions)and geographic

diversity, Cameroonis also known as

‘Africa in miniature’.”

14

edly proceeded by trial and error. But couldit have been otherwise? I have mentionedour unpreparedness and inexperience. Icould as well have included hunger, pan-demics, civil war, external pressure andeven corruption to justify our failures. Weprefer to accept responsibility and say: “wehave done our best”.’

Nevertheless, it could be argued that Cam-eroon could have been economically richerand infrastructurally much better equipped,if it could have dealt with its two majorshortcomings which are the distribution ofwealth between elites and population ingeneral, and corrup-tion. Having spentits entire post-i n d e p e n d e n c eperiod under onlytwo presidents,the country hasbenefited from thestability this hasbrought. However,it also seems tohave created astifled political environment in which forexample, being within the close circle of thePresident seems to be considered as thegreatest achievement by those who governthe country. There are national and localelections, but it is a very rare occasion forthe country’s National Assembly to block orchange any legislation proposed by thePresident. Many people I talked to duringmy visit complained about the ‘division’ be-tween the President and population, asotherwise, they always referred to him as‘father’ in an affectionate way. They wantedhim to interact with Cameroonians moreand see the problems in situ by visiting dif-ferent parts of the country more often.Even those at high levels of judiciary and

bureaucracy have found it difficult to havean access to the President, creating a cer-tain level of vacuum in decision makingprocesses. Such a gap is also the mainreason why many of my interviewees be-lieved that the fight against corruption andattempts for a fairer wealth distributionhave largely failed so far. They thought thePresident has always had the best inten-tions to deal with these problems, and theestablishment of the National Anti-Corruption Observatory in 2006 and re-cent imprisonment of several ministers oncorruption charges are considered as indi-cators of this. Nevertheless, these meas-

ures seem to be notvery effective so far,as according toTransparency Inter-national CorruptionPerceptions Index2009, Cameroonwas at the 146th

place out of 180countries, putting itaround the same

level with such coun-tries as Russia, Kenya and Zimbabwe. Infact, comparing with the 2007 Index thecorruption in Cameroon seems to haverelatively worsened since, as in that yearCameroon was at the 138th place out of179 countries.

As identified by all interviewees too, corrup-tion is clearly the most significant challengefaced by the country today, but having saidthat another important difficulty may beonly in stand-by position: the future of Cam-eroon after President Biya. After the lastyear’s amendment in the electoral law, 78year old President will be able to run for theoffice once again in the next year’s presi-dential elections. Having participated in

Cameroon’s G

olden Anniversary of IndependenceCOMMENTARY | By Prof. Alpaslan Ozerdem


“corruption is clearly the mostsignificant challenge faced by the

country today, but having said thatanother important difficulty may be

only in stand-by position: thefuture of Cameroon after

President Biya.”

15

them, nobody has any doubts that hewould also win them. From a Western-centric liberal democracy perspective thismay sound like a doomed and gloom story,as it would mean the extension of hispower for another five or possibly moreyears, which would make him one of thelongest serving Heads of State in Africa.However, this was not what most of myinterviewees were afraid of and in fact, onthe contrary, they thought the most signifi-cant danger for the country would be asudden death of its ‘father’. The argumentput forward by most of them was that thecountry has not been prepared for asmooth hand over from President Biya tothe next president, and with a suddendeath there would be a huge decision mak-ing vacuum which might result in an inter-nal conflict. The division between the Fran-cophone majority and minority Anglo-phones seems to be considered as themost significant political fault-line thatcould be exploited for the creation of con-flict dynamics in the country. Many arguedthat the Anglophones have resentmentstowards the Francophone population forbeing discriminated in accessing to thenational decision making processes andresources, though both are the official

languages of the country and Cameroon isa member of both the Commonwealth ofNations and La Francophonie.

Overall, my short visit to Cameroon hasunderlined the urgency of such a risk, andthe country should become a key focus forconflict prevention for the internationalcommunity, as it would be such a big lossfor the region and Africa in general, if Cam-eroon falls apart by an intrastate armedconflict after such a long period of ‘peace’since its independence. For most Camer-oonians I talked to a ‘no-ending’ life forPresident Biya was the best solution forthis problem, which not only reflected theirironic sense of humour with the future oftheir country but also how helpless theyfelt with such a conundrum. However, in amore proactive way, if there are any waysof international diplomacy that could beused as a means of conflict prevention,then they should be utilised as soon aspossible for Cameroon to extend its politi-cal stability.

Notes:

* Alpaslan Ozerdem is a Professor ofPeacebuilding at Coventry University.

1) Those countries that gained their inde-pendence in 1960, in a chronologicalorder, are: Cameroon, Togo, Madagas-car, Democratic Republic of Congo, So-malia, Benin, Niger, Burkina Faso, IvoryCoast, Chad, Central African Republic,The Republic of The Congo, Gabon, Sene-gal, Mali, Nigeria and Mauritania.

2) State education budget would comprisethe spending for the Ministry of BasicEducation, the Ministry of SecondaryEducation, the Ministry of Higher Educa-tion and the Ministry of Employment andVocational Training.

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“The division between theFrancophone majority and

minority Anglophones seemsto be considered as the mostsignificant political fault-line

that could be exploited for thecreation of conflict dynamics

in the country.”

16

ForA Pro-ImmigrationArgumentBy Dr. Ibrahim Sirkeci*

COMMENTARY | By Dr. Ibrahim Sirkeci


In the last five years, parties stand-ing in the UK elections have beenforced to debate immigration. The2005 elections were full of pretty“bigotted” discourses. The then Con-

servatives’ leader was appealing to the xeno-phobic vote by saying “are you thinking what Iam thinking”. Luckily his party did not suc-ceed. However, every other election sincethen has been dominated by far right argu-ments and policies. During the last decade,small parties with well known xenophobicstances set the scene while major partiestried to avert the tide by surrendering tosome of these arguments.

In line with the overall securitisation of migra-tion in Europe and other advanced countries,the UK has moved towards a “tough” stanceon immigration. This mainly meant humanright abuses for the sake of homeland secu-rity and covert torture for millions of immi-grants through additional hassles and occa-sional abuse. The Government’s attempts tocontrol immigration have largely failed. As weknow from evidence and experience fromaround the world, migration control is a myth(See Cornelius, Martin, and Hollifield 1994;Cornelius et al. 2004).

It is no different in the UK. Although by defini-tion and nature we can not know for sure,the volume of illegal immigrant stock in theUK is believed to be between 600 to 900thousands by now. This added to the 5 millionminority population in thecountry represents asignificant issue. Theanxieties the British pub-lic have are understand-able given the fact thatnobody is communicatingthe pro-immigration argu-ment. Thus these anxie-ties are largely based on

myths rather than reality. People strugglingduring the crisis, particularly those at thelower end of the welfare league are wronglyplacing the blame on immigrants. Welfaregap in the UK has widened even further un-der successive Labour governments. Casinobanking in this country and elsewhere led tax-payers money to disappear into bankerspockets not only in the last two years but fordecades. Similarly, the little Britain pretend-ing to be a superpower alongside the USover the years caused lives of thousandslost in Afghanistan and Iraq as well as bil-lions of Pounds wasted. These are the rea-sons for increasing poverty, high unemploy-ment and uneven provision of public servicesacross the UK. Detention camps where thou-sands of asylum seekers kept and a bareroom allocated to a refugee couple in a coun-cil estate (or ruins) in the most deprived ar-eas of British towns are not and cannot bethe source of poverty or any other socialproblem in today’s Britain.

The pro-immigration argument can be builton any philosophical premises. From an es-sentialist point, we can argue that it is a ba-sic right for people to choose where to live,where to travel to. Many argue that the keyobstacles to pro-immigration policies arepolitical and cultural rather than economic.Mass influxes of outsiders often cause worryamong the host. At the other end of the de-bate comes the brain drain, a huge cost tosending areas. However, this should never

bar the ability to move, afundamental right.

Pierre Sane, AssistantDirector -General atUNESCO introducing thebook by Pecoud andG u c ht e n e i r e , sa ys“imagine a world withoutborders, where people

COMMENTARY | By Dr. Ibrahim SirkeciFo

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“...the little Britain pretendingto be a superpower alongsidethe US over the years caused

lives of thousands lost inAfghanistan and Iraq as well

as billions of Pounds wasted.”


had the right to move freely from one countryto another, to settle down, live and workwherever they wished” (2007: ix). Even froma utilitarian perspective, the opinion leaders incountries like the UK have an obligation toinform the public that immigration has been agood thing for these countries. Not the“bigoted” views but the truth must be spoken.Majority of doctors and nurses in British hos-pitals are of foreign origin. A significant por-tion of researchers in universities are fromoverseas. Yet, at the same time, millions ofBritons are living abroad temporarily or per-manently. One should not also forget that atindividual and national level, there is a univer-sal obligation to help the others in suffering.Asylum seekers must be welcomed andtreated with dignity.

The key lies in the fact that solutions for manyproblems we face in the world today requiresome sort of a transnational cooperation.Environmental issues, poverty, disarmament,diseases, population growth, ethnic conflictsare all crying for global cooperation. There-fore, the nature of our lives and problemsalso points to pro-immigration.

Perhaps the Icelandic Volcano put everythinginto a context for us. The 6 days of eruptionsand ash clouds spreading over WesternEurope left millions of passengers strandedwhere they were as well as costing hugely forairline industry and other related indus-tries. Excluding the indirect costs to otherindustries and the troubles passengers andfamilies went through; the total bill of the

ash cloud for Europe is expected to be over£2 billion. This can be something to use as ascale measuring the potential costs of zero-immigration policies if applied in Europe.

The world populations are strongly mixed witheach other. Wherever you go in the world, nomatter developed or developing country, youwould simply see sizeable immigrant commu-nities exist. Moreover, this is not a new phe-nomenon. The human history is full of massmigrations creating and recreating nationsand countries. Nevertheless, pro-immigrationgovernments taking charge is still very utopic.Similarly “open borders” will not be a realityanytime soon. There are big political and cul-tural obstacles for these changes. However,there is hope and more importantly a growingneed for it.

Note:* Ibrahim Sirkeci is a Reader in Demographyat European Business School London, Re-gent’s College, London, UK. He is also theeditor of Migration Letters journal.Email: [email protected]@migrationletters.com

References:

1) Cornelius, Wayne A., Philip L. Martin, andJames F. Hollifield. 1994. Controlling immi-gration: a global perspective. Stanford, Calif.:Stanford University Press.2) Cornelius, Wayne A., Takeyuki Tsuda,Philip L. Martin, and James F. Hollifield.2004. Controlling immigration: a global per-spective. 2nd ed. / edited by Wayne A. Cor-nelius. [et al.] ed. Stanford, Calif.: StanfordUniversity Press; London: Eurospan.3) Pécoud, Antoine, and P. F. A. deGuchteneire. 2007. Migration without bor-ders: essays on the free movement of peo-ple. Paris: UNESCO Publishing; New York:Berghahn.

For A Pro -Imm

igration Argument

COMMENTARY | By Dr. Ibrahim Sirkeci

“Even from a utilitarian perspective,the opinion leaders in countries like the

UK have an obligation to inform thepublic that immigration has been a

good thing for these countries.”




The Fear of a Free Kurdistanin the Middle East ofthe 21st Century

By Dr. Ayla Gol*

COMMENTARY | By Dr. Ayla Gol

“History teaches us clearly that the battle against colonialism does notalways run straight away along the lines of nationalism.

(Franz Fanon)(1)

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Since the overthrow of SaddamHussein in Baghdad and the defacto existence of Iraqi Kurdi-stan in northern Iraq, Ankara’sfear of the disintegration of the

Turkish state has been severely intensified.In particular, a speculative map of the Mid-dle East was published in the AmericanArmed Forces Journal in 2005 that pro-posed to divide Iraq into three separate

states: Sunni, Arab Shia and ‘free Kurdi-stan’ (See Map 1) with Iranian, Syrian andTurkish borders adjusted accordingly (3).

The scenario of re-drawing the borders of‘free Kurdistan’ in the Middle East remindedthe historical clauses of the Treaty ofSevres of 1920. The possibility of a freeKurdistan has always been perceived as areal threat to Turkey’s national unity and

territorial integrity that led to the construc-tion of hegemonic discourses by the state.Moreover, an independent and prosperousoil-rich Kurdish state in Iraq has the poten-tial to attract Turkey’s citizens of Kurdishethnic origin to unite with Iraqi-Kurdistan(4).

Hence, Ankara governments have continuedresisting the de jure existence of the Kurd-ish Regional Government in Iraq and opted

for establishing diplomatic and economicrelations via Baghdad. When Prime MinisterNouri al-Maliki banned the PKK from operat-ing in Iraq in 2006 this was seen largely asa gesture to Turkey. Ankara accused north-ern Iraqi self-rule of supporting the PKK(5).While Ankara’s military incursions in north-ern Iraq occupied the attention of the inter-national community between 2006 and2009 it remains uncertain as to how the

Map 1: A New Map of the Middle East?(2)



The Fear of a Free Kurdistan

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pro-Islamic AKP government will reconcileits Kurdish issue in domestic politics in post-liberation Iraq in 2010.

Search for a Viable Solution? DemocraticEngagement

The Kurdish path to radicalisation and thesubsequent rise of PKK terrorism wasshaped by the repressive policies and hege-monic discourse of the authoritarian statesthat refused to accommodate ethnic diver-sity in Turkey and Iraq. On the one hand, acultural and political expression of a distinctKurdish ethnic identity was denied by thehegemonic discourses and, on the other, theemergence of a radical minority groupamong the Kurds that demanded the recog-nition of cultural rights and ethnic identity.The transformation of the movement fromnon-violent to violent was detrimental forKurdish demands, which would be perceivedas undemocratic and led the movement to adead-end in the long run. It was only after

the AKP came to power in 2002 that cul-tural reforms have been passed through theTurkish Parliament. Undoubtedly, it was anintegral part of an attempt to achieve Tur-key’s fast-forward membership into the EU.Diplomatic and political pressure from Brus-sels to improve Ankara’s record in minorityrights had positive impacts on the AKP poli-cies towards the Kurds in its domestic andforeign affairs.

In domestic politics, a new process of de-mocratic engagement with the Kurdishquestion was initiated that led to lifting previ-ous bans on the Kurdish language in publicand allowing parents to have Kurdish namesfor their children. The EU-led reforms rela-tively eased restrictions on public expres-sions of Kurdish ethnic identity that indi-cated significant progress in Turkey’s de-mocratic credentials. During this process,the PKK’s decision to reinitiate the armedstruggle on 1 June 2004 seems to bea paradoxical response that questions the

Map 2: Demographic distribution of Kurds in the Middle East(6)



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viability of democratic solutions. Accordingto Tezcur, the PKK’s further radicalisationas a response to EU-induced democraticprocess disqualifies the argument that“fostering democracy would reduce theproblems of ethnic conflict”(7). However, thisargument is not only far from convincing butalso shadowed by the burden of hegemonicdiscourses. Tezcür’s conclusion can be eas-ily turned on its head by counter-arguments.As Waldman’s comparative study of North-ern Ireland, the Basque country and Quebecindicated, Northern Ireland was too unstableto make democracy work and the same canbe said for Spain, but succeeded in endingviolence and finding democratic solutions.

From a Kurdish perspective, there is a morepowerful counter-argument that the EU-induced reforms can be interpreted not somuch as democratic, but as mere prag-matic concessions aimed at promoting Tur-key’s ‘democratic’ image for its EU member-ship(8). Moreover, in terms of the key regu-lations of Turkish law, there is no real pro-gress in democratization with reference tothe Kurdish reality in Turkey. As lucidly sig-naled by the AKP’s constantly changing poli-cies, if Ankara is convinced that the EU willnever accept Turkey’s membership despitethe ‘democratic’ progress, Turkey’s pro-Western orientation can be slowly but surelyshifted towards the (Middle) East, wherethey can find better solutions to regionalissues, including the Kurdish question.

The Iraqi Kurdistan and the post-liberationera

In regional affairs, the controversial parlia-mentary elections in Iraq on 7 March 2010introduced further complications to regionalpolitics. Although it brought partial victory tothe Iraqi National Movement under Ayad

Allawi's leadership, none of the parties se-cured a majority of seats to form a govern-ment according to the Iraqi constitution of2005. After the parliamentary elections inIraq President Obama's message spokenfrom the White House Rose Garden onMarch 7th, 2010, was very clear. He saidthat the US government supports “the rightof the Iraqi people to choose their own lead-ers.” His speech indicated the following pol-icy of change on three key issues: a) the Iraqiprime minister will be elected by Iraqis inBaghdad. b) The United States is no longer acentral player in Iraq. c) The Kurdish leadersmust take the initiative and use their influ-ence to elect the right candidate. Moreover,this implied that the de facto Kurdistan inIraq and the Kurdish self-rule should con-tinue without the US presence in the coun-try. All the US forces will be out of Iraq by theend of 2011(9). Iraq needs a stable govern-ment and a charismatic leader, like theAmerican President Barak Obama, who hasthe power to speak for Iraqi people, includingthe Kurds, and voice their concerns overfuture policies.

“From a Kurdish perspective,there is a more powerful

counter-argument that the EU-induced reforms can be

interpreted not so much asdemocratic, but only

pragmatic concessions topromote Turkey’s

‘democratic’ image for its EUmembership.”




23

A new Iraqi government has to be sovereignand legitimate to lead the country throughthe crucial and most challenging stage ofthe post-liberation era. There are pressingcritical issues for the Iraqi government suchas preventing terrorism, establishing secu-rity and stability while building the institu-tions of the state and constructing the col-lective identity of a united nation, which in-cludes the Arabic, the Mandaean, Shabak,Yezidi, Chaldo-Assyrian, Turkmen, Kurdishpeoples. The national unification and the'reconciliation' will not suddenly appear exnihilo among theseethn ic groups .Hence, bui ldingtrust between Iraq’se t h n i c g r o u p sshould be the keyobjective that willultimately transformIraq into a state ofcitizenship and therule of law. This isexactly what needsto be done to pro-tect the rights ofKurds and otherethnic groups as well as individuals in Iraq.The rise of insurgencies and subsequentsectarian violence since the parliamentarianelections in March 2010 brought Iraq tothe brink of civil war. Sunni anger over beinglargely excluded from government in thepost-liberation Iraq reinforces fears thatinsurgents are regrouping in Iraq. The ideaof transforming Iraq into a functioning stateunder the rule of law is easier said thandone. A stable and democratically governedIraq is also obliged to prevent its strongneighbours (Turkey, Iran and Syria) frominterfering in Baghdad’s internal affairs. Thisis not an easy task for either Iraq or Turkeythat makes the historically already compli-

cated Kurdish question more difficult toresolve in contemporary Middle Easternpolitics.

Concluding remarks

It is clear that future governments in An-kara and Baghdad must make democracyas a self-governing of the people for the peo-ple work for all citizens. The Kurdish ques-tion is the acid test of democracy promotionin the Middle East. Historical trends andrecent events in Turkey and Iraq indicate

that the demo-graphic compositionof the Middle East ismore complicatedthan many analystsand policy-makersassumed with itsstrong ramificationsof regional politics. IfI may recall FranzFanon’s words at thehead of this paper:“History teaches usclearly that the bat-tle against colonial-

ism does not always run straight away alongthe lines of nationalism(10). The resistanceof Kurds against colonialism and the hege-monic discourses of the Turkish state werereinforced by the rise of Kurdish national-ism. The subsequent policies of the Turkishstate based on their ‘assimilation’ and thedenial of their ethnic identity led to the pathof radicalisation and violence.

The Kurdish question also shows that Islamis not necessarily the main cause of eitherradicalisation or violent terrorism. Theforces of ethnic nationalism with its separa-tist tendencies and identity politics can bestronger than religious ties. In similar vain,

“It is clear that futuregovernments in Ankara and

Baghdad must makedemocracy as a self-governingof the people for the people

work for all citizens.”



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the debates over ‘silent assimilation’ ofKurds in Turkey and the PKK terrorism feddirectly into twenty-first century identity poli-tics and the Turkish government’s policy of‘democratic engagement’. In particular, thehistoricised and contextualised analysis ofthe Kurdish radicalisation and the rise ofPKK terrorism overlap on the search fornon-violent solutions and, therefore, democ-ratic engagement is the acid test of Turkishand Iraqi democracies. Politically, although itis still too early to predict whether a democ-ratic solution to the Kurdish question can befound, based on the experiences of Irish,Basque and Québec politics it is paradoxi-cally too late to acknowledge the relation-ship between radicalisation, terrorism andthe denial of ethnic identity. After all, theseethnic conflicts overlap on the same crucialdimension of identity politics: to be Irish isnot to be English; to be Basque is not to beSpanish and to be Kurdish is not to be Turk-ish or Iraqi. Hence, suppressing the expres-sion of ethnic minority rights and identitiesby undemocratic ways is more likely to fur-ther radicalisation, violent insurgencies andterrorism in the Middle East of the 21st

century.

Notes:

*Lecturer in International Politics,Aberystwyth University ([email protected])

1) Franz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth,Penguin, 2001: 119

2) http://www.bitsofnews.com/images/graphics/war/ralph_peters_solution_to_mideast_medium.jpg See the before and after versionsof the map (Accessed on 27 January2010).

3) See R. Peters, ‘Blood Borders: How abetter Middle East would look,’ Armed

Forces Journal, which originally includedthe map in2005.www.armedforcesjournal.com/2006/06/1833899However, the map is no longer availableon this site (Accessed on 27 January2010).See also P. W. Galbraith, The End ofIraq: How American Incompetence Cre-ated a War Without End, Simon &Schuster, 2006, which suggests a policyof American withdrawal from Iraq bybreaking the country into three parts: anindependent Kurdistan, Sunni and ShiiteArab states.

4) Robert Olson, ‘Kurdish Nationalism, Capi-talism, and State Formation in Kurdistan-Iraq,’ in the Evolution of Kurdish national-ism, 205

5) ‘American troops among nearly 50 deadin Iraq,’ The New York Times, 13 August2006.

6) The estimated demographic distributionof Kurds in the Middle East seewww.mapcruzin.com/ free-kurdistan-maps.htm (Accessed on 23 January2010)

7) G. M. Tezcur, ‘When DemocratizationRadicalizes? The Kurdish NationalistMovement in Turkey’, Journal of PeaceResearch (September 18, 2009). Avail-able at SSRN:http://ssrn.com/abstract=1451562

8) Kurdistan National Assembly of Syria -Kurdish Nationalism from World War Ithrough 2007: 23/01/2010 18:41http://www.kurdnas.com/en/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=573&Itemid=71 Page 6 of 18

9) K. Katzman, Iraq: Politics, Elections andBenchmarks, CRS Report for Congress,2010. http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RS21968.pdf

10) Franz Fanon, The Wretched of theEarth, Penguin, 2001: 119


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http://www.bitsofnews.com/images/graphics/war/

www.armedforcesjournal.com/20

www.mapcruzin.com/

http://ssrn.com/

http://www.kurdnas.com/en/

http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/

Taming Rating Agencies

By Dr. Kurtulus Gemici*

COMMENTARY | By Dr. Kurtulus Gemici


Alchemy thrived in seekinghow to turn ordinary, worth-less metals into gold. To thedismay of countless alche-mists, that goal has been

rather elusive in the world of metals. Not soin the world of modern finance. The busi-ness of making golden assets out of worth-less ones, a relatively recent innovation, hasbeen a particularly lucrative practice in fi-nancial markets. The name of this game isstructured finance and securitization. Ituses the tools of modern finance to trans-

f o r mhighly risky or junk as-

sets into something shinier. Once thesesecurities receive good ratings from institu-tions such as Moody's or Standard &Poor's, they become legitimate investmentinstruments that can be used in all types offinancial transactions. This is, then, the al-chemy of contemporary finance: convertingassets once considered unacceptable forfinancial transactions into prime investmentcommodities. There is a growing consensusthat this alchemy was a crucial element ofthe financial boom—so much fool’s gold—that ended with the meltdown of the worldfinancial system between 2007 and 2008.

Convinced that the financial meltdown of2007-2008 was at least partially a conse-quence of deregulation and lax supervision,American politicians are eager to pass leg-islation to curb the power of financial mar-

kets and its institutions. A new amendmentto the financial regulation bill, proposed bySen. Al Franken and approved in the Senateon May 13, aims to limit the considerableinfluence a handful of agencies exerciseover credit ratings. The central idea is toestablish a board, consisting largely of pri-vate investors, to determine which agencywould rate newly issued asset-backed secu-rities. This regulatory entity, named TheCredit Rating Agency Board in the amend-ment, will also supervise the performanceof rating agencies. The avowed goal of thislegislation is to put a stop to the practice ofinflating ratings on securities backed byassets such as house mortgages.

It’s a nice idea. Establishing a Credit RatingAgency Board might perhaps address con-flicts of interest, collusion, and corruption inthe business of rating credit and financialinstruments. However, conflicts of interestand collusion are not why sophisticatedrating agencies such as Moody's and Stan-dard & Poor's handed triple A ratings tofinancial instruments consisting of a pool ofsubprime mortgages, and why such ratingsturned out to be poor assessments ofcredit quality. Rather, rating agencies be-lieved they could mitigate risk through theapplication of their own alchemist’s formula:they would use the knowledge and tools offinancial engineers, academicians, andbankers to transform highly risky and dan-gerous financial instruments into risk-freeones through the precise measurementand quantification of market uncertainty.

Securitization is the primary tool throughwhich financial market practitioners engi-neer high-quality financial instruments outof assets such as subprime mortgages.This practice involves pooling risky assetsand then slicing this pool into differenttranches. Each tranche is endowed with


“…the financial meltdownof 2007-2008 was at

least partially a conse-quence of deregulationand lax supervision…”


Taming Rating Agencies

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different rights about the cash flows origi-nating from the asset pool, meaning thatthe risk of default is distributed unevenlyamong different tranches. While equitytranches bear the risk of the first three tosix percent of defaults, senior tranches areprotected from a large percentage of de-faults. As a result, each tranche gets a dif-ferent credit rating, creating the opportu-nity to obtain triple A instruments evenfrom assets that are considered to be be-low investment grade.

Securitization, as a tool in financial engi-neering, involves specific assumptions andprojections about the housing market andhow defaults in underlying mortgages occurover time. It requires knowledge—necessarily probabilistic—about the per-centage of mortgages that will default inthe future. Most importantly, it involves as-sumptions about the percentage of defaultsthat are likely to occur at the same time. Ifa large percentage of the assets underlyinga securitized financial product default simul-taneously, even the senior tranches are noteffectively protected from the default risk.That is indeed the moment when the logicof securitization fails miserably, with theimplication that the ratings accorded todifferent tranches become erroneous.

That is exactly what went wrong with therating agencies before the meltdown of2007-2008. Ratings institutions assumed

that housing prices would rise forever andmiscalculated the risk of simultaneous de-faults. In the meantime, by contributing tothe creation of vast amounts of credit andleverage in the financial system, they en-abled the inflationary spiral in the housingsector. What failed them was the particularculture—assumptions, expectations, knowl-edge set, toolkits, and mathematical mod-els—through which they assessed risk anduncertainty in financial markets. That is whylegislation aiming to stop corruption andconflict of interest in credit rating agenciesis not sufficient to stop inflationary ratingsof essentially risky assets.

Once considered the darlings of Washing-ton and the source of indisputable wisdom,financial markets and their institutions areagain les bêtes noires of politics. This politi-cal environment creates the opportunitystructure for the re-regulation of financialinstitutions and markets, which is a much-needed and belated adjustment in the rela-tionship between finance and society. How-ever, such an adjustment should be effica-cious in the long-run. And efficacy in thelong-run necessitates broad changes con-cerning existing tools, assumptions, expec-tations, and models employed in the worldof finance. That task is, of course, consid-erably more taxing than establishing a regu-latory board charged with supervision. Alas,there is no viable alternative to sweepingcultural change in finance. Otherwise thecurrent reform and re-regulation move-ment will simply miss the target, and finan-cial engineers will once again assume theirroles as modern-day alchemists. Until thenext explosion.

Note:* Kurtulus Gemici is a Visiting Scholar atNew York University.



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Platonic LoversChasing Nukes

Around the World

By Ozgur Tufekci*


The 2010 Review Confer-ence of the Parties to theTreaty on the Non -Proliferation of NuclearWeapons (NPT) held in May

2010 at UN Headquarters in New York.The first day of the monthlong conferencewas dominated by Iran’s President Mah-moud Ahmadinejad. And, as an expectedconsequence, he was harshly criticised bythe US, the British, and the French delega-tions.

During the conference, in a nutshell, MrAhmadinejad said that “the US, not Iran, isthe real threat to world peace... Regrettably,the government of the United States hasnot only used nuclear weapons, but alsocontinues to threaten to use such weaponsagainst other countries, including Iran(1).”

Let us stop here...And go back almost 60 years; start fromscratch.

The United States is the first producer ofnuclear weapons.

The United States conducted a nuclearweapon test in 1945 for the first time inhistory.

The United States dropped two bombsonto the Japanese cities Hiroshima onAugust of 6th, 1945 and Nagasaki onAugust of 9th 1945; killed tens of thou-sands of people outright.

The United States and Russia were thetwo parts of nuclear arms race duringthe Cold War.

Between 1945 and 1990, the US builtmore than 70.000 nuclear warheadsand bombs.

However, Russia managed to beat theUS in this race and in 1986; Russia hadthe world’s largest nuclear arsenal, al-

most 45.000 warheads(2). Still, Russiamaintains the largest stockpile in theworld.

Now let us come back to present.Currently, around the world there are 9countries having nuclear arms; Russia, theU.S., France, China, Britain, Israel, Pakistan,India, North-Korea. Apart from that, 430nuclear power reactors are being operated.Furthermore, many of the world’s oil richstates are in the queue to have nuclearpower plants. What makes them to thinkthat they need that technology is awarenessof their oil reserves will not last muchlonger.

However, according to the US, once coun-tries have the nuclear power technology, itwill not last to manage to develop weaponsof their own. That is why: the Americanstrategy, begun during the Bush administra-tion, is to pre-empt countries, in particularthe Middle East countries, to develop nu-clear weapons. From the perspective ofEllen Tauscher, undersecretary of state for

arms control and international security, thatis the right formula for the Middle East(3).

In this context, one of the most significantissues in the agenda of the majority of theworld leaders is to prevent Iran and thenMiddle East countries from developing nu-clear power reactors and nuclear weapons,


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respectively. With bearing this mind, can wesay that Mr Ahmadinejad’s speech in the con-ference was a predictable speech; although itis an argument which has been put forwardby a controversial figure? To me, it was. How-ever, the crucial point to take into account iswhat is the stake which makes people so furi-ous about Iran’s nuclear issue?

There are several assertions, regarding thestakes. Let me talk about some of them. Ifso-called rogue state(4), Iran, have a nuke,she can use it against Israel. If Iran has anuke, she can turn upside-down the balanceof power. And, last but not least is that ifIran has a nuke, this situation could provoke‘nuclear arms race in Middle East’. The lastone has been brought about by Joe Biden,U. S. Vice-President, on May of 5th, 2010. Ifit is true, what are the measures should be

taken? To impose more sanctions on Iran?To invade Iran in order to bring stability anddemocracy to the region? Or, to decreaseconsiderable amount of nuclear weapons asa sign of good intention.

So far, the sanction option has been com-monly used to prevent the Middle Easternstates to have nuclear weapons. On theother hand, a couple of times states haveresorted to the use of force. When we lookat the near history of Middle East, two inci-dents draw the attention. The first one wasin 1981. Israeli jets bombed an Iraqi reac-tor at Osirak. And the second one was inSeptember 2007; again Israeli jets de-stroyed a Syrian reactor, secretly. In thesetwo incidents, the main rational behind wasthese reactors might have produced pluto-nium that could fuel bombs; and then, these

countries could harm the status quo.

Herein, should we ask whose statusquo? From the perspective of Israeland the U.S., the status quo is ontrack. What about from the perspec-tive of the rest of the Middle Eastcountries; rest of the world. Is thestatus quo tolerable for the rest ofthe world or until when will be toler-able?

As for making it tolerable, there is atheory, called ‘Deterrence Theory’.That is one of the relevant phraseswith regard to the use of nuclearweapons. According to this theory,having nuclear weapons preventspotential aggressor from aggression.Now, when we look at the MiddleEast, only state who has nuclearpower is Israel. The actual size andcomposition of Israel’s nuclearstockpile is around 300. Let us forgetIran’s claims that ‘we are not

ESTIMATED GLOBAL NUCLEAR WEAPONSINVENTORIES, 2009 (5)

Russia 13.000*United States 9.400**

France 300

China 240

Britain 225***

Israel 80-100

Pakistan 70-90

India 60-80North-Korea ?

TOTAL ~23.360

* Approximately 4,850 of the Russian warheads are operationalor active. The status of the other 8,150 warheads is unclear.Some portion may be in reserve with the balance retired andawaiting dismantlement.

** Approximately 5,200 of the U.S. warheads are in the militarystockpile (about 2,700 deployed); 4,200 retired warheads areawaiting dismantlement.

*** This number was revealed by William Hague (Foreign Secre-tary) on 25th May 2010.


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developing a nuclear weapon’. Think thatIran aspires to have the nuclear reactortechnology and become one of the nuclearpower in the world. What could be the rea-son for that? What about to protect herselffrom the regional or global risks, from otherpotential rogue states (as you know allrogue states are not friends of each other)or to become a ‘Nuclear Power’ in order tobe a global actor.

Politics is a logical issue. That is why; leadersshould behave logically. When you imple-ment a plan, you should check it results,consistently. If it does not give you what youwant, you should find out another plan. Inthis case, to some extent the sanctions [orfear of being given official sanctions(6)] haveworked. However, it does not mean that itwill last forever. Sooner or later, Iran or an-other potential rogue state will win out.

So, if the leaders want to be a logical, whydo not they try to dismantle all nuclearpowers instead of deciding who can or notbecome a nuclear power. Recently, the lead-ers have decided that a state is suitable tohave a nuclear reactor. That state is theUnited Arab Emirates, which has awarded a$20.4 billion contract to a South Koreanconsortium to build four 1400 MWe reac-tors by 2020. Jordan, Bahrain, and SaudiArabia are on the queue. What makes thesecountries different from Iran? Their Pro-Western leaders? What about in the fu-ture? Who can ensure that one of thesestates will be a threat for the World Peace?

Let us face it; this is not a peaceful solution.This attitude only escalates the hatred. Thatis why; the parties should gather and reducethe stockpile of Nuclear Arms more thanwhat they have done so far. Or, the best is tosay their farewell to Nuclear Arms.

Notes:* Ozgur Tufekci is a Doctoral Researcher atthe University of Birmingham.Email: [email protected]

1) Independent, 04 May 2010, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/politics/ahmadinejad-refuses-to-curtail -nuclear-ambitions-as-weapons-talks-begin-1961500.html2) Stephen I. Schwartz, 50 Facts About U.S.N u c l e a r W e a p o n s , h t t p : / /www.brookings.edu/projects/archive/nucweapons/50.aspx [Accessed on08/05/2010].3) New York Times, 2 May 2010, http://w w w . n y t i m e s . c o m / 2 0 1 0 / 0 5 / 0 3 /world/03nuke.html4) Michael Lind explains the term as “Roguestate is a term of emotional propaganda, notsober analysis. The rogue-state rationale isemployed when American leaders wish torally support for a policy whose actual pur-pose -- increasing or reinforcing Americanmilitary hegemony in its European, Asian orMiddle Eastern sphere of influence -- cannotbe explained to the public” in his article inThe National Interest on May/June 2007.http://www.newamerica.net/publications/a r t i c l e s / 2 0 0 7 /beyond_american_hegemony_53815) Bulletin of The Atomic Scientists, Vol. 65,N o . 6 , 2 0 0 9 . h t t p : / /thebul let in .metapress.com/content/x m 3 8 g 5 0 6 5 3 4 3 5 6 5 7 / ?p=ac84fde4a9f54939b7a2bac6688eb44b&pi=96) A nuclear agreement has been signed byTurkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Er-dogan, Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lulada Silva, and Iranian President MahmoudAhmadinejad. According to this agreement,Iranian stockpile of enriched uranium will betransferred to Turkey. In return, Iran will besupplied with the more highly-enriched mate-rial used in medical isotopes.


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www.independent.co.uk/news/world/

www.brookings.edu/projects/archive/

www.nytimes.com/2010/05/03/

http://www.newamerica.net/publications/

Democratic Opening,

Martyrs and Journalism

By Cemil Cengiz*

MEDIA

COMMENTARY | By Cemil Cengiz

The leading political party ofTurkey, AKP (Justice andDevelopment Party) haslaunched a series of solu-tions to the problems con-

cerning the Kurdish minority in Turkey un-der the title of “Democratic Opening” byNovember 2008. Whilst the project wascalled “Kurdish Opening” at the earlierstages, the Government announced that theDemocratic Opening was the first part ofthe “National Unity and Fellowship Pro-ject”(1) which is a wider project that aims toprovide more civil liberties for all society inTurkey.

As the mass media is known to be thefourth power (some cases in Turkish historyshowed it was even the first, for more see‘February the 28 Post-modern coup’), theGovernment’s first guests to whom theywould give some information about the pro-ject and ask for suggestions about the Kurd-ish problem were journalists. To think in arational way, the very first people to per-suade were journalists since they have thepower to convince society. Thus, Besir Ata-lay, Interior Minister and Coordinator of theDemocratic Opening, invited a number ofjournalists who were believed to be“reasonable” people. Later, Devlet Bahceliwho is the leader of opposing NationalistParty labelled the journalists as “12 evilmen” a term which the media highlightedmore than the opening itself. Meeting withthe journalists did not achieve the govern-ment’s purpose because of the intense

pressure put by the opposition parties andsome media groups.

In order to instill morale into the society, on27th of May 2009, Turkish President Abdul-lah Gul said, “Whether you call the problemthe ‘Kurdish issue’ or the ‘South-Easternissue’ this is the most important problem ofTurkey. The later we leave it to resolve theproblem, the harder it will get.” The sameday, in Hakkari, which is a city located in thesouth-eastern region of Turkey, 7 Turkishsoldiers were killed over a mine blast. Thefollowing texts are snippets of the storyabout the blast from three of the leadingTurkish broadsheets after the incident:

Hurriyet

7 Martyrs in Cukurca

The cruel attack occurred at 23:30 yester-day. The mine placed by the terrorists wasremotely blasted while an army lorry carry-ing soldiers to the operation point was pass-ing over it.

Sabah

Mine trap: 6 Martyrs in Cukurca

6 soldiers were killed over the mine thatwas placed by PKK terrorists was remotelyblasted while the soldiers were carried tothe operation point near Iraqi border.‘...the mine was previously placed into atrench by PKK terrorists’

Zaman

6 Martyrs in Cukurca

‘According to the sources, the terrorist or-ganisation (PKK) blasted the mine they pre-viously planted into the road while a group ofsoldiers were walking over it.’

COMMENTARY | By Cemil Cengiz


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‘According to the district officials, the sol-diers were going on foot while the attackwas done. ‘

‘Martyr Private Ozkan Dumlu laid to the restamid tears...’‘Private Adil Yildiz died a martyr over blasthad 55 days to discharge’

All the three newspapers above saddled thePKK with the responsibility of the mine blastwithout verification. Turkish community andthe mass media are familiar to see newmartyr news in the media because the Turk-ish Army has been fighting against the PKKterrorists for more than 25 years. Thissituation caused a specific presupposition inthe minds of the public that in case of anincident resulting the death of a Turkishsoldier, community would directly say hewas killed by the PKK. In addition, a shortwhile after the incident, TSK, Turkish ArmedForces stated that the attacks were carriedout by a group of PKK terrorists thatcrossed the Iraqi border. This official state-ment and presuppositions were enough toconvince the mass media.

A few days before the blast, Turkish PMErdogan had stated that he could make anappointment with Ahmet Turk who is theformer leader of the Kurdish Party, DTP. Itwas important news because Erdogan hadpreviously refused to meet DTP officials be-cause they did not explicitly deny their rela-tion to the terrorist organisation, PKK. Oneday after the blast, Erdogan stated that hecancelled the appointment due to the mineblast and added ‘Every time you decide tostep forward, mines start blasting’. Mean-while, the majority of columnists, newspa-pers and TV channels implied that a KurdishOpening would not help the resolution ofproblems and was not needed when anarmed conflict was going on. So this situa-tion forced the government to halt the open-

ing process and change the agenda. How-ever, about three months after the incident,a sound recording of the dialogues of somemilitary officials who were charged in theregion was anonymously uploaded to You-Tube. The sound file involved a series of tele-phone conversations between the generalsstating that the mine that killed 6 Turkishsoldiers belonged to the Turkish Army’sinventory and that it was ‘forgotten’ that itwas planted in the region. After the newshad broad repercussions in the mass me-dia, public prosecutors launched an investi-gation into the allegations. However, themost important and fragile process, theDemocratic Opening was significantly influ-enced in a negative way because of the im-petuous attitude of the mass media to-wards the government’s new plan.

Although a longitudinal analysis of framingthe ‘martyr news’ by the Turkish mediashould be done to put the case clearly, thisone sample adequately shows how muchthe mass media is able to nearly stop a vitalprocess in Turkey. The situation raises ques-tions about whether the mass media shouldtake a particular side in an ongoing clash orwhether what is expected from journalism isonly to inform society about incidents. WhatI personally believe is that the first thing todemocratize in Turkey is journalism and giveenough of confidence to journalists to inde-pendently write what needs to be knownwithout being obligated to be ‘his master’svoice’ of the official sources.

Notes:* Cemil Cengiz is an MA student at BrunelUniversity and a freelance journalist.

1.Further information: The Book of Democ-ratic Opening (Prepared by the Govern-ment/Turkish)http://www.demokratikacilimkitabi.com/

demokratik_acilim_kitabi.pdf


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http://www.demokratikacilimkitabi.com/

Keynote Lecture:

Turkish Vision of Regionaland Global Order:

Theoretical Background andPractical Implementation


Foreign Minister of the Republic of Turkey

At the Conference onTurkey's Foreign Policy in a Changing World

At the University of Oxford

SabanciUniversity

Preface*

We, as members of CESRAN, attended tothe conference entitled “Turkey’s foreignpolicy in a changing world” held at the StAntony’s College of University of Oxford inwhich Minister of Turkish Foreign AffairsProf. Ahmet Davutoglu delivered a speech (akeynote lecture) on “Turkish Vision of Re-gional and Global Order” on 1 May 2010.The participant/speaker profile of the three-day long conference was presumably givingclues about how eloquent and powerful thekeynote lecture of Prof. Ahmet Davutogluwould be. However, before the conference,we were planning to issue just an observa-tion paper or short report. Nonetheless,after listening to Prof. Davutoglu, we decidedto publish the whole lecture which, we be-lieve, is very valuable.

His speech devoted to reassert the histori-cally-rooted and seemingly irresolvable prob-lems, however, showing care not to touch anerve. Prof. Davutoglu smoothly positionedhis (as he called) humble opinions on theside of reconciliation and dialog with theneighbouring zones. He talked about twoforeign policy measures in his speech; his-torical and geographical continuity and zero-problem aim, driven by a motivation thatacknowledges Turkey as the successor

state of Ottoman Empire. In this, Turkey ismeant to shoulder responsibilities towardsneighbouring regions, but excluding Neo-Ottomanist intensions as Davutoglu claimed.Undertaking so-called formidable problems,with the motivation of reconciliation and ne-gotiation, seemingly brought into existence aunique and friendly-oriented Turkish foreignpolicy reading; consistent with the traditionalforeign policy implementations of Turkey sofar.

On the other hand, it should also be men-tioned that his zero-problem aimed politicalapproaches are in some cases radically atodds with some of the barely conservativescholars’ interpretations of Turkish foreignpolicy; such seen in the relations with Arme-nia. This is probably due to the hesitationsand critiques which reflect the embeddedperceptions and conceptualizations of threatthat neighbouring countries have claimed tohave posed for decades in Turkey.

Regardless of any political and ideologicalcomprehension, Prof. Davutoglu alleged tobe capable of securing his name to be givento the era of his occupancy. We hope hisresult-oriented foreign affairs vision will leadto a well-integrated and securely-bondedneighbourhood as he argues.

In the transcription we stuck to the originalspeech without attempting to alter the ex-pressions, except in some cases where themeaning tends to shift. We embarked on acategorization of the keynote lecture to facili-tate the reading of the speech with respectto the own course of the speech and to thesignposting language used by Prof. Da-vutoglu.

Husrev TabakManaging Editor of JGA and PR

Postgraduate Student at SSEES, UCL


Turkish Vision of Regional and Global O

rderKEYNOTE LECTURE | By HE Prof. Ahmet Davutoglu

“Regardless of any political and ideologicalcomprehension, Prof. Davutoglu alleged tobe capable of securing his name to be givento the era of his occupancy. We hope hisresult-oriented foreign affairs vision will leadto a well-integrated and securely-bondedneighbourhood as he argues.”

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Transcription:

Turkish Vision of Regionaland Global Order:

Theoretical Background andPractical Implementation

By HE Prof. Ahmet Davutoglu…In my presentation, firstly I would like tomention and underline certain issues aboutthe historical transformation of global worldorder… Then I will try to underline the mainproblems, today we are facing about globalgovernance, in political economy and cul-tural fields. Thirdly I will focus on Turkishposition within the context of global and re-gional order. And then I will try to give someissues [which have] impacts on Turkish for-eign policy…

1. Historical Transformation ofWorld Order

When we look at the long term historicaltransformation of the search for global or-der I can say [that] there are four differentstages and now we are at the fourth stage.It is important to understand the shift of theconcept of the order. Of course this is just ageneral framework of conceptualisation inorder to understand the existing problems...In the history we had geopolitics of worldorder. Let me say [firstly] the traditional one.

a. Traditional World Order and Geopolitics

… In that geopolitics of traditional world or-der there was a geographical continuity andeconomic centrality, and different culturalpresence of certain locations… When welook at the Empire of Alexander the Great,

for example, it emerged right at the centreof Afro-Eurasia and there was a geopoliticalcontinuity from Macedonia up to Afghani-stan or Egypt. Even before that, when welook at the Persepolis, the Persian Empire,its geographical continuity was the mainimagination of the leaders or imperial struc-tures. They had a centre and geographicalzone of control/order and there were cer-tain cities and centres which were able totransact in economic and cultural sense.The cities in the name of Alexander wasformation of this character of the traditionalworld order; geographical continuity, politi-cal centre, economic order and culturalcentres of transaction. This continued until18th-19th century and almost all traditionalimperial structures had this structure afterthe Roman Empire like Han Empire in Chinafrom the East, … Abbasids, later Ottomans.This was a traditional geopolitics, althoughthey did not know the concept of geopoliticsbut that was the structure.

b. Colonial World Order and Geopolitics

The second phase of concepts of order wasthe colonial order. In this new concept andnew geopolitics there was a geographicaldiscontinuity. Those who are colonizingforces, they did not want to control fully eve-


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transformation of thesearch for global orderI can say [that] there

are four differentstages and now we are

at the fourth stage.”

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rything in the sense like Alexander the Greator the Ottomans when they came to newconquered lands. For example British rela-tions with India or French relations with theFrench Colonies in West Africa; it was notlike the relations between Romans and con-quered lands or Alexander the Great andthe Mesopotamia or Ottomans [and] Bal-kans. Indian economy was linked to the Brit-ish Economy; but not in the sense that forexample Balkan economy or Black Seaeconomy was linked to Istanbul. This wastotally different geopolitics; geocolonial geo-politics brought its all logic. And it also cre-ated certain alienations in certain regions.For example, Malaysian economy was con-trolled by British, Indonesian economy wascontrolled by Dutch. So regional economieswere divided or were alienated from eachother; Syrian economy was under Frenchcontrol, Iraqi economy was under Britishcontrol. So, the world was divided by thecolonial orders.

c. Cold War World Order and Geopolitics

The third stage was geopolitics of Cold War.Again, these national geographical continu-ousnesses were alienated from each other

and the Cold War geopolitics brought a newreality that this time whole world was di-vided in two big geopolitics so that, for ex-ample South Yemen was pro-Soviet; so thenatural geographical zones were divided.Turkey was in NATO; Syria was closed toWarsaw Pact; and Turkish-Syria relationswere not anymore relations of two dividedworld...

d. New Geopolitics: Expectations from the“New Order”

… [In] the post-Cold War era, we have facedmany difficulties and now we are in searchof a new world order but I do not mean theconcept in the 1990s. This time, there is anew geopolitics. Geography seemingly haslost some significance because we haveinternet, technological facilities, and extraor-dinary potential of interaction. But at thesame time, the traditional geographical con-tinuity did emerge again after the collapseof colonial structures, after the collapse ofCold-War geopolitics. Now, we have a newera where in all these alienated regionsstarted to interact again in cultural or eco-nomical or political sense. And now we arefacing a new reality. What do we have nowin our hands? First of all, in the sense ofglobal order, we have a question of globalpolitical governance. Today there is a chal-lenge of how and to which institutions wecan establish a new concept of order. Inanother speech, I referred to the modernera; after each global war there was a newsearch for a new balance of power and anew structure of order in Europe. For exam-ple, after the Thirty Years wars [with] West-phalia Peace there was a new concept oforder; after the Napoleonic Wars we hadCongress of Vienna; after the First WorldWar we had the League of Nations; afterthe Second Cold War we had the United




“Geographyseemingly has lostsome significancebecause we have

internet,technologicalfacilities, andextraordinarypotential ofinteraction.”

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Nations. But, after the Cold-War, it was awar in different instruments and in differentzones, there was no such a congress; therewas no [such] a peace; there was no [such]a global consensus on the basic values,from 1989 until 2001. We had a long eraof cease-fire. Cease-fires were located in thetraditional geopolitical zones; frozen con-flicts, unresolved issues. Still we are dealingwith the question of how to reform theUnited Nations… because the UN reflectedpartially colonial order; partially Cold Warorder. But now there are new faces;there are new risenpowers.

i. Future of the GlobalGovernance

This is the mainquestion. Thefuture of globalgovernance bringsus a question of how toreform, restructure re-gional orders; withouthaving regional or sub-regional orders therecannot be global order. Now thisworld cannot be carried in balance.There should be a new concept of globalpolitical governance which is inclusive notpower-centric only. There should be certainnew values we have to inject. I will comewhat should be these values. Security andfreedom are two main searches for human-beings throughout the centuries. This newglobal political governance should be basedon a new concept of security and freedomfor all humanity not just for some people, forsome continents, for some nations. Andthere should be an inclusive politicalstructure.

ii. Global Economic Order

Second problem of international global or-der is economic global order. Again sameyear, in 2008, a financial crisis emerged inUnited States. Many of us thought the USAis a huge economy, they can contain thiscrisis, in a few months it became an eco-nomic crisis not financial crisis; in five-sixmonths it became a social crisis for manysocieties because it has created a big issue

of unemployment. Why? Because stillthere is no new financial architecture

of fitting to the neweconomy. The financialarchitecture today;what we have is somereforms, structures of

Bretton Woods ex-actly like the

United Na-tions. All the

financial institu-tions, IMF, World

Bank, they are from theconcept of order, fromColonial era to the ColdWar era in 1940-

1950s. There is a huge need of re-forming international global economy.

What will we need:… New value, a just dis-tribution; without a just distribution of eco-nomic values, there can not be an economi-cal order. Productivity is important, but justis [as] important as the productivity. I willcome how Turkey is approaching to thisissue.

iii. Global Cultural Order

There should be a new concept of globalcultural order. The cultural concepts of 19th

century [and] 20th century cannot be valid


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“There should be anew concept of globalpolitical governancewhich is inclusive notpower-centric only.

There should becertain new valueswe have to inject.”

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today. A Eurocentric cultural approach can-not be shaping the future of humanity. Wehave to be friend to each other. Usually, weare in our own test tube, we [have beentaught] in an environment, in a Eurocentricenvironment and do you think that it is thehistory and this is the future. This is not anymore so. Chinese culture is reviving, Indianculture is reviving. Chinese economy is reviv-ing; parallel to this Indian economy is reviv-ing. Latin American economy is reviving.There is a need of a new inclusive culturalorder. Without that, thinking that all othernations will be enlightened by our Europeanhistory, we will be losing the momentum ofthe history, history is now in a very dynamicshape; there is a huge transformation.Therefore, there is a need of a new conceptof order in political, economic and culturalsense.

2. New Global Order and TurkishPositioning: The Revival

a. Pro-Active Vision: Historical Responsi-bility and Geographical Continuity

What is Turkey doing now, just, where I seeus since I said Turkish Global Vision? Why…are we so active in foreign policy, within thiscontext?

i. Historical Responsibility

When we look at Turkey, whether we like ordislike, there is a historical fact that Turkeyis the successor of the last traditional stateof order, Ottoman State. Ottoman State wasthe last example of the traditional geopoli-tics. When I say this, some of you may thinkthat now I will start to speak Neo-Ottomanism. I have never used this conceptand I do not think that Ottomanism could bea trend but if you want to understand the

difficulties of responsibilities of Turks today,you have to understand the traditional con-cept of order. Because Ottoman State rep-resented Kadim. When they used Kadim,they did not use it by coincidence. They weresaying that “my order is the last order ofthis tradition coming from Alexander, Ro-mans, Byzantine, and Persian tradition”. ………..Now, what is the political consequence ofthis, I want to say, whenever there is a newcrisis around us, all these people or nations,they [turn] their face to Turkey and theyhave certain expectations from Turkey. Werealized this in 1990’s when the Bosnianwar erupted. In 1960s and 70s, we did nothave such a question. Suddenly, we realizedthere is a Bosnian issue, it means a Balkanissue. Why? Because of the end of the ColdWar geopolitics, there was a new era andall these nations had certain expectationsfrom Turkey……Let me give you just an example, Cengiz[Çandar] Bey and Soli [Özel] Bey knows this…We went to Afghanistan together; we visitedNorth Afghanistan, Balkh. The [governor] ofBalkh welcomed us, we were sitting and ourjournalist friends were with us. We did notsay this is an official meeting, they wit-nessed this. The [governor] of Balkh startedto say “welcome minister”, est. words of




“A Eurocentric culturalapproach cannot beshaping the future of

humanity....

There is a need of a newinclusive cultural order.”

41

hospitality, then he said “we need a hospitalin that street, we need a school in thatneighbourhood, and we need a mosque inanother corner”. He started to give a list. Isaid “one minute -Not `that one minute`!laughs- I called council general and took acoordinator, then I said “please take notewe will do all these things”. Cengiz Bey toldme, “I think it is so strange. He is requestingfrom you as if you are minister of Afghani-stan or he is the governor of Konya”. … I saidyes, this is North Afghanistan, Balkh. Wemay think that we are Turkey, we do nothave any interest there, we will not take oilthere or no eco-nomic interests butthey expect thisfrom us becausethey think that Is-tanbul was the cen-tre of a traditionalimagination of or-der and Turkey hasto do.

One week after Af-ghanistan I went toSancak, Serbia. Exactly the same logic, theysaid “we need hospital, we need gynaecol-ogy”… we built a clinic in Sancak. Now, I amnot a minister of an initial state only. … thisis the difference of Turkish geographical andhistorical background and because of theseexpectations, I cannot say, for example, inSancak people are calling me neo-Ottomanist. … They expect and if we cannotsolve their problems, they will come to Tur-key.

In Kirklareli, there is a refugee camp, GaziOsman Pasa Refugee Camp; it is like a ba-rometer of the Balkans. In whichever coun-try you have a crisis in the Balkans; peopleare coming to this camp. In late 1980s,

Turkish minority from Bulgaria came to thiscamp, during Bosnian war Bosnian came,during Macedonia war Macedonians came,during Kosovo war Albanians came. So,similarly, when there was a pressure fromSaddam on Kurds in Northern Iraq, theycame to Turkey. In one night, 500,000Kurdish innocent people came to Turkey.We cannot say “no, we are now anothernation state, no.” Turkey had to accept this.…

ii. Geographical Continuity

[Being] a successor ofthe last traditionalimperial structure inthe Middle East andBalkans and Cauca-sia… this is some spe-cial character butgeographical continu-ity is another charac-ter of Turkish public.None of the Turkishterritories were fixed,static territory, except

Turkish Ottoman territory. For example,Turkish-Syrian territory is not natural at all.Throughout the centuries, there was notsuch a border between Turkey and Syria orbetween [Gazi]Antep and Aleppo. Antep andAleppo, they were “twin cities” for thou-sands of years but suddenly there was aborder. First it was a national border be-tween Turkey and Syria then it became aborder of two poles during Cold War andwe had to protect that border by mines.Turkish-Georgian border is not a naturalborder at all. Batumi and Trabzon were notso alienated from each other like in duringthe Cold War. Mosul and Diyarbakir, Arbiland Mardin, they were not alienated fromeach other throughout the centuries. Edirne


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“Turkish-Syrian territory is notnatural at all. Throughout the

centuries, there was not such aborder between Turkey and

Syria or between [Gazi]Antepand Aleppo.

...Turkish-Georgian border is nota natural border at all. Batumi

and Trabzon were not soalienated from each other like

in during the Cold War.”

42

and Skopje or Salonika was not alienatedfrom each other. 19th century, do not go tothe 16th century, the natural link was fromSalonika to Skopje to Belgrade in the South-North direction in economic sense; or fromSalonika to Edirne to Istanbul from West tothe East, there was a natural border. Sud-denly, all these cities were alienated fromeach other. There were loss of links be-tween Salonika and Skopje or between Salo-nika and Edirne. Edirne was the capital cityof Ottomans and was one of the most dy-namic cities; today Edirne is a small town,why, because it has lost its hinterland, [nowis] deadlock of Turkey. I mean no way out,especially, during Cold War because therewas Bulgaria behind. These geopolitical con-tinuities did emerge, historical responsibili-ties did emerge. It is not a question of shift-ing of access orbits; it is a question of geog-raphy and history.…

iii. Pro-Active Diplomacy

Now, what is the consequence of this?When I say pro-active peace diplomacy, Imean that we cannot wait as Turkey; wecannot wait until a crisis emerged in …[the]regions around us. We have to prevent cri-

sis before they emerge. We cannot waituntil the war approaches to us. We have toprevent the war and tensions and this is anatural concept of a new regional order, letme say. Just to summarize how we shouldresponse, just one another dimension. SoTurkey was seen as the centre of traditionalgeopolitical order, was never colonized dur-ing Colonial Order and during Cold War.Turkey was seen a wing country of NATO,not central country. Now, the meaning ofgeography is changing. When, I am sure youdiscussed many things about StrategicDepth, when I wrote the book I [suggested]that you cannot change history and geogra-phy, these are given to you. It is my history …or my geography I cannot change it. I can-not say “Turkey is in a problematic geogra-phy; let’s take Turkey to Latin America orsomewhere else”. You cannot say it, this isyour challenge but you can reinterpret yourgeography and your history. You must rein-terpret your geography and history wheninternational context is changing. Interna-tional context has changed when I wrote thebook “the strategic depth”. I tried wrongly orcorrectly, you may criticise, what I tried todo was to reinterpret geography and historywithin this new international context. Howwas this interpretation, my assumption wasthis, “Turkey has to reintegrate with theneighbouring zones”. Turkey should not bealienated from the neighbouring zones. Thisis the destiny of this country. We cannothave permanent enemies. We have to havepermanent friends or a new approach ofreintegration with the neighbouring zones.We have to have, of course, the objective offull membership to EU, but even for this ob-jective we have to deal with our neighbour-hood as well.

Now, what do we have in our hand? ... If wehave this global order and regional aspects




“Turkey has to reintegrate withthe neighbouring zones”. Turkey

should not be alienated fromthe neighbouring zones. This isthe destiny of this country. We

cannot have permanentenemies.”

43

of this global order, especially in the tradi-tional geopolitical zones… what we try todo…, as Turkey, in order to fulfil this mission.

b. Global Order and the Position of Turkey

First of all, today, … the main issue of globalgovernance is reformation of United Na-tions [and] Turkey is today a UN SecurityCouncil member. Secondly, for internationalglobal order, we are a member of G20 andTurkish economy is 16th biggest economytoday. In 2002, Turkey was the 26th big-gest economy in the world, today, we are16th. Thirdly, ifthere is a need ofa new approach incultural order;the re fo re westarted the initia-tive of Alliance ofCivilizations. [Withthese]… we aretrying to contributeto global order.We have a newvision, yes, there must be a much more par-ticipatory global governance. Participatory inthe sense that the role of G5 should not beseen like in a hierarchical structure but thatshould be reinterpreted. Yes, in G20, we willnot be there as Turkey only, we have to pro-vide new alternatives for economic issues. Itwas interesting, last year [in April] we wentto Tanzania with President [Abdullah] Gul.Tanzanian president talked to President Gul,… he said, “in G20, there was no strong Afri-can president, and please we expect Turkeyto be spokesman of Africa as well,[spokesman] of the problems of Africa. Yes,we cannot say, “we are member of NATO,we are member of OECD, we are from theNorth, there is no need for Turkey to dealwith the issues of the South, No”. Yes, we

are from the North but we have to deal withthe issues of the South because our econ-omy also carries the characters of southerneconomy. We have a dynamic population,very competitive market and we have torespond to these challenges. In cultural is-sues, yes we are part of the western alli-ance, we have a strong ambition for EUmembership but at the same time, we havea strong Eastern background and this is notleverage, it is a big asset for us. So, for thefuture of the global order, if there is a ten-sion between East and West, betweenNorth and South, Turkey is like laboratory…

we are representingall these and it is abig challenge. I amhappy, in spite ofthese difficulties, tolive in Turkey today,to represent Turkey,and to deal with allthese issues be-cause this createsand brings a huge

responsibility.

c. Regional Order and the Position ofTurkey

Coming to the regional order, how Turkey isresponding to several regional questions.We specified four principles to deal withregional order in theory. Practically, we haveother principle I will refer it.

i. Securing Neighbourhood

One is; we want to have a secure neighbour-hood based on common understanding ofsecurity; in the Middle East, in Balkans, inCaucasia, in Gulf because we belong to allthese regions. Turkey has a multidimen-sional character of geography. Turkey is a


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“...we want to have a secureneighbourhood based on commonunderstanding of security; in the

Middle East, in Balkans, inCaucasia, in Gulf because we

belong to all these regions. Turkeyhas a multidimensional character

of geography.”

44

Balkan country, a Middle Eastern country, aCaucasian country, a Black Sea country, aMediterranean country, a Caspian Seacountry so we have to deal with [all] thesesecurity environments around. Why are weso active in Iranian Nuclear programme? …it is not because we are defending Iran, be-cause we want to have a secure environ-ment. We do not want an Iran having a Nu-clear weapon yes, but we also do not wantany military tension in our regions… In [last]six months, we have Turkey-Bosnia-Serbiatrilateral mechanism; Iwent to Belgrade fivetimes, to Sarajevo 6times. I met Serbianminister 12 timeswithin 5 months andBosnian minister 14times. Why? Becausewe do not want a newtension in Bosnia andwe know very well, asinternational communi-ties [do], if there is anew Bosnian issue, ahot crisis, everybody[will] turn their face tothere. If there is no hotissue or crisis, there[won’t be any] attention…. Bosnia is a back-bone of Balkan issue and we have to dealwith that. As successfully we were able tosolve the main issues between Serbia andBosnia and Herzegovina. Last Saturday (24th

April 2010) we had a summit, Turkey-Bosnia-Serbia presidents of three countriesmet in Istanbul. When we started that proc-ess, nobody was even imagining that wewould achieve this; but we did. Why? Be-cause; we want to have a secure Balkan, asecure Middle East and a secure Caucasiaaround us.

Prof. Davutoglu responded the question onTurkish-Israel Relations as following:...Our relation with Israel was the relation oftwo nation-states and in Israel there is aTurkish-Jewish society living there; and itwas a bridge between Turkey and Israel. Butwhenever Israel applies policies against thevision which I described, we had really nega-tive bad relationships. In 2008, I can say,when they had a vision of peace with Syria;we run mediation, I was the mediator be-

tween two sides. Per-sonally I visited Damas-cus and Tel Aviv morethan 15 times in twoyears, in a confidentialdiplomacy, just to ar-range these indirecttalks. But when theyattacked Gaza, indis-criminately, againstthe civilian populationof Gaza, we reacted,this reaction was cor-rect and we will con-tinue to do this. Wedon’t want any poly oraction in our regionwhich is against peace

and which will risk the regional stability andsecurity environment. We cannot toleratenow what is going on in Gaza. As I said likepeople of North Afghanistan, people of ourregion –Middle East– have certain expecta-tions from Turkey.

…Our policy is clear when Israel applies apolicy compatible with our policy of peacethen there will be no problem between Tur-key and Israel. But if they continue to isolateinnocent people of Gaza, [via] creating aghetto in Gaza, today Gaza is practically a




“…Our policy is clear whenIsrael applies a policy

compatible with our policy

of peace then there will beno problem between Turkey

and Israel. But if theycontinue to isolate innocent

people of Gaza, [via]

creating a ghetto in Gaza,...

we cannot allow these tocontinue.”

45

ghetto; we cannot allow these to continue.We will defend the rights of the people ofGaza everywhere but when there is achange in Israel attitude we will be willing tocontinue all these diplomatic efforts; indirectnegotiations we can start any times. But itis up to the Israeli leadership to decide“what they want”. Do they want ‘two-statesolution’ or ‘one-state solution’ where Pales-tinians and Jewish [people] are living to-gether? Or ‘no-state solution’ which is notacceptable to anyone. We cannot afford aPalestine where there is one Jewish state ofIsrael on one side andthere is no authority, noeconomic development,and no state in the otherside. This is not sustain-able at all.

ii. Political Dialog andDiplomacy

Second principle is highlevel political dialog. In or-der to solve these issues,we think that the only in-strument in our hand ispolitical dialog and negotiation, diplomacyand political dialog. And creatively we devel-oped a new structure what we call it as“high level strategic council meetings” andwe established these mechanisms withSyria, with Iraq, with Italy, with Spain and thismonth in May, we will be doing that highlevel strategic council meetings with Greeceand Russia, with two so-called enemies forTurkey; Russia during Cold War and Greecebefore that. We want to change theseimaginations. We do not want any tension.We want to have high level political dialogand I am happy to inform you now, after twoweeks, 13th of May, Turkish Prime Ministerwill be visiting Athens with 10 ministers and

we will be having joint cabinet meeting dur-ing this difficult time of Greece because wethink that the destiny of Greece is our des-tiny. We do not want a poor neighbour andwe do not want tense neighbour relations.Two days before coming here, I had a meet-ing with our 10 ministers with whom we willbe going to Athens and the instruction ofPrime Minister was clear and I talked all ofthem, “please each of you will study what wecan do with Greece, which agreements arefavouring”, we want to have full integrationwith Greek economy. If they fail, we will fail. If

we succeed, they will suc-ceed. We want to have fullenergy, transportation, andtrade integration. I am notreferring to this crisis,when I say poor I do notwant to insult or anything,but I will say the same thingfor Armenia and NorthernIraq as well. I will come tothat point.

What I want to say is [that]we are sharing the samedestiny. We want to have

full integration with our neighbourhood. Sothat high level contact will ease the tension.And before this, Mr. Medvedev is comingand we will be having a joint cabinet withRussia.

Prof. Davutoglu responded the question onTurkish-Greek Relations as following:

About Turkish Greek relations; when I said;we have an intention to have a high levelstrategic council meeting. We did not havethis intention because there was an eco-nomic crisis in Greece, no, this is our policy.We make this offer to Greece; and now nextweek I will be in Ukraine, we will make the


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“...the destiny ofGreece is our

destiny. We do notwant a poor

neighbour and wedo not want tense

neighbourrelations.”

46

same offer to Ukraine, and to Bulgaria wedecided to have. So, with all of ourneighbours, we want to have this mecha-nism. It is not trying to help Greece, …wewant to develop economic prosperity to-gether, when I met Mr Papandreou on De-cember in order to organise this high levelstrategic council, I said “you came to ourhelp when there was an earthquake, nowthis economic crisis is like an earthquakewe have to share everything, whatever wecan do. This is not somebody’s helping toanother one. This is an issue of commondestiny. We don’t see Greece in that sensea country who needs help, no, we want toshow our solidarity as well as with a com-mon vision we want to re-establish TurkishGreek relationship based on a new para-digm”. A paradigm which will bring all stateinstitutions together, will make Aegean seaa sea of peace and prosperity. We wantTurkish mainland, Anatolia, and Aegean is-lands not a tense relationship but we wantto have energy connection to islands, wewant to have trade connections. If possibleand Schengen Regime allows we want tohave free trade, visa-free movement be-tween islands and Anatolia. Why? Because

only through these we can achieve peace,we can have a sustainable regional peace inAegean Sea. This is not a reaction to Crisisin Greece, please don’t misunderstand meand I don’t want to be misunderstood, this isan issue of vision. I am happy to say … theyhave the same vision.

iii. Economic Interdependency

Third Principle, we want to have economicinterdependency in regional environment.Economic interdependency is the best in-strument of peace because if you have eco-nomical interdependency then possible ten-sion will harm both societies and thereforethey have to react [when] there is a possibil-ity of tension. Therefore, we started to havethe policy of visa free regime with ourneighbours. We want to have full economicfreedom. And there is logic behind this.Please imagine the world map in economicsense; in the west, Germany- France-Italy,put a line; in the north Russia, in the EastChina and India, all the rest of Euro-Asia andplus Africa the biggest economy is Turkisheconomy… Because of this dynamic charac-ter, we want to have a visa free and freetrade regime around us, in order to achievethis we want to have security around us.Therefore, we said our principle, our policy;zero problems with our neighbours; [thispolicy] and visa liberalisation with ourneighbours are compatible.

Now, do you expect any low level tensionbetween Turkey and Syria? No. If I assumethat not these leaders but possible otherleaders … want to create problem betweenTurkey and Syria, [firstly] people [will] rebelagainst their leaders, I mean people of An-tep and people of Aleppo. Because, nowthey are getting benefit … [from] these goodrelations. An owner of the restaurant talk to




“We want Turkish mainland,Anatolia, and Aegean islandsnot a tense relationship but

we want to have energyconnection to islands, we

want to have trade connec-tions. If possible and

Schengen Regime allows wewant to have free trade, visa-

free movement betweenislands and Anatolia.”

47

[one of] our ministers (to Egemen Bagis)when he went there. He came and … said“Hocam all Antep people, they like you verymuch because of this visa [free policy]… onerestaurant owner said ‘before three or fourSyrian were coming everyday to have lunchor dinner to my restaurant, now everydayaround 100 or 150 people are coming andthey are making reservation from Aleppobefore coming. They are coming, havingdinner and going back to Aleppo.’” This isthe best way of peace.

Between Turkey andGeorgia; we are us-ing now Batumi Air-port as our domes-tic airport and Turk-ish citizens are go-ing to Batumi with-out passport, withshowing the identitycard, because, like Isaid, of geographicalcontinuity. Artvinwas in the hinter-land of Batumi notRize or Trabzon, people of Artvin, they weredoing everything with Batumi before. Butduring Cold War geopolitics, Batumi andArtvin were separated, alienated from eachother. Now we want to restructure this. Weare implementing full reintegration with ourneighbours and we will continue to do this.Last year, when we went to Baghdad wewere criticized that Prime Minister is takinga huge risk because of taking 10 ministerswith him to Baghdad when there were sev-eral bombardments in [there]. If there wasa terrorist attack, half of the cabined wouldbe buried in Baghdad but we said “no”. Thisis the time to have solidarity with Baghdadwith Iraq. We signed 48 agreements in onemeeting...

…I am sure those who follow Turkish politicsin 2007 [would know], all opposition leadersand many people in Turkey were makingpressure on government that; “we have toisolate Northern Iraq in the economicsense, close the border, close the HaburGate”. We resisted, we did not accept. Whybecause we believed that, the best way ofpeace is economic interdependency. TodayNorthern Iraqi economy is integrated toTurkish economy, when I went to Arbil last

year as the firstTurkish Minister ofForeign Affairsvisiting Arbil, theBazaar of Arbil;they celebrated,they welcomed andit was like a Turkishcity; Turkish adver-tisements, compa-nies etc. Now howcan you close bor-ders to them?Closing borderwould not bring

peace or security, making borders irrele-vant brings you security, like EU case. WithArmenia, of course, we want to open borderbecause we want to have full integrationwith our neighbours. But opening Turkish-Armenian border will not be enough, wehave to open Armenia-Azeri border as well.So that there will be a regional stability. Thisis a vision for the region for Caucasus, forBalkans, or for Middle East.

iv. Multi-cultural, Multi-sectarian Coexistenceand Harmony

The forth principle… is multi-cultural, multi-sectarian coexistence and harmony. Noneof these cities of countries in history were


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“With Armenia, of course, wewant to open border because wewant to have full integration with

our neighbours. But openingTurkish-Armenian border will not

be enough, we have to openArmenia-Azeri border as well.”

48

uniformed. All of them were mixed and multicultural. Let me give an example of Iraq,Yugoslavia and Afghanistan. Why thesethree states failed after the Cold War? Whynot Romania but Yugoslavia, why not Syriabut Iraq? Why not Pakistan but Afghani-stan? In one article I said: “Because of threecommon characteristics; one commoncharacteristic is; all these three states havebeen the buffer zone states throughout thehistory. Yugoslavia region between East andthe West Roman Empires; Iraq betweenSasanian and Byzantine and between Otto-mans and Safavids; Afghanistan between

British and Russian etc. Secondly all thesethree countries are on transaction roots ofeconomic trade route, silk route …. and nowenergy. But the third is more important. Allthese three countries are new models ofthe respective region. Yugoslavia was asmall Balkans; all ethnicities and all sects ofBalkans were present in Yugoslavia. Iraq isand was a mini model of Middle East; Arabs,Kurds, Turkoman, Christians, Sunnis, Shi-ites, Yazidis. Do you know, for example,…around two hundreds of thousand Sebeksare living around [Northern Iraq], they aremixed Kurdish-Turkish group; some areAlevi and some are Sunni. But they have acultural entity. Similarly in Afghanistan; Ta-jiks, Pashtuns, Uzbeks, Turkoman, Sunnis,and Shiites [are exist in a cultural entity].

Now, how can we manage these things?The only [way to manage] is; we have tokeep cities. Cities are important than coun-tries. We have to keep cities multi-cultural.When I went to Iraq in October (probably2009), first I went to Basra, … then Mosul.In all these… cities, I gave the same mes-sage: “We don’t want to have pure ShiiteBasra, Sunni should continue to stay inBasra. We don’t want to have a pure SunniMosul, a pure Kurdish Arbil. [If so] thenmany things will be lost”. Throughout thecenturies these cities were mixed. In theMiddle East, in Balkans and Caucasus nocity is uniform; historically they have beenmulticutural. But now, because of theseethnic or sectarian tensions [some] want tohave a pure Shiite Basra, some want tohave pure Sunni Mosul, [and] some want tohave pure Kurdish Arbil. This will be the endof everything in our region. Or some want tohave pure Bosniak Travnic pure Croat Mo-star, [so the] Serbian[s]… This will be theend of everything. We have to let hem to[get] mix[ed] again instead of purification ofthem. If we have mixed cities then countriescan survive. Therefore we want to have apeaceful environment.

Prof. Davutoglu responded the question onthe purification policies of Israeli state onJerusalem as following:

…

The same principle is varied for this[Palestinian-Israeli] issue. We are com-pletely against … purification, in the sense inPalestine for example. … There are certainideas when they refer to Jewish state ofIsrael, to make Israel pure Jewish state. Ithink this, from this perspective, is not com-patible with our vision. We want to haveJerusalem as the historic Jerusalem where




49

“Cities are importantthan countries.

We have to keepcities multi-cultural.”


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all religions, all ethnicities are living in peacelike the concept of peace in the name ofJerusalem. If we have pure Jewish WestJerusalem and an invaded East Jerusalemthere cannot be peace in Jerusalem. And ifthere won’t be peace in Jerusalem therecannot be peace in the region. Thereforewhat we need is a new vision, where Jewishand Muslim communities are living togetherand knowing each other; rather than sepa-rating each other, rather than creating apure Jewish part and excluding even 20percent Arab community from these Jewishlands. Or pure Palestinian land which is di-vided by a wall. This is against the history ofour region. We have to find ways how toreintegrate them.

3. Conclusion

Just to conclude [with] some importantpoints. Today we are facing a comprehen-sive issue of global order and this crisis ofglobal order is reflected to several regionalinstabilities. Turkey, as a country in the cen-tre of Africa and Eurasia, is facing all thesechallenges because of natural continuity ingeographical and historical sense. Turkeywants to reintegrate with all theseneighbouring zones and looking to theseneighbouring regions from a perspectivebased on common security, economic inter-dependency, multi-cultural coexistence andpolitical dialogue. [She] wants to have zeroproblems with all neighbours.

And with this logic which is compatible withthe European Union philosophy, we want tointegrate to EU, we want to bring EU apeaceful neighbourhood. And through EU,we want to re-establish security and free-dom in our society, because this is the onlyway of legitimacy. … We want to provide

security to our own nation only through ex-panding democratic values and expandingthe zone of freedom. Therefore we have toreform our political system. And we will beopening to new global issues in the UN Se-curity Council; [in there] we will be very ac-tive. We will be supporting the idea of trans-forming G20 into a new structure. We willbe continuing to be very active in Iran’s so-cialisation … in the future. So, none of ourforeign policy objectives is reactive. We arenot trying to respond crisis. But our foreignpolicy is visionary; a vision based on humanrights, historical continuity, geographicalcontinuity, peace and stability, and economicinterdependence. This visionary approach,we hope that, contribute [to] the surround-ing regions and [to] the global peace.

Thank you.

Note:

* CESRAN is grateful to publish this keynotelecture which has been edited by HusrevTabak. We would like to thank Husrev Tabakfor his efforts to prepare the Preface andedit the entire transcription.

Besides, CESRAN is thankful to RahmanDag and Aksel Ersoy for their eminent con-tributions to transcribing process.

50

“Turkey wants to Reintegrate withall these neighbouring zones and

looking to these neighbouringregions from a perspective based

on common security, economicinterdependency, multi-cultural

coexistence and political dialogue.[She] wants to have zero problems

with all neighbours.”

The Development ofa European UnionSecurity Culture:

Wishful Thinking or Reality?

By Paula Sandrin*

EUROPE REVIEW | By Paula Sandrin


This article attempts to an-swer the following ques-tions: Does EU have thepotential to construct asecurity culture, with com-

mon views about threat identification andthe best means to tackle them? Does theEU already possess a security culture? If so,which are its main features?

Most of the literature about the EU strate-gic culture is pessimistic about the pros-pects for its development (see for exampleRynning 2003, Hyde-Price 2004, Matlary2006 and Tardy 2007). The Union is stillreluctant to contemplate the use of forceas a policy option and is incapable of com-manding military forces aside from thoseengaged in peacekeeping and conflict reso-lution. For the EU to be considered a tradi-tional strategic actor, it must have the will-ingness and the ability to threaten the useof force through coercive diplomacy and thecapacity to actually deploy such force.

It is interesting to observe that, althoughthese authors recognize that the EU haspublished a European Security Strategy(ESS), which identify threats and responses,developed a Common Foreign and SecurityPolicy (CFSP), and within that a EuropeanSecurity and Defense Policy (ESDP), whichincludes a military capability that has beendeployed (i.e. the EU does use force) they donot consider that the EU has a strategicculture, with common views regarding theuse of force. Because the use of force bythe EU is so limited (in terms of number ofpersonnel deployed, the necessity of ap-proval by International Law, the kind of op-erations, such as Peace Support Opera-tions, it is involved), they conclude that theEU does not have a strategic culture.

I would argue that the EU does have astrategic culture: it has established whichthe threats to its security are and whichmeans it is to employ to guarantee it, in-cluding military means. The fact that theUnion does not engage in coercive diplo-macy, does not employ military means todefeat an opposed willpower, and does notsee conflicts as zero-sum, does not meanthat it is not a strategic actor. It meansthat it is a different strategic actor. In addi-tion, because the US is usually the refer-ent used to analyze the EU security poli-cies, by comparison the EU is frequentlyfound wanting. It is my view that the EU isnot lacking a strategic culture: it has one,but it is obviously different from that of theUS.

Furthermore, it is important to stress thatthe literature just mentioned is mostly con-cerned with the narrow concept of strate-gic culture, which is primarily about theuse of force. Paralleling the calls in securitystudies for the broadening and deepening

EUROPE REVIEW | By Paula Sandrin…

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the concept of security, Krause (1999) sug-gested the introduction of the concept ofsecurity culture, which builds upon thework on strategic culture but moves itaway from its emphasis on military affairsand the use of force. Security culture refersto all the means available to achieve secu-rity, including, but not restricted to, the useof force. With this perspective in mind, it ispossible to argue that the EU has developeda security culture, albeit it is constantlyevolving as the EU also is.

And which are characteristics of the EUsecurity culture? The EU conceives itself asa zone of peace and prosperity which cameabout due to a process of integration andinterdependence. Europe’s unique historicalexperience (and how it was narrated andpropagated) helped shape its strategic be-havior. The common historical memoriesare the destructiveness of the SecondWorld War, a belief in the reconciliation offormer enemies and the achievement ofpeace and prosperity through economicinterdependence and cooperative institu-tional structures (Toje 2005). The EU pre-sents itself as a force capable of bringingstability and prosperity within and withoutthe Union. In other words, the EU formu-lates and conducts a foreign and securitypolicy that derives from the way itself devel-oped (its own history and identity). The EUforeign policy preference for diplomacy overcoercion and the employment of economicsolutions to political problems reflect theUnion’s own sense of history.

The sources of insecurity to the Union arethus those that challenge its stability andprosperity (its identity features) and theUnion itself (which brought about peace andprosperity). Terrorism, organized crime,

proliferation of WMD, regional instabilityand failed states are considered threats tothe stability and prosperity of the Union.

The Union tries to distinguish itself fromthe US because it employs civilian andmilitary means and support multilateral-ism in order to handle crisis, and, moreimportantly, to prevent them (Brok andGresh 2005). Therefore, in the EU view, abroad range of instruments is required toprevent and to deal with crisis. The EU hasnow military instruments at its disposaland EU soldiers have been or are beingdeployed, but the ESS imposes limitationson the use of force: it is only allowed whenapproved by International Law (Heusgen2005).

The EU also holds a broad conception ofsecurity and links security with develop-ment. Javier Solana (2002), in a speech inthe annual conference of the EU Institutefor Security Studies, stated that: “since thebeginning of the European project,[Europeans] have developed a specific cul-ture of security, based on conflictprevention, political management of crisis,and taking account of the economic and

...A European Union Security Culture...

EUROPE REVIEW | By Paula Sandrin

“The EU conceives itself asa zone of peace and

prosperity which cameabout due to a process of

integration andinterdependence.”


social root causes of conflict” (quoted onTardy 2007, p. 551).

Hence, the EU combines long-term strate-gies addressing the root causes of conflict,such as underdevelopment, inequality andviolations of human rights, and a short-termaction dealing with the immediate causes ofinstability. The use of force is one of themany and varied instruments used in con-flict prevention and crisis management.

Therefore, EU does have a security culture:it has common assumptions on what consti-tutes insecurities and the best way to tacklethem. The EU, conceived as a zone of peaceand prosperity brought about by a processof integration and interdependence, be-haves in the international system in a waythat reflects its identity construction andhistory. Finally, its main features are a pref-erence to tackle threats to its stability andprosperity through non-coercive civilianmeans which the EU believes addresses toroot causes of conflict.

Note:

* Paula Sandrin is a Doctoral Researcherat the University of Westminster.

References:

Brok, Elmar and Gresch, Norbert (2005).“Paving the Way to a European Cultureof Security”. In: Oxford Journal on GoodGovernance 2 (1): 17.

Heusgen, Christoph (2005) “Is there sucha thing as a European Strategic Cul-ture?”. In: Oxford Journal on Good Gov-ernance 2 (1): 29.

Hyde-Price, Adrian (2004). “EuropeanSecurity, Strategic Culture, and the Useof Force”. In: European Security 13(4):323.

Krause, Keith (1999). “Cross-Cultural Di-mension of Multilateral Non-Proliferationand Arms Control Dialogues: An Over-view”. In Krause, Keith (ed.). Culture andSecurity: Multilateralism, Arms Controland Security Building. London: FrankClass.

Matlary, Janne Haaland (2006). “WhenSoft Power Turns Hard: Is an EU Strate-gic Culture Possible?”. In: Security Dia-logue 37: 105.

Rynning, Sten (2003). “The European Un-ion: Towards a Strategic Culture?”. In:Security Dialogue (34): 479.

Tardy, Thierry (2007). “The European Un-ion: From Conflict Prevention to‘Preventive Engagement,’ Still a CivilianPower Lacking a Strategic Culture”. In:International Journal 62 (3): 539.

Toje, Asle (2005). “Introduction: The EUStrategic Culture”. In: Oxford Journal onGood Governance 2 (1): 11.

EUROPE REVIEW | By Paula Sandrin..

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“The EU, conceived as a zone ofpeace and prosperity brought

about by a process of integrationand interdependence, behaves inthe international system in a way

that reflects its identityconstruction and history.”


EUROPE REVIEW | By Dr. Dilek Yigit


The European Union

as a Normative Power

and the Western Balkans

By Dr. Dilek Yigit*

55

The Western Balkan countrieshave gone through political andeconomic reform process inwhich the European Union (EU)plays a major role. The effective-

ness of the EU’s role in the region has beenincreased through the prospect of EU mem-bership, since the clear EU perspective notonly enhances the weight of the EU in tacklingpolitical and economic challenges in the re-gion but also provides encouragement forpolitical and economic reform in the WesternBalkan countries.

Croatia applied for EU member-ship on 21 February 2003,its status as a candidatecountry was confirmed bythe European Council inJune 2004. The acces-sion negotiations be-tween the EU and Croa-tia started in October2005, and as of 20April 2010 the negotia-tions have been openedprovisionally on 30 out of35 chapters and provision-ally closed on 18 chapters.The Council is supposed to setup the ad-hoc technical workinggroup for the Accession Treaty with Croatia,and Croatia’s accession negotiations with theEU may be concluded within a few years. TheFormer Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia ap-plied for EU membership on 22 March 2004,the Council invited the Commission to submitits opinion on the application on 17 May2004, and the European Council grantedcandidate status on 16 December 2005.Montenegro applied for EU membership on15 December 2008 and the Council re-quested the Commission to prepare an opin-ion on the application on 23 April 2009. Alba-nia applied for EU membership in April 2009,

Serbia submitted its application for EU mem-bership in December 2009. Bosnia and Her-zegovina’s EU perspective was confirmed inThessaloniki European Council in June 2003,when Bosnia and Herzegovina became a po-tential candidate country for EU accession.Among the Western Balkan countries, as theCouncil of the European Union points out“Kosovo constitutes a sui generis case.”United Nations Security Council Resolution1244 established the United Nations InterimAdministration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) inJune 1999, and the status negotiations were

started under the auspices of the UNSpecial Envoy in February 2006.

The EU supports Kosovo's eco-nomic and political develop-

ment through underliningthat Kosovo has a Europeanperspective.

These developments inthe relations between theEU and the Western Bal-kan countries address the

fact that their future lies inthe EU. In the light of this

fact, the question of how theEuropean Union has succeeded

in increasing its weight in tacklingpolitical and economic challenges in the

region requires a satisfactory answer.

The answer to this question should build onthe conception of the EU as a civilian powersuggested by Duchene in the early 1970sand on six factors shaping norm diffusion ininternational relations suggested by Manners.After Duchene introduced the conception ofthe European Union as a “civilian power”,much attention was paid to the question ofwhy the EU is a civilian/normative powerrather than whether or not it is a civilian/normative power, for it is indeed impossible toconceive the EU’s international role without


Croatia’s Coat of Arms


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referring to its economic and political means.Although the Common Foreign and SecurityPolicy (CFSP) and the European Security andDefence Policy are regarded by some schol-ars as the militarisation of the EU risking itsnormative power, the concept of normativepower is still the main starting point in analy-sis of the EU’s foreign policy, and, as Sjursenpoints out “the conception of the EU as a nor-mative/civilizing power has provided a fruitfulavenue for research...”

If the EU is conceptualised as a normativepower, the relationshipbetween the EU and theWestern Balkan coun-tries should be an exam-ple of demonstrating theway in which the EU as anormative power diffuseits norms through thefactors suggested byManners.

In a general sense, a nor-mative/civilian power canbe defined as a powerpromoting its norms through using civilianinstruments. At this point, the question of howthe EU promote or diffuse its norms shouldbe answered. To answer this question, what isneeded is to understand six factors fromwhich the EU’s normative power stems- “overtdif fusion”, “ informational diffusion”,“contagion”, “transference”, “procedural diffu-sion” and “the cultural filter.”Manners statesthat “What has been significant in these normdiffusion factors was the relative absence ofphysical force in the imposition of norms.”

Manners defines “overt diffusion” as “a re-sult of the presence of the EU in third coun-tries and international organizations”. Thephysical presence of the EU, as the delega-tions of the Commission and the member

states’ embassies, contributes to the diffu-sion of EU norms. The example of overt diffu-sion is seen in the EU’s relations with theWestern Balkan countries. The EU has theEC Delegations in Zagreb, Tiran, Sarajevo,Podgorica, Belgrade, Skopje and the LiaisonOffice in Kosovo. The EC Delegations in theWestern Balkan countries have focused onthe political, economic and trade relationsand monitoring the Western Balkan coun-tries’ progress towards EU membership.And, the EU has sent EU Special Represen-tative (EUSR) to Bosnia and Herzegovina so

as to monitor Bosnia andHerzegovina’s transition topeaceful and viable democ-racy.

M a n n e r s d e f i n e s“informational diffusion” as“the result of the range ofstrategic communications,such as new policy initiativeby the EU, and declaratorycommunications, such asinitiatives from the presi-dency of the EU or the

president of the Commission”. In this context,the Progress Reports and EnlargementStrategies which assessing the progressmade by the Western Balkan countries ascandidates, and the Presidency Conclusionsincluding statements on the region, can beregarded as the examples of informationaldiffusion in the region. For example, in thePresidency Conclusions December 2006, itis stated that the future of the West Balkanslies in the European Union. As regards newpolicy initiatives, achieving visa-free travel canbe regarded as an example of new initiativeslaunched by the EU. In 2008 the Commissionpresented a road map for visa liberalisationwith Albania and Bosnia-Herzegovina. In July2009, a visa-free regime was proposed bythe Commission for the Former Yugoslav

...“the conceptionof the EU as a

normative/civilizing powerhas provided a

fruitful avenue forresearch...”



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Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro and Ser-bia. In November 2009 the Former YugoslavRepublic of Macedonia, Montenegro and Ser-bia were granted visa free travel to theSchengen area as of 19 December 2009 bythe decision of the Council.

Another factor shaping norm diffusion is“contagion”, which refers that the EU hasbecome an example of regional integrationthrough “exporting its experiment in regionalintegration” This factor can not be easily appli-cable to the Western Balkans, since theWestern Balkan countries have given mainpriority to EU accession rather than regionalcooperation initiatives. There are three mainregional initiatives in the region; Central Euro-pean Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA), theRegional Cooperation Council (RCC), and theRegional School for Public Administration(ReSPA). The parties of CEFTA are Albania,Bosnia-Herzegovina, Moldova, Serbia, Monte-negro and Kosovo, and the aim of this agree-ment is to establish a free trade zone in theregion. The EU regards CEFTA as a processcomplementing the Stabilisation and Associa-tion Process. The RCC launched in February2008 aims to maintain close relations amongcountries in the region especially in six areas;economic and social development, energy andinfrastructure, justice and home affairs, secu-rity cooperation, building human capital, andparliamentary cooperation. ReSPA aims tostrengthen regional cooperation in the field ofpublic administration and help the participat-ing countries to meet membership criteria.The EU supports the regional cooperation inthe region through providing technical andfinancial assistance; nonetheless progress inregional cooperation is not satisfactory. TheEuropean Commission indicated in 2009 that“Disagreements relating to the Participationof Kosovo in regional meetings, initiatives andagreements are becoming an obstacle toregional cooperation. The normal functioning

of important structures such as the CentralEuropean Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA),the Regional Cooperation Council (RCC), orthe Regional School for Public Administration(ReSPA) could be jeopardised, if present prac-tices do not change.”

As regards “transference”, Manners defines itas “a diffusion takes place when the EU ex-change goods, trade, aid or technical assis-tance with third parties through largely sub-stantive or financial means.” Examples oftransference diffusion also can be seen in theEU’s relations with the Western Balkan coun-tries. The EU signed Stabilisation and Associa-tion Agreements (SAA) with Croatia, the For-mer Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Albania,Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro, Serbia inthe last decade, these agreements are partsof Stabilisation and Association Process,which aims to establish contractual relation-ship between the EU and the Western Balkancountries, increase trade between partners,and ensure peace and stability in the region.As a result of ratification of SAAs or InterimAgreements on trade and trade-related mat-ters, the EU countries have become maintrading partners of the Western Balkan coun-tries. In 2000, The EU created the“exceptional unlimited duty-free access to theEU market” for certain goods originating in the

Western Balkans



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region. In 2008, EU’s good exports to theBalkans were increased to 32,5 billion Euroand good imports from the region amountedto 13,9 billion Euro. Since the current prefer-ential regime is due expire in the end of2010, on 22 February 2010 the Commissionproposed to prolong the preferential regimeuntil 31 December 2015. The Western Bal-kan countries have been receiving EU financialaid under the Instrument for Pre-accessionAssistance (IPA) since 2007. The Commis-sion pointed out that “IPA streamlines all pre-accession assistance within a single frame-work. It places more focus on ownership ofimplementation by the beneficiary countries,on support for cross-border cooperation, andon “learning by doing”.It prepares candidatecountries to implementthe regional, social,rural development andcohesion funds uponaccession.” Under thecurrent (2007-2013)financial framework,the total pre-accessionfunding is 11.5 billionEuro. In 2008 146 million Euro for Croatia,70.2 million Euro for the Former YugoslavRepublic of Macedonia, 70.7 million Euro forAlbania, 74.8 million Euro for Bosnia-Herzegovina, 184.7 million Euro for Kosovowere allocated, in 2009 33.3 million Euro forMontenegro and 194.8 million Euro for Ser-bia were allocated. The European Union is thelargest donor to the region.

The fifth and sixth factors from which Euro-pean normative power stems are “the cul-tural filter” and “procedural diffusion.” Man-ners points out that “Procedural diffusioninvolves the institutionalisation of relationshipbetween the EU and a third party, such asinter-regional cooperation agreement, mem-bership of an international organization or

enlargement of the EU itself.” Moreover, “Thecultural filter is based on the interplay be-tween the construction of knowledge and thecreation of social and political identity by thesubjects of diffusion.” As it is seen, Mannersstates that the EU’s enlargement policy is anexample of procedural diffusion, but the EU’senlargement is also an example of the cul-tural filter, for the EU promotes its democ-ratic norms through its enlargement policy. Inthe article 49 of the Treaty on the EuropeanUnion, it is stated that “any European statewhich respects the principles of liberty, de-mocracy, human rights and fundamental free-doms, and the rule of law may apply to join theUnion.” At the Copenhagen summit in 1993,

the basic conditions formembership were laiddown. These criteriaare;

Stable institutionsguaranteeing democ-racy, the rule of law,human rights and re-spect for and protec-tion of minorities,

A functioning market economy and thecapacity to cope with competitive pressureand market forces within the Union

The ability to take on the obligations ofmembership, including support fort he aimsof the Union. They must have a public ad-ministration capable of applying and manag-ing EU laws in practice.

The Western Balkan countries as candi-dates for EU membership have to meet thisset of membership criteria to accede theUnion. To what extent the candidates meetthe membership criteria is assessed in theProgress Reports published by the Commis-sion each autumn. If the candidate countryfails to meet the membership criteria, theaccession process is halted or slow down.As the Commission acknowledges in its



“any European state whichrespects the principles of

liberty, democracy, humanrights and fundamental

freedoms, and the rule of lawmay apply to join the Union.”

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Communication in 2009 that “Progress withreforms in the enlargement countries hasallowed them to move through successivestages in the accession process.” That is why,the EU’s enlargement policy leads the diffu-sion of political and economic norms of theUnion in the Western Balkans through ena-bling not only the Union to induce reforms inthese countries, but also the Western Balkancountries’ governments to provide justifica-tion for political and economic reform.

Building on the concept of the normativepower and the factors shaping EU norm diffu-sion, we see that the EU has been increasingits weight in the Western Balkans as a nor-mative actor through civilian instruments. Themajor policy instrument of the EU to promoteEU norms effectively in the Western Balkansis its enlargement policy, for what enables theWestern Balkan countries to be committedto the economic and political reform is theprospect of EU membership.

Note:* Dilek Yigit is a Chief of Division atUndersecretariat of Treasury, TurkeyEmail: [email protected]

References:1) Kosova under UN Security Council Resolution1244/99-profile; Political relations with EU,h t t p : / / e c . e u r o p a . e u / e n l a r g e m e n t /potentialcountries/kosova/relation, accessedon 07.04.2010.2) Ibid.3) Sjursen, Helene, (2006), “What kind ofpower?”. Journal of European Public Policy, Vol.13, No.2, p.170.4) Manners, Ian, (2002) “ Normative PowerEurope: A Contradiction in Terms?”, Journal ofCommon Market Studies, Vol. 40, No.2, pp. 244-245.5) Manners, Ian, (2006), “Normative PowerEurope reconsidered: Beyond the Crossroads”,Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 13, No: 2,p. 184.

6) OHR Office of the High Representative-OHRIntroduction, www.ohr.int, accessed on01.04.2010.7) Manners, Ian, (2002), p. 244.8) Council of the European Union, Visa Liberalisa-tion for Western Balkan Countries, Brussels,16640/09 (Presse 349), Brussels, 30 Novem-ber 2009.9) Manners, Ian, (2002), p. 244.10) European Commission: Trade:Balkans(Bilateral relations, http://ec.europa.eu/trade/creating-opportunities/bilateralrelations/regions/balkans, accessed on 26.04.2010.11) http://www.rcc.int, accessed on19.04.2010.12) http://www.respaweb.eu, accessed on19.04.2010.13) Communication from the Commission to theEuropean Parliament and the Council, COM(2009) 533, 14.10.2009.14) Manners, Ian, 2002, p.245.15) Stabilisation and Association Process,http://europa.eu/scadplus/glossary, accessedon 19.04.2010.16) European Commission Directorate-Generalfor Trade, Press release-the Balkans, Brussels,22 February 2010, http://trade.ec.europa.eu,accessed on 26.04.2010.17) European Commission: Trade:Balkans(Bilateral relations, http://ec.europa.eu/trade/creating-opportunities/bilateralrelations/regions/balkans, accessed on 26.04.2010.18) Ibid.19) Communication from the Commission to theEuropean Parliament and the Council, COM(2008) 127 final, 5.3.2008.20) Instrument for pre-accession assistance(IPA), http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement, ac-cessed on 19.04.2010.21) http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/candidatecountries, accessed on 19.04.2010.22) Manners, Ian, 2002, p.244.23) Enlargement: Uniting a continent, http://europa.eu/pol/en larg , accessed on20.04.2010.24) Communication from the Commission to theEuropean Parliament and the Council, COM(2009) 533, 14.10.2009.



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www.ohr.int

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EUROPE REVIEW | By Assist. Prof. Fusun Ozerdem


Enhancing Peace, Security andStability in Western Balkans

Through EU Membership andKosovo Issue

By Assist. Prof. Fusun Ozerdem*

62

On 1 May 2004, the Euro-pean Union (EU) undertookits biggest enlargementwith ten new MemberStates. Two more Member

States, Bulgaria and Romania followed thisexpansion on 1 January 2007. Currently,Turkey, Croatia and the former YugoslavRepublic of Macedonia are candidate coun-tries and the negotiation process wasopened with Turkey and Croatia on 3 Octo-ber 2005. Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina,Montenegro, Serbia and Kosovo (under UNSecurity Council Resolution 1244) in theWestern Balkans region are considered po-tential candidate countries.

Candidate countries need to fulfil the Copen-hagen criteria which are a range of eco-nomic and political conditions in order to jointhe EU which provides financial assistancefor improving infrastructure and economicand political systems to candidate countries.The Stabilisation and Association Process(SAP) is the EU’s policy for Western Balkans.On November 2000, at the Zagreb Summit,the SAP is launced for Albania, Macedonia,Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and theFederal Republic of Yugoslavia. Croatia andMacedonia, which are candidate countries,remain part of this process. A year after, theCommunity Assistance for ReconstructionDevelopment and Stabili-sation (CARDS) pro-gramme is specificallydesigned for SAP coun-tries. The new Instru-ment for Pre-AccessionAssistance (IPA) re-places the CARDS andcovers candidate andpotential candidatecountries.

The Stabilisation and Association Agree-ment’s aim, which is signed between the EUand Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montene-gro, Serbia is to support these countries’economic transition and to strengthen theirintegration into the EU Single Market. TheAgreement covers reforms from politicaldialogue to freedoms in the movement ofgoods, services, workers and capital andrequires trade liberalization. Also regionalcooperation is another emphasized area.However, the experience shows that thecountries in the region are facing a numberof problems with their EU accession process,some of which are related to their recenthistory with the disintegration of formerYugoslavia. Therefore, the objective of thisarticle is to identify the main challenges withthe EU membership process of these West-ern Balkans countries and as the review willshow unless there is a resolution with theKosovo issue in the near future, the hopesfor security and stability through EU mem-bership will need to wait for a long time. How-ever, before that it is important to do a quickstocktaking of Western Balkan countries EUmembership processes.

ALBANIA

The formal bilateral relationships betweenAlbania and the EU was initiated with the

Trade and Co-operationAgreement which wassigned in 1992. With thisAgreement, Albania be-came eligible for fundingunder the EU’s Phare pro-gramme. In 1999, thenew Stabilisation and As-sociat ion AgreementProcess (SAP) was pro-posed to five South-Eastern Europe countries,

Enhancing Peace, Security and StabilityEUROPE REVIEW | By Assist. Prof. Fusun Ozerdem


“Albania,Bosnia-

Herzegovina,Montenegro, Serbiaand Kosovo ... in

the WesternBalkans region are

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63

including Albania. At the Feira Euro-pean Council in June 2000, the SAPc o u n t r i e s ( A l b a n i a , B o s n i a -Herzegovina, Croatia, the former Yugo-slav Republic of Macedonia, Montene-gro and Serbia, including Kosovo asdefined by resolution 1244 of the UNSecurity Council) were announced aspotential candidates for EU member-ship. At Thessaloniki European Councilin June 2003, the SAP was confirmedas the EU policy for the Western Bal-kans and finally, on 28 April 2009,Albania, submitted its application forEU membership.

BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA

The history of institutional relationshipsbetween Bosnia-Herzegovina and theEU started by the establishment ofpolitical and economic conditionality forthe development of bilateral relationsin 1997. In 1998, the EU-Bosnia andHerzegovina Consultative Task Forcewas established and after the Thessa-loniki European Council, the negotia-tions for Stabilisation and AssociationAgreement (SAA) were officiallyopened in Sarajevo on 25 November2005 and on 16 June 2008, SAA wassigned. It will enter into force once its ratifi-cation process has been completed.

MONTENEGRO

After the Thessaloniki European Council, theEnhanced Permanent Dialogue between theEU and the State Union of Serbia and Monte-negro was launced in July 2003. Accordingto the referendum on independence on 21May 2006, a majority of Montenegrin optedfor the independence of Montenegro. The EUCouncil declared Montenegro as a sover-eign, independent state on 12 June 2006and adopted a negotiating mandate for a

Stabilisation and Association Agreement(SAA) with Montenegro. On 15 October2007, the SAA was signed in Luxembourgand Montenegro submitted its applicationfor EU membership on 15 December 2008.

KOSOVO

After the new Stabilisation and AssociationProcess (SAP) was proposed by the EU, theUnited Nations Security Council Resolution1244 established the United Nations InterimAdministration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) inJune 1999. On 17 February 2008, the Kos-ovo Assembly adopted a resolution which

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declared Kosovo as an independent state.The European Council recalled the EU’s“willingness to assist the economic and politi-cal development of Kosovo through a clearEuropean Perspective, in line with the Euro-pean Perspective of the region” on 19-20June 2008.

In order to establish all ‘decision makers’ inKosovo requires a substantial endeavour.Kosovo Force (KFOR) that deployed the big-gest military base in Europe - Camp Bond-steel seems to stands at the top of the hier-archy. Then there are the institutions whichare under the control of KFOR, while at the

third level, there are UNMIK and thoseEU institutions – International CivilianOffice (ICO) and European Union Rule ofLaw Mission in Kosovo (EULEX) whichhave the same authority as UNMIK. Atthe bottom of this sovereignty hierarchy,there is Kosovo Government, and Bel-grad Government acting as protectiveforce of Kosovo Serbians.

Kosovo considers the full membership tothe EU as an absolute priority and hopesto reach to this aim in 2015, and withthe aim of accomplishing its commit-ments for the international community,Kosovo will need to concentrate onthe integration of minorities, institutionalstability and parliamentary administra-tion. However, it should be noted thatthe full member states, Spain, Greece,Cyprus, Slovakia and Romania do notrecognize Kosovo as an independentcountry and therefore, how the EU canstart stabilisation and association proc-ess with a state that is not recognized byall of its 27 member states and dealwith the Stabilisation and AssociationAgreement? On the other hand, it shouldnot be forgotten that all of 27 memberstates are deployed as EULEX in spite ofthe fact that five states do not recognize

Kosovo.

SERBIA

After breaking up of Yugoslavia, ethnic ten-sions which were provoked by nationalistpolitical leaders turned into wars and ethniccleansing tactics in the Balkans. The conflictscontinued successively as Serbians againstCroatians (1991-1995), Serbians againstBosnian and Croatians (1992-1995) andSerbians against Kosovans (1998-1999).However, having been tested by the interna-tional community and accessed to somediplomatic and military sources in recent



years, Serbia, the “heart” of Old Yugoslavia,now does all it can for a EU membership.After the Stabilisation and Association Proc-ess (SAP) was confirmed as the EU policy forthe Western Balkans, including Serbia, theP r o c e s s ’Agreementnegotiationscalled offdue to lackof progresson Serbia’sc o -o p e r a t i o nwith theI n t e r n a -tional Crimi-nal Tribunalfor the for-mer Yugo-slavia (ICTY) on 3 May 2006. After the clearcommitment of Serbia to achieve full coop-eration with the ICTY, the SAA was signed inon 29 April 2008 and Serbia submitted itsapplication for EU membership on 22 De-cember 2009.

Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independ-ence in February 2008, political instability inBosnia and Herzegovina, the Croatian geno-cide claim against Serbians, the failure withthe arrest of General Mladic and bordersproblems with former Yugoslavian countriesaffected the Serbia’s EU membership aspira-tions negatively. Spain’s Presidency has be-gun on 1 January 2010 and Spain is one ofthe five countries who have not recognizedKosovo’s independence. Spain feels anxietythat this can encourage its own separatistsin Pais Vasco and Catalan regions. Overall,the relations between Serbia and her south-ern neighbour and old province Kosovo hasall the characteristics of a test in the way ofSerbia’s EU membership. The EU does notwant to face with a similar problem that was

brought by the membership of a dividedCyprus in 2004. Consequently it has notgiven a green light to the Serbian member-ship unless there is a peaceful resolutionbetween Serbia and Kosovo.

These days,Serbia andKosovo havecarried theconflict to ad i p l om a t i clevel, as Ser-bia disaf-firmed Kos-ovo’s decla-ration ofi n d e p e n d -ence by ap-

plying to the International Court of Justice(ICJ). Both sides hope that the ICJ’s decisionwill in a way determine the Kosovo’s finalstatus with statehood. This new ‘diplomatic’period issue between Serbia and Kosovo hasalready had a number of serious ramifica-tions. Serbia has recently recalled its Ambas-sador to Montenegro upon request of thelatter’s desire of diplomatic relations withKosovo. Also, President of Serbia, Mr. Tadicboycotted Croatia’s new President Ivo Josi-povic’s oath-taking on the grounds of Kos-ovo’s President Mr. Fatmir Sejdiu’s appear-ance at the same ceremony. AdditionallySerbia refuses negotiations with Kosovo andinsists on UNMIK representation to the oldSerbian province.

On the other hand, after the bloody conflict of

1990s, there has been a recovery of rela-tions is between Serbia and Croatia in recent

times. With the election of the social democ-

rat Ivo Josipović as President in Croatia has

created opportunities for the resolutions ofgenocide claims in a more political and diplo-

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matic way. For example, the Serbian govern-

ment promised the broadcasting of a decla-ration, condemning the events in Srebrenica

which was resulted over 8.000 slaughteredBosniacs. Moreover, Croatia which is plan-

ning to accomplish its EU accession processsoon, declared that it will help other Balkan

countries in harmonizing national laws to the

EU legislations. Serbia’s relation with Bosniaand Herzegovina is also carrying a special

meaning. The tensions between ethnic Serbsand the international community in the coun-

try increased in recent years. With the Day-

ton Agreement signed in 1995 Bosnia andHerzegovina is under the protection of the

international community through the Officeof High Representative, and the possible

disintegration of the country can easily cre-ate a domino effect in the entire region.

CONCLUSION

After the horrific experiences of armed con-

flicts in the Western Balkans in the 1990s,

the most urgent priority remains to be themaintenance peace and stability. Although

the countries of the region have movedcloser to the EU over the past two years,

their security, stability and well-being are still

challenging issues. The focussed attention isthe status of Kosovo and this needs to be

resolved in order to progress with the mem-bership process of not only Kosovo itself but

also Serbia. The EU perspective can be thebest equilibrium key for his issue. The popula-

tions of these countries experienced all

means of vandalism and racialism in the re-gion are understandably highly favourable to

an EU integration. The governments like thepublic opinion, should commit themselves to

support for strengthening the rule of law,

good governance, judicial and administrativereform and the development of civil society.

For supporting this intention, the EU should

continue initiatives to make more visible andconcrete membership prospects.

As good neighbourly relationships are a keyelement towards EU membership, the bilat-

eral issues have to be resolved with mutuallyacceptable solutions. By the support of In-

strument for Pre-Accession Assistance

(IPA), the governments with the civil societycan find the way of utilising for the region’s

modernisation and development in mostareas. To achieve it, every Western Balkan

country should set out its priorities and thenthe EU should assist them in reform and

reconciliation. For example, Croatia should

address the Ecological and Fisheries Protec-tion Zone in line with the European Council

conclusions without any delay, if it would notlike to see any problems during the Acces-

sion Negotiations. With this endeavour, Croa-

tia can also send a good signal to otherWestern Balkan countries about fulfilling thenecessary conditions. Montenegro should

begin to implement her constitution which isin line with European standards. As adminis-

trative reform and capacity are a key element



“After the horrificexperiences of armed

conflicts in the WesternBalkans in the 1990s,

the most urgentpriority remains to be

the maintenance peaceand stability.”

67

for Montenegro, efforts to fight corruptionand organised crime should be continued

and supported. Bosnia and Herzegovinashould meet the capable of functional and

effective institutions; also continue the coop-

eration with ICTY.

With Albania’s balanced position on the Kos-ovo issue, it should contribute to the re-

gional stability positively. Considering that

there are close historical and socio-culturallinks between Albania and Kosovo, the for-

mer could in fact, play a more active role inthe resolution of Kosovo issue. With its own

EU membership aspirations, Albania hasstrong incentives to encourage Kosovo in

finding a common ground with Serbia when

it comes to a number of controversial is-sues such as the future of Serb minority and

Christian Orthodox cultural heritage in Kos-ovo. However, it is also important that Alba-

nia’s political leaders should endeavour for

strengthening the rule of law in their countryand make fight against corruption and or-

ganised crime a primary objective. This isparticularly important after the EU’s unde-

sirable experience with the membership ofRomania and Bulgaria in relation to these

particular governance chal-

lenges.

Overall, the implementation ofthe Stabilisation and Association

Agreement is very important forAlbania, Montenegro, Bosnia

and Herzegovina and Serbia.

Especially for Serbia, full coop-eration with the International

Criminal Tribunal for formerYugoslavia is essential take im-

portant steps on the way of full

membership. Kosovo has a clearand concrete EU perspective

and therefore the EU should use availableinstruments. Mr Stefan Füle, the EU Com-

missioner for Enlargement visited Kosovoafter Serbia, Montenegro and Bosnia and

Herzegovina in March 2010, which was an

important signal for all Western Balkansand other European countries. Fulfilling all

necessary conditions would likely to bringconcrete benefits for all regional countries,

as it is imperative to remember that the

future of the Western Balkans lies in the EU.However, unless there is a sustainable solu-

tion with the future of Kosovo, the plans forpeace, security and stability through EU

membership in the Western Balkans arelikely to remain a futile exercise. The way the

countries of Western Balkans are very

closely linked with each other in terms oftheir history, demographics and socio-

cultural structures, a regional approach tothe problem is clearly imperative, however,

Kosovo continues to be the key issue in this

bigger picture.

Note:* Fusun Ozerdem is an Assist. Prof. in

Department of International Relations atTrakya University.

EUROPE REVIEW | By Assist. Prof. Fusun Ozerdem

Mr. Stefan Füle

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EURASIA REVIEW | By Paul Richardson

69

In the Deep Freeze?A Cold War Legacy andthe Visa-Free ProgrammeBetween Russia and JapanBy Paul Richardson*

The Southern Kurils arethree islands (Iturup, Kun-ashir, Shikotan) and a clus-ter of rocky islets that lie offthe north-east coast of

Hokkaido. The Japanese collectively refer tothem as the Northern Territories. Until theend of the Second World War the entireKuril chain as far as Kamchatka belongedto Japan however in August and Septem-ber 1945 the Soviet military swept downthe chain, imprisoning the Japanese sol-diers and a few years later repatriating allthe Japanese civilian residents. Today, theJapanese government claims the SouthernKurils (Northern Territories) but they re-main de facto part of the Russian Federa-tion, falling under the administrative juris-diction of Sakhalin region. As both sidestirelessly assert their rights to the islandsaccording to geography, first-discovery,development, and international law, thedispute remains as far away as ever frombeing solved. This unresolved territorialdispute has so far prevented both sidessigning a post-war peace treaty.

Most Russian visitors to Japan, and Japa-nese visitors to Russia, require a visa. How-ever, for the Russian residents and formerJapanese residents of these wind-swept,fog-bound and disputed islands there existsan unusual visa-free regime over them.Almost nine thousand Japanese have vis-ited the Southern Kuril Islands, and someseven thousand Russians who live therehave travelled to Japan on the visa-freeexchange programme existing between thetwo countries since 1992(1). For the Japa-nese, the process of regularly visiting andtending ancestral graves on the islandsbecame possible and the Japanese guestswere also invited into Russian homes andwere able to introduce Japanese culture to

the local residents. Japanese humanitarianassistance also became an important partof the visa-free programme, particularlyafter an earthquake and tsunami devas-tated the islands’ infrastructure in 1994.

The official aim of the exchange pro-gramme is to promote mutual understand-ing and friendship between the Russian andJapanese participants, and reflecting on itssuccesses in 2005 the then Sakhalin Gov-ernor, Ivan Malakhov, explained that it hadpermitted an ‘increasing number of citizensof both countries to meet with the habits,

culture and way of life of their neighboursand in this way further the development offriendship and good neighbourly rela-tions'(2). Many Kuril islanders participatingin the exchange also relish the chance tovisit Japan and stock up on consumergoods and food products which are usuallycheaper and more available than on theislands themselves. The visa-free exchangeprogramme has contributed to a break-down of outdated stereotypes and in-creased mutual understanding amongst itsparticipants, who now ‘invite each otherinto their homes as friends, not enemies - aremarkable achievement when a few years

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“Until the end of theSecond World War the

entire Kuril chain as far asKamchatka belonged to

Japan however in Augustand September 1945 theSoviet Union swept down

the chain...”

earlier this was one of the front lines of theCold War(3).

The Ministries of Foreign Affairs of Russiaand Japan agreed that visa-free visitswould take place under the premise of notharming the legal positions of either Japanor Russia in regard to the disputed islands(4). However, too often the programme hasbeen manipulated for political ends. Thegovernors of Hokkaido (including the cur-rent governor, Harumi Takahashi) havevisited the disputed islands in visa-freegroups, the Japanese participants attendworkshops and seminars detailing the pro-cedures of the visit as well as remindingthem of the Japanese government’s claimon the islands which include warningsabout not saying anything that might under-mine this, and also the committee incharge of managing the exchange pro-gramme on Hokkaido includes the North-ern Alliance (Hoppo Domei) - a key group inthe Northern Territories Return Movement(5).

On the Russian side, the chairman of theSakhalin commission for managing the visa-free travel of Russian and Japanese citi-zens is Sergei Ponomarev - a deputy in theSakhalin Regional Parliament and co-ordinator of the parliamentary faction ‘Forthe Russian Kurils!’ (a group against anykind of territorial compromise with Japan)

(6). For his part, Ponomarev sees only thedarkest geopolitical motivations behind thevisa-free programme. He fulminatesagainst what he sees as the inherently po-litical aspects of Japanese visa-free visits tothe islands, which he believes are:

“ Directed at fixing thedependency of the citi-zens of the Kurils onJapan, continuing eco-nomic stagnation on

the islands and neutralising thepatriotic feelings of the population,thus creating an atmosphere ofuncertainly for the future and, ulti-mately, the seizure of the Islandsfrom Russia and the destruction ofits territorial integrity(7).”

Such patriotic rhetoric again bubbled to thesurface in July 2009 after Japan’s parlia-ment passed amendments to a bill on the‘Northern Territories’ which named theSouthern Kurils ‘the historical territory ofJapan’(8). The response in Moscow wasswift with the Russian parliament declaringthat the peace treaty talks with Japan werenow ‘pointless’ unless Tokyo cancelled thelegislation(9). A resolution was approved inthe Federal Council (the upper house of theRussian parliament) denouncing the Japa-nese declaration as ‘a deeply unfriendly

The visa -free Programm

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gesture, which is offensive for the Russianpeople, who are always friendly towardsJapan’(10). The Federal Council at thesame time appealed to President Medve-dev to consider introducing a moratoriumon the visa-free travel between the South-ern Kurils and Japan(11).

At the local level, the head of the Kuril dis-trict, Nikolai Razumishkin, told a Japanesedelegation on July 8 2009 that the islandof Iturup would henceforth suspend visa-free travel, stating that it will not resume‘until the Japanese government annuls thisbill’(12). Igor Koval’, chairmanof the South Kuril districtlegislative assembly, alsostated that Shikotan andKunashir could similarly stopthe exchanges, stating that‘we hold in very poor regardthe current Japanese law…itcancels everything that wasachieved over the last 17years with the exchange be-tween our citizens’(13). Nev-ertheless, the protests of thedeputies from the Kurils hadlittle consequence for the programme andthe visa-free travel of Russians and Japa-nese has continued. Unfortunately, the is-sue resurfaced again when in May 2010 itwas reported that an association of depu-ties had again been created in the Japa-nese Parliament who intended to inten-sively campaign for the resolution of the‘Northern Territories’ problem. The depu-ties urged Japanese citizens to use anychance to promote ownership over ‘ancientJapanese lands’ in conversations with Rus-sians(14). This provoked an immediate re-sponse from Sakhalin, with an official com-munication from the governor declaringthat ‘to politicise the visa-free programme,

at a minimum, does not bring closer a mu-tually acceptable solution to the problem ofa peace treaty’(15).

Even with such strong responses to Japa-nese announcements, there still appears tobe a desire in the region to continue thevisa-free programme. At the same time assuggesting that Kunashir and Shikotan maysuspend visa-free visits, Igor Koval’ some-what contradicted himself when he ac-knowledged that ordinary Russian peopleliving on the islands want the visa-free regu-lations to remain. He explained that Kuril

Islanders enjoy these trav-els, and he stressed thestrong contacts in culture,sports, and the conservationof nature that have beenestablished with the Japa-nese over the duration ofthe visa-free programme(16). As for the statementson suspending visa-freetravel by the federal organsof power, Koval’ said: ‘Weonly implement these deci-sions, but we would like the

government to pay heed to the opinion ofthe local population and not to take ex-treme and radical decisions that could af-fect, first of all, ordinary people’(17).

Similar local sentiments towards centraldecision making were revealed when inresponse to a request from the RussianMinistry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) the Japa-nese government agreed to cease provid-ing humanitarian aid to the Southern Kurilsfrom April 2010. Valentin Smorchkov, headof the ‘The Kuril-Japanese Centre’ (the or-ganisation on the Kuril Islands that man-ages visa-free delegations), declared to thenewspaper Kommersant” that it is ‘with a


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“...ordinary Russianpeople living on the

islands want thevisa-free regulations

to remain.”

pain in my heart I receive the news aboutthe ceasing of humanitarian assis-tance’(18). According to Smorchkov, overthe last 17 years Japan has rendered tothe inhabitants of the islands $23million ofhelp – a large part being the delivery ofmedical supplies and equipment, and freeoperations in Japanese hospitals.Smorchkov is convinced that ‘thanks to thehumanitarian aid and the visa-free ex-change the lives of 98 children have beensaved’(19). As Anatolli Svetlov, the head of

the Kuril municipal-district, put it ‘the localauthorities take no pleasure in the refusalof aid…[but]…if the MFA have notified thegovernment of Japan, we must acceptit’(20).

In conclusion, the visa-free programme hasbeen an extraordinary initiative that hasseen former Japanese residents return totheir place of birth as guests and evenfriends of their usurpers. Compassion andrespect from the Russian side facilitatedvisits of the former residents to the gravesof their ancestors. Similarly, generous hu-manitarian aid from the Japanese side had

a profound affect on the Russian Kuril Is-landers who greatly appreciated the assis-tance at a time when their standards ofliving were becoming desperate and thefeeling of being abandoned by their ownpoliticians in Moscow was increasing. How-ever, in the name of politics, rather than thewell-being of the islanders, politicians couldnot help meddling in the programme andtoday there is a danger that one side or theother could suddenly decide to terminatethe programme as happened with the hu-

manitarian aid tothe islands. Thiswould be a shamefor the Kuril Island-ers who mostlywant to maintaintheir visa-free visitsto Japan whichthey rely on formany goods andservices, and alsofor the descen-dents of the Japa-nese residents whowant to pray attheir ancestors’graves or for the

aging former residents who would like totake one last look at their homeland. Whenthe programme moves beyond humanitar-ian exchange into naked politics then it un-dermines the foundations of the personalconnections and good-will at the local-levelthat have begun to bridge the historical,geographical and cultural divide betweenRussia and Japan. Without such a bridgethis Cold War territorial dispute will remainforever frozen.

Notes:* Paul Richardson is a Doctoral Re-searcher at the University of Birmingham.

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1) Borisov, S. (2009) "Japan will never reclaimthe Southern Kurils". Russia Today, 10thJuly , 10th July , http://rt.com/P o l i t i c s / 2 0 0 9 - 0 7 - 1 0 /ROAR___Japan_will_never_reclaim_the_Southern_Kurils_.html, Accessed, 29th May2010. However, due to the travel costs itappears that ‘wealthier’ Kuril Islanders aremaking repeat visits rather than all of theislanders participating in the programme(The Sakhalin Times, 22 Sept – 6 December2001, cited in WILLIAMS, B. (2007) Resolv-ing the Russo-Japanese Territorial Dispute:Hokkaido-Sakhalin relations, Abingdon,Routledge. p.185).

2) Malakhov, I. (2005) Sakhalinskaya oblast' iYaponiya: ot narodnoi diplomatii k biznesumirovogo yrovnya. Rodina, 10, http://is trod ina . com/rod ina_ar t i cu l . php3?id=1663&n=88, Accessed 17th Jan 2010.

3) Williams, B. (2007) Resolving the Russo-Japanese Territorial Dispute: Hokkaido-Sakhalin relations, Abingdon, Routledge. p.83

4) Mofa (2008) Japan's Northern Territories:For a Realtionship of Genuine Trust. Ministryof Foreign Affairs of Japan, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/europe/russia/territory/pamphlet.pdf. p.5

5) Williams, B. (2007) Resolving the Russo-Japanese Territorial Dispute: Hokkaido-Sakhalin relations, Abingdon, Routledge. p.82-83

6) Oratai, V. (2009) Yapontsy otkazyvayutsya otzapolneniya migratsionnykh kart. Kommer-sant" (Khabarovsk), 26th November, http://w w w . k o m m e r s a n t . r u / d o c . a s p x ?DocsID=1280677, Accessed 29th May2010.

7) Ponomarev, S. (2005) Kak ne poteryat'Kurily? Marketing and Consulting, 29th June,www.old.iamik.ru/22380.html, Accessed18th June 2008.

8) Borisov, S. (2009) "Japan will never reclaimthe Southern Kurils". Russia Today, 10thJuly , 10th July , http://rt.com/P o l i t i c s / 2 0 0 9 - 0 7 - 1 0 /ROAR___Japan_will_never_reclaim_the_Sou

thern_Kurils_.html, Accessed, 29th May2010.

9) Ibid.

10) Anon (2009a) Senatory predlagayut vvestivizovyi rezhim mezhdu Yuzhnymi Kurilami iYaponiei. Kommersant", 7th July http://w w w . k o m m e r s a n t . r u / d o c . a s p x ?DocsID=1200118, Accessed 29th May2010.

11) Ibid.

12) Borisov, S. (2009) "Japan will never reclaimthe Southern Kurils". Russia Today, 10th July,10th July, http://rt.com/Politics/2009-07-1 0 /ROAR___Japan_will_never_reclaim_the_Southern_Kurils_.html, Accessed, 29th May2010.

13) Anon (2009b) Yapontsam prikazano pisat'ukazateli po-russkii. Kommersant", 9th Julyhttp://www.kommersant.ru/doc.aspx?DocsID=1200648, Accessed 29th May2010.

14) Sycheva, E. & Mingazov, S. (2010) Ne pred-met razgovora. Kommersant" (Khabarovsk),20th May http://www.kommersant.ru/doc.aspx?DocsID=1371720, Accessed 29thMay 2010.

15) Ibid.

16) Borisov, S. (2009) "Japan will never reclaimthe Southern Kurils". Russia Today, 10th July,10th July, http://rt.com/Politics/2009-07-1 0 /ROAR___Japan_will_never_reclaim_the_Southern_Kurils_.html, Accessed, 29th May2010.

17) Ibid.

18) Il'yuschenko, M. (2009) Kuril'skie ostrovapopali v bespomoshchnoe polozhenie. Kom-mersant" (Khabarovsk), 13th Aug, http://w w w . k o m m e r s a n t . r u / d o c . a s p x ?DocsID=1220009, Accessed 30th May2010.

19) Ibid.

20) Ibid.

http://rt.com/

www.mofa.go.jp/region/europe/russia/

www.kommersant.ru/doc.aspx

www.old.iamik.ru/22380.html

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http://rt.com/Politics/2009-07-

http://www.kommersant.ru/doc.aspx

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Regional Cooperation ofSouth Caucasus States:

Illusions, Reality, Perspectives

By Zaur Shiriyev*

The South Caucasus is a region where a number of unresolved conflicts still exist in theabsence of regional security arrangements. Indeed, three unresolved (Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia and Abkhazia) conflicts of the South Caucasus can be con-sidered as one of the most serious obstacles for establishing a regional security system.The article gives brief information about security problems of the region and analyzesthe perspectives of the realization of regional co-operation.

CAUCASUS REVIEW | By Zaur Shiriyev


The South Caucasus regionrepresents the most prob-lematic region within thepost-Soviet area in termsof regional security con-

cerns. The regional security situation inthe South Caucasus is best described as“security deficit,” a term used by authorsof the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute atJohns Hopkins University(1). The securitydeficit stemming from the interrelated andunregulated secu-rity threats de-scribed above haveplagued the regionfor a considerabletime. The increas-ing importance ofthe South Caucasusin the aftermath ofthe anti-terroristoperation in Af-ghanistan and thewar in Iraq havenow made the secu-rity deficit a threatnot only to regionalsecurity but to that of Euro-Atlantic inter-ests as well. The need for institutionalizedsecurity arrangements to manage, reduceand if possible resolve the security threatsin the region has become palpable. In fact,it is increasingly apparent that failure toprovide security is impeding the building ofviable sovereignty in the region.

One may agree or disagree with theseassumptions. However, it is hard to denythat the political situation in the Caucasusis unique, unstable and even hazardous interms of the perspectives of the regionalsecurity. This fact has been highlighted inAugust 2008 during Russia-Georgia war

which resulted Russia’s recognition ofAbkhazia and South Ossetia as independ-ent states. Today, security threats in theSouth Caucasus will remain serious, com-plex and urgent. At the center of theseconcerns are three protracted unresolvedconflicts in Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhaziaand South Ossetia. These conflicts posemajor risk to regional states, populationand regional security as a whole.

Clearly, conflictsfuel those newdangers thatthreaten the na-tions in the entireE u r o - A t l a n t i cspace. Namelythese are ethnicand religious ex-tremism, interna-tional organisedcrime, humantrafficking, illegaltrade in drugs,and what is par-ticularly perilous,

the existence of uncontrolled territories,or the so-called “white spots”, which pro-vide shelter to international terrorists andallow them to develop relevant infrastruc-ture.

Therefore, as a solution to the problems, itis extremely important to create hostilityamong the region states and others,which follow its interests in the region andaspire to keep the balance between theirinterests. How this cooperation can beachieved? If we get answers to this ques-tion, it will be possible for us to find a per-manent solve to the problems in theregion.

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“The increasing importance ofthe South Caucasus in the

aftermath of the anti-terroristoperation in Afghanistan and

the war in Iraq have now madethe security deficit a threatnot only to regional securitybut to that of Euro-Atlantic

interests as well.”


Regional Co-operation: Two Approach

However, despite the integration of theCaucasus supported by the world union,because of the objective and subjectivereasons it remained as an abstract model.Despite several studies of the political andeconomic problems in the Caucasus, it iscontroversial to say Russia or the Westwill determine the future of the Caucasus.To be more accurate, it is an issue of cor-relation between the settlement of theconflicts and establishment of the co-operation based on thefactor of time. The ques-tion is: should the co-operation be establishedbefore or after the settle-ment of the conflicts?There are two conceptsfor resolving the said di-lemma.

According to the first con-cept, the economic or anyother type of cooperationshould be embarked onlyonce the problems areresolved. It will be right to start integrationwith Georgia and Azerbaijan, which havemany common opportunities and facilitiesin the South Caucasus. In this point, theWest farthest extending point of Turkeywill directly be able to contribute to thisintegration. Armenia is the latest countryto join integration process. Because Arme-nia has Nagorno-Karabakh problem withAzerbaijan, with the Armenians in Caval-heti region, it has a problem with Georgia.Therefore, without solving these problems,its entrance to the integration with othercountries without obstacles is almost im-possible. Although, they made rapproche-

ment with Turkey, especially, on this issue,themselves are approaching reluctantbecause of the domestic political factorsand pressure of the Diaspora. The positionof Baku is mostly negative and fair to-wards trilateral regional cooperation.Azerbaijan has expressed its reluctance tocollaborate with Armenia until the Kara-bakh conflict is resolved and all the occu-pied territories are returned to the Azer-baijan jurisdiction

The core idea of the second conceptadopted by Armenia isthat the paramountimportance of settlingthe existing problems isaccepted. Moreover,according to the con-cept, the addressing ofthe problems is the keyissue for ensuring theregional security. Thesupporters of the sec-ond concept (Armenia)believe that the estab-lishment and advance-ment of the co-

operation between the conflicting sideswould change the situation and createmore favourable political conditions, rein-force the mutual confidence, change thementality of the people and, hence, opennew horizons for the peaceful and civilisedsettlement of the conflicts.

As a being a party to blame for lack of eco-nomic and security cooperation intra-regionally, Yerevan has proposed that re-gional cooperation should start from theformulation and accomplishment of con-crete doable tasks(2). Karapetian, formu-lated the position of Yerevan as follows:

Regional Cooperation of South Caucasus StatesCAUCASUS REVIEW | By Zaur Shiriyev

“...it is controversial

to say Russia or the

West will determine

the future of the

Caucasus.”


‘Armenia… believesthat close cooperationin the region, whetherpolitical, economic orsecurity-based, willhelp to bring lastingstability and prosperitybased on a sense ofsolid and sharedemergent values’(3).Today when Russiais rethinking its rolein world affairs, given the weakening ofits economic and military capacities, Ar-menia has not got leeway in making itschoices.

The Best Example of Regional Coopera-tion: Azerbaijan and Georgia

The contemporary example of strong re-gional partnership between Azerbaijanand Georgia, two nations with very differ-ent dominant ethnic and religious groups,shows that not only a cooperative ar-rangement within the South Caucasus ispossible, but also that it is, clearly, in theinterest of its participants. Moreover, theAzerbaijani-Georgian cooperation has hada strong impact on the wider region,among other things, the largest infrastruc-ture project, the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan, orBTC, pipeline, and by having served as thecore for the GUAM, the Organization forDemocracy and Economic Development.

Such cooperation is not based on history,but rather on the ability of both Baku andTbilisi to overcome existing obstacles for avision of a common future of the Cauca-sus. For the South Caucasus’ commonfuture to be fully realized, however, Arme-nia must be a part.

Presently, Armenia stands largely sepa-rate from its two Caucasian neighborsand, unable to develop relations with Tur-key, generally, acts more as an observerrather than a participant in the emergingpartnerships in the region. It seems that ifAzerbaijan and Georgia are fixated on theregional future, the Armenian thinking isstill preoccupied by its past. Thus, notmuch room is left for thinking about thepresent; perhaps, a common trend fortransitional periods.

As the regional projects expand and de-velop further, Armenian non-participationincreasingly turns into a limitation for inte-gration in the South Caucasus as a wholeand destructive isolation for Armenia it-self. Should the current tendency of en-trenching positions both in Baku and Yere-van continue, with time it might be evenmore difficult to bridge the differences andhelp Armenia to become a fully integratedmember of the South Caucasus region.

Comprehensive integration in the SouthCaucasus, thus, can be achieved throughthe formulation and acceptance of a com-mon political identity based on the inter-ests of the Caucasian states and theircitizens. However imperfect, Azerbaijani-

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“...Armenia … believes that closecooperation in the region, whether

political, economic or security-based, willhelp to bring lasting stability and prosperity

based on a sense of solid and sharedemergent values.”


Georgian relations provide evidence forthe feasibility of such integration and amodel of recognition through the accom-modation of both the interests of the indi-vidual states and of the entire region.

Another important element of the partner-ship between Baku and Tbilisi is the abilityto overcome mutual historic and morerecent emotional grievances as well as anunderstanding that all unresolved issuescould be addressed through bilateral ne-gotiations. Arguably, only such accommo-dation can serve as the basis for sustain-able regional identity. One psychologicalfactor that seems to underpin any suchidentity is the appreciation of the Cauca-sus being a common neighborhood for allof its citizens. Without an appreciation ofthis commonality, a regional cooperativearrangement is not likely to be effective.

As it seen, the integration process in theCaucasus will be realized gradually, withextremely difficult andslow steps. Some dif-ferences in the proc-ess of integration ofthe Caucasus mayoccur, that is to say,the targets for theprevious stages maybe realized in the lateststages or the opposite.

Conclusion

The relatively SouthCaucasus has becomea zone of widely spreadconfrontations andconflicts. Very oftenmany countries, includ-

ing the powerful states, pursue their ownpolitical, strategic and economic goals atthe expense of the interests of the othercountries; it became evident that the ideaof establishing cooperation between thecountries of the South Caucasus region isa more unrealistic but need to considersome ideas. Below some ideas on ensur-ing security and cooperation in the SouthCaucasus region are given in light of thecurrent political situation and balance offorces:

First: The regional security and realizationof cooperation should base on the two"No"s:

a) “No” to engagement of quasi states tothe cooperation process between inter-states;

b) “No” to the apply the Kosovo case as asolution mechanism for the exciting con-flicts in the South Caucasus region;

Second: The realisa-tion of cooperationshould base on thetwo “Yes”s:

a) “Yes” to more ef-fective Western en-gagement to thepeace negotiationprocess of Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhaziaand South Ossetianconflicts;

b) “Yes” to restora-tion of territorial in-tegrity of Azerbaijanand Georgia.

Regional Cooperation of South Caucasus StatesCAUCASUS REVIEW | By Zaur Shiriyev

“Comprehensiveintegration in theSouth Caucasus,

thus, can be achievedthrough the formula-tion and acceptanceof a common politi-cal identity based onthe interests of the

Caucasian states andtheir citizens.”


CAUCASUS REVIEW | By Zaur Shiriyev

Third: While the old conflicts occupy theminds of policy-makers in South Caucasusand in the international organizations, moreefforts should be made to prevent new po-tential inter-ethnic conflict from erupting.

Four: This should be taken into accountthat the region faces potential threats asspill over of insecurity from neighboringregions, particularly the Russian North Cau-casus and a prospect of future conflict inIran over its nuclear programme wouldhave a detrimental affect on the South Cau-casus region.

Five: Support for an immediate and effec-tive cease-fire including an active commit-ment by responsible local commanders toits implementation.

Six: In the long run development of regionalcooperation initiative between all regionalstates – along the lines of Turkish initiativefor Regional Stability and Cooperation Plat-form which includes 3 South Caucasusstate plus Russia and Turkey – should beencouraged. In the short term it is impor-tant to support integration of regionalstates in wider initiatives and organizationssuch as Black Sea Economic Cooperation(BSEC) and OSCE.

Seven: Convening of the international con-ference on security problems of South Cau-casus under the auspices of OSCE (or EU)with the participation of the three SouthCaucasus republics and regional players(Turkey, Iran, Russia). The purpose of theconference would be the determination ofthe fundamental solutions to the aforemen-tioned problems which would be mandatoryand universal for everyone.

Eight: Full support initiatives within theframework of the EU “Eastern Partnership”new program consultations on regionalcooperation perspectives contribute to thepursuit of optimal regional security architec-ture in the South Caucasus. But, after ana-lyzing current situation it will be easy to dis-cuss EU’s attempt’s efficiency.

To sum up cooperation and effective re-gional security system, the Southern Cauca-sus has come to the crossroad. Either re-gion will begin to integrate into Europe, an-chor into the Euro-Atlantic security systemand develop into an effective barrier to theproliferation of terrorism, extremism, drugtrafficking and organised crime or there willbe a wholesale deterioration of security anda new gateway to Europe will open for eth-nic conflict, terror and insecurity.

Notes:*Zaur Shiriyev is a foreign policy analyst

based in Azerbaijan.

1) Svante E. Cornell,Roger N. McDer-mott,William D. O’Malley,Vladimir Socor, S.Frederick Starr, "Building Stability in theSouth Caucasus: The Role of NATO andMultilateral Security Organizations," CentralAsia-Caucasus Institute, The Johns HopkinsUniversity; Apr.21, 20042) Libaridian, G. J. (1997, June 23). ThePolitics of Promises. Conference titled theTranscaucasus Today: Prospects for Re-gional Integration.3) Karapetian, V. (2001). Some Aspects ofForeign Policy in Armenia: an ArmenianView of Regional Economic Cooperation asa Prerequisite for the Establishment of aStable and Secure Environment in the Cau-casus. In P. Hardouin, R. Weichhardt & P.Sutcliffe (Eds.). (2001).

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A Brief Analysis Over

the Historical Factors

that Affect Today’s Iraq

By Tamer Kasikci*

After the invasion ofUS-led forces Iraqbecame the focusof the internationalrelations. Many

researchers began to write aboutthe invasion and its aftermath. Thecurrent situation in Iraq is not suit-able to make prediction about thefuture of the country but from regu-lar people in Iraq streets to toplevel politicians in the White Houseeverybody is curious about its fu-ture. But to understand the currentsituation and make prediction about future itis a necessity to examine the political devel-opment of the country. In this brief text, I amgoing to discuss the political development ofIraq by giving reference to factors that af-fect this process.

The history of Iraq goes back to 1920s as apolitical entity. Before that time the Iraqiregion was dominated by the Ottoman Em-pire. During that time as Hans Boesch men-tions in his old article this region has a geog-raphy which does not allow a wide popula-tion to live a rich life. Because of wide de-serts and mountainous areas the populationwas limited and establishing a state author-ity over this geography was not easy. Thisreality is still valid today even though manycrowded cities have been established. Obvi-ously the major geographic factor that hasaffected the political development of thecountry is its rich oil industry. Even in 1930sthe great power discovered the importanceof the oil and this reality made the regionone of the most important regions in inter-national relations.

Besides the geographic conditions whichmade the region uncontrollable, the popula-tion is another factor that affects the politi-

cal development. The creation of nation-state in Europe ended the period of multi-national state formations but in many re-gions like in Iraq sub-identity creates thebiggest challenge against the state-buildingprocess. Many authors try to explain thecultural diversification of the country fromdifferent perspectives. Some see the majorconflict between Sunnis and Shiites. Somepay attention to the Kurdish problem whileothers point the distinction between urbanand rural population. In my opinion it is anecessity to define the major sub-groupswhich have political influence throughout thehistory. From that perspective there arethree groups: the Sunnis, Shiites and Kurds.At that point it is necessary to warn thereader about this diversification. Because ofthe complexity of the population some re-searchers like Liora Lukitz, mistakenly seethis diversification in a cultural perspective.But we should keep in mind that the Kurdsare Sunnis. The major distinction betweenKurds and other Sunnis is that the Kurdsethnically are not Arabs. They have differentlanguage and different ethnic roots as Mi-chael Gunter explains in detail in his book.This diversification in society has createdmany problems in the political developmentof Iraq.

The White House

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The political development of the country isvery complicated process since it was cre-ated by an external power. Differently

from the nation-building experience of theWesterns, the state was imposed from topto down. This character of the state forma-tion process has been felt in all stages ofthe Iraqi history. As Reeva Spector Simonmentions in his book the origins of the ad-ministrators in the region has played a cru-cial role in the establishment of an authori-tative state. But it is not fair to say that onlythese origins pave the way of absolutepower which create suitable environmentfor the rise of such a tyrant like Saddam.The state builders could be influenced byGerman nation-state but what allowedthese state-builders to maintain their poweris the factors that Charles Tripp mentionsin his book: the patron-client relations, theoil incomes and the use of violence.Throughout the Iraqi history, these threefactors give the leader to control of thepopulation in an authoritative way.

At that point it is an obligation to explain thestructure of the society which allows thisauthoritative government to manage thecountry without any opposition. As men-tioned above the society is formed by threemajor groups. While the Shiites is the larg-est one, always the Sunnis have the politicalpower. Peter Sluglett and Marion Farouk-Sluglett explains this phenomenon by claim-ing that the Shiites always keep themselvesaway from political issues and live in citiesthat are closed to the world. This perspec-tive is not sufficient to understand the issue.The very detailed book of Yitzhak Nakashproves that the Shiites were about to estab-lish a political unit before the British forces

took the control of the country. Moreoveras Toby Dodge insists in his book the Shiiteleaders, Mujtahids, were always seekingpolitical power to unify their cities with theShiite Iran. But this majority of the popula-tion has been controlled by Sunni minority.The best explanation for this phenomenoncomes from William Polk. In his book hementions that throughout the history, bybeginning very early times, there has alwaysbeen a gap between central governmentand the people in Iraq. This gap strengthensthe government’s position against thepeople.

Another main factor that affects the politi-cal development of Iraq is its rich oil re-serves-as mentioned above-. In a countrysuch a reserve would be an amazingchance for economic development but inIraq, which is created by an external powerit is not a chance because it makes thecountry as a target for major powers. AsAbbas Alnasrawi mentions in his book Iraq

“...Iraq always has to be

careful about using its oil

reserves and open its

economy to the world. If

not, it can be punished by

major powers like in the

Gulf War, or oil boycott.”

Brief History: Iraq

BRIEF HISTORY | By Tamer Kasikci


always has to be careful about using its oilreserves and open its economy to theworld. If not, it can be punished by majorpowers like in the Gulf War, or oil boycott.Another problem that oil reserves causedis that as Alnasrawi insists, focusing of oilindustry kills other industries. For thatreason if there is a crisis in oil import likeduring the oil boycott time, the countrysuffers from the lack of other industries.This happened in Iraq history and crippledthe economy.

Today we are in a different stage ofthe Iraqi history. Even though the chaoswithin the country has not been absolutelycontrolled, elections were held and Iraqbegan to walk through its democratisationand modernization process. But it is crucialto keep in mind the historical factors thatstill affect Iraq during this process. Anystate building attempt which ignores thehistorical realities of the country woulddeepen the chaos and open the way of amore authoritarian regime or disintegra-tion of it.

Note:

* Tamer Kasikci is an MA student at theUniversity of San Diego.

References:

1) Boesch, Hans H, “El-'Iraq”, Source:Economic Geography, Vol. 15, No.4 (Oct., 1939), pp. 325-361 Publishedby: Clark University Stable URL:http://www.jstor.org/stable/141771Accessed: 04/03/2009 21:01

2) Gunter, Michael M., The Kurds of Iraq:

Tragedy and Hope, St. Martin Press,New York, 1992,

3) Simon, Reeva Spector, Iraq Betweenthe Two World Wars : The MilitaristOrigins of Tyranny Columbia UniversityPress, 2004

4) Tripp, Charles, A History of Iraq, Cam-bridge University Press, Cambridge,2000

5) Sluglett, Peter and Farouk-Sluglett,Marion, “Some Reflections onthe Sunni/Shi'i Question in Iraq”,Source: Bulletin (British Society forMiddle Eastern Studies), Vol. 5,No. 2 (1978), pp. 79-87 Publishedby: Taylor & Francis, Ltd. StableU R L : h t t p : / / w w w . j s t o r . o r g /s t a b l e / 1 9 4 7 8 9 A c c e s s e d :05/03/2009 02:37

6) Nakash, Yitzhak, The Shi'is of Iraq,Princeton University Press, PrincetonNJ, 1994

7) Dodge, Toby, “Chapther 4: Ruraland Urban: The Divided Imaginationof Late Colonialism”, Book: InventingIraq: the Failure of Nation Buildingand a History Denied, ColumbiaUniversity Press, New York, 2003, p.63-81

8) Polk, William R., Understanding Iraq :A Whistlestop Tour from AncientBabylon to Occupied Baghdad, I.B. Tau-ris & Company Limited, 2000

9) Alnasrawi, Abbas, “ Chapther 7:Iraq’s Economic Development, 1950-1990: An Assessment”, Book:The Economy of Iraq: Oil, Wars,Destruction of Development andProspects 1950-2010, GreenwoodPress, London, 1994, p.127-149

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http://www.jstor.org/stable/141771

http://www.jstor.org/

The Demise ofArab Nationalism in Iraqand Its Possible Alternatives

By Rahman Dag*

MIDDLE EAST REVIEW | By Rahman Dag


Contemporary Middle Easternstates have not yet reachedto the full level of stability interms of domestic and for-eign issues after the demise

of the Ottoman Empire in World War I. Eventoday, several of them, such as Iraq, Yemen,Lebanon and Somalia have been strugglingwith and suffering from severe internal con-flicts Current internal quarrels in thesecountries have been experienced and yet nosolution has been found to halt them. Thisessay is going to focus on current internalconflicts in Iraq and ap-proaches to them froman ideological perspec-tive. It is undeniable thatevery single struggleamong belligerents in aparticular conflict has itsown ideology to justifyand legitimize its de-mands and aim. By doingso, sides in a particularfight seek to increasetheir disciples and sup-porters. In the light ofthese conditions, thecrucial question hascome to mind is the question of that Arabnationalism still has a chance to prevail inIraq`s politics and if it does not, what are itsalternatives?

It is very well known that from the late Otto-man Empire to today’s world nationalismhas become an inherent ideology for theMiddle Eastern countries. Nationalism wasborn and grew up in Europe and then hasspread to the world. It was the most funda-mental idea in the process of state buildingin the post-World War I period. One ofthese states was modern Iraq which wasestablished in 1922 as a British mandate.

On the other hand, there is another signifi-cant determinant of the Middle Easterncountries in the respect of ideology, which isreligion namely Islam. The Middle East is aplace where Islam came into existence andit has been perceived as a natural part ofthat region and of people living in there. Ithas penetrated into the blood of that region.These two basic components have taken theMiddle Eastern countries` pulse. Thereforethey are always effective in the politics of anycountry in the Middle East as it is so for Iraq.These two major ideological tenets- national-

ism and religion- arepowerful identity signifi-ers in times of uncertainstructural conditionsand conflicts (Kinnvall,2004).

In the regard of ideologi-cal thoughts in the Mid-dle East, nationalism hadbeen emerged as a cul-turally Arabist move-ments in the late Otto-man Empire with theinvasion of Egypt byFrance and commercial

relations between the west and Arab worldvia port cities such as Beirut, Aleppo andBasra (Antonius, 1938). That culturally Arabmovement changed into political nationalistmovement when the Ottoman Empire col-lapsed and Western powers directly inter-fered to the Middle East politics and createdArab nationalism which means unification ofall Arabs coming from the same culturalroots and having the same language(Dawisha, 2003 pp:2). With the forming ofmandate system, Arab world was adminis-tratively divided rather than ruled by a singlepolitical unity which covers all Arabs. As aresult of that, nationalist movements fought

“In the regard of ideologicalthoughts in the Middle East,

nationalism had beenemerged as a culturally

Arabist movements in thelate Ottoman Empire withthe invasion of Egypt by

France and commercial rela-tions between the west and

Arab world via port citiessuch as Beirut, Aleppo and

Basra.”



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for state independence instead of Arab inde-pendence (Barnett, 1995). In the colonialperiod, the nationalist sentiments evolvedand generated Pan-Arabism which simplymeans the political unification of all Arabstates. For instance, the initiation by Egypt,Syria and Iraq to be united as a pioneeringforce to encompass a unique and one ArabState is a concrete evidence of pan-Arabistideology (Choueiri, 2000 pp:167). The fail-ure and disunion of this enterprise and thedefeat of Egypt by Israel in 1967 war due toPalestine question extinguished the flame ofArab nationalism. This was the turning pointof the displacement of nationalist thoughtsand it left its dominant position to the Is-lamic movements with the fostering role ofIslamic revolution in Iran. During the revivalof religious notions, territorial nationalismamong Arab states has emerged and eachArab state sought to improve and solidify itsown nationality for example Saudis, Iraqis, orEgyptians. After the short history of theevolvement of nationalism in the MiddleEast, it can be said for the contemporaryconditions; nationalism has lost its previousdominance but did not completely lost itspower. Moreover, it should be mentionedthat this reminded that nationalism was notpan-Arabist nationalism but territorial na-tionalism.

If we specifically look at the ideological his-tory of Iraq, a few more ideologies can be

observed in it. Socialism is one of the strong-est thought systems which had impacted onthe politics and social structure of Iraq dur-ing the Baath Party regime in 1968 andonwards. Another one is secularism which isan inseparable element of European nation-alism imported to the Middle East. Due tothe predominant position of religion in theregion, secularism has never got power asmuch as socialism has got. Yet, it is not tosay that it did not have impact on the Iraqipolitics (Al-Khalil, 1990 pp: 209).

Up to now, it was sought to illustrate thatseveral ideologies have been experienced inIraq. From that point, it is going to move onto the main subject that in current internalconflicts in Iraq to what extend we can traceany ideological tenets. It is likely that sub-sectarian religious nationalism, regional na-tionalism and Islamism are prevailing ideolo-gies in the internal conflict of Iraq ratherthan Arab nationalism.

The invasion of Iraq by the USA and its alliespaved the way for opening the Pandora’sBox for Iraq. Ethnic, tribal, religious, socialand political divisions of Iraq have resurfacedsince the modern Iraq was established in1922 by the British Empire. These differen-tiations were held together by tyrannicalpowers; the King, generals and SaddamHussein, respectively. In this sense, pan-Arabist, nationalist, socialist discourse andideologies has left their places to the localethnic and sectarian groups` interests. Inthe respect of components of Iraq and theirpercentages in total population, that condi-tion could be explained better. The popula-tion of Iraq is 28,945,569 (July 2009 est.).Ethnically, Arabs are 75%-80%, Kurdish are15%-20% and Turcoman, Assyrian, or other5%. Religiously, Muslims are 97% (Shia60%-65%, Sunni 32%-37%) and Christians

“...nationalismhas lost its previousdominance but did notcompletely lost itspower.”

The Dem

ise of Arab Nationalism

in IraqMIDDLE EAST REVIEW | By Rahman Dag


or others are 3%(1). These figures showthat ethnically major components of Iraq areArabs and Kurds and major religious com-ponents are Sunnis and Shias. With the de-mise of Saddam` brutal and repressive re-gime, Kurds and Shias, who have been pres-sured for a long time, have emerged in thepolitical arena and have sought to get asmany concessions as they can. Therefore,struggle among Kurds - Arabs and Sunni -Shia Arabs are two fundamental determi-nant of today’s internal conflict in Iraq. Thatthrows light on the argument that ideologi-cal tenet of current domestic fighting in Iraqis not likely to be Arab nationalism but ethnicnationalism which is among Arabs andKurds as well as sub-sectarian nationalismwhich is among Sunnis and Shiites.

To start with, the first of these ideologicalconflicts is Sunni-Shiite potential conflict. Theprimary strategy of the USA in Iraq is toeliminate all institutions and groups whichare still loyal to Saddam, for instance, theabandonment of the Baath Party and theArmy that was thought that it was full ofbuttress of Saddam. This process is calledas De-Baathification which removed themain and significant obstacle in front of theShiite revival in Iraq, whereas this processincreased resentments among Sunni Arabs

and the ongoing Sunni insurgency. EvenSunni reaction to it has spread beyond Iraq’sborder, from Syria to Pakistan. On the otherhand, Shiites in the other Middle Easterncountries from Lebanon to Pakistan had achance to visit Najaf which is one of the holycities for Shiites. In this regard, reciprocalresentments and backlash among Sunnisand Shiites was and have been a potentialconflict that is ready to break out in Iraq(Nasr, 2006). In addition to that conflict inIraq, King Abdullah of Jordan has warnedthat a new “Shiite crescent” lying from Bei-rut to Tehran and even to Pakistan mightdominate the Sunni structure of the MiddleEast. This notification (warning) is quitemeaningful to emphasize to what degree theSunni-Shiite conflict is perceived by otherSunni states in the Middle East.

From the Sharifian monarchy(2) (1921-1958) to the end of the Saddam Regime,Sunni domination had survived in Iraq.Throughout this period, the suppression ofShiites and denying the legitimacy of Shiitesby the Sunni Officials cemented the aggres-sion and anxiety among Sunnis and Shiites.A massacre against Iraqi Shiites in 1991 isa fundamental instance of this pressure onShiites. Due to that historical background,invasion of Iraq was not directly rejected byShiite communities while most of the Sunnigroups stated their concerns about andreluctance to the invasion. The main reasonfor welcoming the USA by Shiite groupsbased on occupier’s powers discourse whenthey invaded Iraq, which was to bring democ-racy to Iraq and to release Iraqis from theSaddam regime. In this sense, as Shiitepopulation is much more than any othergroups in Iraq, they thought that Shiite partywould get higher percentages of vote in afair election. That is why Shiites remainedmostly silent to the invasion but Sunnis were

“The primary strategy of theUSA in Iraq is to eliminate all

institutions and groupswhich are still loyal to

Saddam, for instance, theabandonment of the Baath

Party and the Army that wasthought that it was full of

buttress of Saddam.”



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completely against the invasion because itwas obvious that they were going to losetheir power that they had during the Sad-dam regime.

The bombings and assassinations through-out Iraq, especially in Baghdad are concreteindication of those reciprocal resentmentsamong Sunnis and Shiites whether they areagainst to each other or against the allianceforces, particularly against the US army.That fighting sometimes reached the level ofcivil war in Iraq. Sectarian struggle forpower in Iraq is not likely to come to an endin the foreseeable future.Sunni insurgency groups, gen-erally they are radical Islamistgroups seem to be mainthreat to the stability in Iraq.In light of these conditions inIraq, it is really hard to saythat Arab nationalism is apioneering ideology. It is be-cause of that both sides Sun-nis and Shiites are ethnicallyArabs but their primary iden-tity is not race but their sec-tarians.

The second core contradiction is betweenthe Kurds and Arabs, especially Sunni Ar-abs. From the very early date of formation ofmodern Iraq, Kurdish question has alwaysoccupied the agenda of Iraqi governments.As other successor states of the OttomanEmpire, Kurdish people had been affected bythe nationalist thoughts since the late Otto-man Empire. Yet, they could not end theirstruggle with a separate nation-state in theMiddle East. Kurdish groups were severaltimes betrayed since the establishment ofthe modern Iraq. In 1920`s, they werepromised for a kind of federal government inthe northern Iraq but that promise was not

kept by the governor of Iraq. They were notonly used by the Iraqi government but alsoby other states as a political puppet such asIran, USA and Russia. They became a poten-tial mean for a power that has a strategyover the Middle East (Ajami, 2003). The lastdisaster for the Iraqi Kurds was the Halabjamassacre in which thousands of Kurds werekilled with a chemical weapon by Saddam`sforces. Kurdish question might seem a prob-lem only for Iraq but actually it is crucial forIran, Turkey and Syria as well due to the factthat these states have considerable numberof Kurdish population in their territory. That

is another reason for beingalone of Iraqi Kurds. Simply, thecompetition between Arabsand Kurds in the border of Iraqhas been continuing almost fora century with a revolt in everydecade (Schofield and Zenko,2004).

The invasion had led a conditionthat Kurds took the advantageof it via new federal structure ofIraq. Kurdish groups were al-

ready released from the cruelty of Saddamwith the UN decision that banned Iraqi Armyto pass over the 36th parallel after the firstGulf War in 1991. Since 1990s northernIraq has become a separate part of Iraq andafter the invasion it gained its official federalstate of Iraq. Now they have their own localparliament and government. This does notmean that the relationship between Arabsand Kurds are completely smooth and thereis no complication. For instance, the statueof Kirkuk is today’s the most significantquestion due to the fact that it consists of8% of total oil reserve in the world. In thisregard, the main struggle over Kirkuk contin-ues between Sunni Arabs and Kurds. Theircommon aim is to get the control of the city

“The invasionhad led a

condition thatKurds took theadvantage of itvia new federal

structure ofIraq.”



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because of its oil capacity. That is almost akind of ethnic struggle between Arabs andKurds and reminds us ethnic nationalismrather than Arab nationalism again.The last prominent ideology that can beseen in the internal conflict in Iraq is Islam-ism. As it was mentioned above, the Islamhas been one of the most significant ele-ments of social, cultural, economic and politi-cal life of any Middle Eastern country as ithas been for Iraq since its foundation. Dueto that fact, all sovereign ideologies or gov-ernments whether Islamic or not have usedIslamic discourse in their speeches and poli-tics. For instance, the triple ideological es-sence of the Baath Party in Iraq was nation-alism, socialism and religion (Al-Khalil, 1990pp: 183). However, it generally seemed tobe nationalist and socialist party.

With the failure of Pan-Arabism after 67War between Israel and Egypt, nationalistsensation gradually had decreased till1980s and it was replaced by religiousthoughts through the Islamic revolution ofIran. Revival of Islamism in Iraq or any statein the Middle East is not only due to thatrevolution. Islamic groups have gained thesupport from the deprived rural people it is

because of that religious foundation in theMiddle East interacted directly to public andhelped them via privately established socialand health institutions. HAMAS in Palestineand Hezbollah in Lebanon are great exampleof that situation. Another critical reason forIslamic revival against Arab nationalism isthe First Gulf War which some Arab statesjoined to the western forces against an Arabstate, Iraq (Demirpolat, 2009).

With regard to the internal conflict in Iraq, itis obvious that religious identity has over-come the Arab nationalist identity. Thatmight not true for other Arab states in theMiddle East but for Iraq, talking about Arabnationalism is probably out of question. Inthe term of illustrating the overwhelmingIslamic character of current conflict in Iraq,looking at the statements of both Shiite andSunni clerics is adequate. They have beenarticulating that Americans and their Chris-tian allies are in Iraq to destroy Islam in itsheartland and to steal Muslim’s oil (Luttwak,2005). And if the group and religious loyaltyare considered, it is not hard to compre-hend to what extend the Islamism is prevail-ing the ideological conditions in Iraq. Further-more, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, who isspiritual leader of Shiites in Iraq, stated thatthe religious constants and the Iraqi peo-ple`s moral principles and noble social val-ues should have been the main pillars of thecoming Iraqi constitution. Parallel to that,Sunni radical groups have already been ad-herents of religious structure of new Iraqiconstitution as well as of social and culturaldimensions (Coleman, 2006). In this sense,inspite of that these two sectarian groupsseem to be coherent on supreme position ofreligion; they follow distant arguments aboutsharing political power. That proves thattheir common point is not their ethnicity. Soit is unlikely to articulate any more that Arab

“With the failure ofPan-Arabism after 67 Warbetween Israel and Egypt,

nationalist sensationgradually had decreased till1980s and it was replaced

by religious thoughtsthrough the Islamicrevolution of Iran.”



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nationalism generates ideological basis ofpost-2003 invasion of Iraq and it is hard totrace footsteps of Arab nationalism in cur-rent internal conflict of Iraq.

These explanations might create a tendencyto accept the total dominant position of thereligion but it is not. Some secular Kurdsand Sunni Arabs are really strict to keep thereligion out of government and administra-tive institutions. For instance, in this regard,the president of current Iraq, Jalal Tala-bani`s statement ismeaningful, which is that“We will never acceptany religious govern-ment in Iraq. Never. Thisis a red line for us. Wewill never live inside anIslamic Iraq”. Moreover,Maysoon al-Damluji,president of the IraqiIndependent Women`sGroup, expressed herconcerns about the in-terpretation of sharialaw which would take usbackward. Additionally, Adnan Pachachi, theformer Iraqi foreign minister and a Sunnileader mentioned his thoughts by mouthingthat they wanted to inject religion into every-thing, which was not right (Coleman, 2006).When the position of these people and theirstatements were taken into consideration,talking about absolute agreement on beingsupreme and leading ideological power ofreligion namely Islam seems impossible.That still does not change the reality thatwidespread standing of Arab nationalismhas been lost among Iraqi`s agenda.

Eventually, due to the fact that invasion ofIraq by the US and its allies led to reconfigu-ration of Iraq and revealed the pressured

conflicts among the major components ofIraq. These groups were being covered bythe cooperation of British and the KingFaisal, the military regimes and the despoticregime of Saddam, respectively since theestablishment of Iraq and that had renderedIraq united. With the emergence of the dif-ferences among the major elements, thepicture of united Iraq shook at its core andevery single components of Iraq sought tomaximize and then preserve their interestsin the process of rebuilding of the state.

Being under the impactof nationalist movementsin the Middle East andhaving a government withSunni Arab dominance(majority), nationalistmovements and dis-courses took places inthe programme of Iraq`spolitics. It was becausethis fact that Iraqseemed to have a unitedportrait but actually it didnot.

To sum up, internal conflicts of Iraq couldnot be explained by any ideological tenet. It isobvious that there is no ideological evidenceof Arab nationalism due to the struggleamong Sunnis-Shiites, Kurds-Arabs and pos-sibly Secularists-Islamists. Unfortunately,bombings, killings, murdering and assassina-tions within these groups and between theUS forces and Sunni radical groups in-creased group loyalty and people give theprimary importance to their local and groupidentity. That also enhances in-group solidar-ity and marginalizes the components toeach other. As a result of that, the gapsbetween the major groups arrive at the levelof not able to meet (Inglehart, Moaddel,Tessler, 2006). Generally, it can be said that

“...the strugglebetween Kurds and

Arabs, between Sunnisand Shiites and Islamistand secularist can be

called as ethnicnationalism, sectarian

nationalism andreligious nationalism,

respectively.”



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in today`s internal conflicts of Iraq, observa-tion of any practices of Arab nationalism isalmost impossible. At the same time, wecannot clearly trace current conflict to anyother ideological tenets. Yet, the strugglebetween Kurds and Arabs, between Sunnisand Shiites and Islamist and secularist canbe called as ethnic nationalism, sectariannationalism and religious nationalism, re-spectively. If the descriptions are correct, wecan trace current internal conflict in Iraq tothese kinds of nationalism.

Notes:

*Rahman Dag is an MA student at SOAS.

1. h t t p s : / / w w w . c i a . g o v / l i b r a r y /publications/the-world-factbook/geos/iz.html

2. The Sharifian Monarcy means that thekingdoms of himself and his sons ofSharif of Mecca, Hussein. He was Hebecame the king of Hejaz where Meccaand Medina locates. One of his son,Faisal became the king of Iraq and an-other son became the king of Jordan,Abdullah.

References:

AbuKhalil, A. “A New Arab Ideology?: TheRejuvenation of Arab Nationalism.” Mid-dle East Journal 46 (1992): 22-36

Ajami, Fouad. “Iraq and the Arabs` Fu-ture.” Foreign Affairs 82 (2003): 2-18

Al-Khalil, S. Republic of Fear: The Politicsof Modern Iraq. Berkley and Los Angeles:University of California Press, 1990.

Antonius, H. George. The Arab Awaken-ing: the Story of the Arab National Move-ment. London: Hamish Hamilton, 1938.

Barnett, N. Michael. “Sovereignty, Nation-alism, and Regional Order in the ArabState System.” International Organization49 (1995): 479-510

Choueiri, M. Youssef. Arab Nationalism: AHistory. USA, UK, and Australia: BlackwellPublishing, 2000.

Coleman, Isobel. “Women, Islam, and theNew Iraq.” Foreign Affairs 85 (2006): 24-38

Dawisha, A. and Dawisha K. “How to Builda Democratic Iraq.” Foreign Affairs 82(2003): 36-50

Dawisha, A. Arab Nationalism in theTwentieth Century from Triumph to De-spair. Princeton: Princeton UniversityPress, 2003.

Demirpolat, A. “The Changing Aspects ofArab Nationalism.” Ekev Akademi Dergisi39 (2009): 87-96

Inglehart, R., Moaddel, M., and Tessler, M.“Xenophobia and In-Group Solidarity inIraq: A Natural Experiment on the Impactof Insecurity.” Perspective on Politics 4(2006): 495-505

Kinnvall, Catarina. “Globalization and Reli-gious Nationalism: Self, Identity, and theSearch for Ontological Security.” PoliticalPsychology 25 (2004): 741-767

Luttwak, N. Edward. “Iraq: The Logic ofDisengagement.” Foreign Affairs 84(2005): 26-36

Nasr, Vali. “Regional Implication of Shi`aRevival in Iraq.” The Washington Quar-terly 27:3 (2004): 7-24

Nasr, Vali. “When the Shiites Rise.” For-eign Affairs 85 (2006): 58-71, 73-74

Schofield, J. and Zenko, M. “Designing aSecure Iraq: A US Policy Prescription.”Third World Quarterly 25 (2004):677-687.



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Hong Kong Democracy:A Pessimistic Review“Newlonkong” is a neologism referring to the three internationaleconomic centres namely New York, London and Hong Kong.However, among the three places, Hong Kong might be regardedas the most democratically backward.

By Antony Ou*

CHINA REVIEW | By Antony Ou


The Problems

There is now no universal suffrage for theChief Executive of Hong Kong Special Ad-ministrative Region (HKSAR). Instead, an800-member Election Committee enjoysthe special privilege of electing the ChiefExecutive, according to the Basic Law, themini-constitution for the Region. The 800members are drawn from the voters of theFunctional Constituencies (FCs), the reli-gious sector, and district and central gov-ernment organisations. The Chief Executivethen appoints the Executive Council, whichprimarily functions as the “cabinet” of theChief Executive. Some could easily arguethat the Chief Executive and his/her cabi-net can by no means represent the citizensof Hong Kong, simply because he/she isnot competitively voted by the general pub-lic. By any modern democratic standard,such kind of indirect election is definitely aproduct of authoritarianism.

In addition, the Legislative Council (LegCo)is a quasi-bicameral system, which is con-stituted by 30 seats of Geographical Con-stituencies (GC) and 30 seats of Functional

Constituencies (FC). For the former, gen-eral voters (around 3.37 millions) directlyselect their candidates based on their geo-graphical districts; for the latter, member-ship of voters are highly restricted—onlyaround 226,000 electors—composed byindividuals, organisations and corporations.They have the right to cast a vote for theircandidates. For the composition of the FC,it includes mainly businesses and a numberof professional sectors (See Appendix). Forexamples, the FCs of Agriculture and Fish-eries, Insurance and Transport are electedvia process of corporate voting, of whichthe latter comprises legal entities but not“natural person”. In this sense, the onlyeligible voters of these FCs are the oneswho own companies of respective constitu-encies. The problem follows that for these226,000 electors, around 57,000 of themcontrol over 80% of 30 FC seats (i.e. 25seats). And within these 25 seats, 12seats are coming from 10 constituenciesselected by 5,600 voters who are all corpo-rate voters. That is to say about 5,600corporate voters control 40% of FC seats.To paraphrase the famous quote from theAnimal Farm, we can then say, in HongKong, some voters are more equal thanthe others. It gives corporate minorities toomuch power and influence over Hong Kong.Most ironically, the functional constituencyof Hong Kong might lead someone to asso-ciate it with the equivalent functional oroccupational legislative representation ofthe German Nazi regime, which attemptedto pave the way to make Germany into acorporate totalitarian state.

Worse still, the issue of separate voting isone of the most frustrating built-in proce-dures for the pan-democrats of Hong Kong.For any citizen and legislator, he/she canpropose a bill to be passed by the LegCo.

“To paraphrase thefamous quote from theAnimal Farm, we can

then say, in Hong Kong,some voters are more

equal than the others.”

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However, this can only be possible by win-ning separate voting of both GCs and FCs.As for any bill proposed by the government,only a simple majority is required to passthe bill. And for any amendment of the Ba-sic Law, it requires the absolute consent oftwo-thirds of the LegCo members to sup-port the bill, before entering to the ChiefExecutive (veto power is given under Article159) and Hong Kong’s deputies to the Na-tional People’s Congress. That is to say, onone hand, by separate voting, any bill pro-posed by pan-democrats, or any bill con-cerning public interests, could be easilyrejected by the FC legislators, who inclineto represent the interests of large corpora-tions and the government. On the otherhand, any government bill can be passedrelatively easily because the government-friendly camps (from both GCs and FCs)ensure the simple majority. The recent con-troversial bill on the High-Speed RailwaySystem (costing HK$66.9 billion) is a per-fect example of such legislative mecha-nism: despite of a mass rally outside theLegCo building, the government onlyneeded to ensure one thing—the collabora-tion of the government-friendly legislators—in order to pass the bill. No wonder HumanRights Monitor criticized the FC as a highlycorrupted entity.

In the Articles 45 and 68 of the Basic Law,it clearly states that the Chief Executive andall the LegCo members of Hong Kong willbe ultimately elected by universal suffrage.Yet, the problems remain since we do notknow when and how they will be elected. InAnnex 1, Section 7 of the Basic Law, itstates that laws about the election could beamended as soon as in 2007. The Stand-ing Committee of the National People'sCongress (NPCSC), which has the ultimatepower to interpret the Basic Law, promul-gates that any amendment to the electorallaw must be supported by the NPCSC. On26 April 2004, the NPCSC abruptly deniedthe possibility of universal suffrage in 2007for the Chief Executive and 2008 forLegCo.

After the failure of proposing a seemingly“progressive” political reform in 2005, in2007, the Chief Executive Donald Tsangasked the central government whetherthere would be a democratic future forHong Kong people. Tsang reported that wehave to wait till 2017 for the possibility ofgetting two-thirds of the LegCo membersto support the reform. The NPCSC allowedthe possibility for the 2017 Chief Executiveand 2020 LegCo elections via the meansof universal suffrage. In 2009, there was aconsultation on political reform, which wasvery similar to the proposal set in 2005.The key points of the proposed package aresummarised as below:

The number of members of the ElectionCommittee for the Chief Executive isincreased from 800 to 1200;

There will be 100 new members of theElection Committee who are DistrictCouncil and LegCo members. They arechosen by the other District Council and

The Logo of Hong Kong Human Rights Moni-tor. The logo based on Chinese character

meaning 'human'

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LegCo members;

The threshold of Election Committeenomination will be reduced to 150;

The size of the LegCo will be increasedfrom 60 to 70 seats with five additionalGeographical and Functional Constituen-cies respectively;

The new Functional Constituency seatsare all District Council members. Theyare chosen by the other District Councilmembers via proportional representa-tion (amended in April 2010).

The 2009 political reform proposal,amended in April 2010, by nature, is justlike the 2005 one. They are nothing closeto universal suffrage. With complicatedprocedures and newly created traps, thegovernment shows no signs of improve-ment for the present undemocratic politicalstructure. For instance, the Chief Executiveelection is still a non-democratic electionparticipated by 1,200 privileged citizensinstead of the 3.7 million adults in HongKong. Besides, in the name of “gradual andorderly progress”, the “democratic ele-ment” added to the LegCo is minimal. Ac-cording to the government and its“ideologues”, the proposal is one huge step

for Hong Kong democratic progress byhaving more popularly voted District Coun-cil members. However, despite the factthat FC is one of the key sources of a non-democratic Hong Kong, the proposal nevermentions the abolishment of the FC. In-stead, by having five more seats to the FC,the FC is arguably more difficult to bebrought to an end in the future. Since theBasic Law ensures the same numbers ofGC and FC seats, it is extremely difficult tohave two-thirds of LegCo members to abol-ish the FC by amending the Basic Law. Toput it in the simplest sense, who would voteagainst their own FC seats and step downaccordingly?

These odd proposals, together with thelong stagnated democratic progress, trig-ger the new movement, that some peoplewould find it non-harmonious— the de factoreferendum.

The “Non-Harmonious” Hong Kong

The concept of a “harmonious society” hasbecome an over-arching theme campaign-ing over the years in China. The Chinesecentral government advocates that it isnecessary to construct a “harmonious soci-ety” while enjoying the economic prosperity.The term has been repeatedly criticized asa strategy that underplays the democraticreform of China. Hong Kong, as part ofChina after 1st July 1997, is of course in-cluded in this grand theory of harmonioussociety. Interestingly, however, according toa recent survey conducted by the ChineseUniversity of Hong Kong, there are a quar-ter of Hong Kong population (around 1.53million citizens) who think that Hong Kongis not a harmonious society and Hong Kongpeople should apply more radical measureswhen fighting for democracy and other

“...the Chief Executiveelection is still a

non-democratic electionparticipated by 1,200

privileged citizens insteadof the 3.7 million adults in

Hong Kong.”

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demands. The result is alarming for theSAR government as well as the centralgovernment, both of which emphasise somuch on the importance of a stable gov-ernment.

Some commentators and scholars inter-pret that the only reason for a governmentto promote harmony is because the societyof which it governs lacks harmony. Moreimportantly, politicians often do not ac-knowledge the fact that in nature, politics isnever harmonious. An open society needschannels for non-harmonious, pluralisticpolitical interactions. Hong Kong enjoys therights to demonstrate, assemble and ex-press, yet, when it comes to the right touniversal suffrage, the SAR governmentd i s a p p o i n t sHong Kong citi-z e n s . T h e“radical” but non-violent measuresthat the surveymentioned makepeople think ofthe recent con-troversy on defacto referen-d u m . T h eLeague of SocialDemocrats (LSD) and the Civic Party werethe initiators of this so-called “New Democ-ratic Movement”.

The 2010 Hong Kong by-election, which willbe held on 16 May, was triggered by theresignation of five pan-democrat LegComembers in January of the same year. Theresigned LegCo members named it “FiveConstituencies Referendum”, that requiresone pan-democratic lawmaker from eachof the five GCs to resign and then conse-quently triggers a by-election, which is a

standard legislative procedure. The BasicLaw never offers a de jure referendum,nonetheless, the “Five Constituencies Ref-erendum” serves as a de facto one. Its pur-pose, according to the resigned LegComembers, is to let every Hong Kong citi-zens to participate in a form of direct de-mocracy—to decide whether there shouldbe a genuine political reform, which guaran-tees universal suffrage, and the abolish-ment of the FC system.

Since late January 2010, LSD and CivicParty advertised their campaign with the(in)famous slogan “uprising of the peo-

ple” ( ). It generated a lot of media

attention, controversy from the generalpublic, and strong condemnations fromBeijing and the “Royalists” (the pro-Beijingadvocates). On one hand, Rita Fan, a HongKong Deputy to the NPCSC, denounced theslogan was dangerous and misleading,since the term “uprising” in Chinese impliesrevolution and violence and it is a term thatdestabilises and disharmonises any healthysociety. Other pro-government critics, suchas Elsie Leung, Ip Kwok-him and GordonWu, insisted the slogan entailed anarchy,treason or even armed conflict. Whilst onthe other hand, Audrey Eu and RaymondWong, the Presidents of the two “uprising”parties, argued that the purpose of theslogan was never meant to support any

Logo of LSD (League ofSocial Democrats)

Logo of Civic Party

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violent revolution and independence.Rather, it referred to any rational politicalactivities such as the “de facto referen-dum”. For the other pan-democrats, theirpositions on referendum were more am-biguous. The “Alliance for Universal Suf-frage” is composed of 13 pro-democracycommunities, including the DemocraticParty (the largest pan-democratic party).The group has persistently advocated for amild political position, that pan-democratsshould strive for dialogues between HongKong and China on the issue of democracy,based on rationality and mutual under-standing. However, the “uprising” partiesand their supporters criticised the Allianceas too simple and naïve, since the pan-democrats have been “rational” and“reasonable” for more than 20 years. Yet,no visible changes have resulted. For the“radical” advocates, without any radical butnon-violent measure in order to expresstheir democratic demands, Hong Kongpeople can never see a reasonably democ-ratic future.

The SAR government’s responses areplain: 1) The nature of the 2010 by-election

is solely to fill up the five LegCo seats, and2) it is totally unnecessary to have a by-election for the sake of 2012 universalsuffrage, since the NPCSC has provided aschedule for Hong Kong people, assuring a“gradual and orderly” democratic progress.In other words, the SAR government doesnot encourage citizens to vote and wouldrather see a low voting-rate. By contrast,the responses of the Central Governmentas well as its subordinates are much morevigorous and severe. For instance, PengQinghua, the Head of Communist Party ofChina Hong Kong Liaison Office, criticised,

“There are political groups that havelaunched the so-called 'five constituen-cies referendum campaign,' even pro-posing sensational and extreme sloganslike 'civic uprising' and 'liberating HongKong’. This is a total violation of main-stream public opinion that wants stabil-ity, harmony and development.”

Among many “Royalists”, Maria Tam is themost out-spoken one. As a member of thePreparatory Committee for the HKSAR, adeputy of the NPC, and Hong Kong Affairs

Advisor (PRC), she insisted that the“de facto referendum” is an attemptto violate the Basic Law. She saidHong Kong is not a sovereign state,but only a special administrative re-gion, which does not have absolutecontrol over critical political reform.In this sense, the resigned legislatorsare not granted the authority to up-hold any referendum.

For the government-friendly campslike the Liberal Party and the Democ-ratic Alliance for the Betterment andProgress of Hong Kong (DAB), theyc h o s e t o b o y c o t t t h e

Maria Tam

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“unconstitutional act”. For the LiberalParty, its former chairman JamesTien and his brother Michael Tienwere once showing interest to gainLegCo seats like any other opportun-ists. However, they never handed intheir applications. For DAB, its vice-chairman Ip Kwok-him saw disparag-ing opinions towards the by-electionand argued that DAB would onlyparticipate if the by-election were notinterpreted as a referendum. Chair-man Tam Yiu-chung even challengedthe resigned LegCo members bysaying that the by-election is a farcewhich squanders taxpayers’ moneyand disharmonises social stability.

The NPCSC Deputy Secretary-General QiaoXiaoyang recently repeated what was al-ready stated in the 2009 political reformconsultation document— The Five-StepMechanism”:

Step One: The CE shall make a report to theNPCSC as to whether there is a need toamend the two electoral methods;

Step Two: A determination shall be made bythe NPCSC that the two electoral meth-ods may be amended;

Step Three: The motions on the amend-ments to the two electoral methods shallbe introduced by the HKSAR Governmentto the LegCo, and be endorsed by a two-thirds majority of all the members of theLegCo;

Step Four: Consent shall be given by the CEto the motions endorsed by the LegCo;

Step Five: The relevant bill shall be reportedby the CE to the NPCSC for approval orfor the record.

The Five-Step Mechanism emphasisesNPCSC is the ultimate power of any Hong

Kong democratic reform. In other words,NPCSC is the ultimate hope of the “ultimateuniversal suffrage”.

Back in 1991, way before the handover ofsovereignty over Hong Kong from the U.K.to the PRC, Kuan Hsin-chi, the former de-partment head of Government and PublicAdministration, Chinese University of HongKong, now the chairman of Civic Party, con-tended that,

“Hong Kong is a British colony. It will be-come, in 1997, a Special AdministrativeRegion under the authority of the CentralPeople’s Government of China, i.e. a localgovernment within a unitary state. Thus,Hong Kong is and will remain a depend-ent polity. In a situation of power depend-ence, the choice of the rulers of thehegemonic country who set the rules ofthe game is crucial for political change inthe dominated polity.”

In other words, Hong Kong’s democraticfuture is, to a large extent, pre-destined.

Mr. Qiao Xiaoyang

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Name of FunctionalConstituencies

No. of RegisteredElectors

Bodies Individuals Total

1 Heung Yee Kuk 155 155

2 Agriculture and Fisheries 160 160

3 Insurance 141 141

4 Transport 178 178

5 Education 88,964 88,964

6 Legal 6,022 6,022

7 Accountancy 22,089 22,089

8 Medical 10,493 10,493

9 Health Services 36,491 36,491

10 Engineering 8,261 8,261

11 Architectural, Surveyingand Planning 6,117 6,117

12 Labour (3 Seats) 597 597

13 Social Welfare 12,293 12,293

14 Real Estate and Con-struction 441 286 727

15 Tourism 1,236 1,236

16 Commercial (First) 1,040 1,040

17 Commercial (Second) 748 1,066 1,814

18 Industrial (First) 715 0 715

19 Industrial (Second) 805 805

20 Finance 132 132

21 Financial Services 578 578

22 Sports, Performing Arts,Culture and Publication 2,060 155 2,215

23 Import and Export 875 619 1,494

24 Textiles and Garment 3,579 130 3,709

25 Wholesale and Retail 1,829 4,168 5,997

26 Information Technology 364 5,383 5,747

27 Catering 582 7,414 7,996

28 District Council 425 425

TOTAL 16,060 210,531 226,591

Appendix: Structure and Electors of Hong Kong Functional Constituencies**

CHINA REVIEW | By Antony Ou


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The rules and procedures can never bechanged solely by Hong Kong citizens,rather, there is only one single Leviathanthat has the absolute power over the de-mocratic progress of Hong Kong: shedetermines, reallocates, permits, prohibits,justifies, internalises and normalises. Theresigned LegCo candidates will most proba-bly be re-elected with low turnout rate (Thisessay was written just before the by-election/referendum). However, what is thepoint of going through all these political ad-vocacies? Maybe some Hong Kongers arelosing their patience. Maybe some of themnever trust their government. Maybe theyare showing their anger and grievancestowards a political hegemony and economicoligarchy. Or maybe, they are fighting for ajust cause, of which Goliath might feelslightly uncomfortable about it. The de factoreferendum was in fact broadcasting nation-wide, and was deeply criticised by the PRC.The government controls basically all themedia, yet, whether the people would thinkexactly the same way is another question.

Acknowledgment:I would like to express my sincerest grati-tude to Miss Erica Lowe for her editing ofmy script. Usual disclaimer applies.

Notes:* Antony Ou is a PhD Researcher of Univer-sity of Sheffield and the China Review editorof Political Reflection Magazine. His mono-graph, Just War and the Confucian Classics:A Gongyangzhuan Analysis, has been pub-lished and is available at amazon.com.E-mail: [email protected]: https://twitter.com/ouantony

** Source: Constitutional & Mainland Af-fairs Bureau, Public Consultation on the

Methods for Selecting the Chief Executiveand for Forming the Legislative Council in2012 Government of Hong Kong, 18 No-vember 2009

Further Reading:

1) Chan, Ming K. and Alvin Y. So (eds.) 2002.Crisis and Transformation in China's HongKong. Armonk and London: M.E. Sharpe.2) Cheung, Anthony Bing-leung and Kin-sheun Louie. 1991. Social Conflicts in HongKong, 1975-1986: Trends and Implications.Hong Kong: Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, Occasional Papers No. 3.3) Hughes, Richard . 1976. Borrowed Place,Borrowed Time : Hong Kong and its manyfaces. London : Andre Deutsch. (2nd rev. ed.)4) King, Ambrose Yeo-chi. 1975."Administrative Absorption of Politics inHong Kong: Emphasis on the Grass RootsLevel," in: Asian Survey 15:5 (May). P. 422-439.5) Kuan, Hsin-chi. Power Dependence andDemocratic Transition: The Case of HongKong. The China Quarterly, No. 128 (Dec.,1991), pp. 774-793. Cambridge UniversityPress6) Lau Siu-Kai (ed.) 2002. The First TungChee-hwa Administration: The First FiveYears of the HKSAR . Hong Kong: The Chi-nese University Press.7) Lau, Siu-kai. 1982. Society and Politics inHong Kong. Hong Kong: The Chinese Univer-sity Press.8) Miners, Norman. 1991. The Governmentand Politics of Hong Kong. (5th. ed.) HongKong: Oxford University Press.9) Sing, Ming. 2004. Hong Kong's TortuousDemocratization: A Comparative Analysis.London: RoutledgeCurzon.10) Scott, Ian. 1989. Political Change andthe Crisis of Legitimacy in Hong Kong. Lon-don: Hurst & Company.

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Funny Games USBy Enes Erbay*


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As a masterpiece inH a n e k e ’ s f i l m o g r a -p h y , F u n n y G a m e sUS (2007) is a remake ofthe Funny Games (1997).

This anti-thriller, like the others that pre-cede it, is a critical enquiry of brutality andspectatorship, and undoubtedly it takes asui generis place among other examples ofthe aesthetics of violence. The plot of thefilm is irritatingly simple: A rich Americanfamily of father, mother and son (with theirdog) go on vacation to their lakeside villa. Awell-groomed young man arrive clad in golfgear and asks to borrow some eggs. Thena second young man unexpectedly appearsand the two proceed, without any purpose,to terrorise and then kill dog, son, father,and mother. It should absolutely be defined

as an anti-thriller because there is neither arescue sequence, nor a revenge scenario;there is even no happy ending to the story.The violence, on the other hand, is neverreally disclosed in the film, except thebloody death of Peter, but rather indicatedin the soundtrack or recorded in the facesof the killers or of family members. Only theeffects of violence on the victims are shownthrough close-ups and long shots, and witha slow tempo in montage and camera,which allows audience a distanced ‘thinkingspace’. The question that seems to beposed most often to Michael Haneke inmany interviews is: “Do you enjoy disturbingthe audience?” But how should we ap-proach this terrifying style of the director?According to Wheatley, ‘An unpleasurecalls attention to itself in a way that pleas-

ure does not, it prompts the viewer toquestion what it is in the film thatcauses this feeling, and hence forcesthem to engage rationally with theimage on screen. The film therebyemploys spectatorial “unpleasure” asa device for mobilizing a tension be-tween reason and emotion, creatinga moment of “impact” for theviewer.’(1)

The physical environment of thescene that I have selectedfrom Funny Games US to discuss inthis article(2) — even the atmosphereof the whole film — and the elementsin it are overly structured by an em-phasis on ‘whiteness’: The livingroom, with its white walls, is furnishedby various items in different tones ofwhite — doors, cupboard, arm chairs,coffee table, frameworks of the win-dows, curtains, carpet, lampshade,tableaus hanged on the walls, (silver-


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coloured) television, eggs, andso forth. The purity of the at-mosphere is also supportedby some distinctive featuresof the characters: privilegedrace (white Western), up-per class (classical West-ern music, an expensive jeep,a white elegant villa, a whiteyacht, white golf clothes,gloves, shoes), gender (queer-like couple). This emphasis on‘whiteness’ is a parody thatrenders questionable the con-ventional approaches of thepsychology of colour andproblematizes the notion of ‘signification’ ina deconstructive way: the psychopathologi-cal attitudes of the queer-like couple Pauland Peter definitely seem incompatible withthe purity of white and its historical refer-ences to ethical and religious dimensions —divine, angelic, spiritual, good-hearted, andso forth. Moreover, their speaking Englishwith a good accent in addition to theirsmooth appearance, gentility, baby-faceattractiveness and slightly effeminate be-haviors absolutely seem at variance withthe classical rhetoric of male domination,or with macho/masculine manners: InRitzenhoff’s words, it would not be a boldclaim that Paul and Peter ‘simply like toexert violence. Out of boredom. Out of lackof humanness. Maybe also out of lack ofmasculinity because they are no longerdriven in their crime by their libido.’(3) Thisparody opens up a space to criticise theaestheticized, sentimental, mundane, ster-ile life form of bourgeoisie and its isolated-ness from the mud of everyday life andfrom the crowds of ordinary people, withstrong expressive forces: the extremewhiteness of the room brings the ‘white

cube’ model of contemporary art museumsinto mind, and increases the devastatingpower of squirting blood effect in an exhibi-tionist way (4). Briefly speaking, the threatto family happiness and bourgeois consum-erism does not come from a rogue ele-ment at the edge of society, but from withinthe upper class. Moreover, the scene alsoshows us that the ‘white’ dreams of thesecular life of the family are disturbed bythe ‘white’ demons’ un-spiritualcall forprayer: ‘“I love you God with all my might.Keep me safe all through the night.” If youcan say this little, unfortunately, much tooshort of a prayer backwards with no mis-takes, not only will you be able to decidewhich one of you bites it first but also — andI’m sure this is gonna interest you more —with which device: whether it’s the fast andalmost painless big gun or the slow, drawn-out...’

* * *

Film is an event which is multiple in itself inthe sense that cinematic time is consti-tuted by a cluster of temporalities. Mary


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Ann Doane formulates these ‘multiple tem-poralities’ in the following way: the tempo-rality of the apparatus (which she de-scribes as ‘ l inear, irreversible,“mechan ica l ” ’ ) , t he tempora l i t yof diegesis (‘the way in which time is repre-sented by the image, the varying invoca-tions of present, past, future, historicity’)and finally the temporality of reception(5). According to this formulation, cine-matic time, as a continuum that is ‘infinitelydivisible’, is an illusion of a nonselective re-cord of real time; in other words, there arealways irrepressiblegaps, lacks, losses anddivisions between frames(6). At this juncture, itshould be enunciatedt h a t c o n t i n u i t y - as -continuous-break in theduration of cinematictime is neither bound bylinearity or teleology, noris it irreversible. Hanekeironically stresses this‘reversibility’ of cinematictime, when the mother man-ages to grab a gun and shoot Paul’saccomplice. Just after the violent and san-guineous death of Peter, Paul grabs a re-mote control and rewinds the scene, secur-ing control over the film’s outcome: ‘Okay,that was the test run!’ Finally, I should alsopoint out that Funny Games has many in-tertextual references to not only Haneke’sother films but also Stanley Ku-brick’s Clockwork Orange (1971)and Shining(1980): aesthetization of vio-lence, strange men in white clothes, com-ing balls as precursors of the horror, psy-choanalytic triangle of family — father,mother, son. As for the performance andself-referentiality, the film plays with us, the

spectators, just as Paul and Peter playtheir ‘funny games’ with the family: Paulwinks into the camera and asks the viewer,‘you want a real ending with plausible plotdevelopment, don’t you?’

Note:

*Enes Erbay is an M.A. Student in Direct-ing: Film and Television at the University ofWestminster

References:

1) Catherine Wheatley,Michael Haneke’s Cinema:The Ethic of the Image(New York: BerghahnBooks, 2009), p. 78.2) The scene takes placebetween the time codes01:29:25 and 01:40:30in DVD.3) Karen A. Ritzenhoff,‘The Frozen Family: Emo-tional Dysfunction and

Consumer Society in MichaelHaneke’s Films,’ in Sex and Sexuality

in a Feminist World, eds. Karen A.Ritzenhoff and Katherine A. Hermesp(Newcastle upon Tyne: CambridgeScholars Publishing, 2009), p. 75[emphasis added].

4) Cf. Another squirting blood effect on thewhite wall in Haneke’s Caché (2005):the scene in which Majid commits ashocking suicide.

5) Mary Ann Doane, The Emergence ofCinematic Time: Modernity, Contin-gency, The Archive (London: HarvardUniversity Press, 2002), p. 30

6) Doane, The Emergence of CinematicTime, pp. 33-68.

“...continuity-as-continuous-break in

the duration ofcinematic time isneither bound by

linearity or teleology,nor is it irreversible.”


FILM REVIEW | By Enes ErbayFunny G

ames U

.S.

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European CorporateGovernance Readingsand Perspectives

Authors: Thomas Clarke,Jean-Francois Chanlat

ISBN: 978-0-415-40534-8

For decades, Europe hassought to become morefinancially integrated with theUnited States and thus Euro-pean legal institutions, regula-tory, governance and account-ing practices have faced pres-sures to adapt to internationalcompetitive markets. Againstthis backdrop, European corpo-rate governance systems havebeen criticized as being lessefficient than the Anglo-American market basedsystems.

This textbook examines theunique dimensions and quali-ties of European corporategovernance. Reforms of keyinstitutions, the doctrine ofshareholder value and theseemingly irresistible growth ofCEO power and reward arecritically analyzed. The bookbrings out the richness of Euro-pean corporate governancesystems, as well as highlightinghistorical weaknesses that willrequire further work for a sus-tainable corporate governanceenvironment in the future.

In light of the most severefinancial crisis since the1930s, this intelligent look atEuropean corporate govern-ance is a vital textbookfor courses on corporate gov-ernance and a great supple-mentary textbook on a host ofbusiness, management andaccounting classes.

Public Management andGovernance: Second Edition

Authors: Tony Bovaird,Elke Löffler

ISBN: 978-0-415-43043-2

The role of government inmanaging society has onceagain become a hot topicworldwide. A more diversesociety, the internet, andnew expectations of citizensare challenging traditionalways of managing govern-ments.

The second edition of PublicManagement and Governanceexamines key issues in efficientmanagement and good qualityservice in the public sector.With contributions fromleading authors in the field,it goes beyond the first edition,looking at the ways in whichthe process of governingneeds to be altered fundamen-tally to remain legitimateand to make the most ofsociety’s many resources.

Key themes include:

challenges and pressuresfacing modern governmentsworldwide

the changing role of the pub-lic sector in a ‘mixed economy’of provision

governance issues such asethics, equalities, and citizenengagement

This new edition has an in-creased international scopeand includes new chapters onpartnership working, agencyand decentralised manage-ment, process management,and HRM. Comprehensive anddetailed, it is an ideal compan-ion for undergraduate andpostgraduate students of pub-lic management, public admini-stration, government and pub-lic policy.

Participatory ResearchMethodologies

Development and Post-Disaster/ConflictReconstruction

Author: Alpaslan Ozerdem

ISBN-13: 978-0754677352

Participatory research method-ologies have been used sincethe 1970s as a tool to garneraccurate information aboutcommunities in which develop-ment practitioners operate.Their usefulness as a collectionof research techniques hasbeen evident in academic

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disciplines such as politics soci-ology anthropology and eco-nomics, among others. Thisinformative text assesses theuse of participatory methods asa research tool in the contextsof development and reconstruc-tion after conflict and disastersby identifying cross-cuttingthemes and establishing a com-parative lessons-learned frame-work that can help inform fu-ture uses of them, both forpractitioners and researchers.More importantly, rather thanadopting a prescriptive per-spective, this book provides acritical analysis of such method-ologies. Specifically, the readerwill benefit from the collation ofthe experiences of those whoutilize participatory researchmethods in different countriesand contexts, and from differ-ent academic and practitionerperspectives.

Just War and the ConfucianClassics: An Analysis ofGongyangzhuan

Author: Antony Ou

ISBN-13: 978-3639157901

The revival of interest in the justwar theory, sparked in largepart by publication of MichaelWalzer’s Just and Unjust Warsat the end of the 1970s, hasgenerated widespread analysisof the conditions in which re-course to arms can be given

some sort of moral warrant.However, most contributionshave drawn on the long-standing Western tradition ofdebate, which has for manycenturies been inspired byChristian thinkers, and contin-ues to be informed by Christianmoral codes. Other traditions,for examples, Islamic and Con-fucian thinking have been givensome attention. However, theirstatus has been no more thanmarginal. In these circum-stances it is necessary to en-gage in intensive textual exege-sis and analysis of the Confu-cian classics. Only by diggingdeep into the tradition is it pos-sible to make sense of its his-torical significance over centu-ries. In this spirit, this thesisseeks to provide a Confucianperspective on the just wartheory by focusing not on theworks to which scholars areusually drawn, but on Gongy-angzhuan, which was rarelyheld to have much to add to thejust war historical analysis.

The Post-American World

Author: Fareed Zakaria

ISBN-13: 9780393334807

In his influential book FareedZakaria evaluates the growth ofthe global economy in recentworld and claims that while ineconomic terms the US has

been declining the rest of theworld is gaining more strength.

Depending on that argumentZakaria argues that the USwould not enjoy a unipolar worldin which they easily pursuit uni-lateral policies. In an optimisticway Zakaria insists that theeconomic growth would createnew powers and the US wouldbe forced to compromise inorder to keep its position as agreat power.

Endless War: Middle-EasternIslam vs. Western Civilization

Author: Ralph Peters

ISBN-13: 9780811705509

In his Ralph Peters gathers hisarticles about political Islamand the Middle East. Whatmakes unique this book is thatrather than making a superficialanalysis the author presents adeep historical frameworkwhich enables the reader tounderstand the roots of thepolitical Islam, its expansionthroughout the Middle East andits evolution through the time.Peters simply gives a historycourse to the Middle Easternstudents by examining the riseand fall of the political Islamduring the Ottoman Empire.With independent articles hetalks about not only the histori-cal side of the subject but alsothe contemporary issues over it.

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107

When China Rules the World

Author: Michiko Kakutani

ISBN-13: 9781594201851

With the tremendous growthrates China has become one ofthe leading power in 21th cen-tury. In his book Kakutani, as ajournalist who had lived in Chinafor a long time, the rise of Chinawould change the currentstructure of the internationalsystem. He claims that If itkeeps on growing at such highrates China would be able toreplace the global dominion ofthe US. He makes an interest-ing point by saying that the riseof China is not like the rise ofthe Great Britain, Germany orthe US. These forces emergedas dominant in such periods.But China had been dominantbefore in ancient times. Now ithas been recovering its domi-nant position. In other words itis re-emerging as a hegemon.Unlike many, Kakutani claimsthat China is getting power notonly economically but also cul-turally and politically. These di-mensions would help China tobe a dominant in near future.

Overlapping GenerationsEconomies

Author: Mich Tvede

ISBN: 0230243339

In the past two decades theoverlapping generations (OG)model has become a dominantframework in macroeconomicanalysis. This book provides aclear and self-contained intro-duction to OG economies. Start-ing with the existence of equilib-rium and the optimality of allo-cations, the discussion thenturns to properties of equilibria,including the existence of fluc-tuations and sunspot equilibria,ending with applications to thetheories of exchange rates andendogenous growth.

Throughout the book, OG econo-mies are compared and con-trasted with optimal growtheconomies. The presentationincludes detailed proofs of re-sults as well as illustrative ex-amples. Growing out of re-search and teaching experienceon the subject, the book is suit-able for advanced students andresearchers.

The Global Crash: Towards aNew Global Financial Regime?

Author: Leila Simona Talani

ISBN: 023024341X

The financial crisis hit the globaleconomy unexpectedly fromAugust 2007 producing conse-quences comparable to theones experienced in the courseof the 1930s. This book pro-

vides a comprehensive interdis-ciplinary account of the eventsleading to the financial crisis, itsinstitutional causes and conse-quences, its economic charac-teristics and its socio-politicalimplications. This book repre-sents a unique opportunity togather the opinions of estab-lished experts on financial mar-kets from different academicdisciplines and from a differentacademic traditions debatingover the future of the globalfinancial order. Leading econo-mists are confronted with lead-ing political scientists in an ef-fort to assess the future ofglobal financial stability and topropose solutions to the prob-lems envisaged. This book isessential reading for all inter-ested in macroeconomics, politi-cal economy, globalization stud-ies and political science.

The Caged Phoenix:Can India Fly?

Author: Dipankar Gupta

ISBN: 0804771898

Dipankar Gupta, one of India'sforemost thinkers on social andeconomic issues, takes acritical-and controversial-lookat the limits of the Indiansuccess story in The CagedPhoenix. Through a fine blendof theory and new evidenceon small scale industries, farm-ing, and more, Gupta arguesthat, despite the promise of

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Independence and liberalisation,India continues to remain cagedin backwardness. In short, thecountry's phenomenal growthstory has not translated intodevelopment. Questioning pre-vailing culture-based theories—and the academics who per-petuate them—that are used toexplain India's poverty and itshampered development, Guptaattempts to "normalize" India,advocating a rigorous rejectionof justifications that rely uponcultural otherness and exotici-zation. He critically examinesthe reluctance to acknowledgethat structural impediments,not cultural factors, denygrowth benefits to the majorityof Indians, and explores theclose link between growth inhigh technology sectors of theIndian economy on one side andsweat shops and rural stagna-tion on the other. Making acomparison with the developedWest, Gupta underscores thepoint that affluence can beachieved only after living condi-tions improve across all socialclasses.

Combining original scholarshipwith a lively narrative, Guptadebunks widespread mythsabout why India's democracyhas yet to deliver and offerscompelling explanations for theparadoxes that exist.

Michal Kalecki(Great Thinkers in Economics)

Author: Julio Lopez

ISBN: 1403999376

This book examines the life andwork of the extraordinary Polisheconomist, Michal Kalecki. Itdiscusses Kalecki's theory ofthe capitalist economy, andprovides a thorough guided tourthrough his published works,including his important writingson the economics of underde-veloped countries. Kalecki'sideas received wide interna-tional recognition during theperiod when Keynesianism pre-dominated in the economiclandscape. In the early 1930s,Kalecki anticipated many as-pects of the principle of effec-tive demand that later JohnMaynard Keynes put forward inhis General Theory of Employ-ment, Interest and Money. Thisbook commemorates Kalecki'soriginality, and great contribu-tion to economics. The book isco-authored by a former stu-dent of Kalecki. It includes origi-nal notes taken from Kalecki'scourses, which up till now havenever been published. This bookis indispensable reading for allinterested in the history of eco-nomic thought.

21st Century KeynesianEconomics

Author: Philip Arestis,Malcolm Sawyer

ISBN: 0230236014

The International Papers in Po-litical Economy (IPPE) seriesexplores the latest develop-ments in political economy. Thissixth volume focuses on thetheme of the need for and thedevelopment of Keynesian eco-nomic policies for the 21st cen-tury. The volume deals with fi-nancial systems and economicdevelopment and asks whetherwe are all Keynesians now.Keynesian growth theory in the21st century along with eco-nomic policies thought toemerge from the theoreticalframework that underpins it --always a Keynesian one butadapted to the realities of the21st century -- are also exam-ined. Essays in this volume alsoexplore the nature and conse-quences of financialisation asperceived by Keynesians, theconceptualisation of money andthe implications for economicpolicy of the current financialcrisis, and the role of banks andthe case for public banks. Thisbook offers detailed analysisand informed comment on thetype of economic policies thatare relevant for the 21st cen-tury in the aftermath of the fi-nancial crisis and global reces-sion. It is essential reading forall postgraduates and scholarslooking for expert discussionand debate of the issues sur-rounding economic policyissues.


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political reflection vol.1 no2[1] davutoglu oxford

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