political economy of reform: dynasties, poverty …...political economy of reform: dynasties,...

Political Economy of Reform: Dynasties, Poverty and the RH Law

Ronald Umali Mendoza, PhD

On Implemen)ng reforms like the RH Law…

A ques)on of capacity and exper)se?

•  Are LGUs, par)cularly its execu)ves, ready to implement the RH Law?

Or a ques)on of poli)cal economy?

•  Are LGUs, par)cularly its execu)ves, commiEed and accountable to empower ci)zens and end poverty?

Highly unequal society…

76% of the wealth in the Philippines was held by the top decile in 2014. This is an increase from the 69.2% in 2007.

Inequality in educa?on

0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 Cavite

Pangasinan Tarlac

Nueva Ecija Camarines Sur

Albay Abra

Davao del Norte Agusan del Norte

Nueva Vizcaya Oriental Mindoro

Quirino Masbate Cotabato

Zamboanga del Sur Lanao del Norte

Samar Bukidnon

2000

1980

Source: Computa?ons of Mesa (2007) from census data

STRUCTURAL REFORMS TO ADDRESS POVERTY AND INEQUALITY

Challenges to Sexual and Reproduc)ve Health Policy Reform

1.  Reform threatens the posi?on of the status quo

2.  Beneficiaries of reform have li^le or no influence in policymaking

3.  Issue is a cultural taboo 4.  Percep?on of the reform’s complexity

HB 4244 (RH Law, 15th Congress): Roman Catholic Propor?on (X-‐Axis) vs. % “Yes” Vote of Congressmen

in 3rd Reading (Y-‐Axis), Per Province 0

.000

00

.200

00

.400

00

.600

00

.800

01

.000

0

0.0000 0.2000 0.4000 0.6000 0.8000 1.0000RC

THIRDREAD Fitted values

Poverty vs. 2nd and 3rd Reading Yes Vo?ng Provincial Propor?on

MALFUNCTIONING PARTY SYSTEM: DYNASTIES

Innova?ons in this Study

•  THIN DYNASTY •  FAT DYNASTY

A Snapshot of One Political Dynasty: “Fat –type”

Sibling

Spouse

Cousin

PBM (Provincial Board Member) Note: Incumbent posi?ons are in brackets.

Distor'ons in Local Public Finance?

Ravanilla (2012): study of legislators and their use of “pork barrel” funds from 2001-‐2010;

Legislators bias distribu?on of their cons?tuency development fund (CDF) in favor of local patrons and allies ;

More poli?cal compe??on (?ghter Congressional races) tend to exacerbate this clientelis?c distribu?on bias.

Mendoza, Beja, Venida and Yap. 2012. “Inequality in democracy: Insights from an empirical analysis of poli)cal dynas)es in the 15th Philippine Congress”. Philippine Poli'cal Science Journal 33(2):132-‐145. h^p://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1969605

ü 70% of the 15th Philippine Congress is dynas?c; and dynas?es dominate all of the major poli?cal par?es.

ü On average, there are more dynas?es in regions with higher poverty and lower human development.

ü Dynas?es tend to be richer (higher SALNs) when one outlier is removed among present non-‐dynas?es (MP).

ü 80% of the youngest Congressmen (age 26-‐40) are from dynas?c clans.

Dynas?c and Non-‐Dynas?c Elected Officials (2013): Maguindanao

AMPATUAN Ø 6 MAYORS Ø 4 VICE MAYORS Ø 13 COUNCILORS

Distribu)on of “Fat” Dynas)es

NOTE: AMPATUANS WERE TRIMMED. THE NUMBER OF AMPATUANS ON ALL LEVELS THEY PREVIOUSLY OCCUPIED DECREASED. 163

123

60

0 50 100 150 200 250

DYNASTIC

NONDYNASTIC

FAT THIN

AMPATUAN, 23

MIDTIMBANG, 12

MANGUDADATU, 11

SINSUAT, 10

LUMENDA, 5

ABDULLAH, 4

ANGAS, 4

KALI, 4

MAMALAPAT, 4 PAGLAS, 4

SANGKI, 4

UTTO, 4

ALI, 3 KASIM, 3

MAMA, 3

MASUKAT, 3

PENDATUN, 3

SABAL, 3

ALIM, 2

BIANG, 2 BUAT, 2

DAGALANGIT, 2 DELNA, 2 DILANGALEN, 2 DIMAUKOM, 2 DIOCOLANO, 2 DUKAY, 2 EBUS, 2 IBANEZ, 2 IBRAHIM, 2

IMAM, 2 KATAMBAK, 2

LANGKUNO, 2 LAUBAN, 2

MACAPEGES, 2 MALAGUIAL, 2 MAMALO, 2 MAMASABULOD, 2

MATALAM, 2 MUSA, 2 MUSTAPHA, 2

PIANG, 2

SALENDAB, 2

SANDIGAN, 2 SEMA, 2 TALUSAN, 2

Dynas?c and Non-‐Dynas?c Elected Officials (2013): Dinagat Islands

ECLEO Ø 1 GOVERNOR Ø 1 VICE GOVERNOR Ø 3 MAYORS Ø 2 COUNCILORS Ø 2 PROVINCIAL BOARD MEMBERS

Distribu)on of “Fat” Dynas)es

ECLEO, 10

LONGOS, 3

BORJA, 2 CREENCIA, 2 LADAGA, 2

LISONDRA, 2

LLAMERA, 2

LUIB, 2

PELISMINO, 2 TAN, 2

VARGAS, 2

31

49

3

0 10 20 30 40 50 60

DYNASTIC

NONDYNASTIC

FAT THIN

NOTE: NON DYNASTICS DECREASED FROM 2010 TO 2013 IN ALL THREE PROVINCES SHOWN. NOTE: MOTHER ECLEO FOUGHT AND DEFEATED HER OWN DAUGHTER.

Snapshot of Inequality – Ecleo Castle and fishing village in Dinagat Islands

How do Non-‐Dynas'es Stack Against Dynas'es?

Source: AIM Policy Center’s 2013 Elec?ons Survey.

9 40 19 4 3 5

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90

GOVERNOR

DYN UNCON

DYN BEAT DYN

DYN BEAT NONDYN

NONDYN BEAT DYN

NONDYN UNCON

NONDYN BEAT NONDYN


How do Non-‐Dynas'es Stack Against Dynas'es?

172 425 445 247 67 215

0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400 1600 1800

MAYOR

DYN UNCON

DYN BEAT DYN

DYN BEAT NONDYN

NONDYN BEAT DYN

NONDYN UNCON

NONDYN BEAT NONDYN

MALFUNCTIONING PARTY SYSTEM: TURNCOATISM

Excessive Turncoa'sm?


Share of Party-‐Switchers in Different Legislatures/Parliaments

4.53%

15.64%

19.28%

33.35%

33.49%

0.00% 5.00% 10.00% 15.00% 20.00% 25.00% 30.00% 35.00% 40.00%

Spain (1977-‐1996)

Italy (1987-‐1996)

Japan (1993-‐2003)

Brazil (1990-‐2002)

Philippines (1987-‐2010)

Turncoats Dominate


MUNICIPAL MAYORS ACCORDING TO AFFILIATION DECISION (2013 ELECTIONS)

239

18

1331

740

42

1524

0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000

NEW CAND

STAY

SWITCH

WIN LOSS

020

4060

5000 10000 15000 20000 25000 30000CAPITA

MIDSWITCH Fitted values

Regional Per Capita Income, 2003 (X-‐Axis) vs. Average Share of Party-‐Switchers during Midterm Polls, 2007 and 2013 (Y-‐Axis)

Source: Policy Center staff calcula?ons based on data obtained from BLES (2003); NSCB; Balisacan, Hill, and Piza (2007); and Tecson (2007)

Share of Agricultural Workers, 2003 (X-‐Axis) vs. Average Share of Party-‐Switchers during Midterm Polls, 2007 and 2013 (Y-‐Axis)

020

4060

0 20 40 60 80AGRI



020

4060

0 5 10 15 20UNI


Share of Higher Educa?on Ins?tu?ons, 2003 (X-‐Axis) vs. Average Share of Party-‐Switchers during Midterm Polls, 2007 and 2013 (Y-‐Axis)


A Na'on Led by Dynas'es and Turncoats


Share of Non-‐Dynas)es and Dynas)es among Party-‐Switchers in the Philippine House of Representa)ves, 2004-‐2013

20 27 29

68

2

8 9

12 26

18 24

22

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

2004 2007 2010 2013

Non-‐Dynasty

Thin Dynasty

Fat Dynasty

This presenta?on builds on: Mendoza, R.U., E.Beja, V.Venida and D.Yap. 2012. “An Empirical Analysis of Poli?cal Dynas?es in the 15th Congress.” Philippine Poli*cal Science Journal 33(2):132-‐145. This study is conducted with the support of the Asian Ins?tute of Management Scien?fic Research Founda?on and the Konrad Adenauer Founda?on. The views expressed herein are the authors’ and these do not necessarily reflect the views and policies of the Asian Ins?tute of Management, and the Konrad Adenauer Founda?on.

DEMOCRACY AND INCLUSIVE GROWTH

AIM Policy Center / hEp://Policy.aim.edu

Poli)cal Dynas)es and Poverty/Inequality Empirical link between poli)cal dynas)es and poverty/inequality:

• PREDATORY VIEW: Dynas?es increase P/I -‐-‐ If dynas?es are associated with rent-‐seeking and state capture, corrup?on and ineffec?ve and poorly designed policies (e.g. Proud’homme, 1995; Hutchcrow and Rocamora, 2003).

• STATIONARY BANDIT: Dynas?es reduce P/I -‐-‐ If dynas?es have longer “runways” for reform and are more firmly associated with socio-‐economic outcomes (e.g. Olson, 2003; Solon et al, 2009; Dal Bo and Rossi, 2009).

• LONG RUNWAY FOR REFORMS: Dynas?es are be^er able to pursue reforms with longer-‐term gesta?on periods for results; policy stability and con?nuity that investors would prefer

Addi)onal complexity:

• PATRONAGE: High P/I tends to increase dynas?c prevalence: the poor vote for dynas?es as long as these are able to directly provide support during elec?ons or in ?mes of income shocks (e.g. Coronel, 1998; Manacsa and Tan, 2005).

• SELF-‐PERPETUATION: Poli?cians are capable of developing dynas?es: being in public office affords poli?cians the opportunity and means to keep on winning or to increase their heirs’ chances of winning (e.g. Dal Bo et al, 2009; Querrubin 2010).

Reproduc)ve Health Law

•  The core thrust of the Reproduc?ve Health Law is freedom of choice. The law is designed to provide Filipinos with opportuni)es to avail of quality reproduc)ve health care services, methods, devices, and supplies. The law intends to promote, first and foremost, responsible parenthood.

•  The law is underpinned by the desire to promote gender equality, further empower Filipino women, and guarantee the welfare of Filipino children.

•  The law places emphasis on responsible parenthood. The law is not meant to constrain the freedom of individuals to have children or limit popula?on growth.

0.52

0.7

0.7

0.71

0.75

0.76

0.79

0.81

0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9

REPUBLIC OF KOREA

INDONESIA

CHINA

VIETNAM

CAMBODIA

PHILIPPINES

THAILAND

MONGOLIA

Ra)o of female-‐to-‐male wages for selected countries (2007)

Source: Toward Gender Equality in East Asia and the Pacific Conference Edi?on, World Bank (2012)

171.05

142.8

206.44

223.66

197.39

195.79

314.45

302.37

0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350

FARMERS, FORESTRY WORKERS, AND FISHERMEN

LABORERS AND UNSKILLED WORKERS

SERVICE WORKERS AND SHOP/MARKET SALES WORKERS

TRADES AND RELATED WORKERS

Average Daily Basic Pay for Selected Low Income Occupa)onal Groups (2011)

Male (PHP) Female (PHP)

Source: 2011 Department of Labor and Employment Data

political economy of reform: dynasties, poverty …...political economy of reform: dynasties,...

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