political legitimacy in a non-optimal currency area
TRANSCRIPT
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Political Legitimacy in a Non-optimalCurrency Area
Fz W. Shf
N. 52 | O 2013
WORKING PAPER
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2 | KFGWorking Paper No. 52 | October 2013
KFG Working Paper Series
Edited by the Kolleg-Forschergruppe Th Tsfv Pw f E
Th KFG W P Ss svs dss h sh ss f h K-Fsh
h v d . I s h d xh s w s sh d d
xs s sh d x ds sss E d h E U.
A KFG W Ps v h KFG ws www.sf. dd v
Ch f hs ss: Fz W. Shf
Ed sss d d: Ad Bh d F Bh
Shf, Fz W. 2013: P L N- C A, KFG W P Ss, N. 52, O
2013, K-Fsh (KFG) Th Tsfv Pw f E, F Uvs B.
ISSN 1868-6834 (P)
ISSN 1868-7601 (I)
Ths hs fdd h G Rsh Fd (DFG).
F Uvs B
K-Fsh
Th Tsfv Pw f E:
Th E U d h Ds f Ids
Ihs. 26
14195 B
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Ph: +49 (0)30- 838 57033
Fx: +49 (0)30- 838 57096
www.sf.
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Political Legitimacy in a Non-optimal Currency Area
Fritz W. Scharpf
Abs
O h ss f f s f h ss d s f h E ss, hs xs, -
f d hh, whh h w E , ss s s d s-sd
fs, d hv vd h s f h ss s d wh s dsss d s
. A s wh h f sf-sd Ks sss h, h
ss, sss s , wh h hs d sv v sd-
s. I h f sh ds hs, s z E s
v h v h -d, d d f
E v.
Th Ah
Fritz W. Scharpfs Es D f h Mx P Is f h Sds
f Ss C. H h Lw h Y Lw Sh d P
S h Uvs f Cs. I 2009 d 2013, Fz W. Shf ws
s fw h K-Fsh. Hs ssv sh hs f-sd h f h jd, v d h,
h ss f v v G d h E
U, d h v f d wf ss.
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4 | KFGWorking Paper No. 52 | October 2013
Cs
1. Id 5
2. Pf f h O E R 6
2.1 CentralizedMonetaryPolicyinaNon-opmalCurrencyArea 7
2.2 EuroCrisisandEuro-rescuePolicies 10
3. Th Nw R f E Gv 12
3.1 RevisedProblemPerceponsandtheirImplicaons 13
3.2 FromSoRecommendaonstoHardenedRequirements 13
3.3 WhatiftheNewRegimeHadBeeninPlace? 15
4. Th E R: Wh s Gd d Wh Ws Ls? 17
4.1 LimitedGains 18
4.2 InsteadofNominalDevaluaon,CompeveRealDevaluaon 18
4.3 ObstaclestotheManagementofAggregateDemand 19
4.4 GlobalCapitalismandSelf-inictedHelplessness 204.5 ButCouldtheRegimebePatched? 20
5. I L f h Ps E R? 24
6. Cd P U Pvd h S? 26
6.1 TheRiskofPolicizaon 26
6.2 LegimateMajorityRule? 28
Rfs 30
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1. Id1
I s f d d sss f E d d, d s f sd
ds v s f h E P (EP), 57 f Essd h h dd s h E U S 2007 h s, f h s f h
s ss. B h d f 2012, hwv, sss h s E qs dd
h s hd f 33 , d dss f h EU hd s f 32 57 (Z 2013; s
s, Rh . 2013). B f s ws hh 2007, d f dd s h s f vs
hs h d qs f E v ss, h sss h h dsd-
f s d E svs ds f h d d d
dssss f h d d. Ths d s d h ds w h
-d d h -d ds f (Shf 1970; 1999) w
Ls v f h d h w ss d ssv
v (M 2009).
I v h, h ss f -d s d. Th v ws
f v dd ss, d d wh s h d h h f
v v s d f s. A h s , hwv, hs ws
sd ssv, d, vdv s vs. H h
f v sf s qs f fs sv h d f h d
wh s s s d sdds f js. Wh -d h f f
v ss h d, h -d f d sf-v s s.
Id, v shd s f h q f zs s-d
ds dd s. I sv ds, h s h vs
shd ssv hs ds s h fs d ss f s f
h s. T s ssvss, d sss dd v f s-
s, h s f whh s h dd f vs h s f f,
q, d, d v s.
Cqs f E d d hv fsd -d ds f EU -
sss d ss. B s E s ws d d fd -s
ss, zs w d fd wh h v w f EU v. A h s, -s vs w vs vvd EU -, d vs d d hv
sd h ws hd h w vs f h xs f v
ws, dss f h E vs. Bs f hs -d
d (Shf 2012), dssss f h EUs d d hv d d
1 Th ws w d s s vs fw f h K-Fsh Th Tsfv Pw
f E h F Uvs f B (A-J 2013). I f Tj Bz d Ths Rss f h
v d f h h v d h dssss KFG fws. A
s d f h d f h x KFG s d f hf
s Ths Rss, whs s h s vs I hv s d d. A h
Mx P Is f h Sd f Ss, sh f h hs d f
dssss wh M H d f h sss f A B. A sh vs f h
w Of C/S B. H (ds.), D Ps E U d Sss. Oxfd
Uvs Pss (2014).
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6 | KFGWorking Paper No. 52 | October 2013
sss d ds s, h hv hvd hh s. I ss s,
hf, h hh v f s h EU s d f -
d d f zs f -d ds h E v.
I h , hwv, hs hv hd. E s w d h h
d ss d h s f Lh Bs. h f f 2008. Ssq,
s ss f h E M U (EMU) w hd sv sv
whh ws d s E ss. I h sv h E s, E hs h
C, h Css, h E C B (ECB) d h T hv h d vd
h vs f s f zs d h , s d s fs f s EMU
ss. I h ds, hs s hv s f sdd h d d
h s f ss hs ss. I h ss, hwv, h hv s dsd -
d d hs h v, hv fd s wh
qs h d j wh dsvw h E . I sh,
h E ss d h s wh hv dsd h ds f
d s h d vs, s, d d s f xss f E v-
h hv d h ssv sss d h hzd
zs ds wd h EU.
As sq, h E s w fd wh s d f h -
d s whh d f h s f h s ss, s wh h
h sd s f s -d d d whh hs f sd
h s f E-s s. Ws , I w , h E ss hs d fd -
d: If h M U s d, h s qd h ss s
f d hv sqs h w s hv -d
f ss d hs h E v.
B d ssh h s f hs s, s s ss x h d
s ss f h s d f d h ss f v h -
sv vss f h M U f dsss h s f
sss h -d ds f E . I dsss h f f h
M U, I w ddss h f h EMU s h E ss d sh sss, s w s h w E h hs s h s f h
ss d v s -, d I w h -sv vss f h
s E-v .
2. Pf f h O E R
Th s ds f h EMU d h s h E ss w
s w dsd (Shf 2011; D Gw 2012; N E 2012): B j h M
U, ss s h h d s -f-s s d h
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sd s f d hh h f -
ds dd. Ad hh s s d vs, h s f -
ss ws s sd h S P d h f h vs
d ss ds h w . I dd, ss s s h f s d f s s s f s qd ss. Exh-
d w zd d xsd h ECB wh d s s
h Ez. Ths , ws xd, wd d f h s f h M U
h s whh h qs-s s f h Bundesbankhd dd f h G
(Ds C 1989; Css 1990).
2.1 CentralizedMonetaryPolicyinaNon-opmalCurrencyArea
I s wd wdd, hwv, h h Ez ws h d s w wh R Md
(1961) dd s (OCA) s, h s, whh zd
s hv s s s.2 B s w , f s
sss s v s ss (Fss/Lvss 2013). I f,
hwv, h Ez ds x hs sh f f hd- d
s- s wh d ds dv dvs s ss, -
dsv ss d s d, v , d w-s ss (Shf
1991; Cfs 2001; H/Shf 2012; H 2013). H, v hh h ECB hs sdd
w s f h Ez s wh, s d
ss.3
Ths ds dd v h s v f s s. B
h hd h f v hs hh s s w- s, sh s
G, d v w v v s s h f s- s. As
sq, ds dd ws dd h s f s d sd
h sdd v f v h d h sd. Th s dv ws h
fh hd h ss f f ECB s whh w, f s, sv
f h s, d s f h sd f s.
2 R dss w f s s xs s s; d fd ss h Ud
Ss d G h s s h f s dv
s d s. B hs fd ss, h dv-s f
ss w d h qz s f f x, zd s , h-
z d v s-qz s, d f s s f h
sd d s s. I sh: h Ez s - s
s fd s.
3 I M 2005, h ECB xd M d ds hs
(h://www..//df/h/61_77_200505.df, vd 01 O 2013) d d h h
E sh ds dd ss v , whs h w vsd wh w h
Ud Ss. Th s d h f ECB d sd hs
ds.
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8 | KFGWorking Paper No. 52 | October 2013
Th dsz s f hs s d hv f-
s, d h w f fs s A d Ks ss (K 1990;
Eh 1990; Eh/Fd 1994; H/N 1994; Fds 1997). O h
v E, hs ws hd d s h s ws s s E h f f hss G . Ad h w jd
h ds h Csss (1990) sd d O M, O M, whh, sd
s d -xs sss, dsd h s f ss h
. Mv, ws xd h h M U sf wd
v h h f Ez s. Rdd s ss wd s d, d
wd qz s d ds w ss. A h s , h v f -
ss d f -f-s ss wd f ss-d ws
h h- dv f v wd s. I sh, h s f -
wd xd h ss ssd wh h ss f s xh s.
M f hs xs w s s f s h w. B h w s . Wh,
ss, ws d w h sss f s h v h
vs d dsvs f ss d h dsz s whh hs wd hv
h vs. I f, hh s s dd d h dd f d G
d shd h h ss f 20012005, whs G, Id, P, S
d I (h GIIPS s), ds dd ws sd h sdd v f x
h d. Th ECB ws sz hs s; s f s
xdd h s d dd h sss h Ez.4
I h d, G, whh hd h s f E h f h dd, d
h s ss hh f w s d s-sd fs. I -
, hs ss fd x-d v d sd xs f w-w -
. A h s , hwv, h d f ds dd d s xs d ssv
x s s - sss d ssv d-v f h
xh . I h GIIPS s, s, d-d ds dd d s,
d s dd s, wh ( h -s s), d ws. Ad
, h ws d- f x s v s - ds d
vs v-vd v xh s h zd xs, js s G xs w s-sdzd d-v.5
4 D Gw (2012, 17682) vds d f s dv wh d s, -
s s, d hs s, d h s dss h dv w h ECB d dsd s
s f dvd s dd f h s. B h ds h h
f f s shs h ECB zd, h h h s s s dsz
ss.
5 Ths s d h s f s ds ds d s h
ss d s s, s d v x s f h GIIPS
s d s d wh s ds f vs d s G.
Th s h wh h dsf vs d ss d h M U h s
f sh ds d d wd hv d s sss s s s
f whh hd x v f h jd h EMU.
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Figure1:CurrentAccountsasaPercentageofGDP(19992008)
Figure2:RealEecveExchangeRates,19992008(ULC/Index1999=100;EU15)
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R, hwv, hs s w d s s f E
-s. Rs GIIPS ds w s d ws f G d h ss
s, d hs sd s h x f h- dv.6 Th
ECB s hd sdd s h s f s s d sw js fv s ss- d h -s s Id d S. Ad s h
Msh T d h S P dd s f s (whh w v-
fd Id d S, d vd P h G F 3, w), h
h Css vs hd ss f d sh. B h hd
wh h s f h ss h f f 2008.
2.2 EuroCrisisandEuro-rescuePolicies
Th d f h Lh s ws wd-wd d sqz whh h s
h s d fd vs d s (d h ECB) v Ks
, d sv h v-xdd ss v s. Ths -s ds s-
d vwh. B h d sqz h hds hs Ez s h hd
dd ws f d. Th s w shd h ds s-
s whh s h h -s ds, whh hd x w Id d S
d hh P h G f 2008, s s s h. I , hs
s vh f v-s ddss ws sfd -s d
(F 3). Ad wh s sdd, h GIIPS ss w dd
s-d ss.
F h sv f vss, ss f h M U w v
h ss dd h w s vs d dfd h sv -
, d s h Msh h f s sd h
ECB s d f s s (D Gw 2012, 120). Ad wh h M U, GIIPS ss w
h s s f sv s s h h - ds sd ds
h f h s sv d h d v d -s d.
H s h v ds sd s whh, s sf-f h, dq d h qd f ds, s h s f sv sv, s G,
d x Id d P.
6 Ev Nv 2008, h Fh ECB C B Cf, Adw Rs (2009: 251) dd h
h EMU hs d vs ; s d d h shz f sss s, EMU ds
h d f . Th s, EMU ss h h
.
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Figure3:GovernmentconsolidatedgrossdebtasapercentageofGDP
O vs G d h ss s zd h G h
d s h h ss d h E, h s hd sd hw
sh svs wd h s ss f h w s whh hd sfd svs
d x sss GIIPS - ds. Mv, s f h E wd s
hv d h x s f d-vd xh (F 2, v). I hs h,
h sv h E s d h dsd f h Msh Ts -
s s svd h s f h d s.
I h d, hwv, h f d-sd E-s fds d h f T-2
sss h ECB s f d s (S/Wshs 2011) hd h f
sf v-s ss -s ss whh, h s f df, wd hv
hd d-s xs.
Mv, s h G v hd dd h s d sss hd fdd v h s,
h E ss ws wd d h s ss f h G d h GIIPS vs.
Ad v hs f (whh ws s f G d w f Id d
S7), s ds d fds sd d s w vdd -
, hs, d sv. Ad d h d f fh ds s q s ss, h
w d d d ds q ssv sd s d x ss whs
ws s d T f s f h Css, h ECB, d h IMF. As
7 S F 3, v. G -s d hd v hh , hd sd f h
s f h ss. S d Id, hwv, hd d dd -s ddss
vs f w h Msh f 60 f GDP, d v fh w h G v. I s f
-s d, v P hd f fd h G f 2008.
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d d shd hv xd, hwv, s s s d d s-
s wd d h d d hs s -s ds (Thd/W
2012; K 2013). I , hf, E-s s fs h s f GIIPS -
s xsv h s-d s hv shd d s d d ss d s ss, wh s xd 25 d h
v 50 G d S, d xssv hh vs h d s s w.
Figure4:Unemploymentratesasapercentageofthelaborforce
3. Th Nw R f E Gv
I h , hwv, s h h f sv sv ss hv d.
B h s f sss ws hvd hh h sss f s fds (whs
s, s s d , dd d ssq sv s), hhh h ECBs d d whv s sv h E. I , h
h, f ss, wd h ds f hd ss hh Oh M
Tss (OMT) ws wd s h h ECB ws w d w s qs-d
f s s f s f vs s w. As sq, s qs
dfdd s d v d f s-d ss, hv
f w E whs s s s h - v f h M U d whh
s f d h vs ss -s s .
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3.1 RevisedProblemPerceponsandtheirImplicaons
Th s v h s E w fd h E Css (2010)
h f v w h s f h ss d h s f fs Ess s I-E-A Cvss d Is. I ss ssh,
hh wdd, vs f h h-sd xs whh, h Csss (1990)
O-M-O-M , hd jsd d dd h f h M U.
Ev hh h s- d s hd, h xs dvd f
hv dd d. Th f h fs wd v h-
h Ez hs dsd. Isd, h s dd f h E s dsd s d
f s s f s d d sss f vss s s
whh w s s h hs h sssf d ss f f EMU h
(Css 2010: 3). Isd f fs, s s h shd hv vd
hs d h s w d h s. B s h Css qs
h M U sf d s ss, s dsss h h f
s. Ad v hh h ws d s w hvd hh s
, h s f ( d s) f
dd h E vs d.
B xs, hf, h Csss ss fs xsv wh w w
d-, d- d s d h ds sds d h
v. Dvd f ss f , vs ssd
v d x s wh h ss f d x d
sd s: ItisthereforeessenalthatMemberStatesputinplaceanambiousandcomprehen-
sivepolicyresponsegearedatspeedingupandimprovingintra-areaadjustmentmechanisms().The
policyresponseshouldbecomprehensive.Itshouldcovermeasuresinfourkeyareas:scalpolicies,credit
markets,labourmarkets,andproductandservicemarkets (Css 2010: 3). Th f h
s hf dvd -s dssss d ds ss h s
h shd svd h vs qs.
3.2 FromSoRecommendaonstoHardenedRequirements
Wh ws sd J 2010, hwv, h hd f h h d -
ds f h Bd E P Gds d h xhs f h Ls Pss, whh
hd hs (Ds . 2008). B h hd d wh
h d ss d E ss d wh s ds s f G d
h f Id d P w ssd wh h ds h w dd
h Css d d h T. Ths dd x s s -
qs s wd f s fs sd h ds d
h 2010 x h w hs d fd whhd h x s f h
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ds h wd sv h s f sv. Ad wh h hd dd h d
f fs s, h q Md f Udsd d h Ts
s w d d dd, s whh ws d s s shd
hd; whh zs shd zd; whh s fs d s-wdss hv vzd; whh ss, wf s d ws s ; d
hw -s js hv d.
I, f s, hs ws w v f s hd d f s ds s f
w, G, Id, P, d Cs d s hs Sv. B D 2011, C d
P dd Sx P f s d dvs h EMU ss, d-
ss f d hs f s sv. Th wh h Tw P, h E Ss,
h Fs P, d h zd svs h s w v-
f h M U h xds zd s f d h h d
h s f h Msh T.
Th s s s d v s h Exssv I Pd
(EIP) sshd w s f h Pv d C f M Is (EU
1174 d 1176/2011). Th xd h Csss svs, , d s ws
dd f s, wh f h dvs f E d
s. Wh s s h h w ws w ssf theneedforastrongerframework,
andreinforcedgovernance,includingnancialdisincenves,toensurethatrecommendaonsareappro -
priatelytakenintoaccountatnaonallevel(Css 2012).
Th, h EIP ss Css-dd Sd f s v ss ds
whh, h wh d w hshds, d h f x
d s8 h w d s h Css. Fds sd
d hs s, d -dh vws f s whh s
hv dd. If h Css ds xssv , h x s w s f
ds fwd d dd wh whh h M S d s
s v (1176/2011, A. 7.2). If d h Css d C, h
s d. If h Css s ssd wh s , s ds
ssh -, whh w v ss h C ss qd -j (1176/2011, A. 10. 4). Th x s h s ds, s s-
ds f 0.1 f GDP h s f -, d h s
ss f d - d f s v . A,
ss sd h Css sd h C hh vs-qd-
j vs (1174/2011, A. 3).
8 Ths d s, s, x shs, ss, v xh
s, v s d, v s d ws, hs hs s, v d, -
s d s s.
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Q f h ds ds h Cs , hs s f sv-
ss: Fs, wh h x f -s d, f h s sd h
Sd d d h f vs. I s s ssd h h h
d d hh h s f ss v ss. Sd, hs d sf whh s d. Isd, recommendaons()
shouldbeaddressedtotheMemberStateconcernedtoprovideguidanceonappropriatepolicyresponses.
ThepolicyresponseoftheMemberState()shoulduseallavailablepolicyinstrumentsunderthecontrol
ofpublicauthories(1176/2011, #20). I h wds, h s f E d
s h ws hvd h Ls T w s h d f d -
ds h EIP s d. Mv, h s vd s f h Csss
ssv hs. S hs s -s d sd hh d
v ds, h s sd h Csss f f d s
-dh vws. U h S P, hf, h Exssv I Pd s ,
d , -sd . Wh hs s s d -
sd x . B h, f s, ds s s -sv vss.
3.3 WhatiftheNewRegimeHadBeeninPlace?
A h f w, h vss f h w ssssd h ss f s -
d. Nvhss, x, f, hw d hv vd h s f
s h s f h M U d, hh, hw d d wh h s
ss f h Ez. I hs ssss, w ss s d s v.
Fs, h w E ds df h fd ds f M U -
. I h wds, xh s djsd, d
s f f h Ez. Gv ds s, w hs -
- dsz d dv-s ss f s
wh v-v d w-v ds (Ed 2004; N E 2012). Ad,
sd, h Fs P d h Sx-P d Tw-P s hv shd, h h xd,
h s v h s f xs s s h v. Th qs s, hf,whh h ss s v vs (ss h h Css
d hv f v h xs) wd s h s f d x
s f d ss.
19992008:CouldtheRiseofImbalancesHaveBeenPrevented?
B wh h s foverheangeconomies, sh s S Id, ss s h
hh xs s d w d s d hv dd h d-
d s f ds dd. Mv, vs d hv sd s s h
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16 | KFGWorking Paper No. 52 | October 2013
v vss f s d hs d. B s, h s h d hv
d v h s f ss d. Ex hs shw h s w s
xd d f (Shf 1991), d h s ds d whh
s d s d f v w s x d-d d hh h-dd d h d dd xs -ss Sh E
Id (H 2013). Mv, h s-sd fs whh h Css s s s
hh s Md f Udsd wd hv dv h d-2000s: Th
w s s dzd d -dv, h d wd ws s s
. If ws wd x, h wds, h s f ss d sd
h s f ss .
T h s fdepressedeconomies, sh s G (20012005), d ds d-
d dd d s d h s f - sss. B s
s w s s hh x s d d sd w d ,9 s wh
h Css d hv dd d s ds dd. Ev f w ss
hd sdd (Fss/Lvss 2013), s wd hv fd h fh s f -
. I h Csss h fw, hf, h d wd d:
s wd hv f s h dd d s s.
B s s d d v , h d hvd
d h ss f d whh f h Csss sv shd sdd
d s wd s s x s. I s, hs s wh f hd
G, wh v w s ws d wh s-sd fs h d-
d s d dd h sv ws f h d. I h d, h s
fd x-d v d h xs f w-w d
svs. B s d s sss, xs, d dvd
v xh , whh f s d h ss f vss f h GIIPS -
s. I , hf, v f h s E hd d 1999, d
hv vd h s f x s.
20092013:HowCouldtheNewRegimeCorrecttheEectsoftheCrisis?
Ev f s svs w vd h ECBs s f OMT s d h d v-
f h E S Mhss (ESM) ds, d v f dd ss shd
vd B U, h GIIPSeconomies f h Ez s s f ssv
d x s: d d, d h s f E-s s,
v s s f s s, wh -s d s s. Mv,
, h , d v hv s sh vs. Ad v
9 G ws d v h d s f h S P s f h f
szs.
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Political Legitimacy in a Non-optimal Currency Area| 17
hh h dss hs dd ds dd d ws, s s d d,
wh h x f Id, h dv ss s s s f f -
h f -v xh s h Ez.
Ud hs ds, h s E w ss s s d s-sd
fs d x ds d v vss. As s v xh
s s vvd, dv d f ss s hvd
w ws. Mv, h Csss ds s ss h d h
ss f ss , -dv ws w f d h wd ws dd
v . H s Md f Udsd f h s f s ds hv
d -s s wh s d s-sd fs h hv h f s
h w s d h d (Shf 2011). If h d s ss
vhss , wd ss h ws hv f s h xs
f w-w d h x-d wh whh d G f s ss
2005. I sh: s s sd.
Surpluseconomiessh s G hd sv sv, d hh h x
s h s f d s, h d h h s
f h E. S wh h EIP ss ddss sss s w s ds, h Css (2012) d-
dd dsd Gs - sss d h s s d-v
f s v xh . O s10 h h d G vss h
E wd s w h Ezs f vs--vs h s f h wd. Bd h,
hwv, s s hd s wh ss h Css d hv qd s
ds dd d ss G. Gv h ss f h Fs P, d
s h v s d sd d x s. I s d s f s q
ss d s sv ss d sd , q s d s hh
ws h v s. I sh, h w E s wss d wh h x
s f ss s s vs v ss.
4. Th E R: Wh s Gd d Wh Ws Ls?
Ex f h M U s ss sdd E -s d h
d dvss s s s ssd wh hv, xd
d ss. Nvhss, s sf h -sv f h s E
wh h s ss s wh h jd h E, f f h s f s-
h hs h hv fd f h E s d.
10 I s h Gs sh h xs f GIIPS s s q s, v w
8.7 Id d 12.6 I 2010, wh h sh f GIIPS s G
xs s 11.1 (OECD d). H h d f hh ds dd dd
vss G f h ss s h q s.
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18 | KFGWorking Paper No. 52 | October 2013
4.1 LimitedGains
Cd h h f h O M, O M (Css 1990), s d-
fss f h E h sd. B h s ss h h s hs sd Eswh s; h hs dd s ss d
d x s; d h hs d h s f v d-
v s s. I w f f h s, qs- ,
h h w dsv s .
Ys, h hv ss f h E hs dd h s fexchangeratevolality Ez -
s, s sh s Swd Nw d s sv wd-wd s s hv d
d wh hs s, js s ss hv d s sh hs wh d Hhw
d s d ds Swss ss d xs. S h s f w s ss
q s vwh. Ad s, h s f h M U xsd s-
v s h s. B d h vs s f xh- d
(B Wds h E M Ss f 19791999), sh s w v fq
d h dd f ss hd s h h ws dfd
s xh . Ad wh E ss w dd s f s h xh
s, h s f sv s h sv f h sv d, whh wd f
h w dd h w .
4.2 InsteadofNominalDevaluaon,CompeveRealDevaluaon
Ad s, h M U hs d d h fcompevedevaluaon
s s. B dvs w v , d vs hd d f f h sd
h s s s wh ss f x vss. S wds hw -
v dv ws d wd . Wh ss h w,
s, s h h M U d h Csss x s f
ss v-s f v dv wh h s d wh
x ds wh ds ss d s . Ev f s d dv w q v, h ds s q d.
N dv s . I ds s s h f s d f f
vs f vd, h d . Ad hvd s ds f h v
h . R dv, s, hvd hh w s hs
s wh , zd d shsd s d w
hs d hs s. Evwh s, hwv, h w hv hvd
d, hh wf s d s-sd fs h s h ss f ss -
d w h d d h d. I h s, v, h d
fs xsv ws, wh ws w f ss h v
h f vss.
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Political Legitimacy in a Non-optimal Currency Area| 19
4.3 ObstaclestotheManagementofAggregateDemand
Th M U shd h w s f d f s whh fs
s wh dd d sh h ss f x vss. Ad f sh s wd sd dv s , h wd s h ss
f d s d d x d -
s. Ths ss d d s, d wh sss s w s s
dvd s d sss s w s ds h x s. Th s
EMU , s, s dsd d wh h s f s f hs -
x s h h h s f h E. Ad s sd ddss hs
s s.
If h f s fexcessdemand, d s d ss
f vss, h EIP vs d ds dd
s xs s d s s d s h s h s d
h v f s, hs, d vs d. B h f -
ss, sv s w h hv v s, h s v
h sw whh s sss s hzd h v- d dsh
h s- s. Mv, h s f hh sv x d s f h ss
f sh- w ss w s
d h s f h s v, whh f vs xs. I
sh, v f h w v d ds dd, h d f-
f hs ss d.11
Evss s v , hwv, f h f s insucient
demand, ssd wh s d s f ss whh, , w
xd - ss. If s sss f d s d
d v xh s sdd s xssv s, h s s
s vs h wd s ds dd d hh x s d vs-
s, d s qs whh s f d s wd hv h wh h
xs f ss d vss v. Ths h Css wd -
d s h d h d f s d s f - sss.
Ad f s w sdd s w, h E wd fd wh h d
sd h G ss h ss f 20012005: If h sds hv
x-d v hh dv, s sss w h ds f hs, d s
v vss w hd h sss f h s. Ad h
w ss ss f vss s, f s, dv. I h wds,
s w , h s E s s s f dv whh,
h s f dv, h h s s
dss ws d w ds d s s q Ez s.
11 M Fd s d hv sd: Th dv f s h s s h h
f h hsds f v s.
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20 | KFGWorking Paper No. 52 | October 2013
4.4 GlobalCapitalismandSelf-inictedHelplessness
I shd hszd, v, h hs s sss sf-d. Th
f h E h hs h d wh h sss d ss f zd d d s. Of s, hh dszd s d h s sh d s-
vss f hshd s d s, d f h w fd wh
d f h v d hs s s s. B s sd h M
U hs w d d hs d hh d
xh , h hh vs d q s s dfd v-
ss hh dv.
Ad f s s ds d h ws s f d w d
h s, sd, d , h h. I ws h h v f s
v, h d f s, d h s f f s h s
dsd f h d s hh - vss h
(S 2013). B s sd h M U d h EU hv s h fd
x d v ss h wd s h dfd h w s d
s. Ev ss, , h h hs s hh h hv v
wd d wvs.12 P-s h Ez, s, hv h sss d sd
h E d h x ss f v d -h hs
sd I-M s d E w (Shf 1999; 2010).
4.5 ButCouldtheRegimebePatched?
I h , dsssf wh h s E s w, h ss
s, s - s swh d v -s h
E v. Mv, ss wh f h s- d f h s-
hv x h ss f Ks ds h ss. B s h
d d s d dfd h M U, h h
s s s ds d f qs. As sq, h ss s s s dd-s hs h . I w dsss h f hs.
Th s s, wagecoordinaon, whh hd d Ks s f hs w
dsd s (Shf 1991), s w d s s h E ss sd -
ssd h Rs Lx Fd f h G L P (Fss/Lvss 2013). I
12 Mh f h -E dsss h E L s, vw, d w s d
f s. Th E s s s d f -hv v h s
h hs s h v (f x, Hs 2011; 2013). Th s hd h -
sh h h E sf d E j f h , h
h s s. Ad h f s ss fs h sh f ss h d w h
v.
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Political Legitimacy in a Non-optimal Currency Area| 21
sss h w s Ez s shd fw h Gd R, d whh
w ss shd dd h s f dv s h f h
ECB. Th s ss wh h Csss (2010) f h dv ss f
ss w h x ss f dv vss. Ad s f ECB shv dsz s f s d, h sd f w ss
sss h v w d h f v h fd f
- . I h wds, f h s w zd, d
v h v f h M U. Uf, hwv, h s fs
ddss s w fd ds.
Th s s h s . I h hv wd f hd dd d d 1999
wh, s, d xh s w h Ez -
s d d h hv szd hh h Gd R. I h , hwv, h
hv dvd d. Ad v f h R w w fhf d GIIPS s
G s w, wd, h hs w s, w dds hv f
v f ss d xh s. If h w d h ,
wd s wh h Csss s f sd dv hh
w s.
Th sd s h h s s s w s ds (Ss/Ivs 1998).
T , s dsd h w d wd q h Gd R
fwd q, wh ws s d wh h f ss. I h s s-
, h sss ss (Os 1982) s wh zd dsh h s
wf h s w dds wh h s d s. B
w s d d ss q ss s sss w
v w d ds s hh ws h . Ad dw-
, hs s sss wd hv v- w ss, d h
wh h s h wd s hv v -v w sss h h sv js
(Kwh 2001).
Ths s ds hv v f zd wh, h w xd
f d ds fw s, whs v ss s h s h shv v ss (Shf 1991; Hss 2006). I h j f Ez s, h d
xs (D Cj . 2008; H 2013). Ws s, h Css s s d ds-
h ss f szd w d. I s s f h w x wd
s v h M U, hs sd h ds f E-s
ds ds v s d d dz w s h s f
h -s s hd Thh d R h 1980s. I sh, ss x
h h ss - E d s vd hh s
Ks w d.
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22 | KFGWorking Paper No. 52 | October 2013
Th sd s f an-cyclicalscalcapacity h f f djs s fd
sshd h E v ws dd J 2012 h Ts Pd-
Sh G f E ss (N E 2012: 3032). I ws s dd -
s f h Psd f h E C, h d ssq C ss d h Csss (2012) B f d d d .13 B h
d ws h f h F Psds (f h E C, h Css,
h E G, d h ECB) whh hszd h d f commonbutlimitedshockabsorpon
funconhcouldtaketheformofaninsurance-typesystembetweenEuroareacountries.Contribuons
from,anddisbursementsto,naonalbudgetswoulductuateaccordingtoeachcountrysposionover
theeconomiccycle(V R . 2012: 1011).14 I h , v, Ed . (2013)
hv sd h f djs s fd d d sd s-
sd shw h sfs h ds w dvd- s d h
Ez v wd hv shd h sss s f s.
Th s s f w ss: Fs, wds h xs f h - d-
sz s f f whh d h s--x-
s d h vd h f h M U. Ad, sd, wds h d
f - s ss h s whh d h S
P d h Fs P. If hs shs hd dd h Csss (1990) O M, O M
ss d h Msh T, h E wd hv d q h ss dd. Th qs
s, hwv, whh h ds, f h w dd w, wd s h wh h ss h
w f dd.
O qs s h v vss f - s wh s wh
- d. I G hs, , h hv sv -
ss whh h Bundesbanks s d h s f h vs s x-
s (Shf 1991). B h s h v. Th s s d s,
d x dsshs hs f s s d vd h vs
s f - s sfs EMU ss. B f s h ssv d
ss s h Ez s s h h s.
Ad d h s E hs d wh hh s qs d s-sd
fs d d ds dd d ss v x s. I hss s, hf, h xs f - s ss wd hv
- ss ( h f w, ECB s sdd
s f G d s sv f GIIPS s), s h d s f h
s qs. Th s s h hs ss d hv.
13 Th Css dd dd s s sd Cv d Cv Is
vs s s s-sd s fs
(Css 2012: 2123).14 Th f h F Psds s s - ssds s ss-
s s v.
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Political Legitimacy in a Non-optimal Currency Area| 23
G d h, s f h qs fgrowthpromoonthroughscalreaon
h wd s h sv ss h ss s. Sh
ds s d s s -f s, s d ds, wh
d h d s qs sd h ss s (f x, Bh2013; K 2013). If hs w xd, f s, wd d sd wd s
d h s d ss. S j s ss wd hv d h hh
s ssdzd x d (hh Eds h OMTs f h ECB) hh ssv
s sfs f h ss ss h d ss. Th s, hwv, h h
f ssv s , ss s fs, wd d h dd
s f h s E .
Th s s d x ds hh s d h ss f vss
hh dv d s ss d h s f v s ss
, s h d . Mssv s wd d s ds dd d
hs ds vs. B dss f hw s d, wd s s
d hs vs h d f - ds. H h v dd f h
s wd s . Ws , f s w v s-
, wd d, v vs, h dwwd sss ws, whh
h sss f h -dv s dds. If dv w f, hwv, d f
d h GIIPS s w v, j- v vs wd
f d s s ws ssdzd. Ud sh ds, v h EuropeanMarshall
Plan h s s d h G S Ds d s sf-ss
v.15
Th s f s d h d f ss sfs v s sh h
ss s sz h f hh-, d d s-sss sss. B wd
q v sf (d q ) f s16 vd s
h wd d s ss f sf-s d
.17
T d, ss h wh h s fw f h M U, dsssd
Ks dds ds f h ss s E d sv h sh- d d- ss f h ss s. Fs sfs wd
15 Th sss f h Msh P sw Ws G ssv dv f h w
dd Dsh.
16 If sfs w sd, f s, s s, h s f sv ws wd
d vss; f h w d s s, s d-
s dd wd s - ds; f dd fds w sd d -
s, h wd d d ss d h v vss s w s h -
.
17 Wh Es G ws d wh Ws G ss vvd xh whh ws -
d hh dv, hs h w dds, w Es f Ws-Es sfs
d ssds, s ssv - s GDP h s s 70 f
h Ws v.
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24 | KFGWorking Paper No. 52 | October 2013
f sz s-s sss d v ss v, d h h s s
h f s-sd s h v vss. B h s
xd h d f s d d d-
d x sfs.
5. I L f h Ps E R?
F -d sv, h wds, h ss f sssf s f h E
ss d. If h M U s d, h f h hs
s/s-sd d Ks/dd-sd ssd wh s v sd s.
Ws , h hv x s ds sqs: Th s E -
ss ssv ss h d s, wh h d ss d x -
ss f h ss s. B s, h Ks v wd v h s f h
d ss wd dd ssv sfs h xs f xs d svs
h ss s. I s h h f hs ds hs h ds h h ss
f E d d dsssd.
I s s f, h E s dds h -d d
s h h s sd h ECB d sd C d h Css w, h
fs f, f h v f h ss s, d h h w h
v h f w s h s f h M U.
Ths hs hv d s s s h vds -f
s h f f -d sss d f d
h ss d.
Th f d s s vs h s f hEuropeanCentralBank, whh hs
- h w E . Is s szd h
d h ws f h G Bundesbank, whs h ddd s
d whs f ss d hv hd s j. I, h ECBs
-d hd sd h f h s d s s h Ez wd s d v d. I ws wd h q ds-
v s f s -d s dvd ss. Ad h f -d
sf hs dd h s ds, hh vs d
vs hs h s f d wh s sv h E. S f, hwv, h ECBs
s hs vd ss ss sj h xs f s
v ws -d d .
I swh s fsh, h wf f h EuropeanCommission E s d
h d f f E w hs ddd h -d d,
s Vv Shd (2013) hs ssd, hh-d h f dd d
s f h E s d f f s ss s h
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Political Legitimacy in a Non-optimal Currency Area| 27
Mv, z E vs f -f- wd hdd
h ds zd h d s. Th M U d s dfs hv d
ssv s f whh h s d ss. Ev ss f Ks
d E Msh P, whh -f- wd s , s-sd wh s ss d dv sd s h d hd s h d f
s d h hss f h sss. I s, hwv, s wd
ddss h E ss d h s, h wd s fs h , , d
sss f -E ds.
Th dd s, f s, h h s f E shd d h sd
ss h h s d v d -
s (Hs 2011). Ad h s dd vd h Es hv h
s f E s h dsv s s sss f h w s (Ghds/
Lfd 2013). B h sd qd h E ss wd f s dd h . I f,
h w hv s h Ws-Es sfs G whh, f h d
w 1990 d 2010, w sd w Es (Bs 2012). I h s, hwv,
h f sd ws sf ds. Ad d , h sfs d zd
Es G h xs fd d wf-s f Ws G. Ths
Es Gs w s dd h -s-- s s ss, wh -
s w djsd s dd. S, h Nw Lnder f h hz d v
qz sh f G s fds, whh, h s h, s d
s w dd h w vs f s . Mv, xs -x
sh ws sd d d f dd sfs f h fd d. I h wds,
Ws-Es ds d d ws d s sss s s G s.
I E, hwv, h sshd dsv s h d s vd. N
d sd s f d. I wd hv E v d
whh, wh s (Rss 2011; Ghds/Lfd 2013), ss s h -
qsd ss f h d d hs . H dsv
s . Mv, h sss f Ws-Es ds G
w h s h hs h s E vss: Gv h x ddss
f ss s, f s, wd sd ds f w- x s ws d s h d ss? O d -s s sfs jsd s
s ss d x- fd h w xs f h h? Ad
shd s d s dd s v f h Ez, h
v wh whh s d qs h s f Id d h xs f Sv
d Es, f -E s, sh s R? I sh, h h f ss-sd,
-s, , s f wh shd d wh shd w v
vs, d s wd h qs f whh E s shd xz
d v shd h s d dvs f E ss
(A 2013). If hs sss w s E s, s h h d
svd sss.
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Political Legitimacy in a Non-optimal Currency Area| 29
js f sss hs dss dss h s s, d h
f h ss d vs vvd s ss w s
h, wh sd d s w s xsv ds. Ev, h,
h w s f h h dvsv s, d s fv- h s f h h (Hs 1998) h s j v
f s sss. Th s s h h E zs, s h
ss, h s d h dd, hv d vd sd
ds hs h. I ws s h, hf, h EU - h -
d wd v ss d h ss f h C Mhd d f s-
s d h f s- d whh j vs wd
ddd dfdd s dss d d (Ps 2003).
Uf, hwv, h v s sss d h E v s w
d h d E s f h E ss. I hs h h
s vvd s h h. N h ds f h q ss, s h ss f
TV ws d d hds w ds d s h E ss
h hh ss fw s . B v f h d sh f
w, wh s w h h s s s d fs
h h ss. Ad wh h d s h E v
ss h sf-sd s f s w h v wd
sss d v dsh.
Wh s s, hwv, h ds d d dvsv s dsssd v. Th
s s ss ( d, f h ) dssss f v vs
h wd wd h ss f h E ss wh ds s h
v d s sz, h wh f ds f h ds f djs.
Ud hs ds, s d vd s s h
fs f E-wd d -E z. Isd, h wd hv d wh hh
s d v dvsv s v wh shd s d wh shd hv , f wh s
d hw h.
Ud hs ds, s z E s s d h f ss h E v v fh (B 2006). Ad f ds w
v s j , hs sd Nh
js d s v Sh ss, Sh d Es js v Nh
ss, h dd ds E hs.
I sh, f f f hh P U d E d, h E ss
ss s f h s - E , d wh v
v Ks hs d s sfs. Ths s s s. B h
s h s v.19
19 Th s, f s, -dd: I h s f ss wds, s-sd ds h
h v h vss f GIIPS s, wh s s wd d x s-
fs. B hs h s f d ws f h v f sfs w v s v-
ss d v wh ss w h d f sfs.
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Political Legitimacy in a Non-optimal Currency Area| 33
Theodoropoulou, Soria/Wa, Andrew 2012: Wh Dd Th Ex? Lsss f E f sv x- v f h s G - , : ETUI W P2012/10, Bsss: E Td U Is.
VanRompuy,Herman/Barroso,JosManuel/Juncker,Jean-Claude/Draghi,Mario 2012: Twds GE d M U, 05 D 2012, : h://www.s../ds/s_D/ds/ssd///134069.df, vd 01 O 2013.
Zalc, Julien 2013: Th Es Ads E: A Dw Ld h Css?, :Fd R Sh, E Isss 277, 7 M 2013.
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Th K-Fsh - E Ad Exh d
Isv Rsh
Th K-Fsh (KFG) s w fd -hd h G Rsh Fd 2008. I s - f h KFG vd s s v
whh vv sh s d wh dss dd wh s f s d j shs.
Th K-Fsh Th Tsfv Pw f Es h sh E s h B-Bd- d szs h wh h v-ss d sh ss. I xs h f h EU s - d f ds, z h hss d sf d x ds sss h sh s:
Id d h P Sh
C, Cd d Bd
Cv Rs d Es Ex Rs