Policy Devolution and the Racial Politics of Poverty Governance

Joe SossHumphrey School of Public Affairs

Departments of Political Science & SociologyUniversity of Minnesota

Presentation based on Joe Soss, Richard Fording, and Sanford Schram. 2011. Disciplining the Poor: Neoliberal Paternalism and the Persistent Power of Race. University of Chicago Press.

The Transformation of Poverty Governance

Neoliberalism

• Agenda: contrast with laissez-faire

• Operations: devolution, privatization, performance

Paternalism

• Agenda: set and enforce behavioral expectations, promote social order and individual self-discipline

• Operations: directive and supervisory admin, penal and custodial logics focused on noncompliance

PG: more muscular in its normative enforcement, more dispersed and diverse in its organization

Continuity and Change in Poverty Governance

• Principle of Less Eligibility (PLE): a default logic disrupted by episodic political pressures.

• Double Regulation of the Poor: rising correctional dimensions of the PLE, convergence as a single system, extension of penal logic/language to welfare

• Blurring of State/Market Boundary: PG as a site of profitable investment and labor market activity

• Disciplinary Goals, Diverse Tools: goal of producing compliant (self-disciplining) worker-citizens, attractive and available to employers

Mainsprings of National Change

Conservative Mobilization• Business, Racial, Neo-, Religious/Social• Investments: think tanks, electoral/lobbying• Racialized “wedge issues” targeting fractures in

the Democratic coalition

Socio-economic Change• Decline of markets/wages for low-skilled labor• Compounding of social problems in racially

segregated areas of concentrated poverty• The Underclass as a repository for diverse

anxieties, growing push to enforce social order and discipline work/social behavior

Today’s Focus: Federalism & Devolution(Structuring the Politics of Poverty Governance)

Horizontal: choice and variation across state and local jurisdictions

Vertical: structured relations across federal, state, and local levels

Federalism: the timing and patterning of change

Devolution : In PG, a racialized policy choice that facilitates racial influences and inequalities.

• Racial effects depend on political and economic conditions across jurisdictions.

Poverty Governance, 1940s-1960s

Incarceration: modest, stable rates (~.1%)

Welfare: patchwork of state and local provision

• Barriers to access, excluded populations• Intrusive, restrictive rules and admin. • Low benefit levels• Calibration to local needs – e.g., seasonal

closures in the South

Disruption in the 1960s:

Political insurgency and welfare rights litigation reshape the welfare settlement:

• Political pressures drive state benefit and caseload increases, moving them away from the PLE

• Expanded federal role in AFDC, constrains admin tactics for excluding/purging in the states

• Incarceration rates respond to insurgency, but criminal justice remains mostly state/local

Federal Role Explains the Timing and Focus of Shifts in Poverty Governance, 1970-1995

Criminal Justice: States are less constrained• Earlier shift to more muscular approach• Steep rise in incarceration across the states

Welfare: States are more constrained• Limits on rule and admin strategies• Benefits become the focus of efforts to restore

the PLE• Real value of AFDC drops by roughly 50%, but

caseloads fail to recede

Disruption and Limited Restoration of the PLE:The Benefit-Wage Ratio over Time

• Declining Wages

• Food Stamps (1964)

.97

.6

.42

.91

.54

.86

0.2

.4.6

.81

1961 1976 1995

State Calibration:Benefit - Retail Wage

State Average:Benefit-Wage Ratio

Multivariate Models of State Welfare Change:The Patterning of Decline, 1970-1995

Rates of AFDC Benefit Decline• Republican Control of Govt. • Higher BWR (benefits encroaching on wages)• Higher black % of AFDC caseload• Interaction of BWR and Black %

GA Termination: Republican control, low-skilled wage levels, black % of recipients

AFDC Waiver Adoption: same predictors as benefit decline

State-Level Patterns in Criminal Justice: Key Predictors of State Increases in Black and

White Imprisonment Rates, 1976-1995

Republican Control

Low-skill Wage

Drug Arrest Rate

Crime Rate

-5 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35

Predicted Change in Imprisonment Rate, by Race(based on 1976-1995 change in independent variable)

Black

White

Federal Welfare Reform (PRWORA):A New Devolution Settlement

• Block grants, expansion of state rule discretion• Federal mandates, asymmetric state choices• Backed up by federal benchmarks, monitoring,

incentives, penalties• Not a handoff, a shift in the federal role. State

discretion over means for achieving federally mandated, disciplinary ends.

• Work enforcement: now a national, bipartisan, implicitly racialized political project

State Choices Regarding TANF Programs

Disappearance of predictors: partisan control, benefit-wage ratio (PLE), fiscal capacities, objective indicators of social problems

Racial Composition strongly predicts… • Time limits• Family Caps• Full-Family Sanctions• Work Requirement Rigidity• Eligibility Restrictions• Second-Order Devolution

The Accumulation of Racial Bias:National Exposure to TANF Policy Regimes (2001)

63

11

31

37

26 26

4143

26

54

29

63

02

04

06

0P

erc

en

t of T

AN

F F

am

ilies

TANF Neoliberal Paternalism Scale

0 1 2 5 4 5

White Percent Black Percent

Convergent Systems of Social ControlTANF Regimes, Correctional Control, and Black Pop. (2001)

R-Squared = .76

2.6

2.8

33.

23.

43.

6P

erce

nt in

Cor

rect

iona

l Con

trol

05

1015

20B

lack

Per

cent

of S

tate

Pop

ulat

ion

0 1 2 3 4 5TANF Regime: Neoliberal Paternalism

Average Black Percent of State PopulationAverage Correctional ControlQuadratic Slope: Correctional Control by TANF Regime

Sanction Implementation: Conservatism, Race, and Devolution

Florida WT Program• Higher rates in more conservative counties: half

as likely to survive 12 months without a sanction• Strong interaction with client race: no effect

among white clients.

National Analysis• Interaction of local conservatism and client race

observed in SOD states only

Black-White Sanction Disparities, Black Arrest Rates, and Benefit-Wage Ratios in Black HH Incomes (FL Counties)

02

46

Pre

dict

ed

WT

Sa

nctio

n D

ispa

rity

0 .1 .2 .3Ratio of Black Arrests to Black Population

Low Ratio ofWelfare to Earnings

Average Ratio ofWelfare to Earnings

High Ratio ofWelfare to Earnings

Convergence: Policing and Welfare Sanctioning

Sanctioning and Labor Market Needs:Statewide Seasonal Calibration

Sanction Hazard Ratios and Tourism Revenues: r = .95

0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1

1.2

1.4

1.6

Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec

Month of Year

Hazard

Rati

o

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

To

uri

sm

Tax C

oll

ect

ion

s (

in B

illi

on

s)

Hazard Ratio

Tourism Taxes

Sanctions and Local Labor Market Seasonality by Client Race (County-Months)

68% Black

43% Black

28% Black

510

15

20

Pre

dic

ted

Mo

nth

ly S

anct

ion R

ate

10 20 30 40 50 60Percentage of Sales Taxes from Tourism-related Businesses

Concluding Remarks

• Contemporary poverty governance as a coherent disciplinary project. A shared logic of… • Criminal justice and welfare• Policy design and implementation

• Neoliberal paternalism as a racial project

• Federalism as a mechanism for calibrating PG and state/local political economies

• Federalism as a mechanism of racial inequality, • Facilitating racial biases in policy choice • Converting them into racial inequalities vis-à-

vis state and market institutions

Policy Devolution and the Racial Politics of Poverty Governance

Joe SossHumphrey School of Public Affairs

Departments of Political Science & SociologyUniversity of Minnesota

Presentation based on Joe Soss, Richard Fording, and Sanford Schram. 2011. Disciplining the Poor: Neoliberal Paternalism and the Persistent Power of Race. University of Chicago Press.

Extra Slides

State Choices Regarding TANFFamily Cap, Time Limit, Full-Family Sanction

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.4.6

.81

Pre

dict

ed P

roba

bilit

y of

TA

NF

Pol

icy

Cho

ice

0 20 40 60 80Black Percent of AFDC Recipients

Family Cap Time LimitFull-Family Sanction

State Choices Regarding TANFWork Requirement Rigidity, Eligibility Restrictions

0.2

.4.6

.81

Pre

dict

ed

Val

ue o

f TA

NF

Re

stri

ctio

n

0 20 40 60 80Black Percent of AFDC Recipients

Work Req. Rigidity Eligibility Stringency

0.2

.4.6

.81

Pre

dict

ed

Pro

bab

ility

of D

evo

lutio

n

0 5 10 15 20Average Black Percent of State's County Populations

Less HeterogeneousDispersion

AverageDispersion

More HeterogeneousDispersion

State-to-Local Devolution in TANF Programs:Size & Distribution of Black Populations