political party in phil

7/30/2019 Political Party in Phil

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Reforming the Philippine Political Party ideas and iniiatives, debates and dynamics


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Copyright 2009

Published by the Friedrich Ebert S ung (FES)

All rights reserved

Cover Design by Dennis Jimenez


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Foreword

Its the (Non-) System, Stupid!:Explaining Mal-development of Par es inthe Philippines

Introduc onThe Nature and Prac ce of Par es

Ins tu onal-Legal Context of Poli cal Par es and its Impact

Final WordsReferences

Ci zen-Party Linkages in the Philippines:Failure to Connect?

Impera ves of Poli cal Party ReformDemocra c Ci zen-Party Rela onship:

The Missing LinkReformist Par es and Party Reforms:

The LP and Akbayan ExperienceParty Ins tu onaliza on:

The Road AheadReferences

Legisla ng Poli cal Party Reforms:The View from the Senate

Introduc onI. Poli cal Party Reform BillsII. IssuesWay Forward

References Cited

Perspec ves of the Reform-Minded on thePoli cal Party Reform Legisla on

Introduc on

The Proposed Poli cal Party Reform BillPoints of AgreementPoints of DivergenceMoving the Party Reform Ini a ves

Forward

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Joy Aceron

Julio C. Teehankee

Jean Encinas-Franco

Joy Aceron and Glenford Leonillo

TABLE OF CONTENTS


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ideas and initiatives, debates and dynamics

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Foreword

Among cha-cha -induced upheaval, the two par es carrying the administra onmerge to create a formidable force for the 2010 elec ons. Yet, they have nopresiden al candidate within their own ranks and are desperately lookingfor an outsider to adopt as the partys standard-bearer. A boxing championdecides that it is me for him to form his own poli cal party. There is neithera pla orm nor a reason to join it except for riding the bandwagon of hisspor ng popularity. In the middle of a Congressional term, a Supreme Courtdecision makes the House of Representa ves scramble for o ce space. Inan instant, 33 new members of Congress have been admi ed, a signi cantnumber of them not knowing whom they represent.

Even a year before the next electoral exercise, the Philippine poli cal partysystem displays its peculiari es to the interested public. Striking is the absenceof the central func on of poli cal par es, which is to transmit the ambi ons

and aspira ons of the ci zens and their organized groups to the poli caldecision-makers and the state. Poli cal par es are commonly ascribed toperform the func ons of representa on, elite recruitment, goal formula on,interest ar cula on and aggrega on, socializa on and mobiliza on andorganiza on of government.


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Reforming the Philippine Political Party System

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This may be a view of poli cal par es that is centered on European modelsof poli cal (party) systems, where membership-based, programma callyoriented poli cal par es dominate the poli cal arena to such an extent thatcommentators lament about the so-called party democracy. While theexcesses of such a system may lead to a sclero c and bureaucra c hegemonin channeling access to poli cal power, the reality of many par es even inEurope is characterized by declining membership, a disenchanted electorateand compe on in the form of small issue-based movements or ini a ves.This reality makes it even clearer that par es do need to shape up and openthemselves to the par cipa on of ci zens. If they fail to do so, the quality of democracy and, concomitantly, the stability and performance of the poli cal

system su ers.

This view is shared by many poli cians, advocates and observers also inthe Philippines. The absence of an intermediary level between ci zens andstate allows for a greater degree of arbitrariness, personality-based poli cs,poli cal turncoa sm, and the dominance of economic and nancial powerof individual poli cal actors. If the poli cal party system (mal-)func ons insuch a way, apathy, mistrust or even frustra on among ci zens may spread,thus endangering the gains of a democra za on process. It is clear that thisis a serious danger to a democra c system making it one of the majorchallenges of Philippine poli cs today.

In its mission to facilitate poli cal dialogue and the exchange of ideas fromdi erent perspec ves, the Friedrich Ebert S ung has been working withPhilippine stakeholders to address the perceived structural de ciencies of the party system of the country. Over the past decade, round tables, studies,workshops and conferences have iden ed the reasons for weaknesses and

proposed solu ons for the strengthening of the party system. The intent of this publica on is to share this discourse, which has been limited to a rathersmall number of interested persons, with a broader audience. We no cethat such technical discussions o en generate li le a en on in the media.Yet, an iden able party system may go a long way in solving some of thestructural impediments to progress in the country.

Hence, we would like to o er the reader di erent perspec ves from theacademe, reform advocates and legisla ve sta - on the challenges whichpoli cal par es are facing, the e orts undertaken to strengthen their posi onwithin the poli cal system and the gaps that s ll need to be addressed. Thefollowing papers do not claim to represent the whole possible spectrum


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of analy cal approaches. Rather, they share perspec ves, from academics,observers and advocates.

Joy Aceron, Instructor at the Poli cal Science Department of the Ateneode Manila University and Program Coordinator of the Ateneo School of Government, suggests an ins tu onal approach to close the de cits of theparty system. On the one hand, she argues, the form of government andthe electoral system signi cantly shape the party system. Interna onalexperiences show that a parliamentary form of government with an electoralsystem displaying propor onal representa on elements enhances the role of poli cal par es. On the other hand, Aceron calls for a poli cal party law that

de nes more clearly func ons of poli cal par es and its funding sources.

Julio C. Teehankee is an Associate Professor of Compara ve Poli cs andDevelopment Studies, and Chair of the Interna onal Studies Department atDe La Salle University, Manila. His contribu on o ers a deeper insight intohow two poli cal par es strive to overcome what is commonly described asa central weakness of Philippine poli cs the linkage between the state andci zens. His examples re ect on reform e orts within poli cal par es in thecountry and how they aspire to open for ci zens ac ve par cipa on and too er programma c policy choices.

Jean Encinas-Franco, a former director of the Senate Economic PlanningO ce (SEPO) and now faculty member of the Department of Interna onalStudies at Miriam College, provides a perspec ve from legislators. The authorrecalls the debates about the proposed legisla on on poli cal par es in theSenate and re ects about its possibili es to be enacted. On substan al items,she suggests, among others, to incorporate a de nite funding source in the

poli cal party reform bills, to incorporate gender aspects in the opera on of par es, and to clarify the role of COMELEC in implemen ng the new laws.

The contribu on by Joy Aceron and Glenford Leonillo summarizes theoutcomes of the discussions and debates of reform-minded groups onstrengthening poli cal par es. These so-called reform advocates principallyagree that the proposed Poli cal Party Reform Bill with its intendedregula ons on poli cal turncoa sm, party registra on and state subsidy of poli cal par es is a step in the right direc on. While speci c points suchas the role of party-lists and the disbursement formula of the state subsidywould require more thorough discussion, these advocates also see thislegisla ve ini a ve as being one part of a broader reform e ort.


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While the upcoming 2010 elec ons may prevent the passing of any bills onpoli cal par es in the short term, the poli cal contest is expected to again bringto the fore systemic challenges that will have to be ins tu onally addressedat some me. At the same me, the contribu ons of this book make it clearthat the challenges run deeper, and ul mately ci zens themselves need tostake their claim on either exis ng par es or by forming new ones.

The Friedrich Ebert S ung would like to thank all contributors and partnerswho we have had the privilege to cooperate with on this topic over the years.A special thanks goes to Ms. Judith Kroll for her relentless support withoutwhich this booklet would s ll not be complete.

Mirko HerbergResident RepresentativeFriedrich Ebert Stiftung Philippine Of ce


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Its the (Non-) System, Stupid!:

Explaining Mal-development of Parties in the Philippines

Joy Aceron

Introduction

Poli cal par es are supposed to perform the important func ons of candidate selec on, leadership forma on, interest aggrega on and agendadevelopment. But in the Philippines, par es can be best described astemporary poli cal alliances. Some would even go to the extent of sayingthere are no real par es in the country and what we have are mere fansclub of poli cians.

This is usually blamed on our poli cal leaders and poli cians, and theirinability to go beyond their poli cal ambi ons and vested interests. Thepeople are also some mes blamed for not par cipa ng in par san poli csand for not vo ng according to party a lia ons. Pundits even claim that


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the poli cal par es lack of ideological orienta on are due to the poli cianswho behave the way they do because people do not vote according to partypla orms or programs.

This has become a vicious cyclea blame game that provides no immediateac onable op ons for e ec ng change. Altering the poli cians behavior andmaking them suddenly party-followers would be wishful thinking, and so ischanging the peoples view on poli cal par es. But this ideological lacunaestems from a much deeper cause; hence, imposing a direc ve that wouldcompel par es to adopt an ideology of their choice would not be of muchhelp.

With this in mind, this paper will search for an aspect of poli cal par esthat:

can explain the mal-development of party poli cs in the country;1.andcan provide a feasible point of reference for party reform measures.2.

It studies the current system (or the ins tu onal-legal context within whichpar es operate), to explain the behaviors that the system elicits given itscharacteris cs and features. Embedded in these laws and ins tu ons arepower rela ons that are then perpetuated by the state of poli cs and theexis ng poli cal culture.

Overcoming the system (or non-system) is possible, but its probability isquite low at the moment. The most immediate step, therefore, is to clearlyar culate a new system for the opera ons and func oning of par es, as well

as improving the modernizing role that par es have to play in state-buildingand economic development. To refrain from doing so would consign ourpar es to being mere agents of patronage- and personality-based poli csin which case, the best op on for the county would be to abolish them alltogether.

The Nature and Practice of Parties

What makes a party a party? It is a party if it seeks to place representa ves ingovernment, and not just to persuade poli cal actors. It nominates candidatesto stand for elec ons in its name; and it exercises power on behalf of thegeneral public (Lawson 1989; 252-253). Meyer, on the other hand, has a more


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demanding set of requirements: Par es are usually large organiza ons witha certain amount of centraliza on and presence across the country. If theyare well organized, they are able to combine the development of poli calobjec ves in communi es, ci es, and villages with a decision-making processon all levels of the poli cal organiza on that the party members deem fair. Atthe grassroots level, well-func oning party democracies are established in abroad and ac ve civil society. (Meyer 2007; 10-11)

Heywood (2002; 251-255), for his part, provides the following list of func onsthat poli cal par es must perform:

Representa on the capacity to respond and to ar culate the views1.of both members and voters.Elite Forma on and Recruitment the ability to mold the poli cal2.elite tasked to govern the body poli c.Goal Formula on the development of programs of government3.with a view of a rac ng popular support.Interest Ar cula on and Aggrega on the task of combining and4.harmonizing di erent demands and expressing them into coherentpolicy formula on.Socializa on and Mobiliza on the forma on of a na onal agenda5.and the crea on of public discourse to raise poli cal awareness andbuild the necessary values and a tudes that would cons tute alarger poli cal culture.Organiza on of Government the power given to a poli cal party6.that gains the necessary votes to cons tute the governmental elite,

lling governmental posts with elements from the party ranks.

The correla on between poli cal par es and the func oning democracyhas also been established by various scholars. Meyer best summed up thisargument when he said that, democracy needs poli cal par es in orderto be able to func onPoli cal par es are the main organiza onal formsof modern democracy. (Meyer 2007a; 8) He further argued that the onecrucial func on that is important for democracy to work is the designingof programs and ins tu ons that give poli cal and legisla ve form to thesocial interests. Par es are able to do this through their es to the interest-ar cula ng structures of the intermediary system of associa ons andorganiza ons. (Meyer with Hinchman 2007; 73)

The other crucial func on is candidate selec on (Co 2005; 75). Especially inopen party systems where an in nite number of candidates can run, par es


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play an important role in screening the candidates and making sure thatthose who join the electoral race are also the best quali ed for public o ce.

However, poli cal par es in the Philippines, and even in the world in general,are held in low esteem, and are o en perceived as sel sh, dishonest, biasedand incapable of recrui ng quality leaders (Lawson 1989; 270-71).

In developing na ons such as the Philippines, where poli cal structures areweak and with rudimentary forms of civic par cipa on, par es are o enunable to perform their task of being the most intermediate link between stateand society. Rather, they are o en reduced to mere ritualized expressions

of prevailing elite coali ons, instead of being the inclusive, responsive andresponsible representa on of civic interests. (Croissant and Merkel 2001; 2).Unable to command party discipline, leaders and government func onariesare therefore induced to gather legisla ve and local support through the useof patronage, privilege and pork, and other forms of rent-seeking ac vi es.

The situa on in the Philippines is not much di erent, for according toRocamora (1997; 106), poli cal par es are not divided on the basis of long-term upper class interests, much less the interests of the lower classes.Instead, they are temporary and unstable coali ons of upper class frac onspieced together for elec ons and post-elec on ba les for patronage. Theycome together only to put down asser ons of lower class interests. The restof the me they maneuver in par cularis c horsetrading and the perennialsearch for deals.

This is a rmed by Almonte (2007; 65) who described the countrys exis ngpar es as catch-all par es that target to please everyone and anyone from

all sectors and social strata, and paper par es organized in an instant tosupport the presiden al ambi on of a poli cal personality.

Because of the way they are organized, Philippine par es are de ned in waysthat o en contrast to what poli cal par es are supposed to be. They donot ful ll the task of interest aggrega on but instead serve as mechanismsfor patronage poli cs to perpetuate vested interests. Par es do not selectcandidates, but are instead formed by the candidates themselves as vehiclesfor their own campaigns. In other words, when we talk of par es in thePhilippines, there is a wide gap between standard and prac ce. Consequently,the public o en views e orts aimed at party-strengthening as mere a emptsto further entrench tradi onal poli cs and elite interests. This is perhaps thegreatest challenge in changing the countrys party system.


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Given the way party poli cs is prac ced in the Philippines, it is no surprisethat the impact of poli cal par es has not been favorable to democra za on.Because of its weaknesses, the party system, according to Almonte, hasfailed to o er meaningful policy choicesand so to provide for orderlychange (2007, 66). If we follow Nohlen (1984; 49) who de nes the partysystem as referring to number of par es, rela ve strength, ideologicaldimensions and distances of compe ng par es, the Philippine party systemcan thus be described as mul -party, uid, non-ideological, non-par cipatoryand not o ering programma c choices.

Personality- and money-based poli cs greatly undermine the electoral

exercise since few real op ons are made available to the electorate. To manyvoters, Philippine elec ons have become a process through which the leastevil is selected from among a crop of choices that were neither iden ed fortheir pla orms or leadership creden als, but for the amount of money thatthey have at their disposal to run an expensive campaign. Unfortunately, anelectoral exercise that aims to choose the least evil would inevitably result in abad choicethus perpetua ng the cycle of corrup on and bad governance.

To somehow address this situa on, the party-list system was devised in thehope that it would produce real poli cal par es that would shun personalis cpoli cs and the rule of guns, gold, and goods, and would serve as a germfor a parliamentary form of government (Llamas 2001; FES website). Thisexperiment, however, was not successful in giving birth to a real and stableparty system. Instead, over the years, the party-list system has been plaguedby fragmenta on, controversies and now, even the tradi onal poli cians arewinning party-list seats. This is further aggravated by the Comelecs lack of concern for organiza onal creden als in registering party-list groups.

Institutional-Legal Context of Political Parties and itsImpact

A number of scholars suggest that the mal-development of par es canactually be traced to the countrys poli cal culture. American author DavidTimberman explains this argument quite well:

The exclusiveness of the Filipino family, the importance of patron-client es, and the strength of regional and linguis c a ni es causeFilipino poli cs to be highly personalis c and par cularis cMostFilipinos believe that the decisions and events that shape their lives


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are determined more by par cular individuals than by impersonalsystems and ins tu ons. Consequently, the maintenance of goodpersonal rela ons with those in power is cri cal. As a result of thepersonaliza on of public life there has been rela vely li le concernwith ins tu ons or ideologies on the part of leaders or the public.(1991; 22)

Other scholars, on the other hand, suggest that the countrys weak partysystem is largely brought about by Philippine democracys ins tu onalde ciencies which can, in turn, be traced back to the American colonialperiod.

(M)any of the major characteris cs of Philippine democracy can betraced to the ins tu onal innova ons of the American colonial era:the exclusion of the masses and elite hegemony over democra cins tu ons; the provincial basis of na onal poli cs; the overarchingdominance of patronage over ideology as the primary founda on of Philippine poli cal par es; and a powerful presidency. These basiccharacteris cs have endured amid enormous transforma ons inPhilippine poli cs, including the rise and defeat of armed challengesto elite domina on at midcentury, independence in 1946, thecrea on of a mass electorate, the long nightmare of mar al law,the reemergence of armed opposi on in the countryside during theMarcos dictatorship, the toppling of Marcos via broad-based peoplepower in 1986, the growth of a vigorous NGO sector, the economicreforms of thec1990s, the populism of Joseph Estrada, and theresurgent People Power uprising that forced Estrada from o ce in2001. (Hutchcro and Rocamora 2003; 284)

This paper focuses on the ins tu onal and legal context within whichpoli cal par es operate. It can be described as constraining, limi ng andeven detrimental to the development and strengthening of poli cal par es.I will argue this from two standpoints: rst, by looking at the aws in theins tu onal arrangement of the poli cal system and the electoral exercise;and two, by iden fying the legal gaps in de ning and structuring theopera ons of poli cal par es. Let me begin with the rst one.

The Constraining E ect of Presiden al System on Par es

The Philippines has a presiden al form of government. As such, thegovernment is divided into three main branchesnamely the execu ve, the


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legisla ve and the judiciarythat are supposed to check and balance eachother as they perform their independent and separate func ons. The presidentexercises enormous power over the bureaucracy as head of the government,and has control over the budget as well as government appointments. S/Healso exercises authority over the military as the countrys Commander-in-Chief. The presidency is lled up every six years with the incumbent restrictedto run for re-elec on. The Vice-President may come from a di erent party.

The legislature is divided into two houses: the Upper House or Senate whosemembers are elected at-large and the House of Representa ves whosemembers are elected by district (single member district) and through the

party-list system.

The Philippine legislature holds the power to pass laws and the na onalbudget, among others. Half of the senators (12 of the 24 senators) arereplaced every six years, while members of the Lower House end their termevery three years. Senators could be elected for two consecu ve terms;while members of the Lower House could be re-elected for three consecu veterms. The judiciary interprets the laws and administers the jus ce system.The Supreme Court, the highest court of the land, consists of 12 associated

jus ces and 1 chief jus ce that are appointed by the president on a seven-year term basis.

The presiden al system, with an overly powerful presidency contributesto the mal-development of poli cal par es. The enormous power of thepresidency enables it to control the members of Congress. The phenomenonof party-switching can be very well explained by the necessity of aligningwith the president to get pork. Par es are supposed to form government, but

instead it is the president that forms par es.

The power over the purse of the Presidency explains the phenomenon of party switching (Mon nola 1999, 136 in Co, 82). This and the other powersof the presidency enable the presidents since post-EDSA 1 (except for Aquinowho refused to be part of a party) to have majority control over the House.A partys pla orm of government is determined therefore by the presidentand not by the party, even if there is a majority party. The president may optto follow the party pla orm or members of the party may try to in uencethe president to refer to the partys pla orm, but no structural mechanismensures this. The strong presidency therefore undermines the developmentof par es.


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Par es are also used for other purposes: consolida on of support base, anda medium for patronage and clientelism. Par es are indis nguishable andunstable because they are personality-based and have a weak ins tu onaldisposi on. Pla orms are not developed. Membership is temporary andloyalty to the party is hardly exis ng.

Theore cally, it is easy to explain this. Par es are developed alongside thedevelopment of the legislature. And if a legislature is weak vis--vis thepresidency, par es tend to be underdeveloped as well, for their developmentwould largely be dependent on the presidency. This is the reason that somescholars are arguing that the parliamentary form of government can support

the development of par es more than the presiden al system.

In rela on to this, more and more empirical studies point to the form of government (presiden al and parliamentary) as a factor in the developmentof poli cal par es. An ar cle of Karvonen and Anckar (2002) en tled Party Systems and Democra za on: A Compara ve Study of the Third World pointsout that numerous studies recognize the posi ve impact of parliamentaryform of government on party development:

Contemporary scholarship on democra za on and consolida onhas taken an increasingly cri cal view of presiden alism as opposedto the parliamentary form of government. Presiden alism is, inthe words of Sartori, a cons tu onal machine made for gridlockwhich it why it has [b]y and large ... performed poorly. Linz andhis associates have in several works detailed the shortcomings of presiden alism: dual legi macy, rigidity, winner take all, problemsof accountability, plebiscitary leadership. Parliamentary systems,

on the other hand, are seen as more prone to nego a on, coali on-building and internal party discipline. Speci cally, considerableparty system fragmenta on is more problema c in presiden aldemocracies than in parliamentary democracies. Presidents tendto view par es and legislatures as obstacles to be circumvented,18and this is naturally much easier if no party is strong enough tochallenge the execu ve. The absence of incen ves for coali on-building in presiden al systems adds to this weakness. (Karvonenand Anckar 2002; 16)

The reliability of parliamentary system in producing working par es can betraced back to the stability it creates that is based on coopera on among


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par es and through a clear mechanism to make the ruling party accountablebased on its performance.

The Flawed Combina on of Plurality Elec ons in a Mul -Party System

The Philippines has a plurality/ majority or rst-past-the-post electoralsystem. Winners of elec ons are determined based on who got the highestnumber of voters among a poten ally in nite number of candidates.

If combined with a mul -party system, the plurality electoral systembecomes problema c. This combina on almost naturally results in a minority

leadership. Take for instance Philippine presiden al elec ons, no candidatesince post Mar al Law was able to garner a majority vote, hence resul ng in apopula on that is mostly opposi on to the si ng president. This is thereforecounter-intui ve to a majority rule principle of a democra c system.

It has been established that a plurality/ majority electoral system works bestin a two-party system. This is so since this combina on produces a clearmajority that is important in governing a pluralist society. Plurality does notsit well with mul ple cons tuencies. Propor onal representa on, on theother hand, is more able to capture mul ple and diverse cons tuencies.

In fact, in some of the literature, it is expected that a plurality/ majorityelectoral system will produce a two-party system (Nohlen 1984; 49)under certain concrete social condi ons (Ibid; 50). In addi on, there areprecondi ons that govern a successful applica on of the plurality/ majorityformula that arguably does not exist in the Philippines, these are:

homogenous society;fundamental poli cal consensus among popula on in regards to themajority rule;the probability that the minority can become a majority (Nohlen1984; 55).

With this awed combina on, par es could hardly develop; simply becausethe leadership of the government resul ng from the elec ons does not re ectthe party performance in the elec ons. If it was a mul -party system in apropor onal representa on electoral system, the number of votes garneredby the party determines the number of seats it occupies in the government.But in a plurality elec ons with mul -party system, though an in nite numberof poli cal par es is allowed, the result of the elec ons would only yield two


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kinds of par es: a losing party and a winning party. The link between theresult of the elec ons and the con gura on of leadership in government isdiluted.

The Supposed Solu on that is Party-List

The Cons tu on also provides for a party-list system, i.e., a system of propor onal representa on in the Lower House.

Republic Act No. 7941 or the Party-List Act de nes a system of elec ons bywhich winners are determined based on the percentage of votes a party

gets out of the total number of votes cast for the party-list. 20% of the totalnumber of seats of the lower house is lled up through the Party-List System.Because of the existence of the party-list system, scholars would refer tothe Philippine electoral system as mixed electoral system employing bothplurality/ majority and propor onal representa on.

The 1987 Philippine Cons tu on (Ar cle IX-C, Sec on 6) provides that

a free and open party system shall be allowed to evolve accordingto the free choice of the people, subject to the provisions of thisAr cle.

According to renowned cons tu onalist Joaquin Bernas:

The 1935 Cons tu on and the Philippine elec on law up to the 1987Elec on Code gave a preferred posi on to the two major poli calpar es. This was the two-party system. The clear impression, which

had emerged from the cons tu onal scheme prior to the 1987Cons tu on was that the electoral system planned and plo ed toinsure the perpetua on of the party in power. The 1987 Cons tu ononce again makes a try at promo ng a mul -party system or openparty systemThe party-list system, already discussed under Ar cleVI, is meant to be an instrument for fostering the mul -party system.(2007; 200-201)

The Party-List System is based on the principle of propor onal representa on(PR) wherein par es are represented in parliament in direct propor onto their overall electoral strength, their percentage of seats equaling theirpercentage of votes. (Heywood 2002; 232). The Party-List System Act de nes


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the party-list system as a mechanism of propor onal representa on in theelec on of representa ves in the House of Representa ves from na onal,regional and sectoral par es or organiza ons or coali ons registered withthe COMELEC.

The said piece of legisla on primarily seeks to ensure the par cipa on of marginalized and/or underrepresented groups or sectors in the legisla veprocess. As s pulated in its Declara on of Policy, the party-list system willenable Filipino ci zens belonging to marginalized and underrepresentedsectors, organiza ons and par es, and who lack well-de ned poli calcons tuencies but who could contribute to the formula on and enactment

of appropriate legisla on that will bene t the na on as a whole, to becomemembers of the House of Representa ves.

Under the law, na onal, regional, and sectoral par es or organiza ons orcoali ons registered with the Comelec can par cipate in the party-listelec ons.

Each registered party-list group has ve nominees but is only allowedto have three (3) seats maximum. For them to achieve a seat, thelaw requires them to get two percent (2%) of the total votes cast forthe party-list. If it is able to reach the 2% threshold or achieve therequired number of votes, the representa ves of the party-list groupwould come from the list of their nominees. It is the name of theparty that the voters should indicate on the ballot and not the nameof the nominee. The elected party-list representa ves have the samepowers and func ons as district representa ves. (IPER 2005; 14)

The Party-List Law, however, has inherent gaps that constrain its capacity todevelop a system where full- edged poli cal par es can eventually thrive. Its

rst aw is its de ni on of party-list groups, which disregards organiza onalrequirements and highlights sectoral and marginaliza on pre-requisites.

Ideally, the party-list is supposed to provide that breeding ground for par es;but instead of being na onal poli cal par es with a na onal developmentagenda, party-list groups have become very sectoral, thereby losing theprospect of party development through the party-list. And instead of furtherconsolida ng so as to become a major poli cal force, party-list groupscon nuously split in order to gain more seats.


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hearing be deemed to have forfeited such status as a registeredpoli cal party in such cons tuency. (Sec. 60)

The Omnibus Elec on Code has the following provisions that de ne poli calparty func ons during elec ons:

par es must be furnished a copy of Comelec direc ves and ordersin pursuant to the provisions of the Omnibus Elec on Code (Ar cleVIII)par es must be no ed by the Comelec in the use of technologicaland electronic devices (Ar cle VIII)

par es must be provided guidelines for campaign spending (Ar cleX)par es must limit their spending to 1.50 pesos per voter for eachcandidate (Ar cle X Sec on 101)the two major par es shall have a representa ve each in the boardof elec on inspector in every precinct (Ar cle XIV) and board of canvassersall par es can have a watcher in every polling place (Ar cle XV)par es may hold party conven ons or mee ngs to nominate theiro cial candidates 30 days before the campaign period and forty-days for presiden al and vice-presiden al candidates (Ar cle X)par es should be no ed by the Comelec before the prin ng of emergency ballots (Ar cle XVI)the two major par es may send representa ves to verify the contentof ballot boxes and shall be given a copy of the statement of elec onresult (Ar cle XVI)par es may raise a pre-proclama on controversy, i.e., any ques on

pertaining to or a ec ng the proceedings of the board of canvassers(Ar cle XX)

Aside from the Omnibus Elec on Code, elec on spending in the Philippinesis governed by the following laws and regula ons:

Fair Elec on Act or Republic Act No. 9006the Synchronized Elec on Law or Republic Act No. 7166Comelec Resolu on No. 7794

These policy documents provide the limit and prohibi ons to campaignnancing, but they hardly provide guidelines on campaign contribu on.


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As the above passages indicate, there is no law that can clearly providethe exact func ons of poli cal par es. For poli cians, a partys immediatefunc on is to abide by the registra on requirements when running for publico ce.

It is a major gap that no law in the country, not even the Cons tu on, speci esthe power and func ons of poli cal par es. The laws provide how par esare registered and imply the opera onal roles that the poli cal par es mustassume during elec ons. But no legal document iden es the principles of the State vis--vis poli cal par es; the values that par es can have for polity;their roles in achieving the end of the Philippine state; the rela onship of the

party system to the government and to society; and the power that par esmust have for them to perform their role in poli cs. This gap is primarily dueto the lack of a law on poli cal par es

The cons tu onal provision on party system also creates a gap in structuringparty poli cs. To be on the safe side, the provision provides a caveat:according to the free choice of the people. This gives the provision apopulist stance. It must be the people who will determine the kind of partysystem that must evolve.

Ironically, the free and open party system, though intended to democra zeparty poli cs in the country, actually allows the prevailing power con gura onto determine the func ons that par es can take. If the predominant powerrela on is patronage-based, the par es may evolve freely and openly toinstruments that perpetuate such poli cal condi on. Instead of the poli calsystem circumscribing the exercise of power, it is de ned by power. Thereforeit is logical that in the case of the Philippines where power is concentrated in

a few elites with par cularis c interests, par es have become an instrumentfor protec ng, defending and perpetua ng the interests of those who holdpower.

There is also a major gap as to who is ul mately responsible for thedevelopment and strengthening of poli cal par es. The Comelec is onlymandated to register poli cal par es and up to some extent monitor them(possibly to validate their creden als). But who has the mandate to ensurethat poli cal par es perform the func ons cri cal to the opera ons of thestate?

This issue is a bit complicated and sensi ve because of the democra cprinciple of independence of poli cal par es. Par es are intermediary


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mechanisms that link the people or civil society and the government. Hence,the state cannot intervene in the internal opera ons of poli cal par es. Thiswould undermine their independence and autonomy from the government.

In light of this pre-requisite, it is worth clarifying that state support for poli calpar es cannot be provided as a means to control their internal opera ons;instead, such mechanisms are established to enable par es to perform theirfunc ons in the state. Hence, apart from establishing a support system forpoli cal par es, mechanisms should also be developed that would ensurethe par es independence and autonomy.

This leads us to another major gap: the lack of a system of nancing partyopera ons.

Campaign nance regula ons are provided by law, but it only lays down howcampaign expenditures are regulated but without clarifying how campaigncontribu ons can be generated and accounted for. Furthermore, there is alsono subsidy provided by the state for poli cal par es. As a result, poli calpersonali es and the poli cal elites are able to dominate the par es,determine the party pla orm, and decide how these par es will engagepoli cs and governancenot the other way around.

It is important to be clear about what can be sensibly regulated. The abovediscussion points to the need to regulate func ons, internal democracy, thecondi ons under which par es take part in elec ons, accountability and

nance.

Final Words

Par es have always been viewed nega vely, but they s ll persist, because thefunc ons they perform are necessary. We need par es. The low sa sfac onwith our current par es also points to knowing and wan ng the ideal party.It will always be disappoin ng, but at the moment we have no other choicethan to make poli cal par es work as they are supposed to be.

The paper argues that it is the ins tu onal-legal system within which par esoperate that can greatly a ect their performance. The most strategic point of interven on to strengthen and develop par es in the Philippines therefore isthe ins tu onal-legal system.


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In the immediate-term, the legal gaps can be addressed through:

a party law that clearly s pulates the powers and func ons of poli cal par es;a state subsidy balanced by mechanisms to ensure independenceand autonomy;a law on campaign nancing, par cularly campaign contribu on; andparty-list reforms.

In the long-term, there should be a review of the ins tu onal designof elec ons and government that would require amendments of the

Cons tu on.

References

Adriano, Fermin. 1992. From Theory to Reality: The Vision of Poli calPar es. In Lorna Kalaw-Tirol and Sheila Coronel. 1992 and Beyond:Forces and Issues in Philippine Elec ons . Quezon City: PhilippineCenter for Inves ga ve Journalism and Ateneo Center for SocialPolicy and Public A airs.

Almonte, Jose. 2007. To Put Our House in Order: We Must Level thePlaying Field . Metro Manila, Philippines: Founda on for EconomicFreedom.

Arugay, Aries, Jay Carizo and Djorina Velasco. 2004. The Party-List Systemof Representa on: Trojan Horse for New Poli cs? In Poli cal Brief .

Volume 12, Number 4. Fourth Quarter 2004.

Ateneo Center for Social Policy and Public A airs. 1992. Peoples Agenda for Development and Democracy . Quezon City.

Bernas, Joaquin. 2007. The Philippine Cons tu on for Ladies, Gentlemen and Others . Manila: Rex Book Store.

Casiple, Ramon. 2008. Philippine Poli cal Party Reform: Reality and ConcreteAc ons. In How Far is It? A Roundtable Discussion on PhilippinePoli cal Party Law . The Blue Room, Ateneo Professional Schools,Rockwell Center, Maka . April 15, 2008.


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Casiple, Ramon. 2007. Party-List System: Issues and Challenges in the 2007Elec ons. In Quo Vadis, Party-List? A Foucs Group Discussion onParty-list Reform . The Blue Room, Ateneo Professional Schools,Rockwell Center, Maka . October 17, 2007.

Co, Edna. 2009. Is There a Party in the House? In Ins tu onal Reform Paper Series . Quezon City and Maka : Ateneo School of Government andKonrad Adenauer S ung.

Croissant, Aurel and Wolfgang Merkel. n.d. Special Parliamentary Representa on of Marginalized Groups and Other Ways to Improve

the Representa veness of Parliaments . Pasig City: Friedrich EbertS ung-Philippine O ce.

Aurel Croissant / Wolfgang Merkel. Poli cal Party Forma on in Presiden aland Parliamentary Systems . Pasig City: Friedrich Ebert S ung-Philippine O ce.

Gloria, Glenda (ed.). 1997. Shi . Quezon City: Ateneo Center for Social Policyand Public A airs.

Hague, Rod and Mar n Harrop. 2004. Compara ve Government and Poli cs (Sixth Edi on). Hampshire and New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Heywood, Andrew. 2002. Poli cs (Second Edi on). Hampshire and New York:Palgrave Founda on.

Hutchcro , Paul and Joel Rocamora. 2003. Strong Demands and Weak

Ins tu ons: The Origins and Evolu on of the Democra c De cit inthe Philippines. Journal of East Asian Studies 3: 2003.

Ins tute for Poli cal and Electoral Reform. 2005. Fairing Well: The PhilippineParty-List System (Current Lessons and Implica on) . Quezon City:IPER and Friedrich Ebert S ung.

Kalaw-Tirol, Lorna and Sheila Coronel. 1992. 1992 and Beyond: Forces and Issues in Philippine Elec ons . Quezon City: Philippine Center forInves ga ve Journalism and Ateneo Center for Social Policy andPublic A airs.


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Lawson, Kay. 1989. The Human Polity: An Introduc on to Poli cal Science (Second Edi on). Boston: Houghton Mi in Company.

Medium Term Philippine Development Plan 2004-2010 . Manila: Na onalEconomic and Development Authority. 2004.

Meyer, Thomas. 2007. Easy Guide to a Modern Poli cal Party . Pasig City:Friedrich Ebert S ung-Philippine O ce.

Meyer, Thomas with Lewis Hinchman. 2007. The Theory of Social Democracy .Cambridge and Malden, MA: Polity Press.

Morada, Noel and Teresa Encarnacion Tadem (eds.). 2006. Poli cs and Governance: An Introduc on . Quezon City: Department of Poli calScience, University of the Philippines, Diliman.

Rocamora, Joel. 1997. The Cons tu onal Amendment Debate: ReformingPoli cal Ins tu ons, Reshaping Poli cal Culture. In Glenda Gloria(ed.). Shi . Quezon City: Ateneo Center for Social Policy and PublicA airs.

Taada, Erin. 2006. Party Life and Organiza on: Ways Forward andChallenges. In Philippine Poli cal Par es: Is There Life BetweenElec ons? Forum held at the Social Development Complex (SDC)Auditorium, Ateneo de Manila University, Quezon City. September16, 2006.

Tigno, Jorge. 2006. Electoral and Party Poli cs in Prewar Philippines. In

Noel Morada and Teresa Encarnacion Tadem (eds.). Poli cs and Governance: An Introduc on . Quezon City: Department of Poli calScience, University of the Philippines, Diliman.


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Citizen-Party Linkages in the

Philippines: Failure to Connect? Julio C. Teehankee 1

In 2001, the Kabalikat ng Malayang Pilipino (Kampi), the poli cal partyfounded by President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo in 1997, only had oneseat in the House of Representa ves. By 2007, the party has increased its

number to 51 seats, making it the second largest party in the lower chamber.Historically, the same feat of instant party building was accomplished in 1961by Macapagal-Arroyos father, President Diosdado Macapagal. At that me,the Liberal Party under Macapagal had managed to elect only 30 out of a total102 House seats. Nonetheless, the president was able to induce 23 membersof the opposi on Nacionalista Party to switch over to the Liberals and electits candidate for House Speaker (Liang 1971). It can be argued that the ascendance of Kampi under the Macapagal-Arroyo administra on is but a reincarna on of the monolithic par es thathave dominated several presiden al administra ons in the past three

1 The author acknowledges the assistance of Raymond John P. Rosuelo in the initial preparation ofthis paper.


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decades from the Kilusang Bagong Lipunan under Ferdinand Marcos,to the Laban ng Demokra kong Pilipino (LDP) during the term of CorazonAquino, followed by the Lakas NUCD-UMDP founded by Fidel Ramos, and theLaban ng Makabayang Masang Pilipino (LAMMP) of Joseph Estrada. Thesepar es, however, were largely built around vast networks of well-entrenchedpoli cal clans and dynas es that constantly switch their a lia on from oneadministra on party to another in order to gain access to state resourcesand patronage (Teehankee 2002; Coronel et al 2004). At this juncture, it isalready an cipated that Kampi (despite its recent merger with Lakas) willsu er the same fate as its predecessors abandoned by its members a erthe term of the incumbent president. Ironically, the current strength of one

party Kampi re ects the inherent weakness of the en re party system inthe country.

The passage of House Bill 3655 also known as the proposed PartyDevelopment Act of 2007 can be seen as a posi ve step towards reformingPhilippine poli cs. However, the bill has also ini ated debates on thenature, process, and ins tu onal requisites of reforming party poli cs inthe Philippines. This paper is an ini al assessment of the current e ortsat ins tu onalizing poli cal party reforms. Speci cally, it will provide anoverview of current debates, within and ini a ves of, two poli cal par es inthe area of party reforms. Looking at the experience of the Liberal Party andAkbayan, the paper will argue for an ins tu onal-compe ve approach topoli cal party reform that strengthens ci zen-party linkage.

Imperatives of Political Party Reform

A mul tude of poli cal par es have come and gone in Philippine poli calhistory. Yet, party ins tu onaliza on in the country remains weak andunderdeveloped. Poli cal par es in the Philippines are personality-based organiza ons largely organized around dominant local poli cal clans and warlords; and anchored on clientelis c, parochial, and personal inducementsrather than on issues, ideologies, and party pla orms.

The current Filipino party system is largely composed of transient par esor those poli cal par es that are not founded on some distal source, likepoli cal cleavage, issue or ideology (Manacsa and Tan 2005: 748). Indeed,there is some truth to the observa on that poli cal clans are the real poli calpar es in the Philippines. (Simbulan 2007:33) Func onally, Filipino par es arevote-seeking par es that are primarily interested in securing the bene ts of


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o ce ge ng its leaders into government, enjoying access to patronage, etc. even if these means sharing power with other or pursuing strategies whichfail to maximize its share of the votes. (Wolinetz 2002: 149-150) The academicliterature on poli cal par es iden es three factors that determine the shapeof par es and party systems: sociological ; ins tu onal ; and compe ve .

Sociological factors seek to explain poli cal phenomena primarily byreference to social phenomena that underlies them. (Ware 1996: 8) Inthe Philippines, this perspec ve had been ar culated by the patron-clientfac onal ( pcf ) framework, advanced by Carl Lande and other scholars sincethe 1960s, in explaining Filipino par es and elec ons. The pcf framework is

a deriva ve of the socio-cultural approach to poli cal analysis exploringthe varia ons in social structure or poli cal culture and correla ng these inelectoral and party behavior. The basic argument of the pcf is that Philippinepoli cs revolves around interpersonal rela onships especially familial andpatron-client ones and fac ons composed of personal alliances. (Kerkvliet1995: 401) While the pcf explana on to Philippine poli cs has endured thetest of me, and con nues to be cited by some poli cal analysts, it is limitedin explaining why the interests of the elites and their allies have con nuedlargely to determine Philippine party genera on and survival despite themajor changes in the countrys socio-economic structure and the emergenceof new social divisions (e.g. ethnicity and religion). (Manacsa and Tan 2003:749) From the sociological perspec ve, poli cal party reforms necessitatethe corresponding endogenous changes within society. Thus, changes insocial forces will always prompt a corresponding change among some of thepar es and in the party system itself. (Ware 1996: 9)

Going beyond socio-cultural explana ons, the ins tu onal approach seeks

to determine the impact of poli cal ins tu ons upon individuals, and theinterac on between ins tu ons and individuals (Lane and Ersson 2000).From this perspec ve, poli cal struggles are mediated by the ins tu onalse ng in which they take place. (Steinmo et al. 1992: 2) Poli cal ins tu onsare essen ally formal and o en legal components of the state machinery thatemploy explicit and usually enforceable rules and decision-making procedures.Looking at the Philippine party system, Manacsa and Tan (2005: 759) arguethat ins tu onal choices have historically inhibited the development of strong par es by denying the ar cula on of certain cleavages and impedingthe rise of counter-elites, certain current structures are inimical to the crea onof strong par es: the dominance of the execu ve o ce, the synchronizedsystem of elec ons and the defects of the party list law. An ins tu onalapproach to poli cal party reform consists of exogenously changing aspects of


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the poli cal rules, such as introducing legal restric ons on the use of poli calpatronage, with the objec ve of a ec ng the nature of other ins tu ons andhow poli cs is conducted within these ins tu ons. (Ware 1996: 9)

Drawing from the ra onal choice tradi on, the compe ve approachposits that individual par es respond to the demands of compe ng withother par es and the party system re ects the logic of compe ve (andco-opera ve) interac ons. Par es are conceived as self-interested actorsresponding to the logic of the situa on in which they nd themselves alogic that is dictated by the need to compete for votes. (Ware 1996: 9) In thisview, par es are treated as individual actors whose ra onal calcula ons are

shaped by ins tu onal rules and procedures. Also known as the responsiblegovernment model, the compe ve approach sees poli cs as the result of interac on of principals (ci zens, voters) and agents (candidates for electoralo ce, elected o cials). (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007: 1)

Based on the three perspec ves on par es and party systems, this paperwill assess the current e orts to ini ate internal poli cal party reformswithin the context of the patronage-based, party-voter linkage that hasshaped Filipino poli cs for years. This paper will argue that the root causeof the underdeveloped par es and party system in the country is the weakins tu onaliza on of ci zen-party linkages. It will highlight the ini a vesof two par es: the Liberal Party and Akbayan in forging an alterna ve anddemocra c ci zen-party rela onship.

Democratic Citizen-Party Relationship: The Missing Link

Two surveys conducted by the Social Weather Sta ons (SWS) in 2004 and2006 reveal that 67% of respondents do not consider any poli cal partyas represen ng their welfare. The weak party linkage in society resultsin a regular split and merger of poli cal par es into ad hoc coali ons;and, the replacement of democra c accountability with clientelis caccountability. Clientelis c accountability represents a transac on, thedirect exchange of ci zens vote in return for direct payments or con nuingaccess to employment, goods, and services. (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007:2) The mobiliza on of money instead of issues and policies in Philippineelec on campaigns has resulted in the prolifera on of clientelism and fraudthat reinforces elite democracy. Philippine elec ons are ironically governedby a mul tude of laws aimed at safeguarding the en re electoral processfrom beginning to end. It has strict laws prohibi ng campaign contribu ons


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from a variety of economic interests, including nancial ins tu ons, publicu li es, government contractors, government employees, and members of the armed forces. Nonetheless, these laws su er from loopholes and the lackof proper enforcement.

The central role of money in the electoral process has resulted in theemergence of the corrup on, unfairness, and nancial barriers. Corrup onin party and candidate nancing usually involves the gran ng of improperfavors in exchange for poli cal contribu ons, aside from securing fundsfrom illegal and criminal sources (i.e. gambling, drugs, bank robbery, andkidnapping). The indiscriminate use of money in poli cal campaigns may lead

to a distor on of electoral compe on as larger funding usually translatesto greater advantage. Although a well-funded campaign is no guarantee forelectoral success, it enables par es and candidates to employ a larger sta ,print more posters and acquire adver sements. Lastly, if access to moneyis a major prerequisite for poli cal candidacy, then only the rich can run forpublic o ce. A healthy democracy necessitates that any individual rich orpoor can aspire for a career in poli cs. (ACE Project 2001) If you are notrich-or do not have a rich patron-you cannot get elected in the Philippines,asserts Rocamora. (As cited in Democracy Forum, 2001)

Moreover, poli cians/par es (as agents) o er the ci zens/voters (asprincipals) an implicit contract in which they promise to deliver policy and/or patronage (Mller 2007: 258) Thus, close a en on to the mechanisms of ci zens and poli cians strategic conduct that link their asset endowmentsand preferences to individual strategies and collec ve outcomes of poli calac on manifes ng themselves in diverse principal-agent rela ons of accountability and responsiveness. (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007: 6) As

Mon nola (1999: 770) astutely argued,

The cross-cu ng nature of compe on to in uence policy inthe Philippines was evident in the party-switching behaviour of individual poli cians and policy-switching behaviour of par es.The mul dimensional nature of compe on was also evidentin the vola lity of party support in the electorate. Based on theprincipal-agent theory of state capacity . . . we would expect minimalbureaucra c reform and weak state capacity where electoralpreferences fail to align largely along a single con nuum.

Since 2002, there have been e orts by civil society ac vists, and even somepoli cal party opera ves, to push for poli cal party reforms. From the


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perspec ve of these reform advocates, party reform is an integral part of abroad spectrum of poli cal and electoral reforms that include such laws asthe party-list law, the fair elec ons act, the overseas absentee vo ng law, theelectoral automa on law, the con nuing registra on act, and such pendingbills as the an -poli cal dynasty bill, the local sectoral representa on bill,the an -turncoa sm bill and on the amendments to the Omnibus Elec onCode. (Casiple 2008)

The introduc on of the Party List System (PLS) into a Mixed Electoral Systemwas envisioned by the dra ers of the 1987 Cons tu on to promote the viabilityof small, new par es and encourage the development of a mul party system.

This follows a similar trend of electoral reform in Italy, Japan, New Zealandand Russia (Dunleavy and Marge s 1995). Pa erned a er the German model,the Philippine PLS is a modi ed version of the List PR-Neimeyer electoralformula in which the number of seats a party (or organiza on) is en tled tois calculated on the basis of the propor on by dividing the votes obtained bya party or organiza on over the total number of all votes cast for all quali edpar es and organiza on. (Agra 1997: 3) Early on, the reform cons tuencyacknowledged the promise of the PLS, but were also frustrated by its sloppyimplementa on. Since its incep on, the Philippine PLS has been saddled bythe problems of de ni on, implementa on and interpreta on.

According to Casiple (2004), the party-list system can be viewed from twoperspec ves. One is the perspec ve of the system itself as it operateswithin a larger framework of the current eli st democra c poli cal systemin the Philippines. It sees the urgent necessity to enable the di usion andassimila on of social forces from below and which the poli cal extremesharvest towards a divisive and ul mately, confronta onal poli cs. The second

is the perspec ve of the marginalized and disempowered people, par cularlyat the grassroots, as they struggle to liberate themselves from the pervasivepoverty and social inequi es. Although narrow, it presents an opportunity forgrassroots empowerment and the poli cal base for mainstreaming na onalpoli cs. It serves as a portal for interested ci zens to be involved and thosethat are indi erent in the process to consider par cipa ng.

Several bills have been led in the House of Representa ves since the 12 th Congress seeking to address the de ciencies of the Party List System Act.Despite the major de ciencies, however, the party-list system has allowedfor a window of poli cal opportunity for social movements and elements of civil society to par cipate in elec ons and penetrate the narrow pathways tothe legislature. In the past ten years, the party list system has seen the ac ve


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par cipa on of the Le and/or reformist par es and has allowed them topar cipate in the na onal poli cal discourse. While it may s ll take a longer

me to ins tu onalize the gains of the party list system, the lessons learnedfrom the poli cal experiment will inform the con nuing e orts to push forpoli cal party reforms in the country.

A empts to reform the Philippine electoral system had been underway forthe be er part of the last decade. The proposed poli cal party developmentact can be considered as part of such e orts to overhaul exis ng electoralprac ces in the country. The bill now pending in Congress aims to strengthenpoli cal par es so that they may become integral to the achievement of

genuine development and democra za on.

Ci zen par cipa on is the cri cal founda on upon which democracy is built.Poli cal par es are vehicles for enabling ci zens to engage and reconnect withthe ins tu ons and processes of democracy. Ci zenship is nurtured on values,knowledge, and prac ce. Par es can perform an integral func on in ci zeneduca on and voters educa on ac vi es as part of their cons tuency buildingac vi es. A closer look at the experience of both Liberal Party and Akbayano ers some interes ng insights in the process and dynamics of ini a nginternal party reforms foster alterna ve democra c ci zen-poli cian linkages.

Reformist Parties and Party Reforms: The LP and AkbayanExperience

During its Fourth Regular Na onal Congress on August 16, 2009, Akbayanformalized its coali on with the Liberal Party for the upcoming 2010 elec ons.

Both par es agreed to forge a common agenda of good governance andreforms that will push for an ac vist government that truly cares for the peopleand their welfare. (Akbayan endorses2009) In the post Marcos electoralterrain, two par es have stood out as exponents of both party reforms andreform poli cs: the Liberal Party (LP) and the Ci zens Ac on Party (Akbayan!).The LP is a tradi onal poli cal party gradually transforming itself into a reformistparty; while Akbayan is a reformist party list organiza on adap ng itself to theways of Philippine tradi onal poli cs. The experience of both par es in recentelectoral cycles is illustra ve of the con nuing challenges for poli cal partyreforms in the country. Consequently, what makes the stories of Akbayanand the Liberal Party reformers intriguing is not that they are commi ed toprogramma c poli cs but that they are commi ed to programma c poli csand to compe ng in mainstream electoral arenas. (Bevis 2006: 392) The


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following sec on will discuss the strategies the two par es adopted in forgingan alterna ve and democra c ci zen-poli cian linkage.

The Liberal Party: From Tradi onal to Reform Poli cs

On its 60 th founding anniversary in 2006, the LP experienced the thirdfac onal split in its history. The party division erupted amidst the so-calledHello Garci scandal that triggered the legi macy crisis of the GloriaMacapagal Arroyo administra on. The split was re ec ve of the con nuingtension within its party ranks, between power and principle, of pragma smversus idealism. One fac on held steadfastly to party values; while another

was lured by the seduc ve pull of patronage. Although the fac onal strugglewas eventually resolved by the Supreme Court, the split was indica ve of atradi onal party transforming itself into a reform-oriented poli cal party. In away, the split was a con nua on of a historical dynamic that began with thestruggle against the Marcos dictatorship. In a candid assessment of the partyduring its 60 th anniversary commemora on, liberal thinker Mario Taguiwalo(2006: 26) noted:

Our Party has championed the masses but has also been captured byelites. Leaders of our Party had fought the old dictatorship at greatcost but some of us accommodated some of its worst aspects inorder to survive as a Party. In many instances, we have been capableof acts of conscience and supreme poli cal sacri ces in behalf of

jus ce and righteousness, but we have also been occasionallyinfected by corrup on and patronage. . . Purity is not our virtue.Ra onality is one of our strengths.

Since its incep on, the LP has been dominated by gures that came torepresent the worst and best of their eras; it has divided, me and again, onissues and ques ons that have divided Philippine society. (Quezon 2006: 21)Consequently, the party has been composed of poli cal personali es whoseek a crea ve fusion of principles and power, speci cally, the ra onaliza onof enduring commitment to certain principles with the expedience demandof staying in or increasing poli cal power. (Taguiwalo 2006: 26) Indeed, theLP is a curious en ty in the Philippine poli cal landscape . . . . A party in theforefront of reform while compe ng in the arena of mainstream poli cs.(Rodriguez 2005)

The LP is primarily a poli cal party that has a long history of electoralpar cipa on since the birth of the Philippine Republic in 1946. For most of its


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existence, the party has formed half of the tradi onal two-party system thatdominated the post war period. Philippine postwar poli cs was characterizedby the intense compe on between the Nacionalista Party (NP) and theLiberal Party (LP). The rivalry between the two par es dominated Philippinepoli cs from 1946 un l 1972. Both took turns in capturing the presidencyand controlling both chambers of Congress. The Liberals won the presiden alelec ons of 1946 (Manuel Roxas), 1949 (Elpidio Quirino), and 1961 (DiosdadoMacapagal). The Nacionalistas won them in 1953 (Ramon Magsaysay), 1957(Carlos Garcia), 1965, and 1969 (Ferdinand Marcos). However, only Garciawas a genuine Nacionalista, as Magsaysay and Marcos were formerly staunchLiberals before they sought the presidency (Liang 1970).

The declara on of mar al law and the emergence of the Kilusang BagongLipunan (KBL) e ec vely cut o the Liberal Party from the tradi onal networkof clientelism. Deprived of access to government resources and patronage,the party boyco ed all elec ons for 14 years of the Marcos regime and optedto reorganize itself as a non-electoral conscience bloc. (Rodriguez 2005)The LPs shining moment emerged during the darkest period in Philippinepoli cal history. Bombed at Plaza Miranda on the eve of authoritarian rule,and locked out of power upon the declara on of mar al law; the remainingleaders of the party who were not co-opted by the dark side of the Marcosdictatorship became the staunchest defenders of democracy. Its key leaderswere all assassinated Jose Lingad of Pampanga; Benigno Aquino Jr. of Tarlac;Cesar Climaco of Zamboanga; and, Evelio Javier of An que sacri ced in thestruggle against the Marcos dictatorship. It was during this period in poli calwilderness that the party transformed itself by embracing mass movementpoli cs and ac vely par cipa ng in the so-called parliament of the streets.The LP played a signi cant role in unifying the poli cal opposi on around the

candidacy of Benigno Aquinos widow Corazon C. Aquino. LP stalwart JovitoSalonga chaired the commi ee that dra ed the opposi ons MinimumProgram of Government which was largely based on the LP Vision andProgram of Government. (Salonga 2006)

A er the EDSA revolu on that ousted the dictator, the LP played an ac verole in the democra c transi on and consolida on in the country. The partycon nuously strived to maintain its relevance in contemporary Philippinepoli cs. Its stable base of support has enabled it to maintain a steady numberof na onal and local elected o cials. The LP has been a reliable coali onpartner for the past three post-Marcos administra ons. Nonetheless, itsideological base did not hesitate in taking cri cal stances towards theseadministra ons. It championed the cause of an -US bases during the Aquino


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administra on; an -charter change under Ramos; and supported the ErapResign, Impeach, Oust (RIO) movement that led to EDSA 2. In a twist of historical irony, the LP which was responsible for the approval of the USMilitary Bases Agreement in 1947; was the very same party that led itsrejec on in 1991.

Since the height of the LPs struggle against the Marcos dictatorship, theparty has endeavored to transform itself from its tradi onal past to a vehicleof new poli cs in the Philippines. As University of the Philippines ProfessorRoland Simbulan (2007: 31) observed, the LP is the only tradi onal partythat is known to a empt to imbibe a liberal-democra c ideology among its

members . . . It has also recently made a empts at ins tu onalizing party lifebeyond elec ons through party building, ideological seminars, etc. althoughthese ini a ves are resisted by tradi onal poli cians within the party ranks.

The campaign strategies of its reform-oriented candidates are neithertradi onal per se nor completely alterna ve. Each was a fusion of bothtypes of strategies . . . . a ghtrope, a never-ending process of nego a onand delibera on about making compromises between the old and the new,between reform now or in the future. (Lorenzana and Sayo 2005: 73-74)While most LP candidates are pragma c enough to accept the current reali esof tradi onal poli cs, they are also bold enough in experimen ng withalterna ve modes of poli cal engagement and grassroot organiza on. Thus,among the alterna ve strategies employed by key members of the party is theestablishment of links with NGOs, POs, or local community organiza ons toaddress development needs of the community on a sustained basis, so thatvoters are engaged at the grassroot level. (Lorenzana and Sayo 2005: 77)

In recent years, the LP has contributed to the emergence of a broader liberalmovement in the Philippines. In this regard, the LP has cooperated with varioussectoral, non-governmental and civil society organiza ons in various issueadvocacies and mass struggles over the years. Moreover, the LP has madee orts to strengthen its ranks among established Allied Sectoral Groups (Youth,Women, Urban Poor, Labor, etc.). It has also a racted a number of middleclass professionals, intellectuals, and members of the academe. Interes ngly,former social democrats and na onal democrats have also gravitated towardsthe party. The broad liberal movement consists of organiza ons that share acommon vision of liberal democracy for the Philippines. These organiza ons,however, are completely autonomous from the Party. The most ac ve amongthe allied liberal organiza ons are the Na onal Ins tute of Policy Studies(NIPS), and the Alliance of Liberal Youth (ALY).


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Akbayan! From Social Movement to Party Poli cs

The Philippine Le historically consists of an underground component waging arevolu onary struggle against the state, and a mul tude of legal organiza ons.While the tradi onal Le led by the old Par do Komunista ng Pilipinas (PKP)par cipated in the 1947 elec ons, it has since eschewed elec ons as arenas forelite poli cs. In 1987, the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) organizedthe Par do ng Bayan (PnB) to par cipate in the 1987 elec ons. However,unfamiliarity with the electoral terrain and internal debates on the strategicimportance of electoral poli cs resulted in the dismal performance of the PnB.The introduc on of the party-list elec on in the 1987 Cons tu on was an

ins tu onal a empt to widen the narrow path to legisla ve power by providingan opportunity for marginalized sectors and their organiza ons to be representedin Congress. Signi cantly, organiza ons belonging to several le tradi ons andblocs par cipated and succeeded in successive party-list elec ons since 1998.

Akbayan! (Ci zens Ac on Party) has emerged to be the most viable exponentof democra c socialism in the Philippines. Founded in 1998, Akbayan is anamalgama on of former na onal democrats, social democrats, Chris ansocialists, and other le -wing tendencies. It is the culmina on of the protractede ort to foster unity within the moderate elements of the Philippine Le .De ning itself as a pluralist party, Akbayan takes posi ons against boththe prac oners of tradi onal poli cs and the radical par es of the Le .The partys declared programma c vision and mass line is par cipatorydemocracy, par cipatory socialism. (The Akbayan Narra ve, 2007)

In the last decade, the progressive party has successfully mainstreamed itself from a motley grouping of individuals and blocs with roots in mass movement

poli cs to a party list organiza on ac ve in legisla ve work. Its three termrepresenta ve Lore a E a Rosales had been acknowledged by both theHouse of Representa ves and media ou its as having made signi cantlegisla ve work. She had been selected to chair the Commi ee of Civil,Poli cal and Human Rights as well as becoming chair of the Subcommi ee onParty-List and Sectoral Representa on. E a Rosales also principally authoredthe landmark Absentee Vo ng Law (Quimpo, 2008).

Nonetheless, Akbayan has not only focused on its law making du es.It has remained true to its roots as a social movement. The party hasaggressively u lized both the halls of Congress and the streets to voice itsstrong opposi on to alleged wrongdoings of the Arroyo administra on. Itscongressional representa ves were at the forefront of the impeachment


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a empts against the sea ng President. It has likewise played a substan alrole in thwar ng a empts by the Arroyo administra on to use Congress tointroduce changes to the 1987 cons tu on that it saw would only serve toperpetuate the oligarchic poli cal system that it had sought to change fromthe very beginning (Rocamora, 2008).

Since its incep on, Akbayan has enjoyed some level of success in its foraysin the electoral arena. It had been able to double its na onal votes duringthe rst three na onal elec ons that provided for party-list representa on.Akbayan garnered a seat during the rst party list elec ons held in 1998. In2001, Akbayan had won two seats in the House of Representa ves aside from

increasing the number of elected local o cials that belonged to the party. By2004, Akbayan had won the maximum number of three seats allowed in forthe Party List elec ons (Rocamora, 2008).

A er years of steady growth, the democra c Le party su ered a signi cantsetback in 2007, when it saw a 47 percent decline in its votes in the PartyList elec on. Party leaders a ribute the decline to the manipula on andcoopta on of the Party List System by the local poli cal clans. In their analysis,the local poli cal clans had transformed what is supposed to be a na onalelec on for party list representa ves into local electoral contests whereinthe clans have considerable poli cal advantage. The 2007 electoral debacleresulted to a rethinking of Akbayans poli cal and electoral strategy. In a post-elec on analysis wri en in 2008, Akbayan Chair Joel Rocamora argued,

. . . our par cipa on in the party list system has, in fact, taken upmost of our energies in the past nine years. In every one of thelast three elec ons, we talked about devo ng more energy and

resources to local electoral work, but party list elec ons alwaysended up monopolizing our energy and resources. Because ourPL vote doubled every elec on, we did not seriously discuss theimplica ons of having made the PL system our main party buildingac vity. Our victories enabled us to gain a na onal poli cal pro le.Our competent and hard working party representa ves gave poli calcontent to our elec on victories. With only three representa ves wewere able to become the focal point of many civil society advocacies.But these major achievements masked several key weaknesses, thekind that one only seriously confronts a er a defeat.

It was also pointed out in his argument that ine ec ve elec on strategiesapplied by Akbayan which devoted too much resources and energies to the


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in the country are a liated with the party. The party has also been ac velyorganizing among middle class professionals, business people, and the youth(Rocamora, 2008). Progressive think tanks such as the Ins tute of Poli cs andGovernance (IPG) and the Ins tute for Popular Democracy (IPD) have closelyworked with the party.

Movement Poli cs and Poli cs of Movement

The paradox of Philippine electoral poli cs is that despite the long tradi onof ins tu onalized democra c prac ces and history of popular struggles,Philippine society has engendered an eli st and clientelis c democracy

embedded in an underdeveloped economy. Foreign and local scholarsseeking to explicate the intricacies of Philippine poli cs further amplify itsparadox. One of these scholars asserts that in a polity that is [c]ompromisedby patrimonialism, provincialism and personalism, Philippine democracy wasnot fully Democra c . . . Philippine capitalism was not really Capitalist, andeven Philippine communism was not properly Marxist or Leninist. (Hedmanand Sidel 2000: 4) From this perspec ve, Philippine elec ons can be seen asa dual pla orm for both elite poli cs and popular par cipa on.

Civil society organiza ons and social movements (i.e. non-governmentalorganiza ons, peoples organiza ons, church organiza ons, sectoral and massorganiza ons) are gradually adap ng electoral engagement as a strategy forpushing their policy advocacy. Undaunted by previous unfamiliarity withthe electoral terrain, the mass movements have managed to create ini alimpacts by suppor ng and elec ng a number of progressive candidatesin the Philippines. As Goldstone (2003: 2) argues that social movementscons tute an essen al element of normal poli cs in modern socie es, and

that there is only a fuzzy and permeable boundary between ins tu onal andnonins tu onal poli cs. Civil society, however, cannot subs tute for poli calpar es when it comes to electoral contesta on. Hence,

The ac ve support and collabora on of strong, inclusive poli calpar es in partnership with vibrant civil society must gain acceptanceas the correctly balanced equa on to achieve a more transparentand par cipatory system of government. In strengthening democra cins tu on in new or transi oning democracies, it is not a ma er of having to choose between building a strong civil society or strengtheningpoli cal par es and poli cal ins tu ons such as parliaments. Thereal challenge is to balance support for democra c ins tu ons andorganiza ons that are more accountable and inclusive, while at the


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same me con nuing to foster and nurture the development of abroadly based and ac ve civil society. (Doherty 2001: 32)

What sets the Liberal Party and Akbayan apart from other tradi onalclientelis c par es is the organic ci zen-party linkages that they foster withcivil society organiza ons in the Philippines. Akbayan (and other emergentnon- ND le ist forces) acknowledges their roots in the mass movementcon nuing their close links with the poor and marginalized. Aside fromprotest or conten ous poli cs, Akbayan and its allied POs/NGOs havealso become adept in construc ve and not-too-conten ous poli cs of development work (Quimpo 2008). More than a decade of par cipa ng in

electoral poli cs has transi oned Akbayan from social movement to a poli calparty. It has imbibed what has been iden ed by Kitschelt (2006: 280) asa movement party or coali ons of poli cal ac vists who emanate fromsocial movements and try to apply the organiza onal and strategic prac cesof social movement in the arena of party compe on. The transi on of Akbayan from movement to party, however, is not a cut-and-dried process.As former Akbayan president Joel Rocamora (2008) explained,

The limits to our development as a party are more internal thanexternal. We remain imprisoned in old ways of understanding whatbeing Le means. We have not yet mastered the art of accumula ngpower within a poli cal system dominated by the Right whileremaining true to our being a Le party.

On the other hand, the LPs years in the wilderness, out of power and deprivedof patronage during the Marcos years have allowed it to embrace the poli csof mass movement. This close associa on with the cause-oriented groups that

comprised the an -Marcos movement ini ally served the LP well in dis nguishingitself from other tradi onal and clientelis c par es that mushroomed in thepost-Marcos period. Under the leadership of Senate President Jovito Salonga,the party made a conscious e ort to shi from tradi onal poli cal, wardleader recruitment policy to a largely mass-cadre type (Rodriguez 2005).Fresh from its successful campaign to reject the US military bases treaty, theparty formed the Koalisyong Pambansa a progressive coali on with PDP-Laban and the precursor of Akbayan to support Salongas candidacy in the1992 presiden al elec on. While the coali on captured the imagina on of leand center civil society organiza ons; it performed miserably in the elec on.Since then, the LP has not been able to mount a credible na onal campaignand had to contend with ac ng as a junior partner in successive presiden alcoali ons. As the party prepares to again contest the presidency in 2010, the


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lesson of the 1992 debacle is not lost to the poli cal calcula ons of the morepragma c, albeit reform-minded, leaders of the party. Nonetheless, it con nuesto rely on progressive and reform-oriented civil society organiza ons in itsongoing party-building e orts. Hence, the LP has emerged truly as a catch-all

party characterized by the overwhelming electoral orienta on of its prominentleadership and top-ranked na onal-level candidates whose overriding (if notsole) purpose . . . is to maximize votes, win elec ons and govern. To do so, theyseek to aggregate as wide a variety of social interests as possible. (Guntherand Diamond 2003: 185-186)

The experience of LP and Akbayan reveals the promise and limits of reform

poli cs in the Philippines. Both par es face pressures to compromise everyday, in almost every facet of party-building . . . It is therefore di cult forac vists to judge the extent to which maintaining a programma c stance orcompromising will lose only a few voters or enough to exclude them fromelec ve o ce. These pressures are more likely to grow than to recede asreformers win o ce. (Bevis 2006: 392)

Party Institutionalization: The Road Ahead

The Party Development Act of 2007 seeks to promote democra caccountability through the ins tu onaliza on of campaign nance reforms,public subsidies, ban on party switching and strengthening ci zen-partylinkages. In turn, it is the hope of reform advocates that poli cal par es will beins tu onalized by revising the rules of the game. There are essen ally twoways by which ins tu ons can either restrict or mi gate poli cal behavior.First, the rules of the game can provide incen ves and disincen ves for

individuals to maximize their u li es. And secondly, ins tu onal choices canin uence future decision making of individuals through a process of pathdependency. (Lane and Ersson, 2000)

An ins tu on is an enduring and stable set of arrangements that regulatesindividual and/or group behavior on the basis of established rules andprocedures. (Heywood, 2000: 93) Tan and Manacsa (2005: 750) argue thatcertain types of ins tu on can signi cantly inhibit the ability of par es toendow social con icts with a poli cal form. The Poli cal Party DevelopmentAct of 2007 seeks to promote the ins tu onaliza on of poli cal par es inthe Philippines by addressing four essen al reform issues, namely, campaign

nance reform, state subsidy to poli cal par es, a ban on party switching,and strengthening ci zen-par es linkages.


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However, a simple revision of the rules is no guarantee of ins tu onaliza onof poli cal reforms as the experience with the Party List System hasdemonstrated. Under the environment of tradi onal, patronage-basedpoli cs where poli cal par es and individual poli cians are faced with achoice between employing clientelis c or programma c strategies to winvotes; it is more likely that the former will be chosen. Apparently, poli cians

nd a way to work around electoral ins tu ons when other impera vesmake it a rac ve for instrumentally ra onal poli cians to build clientelis cprinicipal-agent rela ons. (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007: 43)

Nonetheless, party systems are far from being xed and sta c, and are

responsive to corresponding changes in their opera ng environments. Thechallenge for reform advocates, therefore, is to iden fy the factors thatcontribute to the emergence of new na onal party systems (Tan 2005).While par es have tradi onally been understood in terms of their permanentlinkage with society and their temporal linkage with the state, recent shi sin organiza on-building and adapta on have reversed the process into atemporal linkage with society and a more permanent linkage with the state.From the perspec ve of party system development, the state o ers numerouslong- and short-term bene ts and resources to poli cal par es that maycompensate for their weakness on the ground and allow them to isolatethemselves from par cularis c societal demands. (Van Biezen and Kopeck2007) Hence, despite its inherent limita ons, the Party Development Act of 2007 is a posi ve step towards party system ins tu onaliza on. Provisionsfor public nancing of par es and public regula on of par es may o er someins tu onal constraint on patron-client rela onship, and instead promote analterna ve ci zen-party rela onship.

While the proposed law can be seen as another posi ve step towardenhancing democracy in the Philippines, some caveats are in order. Theunintended consequences of well-meaning reform ini a ves in the pasthave uncovered the limits of a purely ins tu onal approach to poli cal andelectoral reform. In recent years, decentraliza on has further empoweredsome local clans, term limits hastened genera onal shi among clans andincreased their numbers; ban on poli cal adver sement led to ascendance of celebrity poli cians; and, party list elec ons has been co-opted by local clansand non-marginalized sectors. Thus, strengthening ins tu onal capabili esnecessitate the enhancement of legi macy through the mobiliza on of popular support for par cular policy choices. The vehicle for this poli calac on is the establishment of a well-de ned and di eren ated poli cal partysystem that contributes to the forma on of government and the forging


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of legisla ve majori es. To this end, the Party Development Act seek tobuild meaningful poli cal iden es, policy-based pla o

political party in phil

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