8/11/2019 Political participation and the best regime.pdf

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/political-participation-and-the-best-regimepdf 1/17

Southern Political Science ssociation

The Problem of Polity: Political Participation and Aristotle's Best RegimeAuthor(s): Kevin M. CherrySource: The Journal of Politics, Vol. 71, No. 4 (Oct., 2009), pp. 1406-1421Published by: Cambridge University Press on behalf of the Southern Political Science AssociationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20622366 .

Accessed: 10/10/2014 00:27

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

 .JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of 

content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms

of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

 .

Cambridge University Press and Southern Political Science Association are collaborating with JSTOR to

digitize, preserve and extend access to The Journal of Politics.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 200.16.5.202 on Fri, 10 Oct 2014 00:27:18 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

8/11/2019 Political participation and the best regime.pdf

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/political-participation-and-the-best-regimepdf 2/17

The Problem of

Polity:

Political

Participation

and

Aristotle's

Best

Regime

Kevin M. Cherry SaintAnselm ollege

Aristotle

uses

the

same

word?politeia?to

describe both

the

genus

of

regimes

and

a

particular

species

within

that

genus.

I

argue

that this

usage

is

a common

practice

in

Aristotle's

practical

works

and

identifies

the

most

developed species

within its

genus.

Aristotle thus

sees

the

regime

of

polity

as more

appropriate

for developed

communities

than the

regimes often

taken

to

represent

his

ideals, i.e.,

kingship

and

aristocracy.

Aristotle's

understanding of

the

capacities,

and

limitations,

of

the

multitude leads him

to

propose

the

mixed

regime ofpolity

as

the best

regime

generally possible.

While

polity

differs rom

the best

regime

simply

discussed

in

Book

VII,

it

still

offers

rich

possibilities for

both

political

and theoretical

activity.

One

of

the best

known

features

of

Aristotle's

political

theory

s

his

division

of

regimes y

whether

they

pursue

the

common

good

and

by

the number

of

rulers:

one,

few,

or

many.

He

famously

refers

to

the

regime

in

which

the

multitude

governs

for the

common

advantage

as

politeia

[iTO\LT La]

or,

as

it is

usually

translated,

polity

(1279a37-39).1

However,

as

Aristotle himself

notes,

this word

is also the

name

common

to

all

regimes

(1279a38,

1293a40).2

That

is,

he

calls,

and calls

attention to

calling,

one

particular

species

of

regime

by

the

name

of the

genus

to

which that

species

and

five others

belong.

Aristotle's

terminology

here has

long

raised all

sorts

of

questions

among

commentators.

Sidgwick

contends that

Aristotle's dual

use

of the

term

politeia

is

a serious

impediment

in

the

way

of

forming

a

clear and consistent

conception

of

Aristotle's

nomen

clature

(1892,

144).3

More

recently, Mulgan

has

complained

that Aristotle's

attempt

to

distinguish

proper

from

improper

forms of

popular

government

through

the

use

of

two

different

names

is

problematic

because the

term

he

uses

for

proper

popular

govern

ment

is also the

general

word for

constitutions

(1977,

76).

Despite,

or

perhaps

because

of,

this dif

ficulty,

many

commentators,

like Bates

have

empha

sized

the

necessity

of

grappling

with

Aristotle's

dual

usage

here

as

key

to

understanding

his

argument

(2003,

105).4

I

think

that with

some

careful attention

to

his

linguistic

use

elsewhere in the

Ethics

and

Politics,

the

confusion can be clarified and Aristotle's

argument

better

understood. Robinson

notes

that Aristotle's

dual

usage

of

politeia

is

an

example

of what

may

be

called

a

'genus-species'

ambiguity,

where the

same

word is used

to

mean now a

genus

and

now one

of

the

species

of that

genus

and laments

the

tendency

of translations

to

remove

this

ambiguity

(1995, 24).

But

Robinson also

notes,

There

are

other

examples

of

it

[such

mbiguity]

n

Aristotle's

thought

1995, 23).

Aristotle's

use

of the

same

term to

denote

both

the

general

phenomenon

of

regime

and

a

particular

lrrhe

genus

usage

of

politeia

is

generally

translated

as

regime

or

constitution.

translations

of the olitics

are

from ristotle

(1984)

and of the icomachean

Ethics from ristotle

(2002);

I

have

occasionally

modified

both

in

light

f theOxford Classical

Texts,

Aristotle

(1986)

and

(1988),

respectively.

3Sidgwick,

attempting

to

avoid the

problem,

concludes

that

politeia

is more

naturally

used

in

a sense

intermediate between

Aristotle's

general

and

special

senses

(1892, 143).

4Bates

(2003),

highlighting

everal

difficulties

n

Aristotle's

use

of

the

term

politeia,

concludes that

there

s

no

specific

regime

called

politeia, only

the

general

phenomenon

of

politeia

as

regime. hope

to

provide

an

alternative

explanation

for the

difficulties nd

justify

the

consensus

of

scholarship

that there

is,

in

fact,

a

specific regime

called

polity.

The

Journal

of

Politics,

Vol.

71,

No.

4,

October

2009,

Pp.

1406-1421

doi:10.1017/S002238160999003X

? 2009 SouthernPolitical ScienceAssociation ISSN 0022-3816

1406

This content downloaded from 200.16.5.202 on Fri, 10 Oct 2014 00:27:18 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

8/11/2019 Political participation and the best regime.pdf

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/political-participation-and-the-best-regimepdf 3/17

THE

PROBLEM

OF POLITY

1407

species

of

regime

is neither

unprecedented

nor

insignificant.

By realizing why

he does

so,

we can

achieve

a

better

understanding

of his

linguistic

practice

and,

more

specifically,

a

better understand

ing

of his beliefs about the various kinds of

regimes.

Reading

Aristotle

in

this

light

reveals

a

higher

estimation of

polity

than

generally

conceded.5

Although

Aristotle

initially

resents

polity

as

the

rule of the multitude directed toward the

common

good,

it is

not

properly

understood

as

the

opposite

of

democracy.

Just

as

he

refines

his initial

definitions

of

democracy

and

oligarchy,

Aristotle

also

expands

upon

his first efinition f

polity

to

explain

that t is

in

fact

a

mixed

regime,

in

which the contributions of

the

many

are

combined with the

contributions of the

few such that neither

is in

complete

control. Aristotle

concedes that the multitude should have

authority

over

the

highest

offices

by electing

nd

auditing

the

officeholders,

but he also limits their

participation

to

the collective activities

of

serving

in the

assembly

and

on

juries.

It

is

the

few

excellent

people,

those

with

a

fuller

virtue,

who

should

serve

in

the

highest

offices

of

the

city. By

bringing together

he few and the

many,

Aristotle's

polity

is

a

kind of mixed

regime

in

which

laws tend

to

be

made and administered

in

a

way

that

benefits both classes.

Commentators,

like

Johnson,

often

note

that

polity

combines

distinct

features romotherforms f regime 1988, 191) and

so

has the distinction of

bearing

the

name

common

to

all constitutions

(192).

This

is

true,

so

far

as

it

goes,

but

I

believe

much

more can

be said

about

why

polity

has the

name

common

to

the

genus.

Genus-Species

Ambiguity

in

Aristotle

Thomas

Aquinas,

the

great

student

of

Aristotle,

in

determining

whether

equity

is a

part

of

justice,

alludes

to

Aristotle's

treatment

of

the

issue

in NE

V.10

(see

Summa

Theologiae

II-II

120.2).

What

Aquinas

observes is that

Aristotle

uses

the

same

term,

justice,

to

denote

both

a

genus

and

a

species

within it.

Unlike

modern

usage,

which

distinguishes

between

a

genus

and

each

species

within

it

by using

different

terms,

Aristotle

tends

to

use

his

language

in

such

a

way

as

to

highlight

the

relationships

etween

the

genus

and its various

members.6

More

importantly,

Aristotle

uses

the

genus-term

to

name

the

most

fully

developed

species

within the

genus,

thus

indicating

how the various

species

can

be ordered

according

to

the

extent o

which

they articipate

n the

fullness f

the

genus.

In

the

particular

case

cited

by

Aquinas,

Aristotle

argues

that

justice-as-genus,

or

comprehensive jus

tice,

serves

to

produce

and

preserve

happiness

or

its

parts

in

the

political

community

NE 1129M7-19).

It

includes the

acts

of all the

virtues,

each

ofwhich is

necessary

for the

happiness

of

the

political

commun

ity;

it is

put

to

use

in

relation

to

something

else,

and

not

just

y

oneself

(1129b32-33),

thereby

reserving

the

community.

The

opposite

of this

virtue

is

the

whole of vice

(1130al0),

which

destroys

those

communities. In itsmore

particular

sense,

however,

justice

is

the

species

of virtue

that involves

taking

only

one's

due,

i.e.,

the avoidance of

pleonexia

or

over-reaching.

Justice-as-species

involves

what

is

equitable,

or

fair,

for

a

person,

particularly

in

regard

to

honor

or

money

(1130b2,

31).

And because such

questions

always

involve

a

community

and

may,

if

resolved

poorly,

destroy

that

community,

this

species

of

justice

shares in the

name

of the

genus.

It

has the

same

name

because its

definition

is in

the

same

general

class.

For

both have

their

power

in

relation

to another person (1130a33-bl). Insofar as human

beings

are

political

animals,

living

in

community

with

others,

justice

is the

general

virtue concerned with

preserving

communities. The

particular

virtue of

jus

tice,

however,

is the virtue

concerned with

honor and

wealth

and

so

most

directly

concerned

with

living

in

community

with

others.

For

this

reason

it

bears the

name

of

the

genus.

Perhaps

the

most

famous

example

of

genus

species

ambiguity

in

Aristotle

is

the discussion

of

friendship

in the

Nicomachean

Ethics.

Aristotle

5Davis

argues

polity

has its

name

for

it

exemplifies

the

contra

diction found

in

all

regimes,

amely

their

ack

of

self-knowledge

about theends

they

ursue

(1996, 74).

6What

I

discuss

bears

some

resemblance

to

the

philosophical

theme of

focal

meaning,

as

discussed,

for

instance,

by

Barnes

(1995).

Barnes

defines

it

as

a

word

used

in

several

ways,

one

of

which

is

primary

nd the

others

derivative,

he

accounts

of

the

derivative

way

containing

the

account

of

the

primary way

(1995,

76).

The

usual

example

is

healthy,

hich

refers

irst

nd

foremost

to

the

condition

of

bodily

health

but

is

also used

to

describe

complexions

and

foods

which,

respectively, ignify

nd

produce

health.

There

are,

however,

significant

differences

between

my

account

of

hierarchical

language

and

focal

meaning.

In

focal

meaning,

all of the

derivative

usages

bear

the

same

name

as

the

primary

sage,

while in

hierarchical

language,

t

s

only

one

species

in

a

particular

genus.

More

importantly,

focal

meaning

generally applies to a variety of accidents, while the primary

meaning

is

a

substance

(77).

By

contrast,

because

hierarchical

language parallels

the

genus-species

distinction,

all

the

terms

involved

refer

to

substances?in

this

case,

regimes.

This content downloaded from 200.16.5.202 on Fri, 10 Oct 2014 00:27:18 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

8/11/2019 Political participation and the best regime.pdf

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/political-participation-and-the-best-regimepdf 4/17

1408

KEVIN

M.

CHERRY

discusses three kinds of

friendship:

those of

pleasure,

those

of

utility,

and the

true

friendship

of virtue.

Cooper

suggests

part

of

Aristotle's

purpose

in

this

discussion

is

to

clarify

what

it

was

about them that

inclined the Greeks

to

group them together under

this

common

name

(1980, 302).

Though

Aristotle

does

not

deny

that associations

of

pleasure

or

utility

are

in

fact kinds of

friendship,

he is

quite

clear

that,

being

based

on

accidental

qualities,

they

are

imperfect

(1156al6).

The

completed,

r

perfect

telia),

form f

friendship

is

based

on

virtue

and

goodness;

such

friendships

are

fullest and

best,

if also

the

most

rare

(1156b7, 24-25).

Thus,

friendship

n

the full

sense

is

only

one

species

of

friendship,

albeit the

one

most

deserving

of the

name

friendship.

While there

are

different inds

of

friendship,

hat of

good

men

is

friendship

in the

first

and

foremost

sense.

The others

are

friendships

only

insofar

as

they

resemble

true

friendship

1157a30

ff).7

In

other

words,

the discussion

of

friendship,

like

that of

justice,

illuminates

a

critical

aspect

of Aristotle's

linguistic

practice,

as

Cherry

and

Goerner

argue:

Aristotle's

tendency

is

to

see

a

genus

as

hierarchically

arranged

so

that the

most

fully

realized

form within it

(the

highest

species)

is

simultaneously

the

form

in

terms

of which the

other, lower,

forms

are

to

be understood

by

disciplined analogy

rather

than

mere

metaphor.

This

is linguistically reflected inhis simultaneous use of the

term

for the

highest

species

as

the

term

for the

genus

as

a

whole,

the less

complete

forms

pointing

toward the

completed

form.

(2006, 566)

Although

a

regular

practice

of

Aristotle's,

some

examples

of

genus-species ambiguity

require

more

unpacking

than

friendship

or

justice.

For

example,

in

Book

VI

of

the

icomachean

Ethics

(NE

1139a26

ff.),

Aristotle

contrasts

what

we

might

call

practical

thinking

dianoia

praktike)

with

speculative

hinking

(dianoia

the?retike).

Both faculties

of

thought

are

concerned

with

truth

and

falsity,

but the

former

is

concerned

about the

truth that

pertains

to

actions,

while the latter

is

concerned

with the

truth about

being.

Shortly

thereafter,

however,

Aristotle

distinguishes

prac

tical

thinking

nto

two

different

inds:

(1)

things

ade

(poietike)

nd

(2)

actions done

(praktike,

140al

ff.).

Doing

is

not

a

form

of

making,

nor

making

a

form of

doing. Being

distinct

activities,

they

are

governed

by

different

intellectual

capacities.

The rational

capacity

for

art

is

concerned

with

making,

not

with

doing.

Practical

judgment, phronesis,

is the

capacity

to

delib

erate

well

about

acting,

not

making

(1112a30

ff.).

The

genus

of

practical

thought,

unlike the

genus

of

speculative

thought,

includes the

species

of

both

acting and making. However, Aristotle

uses

the

same

term

to

describe

the

(broader)

genus

of

practical

thought,

as

opposed

to

speculative,

and

a

(narrower)

species,

that

of

acting,

within that

genus.

He

makes

clear

not

only

that

acting

is

not

making

but also that

acting,

which

bears

the

name

of

the

genus,

is

more

truly

practical

activity.

Making

is

never

an

end in

itself,

only

a means

to

something

else; action,

by

contrast,

is

an

end

in

itself

(1139M

ff.).8

Aristotle

once

again

uses

the

same

term to

name

both

a

genus

and the

highest

species

within

it.

Appreciating

this facet of

Aristotle's

linguistic

usage

helps

clarify

is beliefs about

including

the

multitude

in

ruling. Though

it

seems

problematic,

Aristotle

says,

there

may

be some truth

in

the idea

that

the multitude should be the

authoritative

element

in

a

city

(Pol. 1281a40-42).

Though

none

of them

is

individually

an

excellent

man

[spoudaios

drier]

when taken

together hey

may

be

capable

of

judgment

at

least

as

good

as

that of

a

single

excellent

man or a

few excellent

men

(1281a42-b3).9

The

judgment

necessary

for

political

life,

that

is,

may

not

be

the

province

of

a

select

few. One

reason

why

Aristotle is able to extend to the multitude some

capacity

for

making

judgments

about

political

life is

his broad

understanding

of the virtue of

practical

judgment

and his

awareness

of the

connections

among

the

various

forms of

knowledge

that have

to

do with

human

activity.

Practical

judgment,

phronesis, helps

us

determine both the

appropriate

ends of

our

actions

and the

means

to

attain those

ends. While this

knowl

edge

takes

various

forms,

according

to

Aristotle,

such

forms

are

not

distinct but rather related.

In

his

treatment

of

phronesis

in Book

VI

of the

Nicomachean

Ethics,

Aristotle

acknowledges

that

most

of

us

speak

of

people

as

having practical

judgment

concerning

some

particular

thing

when

they

calculate

well

with

a

view

to

some

particular

serious

end

(1140a28-30).

Yet it is

not

immediately

clear

whether

Aristotle

agrees

with

this

common

way

of

speak

ing.

However,

by

drawing

a

contrast

between

wisdom

(sophia)

and

phronesis,

Aristotle sides

with

common

opinion:

The

virtue

of

phronesis

is

one

possessed by

7Irwin

contends

there

is

one

definition

f

friendship,

hich is

fully

satisfied

only by

complete

friendship,

nd

is

only

partly

satisfied

by friendships

or

pleasure

and

utility

(1999,

277).

8This

priority

of

acting

to

making

is

reiterated

n

the

Politics,

where

Aristotle,

in the

course

of

discussing

natural

slavery,

emphasizes

that

life is

doing things,

not

making

them

(1254a7).

9Aristotle

later

concedes

the

many

may

be

excellent

[spoudaioi]

in

soul

(1286b3).

This content downloaded from 200.16.5.202 on Fri, 10 Oct 2014 00:27:18 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

8/11/2019 Political participation and the best regime.pdf

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/political-participation-and-the-best-regimepdf 5/17

THE

PROBLEM

OF POLITY

1409

anyone?not

only

statesmen

or

philosophers?capable

of

reasoning

about

what is

good

or

bad for

a

human

being

(1140b4-6).

While

phronesis

deals with what

can

and should

be

done,

wisdom

is

concerned

with what is

eternal

and

unchanging

(1140a31

ff.).

Philosophers?Aristotle

names

Anaxagoras

and Thales

(1141b3?4)?seek

wisdom,

the

most

precise

kind of

knowledge,

which

is

quite

different

rom the

knowledge

of

politics

or

practical judgment

(1141al6,

20-21).10

To be

sure,

exercising phronesis, seeking

the

things

that

are

just

andbeautiful

nd

good

for uman

being

(1143b21-23),

depends

upon

a

conception

of the

good

(1141M2-14),

but this does

not

require

investigation

into

the Platonic

or

Socratic

form of the

Good,

which

Aristotle

suggests

does

not

improve

our

actions

(1096a

10

ff.).

Indeed

Aristotle's

example

of someone who has

phronesis

is

the

statesman

Pericles.

People

like

Pericles,

Aristotle

says,

can

see what

is

good

for themselves and for hu

man

beings,

and this

capacity belongs

to

those who

manage

households

as

well

as

those who handle

political

affairs

(1140b7-ll).

Phronesis

is

possessed by

those who

manage

well

cities, households,

and indi

vidual

lives,

even

if

they

are

not

philosophic.

However,

Aristotle refines

his initial

suggestion

that the virtue

of

phronesis

is

common

to

individuals,

household

managers,

and

political

leaders,

and the

genus-species ambiguity again rears itshead. He says

that

phronesis

is

a

genus

within which

there

is

much difference

(1141b33-42a2).

Phronesis,

that

is,

encompasses

the

knowledge

concerned

with

oneself

as

one

person,

as

well

as

that concerned with

ruling

a

household

or a

city

1141b29-30).

When

it

comes

to

ruling

a

city,

Aristotle also

distinguishes

between

the

phronesis

relevant

to

the

city

in

the

overarching

sense,

in

which

case

it is called

lawgiving

(nom

othetike),

and

the

more common

appellation

of

politics

(politike)

that

deals with

particular

matters

(1141b23?26).

Aristotle laments

this: he

believes that

the

act

of

lawgiving

is

more

truly political

action and

so

deserves the

name,

but

common

opinion

is

otherwise

and

he,

though indicating

his

disagree

ment,

defers

to

it.

This

is

also

an

instance

of

genus

species

ambiguity,

if

one

where Aristotle's usual

hierarchical

organization

of

terms

is

frustrated

by

respect

for

common

opinion.11

Genus-species

ambiguity,

however,

is also

present

within the

term

phronesis:

if

the

practical judgment

of

what is

good

for

oneself,

one's

household,

and one's

city

all fallwithin the

broad

genus,

which kind of

knowledge

is

most

appropriately

called

phronesis7.12

Aristotle notices that

most

people

believe

phronesis

to

be

particularly

concerned with one's

individual wel

fare,

for

someone who knows and devotes his

time

to

things

that

concern

himself

seems

to

be

possessed

of

practical udgment phronimos),

hile

politicalpeople

seem

to

be

busybodies

(1142al-2).

Yet

Aristotle

not

only

refrains

rom

endorsing

this

opinion

(he

only

quotes

Euripides'

lost

play

Philoctetes),

ut

also

gives

reason

to

doubt

it:

presumably

it is

impossible

to

seek

one's own

wellbeing

without household

management

or

the

political

art

(1142a9-10).13

As

Irwin

points

out,

Aristotle

is

emphasizing

here

that

phronesis

should

not

be concerned with one's

own

interests

o

the exclusion f the

good

of others

1999,

245^16).

Properly

understood,

prudence

is

concerned

not

only

with

one's

own

good

but also with the

good

of

one's household and

community.

It

is

difficult

to

pursue

one's

own

good

through

the

exercise

of

individual

phronesis

in

the absence

of

related

capacities

for

phronesis

with

respect

to

the

family

and

city

(1142a9-10). The connection between the good of

the individual nd the

good

of

the

community,

fter

all,

explains

the

transition

from the

Nicomachean

Ethics

to

the

Politics.14

10Thales's

possession

of theoretical

wisdom,

as

adduced

in

Book

VI,

did

not

preclude

his

possession

of

phronesis,

as

Aristotle

recounts nBook I of the olitics (1259a5 ft).However,Aristotle,

in

this

passage,

does call

attention

to

Thales'

knowledge

not

only

of

universals but also of

particulars,

which

is

more

characteristic

of

practical

judgment

than

wisdom.

nIn

his work

on

political

things,

olitik?n,

Aristotle

treatsnot

particular

deliberations but

rather

lawgiving

in

its

overarching

sense,

as

Strauss

(1964)

emphasizes.

12Bodeiis

also

accepts

a

hierarchical

reading

of Aristotle's dis

cussion

of

phronesis,

but unlike

me,

he

asserts

that

legislative

prudence

is far

more

important

than

household

management

and

prudence

in the

specific

sense

of the term because

every

individual,

despite

his

autonomy,

is

a

member of

a

household

and

a

city

and

...

every

household,

despite

its

autonomy,

is

part

of

a

city

(1993, 65).

See also Vander

Waerdt,

who

argues

that

despite

the

apparent

elevation of

political prudence,

it

cannot

truly

be architectonic

because of the

tension between

the

good

man

and the

good

citizen

(1985b,

82-87).

13Ruderman

ails

o note

Aristotle

questions

the

propriety

f

using

phronesis

primarily

to

describe

actions

concerned

with

one's

own

well-being

(1997, 413);

he omits

Aristotle's

use

of

dokei, seems,

and

ascribes the

opinion

of

Euripides

to

Aristotle

(1141b29).

14Might

he

relationship

etween the various forms f

phronesis

help

us

to

understand

Aristotle's remark hat he end

of the

city

s

the

same as

that of

individuals?

Phronesis has

as

its

end the

identification of

what

is

good

and

advantageous

[agatha

kai

sumpheronta]for the sake of livingwell (NE 1140a26-28);

therefore,

he

capacity

for

determining

ell the

activities f

a

city

as

well

as

a

person

or

household

must

have

something

to

do

with

that end.

This content downloaded from 200.16.5.202 on Fri, 10 Oct 2014 00:27:18 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

8/11/2019 Political participation and the best regime.pdf

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/political-participation-and-the-best-regimepdf 6/17

MIO

KE VIN

M.

CHE

RR Y

At

the

same

time,

however,

Aristotle does

not

object

to

using

phronesis

to

refer

to

the

species

of

practical

judgment

concerned

primarily

with

oneself

provided

that

concern

is

wide

enough

to

encompass

the

good

of

the

community

to

which

one

belongs.

While

he

indicates his

disagreement

with

the

com

mon

use

of

politike,

he shows

no

such reservations

about

the

common use

of

phronesis

to

refer

primarily

to

deliberating

about

one's

own

ends.

While the

end

of

political

phronesis?namely,

the

good

of the

city?may

be the

most

authoritative

and

comprehen

sive,

as

is

suggested

at

the

beginning

of

the Ethics

(1094a26-bll),

the

character of laws

that direct

citizens

toward that

end

will

depend

upon

the

character and

practical

knowledge

of

those who make

them;

bad

people

will

not

make

good

laws.

Because

regimes

will reflect hat citizensbelieve is

good

for

human

beings,

understanding

the

good

for

human

beings

is

prior

to

understanding

either what is

good

for

the

city

or

whether the

city's

good

should take

precedence

over

that of

individuals. This

is

why

phronesis

associated

with individual lives is

the

species

which is

deserving

of,

and

so

bears,

the

name

of the

genus.

Practical Judgment and

Political

Judgment

Having

discussed the

relation of

phronesis

to

wisdom,

let

us now

consider

why

it

might

be

possible

for the

multitude

to

have

phronesis

at

a

level that

warrants

allowing

them

to

share

in

certain offices

in

the

city's

ruling ody

yet

does

not

justify

iving

them

bsolute

authority.

Though

they

belong

to

the

same

genus,

the

distinction between individual

phronesis

and

politike

will

be critical

in

understanding

Aristotle's

argument

here.

Phronesis takes

into

account

both the universal

and,

insofar

as

it

concerns

action,

the

particular.

Hence,

people

who have

experience

often are

more

adept

at

action than others who

do

have

knowledge

[eidot?n] (1141bl4?18).

Indeed,

Aristotle

says, prac

tical

judgment

relies more so

on

particulars

than

universals,

which

may

be

why

it

can

exist

without the

theoretical

knowledge

or

wisdom characteristic

of

philosophers

(1141b21?22).

Later,

he will

go

so

far

as

to

say

that

practical judgment

is

not

science

[phronesis

ouk

episteme],

for

it is directed

at

an

ultimate

particular

(1142a23-24).

For this reason,

Aristotle

warns

that

young

people

are

unlikely

to

possess

phronesis,

as

they

have

not

yet

acquired

adequate experience.

It is

not

a

lack

of

study

but

a

lack

of

experience

that

hinders

their

pursuit

of

the

good

(1142all

ft).

In contrast to

the

knowledge

of

universals and

the theoretical

wisdom

required

to

achieve it, expe

rience

with

particulars

is

something

which

the

(adult)

multitude

in

the

city

might

have?particularly

expe

rience with

matters

that

affect them

and

their

lives.

For

that

reason,

phronesis

is

a

virtue

they

may

ac

quire,

particularly

to

the

extent

necessary

to

take

part

in

judging

not

as

individuals

but

collectively

in

assemblies

or

juries.

At

the

same

time,

however,

most

people

are

unlikely

to

have

the

amount

or

breadth of

experience

and reflection

necessary

to

acquire

polit

ical

phronesis

(i.e.,

politike),

let alone

that

phronesis

necessary

for

lawgiving

(nomothetike).

It

is

only

those

fewwho do

develop

thosekinds of

phronesis

who

ought

to

hold

offices

n

the

city

s

individuals

ather

than

as

part

of

a

group.

While laws

are a

necessary

part

of

any

good

regime,

they

are

never

adequate

for

judging

every

situation,

and

so

it is

necessary

that

they

are

sup

plemented

by good judgment

on

the

part

of

citi

zens.

Following

many

commentators,

I

believe

that

Aristotle

ultimately,

though

not

without

hesitation,

concludes that

it

is

better for

the

many,

rather than

only

the

one or

the

few,

to

participate

in

such

judgments.15 Aristotle understands the virtue of

practical

judgment

to

be

one

susceptible

of

relatively

widespread

distribution.

However,

not

every

multi

tude

is

capable

of

judging

well

and

so

warrants

this

responsibility;

only

a certain

kind of

multitude that

judges

better than the

one or

the few

(1281M5-17).

The

multitude

must

have

developed

the virtue of

practical

judgment

through

their

experiences

and

bring

those

experiences

to

bear

on

the decisions

they

make.

One

of the

explicit

conditions is

that the

multitude

not

be

overly

slavish,

but

we

might

also

suspect

that the multitude in

question

must

have

some

level of ethical

virtue

lest

they

disregard

the laws

and

undermine the

regime

itself

(1282al5-16).

Aristotle first

intimates that

the

multitude,

when

combined with the

few,

may

be

no worse

at

judging

than the

few

alone

(1281a34-38,

1282al6-17),

but

he

later

suggests

that

having

the

multitude

participate

in

making

certain

judgments

is

in

fact better than

having only

the few make such

judgments.

There

are some

[arts]

concerning

which the maker

might

not

be the

only

or

the best

judge,

but where those

who do

not

possess

the

art

also have

some

knowledge

15See,

e.g.,

Bluhm

(1962),

Nichols

(1992),

Kraut

(2002),

and

Bates

(2003).

This content downloaded from 200.16.5.202 on Fri, 10 Oct 2014 00:27:18 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

8/11/2019 Political participation and the best regime.pdf

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/political-participation-and-the-best-regimepdf 7/17

THE

PROBLEM

OF POLITY

1411

of

its

work

(1282al7-19).

For this

reason,

Aristotle

says,

the

multitude,

though

unable

to

serve as

individ

uals,

should

collectively

have

authority

over

electing

and

auditing

officials

and should

serve as

members of

the

assembly

and

juries.

Aristotle believes the multitude

may,

in

fact,

be

capable

of

acquiring

a

species

of

phronesis

which

is

adequate

for them

to

take

part

in

the mixed

regime

that

governs

the

city.

He

is

quite

clear

that

phronesis

is

not

a

kind of theoretical

isdom,

which he often

denies

the multitude

can

possess.

Rather,

he

empha

sizes

the

relationship

of

phronesis

to

experience,

which the multitude

can

have.

Again,

this

is

not to

say

that hemultitude

is

capable

of

acquiring

olitike,

which would enable them

to

serve

in

the

city's highest

offices

as

individuals,

much

less

that

they

could

ac

quire

nomothetike,

the

species

of

phronesis

necessary

to

legislate

well

in

a manner

akin

to

Solon.

It

is,

rather,

to

make

a more

limited claim that the multi

tude

may

acquire

the

species

of

phronesis

that enables

it

to

judge

well

involving

the

particular

matters

over

which Aristotle

suggests

giving

them

authority,

i.e.,

the

assessment

of

specific

policies

in

the

assembly,

the

evaluation of

cases

in

the law

courts,

and the selection

and

auditing

of

office

holders.16

Polity

as Genus and

Species

With this

as

background,

let

us

return to

the

ques

tions

surrounding

the

usage

of

politeia

in

the Politics.

To

understand how the

regime

generally

translated

as

polity

is

the

highest

species

within

the

genus

of

regimes,

it is

essential

to

understand what

a

regime

is, i.e.,

a

political

community,

and how

polity

ex

emplifies

these

traits

more

than

any

other

species.

Aristotle's

account

of the

development

of

political

communities

illuminates

how

regimes

ought

to

be

self-sufficient communities of free and

(relatively)

equal

citizens of

a

sufficient

level of virtue

to

share

in

ruling

in

turn

with

a

view toward the

common

end

of

living

well.

In

Book

III

of the

Politics,

Aristotle

discusses

the

various

forms

of

kingship,

one

of which he

calls

heroic and

was

characteristic of

the

earliest

cities

(1285b3-19).

Kings

of this

kind

gained

their

office

because

they

had been

benefactors

of the multitude

in

connection

with

the

arts

or

with

war or

by

bringing

them

together

[in

a

city],

or

providing

them

land.

Their duties

included

leadership

in

war

and those

sacrifices that did

not

require priests

(1285b9-10),

as

well

as

being

judges

in

legal

cases

(1285bl0-ll).

Because

the

people

were

grateful

for

these

benefits,

they

accepted

such

kings

and

even

allowed their

descendents

to

succeed

them.17

The rule

of

heroic

kings

was

justified

because

their

virtues

helped

them

procure

a

greater

level

of

self-sufficiency through

providing

better

for defense

against

enemies,

necessary

sacrifices,

and a means of

resolving disagreements

among

inhabitants

of differ

ent

villages

(1285b4

ff.).

The

attempt

to

secure

these

goods, particularly

those

of

mere

life,

is

what

led

citizens

of the

earliest

poleis

to

accept

the

rule

of

heroic

kings.

Once

in

the

polis,

citizens continue the

search

for

more

efficient

means

of

securing

the

goods

necessary

for

mere

life

as

well

as

the

good

life

(1252b29-30).

These

kings

procured

many

goods

and

achieved

a

level of

self-sufficiency

in

their

cit

ies.

Aristotle

indicates that

a

greater

level of

self

sufficiency was still possible, but it required the

development

of different

parts

in

the

regime.

A

city

is

more

self-sufficient

when the

responsibilities

of

securing

what

is

necessary

for

political

life

are

shared

among many

people,

so

each

person

is

responsible

for

one

task

(1273b9?11).

But,

on

Aristotle's

account,

a

multitude

capable

of

contributing

to

what

is

neces

sary

for the

city

is

not

only likely

o

demand

some

share

in

ruling

in

exchange

for their

contributions

but also

justified

n

doing

so

because

they elp

make

the

polis

self-sufficient

so

its citizens

can

pursue

the

good

life

1281a4-10).

Aristotle

argues

that

the

origin

of the

polis

is

the

drive for

self-sufficiency

(autarkeia).

The

desire

to

secure

the

goods

of

daily

life leads

men

and

women

to

unite in

the household. The desire

to

secure

the

goods

of

nondaily

life?for

instance,

better

security

16Taylor

places

Aristotle in the

mainstream

of modern

repub

lican

theory

2002,

253)

and

identifies

im

as a

progenitor

of

the

liberal-cum-republican

radition

n

political

thought

(242),

discovering

a marked

kinship

between the

principles

and

prescriptions

of

Aristotle and those of

the

American

Founders

(256). (See

also Waldron

1995.)

Collins

(2002)

critiques

this

view,

focusing

n

the

way

in

which

Aristotle

is concerned

about

the limits of law in general. I, however, would focus on Aristotle's

warning

that

only

certain

multitudes deserve

to

share

in

rule,

which is

different from

the

natural

rights

doctrine of

the

American

founding.

17Aristotle

distinguishes

such

kings

not

only

from

kingships

limited

by

law?that of

Sparta,

for

instance?but also from

the

absolute rule of

one

person

similar

to

household

management,

which he

calls

pambasileia.

While

we

may

infer that

the

pambasileus

benefits

those

he

rules

in

a

way

similar

to

that of

the

heroic

king,

which

is

why

Aristotle

says

that

people

ought

to

obey such a person gladly (1284b32-34), such a rulerwill not

be

bound

by

laws.

It is the

possibility

of absolute

kingship

without law that leads

to

Aristotle's

dialectical

treatment

f

whether

the

rule of law

is better than

the rule of

one man.

This content downloaded from 200.16.5.202 on Fri, 10 Oct 2014 00:27:18 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

8/11/2019 Political participation and the best regime.pdf

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/political-participation-and-the-best-regimepdf 8/17

1412

KEVIN

M.

CHERRY

against

foreign

invasion?leads

to

the union

of

several households in

a

village. Although

the

polis

comes

about

as

a

result of

the desire

to

secure

the

goods

of

mere

life

in

a

more

effective

manner,

it

also

exists

for?and

indeed

is

defined

by

its

pursuit

of?the

good

life.

In

the

time

of heroic

kingship,

one man

was

responsible

for

a

variety

of

tasks,

including

war,

sacrifice,

and

legal judgments

because

it

was rare

to

discover

men

who

were

very

out

standing

in

virtue

(1286b8-10).

However,

as

more

people

attained

a

sufficient

level of

virtue

to

benefit their

communities,

they

ceased

to

be satisfied

with

kingly

rule

and

sought

something

common

and

established

a

polity

(1286M3-14).

In

other

words,

what

justified

he

rule

of

heroic

kings?their

ability

to

procure

what

was

necessary

for

self-sufficiency?also justifies

the tran

sition

from

kingship

to

political

rule

(1285M4-19).

The

development

of

a

citizen

body

able

to

contribute

toward what

is

necessary

for

self-sufficiency

seems

to

go

hand-in-hand with the

development

of

a

citizen

body

capable,

on

the

basis of their

experience

and

virtue,

f

participating

n

political

life.

he desire of

such citizens

to

exercise their

political

capacities

led

them

to

seek

a

regime

in

which

they

could

participate

more

fully

in

what characterizes

a

political

community:

speech

about the

good,

just,

and advan

tageous (1253al4-18). Aristotle is clear that when a

political community

contains

a

multitude

capable

of

such

participation,

a

regime ought

to

provide

for

their

participation:

it

is

evident that

among

similar

and

equal

persons

it

is

neither

advantageous

nor

just

for

one

person

to

have

authority

over

all

[matters]

(1287b41-88a2).

Aristotle often

treats

the

nature

of

things

as

what

they

are

in

their

developed

form

(1252a31

ff.),

and he

suggests

that

a

polis

in

which virtue and

political

authority

are more

equally

dispersed

among

the

community

is

the natural

development

of

political

life: It does

not

accord with

nature

for the

part

to

be

preeminent

over

the

whole

(1288a26-27).18

Given

the

connections

of

nature

with

growth

in

the

Greek word

physis

[<ptkris],

we

may

even

understand

Aristotle

to

suggest

it

does

not

accord

for

a

developed

political

community

to

have

a

part

superior

to

the

whole.

A

polis

in

which

the

multitude?or

at

least

a

certain kind of

multitude?takes

part

in

ruling

and

being

ruled

in

turn

is,

on

this

reading,

a

more

developed polis

than

one

in

which the activities

f

ruling

are

restricted

to

the few

capable

of

discharging

such

duties.

Aristotle's

account

of

the

origins

of

political

life nd the

decline of

kingship

suggests

hat

polities

are a

more

developed

form

of

political

community.

This

is

the

case,

I

suggest,

for three

reasons.

First,

a

polis

in

which the

multitude is

sufficiently

dvanced

to

share

in

the

activity

f

ruling

s

one

in

which

the

goods

necessary

for

mere

life

are

procured

more

efficiently

hrough

he

specialization

f

labor,

thereby

providing

more

opportunity

for the

pursuit

of

good

life.

Second,

as

the

number of

people capable

of

participating

in

political

life

increases,

more

people

in

the

city

are

sharing

in

the end for

which the

city

exists:

living

the

good

life

ia

logos

bout the

good,

just,

and

advantageous. Finally,

insofar

as

the heroic

kings

were

responsible

for

achieving

a

great

variety

of

necessary

goods

for the

city,

their

leisure

time

to

pursue

the

good

life,

transcending

the

mere neces

sities,

for

themselves

was

restricted.19

A

regime

in

which citizens

rule,

but also

are

ruled

in

turn,

provides more opportunities for each to pursue the

good

life.

Aristotle's

account

of the

development

of human

communities

should

not

be understood

primarily

in

historical

terms.

The

polis

is

the culmination of the

growth

of

the various other forms of human

com

munities,

and,

I

have

argued,

polity

is

similarly

the

culmination of the

development

of the kind of

community

known

as

the

polis.

Just

as

Aristotle is

aware

that

not

all

communities have

developed

into

polis

communities?indeed,

many

have

not

and

will

not?he

knows that

polity

is

both

rare

(1293a39-42)

and

susceptible

to

decline. Books

IV-VI

teach that the

development

of

political

communities is

fragile

and

requires

no

small

amount

of

phronesis,

hard

work,

and

perhaps

fortune. Aristotle

turns

to

history

to

show

that

a

multitude

capable

of

political

rule

can

exist,

although

his

understanding

f

history

eads

him

to

18To

be

sure,

Aristotle adds that

kingly

rule

is

the

proper

result

in

certain

cases,

namely

situations

in which there is

one

person

who

is

superior

with

respect

to

the virtue relative

to

political

leadership

(1288a5-12).

Such

superiority,

owever,

s

unlikely

t

a

time when

the virtues relative

to

political leadership

are

said

to

bewidespread and not restrictedcf. 1286bl2). This superiority,

I

have

argued, belongs

most

properly

to

earlier

times,

lthough

it

may

also exist

in

less

developed

communities

of later times

(cf.

Robinson

1995, 64-66;

Sidgwick

1892,

142).

19Vander

aerdt

argues

that

the heroic

king

lacks

philosophic

virtue

(1985,

264,

267);

rather,

e

provides

the

opportunity

for

other

citizens

to

engage

in

philosophy

(252).

Such

a

kingship

is,

therefore, Aristotle's best regime because it provides the max

imum

opportunity

for the

good

life f

philosophy;

the second

best

regime

occurs

when

philosophers

rule

and

are

ruled in

turn,

in the absence

of

a

heroic

king

(255, 257).

This content downloaded from 200.16.5.202 on Fri, 10 Oct 2014 00:27:18 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

8/11/2019 Political participation and the best regime.pdf

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/political-participation-and-the-best-regimepdf 9/17

THE PROBLEM

OF POLITY

1413

suspect

most

cities

in

the future

will be democratic

(1286b20-22).20

Aristotle

praises

the

polis

not

because

it is

the

last

stage

of

historical human

development

but because

of what

it is:

the

community

that

makes

possible

the

pursuit

of the

good

life for the

largest

ossible

number

or

proportion

of

its citizens.

In

the

same

way,

he

praises

polity

not

because

of when

it

arises

in

the

course

of

the

development

of

political

life?it

would,

on

my

interpretation,

be

similarly

praised

even

if it

predated

heroic

kingship?but

because

of

the

way

in

which

it

represents

the fullest

development

ofwhat

it s

to

be

a

political community, egardless

f

the actual

historical

circumstances of

its

existence.21

As

a

mixed

regime combining

various

contributions

and claims

to

rule,

rather than

a

simple

regime

that

recognizes only

one contribution or

claim,

polity

is

unlikely

to

have

arisen in the earliest cities.

In

addition

to

the

necessity

nd

difficulty

f

developing

virtue

among

the

multitude,

the

arrangement

of

a

mixed

regime

requires

some

experience

with

different

forms of rule

before

being

able

to

combine them into

one,

mixed

form. Aristotle believes the multitude

is

capable

of

possessing

this

experience,

which both

explains

and

justifies

their efforts

to

secure

partic

ipation

in

a

mixed

regime.

Having

examined the

origins

and

development

of

political communities, I believe it is clear that the

mixed

regime

called

polity

fulfills,

f

not

perfectly

then

to

a

higher degree

than other

regimes,

what

it is

to

be

a

regime

and

so

deserves the

name

of the

genus.

A

regime,

Aristotle tells

us,

is

some

arrangement

of

offices

n

a

polis

(1278b8-10).

As

a

polis,

the

regime

should be self-sufficient

1252b28-30)

and directed

toward

the

good

life,

rather than

simply seeking

profit

r

defense

(1280a30 ff).

Moreover,

it

should

allow citizens

to

participate

in

deliberations

about the

just,

advantageous,

and

good

(1253a9-18),

exempli

fying political

rule rather than

mastery,

which

is

inappropriate

for the

community

of free

persons

and

equal

persons

that

is

a

polis

(1279al7-21,

1328a35,

1332M6-29,

cf.

1284a3-15).

In

such

a com

munity,

rule

should be shared

among

citizens

in

turn,

not

held

by

one

person

or

group

(1279a8-10).

To

be

sure,

Aristotle does

not

believe rule

should

be shared

among

all

citizens

in

every

regime.

How

ever,

he does

suggest

that

a

city

that

not

only

is

self

sufficient

and

promotes

the

good

life but also has

a

multitude

capable

of

participating

in

politics

and

sharing

in that

good

life is

more

developed,

more

in

accord with

nature,

than other cities.

Polity,

more

than other

regimes,

is

comprised

of

free and

equal

citizens

who

seek,

and

deserve,

to

rule and be ruled

in

turn.

Moreover,

it

allows

a

greater

number of

people

with

a

wider

variety

f

views

to

participate

n

political

life.

Johnson

emphasizes

how Aristotle's

use

of

politeia

illuminates the idea that

politics

is an ac

tivity

f

equals

sharing y

turns

n

the

arts

of

ruling

and

being

ruled. There

is

a

certain

requirement

that

such

activity

be both 'virtuous' and carried

on

by

'the

many'

(1988,

204).

A

regime,

however,

is

not

just

any

arrangement

of offices

in

a

city.

The

arrangement

should

be

with

a

view

to

living

finely

[kal?s]

(1278b20-24),

and

polity?perhaps

alone of

regimes?supplies

both of

the

conditions

Aristotle

says

are

necessary

for

a

city

to

be

finely

dministered

oikeisthai

al?s].

While

every

city requires thewell-born, the free, and thewealthy,

justice

and

military

virtue

are

necessary

for

a

city

to

be beautiful

(1283al4-22).22

Not

only

is

political

justice

characteristic

of

a

community

of

relatively

free

and

equal

persons

ruled

by

laws

(NE 1134a24-30),

which describes

a

polity

more

than

a

kingship,

but

military

virtue is

also

the

characteristic first identified

by

Aristotle

s

belonging

to

polity.Why

does

military

virtue

help

a

city

to

be

finely governed,

and how does

it

justify

ncluding

he

multitude in

ruling?

Military

Virtue and

Political Life

Though

Aristotle

suggests

the natural

course

of

development

would lead

to

a

mixed

regime

in

which

a

virtuous

multitude,

capable

of

phronesis,

shares

in

rule,

he

explains

why

kingships

ften

degenerate

nto

tyrannies

or

oligarchies

rather than

develop

into

aristocracies

or

polities.

Certain

peoples

lack

either

20Simpson,

although

he

questions

whether Aristotle believes this

argument,

also reads the

passages

to

suggest

that

kingship

now

is

no

longer good

or

correct

because

now

the

number of the

virtuous,

or

those

capable

of

exercising

rule,

are

much

greater,

and

thus

there

will

be

no one man

who

stands

out

above

the

rest

(1998,

185).

While

not

all

cities

are

sufficiently

eveloped

to

support

olitical

rule,

disagree

with

Simpson,

for

reasons

stated

below,

that

pambasileia

represents

Aristotle's

preferred

regime.

2

Aristotle

recognizes

hat

polity

is

not

the lasthistorical

stage

of

development;

it,

too,

degenerates

when

people

come

to

value

wealth,

leading to oligarchies, tyrannies, and democracies (1286M1-20).

However,

because

Aristotle

criticizes

Socrates's

overly rigid

and

deterministic

account

of

regime

change

(V.12),

I

hesitate

to

emphasize

this

point.

22While

he

OCT

suggests

olitikes,

ord

adopts

polemikes,

hich

is better supported in the manuscripts. Newman refers to

1291a24-27,

where

justice

and

military

excellence

are

said

to

be

goods

of soul that

transcend what is

merely

necessary

for the

city

(1902,

III.232).

This content downloaded from 200.16.5.202 on Fri, 10 Oct 2014 00:27:18 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

8/11/2019 Political participation and the best regime.pdf

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/political-participation-and-the-best-regimepdf 10/17

14H

KEVIN M.

CHERRY

the

necessary

spirit

or

deliberative

faculty

to

engage

in

self-rule

(VII.7);

other

peoples,

by

virtue

of

a

city's

location,

develop

vices

that

preclude

them from

acquiring

the

necessary

virtue

(VII.5,

6).

Bad

laws

develop

bad

habits,

such

as

the

excessive

valuation of

wealth,

which leads

to

tyranny,

oligarchy,

and

de

mocracy

rather than

polity.

Despite

these

obstacles,

some

cities did

develop

populations capable

of

ruling

and

being

ruled

in

turn.

One

reason

for

this

seems

to

be the

expansion

of

the

city's

military, particularly

the

hoplites,

and the

development

among

citizens

of

military

virtue.23

Military

virtue is

said

by

Aristotle

to

form

thebasis

for

the

regime

called

politeia

(1279M-2),

and the

capacity

of

the

many

to

acquire

military

virtue

indicates

a

capacity

on

their

part

to

acquire

other

virtues as well. This is what Aristotle recommends

in

his

city

according

to

prayer

in

Book

VII

of the

Politics: The

young

of

the

city

will

serve

as

soldiers,

acquiring

the

necessary

experience

and

practical

judgment

that

enables them

to

rule

once

they

reach

middle

age.

In

other

words,

serving

in

the

military

provides

young

citizens with

the

time

and

opportu

nity

to

acquire

the

necessary

experience

in

order

that

they might develop

the virtue of

phronesis.

Aristotle

emphasizes

this connection

in

discussing

ruling

and

being

ruled in

turn.

In

a

community

of

those who are similar in stock and free, the ability

not

only

to

rule but also

to

be ruled is

required

of

a

citizen

as

well

as

the

good

man

(1277b7-17).

But

the

ability

to

rule is such that it

can

be

learned

only

by being

ruled,

for it is

not

possible

to

rulewell with

out

having

been ruled

(1277b7-13).

In

other

words,

the

multitude

can

acquire

the

phronesis

necessary

for

sharing

in

rule

only through

first

having

been

ruled.

And it is

likely hey

xperience

eing

ruled

s

soldiers

as

well

as

citizens. The

experience

soldiers receive

in

being

ruled contributes

to

one

character trait that

Aristotle

emphasizes

is

necessary

for

a

multitude

to

warrant

inclusion

in

a

regime:

lawfulness.

In

a

polity,

the multitude

must

be free

persons

acting

in

no

way

against

the law

(1286a36-37).

The lawful

multitude

must

have

some

ethical

virtue,

and the

laws

of

a

polity

foster the

development

of

habits

that

give

rise

to

these virtues.

Serving

in

the

military

would

do

perhaps

even

more

to

guarantee

that citizens

become courageous, if

not

moderate

as

well.

Military

discipline,

after

all,

gives

rise

to

military

virtue.

As

Simpson

acknowledges,

the

military

life

contains

many

parts

of

virtue

(1998,

155).

But

military

virtue,

like the

other

kinds of

ethical

virtue,

is

connected

to

phronesis

in two

ways.

While

there

is

no

virtue

without

phronesis

(NE

1144M9-21),

it is

also

impossible

to

have

phronesis

without ethical

virtue

(1144b30-32).

By

helping

citizens

acquire

ethical

virtue,

military

life

also

helps

them

acquire

phronesis.

Book

VI

of the

Ethics

provides

another

way

in

which

serving

n the

military

can

help

develop

the

kind

of

knowledge

necessary

for

ruling.

Aristotle

distinguishes phronesis

from

a

variety

of

other

in

tellectual

capacities

that

have

to

do

with

action?e.g.,

art

and cleverness. One

of these

is

sunesis,

the

ability

to

perceive

the

excellence of

the deliberations

of

other

people

(1142b35

ff.).

By

observing

the deliberations

of

others

about

their

own

actions,

we

may,

Aristotle

suggests,

learn

from

them

and

improve

our

future

deliberations.

Military

virtue

thus contributes

in

three

ways

to

the development of phronesis necessary for the multi

tude

to

participate

in

ruling.

First,

it

provides

the

necessary

experience

with

particulars

essential for

phronesis.

Second,

it

develops

the habits of

obedience

to

the laws

as

well

as

those of

ethical

virtue,

without

which there

can

be

no

phronesis.

Finally,

it

offers

the

possibility

of

improving

the

capacity

for

judging

well

through

the observation

of the

judgments

of

others.This

would

be

more

likely

f

those

giving

the

orders?those who

already

have

phronesis?explained

their

decisions,

but

even

in

the absence of

that,

it is

likely

that

some

soldiers

will

perceive

the

reasoning

behind what

they

are

told

to

do. The

experience

associated

with

the

development

of

military

virtue

thus makes

possible

the

development

of

phronesis

among

the

multitude,

and this

is

what

makes

possible

and

justifies llowing

the

multitude

to

share

n

ruling

in

a

polity.

Polity

and

the Best

Regime

Yet if

justice

and

military

virtue are

necessary

for a

city

to

be

finely

dministered,

hus

legitimating

he

claim

of the multitude

to

participate

in

a

mixed

23Salkever

suggests

the

connection

between

military

virtue

and

phronesis

is

problematic:

There

is

no

explanation

of

why

the

possession

of andreia

(manliness)

guarantees

the later

flowering

of dikaiosune

(justice)

and

epiekeia (equity

or

decency

...

)

(2007, 35).

Although

Aristotle does

not

offer

n

explicit explan

ation,

I

believe,

and

hope

to

show,

the connection is defensible.

Salkever

argues

that Aristotle is concerned about

the

consequen

ces

of

the

common

understanding

of

manliness

for

political

life; I do not disagreewith this interpretationut believe that

military

virtue,

if

properly

understood,

is

not

necessarily

domi

nated

by

andreia.

It

can

be

not

only

necessary

for

but

also

beneficial

to

the

city

(cf.

Frank

2005,

167-68).

This content downloaded from 200.16.5.202 on Fri, 10 Oct 2014 00:27:18 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

8/11/2019 Political participation and the best regime.pdf

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/political-participation-and-the-best-regimepdf 11/17

THE

PROBLEM

OF POLITY

1415

regime,

what of Aristotle's

statement

that

it is edu

cation and virtue

above all that have

a

just

claim

to

rule

with

a

view

to

the

highest

end of the

city,

i.e.,

the

good

life

(1283a24-26)?

In

other

words,

what

is

the

relationship

etween

polity

and the best

regime

discussed

in

Book

VII

of the

Politics7.

n

Book

IV,

Aristotle

distinguishes

the best

regime

simply,

the

re

gime

forwhich one would

pray

above

all,

with

ex

ternal

things

roviding

o

impediment

1288b23-24),

from the best

regime

generally

possible,

the

regime

most

fitting

for all cities and

more attainable for

all

(1288b34, 38).

While almost

all

commentators

take

polity

to

be Aristotle's

best

regime

in

some

way,

there

is

much

disagreement

about

what

way.

Some

read

Aristotle

to

prefer

kingship

and

aristocracy

to

polity

and

insist

he recommends

polity only

because

of the

difficulty

f

instituting

hese. thers treat t s

the best

regime possible

for

most

cities

given

the

prevalence

of

oligarchy

and

democracy.

And still

others

maintain

Aristotle's

polity

is

in

fact his best

regime simply.

Bluhm

(1962)

argues

that the

best

regime

is

a

polity

populated

by

a

large

number of

virtuous

and

well-to-do

men

who lead the

life of moral

virtue

presented

in

the Ethics

as

the best

social life

attainable

and therefore the

way

of

life of

the

ideal

polis

(747-48).24

Although

Nichols

disagrees

with

Bluhm's optimistic assessment of the virtues of the

middle class

(202 n9),

she,

too,

depictspolity

as

the

best

regime

simply

(1992,

88).25

As

themixed

re

gime, polity

combines the

various

contributions?and

various claims

to

rule?of the different

parts

of

the

city.

The

multitude's

participation

in

rule

is

required

by

the

higher

end of

the

city

because

of

their collective

virtue and

prudence

as

well

as

its

lower end because

of the threat

to

the

city

stemming

from their

exclusion

(68).26

By bringing

together

the few

and

many,

Nichols

continues, polity

allows

human

beings

to

fulfill their

natures

as

political beings,

sharing

in

rule

and

participating

in

the

continuous

debate

over

benefits

and

justice

(88).27

While

I

agree

with

some

parts

of Nichols's

argu

ment,

particularly regarding

the various

contributions

and claims

within the

city,

I

disagree

that Aristotle

describes

polity

as

the best

regime

simply.28

His

de

scription

of

the best

regime simply

in

Book

IV?

what

quality

it

should have

to

be

what

one

would

pray

for above

all,

with

external

things

providing

no

impediment

(1288b23-24)?mirrors

far

too

closely

the

language

used inBook VII,

describing

thebest

regime

simply

as

the

city

that

is

to

be

constituted

on

the basis

of what

one

would

pray

for

(1325b36).

Moreover,

while Aristotle

is

emphatic

that while this

regime

must

not

be

impossible,

he also

acknowledges

that the conditions

required

for

its

realization

are

unlikely.

Nichols,

by

contrast,

argues

that

polity

serves

not

only

as

a

paradigm

but also

a

potential regime

for

all

other

cities. This is

not

the

case

for the best

regime

simply,

whose material

requirements

prevent

most,

if

not

all,

existing regimes

from

achieving

it.29

These

material conditions, in fact, are outside the control of

statesmen,

which

is

why

it is

necessary

to

investigate

how

statesmen

should

legislate

for

other kinds of

regimes

and

not

only

the best

simply.

For

instance,

the

regime

according

to

prayer

would lack

the

economic classes

found

in

a

polity,

24Bluhm

argues

the

regime

of Book

VII

is

a

polity

under

optimal

conditions

(1962, 744);

thus

polity,

as

it

generally

ccurs,

is

not

the best

regime

simply

749).

Bluhm is

right

hat the

regime

of

Book

VII cannot

be understood

as an

aristocracy

in

any

tradi

tional

sense

of

the rule

by

the

few,

much

less

kingship

(751),

but

the differences etween polity and the city of Book VII are

sufficiently

significant

that

they

warrant different

names,

as

I

discuss below.

25Nichols

contends,

based

largely

on

the

presence

of

slavery,

that

the

regime ccording

to

prayer

of Book

VII

of the olitics

is

not,

in

fact,

Aristotle's best

regime simply

but rather

an

illustration

of the limits f

politics.

See also Salkever

(2007,

34-35).

Simply

accepting

their laim that

the

regime

f

Book

VII

is

not,

in

fact,

Aristotle's best would

make

my

argument

easier;

however,

I

believe Aristotle

does

portray

t

as

best. The

problem

of

slavery

may

not

be

as

great

as

it

first

appears;

a

population

of

natural

slaves

is

no more

unlikely

than

some

of the other conditions he

enumerates.

And

perhaps

it is

only

in

the best

regime

that

Aristotle could

recommend,

as

he

does,

that

masters

free

their

slaves if they are capable of independent reasoning and choice:

The citizens of

the best

regimes

would be able

to

make this

determination,

which

Aristotle

acknowledges

is

difficult,

and

to

do

what is

right,

which

may

be

even more so.

26Her

emphasis

on

statesmanship,

which

distinguishes

her

argu

ment

from Bluhm's

(202 n9),

parallels

my

account

of the

phronesis

of

the multitude and the

politike

of

statesmen.

27Nichols

rgues

that

polities

begin

by

mixing

poor

and richwith

a

modicum

of

military

virtue,

such that

the

lawswill in

fact

be

obeyed.

However,

if

properly

rdered,

they

ill over time

develop

a

middle

classwith

a

higher

levelofvirtue that llows the

polity

to

become

an

aristocracy,

a

regime

in which

those

with

some

degree

of virtue rule and

are

ruled

in turn

(1992, 99).

In

other

words,

the

political

institutions

of

polity

remain

a

mixture,

while the

citizens

move

toward

a

middle

status

in their

economic

and ethical character.

28Both

luhm

(1962, 748)

and Nichols

(1992, 88)

emphasize

the

way

in

which

polity

is the

regime

most

reflective

f

political

rule,

allowing

citizens

to

rule and be ruled

in

turn.

29Hence

also

disagree

with

Frank,

who believes thatthe

regime

of

Book

VII

exists

as

an

actualizable future

(2005,

140)

for

Athens

if

it

can

firstbe

transformed

nto

a

combination of

aristocracy and democracy that she calls a democracy of dis

tinction

(142).

Samaras,

acknowledging

the

extensive

material

preconditions

for this

regime,

argues

that it is

a

blueprint

for the

prospective

colonist of Asia

Minor

and

not

Athens

(2007,

89).

This content downloaded from 200.16.5.202 on Fri, 10 Oct 2014 00:27:18 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

8/11/2019 Political participation and the best regime.pdf

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/political-participation-and-the-best-regimepdf 12/17

H1^

KEVIN

M.

CHERRY

even

a

well-arranged

polity

that

promotes

a

large

middle

class.

Moreover,

it

would

provide

the basis for

a

more

leisurely

life that

would

allow

the citizens

to

develop

more

fully

the ethical

and

intellectual virtues.

Aristotleargues inBook IV thatthe regimethat is

best

[ariste]

nd

the

way

of

life that is

best

[aristos]

for

most

cities

and

most

human

beings

is

one

that

emphasizes

the

middling

sort

of life.

The

best

regime

generally

possible,

that

is,

requires

only

the

virtue

appropriate

to

private persons

and

does

not

require

a

high

level

of education

or

circumstances

that

would

be

dependent

on

chance

(1295a25-34,

emphasis

added).

In

the

best

regime

imply, y

con

trast,

anyone might

act

in

the best

[arista]

manner

and live

blessedly

(1324a23-25).

In

other

words,

all

citizens

would

have

a

high

level

of

education

and

ample

benefits f

fortune;

hebest

regime simply

f

Book

VII

is

not

the

best

regime

generally

ossible.

Following

most

commentators,

I

believe

Aristotle

considers

polity

to

be

the

best

regime

generally

possible

and

not

the best

regime

simply.

However,

I

argue

that

ristotlehas

a

higher

estimation

f

polity

than

is

often

acknowledged

because he

sees a

closer

connection

between

it

and

the

city

of

prayer

in

Book VII than is

commonly recognized.

Most

of

those

commentators

who believe

that

polity

is

the

best

regime

generally

possible

do

so

because

they

believe that kingship and aristocracy are no longer

political

possibilities.30

For

them,

the

purported

difference etween

the

polity

and the

regime

f

Book

VII

is,

in the words of

one

critic,

a

strength

because,

unlike the

city

of

prayer,

the constitutional

polity

is

actualizable

(Frank

2005,

164).

Polity,

as

the

only

actualizable

correct

regime,

is the

best

regime

gen

erally

possible

by

default,

leading

Davis

to

lament

that

praising

polity

requires

praise

of

mediocrity;

it

is

a

hard

and

uninspiring

case

to

argue

(1996, 82).

I

argue,

by

contrast,

that

the

regime

called

polity

is

quite

similar

to

the

city

of

prayer

and

so

its

des

ignation

as

the best

regime

generally

possible

is

more

than

damning

with faint

praise.

Why

might

Aristotle

praise

polity

as

more

than

mediocre?

Aristotle's claim that, with a view toward the

good

life that

should be

the

end

of all

political

communities,

education

and virtue

have

the

just

claim

to

rule

is

qualified:

they

have

above

all

the

just

claim

to

rule.

This

hesitation,

I

think,

implies

that

they

o

not

have

the

only

ust

claim

to

rule;

the

contributions of

wealthy

and

free-born

are

not

insignificant.

Moreover,

the

use

of

the

term

virtue

here is

presumably

broad

enough

to

include the

justice

and

military

excellence associated

with

a

multitude suited for

political

rule that

Aristotle

previously

said

was

necessary

for

a

noble,

or

beau

tiful,

administration.

All

of

these have

some

claim

to

rule,

which

is

reflected

in

the

mixed

regime

of

polity.

Indeed,

Aristotle

suggests

that in

a

community

where

there

exists

a

variety

of

just

claims

to

rule,

that

of

the

multitude?taken

collectively

and

provided

it

is

of

a

certain

sort?is

more

persuasive

than

that of

the

wealthy

few

or

even

the virtuous few

(1283b27

ff.).

It

is

not,

in

the

case

of

polity,

a

question

of

whether the

judgment

of

a

certain

multitude

taken

collectively

is

superior

to

that

of

a

few

excellent

individuals;

rather,

polity

mixes

both

parts:

a

multitude

possessing

mil

itary virtue and justice and the few outstanding in

dividuals

(1281b34-36).

While

Aristotledoes

indicate

that

ostracism

may

sometimes be

necessary

for

cer

tain

cities,

he does

not

seem

to

expect

it in

cities

in

which the

multitude has

developed

some

level

of

vir

tue

and

political

capacity

(1284a3 ff.).

Polity,

there

fore,

not

only

incorporates

but also benefits

from the

presence

of

individuals

whose

virtue

exceeds,

though

not

excessively,

that

of the

multitude. Aristotle

calls

the

rule of

either

part?the

few

or

the

many?

incomplete

and

imperfect,

ateles

(1281b38).

The

mixed regimeof polity is perfected nd completed

by

including

oth the few and

the

many.

To

be

sure,

many

have

argued

that

Aristotle's

pre

ferred

regimes

are

kingship

and

aristocracy.

A

close

reading,

however,

questions

whether

kingship

is

a

political

kind of rule and

so

whether

it is

a

regime

t

all

(see

1310a40

ff.,

1311a24).31

Cooper

observes that

although

Aristotle

recognizes

kingship

as one

just

30Mulgan

argues

that while so-called

aristocracy

might

have

a

claim

to

be

superior

to

polity,

Aristotle does

not

accept

it

as a

candidate for the best

constitution

for

most

cities and

men.

It

either ies

beyond

the

reach of

most states

r

else

is

very

close

in

nature to

polity

(1977,

102-03).

He

therefore

suggests

olity

is

thebest

regimegenerally ossible only

because the realizationof

kingship

or

aristocracy

is

unlikely

if

not

impossible.

Simpson

similarly

rgues

thatwhile Aristotle believes the

simply

best

regime

s

a

kind of

kingship

or

aristocracy

1998,

290),

polity

is

the

regime

he recommends for

most

cities

because

it is

thekind

of

regime

most

people

and

most

cities

can

share

in,

emphasiz

ing

that

aristocracies

aiming

at

virtue

are

not

within the

reach

of

most

people

and cities

(327).

And

although

Kraut

argues

that

Aristotle's

best

regime,

s

depicted

in Book

VII,

is

one

in

which

there sawide degreeofpoliticalparticipation, e stillmaintains

that Aristotle believes that when there

are no

kingly

persons

...

we

should

wish

we

had such

extraordinary

ndividuals in

our

midst

(2002, 416).

31Yack

acknowledges

Aristotle's

clear

and

explicit

statement

that

kingship

is

a

regime

(1993, 85);

however,

he concludes that

kingship, like tyranny, involves the monopolization of political

rule

by

a

single

individual

(85),

which

cannot

be

part

of

Aristotle's

understanding

of

political community

without

undermining

its

coherence and

consistency

(87).

This content downloaded from 200.16.5.202 on Fri, 10 Oct 2014 00:27:18 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

8/11/2019 Political participation and the best regime.pdf

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/political-participation-and-the-best-regimepdf 13/17

THE PROBLEM

OF POLITY

1417

and valid

form of rule

in

a

7roAis

...

and

under

certain

circumstances

the best

and

most

just

form of

rule,

he

still refuses

to

call

it

a

7toAitlk?s

kind

of

rule

(1999,

75

n5,

emphasis

added).32

Likewise,

Davis

argues

the

rule of

the

pambasileius

reduces

the

city

to

a

household,

replacing

political

rule

with

economic

(1996,

121).33

Aristotle himself

asserts

it

does

not

in

accord

with

nature?or,

perhaps,

devel

opment?for

one

man

to

be

so

superior

to

his

community

that he deserves

unlimited

personal

rule

(1288a26-8).34

What

of

aristocracy?

Aristotle

indicates

that

aristocracy

is

much

like

kingship:

each of them

wishes

to

be

established

n

thebasis

of

virtue that

s

furnished

ith

equipment

(1289a30-33).

But

like

kingship,

an

aristocracy

established

solely

on

the

basis of

virtue?assuming

that it has the

necessary

equipment?excludes

most

citizens from

participa

tion and

so,

again

like

kingship,

moves

away

from

being

a

political

regime.

To

the

extent,

however,

that

aristocracies

approximate

a

polity by

incorporating

other elements?which

Aristotle

explicitly

says

those

aristocracies which

are

possible

for

cities

to

sustain

will

do

(1295a31-34)?they

aremore

fully olitical

communities,

if

at

the

expense

of

losing

their

aristo

cratic

character.

Aristotle

does

not

deny

that,

in

certain

places

and

times, a community may have a nature suitable for

kingship

r

aristocracy

1287b38

ff.).

hat

I

suggest

is

that

the

development

of

political

communities

over

timewill?if

not

frustrated

by

many

of the

potential

dangers

Aristotle discusses?be

in

a

direction

to

make rule

increasingly

political,

as was

historically

the

case

in

some,

though

far from

all,

cities.

In

other

words,

the conventional

view has it

backward:

The

difficulty

of

developing

a

multitude

capable

of

par

ticipating

in

political

life often makes

it

necessary

for

cities,

if

they

wish

to

be

governed

well,

to

accept

the

rule of

kings

and aristocrats.

What,

then,

are we

to

make of

the

regime

accord

ing

to

prayer?the

best

regime simply?discussed

in

Book

VII? It is

important

to note at

the

outset

that

Aristotle

never

refers

explicitly

to

this

regime

as an

aristocracy.35

It

has

little

in

common

with

existing

aristocracies,

either

those

so-called

aristocracies

that include

claims

to

rule other

than virtue

or

those

true

aristocracies that exclude

the

vast

majority

of

citizens

from

participating

in

political

life.

Rather,

I

suggest,

it

has

more

in

common

with

polity

in

that

both

regimes ustify

idespread political

participa

tion

on

the

possession

of

a

kind of

virtue

if

different

kinds

in

the different

regimes).

While

a

true

aristoc

racy

includes

the best

simply

on

the basis of virtue

(1293b3-5),

Aristotle refrains rom

calling

the

city

according

to

prayer

an

aristocracy

to

highlight

the

way

it differs from the aristocracies with which we

have

experience

1293b7 ff).

ather,

by

referring

o

it

frequently

s

the best

politeia,

he

repeatedly

alls

to

mind

its connection with

polity.

In

particular,

Aristotle

emphasizes

the

way

that

the

regime according

to

prayer

will be

run

not

by

one

or

few but rather

a

multitude.

It is

a

city

that has

a

multitudewith the

capacity

for

doing

thatforwhich

the

city

exists?i.e.,

living

well?that

is

a

great

city

(1326a21-22).

Even in the best

regime simply,

it is

necessary

to

have

a

multitude

that is

capable

of

judging what is advantageous and just in order to

be self-sufficient

(1328M3-19,

29a2-6).

In

other

words,

rule

in

thebest

regime imply

ill

be

political;

a

multitude of

citizens

will

rule and be ruled

in

turn.

In

both kinds

of

regimes,

themultitude

will

select

and audit

the

highest

offices of the

city.36

The

difference

is

that,

in

the best

regime

simply,

more

citizens

will

possess

the levels of

virtue

necessary

to

fill

those

offices,

thus

better

exemplifying olitical

rule

by

turn.

For

this

reason,

some

scholars have

emphasized

the

connection

between the

city

of

prayer

and the

regime

called

polity.

Nichols,

for

instance,

cites

this

similarity

n

favor f her

argument

hat

polity

is

the

simply

best

regime

(1992,

89-90,

99).

Frank

agrees

32It

s

elsewhere ikened

to

household

management,

which differs

from

political

rule

(1285b29-33).

Thus Davis:

There

seems

to

be

no

form of

kingship

as

political

rule_For

a

king

to

rule

without

consent

may

be

good

household

management,

but

it

is

not

political

justice.

For

him

to

rulewith

consent

may

be

political

rule,

but

it is

not

kingship

(1996,

58).

33Davis

concludes

pambasileia

is

Aristotle's

preferred

ption

but

acknowledges

that such

a

regime

acks

justice

(1996, 58)

and

so

the best

city

s

not

a

city

(66).

34Aristotle

says

the excessive virtue

required

for

kingly

rule is

greater

than what accords with human

nature

(1286b26-7).

Reading into nature the connotations of development inherent

in

the

Greek,

Aristotlehints

that

t

does

not

accordwith human

development

for

one

person

to

have the kind of

monopoly

of

virtue that

justifies ingly

rule.

35Some

passages

in

Book

III

are

read

to

refer

o

the

city

f Book

VII

as an

aristocracy

1289a30-33,

1290al,

1293M-3).

Such

an

interpretation equires

rearranging

he

text

of thePolitics

as we

have

it,

which has

some,

but

not

unanimous,

support.

More

suggestive,

I

think,

is that

Aristotle

refrains

from

calling

it

an

aristocracy

while

discussing

it.

36Because

it

involves rule

by

the

multitude,

the

city

according

toprayer scloser toAristotle'sdefinition fpolityas theregime

where the multitude

governs

for the

common

advantage

than

the

definition of

aristocracy

s

the rule of the few

[olig?n]

looking

toward the

common

advantage

(1279a31-38).

This content downloaded from 200.16.5.202 on Fri, 10 Oct 2014 00:27:18 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

8/11/2019 Political participation and the best regime.pdf

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/political-participation-and-the-best-regimepdf 14/17

M1^

KEVIN

M. CHERRY

that the

regime

of

polity

has

substantial

similarities

with

the

city

of

prayer

(2005,

163),

and

Samaras

acknowledges

the

emphatically political

character

of

rule

in

Book

VII

(2007,

79).37

Recognizing

the

similarities

between the

political

institutions of

best

regime

simply

and of

the

regime

called

polity

assuages

the

common

lament

that

Aristotle

gives

us

remarkably

little

information

concerning

the

political

institutions

f

the

regime

of

Book

VII

(Kahn

1990,

370;

cf. Kraut

2002,

225).

While

the

governance

of

these

regimes

would

differ

substan

tially

because

of their

physical

location and

material

status,

and

more

importantly

due

to

the

higher

levels

of virtue

present

in

the

regime

according

to

prayer,

the

political

institutions

themselves?particularly

de

liberative

assemblies and

juries?would

not,

I

suggest,

be all

that different.

However,

while

both

the

best

regime

simply

and

polity

grant

authority

ver

the

highest

offices

o

the

multitude,

they

are

multitudes

of different

kinds.

Aristotle contends

that the

middling

sort

of vir

tue

appropriate

to

polity,

found

among

themiddle

class,

serves

as a

guarantee

that the

city

will

be

ruled

politically,

i.e.,

in

turn,

and

not

like the

rule of

a

master.

Insofar

as

themiddle

class

consists

largely

of

equal

and

similar

persons,

they

make

the

polis

a

true

political

community

united

by

bonds of

affection (1295M2-24). It is clear, therefore,

that

the

political

partnership

that

depends

on

the

middling

sort

is best

as

well,

and

that those cities

are

capable

of

being governed

in

which

the

middl

ing

element

is

numerous

(1295b34-37).

Polity

re

quires

a

large

middle class

to

succeed,

even

though

its

members

are

not

suited

to

hold the

highest

offices

themselves,

only

to

serve

in assemblies

and

juries.

In

the

city

according

to

prayer,

by

contrast,

all

citizens will have the

wealth

and leisure

necessary

to

engage

not

only

in

politics

but

also

in

the

pursuit

of

ethical and

theoretical

irtue

(1329al-2).

The

city

f

Book

VII

has the

necessary

material

preconditions

to

guarantee

that all

people

will

be

able

to

hold

political

office,

so

that

the

virtuous will

always

be

in

office.

In

a

polity,

class

divisions,

though

moderated,

will

still

exist,

such that

not

all citizens will

have

the

lei

sure

necessary for ruling let alone for the pursuit of

virtue.

The

city

according

to

prayer

will

have

citizens

of

ethical virtue

capable

of

a

more

robust

phronesis

and

suited

to

hold

office

as

individuals.

In

a

polity,

the

most

that

can

be

guaranteed

is the

presence

of

a

multitude

possessing

military

virtue

and

capable

of

judging

well

when

doing

so

collectively.

Moreover,

the

lower

level

of

leisure

afforded

citizens in

a

polity

prevents

them

from

achieving

the

highest

level

of virtue

possible.

The

excellence

of

the

many

that

justifies

heir

sharing

in

rule

is

not

excellence

simply,

and

so

polity

does,

at

the end of

the

day,

differ

from

the

regime

according

to

prayer.

While it is

possible

for

one

or a

few

to

be

out

standing

in

virtue,

Aristotle

argues

that

it

is

diffi

cult

for

[the

many]

to

be

proficient

ith

a

view

to

virtue

as a

whole,

but

[some

level

of

proficiency

is

possible]

particularly regarding

military

virtue

(1279a39-b2).

To be

sure,

he is far

from certain that

the

one or

few will

be

outstanding

in

virtue;

he

is

more

certain that

the

kind

of

excellence

possessed

by

the

many

is

of

a

more

limited

scope:

They

have

only

a

part

of virtue and

prudence

(1281b4-5),

specif

ically hat f privatepersons (1295a27), thekind of

phronesis

based

on

experience

that

enables

one

to

live

one's

own

life

and

participate

in

politics

only

as

a

member

of

an

assembly. Having

a more

robust

eth

ical virtue

and

a

broader

capacity

for

prudence?the

ability

to

choose

rightly

for

cities and

households

as

well

as

individuals?requires

the

leisure for

study

and

so,

in

turn,

greater

economic

resources

to

facilitate

such

study.

These

resources

are

found,

and

broadly

distributed,

in

the best

regime

simply,

not

existing

regimes,

and

only

there

does

the whole

citizenry

have

the

opportunity

to

live

the

best human

life.

These

differences

in

virtue

and

political capacities

are

trace

able

to

a

difference

in

material

conditions,

which

is

the

difference

ristotle identifies

etween the

simply

best

regime

and

the best

regime

generally

ossible

(1288b21-34).

A

full

understanding

f the

best

regime

simply

requires

a

consideration

of what

Aristotle

believes

is

the

best human

life.

Looking

largely

to

the

Ethics

(148),

Bartlett

argues

that

the

highest

activity

for

Aristotle

is

philosophic contemplation

and

so

neither

polity

nor

any

other

regime

can secure

the

end

of

politics,

i.e.,

the

good

life

(1994, 151-52).

Incorpo

rating

the

one

most

outstanding

human

being,

the

philosopher,

within

a

community

of free

and

equal

37However,

Frank also

contends that

the

constitutional

polity

is

no more

(or less)

possible

than

the

city

of

prayer

(2005, 164)

because of the

difficulty

of

generating

a

strong

and

virtuous

middle

class. This is

no

doubt

problematic

for

Aristotle,

but it is

something

hat

s,

s

Nichols

shows,

potentially

nder

the

control

of

prudent

statesmen.

The

preconditions

necessary

for

the

regime

according

to

prayer,

however,

are

not under the

control

of

statesmen but are rather the material with which theymust work

(1325b35

ff.).

Frank

eventually

oncludes that

not

only

is

polity

like the

city

f

prayer,

t is

also like

the

democracy

of distinction

she

champions

(170).

This content downloaded from 200.16.5.202 on Fri, 10 Oct 2014 00:27:18 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

8/11/2019 Political participation and the best regime.pdf

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/political-participation-and-the-best-regimepdf 15/17

THE PROBLEM

OF POLITY

1419

persons

is

all but

impossible

147).38

Even the

best

regime

of

Book

VII,

Bartlett

argues,

is

flawed,

as

it is

devoted

not to

contemplation

but

to

leisure,

which

he

presents

as no more

than the

closest

imitation

of

the

philosophic

life

that is

possible

within

the

con

finesof the

political

community

148).

Because

the

contemplative

life

is

fundamentally

different

from

the

political

life,

t is

achieved

outside

of

politics,

and

thus even

the

best

law

or

the best

regime ?for

Bartlett,

ingship

(153-54

nl2)?is

only

imperfectly

just

(149).

However, others,

like

Zuckert,

deny

Bartlett's

claim of

a

subordination

of

politics

to

philosophy

in

Aristotle

1983, 185).

The

highest

uman life

s

not

necessarily

devoted

exclusively

to

contemplation,

and

regimes

that allow

citizens

to

engage

in

true

political

activity

ay

contribute oboth the

good

life nd the

development

of

our

rational

capacities

(1333a6-ll).

As

Rorty

argues,

nothing

about the

practical

life

...

prevents

its also

being

contemplative

and

even

en

hanced

by being

contemplative

(1980,377).

Phronesis

and

contemplation

can

be

mutually reinforcing;

the

best

human lifewould include both.

While

a

complete

treatment

of this

issue is

outside

our

scope

at

this

time,

there is

at

least

one

significant

irtue

of

polity

worth

mentioning

in

this

context.

Political communities

are

constituted

on

the

basis of shared reasoning about the just and unjust,

as

well

as

the

good

and bad and

advantageous

and

disadvantageous

(1253al4-18).39

Resolving

the dis

pute

about what is

just,

Aristotle

says,

is

a

task suited

for

political philosophy

(1282b23).

By

including

he

variety

of different claims

to

rule?wealth,

free

birth,

excellence?polity actually

opens

the door for

polit

ical

philosophy

to

play

a

greater

ole

in

the

city

s

the

various claimants

argue

about

justice.

The

attempt

to

resolve

questions

about

justice

goes

beyond

introduc

ing olitical

philosophy;

there s

precedent

n

classical

political philosophy?Plato's Republic being

the

most

notable

example?for

leading

people

to

philosophy

itself

through

investigation

nto

justice

(cf.

olitics

1279b

3).

Even if

the

political

life

s

wholly

subordi

nate to

the

philosophical, olity

provides

not

only

for

a

robust and

inclusive

political

community

but also

one

open

to

philosophy.

An Aristotle who

emphasizes

how

participation

in

political

life contributes

to

the fulfillmentf

human

life

clearly

supports

the

enterprise

of

political

theory.

Moreover,

an

Aristotle

who

justifies

the

participation

of themultitude

in

political

life

can

contribute

to

contemporary

debates within

political

theory.

Indeed,

Aristotle's

very

justification

for the

rule of

certain

multitudes?their

having

certain

virtues,

particularly phronesis?highlights

the

impor

tance

he

places

on

political,

or

civic,

education. Lib

eralism

has

recognized

the

necessity?perhaps

the

unavoidability?of

such

education,

but Aristotle

seems

to

insist that

more

should be done

in

regimes

where the

multitude

is

to

share

in

ruling.40

A

full

treatment

of this issue is

beyond

my scope,

but

I

want

to

raise

one

issue

directly

related

to

my

argument.

Aristotle

believes that

to

participate

in

ruling,

the multitude

must

have

certain virtues.

Assuming

thathe

is

right

bout

the

necessity

f such

traits,

is

he also

right

that

one

way

in

which

this

virtue

might

be

acquired

is

through

ilitary

service?

A

civic

education that

emphasizes military

service

certainly has its dangers; Aristotle, given his discus

sion

of

Sparta,

is

aware

of

this

(1271M-6).

However,

Aristotle's

complaint

about

Sparta

is neither the

extent

of her civic education

nor

its

military

compo

nent,

but rather its exclusive focus

on

courage

and,

moreover,

the

inappropriate

ends

to

which

Sparta

looks

in

preparing

its citizens

for

military

service

(1324b8-25a5,

1333b38

ff.).

A

contemporary

Aristo

telian

approach

to

this issue

might

ask

whether

modern

military

service

can

help

citizens

acquire

phronesis

while

avoiding

the

possible

hazards.

Per

haps

a case can

be made for national service of

a

more

peaceful

kind

playing

the role

military

service

once

did.

In

any

case,

Aristotle's

emphasis

on

the

importance

of

civic education

for

a

regime

in

which

the multitude shares

in

ruling

both

poses

a

challenge

38Bartlett

presents

the

pambasileus

as

Aristotle's

adoption,

albeit

distorted for

political

purposes,

of the

philosopher-king

in

Plato's

Republic

(1994, 148)

and intimates

hat

kingship

is

thus

Aristotle's

preferred

egime

(153-54 nl2).

In

light

f Aristotle's

carefully

eveloped

distinctionbetween

practical

and theoretical

knowledge,

I

find

unconvincing

Bartlett's

suggestion

that there

is

less

to

this

distinction

than

meets

the

eye,

thatAristotle's

invention of

phronesis

is

designed

to

make

morally

virtuous

actions

appear

simply

rational

(154 nl3).

39Aristotle's

emphasis

on

this

shared

reasoning

and

speech

allows

him to be a resource for discourse theories of politics; indeed,

Putnam has

argued

that

Aristotle is

a

better

resource

for such

theories because he has

a

richer

notion

of

the human

good

(1987,

56,

58).

40Collins

focuses

on

the

advantages

of

an

Aristotelian

conception

of

citizenship

over

contemporary

understandings;

see,

in

partic

ular,

chapter

1

and her

conclusion.

However,

Collins's ultimate

concern

is

the

conflict etween the

political

and

philosophic

ways

of

life,

nd she claims

Aristotle

ultimately

refers

he

latter: the

contemplative

r

theoretical

ife,

nd

not

the

political

or

moral

life, s thebest one for human being (2006, 93). Like Bartlett,

Collins

argues

that ristotle

reject[s]

the

political

life ecause it

is

an

obstacle

to

the fullest uman

life

146)

and

so even

thebest

civic

education

is

incomplete

and

must

point

beyond

itself.

This content downloaded from 200.16.5.202 on Fri, 10 Oct 2014 00:27:18 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

8/11/2019 Political participation and the best regime.pdf

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/political-participation-and-the-best-regimepdf 16/17

H20

KEVIN

M.

CHERRY

to

liberal

theory

and

provides

resources

for

thinking

about that

challenge.

Polity,

I

have

argued,

is

the best

regime

generally

possible

because

it is

the

regime

that

represents

the

fullest development of political life that statesmen

can

bring

into

being

without the

material

conditions for

which

we

would

pray.

Although

it

would differ

rom

polity

in

its

material

conditions

and

so

in

the char

acter

of

its

citizens,

the

city

according

to

prayer

resembles

polity

in

its

political

institutions,

most

im

portantly

the

widespread

participation

in

ruling

and

being

ruled

in turn.

Though

it

would

not

necessarily

secure

the

highest

excellences of

human

life,

polity

would

promote

the

kind of discussion and

deliber

ation

that

make

political

life

rewarding

nd

might

lead

to

philosophy.

And

because

partnership

in

de

liberation about the

just

and

advantageous

and

in

ruling

and

being

ruled is

what

constitutes

a

polis,

it

makes

sense

that

polity?the particular

regime

in

which

rule

and

deliberation

are

most

held

in

common?

bears the

name

of the

genus

politeia,

the

character

istics

of which

it

represents

inmost

developed

form.

Acknowledgments

Versions

of

this

paper

were

presented

at

the 2007

meetingsof theSocietyfor ncientGreekPhilosophy

and the

Northeast

Political

Science

Association,

where

I

benefited from

comments

by

Thanassis

Samaras

and

Kathryn

Sensen.

Jeffrey

Church,

E.A.

Goerner,

and

Catherine

Zuckert

provided helpful

comments

on

this and earlier drafts.

Manuscript

submitted

6

February

2008

Manuscript

accepted orpublication

16

November

2008

References

Aquinas,

Thomas.

1981.

Summa

Theologica.

Trans.

Fathers of

the

English

Dominican Province.

Allen,

TX:

Christian Classics.

Aristotle.

1984. The

Politics.

Trans. Carnes

Lord.

Chicago:

University

of

Chicago

Press.

Aristotle.

1986.

Politica. Ed. W. D. Ross. Oxford:

Oxford

University

Press.

Aristotle.

1988.

Ethica Nicomachea. Ed.

I.

Bywater.

Oxford:

Oxford

University

Press.

Aristotle.

2002.

Nicomachean Ethics. Trans.

Joseph

Sachs.

New

buryport,

MA: Focus.

Barnes,

Jonathan.

1995.

Metaphysics.

In

The

Cambridge

Companion

to

Aristotle, ed. Jonathan Barnes,

New

York:

Cambridge University

Press,

66-108.

Bartlett,

Robert

C. 1994.

Aristotle's

Science

of the

Best

Regime.

American

Political

Science Review

88

(1):

143-55.

Bates,

Clifford

Angell,

Jr.

2003.

Aristotle's

'Best

Regime':

Kingship,

Democracy,

and

the

Rule

of

Law.

Baton

Rouge:

Louisiana

State

University

Press.

Bluhm,

William

T. 1962.

The Place of the

'Polity'

in

Aristotle's

Theory

of

the

Ideal State.

Journal

f

Politics

24:

743-53.

Bodeiis, Richard. 1993. The Political Dimensions of Aristotle's

Ethics.

Trans.

Jan

Edward Garrett.

Albany:

State

University

of

New York

Press.

Cherry,

Kevin M.

and E. A.

Goerner. 2006.

Does

Aristotle's

Polis

Exist

'by

Nature'?

History of

Political

Thought

27

(4):

563-85.

Collins,

Susan D. 2002.

The

Problem of

Law

in

Aristotle's

Politics:

A

Response

to

Quentin

Taylor. Interpretation

29:

261-64.

Collins,

Susan D.

2006.

Aristotle

nd the

Rediscovery

f

Citizen

ship.

New

York:

Cambridge

University

Press.

Cooper,

John.

1980.

Aristotle

on

Friendship.

In

Essays

on

Aristotle's

Ethics,

ed.

Amelie

Oksenberg Rorty.

Berkley

and

Los

Angeles:

University

of

California

Press,

301-40.

Cooper,

John

M.

1999. Plato's Statesman

and

Politics. Boston

Area

Colloquium

in Ancient

Philosophy

XIII,

eds.

John

J.

Clearzy

and

Gary

M.

Gurtler,

S.

J.

Leiden,

Netherlands:

E.

J.

Brill,

71-104.

Davis,

Michael.

1996.

The Politics

of

Philosophy:

A

Commentary

on

Aristotle's

Politics.

Lanham,

MD:

Rowman

&

Littlefield.

Frank,

Jill.

005.

A

Democracy

of

istinction.

Chicago:

University

of

Chicago

Press.

Irwin,

Terence. 1999.

Aristotle's

Nicomachean Ethics.

Translated

with

notes

and

commentary.

Indianapolis,

IN:

Hackett.

Johnson,

Curtis. 1988.

Aristotle's

Polity:

Mixed

or

Middle

Constitution?

History

of

Political

Thought

9

(2):

189-204.

Kahn,

Charles

H. 1990.

The Normative Structure of

Aristotle's

Politics.

Aristoteles

Politik,

ed. Gunther

Patzig. Gottingen:

Vandenhoeck

&

Ruprecht,

369-84.

Kraut,

Richard.

2002.

Aristotle:

Political

Philosophy.

New

York:

Oxford

University

Press.

Mulgan,

Richard.

1977.

Aristotle's

Political

Theory:

An

Intro

duction

for

Students

of

Political

Theory.

New

York:

Oxford

University

Press.

Newman,

W.

L.

1902.

The Politics

of

Aristotle.

Oxford:

Oxford

University

Press.

Four volumes.

Reprinted

by

Sandpiper

Press,

2000.

Nichols,

Mary

P.

1992.

Citizens and Statesmen:

A

Study

of

Aristotle's Politics.

Savage,

MD:

Rowan

and

Littlefield.

Putnam,

Hilary.

1987. The

Many

Faces

of

Realism.

LaSalle,

IL:

Open

Court.

Robinson,

Richard. 1995. Politics:

Books

III

and

IV.

Translated

with

introduction

and

comments.

New

York: Oxford

Uni

versity

Press.

Rorty,

Amelie

Oksenberg.

The

Place of

Contemplation

in

Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics.

Essays

on

Aristotle's

Ethics,

ed. Amelie

Oksenberg

Rorty.

Berkley

and

Los

Angeles:

University

of California

Press,

377-94.

Ruderman,

Richard

S.

1997.

Aristotle

and

the

Recovery

of

Political

Judgment.

merican

Political

ScienceReview

91

(2):

409-20.

Salkever,

Stephen.

2007.

Whose

Prayer?

The Best

Regime

of

Book

7

and

the Lessons

of Aristotle's

Politics.

Political

Theory

35 (1): 29-46.

Samaras,

Thanassis.

2007.

Aristotle's

Politics:

The

City

of

Book

Seven and the

Question

of

Ideology.

Classical

Quarterly

57

(1):

77-89.

This content downloaded from 200.16.5.202 on Fri, 10 Oct 2014 00:27:18 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

8/11/2019 Political participation and the best regime.pdf

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/political-participation-and-the-best-regimepdf 17/17

THE

PROBLEM OF POLITY

1421

Sidgwick, Henry.

1892.

Aristotle's Classification of Forms of

Government.

The

Classical

Review

6

(4):

141-44.

Simpson,

Peter L.

Phillips.

1998.

A

Philosophical

Commentary

on

the

Politics

of

Aristotle.

Chapel

Hill:

University

of

North

Carolina

Press.

Strauss,

Leo.

1964. The

City

and Man.

Chicago:

Chicago

Uni

versity Press.

Taylor,

Quentin

P.

2002.

Public

Deliberation and

Popular

Government in

Aristotle's Politics.

Interpretation

29:

241-60.

Vander

Waerdt,

P. A.

1985.

Kingship

and

Philosophy

in

Aristotle's

Best

Regime.

Phronesis

30:

249-73.

Vander

Waerdt,

P.

A.

1985b.

The

Political Intention

of

Aristotle's Moral

Philosophy.

Ancient

Philosophy

5: 77-89.

Waldron,

Jeremy.

995.

The

Wisdom

of

the

Multitude:

Some

Reflections

on

Book

3,

Chapter

11

ofAristotle's

Politics

Political

Theory

23

(4):

563-84.

Yack,

Bernard.

1993.

The Problems

of

a

Political Animal.

Berkeley,

CA:

University

of California

Press.

Zuckert,

Catherine

H. 1983.

Aristotle

on

the

Limits

and

Satisfactions of Political Life. Interpretation 11: 185-206.

Kevin

M.

Cherry

is

assistant

professor

of

politics,

Saint

Anselm

College,

Manchester,

NH

03102.