political opposition in african countries the cases of kenya, namibia, zambia and zimbabwe_...

8/14/2019 Political Opposition in African Countries The Cases of Kenya, Namibia, Zambia and Zimbabwe_ Melber_Kamete_Hu

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D i s c u s s i o n P a P e r 3 7

Political Opposition in African Countries

The Cases of Kenya, Namibia, Zambiaand Zimbabwe

KaroliNa HulTersTrm

amiN Y. KameTe

HeNNiNg melber

Cpd y Hnnn m

ndk aktttt, uppl 2007


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Indexing terms:Political oppositionPoliticsDemocratizationEthnicityLocal governmentPolitical partiesSWAPOCase studiesKenyaNamibiaZambiaZimbabwe

Language editing: Elaine AlmnISSN 1104-8417ISBN 978-91-7106-587-2 The authors and Nordiska Arikainstitutet 2007Printed in Sweden by Elanders Gotab AB, Stockholm, 2007


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Preace 5

Karolina HulterstrmThe Logic o Ethnic Politics

Elite Perceptions about the Role o Ethnicityin Kenyan and Zambian Party Politics 7

Amin Y. KameteO Jinxes and Blessings

The Opposition in ZimbabwesUrban Local Governance 39

Henning MelberSWAPO is the Nation, and the Nation Is SWAPO

Government and Opposition in a Dominant

Party State. The Case o Namibia 61


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Tis Discussion Paper publishes three revised papers originally pre-

sented in Session 1 o the Research Committee on Comparative Socio-

logy at the XVI World Congress o Sociology, which was organised

by the International Sociological Association (ISA) at the end o July

2006 in Durban, South Arica. Te original initiative or this panel

on Te Role and Meaning o Political Opposition in Sub-Saharan

Arica: A Sociological Perspective was taken by Emil Uddhammarrom the Department o Government at Uppsala University in collab-

oration with Jean-Pascal Daloz. I wish to thank them both or thereby

paving the way or what ultimately matured into this printed result.

Tis is among the last publications o the project Liberation and

Democracy in Southern Arica (LiDeSA), which was operational

at the Institute between 2001 and 2006. Te research network has

during the period o its existence, produced several Discussion Papers,

Current Arican Issues and a book published by NAI. Further books,

many more articles and a variety o other scholarly as well as popular

writings were also published elsewhere.

While the LiDeSA project is drawing to a close, the relevance o

the subjects touched upon within its ramework continues to demand

attention. Te commitment to urther emancipation o the people

not only but also in the context o (Southern) Arica remains a

priority on the agenda o all concerned about true liberation who

aim through their own work in whichever way to contribute towards

urther decolonisation all over this world.

Henning Melber

October 2006

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Th Lg f eth Plt

Elite Perceptions about the Role of Ethnicity in Kenyan

and Zambian Party Politics

Karolina Hulterstrm

Ethnic politics is in the minds o most people no doubt associated with dierentkinds o democratic constraints.1 Political scientists have devoted considerable eortto explaining why ethnic mobilisation is likely to spill over into violent conict(Varshney, 2002; Glickman, 1998; Fearon and Laitin, 1996; Forbes, 1997; Hardin,

1995; Horowitz, 1985); how institutions in plural societies ought to be structuredin order to mitigate such perverse eects o ethnic mobilisation (Hadenius, 2002;Rule, 2000; Sisk, 1996; Glickman 1995; Horowitz, 1993; Lijphart, 1977; Rustow,1970); and increasingly also in critically analysing whetherethnic mobilisation isin act inherently more conict prone than other orms o mobilisation (Chandra,2001; Widmalm, 1997). Apart rom these three research themes concerned withthe consequences o mobilisation, a ourth body o literature consists o attempts toexplain why ethnic identities are mobilised in the frst place (Bates, 2000; Mozaar,1995; Esman, 1994; Newman, 1991; Horowitz, 1985): under what circumstancesdo individuals mobilise along ethnic cleavages? Within it, this literature contains anumber o studies that ocus specifcally on the causes o one, oten well-elaboratedaspect o ethnic politics. For example, Chandra (2003) and Posner (2002) bring tolight dierent determinants o varying levels oethnic voting. Mozaar et al. (2003)show that both institutions and structure (in the orm o ethnic cleavages) shape the

party system in plural societies.Two aspects o ethnicity and politics however appear to be insufciently explored

in the political science literature. Firstly there is little study ocused on systematic

accounts o non-violent ethnic politics.2 A considerable number o ethnic relationsare clearly not violent, and several societies bear witness to the act that competitivepolitics based on ethnic afliation may be durable, peaceul and open to democra-tisation. The existing investigation o such polities have tended to explore the par-

1. Here ethnicity reers to a consciousness o a group identity built around an ascriptive categorydissimilar to others in terms o objective criteria including language, customs, religion or anyother category normally acquired at birth or through early socialisation. This defnition is elabo-rated rom Chandra, 2002:3 & Brass, 1991:19.

2. Several studies that attempt to explain a specifc element o what we might call ethnic mobilisa-tion (Chandra, 2001; Mozaar et al., 2003; Posner, 2003; Posner, 2002), oer rich conceptuali-sations o specifc aspects o politicised ethnicity ethnic voting, ethnic parties or party systems but there are ew studies that oer a comprehensive conceptual ramework, capturing all theexpected maniestations, o peaceul politicised ethnicity. For an exception, See Hulterstrm,2004.

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K a r o l i n a H u l t e r s t r m

ticipatory side o politics (i.e. mobilisation) rather than oer a complete rameworkor expected maniestations o politicised ethnicity. Secondly, while we empiricallystudy the behavioural maniestations o ethnic politics (how people vote, partiesmobilise, elites align etc), we tend to neglect (or simply theorise about) the atti-tudinal patterns that sustain (or undermine) the behaviours labelled ethnic mo-bilisation or ethnic politics.3 The purpose o this chapter is to contribute to boththese neglected aspects. The chapter explores perceptions and attitudes regardingthe inuence o ethnicity on politics in two predominantly peaceul polities charac-terised by varying degrees o maniested ethnic politics.

Apart rom the relative lack o previous examination, there are a couple o reasonsor studying attitudinal patterns associated with varying degrees o ethnic politics.Firstly, identiying a potentially cohesive set o belies about ethnicity is important

or the later endeavour o explaining behaviour associated with ethnic politics. Per-ceptions among political actors are essential in order to illustrate how, and explain

why, ethnic politics is sustained or dismantled. Secondly, and linked to the frstpoint, understanding belies and perceptions is necessary or institutional theoryin that it constitutes the basis or the incentive structures on which institutionalengineering builds. I, or example, the ambition is to create electoral incentivesthat diminish party ragmentation in plural societies, then one needs to understandhow political actors themselves perceive the driving orces behind such centriu-

gal developments. Exposing how political actors themselves perceive o ethnicityas enabling or constraining their political action is thus a principal ambition o thisstudy.

A second ambition is to detect attitudes on the role o ethnicity with regard to amore comprehensive notion o politics than that normally associated with (ethnic)mobilisation. Rather than limiting the examination o attitudes to a particular man-iestation o an ethnic cleavage, such as ethnic voting, or even to dierent aspects omobilisation, the analysis includes both the input and output side o politics. Inorder to disclose a comprehensive belie pattern on the role o ethnicity in politics,the study seeks to capture perceptions about several o the core actors in democraticpolitics: voters,partiesand thegovernment. Ethnic politics is thus understood as themaniestation o an ethnic cleavage with regard to both political participation andpolicy making.

To clariy the purpose o the study urther, it can be said to examine how eliteactors believe that ethnicity aects the government, political parties and their elite,as well as voters in an attempt to identiy a cohesive notion o the role o ethnicityin politics in Kenya and Zambia.

3. Larger surveys that have included some questions on ethnic identity and political behaviour mayoer clues about such a belie pattern. See e.g. the Arobarometer. Studies with interviews ontopics related to ethnic politics have been carried out by among others Inkinen (2003); Chandra(2001) and Mattes and Gouws (1998).


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T h e L o g i c o f E t h n i c P o l i t i c s

The most comprehensive attitudinal pattern with regard to ethnicity is presum-ably gained through surveys capturing the attitudes o (a representative sample o)citizens. What role do citizens ascribe to ethnicity in relation to government policy,voting behaviour and the support and leadership divisions in the party system? Sucha large-scale survey is nevertheless oten not an option. An alternative is oeredthrough the study o the belies o individuals that or some reason are particularly

well placed to oer insights on the central cleavages in politics. As was once pointedout by a well-known American political scientist, some people are much more inter-ested, much more involved, and much more inuential in public aairs than theirellows (Putnam, 1973:2). The political elite, the makers o politics, are obviouslysuch people. The argument or studying elite belies is twoold. Firstly, political eliteactors are placed right in the middle o the political process. Politics is their game

and they consequently have a comprehension o how that game works that widelyexceeds that o most people. They are urthermore in this case ound at the nationallevel, which means that they have the chance o a much broader, nation-wide viewthan most. Secondly, politicians are not only well placed observers o politics, theyare the makers o politics. They inuence to varying degrees depending on theirposition but no doubt more than the rest o us how the political game unctions.In short, the political elite is better inormed and more inuential than the averagecitizen is with regard to the role o ethnicity in politics. Elite actors are the theme

o this study.

T pl vtgt lt tttd

Attitudes on ethnic politics were investigated through a series o interviews withKenyan and Zambian elite actors: Cabinet Ministers, Assistant Ministers, Memberso Parliament or party executives at the national level.4 The interviews with politicalelite actors were supplemented by interviews with a reerence group in bothcountries. The reerence group consisted o political analysts rom the University

o Nairobi and the University o Zambia, dierent research institutes, politicalreporters rom dailies, and senior ofcials rom non-governmental organisations

working with policy issues.5 The purpose o the reerence group interviews wasto partly test the interpretations o the elite interviews. Politicians are normallyvery experienced interviewees and actors accustomed to pushing their own (notalways obvious to the outsider) agenda. The discussions with individuals with vastexperience o analysing the specifc political settings were, thus both an attempt to

4. See the reerences or a complete list o those interviewed.5. See the reerences or a complete list o the individuals constituting the reerence group in each

country. It should be pointed out that the reerence group is imagined in the sense that theinterviews with its participants were conducted individually. No group interviews were con-ducted.


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improve the interpretation o elite responses and an additional perspective on therole o ethnicity in politics in the two countries.

The sample o respondents was strategic in the sense that it was intended toensure a spread across political parties, between incumbents and the opposition, andto some extent dierent ethnic groups.6 A total o 69 Members o Parliament andparty executives were interviewed, 35 in Kenya and 34 in Zambia. The reerencegroup consisted o ten people in Kenya and eleven in Zambia. The interviews withpoliticians were carried out in November and December 1999 and in the periodbetween October 2001 and January 2002. The interviews with the reerence group

were conducted during the period o December 2002 and January 2003.7

Bvl tt t plt K d ZbWe know rom previous studies that the two countries vary signifcantly with regardto the extent to which ethnicity aects the actual behaviour o voters, politicalparties, party leadership and policy makers (i.e. the government).

In Kenya a very strong relationship between ethnic belonging and voter supportexists. In other words, Kenyan voters tend to bloc vote with their ethnic group orthe same party or presidential candidate. Furthermore, a vast majority o Kenyansbelong to bloc voting ethnic groups. In Zambia the number o bloc voting ethnic

groups is ewer and the proportion o the population belonging to these groups ismuch smaller than in Kenya. Hence, ethnicity does aect voters in both countries,but it does so to a signifcantly a greater extent in Kenya than in Zambia (Hulter-strm, 2004:7594).8

6. It should be pointed out that there is a heavy bias in the Kenya sample towards members o theopposition parties. Members o Parliament and party executives o the opposition proved sub-stantially more willing to partake in the interviews and despite a deliberate eort to correct this

bias it still persists. O the 35 interviews carried out with politicians in Kenya, six were held withKANU Ministers or Members o Parliament. An additional our interviews were held with Min-isters or Members o Parliament rom KANUs allies, the NDP. The NDP supported the KANUGovernment on many issues in Parliament ater the 1997 elections, and ofcially crossed theoor in March 2002. As there were quite probably attitudinal dierences between the oppositionand the KANU Government with regard to ethnic politics, or at least to the willingness to coneron such attitudes, this bias is something that should be kept in mind throughout the analysis.

7. The interviews were semi-structured and took between 40 minutes and one and a hal hours.There are some dierences in the interviews as the respondents were to a certain extent permittedto inuence the direction o the discussions.

8. Few studies make the distinction made explicitly here between voting behaviour and the cohe-

siveness o parties. For studies on voting, parties or elections in Kenya and Zambia, see: Mute-sa, orthcoming; Norris and Mattes, 2003; Carey, 2002; Cowen and Kanyinga, 2002; Gould,2002; Omolo, 2002; Burnell, 2001; Hornsby, 2001; Rutten et al., 2001; Bratton and Posner,1999; du Toit, 1999; Ajulu, 1998; Barkan and Ngethe, 1998; Osei-Hwedei, 1998; Reynolds,1999; Throup and Hornsby, 1998; Burnell, 1997; Ndegwa, 1997; Simutanyi, 1997; Rule, 1996,von Doepp, 1996 and Barkan, 1993.


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Tbl 1. et vtg t K d Zb lt 1991, 1992, 1996 d 1997

eThnic GrouP

Kenya

Pt Bl Vtd tK elt

eThnic GrouP

ZamBia

Pt Bl Vtd tZb elt

1992 1997 1991 1996

Kikuyu DP; Fd-a;-Kanu

DP; sDP; -Kanu Bemba mmD

Kalenjin Kanu; - DP Kanu Inamwanga

Kisii Kaonde nP; -mmD

Luhya Fd-K ForD-K;-DP

Lozi -mmD

Luo Fd-K;

-Kanu

nDP;

-Kanu;

Lunda-Luvale nP

Masaai Kanu; Mambwe

Mijikenda Nyanja uniP;

-mmD

Turkana Kanu Kanu Tonga

Tumbuka uniP;

-mmD

s: hltt, 2004:85 & 89.

all gp t tbl llwd b pltl pt gp tt bl vtd tt ptl pt. Bl vtg

dtd t lt 25 p t t gp vtg t pt. (stttll t tt gp d pt

w ldd w p t ptl gp d dd t ppt ptl

pt b t lt 0.25 dtt lvl.)

Maniestations o an ethnic cleavage in the party systems reveal an even clearer dis-tinction between the two countries. All, but one, o the major parties in Kenya havea highly ethnically cohesive voter support. KANU is the only party that is betterdescribed as a multiethnic rather than an ethnic party.9 The opposite is true aboutZambian parties. Only one party, in one o the two Zambian elections (the small

Agenda or Zambia) gains ethnically cohesive support (Hulterstrm, 2004:95109).

The ethnic cleavage is similarly more pronounced in Kenyan policy making than

in Zambian.10

Kenyan governments have consequently taken part in ethnic politics,most likely through ethnically biased resource distribution and certainly through

9. The defnition o an ethnic party used here is that o a party that receives at least 67 per cent oits support rom a single ethnic group. This concept o ethnic parties has been elaborated roma concept introduced by Rose & Urwin (Rose & Urwin, 1969). The analyses on which thisconclusion is based were however made on ecological data. Hence the exact conclusion to bedrawn is that at least two thirds o support o parties came rom a geographical area in which aparticular ethnic group constituted at least 75 per cent o the population. The correct conclusion

would thus be that a majority o Kenyan parties were ethno-regionally cohesive (Hulterstrm,2004:95109).10. Other studies ocused on policy making in Kenya and Zambia, with varying interest in the role

o ethnicity are: Ajulu, 2002; Atieno-Odhiambo, 2002; Chikulo, 2000 ; Berman, 1998; Grindle,1996; Ihonvbere, 1996; Maipose, 1996; Ngunyi, 1996; Kees van Donge, 1995; Barkan, 1994;Momba, 1993; Widner, 1992.


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an ethnically inclined appointment policy. The latter conclusion is clearly illustratedin the table below.

Tbl 2. et pt K bt 19641998

eThnic GrouP 1964 1973 1983 1993 1998

Pp. p t m Tt m Tt m Tt m Tt m Tt

Kk. 21 33 31 32 32 18 28 4 11 4 8

L 14 0 9 11 11 14 11 13 15 15 15

L 12 33 26 11 14 14 14 4 9 0 4

Kl. 12 0 3 5 8 14 16 17 16 23 24

Kb. 11 7 10 11 14 5 7 17 14 15 11

K 6 7 7 11 11 0 2 9 7 8 8

m 5 7 4 5 3 5 3 9 7 4 6mjk. 5 0 0 5 3 5 5 4 2 4 2

ot 7 14 14 10 8 28 18 21 19 28 29

s: hltt, 2004: 118.

m t p t cbt mt wl Tt t p t bt cbt mt d Pt

st t ptv Gvt.

In Zambia the conclusions about policy-making are less straightorward. Thereare signs o a rather dramatic overrepresentation in appointments o certain ethnicgroups. This can however not, as in Kenya, be explained as an eect o those control-

ling appointment power (i.e. State House) avouring their own ethnic community.

Tbl 3. et pt Zb bt 19641996

eThnic GrouP 1964 1973 1983 1991 1996

Pp. p t m Tt m Tt m Tt m Tt m Tt

B* 38 33 38 38 40 29 26 39 28 37 37

Tg 10 17 9 13 13 5 8 5 9 11 7

Lz 7 25 21 13 7 14 11 14 16 11 11

nj. 19 25 17 17 9 10 17 14 20 5 8

Tb. 3 0 13 4 17 10 9 10 17 11 11

K. 2 0 0 0 0 10 5 10 5 5 5

n. 1 0 0 0 0 5 10 5 3 11 9

L** 3 0 0 4 2 10 6 5 5 0 0

Lvl. 2 0 0 0 7 10 5 0 2 0 0

Ld 2 0 0 13 7 0 0 0 0 11 13

s: hltt, 2004:124.

m t cbt mt wl Tt t bt cbt mt d Pt st t p-

tv Gvt.

* Bb ld Lb.** Lj l ld il d Tkl.

12


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Accusations about biased resource distribution are not supported by data during theKaunda or Chiluba presidencies (Hulterstrm, 2004:111152).11

et plt a t lvg td ptpt d pl

As indicated earlier the concept o ethnic politics applied in this study goes beyondthe commonly used concept o ethnic mobilisation and aims at capturing manies-tation o an ethnic cleavage with regard to both the participatory side o politics andpolicy making (that is, the output side o politics). Six themes, briey introducedbelow, were used to structure both the interviews and the analysis. They aim atcapturing both the cognitive and normative perceptions concerning how ethnicityaects the behaviour o the three actors o interest: voters, parties (and their leader-

ship) and policy makers (or government).1. Belies about ethnicity generally in politics.

Respondents were asked to discuss whether ethnicity inuences politics generallyin Kenya and Zambia, and i so how.

2. Belies about the behaviour o voters.The questions under this theme dealt with to what extent ethnic groups areunderstood to bloc vote; to what extent voters are perceived to shun candidatesor political parties led by candidates rom other ethnic groups than their own;

to what extent it, as a consequence, is possible or parties and presidential can-didates to win nation-wide support.

3. Belies about political parties and party elites.Focus here was on how ethnic (in the sense o how strongly associated with anethnic community) parties are thought to be; what are the main distinguishingeatures between political parties; what are the main reasons or politicians toalign with a particular party; and how does ethnicity aect the collaborationbetween political parties as well as between political leaders?

4. Belies about government policy.This theme aimed at capturing whether past and present governments in Kenya

and Zambia are seen as partakers or actors in ethnic politics. This was discussed in

relation to both appointment policy and policies on the distribution of resources.

Two different aspects of distribution were pondered: a) whether the respondent felt

that the distribution of (particular) governments was or had been biased towards

certain ethnic groups (or other societal groups) and b) whether the respondent felt

that ethnic balancing (leading to either proportional or disproportional distribu-

tion) was or had been practised by past and present governments.

11. It should be stressed however that analysing and drawing conclusions about the distribution opublic resources is rather difcult considering the lack o reliable public statistics. More analyses,using better data, are needed or reliable conclusions to be drawn.


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5. Evaluative attitudes regarding the desirability and legitimacy o ethnic politics.Normative perceptions are important in order to understand why perceptionsabout reality do not always correspond with observed maniestations o reality.

A amiliarity with the normative belies about ethnic politics makes it easierto interpret the cognitive views on the subject.12 As an illustration, it seems aplausible assumption that what one perceives as normatively desirable, or con-versely undesirable, will inuence how one perceives reality (Hardin, 1995:4142). I we want to use perceptions in order to better understand behaviour, itserves us well to take evaluative attitudes into account. Furthermore the experi-ence rom this investigation is that it can be rather difcult to empirically dis-tinguish cognitive and evaluative attitudes. Both kinds o norms make up theunderlying belies people possess with regard to ethnicity and politics, and even

i the two are untangled they appear to deeply inuence one another. Conse-quently, including both in our analysis allows us to draw a more comprehensivepicture o the belies surrounding ethnicity and politics. The questions underthis theme were expected to capture the extent to which dierent maniestationso ethnic politics (e.g. the perception o ethnic interests, ethnic bloc voting, eth-nically inclined distribution) are viewed as desirable or not on the one hand,and legitimate or not on the other.

6. Normative attitudes towards ethnic balancing.

Finally attitudes towards the practice o ethnic balancing were probed. Respond-ents were asked whether they viewed it as a legitimate and desirable practice, ornot.

elt ppt bt t plt K d Zb

The perceptions about ethnicity and politics discussed in the interviews togetherclearly make up distinct sets o belies in the two countries. These belies will be

summarised in two dierent accounts o the dierent logic guiding politics in thetwo countries under study. By discussing the two countries one ater another somecomparability may indeed be lost, but on the other hand it allows us to accentu-ate the possible mechanisms linking the perceptions o dierent aspects o ethnicpolitics. It turns out that the dierent maniestations are not isolated elements, atleast not in the minds o the countries elite actors, but rather parts o a larger logicthat guides politics. The account o how these aspects interact is valuable in at-tempting to illustrate and explain why ethnic politics is sustained or dismantled.

12. The distinction between cognitive and normative/evaluative belies is intended to capture theis ought duality.


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The Kenyan ethnic pragmatist

Ethnicity is clearly the main conict dimension in Kenyan politics. In the under-standing o the Kenyan elite, ethnicity is the essence around which politics revolved.

This is maniested through a number o belies and attitudes, and taken togetherthey give rise to a very explicit logic o politics. The ollowing is an account o thatlogic as it came orth in the interviews.

Even though ethnic politics originates rom a selfsh political elite and in acthas no or little meaning to ordinary people, wananchi, electoral politics in Kenyaconsists o highly cohesive bloc voting ethnic groups.13 Kenyans generally vote orthe same party as their ethnic kin, and particularly so i a contending party has arepresentative rom their own community as a presidential candidate. The local-man syndrome is hence strong and a credible presidential candidate can more orless count on the support o his or her entire community. In the unlikely event thatan aspiring Member o Parliament chooses to break this compartmentalisation oparty politics by running or a party with a presidential candidate rom anothercommunity, the price to pay is hety.

[M]y environment was absolutely hostile because it was part o what is known asKANU zones. KANU zones are mainly the Rit Valley which is the homeland othe President [i.e Moi]. Among the Kalenjin there is only KANU and they lookedupon me as a traitor, since I am a Kalenjin who has gone to the opposition. This is

where politics become tribal ; you do not have the independent mind to choose whatyou want. It is bloc voting. This tribe is voting or so and so because they belong totheir tribe. So a Kalenjin rom Rit Valley who takes up a party associated with theKikuyu rom Central Province will not fnd it easy. How are you going to explainwhy you have decided to betray your people by going opposite? they aske (Seii,22-11-2001)

Only i more than one presidential candidate rom the community stands does theethnic groups vote risk being divided. From this practice it ollows that ethnic

groups not only bloc vote but do so or a party exclusive to them. Where such avoting behaviour is not possible because no candidate rom the community stands people instead vote selectively in the sense that the community systematicallyshuns parties led and supported by ethnic groups perceived as antagonists o thecommunity.

As hinted above, the cause o this ethnicised voting behaviour is the elite itsel.The mobilisation strategy and leadership style o the past decades have taught theKenyan electorate that only by having one o your own in State House can thecommunity access power and patronage. Thus every ethnic community needs

13. It might be pointed out here that most o the respondents in the reerence group endow local po-litical leaders with enormous inuence over the voting behaviour o their ellow kinsmen. As oneinterviewee put it people vote the way their lite tell them. The level o legitimacy and control omost leaders is almost hypnotical and close to worship (Owiti, 13-12-2002)


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its own presidential candidate and party to sustain the hopes o controlling StateHouse. The idea o one community, one party is now so entrenched that it hasto a large extent cornered the very elite that once ensured that it evolved. Even

where the will to co-operate with leaders rom other communities exists, the es-tablishment o multiethnic parties is prevented by ear among the elite that theirethnicised voters would then abandon them. There is a strong belie that steppingdown rom presidential ambitions, or other grand ambitions, in order to work withleaders rom other communities is very risky, not to say suicidal. The compart-mentalised competition in Kenyan elections implies that leaders only compete orsupport within their own ethnic group. Hence, there is little to win rom beingmoderate and collaborating with outsiders. On the contrary, stepping down entailsan immediate danger o being made redundant, as it would very likely mean that a

ellow kinsman picks up the presidential banner and carries instead the aspirationso the community. The ethnic group would then no doubt switch their support tothe latter. As an illustration the suggestion that a Luo Member o Parliament shouldtry to convince his electorate to vote or a Kikuyu presidential candidate was met

with the candid comment: It would be suicidal at this stage to even try to do that.(Ochoudho, 14-12-2001)

It should be stressed that this voting behaviour which saw a unifed minoritybeat a ractionalised majority in two consecutive elections during the 1990s is not

seen frst and oremost as an act o a deceived and oolish electorate. Rather, given thecircumstances, both leaders and ollowers act according to what is viewed as a airlyrational strategy. The compartmentalised character o electoral competition makesit rational or most politicians not to co-operate, as a strategy o co-operation wouldalmost certainly guarantee a loss. Bearing the communitys presidential ambitionsmay not take you to State House, but it will most likely get you into parliament.

These people bear the presidential aspirations o their entire community. Steppingdown would defnitely weaken their grip on their community. Someone else rom

the community would steal their role i he instead declared presidential ambitions.(Hassan, 12-12-2001)

Voters want to access state patronage and the only way o being sure o that is tohave your own ethnic kin in State House. So even i your local man may have littlechance o winning there is no point in voting or someone else. The best that can bedone is to vote or your local man and hope or a miraculous victory.

Because o the way things have been handled in Kenya in terms o distribution oresources, people have been pushed to think that unless you have a person in there

[i.e. in State House], you will not be able to get resources back to your people. ... Sopeople will want to have their own [ethnic kin] there, to be able to get jobs, alloca-tion o resources etc. (Katuku, 21-11-2001)

Furthermore, this strategy is advanced by the lack o reliable inormation about the


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popularity o candidates. The popularity o the candidate supported by everyone inthe voters surroundings will no doubt be exaggerated, while the support o othercandidates rom other parts o the country will be similarly undervalued.

[I] you [as an MP] are in a party that people think can never win [the presidency]then they will not support you. And since most people live a very local lie with littleunderstanding o what is going on in other areas, they think that the presidentialcandidate supported in their own region is the only one that stands a chance owinning. In Meru they have no idea that Kibaki isnt popular in Luo-Nyanza. So[similarly] you cant convince [the Meru] to support you on a NDP ticket becauseRaila isnt popular among their neighbours so they think he has no support. Lead-ers are caught up in this logic and it thereore works as a sel-reinorcing prophecy.(Murungi, 20-11-2001)

Consistent with the voting behaviour described, ideological dierences are o littleconsequence in Kenyan party politics. Neither party afliation o individual politi-cians nor inter-party co-operation in parliament is to any large extent decided byideological concerns. A politicians party afliation is instead primarily determinedby his or her ethnic belonging (and at times by more personal relations and an-tipathies). Party politics is all about representing the interest o your community.14Moreover, electoral success is by and large determined by afliation to the rightparty in the politicians own region. The right party is naturally the party led

by one o the communitys own members. Even the most popular parliamentarycandidate will have trouble being elected i he or she stands on the ticket o a partyassociated and led by another ethnic community.

There are no ideological dierences between Kenyan parties. So we dont joindierent parties because we believe more in the one party than the other or evenbecause we believe more in the leadership o our party. Look at XX, he doesnt re-spect his party president at all, but he cant join any other party i he wants to cometo parliament. (Nyagah, 11-121-2001)

The behaviour o both leaders and voters ensures that there are very ew, i any,national parties, parties with support in all ethnic communities, in Kenya. Someparties might be labelled multiethnic as they bring together the support o severalethnic groups. But, they still have selective support in the sense that they have nosupport at all among many o the countrys communities. Most parties, however,have even more exclusive support, which may not cross any ethnic boundaries at all.Such exclusive parties only have the support o the party presidents ethnic group.The personalised character o Kenyan parties renders the party president an eective

marker, indicating the ethnic afliation o the party. Consequently a party can havea very clear ethnic afliation despite never having contested an election. The notiono exclusive bloc voting and the role o the party leader as ag bearer predetermines

14. E.g. Ngunyi, 18-12-2002.


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the ethnic connotation o parties even i they are new in Kenya.There seem to be very ew limitations to inter-party co-operation in parlia-

ment apart rom personal animosities and a widespread distrust between KANUand the opposition. A diverging ethnic voter basis certainly does notconstitute ahindrance to collaboration. Hence, while inter-party divides make inter-party co-operation impossible beore elections, they seem to be o little importance once theparties have won their seats in parliament. I it increases the communitys chances oaccessing patronage to work with others then it would seem almost an obligation orparty leaders to engage in such an alliance regardless o the antagonism that mayhave existed between the groups beore the elections. A Minister rom the NDP incoalition with KANU explains this point very succinctly:

There are no ideological dierences between Kenyan parties so why be in oppositioni it means more possibilities to develop your area i you co-operate [with the KANUGovernment]. (Awiti, 30-11-2001)

That it does matter or the access to public resources whether your community is ingovernment or not, as we shall see urther below, is next to a truism in Kenya. Anassistant Minister rom KANU elucidates:

O course Charity Ngilu [leader o the opposition party, NPK] should join KANU.She will never be President, but i she joins KANU she will be able to develop her

area. Now she asks or roads, and the ministry says sure as soon as there are re-sources available you will get your road [the respondents ace clearly shows thatthat will never happen]. But i she were in KANU she would get unding rom thepresidential unds or such projects. But she just wants to be rebellious. (Kimkung,12-12-2001)

The notion o compartmentalised electoral competition is not only reected in theact that ew, i any, parties have nation-wide support, but also in that ew partieshave any ambition to gain nation-wide support. The logic is simple; why wasteresources campaigning in areas where the party will never gain substantial support?No doubt most parties are believed to have some ambition outside the party strong-hold but the notion o ruitless areas is strong. The amount o resources considerednecessary to overcome such structural constraints is simply not available to mostKenyan parties with the possible partial exception o KANU.

Relations among elite actors o dierent ethnicity are, similarly to inter-partyrelations, on one level very good and unconstrained, but on another rather con-icting and tense. On the one hand politicians at the national level orm a airlycohesive group. They have oten attended the same schools, they have been involved

in student politics together, they share large business interests, they dine in the samerestaurants, and they are members o the same clubs. In short, they are riends andbusiness partners.


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Yes, we could very easily co-operate. I am very ree with my riends like haveyou spoken to Dr Mukhisa Kituyi? Kituyi and I were expelled rom the Universityo Nairobi together. We are riends. But i I want to come to parliament I must dowhat my community wants me to do. Although I know very clearly that i we go the

way we are going [i.e. down the road o ethnic politics], we are all going to lose. AndI say to him Mukhisa, we are going to lose? And he says yes, we are losing. Whydont we vote together? Because my community cannot vote or you and yourcommunity cannot vote or me. So in the end we can talk but when it comes tovoting each one goes to his community to survive as a politician frst and oremost.(Kajwang, 16-11-1999)

On the other hand, in politics they represent their communities and it is onlythrough this representation that they can access state power and patronage. Politics

is largely seen as a game o sharing whatever the state has on oer and during suchdistributive sessions these riends turn into adversaries. Being leaders o dierentcommunities engaged in a zero-sum game means that your riends loss is your gainand vice versa. Hence, personal and social harmony co-exists with political competi-tion and antagonism. It should also be mentioned, however, that among elite actors,ethnicity does ensure someeelings o closeness among kin or among ethnic afliateso groups perceived as being particularly close.15

Turning to the Kenyan Government, it is beyond doubt seen as a part in ethnicpolitics. The distribution o both public resources and government positions hasalways been biased. The ethnic groups controlling State House have systematical-ly avoured their own ethnic communities. Most agree that the uneven distribu-tion under Kenyatta has been urther distorted during the Moi era. An oppositionMember o Parliament wryly remarked that:

When Moi became President even his arid areas developed. They have even got aninternational airport. So because o that it became known that i a son o a tribe is ina position [o power] then the rest o the tribe will beneft. (Kombo, 14-12-2001)

Public resource investment in the Rit Valley has been extensive, as has the propor-tion o Kalenjin appointed to government, while deliberate attempts to weaken theKikuyu community economically are believed to have been undertaken. Public dis-tribution is thus viewed as a system o ethnic punishment and reward, and politicsitsel has, due to this government bias, been diminished into a game o ethnicpatronage. Whoever dominates State House is expected and no one has been dis-

15. This somewhat schizophrenic personality o lite actors, as it was put by one person in thereerence group (Ngunyi, 18-12-2002), was described in almost every reerence group interview.

Another member o that group illustratively explained that they are all riends, but claims beginat home (Opanga, 09-01-2003). The notion o an lite culture that transcends ethnic bounda-ries is thus understood as ully corroborated by the Kenyan reerence group, as is likewise theimportance o the ethnic ollowing or politicians to access state resources. Gaitho, 12-12-2002;Owiti, 13-12-2002; Kibara, 16-12-2002; Kanyinga, 18-12-2002; Ngunyi, 18-12-2002; Musebe,07-01-2003; Opanga, 09-01-2003; Karlsson, 18-12-2002.


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appointed in this respect to avour his own community and neglect others.It is interesting that the belie o a bias is so strongly held that a Nandi Member

o Parliament complained that the Nandi subgroup has not been aorded the biasedtreatment it, as part o the Kalenjin group, should have been able to count upon.President Moi himsel comes rom another Kalenjin subgroup, the Tugen.

[W]e expected that once he [Moi] gets the cake he would be air. Even i he is notair when it comes to the rest o the country, he will at least be air when it comes toour ront. Because when we are in trouble we are all lumped together [the Kalenjingroup], so we thought during the good time we would also receive get somethinghere and there. The observation we have made is that he has not only been unair tous, but deliberately gone out o his way to make sure that we dont get what is right-ully ours. (Anonymous Member o Parliament)

This highly exclusive view o political power has encouraged the notion o ethnicgroups as having dierent or even opposing interests in Kenya. Furthermore, itmeans that a kind o distributive justice can only be upheld i the control o StateHouse is alternated. Hence, a very cohesive set o belies, which has been aptly,even i somewhat crudely, summarised as our-time-to-eat underscores Kenyanpolitics.16

The understanding o voters, elite actors and the government described here addsup to a notion o politics that is deeply entangled with ethnic concerns. There is

primarily a very strong association between the notion o political patronage andethnic politics. Ethnic politics is made possible by the unctioning o politics throughpatronage, or dishing out as it is oten reerred to in Kenya. Ethnic politics is inthat sense an institutional arteact, as it could hardly exist without the institutionsthat enable ethnic patronage.17

Politics is a competition over the control o state patronage, and ethnic groupsthus become competitors over limited state resources. Hence, there is a view o ethnicgroups as having diametrically opposing interests in a zero-sum game. Structural

dierences are in this sense o limited importance or the notion o diverging ethnicinterests. Winning the game entails control over patronage it is our time to eat.Losing the game means that the community is denied such pubic patronage. This

winner-takes-all character o politics breeds the understanding that the community

16. The reerence group supports the notion o systematic distribution uneveness. Interestinglyenough, however, many in the reerence group argue that ethnic balancing has indeed been animportant principle in Mois appointment policy especially beore the introduction o multi-party politics. Even though much more important within the KANU party, balancing has atleast to some degree also been practised in Government. The reerence group contends that the

balancing has been largely superfcial and has not contributed sufciently to a sense o inclusive-ness but nevertheless balancing has been practised. Hence their argument is basically thatbalancing and bias have co-existed and that presence in the Government does not automaticallymean access to any substantial power. (Githongo, 06-01-2003; Musebe, 07-01-2003; Okello,08-01-2003; Opanga, 09-01-2003)

17. This point is discussed by Kanyinga (18-12-2002).


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must have one o its own in, or at least close to, State House or perish until thenext elections.

This belie or perception o politics as being very exclusive is in additionsupported by a normative view that politics shouldbe competitive. Ethnic balancing,

while not rejected, does not have a undamental place in the notion o politics inKenya. There is airly extensive support or a government o national unity, butout o purely pragmatic rather than normative motives. A government o nationalunity might assist in improving the perceived low levels o trust in institutions. Itis seen, however, as a temporary measure, suggesting that inclusion as such is notthe guiding norm. In the era o multiparty politics it is no inclusive principle o dis-tributive justice that gets or should get leaders into politics, but numbers. So inshort, politics is a game in which ethnic groups give their support to ethnic leaders,

and i they have the numbers this support will be traded or patronage, or whatevercrumbs might all o the dining table as ethnic leaders share the spoils.18

Finally, and as already mentioned above, ethnic politics despite its frm grip isnot an entirely legitimate nor desirable phenomenon in the eyes o the Kenyan elite.On the contrary, most consider it highly problematic. Tribalism contradicts meri-torial concerns and undermines all attempts or more issue-based politics. Conse-quently, tribalism hampers national development, it is said. However, despite thisview o ethnic politics as highly undesirable, ew reject it completely in practice.

Most maniestations o its existence perhapswith the exception o distribution bias are somehow considered legitimate exercises o politics.

Well, I would put it this way; every community is strategizing. Mois community[the Kalenjin] is thinking about how to survive without Moi and there is absolutelynothing wrong about talking. The Kikuyu community has been in governmentbeore and they know what benefts that can be derived rom it, and what losses thatcan be suered rom being out o it. So you dont blame them or wanting to go backthere. (Kajwang, 16-11-1999)

As things stand, the ethnic community is the undisputed and supposedly legiti-mate building blocs o politics. Working or the good o the group is hence anunderstandable and presumably legitimate motive behind political behaviour.In act there seem to be ew other ways to gain legitimacy as a leader than to bethe (undisputed) representative o an ethnic community. Evoking ethnic loyalties isnecessary in order to become the leader o the community. Few politicians in Kenya

18. It is interesting, albeit somewhat conusing, that the members o the reerence group have verydiverse opinions about the impact o distribution uneveness. While all agree that distribution o

public goods has been biased, a ew (e.g. Kibara, 16-12-2002) argue that this has really onlyaected lite actors as very little trickles down to the local level anyway. Others (Owiti, 13-12-2002; Githongo, 06-01-2003; Musebe, 07-01-2003; Okello, 08-01-2003; Opanga, 09-01-2003)instead contend that there have indeed been large dierences in the provisions o services at thelocal level. It is quite difcult to study distribution empirically, as the investigation into this mat-ter in Hulterstrm, 2004 revealed, which might explain part o the attitudinal discrepancy.


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deny that they use ethnic loyalties to mobilise support and reely acknowledge thatthey would never succeed in politics i they did not.19 Kenyan elite actors clearlydislike ethnic politics, but on the other hand they cannot do with out it they aretrue pragmatists.

I dont start a war I cant win. I just become pragmatic. (Kajwang, 16-11-1999)

The Zambian national moralist

The attitudinal pattern with regard to politicised ethnicity is less distinct andcohesive in Zambia. This may o course be a reection o the act that the politicalelite does not perceive ethnicity as the main conict dimension in politics. However,the sturdiest support or such a conclusion would rather be a cohesive set o beliesthat unambiguously point to an alternative conict dimension. Alternatively, thesomewhat inconsistent attitudinal pattern may be a reection o the act that theZambian polity is undergoing substantial change. It is plausible that the dramaticelectoral politics witnessed in Zambia at the beginning o the 1990s and the increaseo ethnic consciousness, have led to a situation in which no cohesive set o politicalbelies has yet been completely consolidated. Or it may be the natural result o agenerally more disparate political elite with ewer shared nodes around which todevelop common attitudes. Whatever the reason, it should also be stressed that

there areunmistakably some shared norms and belies with regard to ethnicity andpolitics in Zambia. It is to a portrayal o this attitudinal pattern the discussion nowturns.

Generally, ethnicity is o limited importance or Zambian politics. Few deny thatethnic afliation has some impact on political behaviour but argue that structuralactors, such as demography and social circumstances, make reerence to ethnicbelonging highly problematic. Like the party executive cited below, many politi-cians described their own amily relations in detail to illustrate this point.

Zambia is a unique place, I think. Kenya is very ethnic, Zambia is not. And the rea-son Zambia is not ethnically inclined is the intermarriages that have taken place. Forinstance, I come rom a amily where my ather comes rom northern Zambia. Mymother comes rom the eastern part o Zambia. My sisters are married to virtuallyevery other province. My wie comes rom Eastern province. Her amily has links toSouthern province. So when we have amily gatherings we have the whole country inone house. So I have no ethnic basis o treating anybody because I accept the chapswho have married my sisters, or instance, simply as Zambians. So we dont have aserious ethnic problem. (Chunga, 30-10-2001)

19. There is great agreement in the reerence group that ethnic mobilisation is completely acceptedand ethnic claims are regarded as completely legitimate among Kenyan politicians. Owiti, 13-12-2002; Kibara, 16-12-2002; Ngunyi, 18-12-2002; Musebe, 07-01-2003; Opanga, 09-01-2003;Karlsson, 18-12-2002.


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This rather unctional attitude stresses, apart rom the requency o intermarriag-es, that many Zambian regions are multiethnic. This renders reerence to ethnicbelonging a poor strategy or mobilising support in many constituencies. Ratherthan talking in terms o ethnic groups, regions or provinces are oten spoken o asthe relevant actors in Zambian politics.20 Besides reecting a perception o manyparts o Zambia as airly ethnically integrated, this description o politics also seemseasier to reconcile with the strong nationalist norm that inspires all political thinkingin Zambia. Zambian elite actors take great pride in the nation-building success theyascribe to their country, and perceiving politics as a matter o ethnic competition

would clearly be a proound break with that understanding.21

We are all one and tribes do not separate our mutual understanding. (AnonymousMMD Member o Parliament)

Politics in Zambia is, however, slowly becoming more ethnic. Attempts to draw onethnic loyalties in order to mobilise political support are increasing, as is distribu-tion uneveness on ethnic lines at least in the orm o appointment bias. 22 TheZambian elite argues that this development is caused by political leaders who useethnic kinship or want o other sources o support. However, ordinary people, justas in Kenya, are said to not care about ethnic politics nor perceive politics in termso ethnic competition.

Recognising some discrepancy, the overarching notion is thus that voters inZambia do not bloc vote with their ethnic community.23 Ethnic loyalties are notcompletely disregarded but are thought to compete with a number o other character-istics, such as proessional identities or the qualities o the individual candidates. Asthe party executive argues below, the individual candidate is oten perceived as moreimportant than the party or which he or she stands, which suggests that politicalconsiderations are quite local. His concluding remark, moreover, very illustrativelycaptures the ambiguity that surrounds thinking about ethnicity in Zambia.

That eeling o sending someone o your own to represent you in Lusaka, I think itis a very natural eeling. But I dont think it is a tribal eeling. [P]eople look at

20. This is also stressed, or example, in the interview with Kaela (21-01-2003). Mutesa (21-01-2003) also pointed out that endeavours with ethnic mobilisation might be camouaged in re-gional terms, as this is a more accepted terminology.

21. Mulenga (20-01-2003) explains that, in his view, it is simply unthinkable to claim to be theleader o an ethnic community in Zambia. Such ethnic language is just not conceivable.

22. This is supported by several in the reerence group, while no one had a diverging understanding(Chanda, 20-01-2003; Kaela, 21-01-2003; Mutesa, 21-01-2003; Simuchoba, 22-01-2003).

23. While voting behaviour was not widely discussed in the reerence group, it was clearly under-stood by most o them that that the Southern provinces or the Tongas were willing to bloc voteor Anderson Mazoka and the UPND (Mumba, 15-01-2003). This was seen, however, as some-thing rather abnormal albeit not unknown as the Eastern province is at times accused ohaving moved as a bloc in the frst two elections o the 1990s. (Lungu, 17-01-2003; Mulenga,20-01-2003; Kaela, 21-01-2003; Mutesa, 21-01-2003)


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somebody being one o them in terms o whether that person lives with them, not interms o where they hail rom. However one would be burying ones head in thesand i one said there was no tribal actor in politics. (Sikota, 10-12-1999)

Voters want to be represented by people with a strong local connection and knowledge,in other words, by local men. That such local men in turn are connected to otherlocal men, in other constituencies with the same ethnic afliation, in order to protectthe interests o the larger ethnic community is not the political norm in Zambia.Voters in Zambia are instead perectly willing to support (candidates o) politicalparties (or presidential candidates) that are supported by other ethnic communities.Rather than voting exclusively ethnically, voters shun parties with exclusive ethnicsupport. It is argued that since no single ethnic group can orm its own majority, anyvoter who wishes to see his or her preerred party or president in government mustsupport a party with ethnically non-exclusive support.

Immediately that Zambians fnd out that a party is tribal that is the end. It is a natu-ral death. Because like I told you there is no single tribe with an outright majority.(Mukupa, 13-12-1999)

The motives ascribed to the behaviour o voters are hence extremely rationalistic.This rationale is moreover sustained by the act that representation in Zambia hasa broader connotation than the presidency. The perception is that one does not

require ethnic or regional representation in State House in order to eel included andprotect ones interests. This less exclusive notion o politics can only be interpreted asresulting rom a greater trust in either ormal or inormal institutions in Zambia.

Neither ideology nor ethnicity is understood as a major divisive actor in partypolitics. Some ideological dierences between parties exist but they are small, andideological concerns are not the main reason or individual party afliation orinterparty collaboration.24 The FDD National Secretarys response to a questionabout the distinguishing actors between the major political parties in Zambia, givesa airly representative view.

[I]t is not ideology it is just personality. There are no major dierences i you lookto maniestos. I think the dierence is in the personality o the leaders o these po-litical parties. (Sejani, 23-11-2001)

Parties are not seen as ethnic in the sense o bringing people together with a sharedethnic afliation. Parties may not be equally strong across the entire country butthey do gather voters and leaders o dierent ethnic belonging.

As indicated above, some parties, but it should be stressed not all, are highlypersonalised, which entails an increased risk o being identifed as more o an ethnic

24. In the reerence group interviews in which this is discussed, the view that there are ew ideologi-cal dierences between parties is supported (Lungu, 17-01-2003; Mulenga, 20-01-2003; Kaela,21-01-2003).


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party. The more homogeneous the party leadership, the greater the chance o homo-geneous party support. A description o the UPND and its leadership reects thispoint.

What makes the UPND a tribal party is that the party is built around one person.Then that person appoints his right-hand men rom his tribe. It is not a party that isormed by various people who then elect their leaders. But here there is one man thatorms a party. Then he gets his tribesmen to go and register the party. (Mwuambi,10-12-1999)

This indicates that there is in act a perceived relationship between the ethnicity o aleader and his or her voter support even though political leaders in Zambia cannotcount on the support o their entire community.

Nevertheless, generally the understanding is that o an integrated party system where parties and presidential candidates strive or nation-wide support and inactuality also compete or the same votes. The perception o political parties ashaving a nation-wide ambition is not, however, only descriptive but evidently alsonormative. The idea o an integrated Zambian polity is clearly strong and politi-cians oten hold a stronger belie that parties shouldhave a national ambition thanan opinion as to whether they actually do. Pressed on the issue o whether partiesactually attempt to garner support in all areas o the country, a UNIP executiveinstead gives his view on why a strategy o selective vote seeking is at least nothing

that one could say out loud.

Because o the way that our nations were built. Our nations were arbitrarily set up.So i you take the Chewas; a small group in the Eastern province o Zambia; a biggroup in Malawi; and even bigger group in Mozambique. So i there was sup-posed to be a Chewa nation it would cut across our countries. What this means isthat our countries, many o them have not succeeded in nation building. And insome cases that has caused serious problems o ethnic violence. So this is an areawhich is delicate. So to say that I am just representing the Tongas [now laughing

a great deal] I think you would be laughed out o the luncheon. Every politicalparty in Zambia attempts to get support rom everywhere. Because I think we havebeen more successul in the process o nation building. (Choongo, 17-12-1999)

The elite in Zambia is not only airly disparate when it comes to attitudes on politi-cised ethnicity but also regarded as a generally rather heterogeneous group. There isno apparent notion o the political elite orming an elite class with similar habits andinterests in Zambia. The diversity is not understood, however, as being primarilyrelated to ethnic divisions. Few Zambian politicians eel that they are aected by

ethnicity in their relations with ellow politicians. Interestingly though, while poli-ticians are generally not themselves aected by ethnic belonging it is not unusualthat their colleagues are. The debate over whether a Bemba speaker was actuallya easible successor to President Chiluba ater his two terms in ofce in which


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many politicians explicitly stated their opposition to yet another Bemba urther-more, suggests that ethnicity is not an entirely unamiliar concern among Zambianelite actors.25 Very ew were however as explicit and inormative about the role oethnicity as this Member o Parliament.

Like now when we are talking, i somebody rom my tribe comes in, I will immedi-ately switch to my mother language, and sort o ignore you. I will fnish with himand then come back to you without an apology. It always comes out in politicalcircles. (Kamanga, 12-10-2001)

Attitudes on the unctioning o distributional practices are in part very cohesiveamong the Zambian elite. The distribution o public resources is, and always hasbeen, largely unrelated to ethnic belonging. Ethnic inclination is not perceived as

the norm in Zambia distribution policy. This is a view shared by both incumbentsand the opposition as demonstrated by this FDD Member o Parliament.

The regional unbalances that may exist depend on dierent endowments o naturalresources rather than politics. The Copperbelt was ull o minerals so inrastructurehad to be put in place in order to develop that. South, Eastern and Central provincesare agricultural land and roads must be built or transportation etc. North-westernWestern and Luapula have less resources at least that have been developed so lessinvestment is made there. But once the development o resources gets started therethey will also enjoy more investment. (Ngulube, 26-01-2001)

Ethnic communities are not, it seems, even a relevant entity when distributive justiceis discussed in Zambia. The discussion instead tends to ocus on a perceived biasbetween urban and rural areas, and at times on the neglect o socially weak groups,such as women and disabled people.26 When it comes to appointment policy thereis less attitudinal cohesiveness. The attitudinal divide seems to largely ollow partylines. Politicians afliated to the ruling MMD have the belie that appointmentpolicy has, during the 1990s, ollowed the same logic o ethnic balancing, whichhad already during Kaundas early days, ensured representation to all Zambias major

ethnic communities. The opposition on the other hand claims that Chiluba hasabandoned the practice o ethnic balancing and instead avoured his own Bemba-

25. Respondents in the reerence group normally believed that ethnicity had a rather limited impacton elite relations. (Lungu, 17-01-2003; Mulenga, 20-01-2003; Siyanga, 22-01-2003) Politiciansare not seen as ethnic leaders in Zambia in the way that they are in Kenya. This notwithstand-ing, a couple o respondents stressed that top politicians, like al l people, will normally want to besurrounded by people they eel close to. This is only to be expected, it is argued. Such closenessis, in Zambia, not only constituted by ethnicity but a common ethnic belonging is defnitely apossible ground. (Chanda, 20-01-2003; Simuchoba, 22-01-2003; Milapo, 22-01-2003)

26. Even though the largest part o the reerence group shared the general view o distribution hav-ing been largely ree o ethnic inclination (Momba, 14-01-2003; Mumba, 15-01-2003; Chanda,20-01-2003; Kaela, 21-01-2003; Mutesa, 21-01-2003; Simuchoba, 22-01-2003), there are sev-eral interviewees in the group that believed that the Northern province and Luapula provincebenefted during Chilubas years as president (Lungu, 17-01-2003; Siyanga, 22-01-2003; Milapo,22-01-2003; Kanyanga, 24-01-2003).


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speaking community. The opposition is convinced that the government in general,and the important positions in Cabinet in particular, have been heavily dominatedby Bembas.27

In the last eight years [the MMD] has been in government, the whole governmenthas become Lupaula and Northern province. All government [branches] and depart-ments are ull o Northern province. In the whole Ministry o Finance, i yougo right rom the top to the bottom, including the Cabinet Ofce, you will fnd90 per cent o the sta even the ordinary sta are Bembas. I you go across toother ministries, to the Bank o Zambia and so on, everybody is Bemba! (Kahenya,07-12-1999)

Furthermore, this ethnic inclination is the most common reason cited or theincreased ethnifcation o politics in Zambia. A ormer MMD Minister o Agricul-ture, now active in the opposition, who is himsel neither Bemba nor rom any o thecommunities around Lusaka, disclosed his perception o this trend.

You are even supposed to speak Bemba in Lusaka these days. You stand up and ad-dress a rally here [in Lusaka] and you address it in Bamba and everybody goes yeah,yeah [without reacting]. (Scott, 1999-12-10)

The logic o politics in Zambia is, most would no doubt agree, not entirely compre-hensible. It clearly bears certain attitudinal traits related to politicised ethnicity but

in addition it also shows signs o actors other than ethnicity that structure beliesabout politics. In the Zambian context it seems important to distinguish betweencognitive and evaluative attitudes. The descriptive attitudes on politics, frstly,reveal that ethnicity is not entirely absent in the minds o elite actors, but normativebelies, secondly, make the disclosure o such traits awkward. Turning frst to de-scriptive attitudes on ethnicity and politics, it is apparent that the ethnic group isnot the expected, or normal, building block in politics. It is noticeable, however,that no alternative cohesive dimensions along which people are believed to structuretheir political opinions or behaviour are visibly expressed. This applies to voters andpolitical parties as well as the political elite in general. Indeed, local afliation andperhaps to a small extent region or province are said to aect voting behaviour. Buta local connection can hardly be viewed as a dimension that structures politics ina predictable way at the national level (especially not with an electoral system thatalmost dictates a local connection). Even though regions or provinces are not un-amiliar political entities not least due to their importance as administrative anddistributive units, no doubt they can defnitely not be said to orm a consistentlyperceived building block in politics. Political parties seem to be structured, i by

27. I the political establishment is divided on this issue the reerence group is all the more in ac-cord. There is almost total agreement that Bemba speakers have dominated Government in adisproportional manner (all except Mulenga 20-01-2003). A number o interviewees, however,believed that Chilubas appointment policy became more balanced towards the end o his rule presumably due to the sharp reactions to his early bias.


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anything, by personality and personal animosity among elite actors. Elite actorsthemselves seem to be, to some extent, guided by ethnic concerns but evidently notvery consistently.

It is obvious that no Kenyan understanding o politics as a game in whichethnic groups compete or state patronage exists in Zambia. What the prize is inZambian politics, and which actors stand the chance o winning it, is yet unclear.Hence, the limited conclusion that can be drawn here is that there is a airly limitedperception o ethnic politics in Zambia but no satisactory alternative or, perhapsmore appropriately, complementary logic has been distinguished.

Turning instead to the evaluative aspect o the Zambia attitudinal pattern, thereis an exceedingly strong nationalist norm in Zambia. Great pride is elt over the suc-cessul nation-building process and the one Zambia, one nation axiom. Tribalism

is not only illegitimate and undesired. The intensity with which attitudes on ethnicpolitics are held is very striking. Suggestions that politicians might want to protectthe interest o their ethnic group are met with shock and disapproval.

[W]e know what tribalism can do. We have seen examples in other countries. Weknow what is happening in Angola. What happened earlier in Zimbabwe. We dontwant that. It will bring violence. This evil should not be allowed to reign withinour country. (Chitala, 30-10-2001)

You simplycannotbe tribal in Zambia. The evils o tribalism, which consist o

violence or even genocide, are unquestionably a political ghost in Zambia.More nuanced descriptions o attitudes suggest that there might be a somewhat

greater tolerance towards ethnic voters than ethnic leaders. The most despicablepolitical oence is committed by ambitious leaders who call on ethnic loyalty tourther their own cause. Similarly, there is very little tolerance or the practice oavouring the elite in ones own ethnic group through appointments.28 The supportor ethnic balancing in Zambia is enormous while the rejection o tribalism (espe-cially in the orm o appointment bias) is equally heated. A ZAP spokesman elabo-

rates the virtues o ethnic balancing:The perception is that when they are sharing a cake in Lusaka I am sure that my MPis also present, so they cannot leave us out. It also removes the perception o tribalhegemony, so that no one ethnic grouping should eel that they are predominating.And when you look at it in practice, it works out so well. Even when you go about itin a mathematical way, the seats and positions are shared equally; one there, anotherthere, you get one there and so on. (Kabimba, 08-12-1999)

While tribalism seems to be the illegitimate practice o accommodating ones own

ethnic group at the national level, ethnic balancing is instead the legitimate practice

28. It is surprising the Zambian reerence group shows quite a large tolerance or the practice o sur-rounding onesel with ones own kinsmen, while that practice is completely rejected by Zambianpoliticians.


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o accommodating all ethnic groups at the national level. These two, strongly heldattitudes orm two interesting contradictions. Firstly, tribalism is rejected due toits violent consequences but also because it is said to contradict concerns o meritand democratic principles. It is hence also oten argued in Zambia that tribalismhampers economic development. Ethnic balancing on the other hand is insteadcredited as ensuring meritorial concerns and reecting democratic principles, despitethe act that the main eature which tribalism and ethnic balancing share is thatboth practices put ethnic concerns beore other considerations.

This contradiction seems utterly unreasonable i it is not placed in the context oZambian political tradition. Ethnic balancing is (and has been since the beginningo the 1970s) not only seen as normatively good but as the remedyor tribalism.29Hence, it is perhaps not surprising that ethnic balancing is ascribed all the good

qualities that tribalism lacks.Secondly, it is somewhat surprising that ethnic balancing is regarded as such

a vital principle in a polity where the ethnic group is not regarded as a relevantbuilding block o politics. This gives rise to an image o ethnicity as always lyingin wait to strike as soon as eorts to balance out its potential powers are relaxed. Ascenario o unchecked ethnic politics is normatively awul and descriptively disas-trous, as it would threaten the entire Zambian nation the nation that hasbeen theonly relevant building block in Zambian politics since 1964.

To sum up, ethnicity cannot be said to be absent in the logic o politics inZambia. The notion o ethnic politics is, however, a stronger normative than de-scriptive attitude. Ethnic politics is not understood as widespread but is all the moredreaded and despised. It is simply not accepted to preer or avour your own ethnicgroup not when voting, not when politicians interact, defnitely not when govern-ment positions are to be flled, and not in politics generally. The game o politics inZambia is thus to a large extent occupied with struggling against underlying orcesthat may, i let uncontrolled, contaminate the polity with ethnic politics. It is hencerather the ideal o the nationalist vision that constitutes the motive behind politicsin Zambia, than a competition between opposing interests be they ethnic or ideo-logical. In short, Zambian politicians are national moralists.

cldg k

Briey summarising the fndings, Kenyans have a very cohesive set o belies. Theyhold an explicit notion that ethnicitydoes, and howit does, aect politics amongvoters, elite actors, political parties, government, and hence politics in general. The

fndings suggest that ethnicity is perceived as the primary actor around which

29. This line o reasoning is present in many o the reerence group interviews : Momba, 14-01-2003;Mumba, 15-01-2003; Lungu, 17-01-2003; Chanda, 20-02-2003; Kaela, 21-01-2003; Mutesa,21-01-2003; Kanyanga 24-01-20031.


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politics is structured. This perception is defnitely held about voters, politicians (intheir strictly political unction) and the government, and in some respects aboutpolitical parties. The revealed evaluative attitudes on ethnic politics are moreambiguous. They contain a collective rejection o ethnic politics as inerior to other

ways o organising politics, but deeply entangled with cognitive attitudes as theyare, the result is a airly large and cohesive acceptance o ethnic politics. Realismsurmounts norm, it would seem.

The Zambian norm system concerning ethnicity is less cohesive and elaboratedthan the Kenyan. It would be erroneous, however, to conclude that Zambian eliteactors are not accustomed to certain belies about ethnic politics. No aspects opolitics seem to be untouched by ethnicity, and even more evidently none are un-derstood as immune to ethnicity. The Zambian attitudes are characterised by a

view o politicised ethnicity as a partly dormant, underlying actor, combined witha strong norm rejecting that actor. I the opposite is true in Kenya, in Zambia itseems as i evaluative attitudes on the ills o ethnicity oten dominate cognitivenotions o how ethnicity inuences politics. There is ar greater normative, thancognitive, cohesion in Zambia and it appears as i the cognitive attitudes are inu-enced more by the evaluative norms on ethnicity, than vice versa. In conclusion,there is nevertheless a airly uniorm understanding that it is not the only or evenprimary determinant o politics on any o the three aspects: government, parties

and voters.

Attitudinal patterns and behavioural manifestations of ethnic politics

Relating the fndings about the attitudinal patterns with previously observed behav-ioural maniestations o ethnic politics (i.e. voting, party and leadership cohesive-ness, and distribution), there is clearly a large coherence in both countries. A ewinteresting inconsistencies between belies and behaviour however exist and withregard to these it seems two rather distinct conclusions about the two countries can

be drawn.Starting with Kenya, perceptions about the working o politics appear to slightly

exaggerate the role o ethnicity and especially so with regard to the behaviour ovoters and policy makers. Bloc voting has been shown to be extensive in Kenya butthe coherence was not as perect as suggested by the belies o elite actors. Similarly,the entrenched notion o a severe distribution bias avouring the presidents owncommunity is not entirely supported by data. Politics in Kenya is viewed as a gamein which it is expected that one avours ones own and neglects others. While

previous analyses confrm that such an inclination exists, it is not nearly as extremeas perceived by the countrys elite.

In Zambia it instead seems that the role o ethnicity may be somewhat greaterin practice than perceived by elite actors. Limited bloc voting does occur in Zambia


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in contrast to the view o political leaders o the ordinary citizen as disinterestedin ethnicity

Even though it should be repeated that belies and behaviour about ethnic politicsin the two countries seem airly consistent, the discrepancies discussed above maysuggest a ew insights into how attitudes and actions relate. These inconsistenciesmay simply be a sign o changing political cleavages. That is to say that the impor-tance o ethnicity is either growing or diminishing so rapidly that no cohesive un-derstanding on the subject exists among the countrys elite.30 There are some indica-tions, however, that the discrepancies may be the result o the inuence o divergingnormative attitudes in the two countries. It is at least a plausible hypothesis thatnormative attitudes inuence the consistency between behavioural maniestationsand belies. The unctioning o norms is perhaps appropriately likened to a flter

through which reality is interpreted beore a perception o that same reality takesshape.

Looking at the evaluative or normative belies held about ethnic politics, thereis apparently a consensus among the leadership o Kenya and Zambia that ethnicpolitics is something utterlyundesirable. In Kenya, ethnic politics is perceived asundesirable and it is believed to hamper development. In Zambia, there is rather anintensely held ear that ethnic politics would not only slow progress but that it woulddestroy the Zambian nation with its perceived violent consequences. An even more

interesting dierence in the normative attitudes ound, is that the shared rejection oethnic politics as undesirable is not paralleled with a shared notion o ethnic politicsas illegitimate.31 It seems that while Zambian politicians view ethnic politics as bothundesirable and illegitimate, many Kenyan elite actors make a airly explicit distinc-tion between the phenomenons desirability and legitimacy. (This at least seems tobe the case with regard to participatory aspects o ethnic politics.) Many Kenyansapparently view ethnic politics as undesirable, but they also reason, given currentconditions, that it is legitimate or ethnic groups to organise politically as such, andprotect their collective interests. It moreover seems ully plausible that strongly heldears about the consequences o ethnic politics in Zambia, inuence the individualspropensity to perceive and describe reality in terms o ethnic politics. Similarly, it

30. This is a possible explanation as to why there was a strong belie in a Bemba appointment bias inZambia, despite there being no objectivist evidence supporting such an inclination. An alterna-tive, and perhaps more plausible, explanation o this discrepancy is that the Chiluba administra-tion abandoned the rhetoric o ethnic balancing to a ar greater extent than the actual practice and that this was enough to alter the general (lite) perception about the appointment policy.

31. The distinction between legitimacy and desirability is aimed at capturing an apparent attitu-

dinal distinction made by many respondents in the two countries. Desirability reers to the viewo ethnic politics as either something positive or negative. Is ethnic politics regarded as a societalproblem or not? The concept o legitimacy, on the other hand, is intended to capture the right,

which is ascribed to ethnic politics or in most cases, specifcally ethnic participation or ethnicpolicy. It addresses the issue o whether people (voters or leaders) have a moral or recognisedright to partake in dierent orms o ethnic politics.


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does not appear too aretched that a Kenyan with the contrary view, that ethnicgroups constitute legitimate actors o politics, will be more prone to interpret thepolity in ethnic terms. This is simply to suggest that what ought to be inuences

what is, just as what is no doubt aects what ought to be.More importantly perhaps, this study o belies and attitudes about ethnic

politics, combining cognitive and normative attitudes, points to an interestingempirical fnding only implied above. Namely, that ethnic politics is upheld despitebeing deemed as an undesirable, and in other words ineective, way o organisingpolitics by the central actors o politics. In Kenya (as well as in Zambia) elite actorsperceive ethnic politics as highly undesirable, but yet it persists (not least due to theactions o those same actors) as the main conict line in Kenyan politics. The kindo dilemma that such ineective institutions constitute or the (rational) individual

is o course not unique to ethnic politics, but the revealed attitudes suggest to drawa careul conclusion that the view o the political game, rather than the role oethnicity per se in society, is a great inuence on the role ethnicity plays in politics.I politics is viewed as an exclusive winner-takes-all situation, than there is littleto gain rom breaking ethnic compartmentalisation.32 Whereas i there is a belie,as there seems to have been in Zambia, in the distributive mechanisms o power,then one has a great deal to win rom bridging ethnic divides in electoral politics.In Zambia it oers some degree o assurance that the community has a man in

Lusaka, while control o State House is the only way o ensuring a piece o the cakein Kenya.

32. This dilemma has been discussed in relation to almost endless cases o collective action. To men-tion but a ew, e.g. in Putnam (1973) it is discussed in relation to administrative reorm in Italy;in North (1990) with regard to circumstances o proftable economic transaction; in Ostrom(1990) concerning common pool resource projects; in Olson (1965) in relation to labour unionsand class action.


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r

Interviews (Kenya)

Akhaabi, B.K. Ford-K, Secretary or Human Rights and Democratisation, Nairobi, 3/12

2001Awiti, Adhu, NDP, Minister o Planning, Nairobi, 30/11 2001Ayako, George Ochillo, NDP, MP Rongo, Nairobi, 17/11 1999Donde, Joe. Ford-K, Acting Vice-Chairman, Nairobi, 29/11, 2001Gaitho, Macharia, The Nation, Special Project Editor, Nairobi, 12/12 2002Githongo, John,Transparency International Kenya, Executive Director, Nairobi, 6/1 2003Hassan, Omar Hassan, Maguezi. Nairobi, 12/12 2001Imanyara, Gitobu, Ford-K, Secretary General, Nairobi, 30/11 2001Isaak, Ali Shaaban. KANU, MP Mandera East, Nairobi, 17/11 1999Kajwang, Gerald Otieno, NDP, MP Mbita, Nairobi, 6/11 1999

Kanyinga, Karuti, University o Nairobi, Institute or Development Studies, ResearchFellow, Nairobi, 18/12 2002

Karlsson, Per, Embassy o Sweden, Programme Ofcer, Nairobi, 18/12 2002Katuku, J.M., SDP, MP Mwala, Nairobi, 21/11 2001Keriri, John Matere, DP, MP Kerugoya/Kutus, Nairobi, 6/12 2001Kibara, Gichira, Centre or Governance and Development, Director, Nairobi, 16/12 2002Kimkung, J.N., KANU, Assistant Minister, MP Mt Elgon, Nairobi, 12/12 2001Kioko, Joseph, NDP, Executive Director, Nairobi, 10/12 2001Kirwa, arap Kirupto, KANU, MP Cherangani, Nairobi, 11/11 1999Kirwa, arap Kirupto, KANU, MP Cherangani, Nairobi, 8/11 2001Kituyi, Mukhisa, Ford-K, MP Kimilili, Nairobi, 10/11 1999Kiunjuri, F.M., DP, MP Laikapia East, Nairobi, 5/12 2001Kombo, Musikari, Ford-K, MP Webuye, Naoribi, 14/12 2001Kulundu, Newton, Ford-K, MP Lurambi, Nairobi, 4/12 2001Magara, James Omingo, Ford-K, MP South Mugirango, Nairobi, 19/12 2001Mbogo, Jael O. Ford-K, First Assistant National Organising Secretary, Nairobi, 30/11 2001Muigai, Ngengi, Saba Saba Asili, Secretary General, Nairobi, 14/12 2001Muihia, Moses, SDP, MP Gatundu South, Nairobi, 9/11 1999Munyao, Joseph K., DP, Secretary General, Nairobi, 16/11 2001

Munyao, Joseph K., DP, Secretary General, Nairobi, 18/11 1999Murathe, David, SDP. MP Gatanga, Nairobi, 9/11 1999Murungi, Kiraitu, DP. MP Imenti South, Nairobi, 20/11 2001Musebe, Vitalis, Mediawise Consultants, Political Analyst, Nairobi, 7/1 2003Ngunyi, Mutahi, Consult Arica, Researcher and Consultant, Nairobi, 18/12 2002wa Nyoike, Kimani, Ford-People, Secretary General, Nairobi, 7/1 2002Nyongo, P. A., SDP Nominated MP, Nairobi, 13/11 1999Njonjo, Apollo, SDP, Secretary General, Nairobi, 11/

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