political branding is good for democracy
DESCRIPTION
The emergence of modern political branding in the Philippines, while not without the risks posited in mature democracies, represents shifts in voter mobilization that feed from and into increasing public demand for platforms and serious debate, challenging the old order of cacique politics, and signaling a departure from what has thus far been an unrepresentative democracy.TRANSCRIPT
SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF MSC POLITICS AND COMMUNICATIONAT THE LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS AND POLITICAL SCIENCEJANUARY 21, 2013
BY: FELICITY [email protected]
The emergence of political branding is good for democracy.
Branding, the “hallmark” of modern political communications, is viewed as ersatz ideology
especially in electoral contexts: a sales pitch during the political point of sale where voters are
consumers and candidates are products (Mitsikopoulou, 2008; Scammell, 2007, p. 176). It
reduces political information to symbols and images constructed on the basis strategic
marketing research, and so enables the shifting of shallow ideological roots for electoral gain
(Dean & Croft, 2009; Scammell). Political branding is thus often derided as a means to an end,
and is seen to narrow the political agenda to the detriment of democratic processes (Marsh &
Fawcett, 2011). Such arguments against political branding, however, do not appear to fully apply
to a “dysfunctional democracy” like the Philippines (Dressel, 2011, p. 53), as recent trends in
elections there suggest. In the Philippines, often characterized as a “cacique democracy”
(Anderson, 1988), the rise of modern political branding represents a decisive shift in voter
mobilization and government responsiveness that has the potential to shrink the country’s
democratic deficits (Hedman, 2010a).
The increasing robustness of market-driven branding in Philippine elections indicates the
weakening ability of political machines to ‘deliver’ votes based on kinship networks, non-
ideological alliances and coercion. Fueled by the rise of mass media, modern political branding
challenges the primacy of clientelist “command votes” by activating “market votes” that are
more responsive to the electorate (Teehankee, 2006). Its practice also indicates decreasing
barriers to entry in the political arena, opening doors for political outsiders to construct counter-
narratives to politics as usual (Bionat, 1998). An examination of recent presidential elections
shows the dependence of weak political brands on patronage and bossism, which is at the core
of the “crisis” of Philippine democracy (Hutchcroft & Rocamora, 2003, p. 281). And as evident in
the 2010 race, the injection of political branding as “something new” in Philippine politics
necessitates some form of responsive ideology that can foster reflexive governance (Hedman,
2010a). Because political machines continue to dominate local elections due to higher
incidences of poverty and less access to media in remote regions (Bionat), the analysis here will
be limited to presidential races in the post-dictatorship era. Even so, the emergence of modern
political branding in the Philippines, while not without the risks posited in mature democracies,
represents shifts in voter mobilization that feed from and into increasing public demand for
platforms and serious debate, challenging the old order of cacique politics, and signaling a
departure from what has thus far been an unrepresentative democracy.
From Feudal to Mass Politics: Political Branding and the rise of the Market Vote
Political brands are unique, identifiable symbols and associations embodied in names or
trademarks that serve to differentiate between political actors, notably as candidates during
elections (Mitsikopoulou, 2008). Brands are a “form of condensed meaning” (O'Shaughnessy,
2002 cited in Mitsikopoulou) summarizing ideas and attributes packaged in a single product: the
candidate. A political brand is thus the “psychological representation” of the candidate from the
point of view of the voter, an affinity known as brand equity (Scammell, 2007, p. 177). In the
Philippines, brand equity may be outcomes of patron-client relationships, inherited from non-
political contexts or, most recently, manufactured from readings of the public mood. As such, a
modern political brand is not just an identifier but an identity that needs to be “designed,
positioned and driven to grow” through the segmentation and targeting of the electoral market
(McDivitt, 2003 cited in Marsh & Fawcett, 2011). Political branding in the modern sense is thus
the strategic construction of an emotional connection representing the electorate’s rational and
irrational preferences in candidate selection (Scammell) and can be viewed as a new form of
voter mobilization, usually in the absence of distinct political ideologies.
Voter mobilization in the Philippines has historically been dominated by the dynamics of “feudal
politics” from which “command votes” are drawn (Teehankee, 2010, p. 118):
Bloc votes…are gathered and delivered through [a network of] political machines and bailiwicks, usually negotiated through leaders and gatekeepers.
Command votes are a result of – and often used to justify – electoral manipulation that cascade
from and into a political system variously referred to as caciquism, bossism and clientelism, or
more descriptively, “guns, goons and gold” (Quimpo, 2010, p. 51; Thompson, 2010a). Because
name recognition has long been among the most crucial metrics for candidate selection,
coupled with the “winnability factor” of bailiwick networks, Philippine brand politics in the
traditional sense can be associated with political dynasties: some 160 families to which nearly 20
percent of all Philippine legislators since 1907 belong (Institute of Philippine Culture, 2005, p.
134; Perron, 2009; Teehankee, 2007). An “enduring feature of Philippine politics,” these clans
utilize the mileage of their family name, bolstered by their alliances, socio-economic stature and
access to state resources, to actively pursue elected office (Teehankee, 2007). Their
consolidated power form political machines expressly built to mobilize and influence electoral
outcomes for the protection of economic and personal interests (Teehankee). Political scions
dispense patronage in exchange for votes, and when their economic bases are weak or
threatened, their machines enable fraudulent and coercive tactics to secure their election
(Perron, 2009; Teehankee).
The ascendancy of mass media and increasing urbanization after Martial Law have been linked
to the declining influence of traditional brands as such on the electorate (Hedman, 2010a;
Teehankee, 2010), but have not been sufficient to supplant the primacy of command voting.
Instead, it appears it is the emergence of a new kind of political brand coinciding with the rising
influence of mass media that began to change the political game in the post-dictatorship era.
The victory of political newcomer Fidel Ramos over traditional powerhouses in the 1992
presidential race is credited to a well-oiled political machine that backed him, bestowed via the
incumbent’s endorsement (Teehankee, 2006). In the following elections, however, movie icon
Joseph Estrada captured the presidency with double the votes of his closest rival, a “classic
clientelist, command-vote politician” with a nationally recognizable family name (Thompson,
2010b, p. 9; Table 1). Estrada targeted his campaign to the largest segment of the emergent
vote market: classes D and E or the masa, representing 90 percent of the population (Social
Weather Stations, 2011; Teehankee, 2010). Despite being a political veteran with his own
machinery, Estrada is typically considered a political outsider (Dressel, 2011). It was his strong
brand equity – an extreme popularity among the lower classes sourced from his proletariat
movie persona – that attracted political networks into his fold (Hedman, 2001; Teehankee,
2006; Thompson, 2010b). Popularly known as Erap, an anagram of the Tagalog word for buddy,
Estrada sealed his affinity with the poor with the slogan Erap para sa mahirap (tr. ‘Erap is for the
poor’) (Hedman, 2010b). He actively circumvented traditional clientelist networks, preferring
media to machinery as his primary campaign strategy (Thompson, 2010a; 2010b). Splitting
bailiwicks across the archipelago, the Erap brand soundly crushed command-vote dominance
with market votes, signaling the emergence of the modern political brand as a force to contend
with.
Powerful brands, political legitimacy and the democratic deficit
The democratic deficit in the Philippines boils down to the government’s failure to respond to
“pent-up demands and pressures from below,” fueled and exacerbated by patronage politics
(Hutchcroft & Rocamora, 2003, p. 259) that the implications of political branding appear to
address, even if limitedly. Political branding does not necessarily promise an end to elite
democracy; Estrada’s pro-poor brand was after all a pseudo-populist appeal, where ‘populism’ is
an alternative form of pro-capitalist governance featuring cronyism and “perfunctory alliances
with leading leftists” (Thompson, 2010a, p. 25). Modern brands do however offer political
legitimacy in terms of voter mandate, especially among the masa. Political legitimacy is
understood by the lower classes as bestowed by the people through elections, itself seen as the
“legitimate democratic process” of representation and, more crucially, as a mechanism of
expressing their power (Institute of Philippine Culture, 2005, p. 101). A legitimate electoral
victory, which recent election trends suggest is achieved through strong, insurmountable
brands, is thus a pre-requisite in bridging the democratic deficit.
The crippling effects of command voting on political legitimacy and, ultimately, democracy, is
perhaps most evident in the “stolen election” of 2004 (Teehankee, 2010, p. 115), which likewise
highlights how voter mobilization strategy depends largely on a candidate’s brand or lack
thereof. If political branding is understood as image and personality politics (Mitsikopoulou,
2008), then 2004 victor Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo’s brand was “at sea,” despite various
makeover attempts (Teehankee; Thompson, 2010b, p. 10). In the absence of a political brand
that would attract market votes, Arroyo – a political veteran, daughter of a former president and
member of the landed elite – actuated clientelism to win enough command votes to crush the
market votes of her populist challenger, another cinema idol who sought to replicate the
“Estrada juggernaut" (Thompson, pp. 9-11). Through years of dispensing political patronage,
including with state funds and to powerful warlords and politicos, Arroyo machinated large-
scale fraud that involved bribing election officials, extensive voter disenfranchisement and
hundreds of extrajudicial killings, to pad a lead of just over one million votes in the official tally
(Desuasido, 2006; Table 1).
Both the Estrada and Arroyo governments have been classified as predatory (Quimpo, 2010),
but Estrada had what Arroyo lacked: support from the heretofore-underrepresented masses.
Estrada had secured nearly 40 percent of the vote in 1998 thanks to the numerical strength of
the poor, garnering more votes than his next two challengers combined, and twice the votes
Ramos won in 1992 (Table 1). In contrast, Arroyo’s controversial victory rendered her so
“distrusted and despised” that “many Filipinos say…in public that they do not recognize her as
president” (Desuasido, 2006, p. 53). Thus, while Estrada’s plunderous presidency was
infamously short-lived, the masa considered him their legitimate leader, with many thousands
of them counter-protesting the middle class-led Edsa Dos demonstrations that ultimately
unseated the popular president in 2001 (Hutchcroft & Rocamora, 2003; Institute of Philippine
Culture, 2005). Edsa Dos was hailed as a triumph in demanding government accountability, but
it also exposed the gap between political forces and the will of the poor and marginalized
(Hutchcroft & Rocamora). Manifesting in 1998 and again in 2001, the connection the Erap brand
established with the masses unleashed the “voice of the electorate” (Scammell, 2007, p. 190). If
voters’ willingness to assert their choice – whether by ballot or street – is an expression of
democracy (Mangahas, personal communication, 2012), then despite the glaring deficiencies of
Estrada’s presidency, the “pull factor” of his brand (Teehankee, 2010, p. 117) had at the very
least loosened the constraints to democratic participation.
Narratives, ‘Megacepts’ and Public Opinion: Branding in the 2010 Elections
The 2010 presidential contest presented an opportunity to address layers of democratic and
legitimation crises by providing an “institutional mechanism” of replacing Arroyo (Teehankee,
2010, p. 115) and by correcting the flaws of Estrada’s branding strategy. By the 2010 election
cycle, public opinion polling had become a social fact in Philippine electoral politics, acting as
“fever chart[s] to guide and shape campaign strategies” (Bionat, 1998, p. 145; Hedman, 2010b).
Media influence, judging by record advertising expenditures, also reached a fever pitch (De Los
Reyes, 2010). Through the “politics of public opinion,” Noynoy Aquino cultivated his winning
brand not only on the basis of demographics but the issues circulating in the public sphere
(Hedman, 2010b). His reflexive brand strategy played a decisive role in producing a national
leader elected by the largest plurality since 1986, with a wide margin and, crucially, dominating
across all regions and social classes (Hutchcroft, 2010; Figures 1.1-2). The “hopes embodied in
the new Aquino presidency” have rendered the 2010 elections a watershed for Philippine
democracy and potentially its future (Dressel, 2011, p. 530).
One explanation for Aquino’s landslide victory in 2010 is the cycle of “clientelism, populism and
reformism” in Philippine politics (Thompson, 2010a, p. 25), but closer examination suggests that
brand politics was a key factor in determining the next phase of the cycle, as in 1998 and 2004.
Indeed, reformist Aquino and fellow contender, populist senator Manuel Villar, ranked among
the top brands of 2010 alongside consumer goods (Mangahas, 2010). Villar outspent and ‘out-
jingled’ Aquino ten-to-one, even amassing the “country’s largest political machine” to
complement his market-vote appeal (De Los Reyes, 2010; Thompson, 2010b, pp. 16-17). On the
other hand, Aquino, the son of democracy heroes, had the built-in advantage of a “meta-
narrative of family and nation, the Aquinos and the Philippines” (Hedman, 2010b, p. 111). Four
months before the election, Aquino and Villar were statistically tied in the opinion polls (Figure
2). While both candidates employed degrees of hybridization in voter mobilization, ultimately,
“how people feel about the candidates” would decide the election (Rocamora, 2010, p. 88;
Thompson, 2010b).
Establishing emotional connections is a hallmark of political branding, and one way brands build
such relationships is by creating a set of promises and expectations catering to voters’ needs
and wants, thereby encouraging participation (Mitsikopoulou, 2008; Dean & Croft, 2009).
Among masa voters in the Philippines, expectations of “dedication to the service of the people”
is the primary notion of leadership; hence, because they evoke assurances of strong will and
guidance in public service, image and personality rank as the top criterion for candidate
selection (Institute of Philippine Culture, 2005, pp. 19-21). Consequently, Aquino’s and Villar’s
brands took the form of megacepts – “easily appreciable core issue[s]” that engage the
electorate (Bionat, 1998, p. 85). These megacepts and the promises they imply are projected via
narratives and images, which voters then use to gauge character traits that signal these
leadership values (Institute of Philippine Culture; Mitsikopoulou, 2008). They were also
projected in colors: orange and yellow to represent Villar and Aquino, respectively, and the
ideals they embodied (Bayos, 2010). Aquino’s brand was predicated on his parents’ political
legacy, a heritage that bestowed on him a clean and honest pro-democracy image (Thompson,
2010b, p. 15). Public grief over his mother’s death furthermore “transformed into political
capital” for the relatively obscure senator, who declared his candidacy amidst the unraveling of
the Arroyo regime’s irregularities (Abinales, 2011; Thompson, p. 14). With a family name* that
“evoke[d] magic” (Magno, 2009), an untainted image and political events in his favor, the
Aquino brand had the makings of a credible reformist narrative backed by a strong, anti-
corruption megacept. In contrast, self-made billionaire Villar, a shrimp vendor’s son, constructed
a “rags-to-riches” narrative intended as an aspirational, relatable, pro-poor megacept directly
targeting the masa as well as Aquino’s lofty heritage (Rocamora, 2010, p. 87; Thompson, 2010b).
He effectively communicated that he identified with the plight of the poor (Ilagan, 2010).
Building on Estrada’s populist success, Villar developed an “applied populism” involving
sponsoring game-show segments that televised his generosity, offering a “foretaste of his
promised benevolence as...president” (Thompson, p. 17). Their brands appealed to the
competing strains of populism and reformism that “run deep in the veins of public opinion”
(Thompson, p. 18).
From a branding perspective, Aquino’s ability to respond to the popular pulse tipped the
election in his favor. Over the campaign period, opinion polls revealed competing clamors for
pro-poor representation and incorrupt leadership, and to a lesser degree, competency (Table 2).
Villar drummed up a pro-poor message and capitalized on his generally acknowledged
competency (Rocamora, 2010). In contrast, Aquino’s slogan Kung walang corrupt walang
mahirap (tr. ‘if there is no corruption, there is no poverty’) linked the dominant voter concerns
of corruption and poverty, reflected his incorrupt image, and was flanked by a solid reformist
* Referencing the Aquino franchise, Thompson notes: “Filipinos also appear to believe that there are such things as ‘good’ dynasties” (2010b, p.15).
narrative. Brand narratives are deliberately left unfinished for voters to adopt as their own
(Mitsikopoulou, 2008). Aquino’s compelled voters to help him combat corruption through the
promise of participatory governance enshrined in his platform, A Social Contract with the Filipino
People, ironed out by a policy unit representing a spectrum of civil society actors (Rocamora,
2010). Finally, exploiting Villar’s refusal to seriously engage with the booming anti-corruption
discourse, the Aquino campaign branded the billionaire Villarroyo – “Arroyo’s real candidate”
(Abinales, 2011; Cabreza, 2010). On May 10, 2010, Villar captured only 16 percent of the vote
and promptly conceded (Abinales).
Political events may have set the stage for his victory, but the uphill battle against the populist
narrative strongly suggests Aquino needed to translate political capital into votes, by
communicating to voters the authenticity of his core values and the associated promises: the
“Noynoy [Aquino] phenomenon” (De Quiros, 2009) was successful political branding in action.
Viewed in terms of brand strategy (Marsh & Fawcett, 2011), the Aquino brand was defined
based on democratic ideals and the public zeitgeist, communicated through a credible image
and narrative, and managed such that his campaign megacept is sustained in governance. The
final aspect is paramount to the potential of political branding in fostering democracy. Where
Estrada’s brand was “window dressing,” Aquino’s has for the most part proven authentic
(Thompson, 2010b, p. 19), and authenticity is necessary if branding is to improve democracy
(Marsh & Fawcett). While democracy is in general difficult to measure, Aquino’s recent 78
percent approval rating across all sectors of society seems to indicate he is on the right path: the
Daang Matuwid (tr. ‘the un-crooked path’), it seems, of his current governance campaign (Pulse
Asia, 2012; Ubac, 2013). While this is a positive illustration of how political branding constitutes
the new permanent campaign (Scammell, 2007), it should be noted that Aquino is
constitutionally barred from seeking re-election.
Conclusions
This paper aimed to (1) establish the pull factor of political branding on the electorate as the
preferable means of voter mobilization against a backdrop of caciquism; and (2) demonstrate
that when reflexive and authentic, political branding can make inroads in consolidating
democracy. Clientelism diminishes government representation and responsiveness, feeding a
“crisis of legitimacy” in the national leadership and for democracy as a whole (Dressel, 2011, p.
539), as seen in Arroyo’s case. By rallying market votes, political branding presents an
opportunity to narrow the democratic deficit. It fuels a positive shift in the expression of
“consumer power” (Scammell, 2007, p. 177) as opposed to that of political machines, evident in
Estrada’s popular election and the mass demonstrations against his ouster. Indeed, the
emotional appeals that define political branding, widely discounted as “cognitive shortcuts” for
making “uninvolved decisions” (Dean & Croft, 2009, pp. 134-135), seem to instead invigorate
the Philippine electorate. And while it can be argued that the preponderance of brand
messaging may affect voter preferences, it could equally be argued that, contrary to claims that
branding erodes political discourse (Dean & Croft), megacepts pull specific issues to the surface,
encouraging public debate of the political agenda. It appears, for instance, that the ‘brand wars’
in 2010 allowed voters to seriously deliberate the narrative that would determine the next six
years. Furthermore, by engaging with public opinion, Aquino was able to craft a brand that
responded not only to the size but the needs of the electorate, creating a “summary of
expectations” (Mitsikopoulou, 2008, p. 354) that his runaway plurality mandates him to deliver.
Authenticity is key if political branding hopes to engender democratic renewal.
Political branding, however, is no magic bullet. Politics continues to be deeply local for market
votes to supplant command votes altogether. Hybridization still exists in national campaigns,
including Aquino’s. Aquino is further accused of engaging in cronyism, and faces criticism for his
failure to address parts of the democratic agenda, including income inequality and gaps in the
freedom of information (Abinales, 2011). It will take the reconfiguration of the country’s political
structures and a realignment of mindsets to eliminate the factors underlying the democratic
crisis (Dressel, 2011). Nevertheless, political branding seems to foster citizen participation,
national debate and government reflexivity that in the Philippines are necessary, albeit not
sufficient, conditions for democratic consolidation. The elections in May 2013 may reveal
whether its transformative potential can be sustained.
APPENDIX: Tables and Figures
Table 1
Presidential Election Results 1992-2010
1992Ramos5,342,521 (23.6%)
Santiago4,468,173 (19.7%)
Other Candidates
1998Estrada10,722,295 (39.9%)
DeVenecia4,268,483 (15.9%)
Roco3,720,212 (13.8%)
2004Arroyo12,905,808 (39.9%)
Poe11,782,232 (36.5%)
Other Candidates
2010*Aquino15,208,678 (42.08%)
Estrada9,487,837 (26.25%)
Villar5,573,835 (15.42%)
Source: Teehankee (2010) and *Fernandez (2010)
Table 2
Pre-Election Survey: Voter Preferences for National PositionsMay 10, 2010 Elections
(Reason for Choosing Presidential Preference)
October 22-30, 2009 December 8-10, 2009 February 21-25, 2010
Not corrupt / clean record 21%Can do something 14%Cares for the poor 12%
Cares for the poor 27%Not corrupt / clean record 21%Good person 12%
Not corrupt / clean record 26%Cares for the poor 22%Can do something 14%
Source: Pulse Asia (2009a, 2009b, 2010)
Figure 1.1
Class ABC Class D Class E Actual Total Vote on May 10*
05
101520253035404550
44 44
35
42.08
1419
2326.25
1318
2115.42
23
13 15
6 6 6
May 2-3 National Survey: Voting Preferences for PresidentMay 10, 2010 Elections
(By Socio-Economic Class, in %)
AquinoEstradaVillarOther CandidatesUndecided
Source: Social Weather Stations (2010) and *Fernandez (2010)
Figure 1.2
National Cap-ital Region
Balance Luzon
Visayas Mindanao Actual total vote on May
10*
0
10
20
30
40
50
43 4147
3942.08
26
18
7
3026.25
10
2025
15 15.4212
1512 13
96 8
3
May 2-3 National Survey: Voting Preferences for PresidentMay 10, 2010 Elections
(By Region, in %)
AquinoEstradaVillarOther CandidatesUndecided
Source: Social Weather Stations (2010) and *Fernandez (2010)
Figure 2
Dec 5-10,
2009
Dec 27-28,
2009
Jan 21-24,
2010
Feb 24-28,
2010
Mar 19-22,
2010
Mar 28-30,
2010
Apr 16-19,
2010
May 2-3, 2010
Actual vote on
May 10*
0
10
20
30
40
5046 44 42
36 37 37 3842 42.08
2733 35 34
28 29 2619 15.42
National Surveys: Voting Preferences for PresidentMay 10, 2010 Elections
Philippines, December 2009 to May 2010(Aquino and Villar, in %)
AquinoVillar
Source: Social Weather Stations (2010) and *Fernandez (2010)
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