police skepticism of citizen oversight: officers’ attitudes toward specific functions, processes,...

This article was downloaded by: [Colorado College]On: 01 December 2014, At: 16:49Publisher: RoutledgeInforma Ltd Registered in England and Wales RegisteredNumber: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK

Journal of Crime andJusticePublication details, includinginstructions for authors andsubscription information:http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rjcj20

POLICE SKEPTICISMOF CITIZENOVERSIGHT:OFFICERS’ ATTITUDESTOWARD SPECIFICFUNCTIONS,PROCESSES, ANDOUTCOMESWilliam Wells a & Joseph A. Schaferb

a Southern Illinois UniversityCarbondaleb Southern Illinois UniversityCarbondalePublished online: 10 Jan 2012.

To cite this article: William Wells & Joseph A. Schafer (2007) POLICESKEPTICISM OF CITIZEN OVERSIGHT: OFFICERS’ ATTITUDES TOWARDSPECIFIC FUNCTIONS, PROCESSES, AND OUTCOMES, Journal of Crimeand Justice, 30:2, 1-25, DOI: 10.1080/0735648X.2007.9721233

http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rjcj20

http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rjcj20

http://www.tandfonline.com/action/showCitFormats?doi=10.1080/0735648X.2007.9721233

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0735648X.2007.9721233

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracyof all the information (the “Content”) contained in thepublications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis,our agents, and our licensors make no representations orwarranties whatsoever as to the accuracy, completeness,or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinionsand views expressed in this publication are the opinions andviews of the authors, and are not the views of or endorsedby Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Content should notbe relied upon and should be independently verified withprimary sources of information. Taylor and Francis shall not beliable for any losses, actions, claims, proceedings, demands,costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoever orhowsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connectionwith, in relation to or arising out of the use of the Content.

This article may be used for research, teaching, and privatestudy purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction,redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematicsupply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expresslyforbidden. Terms & Conditions of access and use can be foundat http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Col

orad

o C

olle

ge]

at 1

6:49

01

Dec

embe

r 20

14

http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0735648X.2007.9721233

http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0735648X.2007.9721233

http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions

Journal of Crime & Justice Volume 30 Number 2 I

POLICE SKEPTICISM OF CITIZEN OVERSIGHT: OFFICERS’ ATTITUDES TOWARD SPECIFIC FUNCTIONS, PROCESSES, AND OUTCOMES*

William Wells Southern Illinois University Carbondale

Joseph A. Schafer Southern Illinois University Carbondale

ABSTRACT

Involving citizens in procedures aimed at holding police ofjcers and agencies accountable for their conduct represents a prominent innovation in policing. Citizen oversight bodies in the United States currently number over 100, a substantial increase j?om the 13 that existed in 1980. An important obstacle to the creation and effective implementation of these external oversight mechanisms is opposition Porn police. This paper examines oficers’ perceptions of speciJic aspects of citizen oversight in one Illinois city that recently created such a mechanism. Results show that oficers are less supportive of aspects of citizen oversight that offer greater degrees of independence; there is not a consensus of opposition to some oversight features, and ofJicers are less opposed to some functions that have the potential to bring about meanin&l change to police policies.

‘The authors thank Jody Sundt and several graduate students in the Center for the Study of Crime, Delinquency, and Corrections, especially Julie Willis, Jason Ingram, Ralph Jones, and Miho Katayama, for their assistance with data collection. The Center provided partial support for data collection.

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Col

orad

o C

olle

ge]

at 1

6:49

01

Dec

embe

r 20

14

2 Journal of Crime & Justice

INTRODUCTION

Involving citizens in the process of holding police accountable is a somewhat controversial community-based innovation in policing. Advocates of citizen involvement .argue that holding police accountable for officer conduct is best achieved through a variety of methods, some of which are independent of the police. Citizen oversight of the police refers to “a procedure for providing input into the complaint process by individuals who are not sworn officers” (Walker, 2001 :5). Attempts to include citizens in police oversight processes in the United States date to the 1930’s but did not gain national prominence and more widespread approval until the 1970’s ’ and early 1980’s. Today approximately 100 citizen oversight bodies in the United States work with police agencies that have jurisdiction over about one third of the population (Walker, 200 1). Despite evidence of greater police support for citizen oversight, officer opposition remains important.

Police officers and organizations have traditionally been opposed to citizen oversight for a variety of reasons. For instance, in 1960 the International Association of Police Chiefs (IACP) argued that citizen oversight would undermine effective law enforcement and police performance and that existing mechanisms were sufficient to monitor police behavior and hold police accountable (Walker, 2001). Despite advocates’ claims about the benefits of citizen oversight, the growth of these systems, and support from police unions and leading police organizations, resistance persists (de Guzman, 2004; Finn, 200 1 ; Prenzler and Ronken, 2001; Walker, 2001). Terrill (1991) concludes that police opposition has been a significant factor in determining whether citizen oversight mechanisms survive. A striking example is how, in a matter of months in 1966, the Patrolmen’s Benevolent Association waged an effective public awareness campaign that attacked and helped bring down citizen oversight, via a referendum, in New York City (Black, 1968; Terrill, 1991). To the extent that police opposition is a significant determinant of whether oversight agencies can survive and carry out their duties then it is important to understand officers’ perspectives about citizen oversight and the factors that drive them. The purpose of this study is to fill a gap in existing knowledge by describing police officers’ attitudes toward common functions, processes, and potential outcomes of citizen oversight mechanisms. In filling this purpose the current study seeks to answer the following questions: Does officer support vary across the different hnctions of

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Col

orad

o C

olle

ge]

at 1

6:49

01

Dec

embe

r 20

14

Journal of Crime & Justice 3

citizen oversight bodies? If so, to which functions of citizen oversight are officers most strongly opposed? What are officers’ perceptions about common criticisms of citizen oversight processes? Do officers believe citizen oversight systems can achieve commonly identified outcomes? This type of examination represents an improvement over more simplistic, dichotomous characterizations of whether officers support or do not support citizen oversight in a global sense (de Guzman, 2004). Citizen oversight mechanisms are highly variable and because of this it seems reasonable to expect that police personnel might hold different opinions about different functions, processes, and potential outcomes of citizen oversight. Findings from the current study can provide police agencies and advocates with information that can be used during the process of planning for and implementing citizen oversight.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Giving attention to police accountability procedures is a relatively recent phenomenon (Walker, 2001). Today, a variety of means exists to ensure officers are held accountable for misconduct and are providing quality services. Internal mechanisms include immediate police supervision, performance reviews, and internal affairs and professional standards units; external mechanisms include media scrutiny, civil court rulings, accreditation standards, and oversight by other governmental agencies.

Identifying and controlling police misconduct are complex and difficult tasks (Kappeler et al., 1998). Evidence from serious instances of misconduct reveals how investigations into misconduct can be limited and that oversight procedures can fail (US. Commission on Civil Rights, 2000; Walker, 2001). The “code of silence” in policing, which refers to the idea that officers are reluctant to report misconduct and testify against fellow officers, poses a significant obstacle to effective oversight. In a recent, nationally representative survey of over 900 police officers, about half reported that it is common for officers to “turn a blind eye” toward misconduct, over 60 percent reported that whistle blowers would likely receive the “cold shoulder” from fellow officers, and most respondents indicated that officers do not always report cases of serious criminal conduct and abuse of authority (Weisburd, Greenspan, Hamilton, Williams, and Bryant, 2000:3). The U.S. Commission on Civil Rights (2000) recently concluded that police misconduct remains an important problem and recommended that local

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Col

orad

o C

olle

ge]

at 1

6:49

01

Dec

embe

r 20

14


officials facilitate the creation of citizen oversight bodies with subpoena powers and authority over investigations into police misconduct.’

Citizen oversight mechanisms take a wide range of forms and vary in terms of their independence, structure, and operating procedures. This has led to the development of classifications to summarize these mechanisms (Finn, 2001 ; Walker, 2001 ; Walker and Bumphus, 1992). The independent nature of citizen oversight is believed to be among its most significant aspects because it has the potential to break down problems related to the “code of silence” in policing (Prenzler and Ronken, 200 1 ; Terrill, 1991 ; Walker, 2001, 2005). Citizen oversight bodies that are structured and hnction independently are assumed to be fiee from police sub-cultural influences that can interfere with oversight and thus, can more effectively respond to and prevent misconduct. Perez (1994) is more cautious and questions whether a citizen oversight mechanism would be able to conduct thorough investigations given that officers are reluctant to cooperate with internal police investigations (see also Reiss, 1992).

Independent oversight is also believed to generate greater levels of perceived legitimacy in the public because it opens up traditionally hidden internal police investigations into alleged misconduct (Kerstetter, 1985). Legitimacy refers to beliefs in the ability of the citizen oversight mechanism to act in ways that are objective, fair, and thorough (de Guzman, 2004; Perez, 1994). A citizen oversight mechanism that is perceived to be legitimate may ultimately enhance public attitudes toward and trust in the police (Walker, 2001). In turn, enhanced public trust in the police can lead to many positive outcomes, including compliance with the law, more positive assessments of police, and greater acceptance of police decisions (see Tyler, 2001). The same is true of officer cooperation with oversight bodies and compliance with rules. Citizen oversight must have legitimacy in the eyes of police officers or it will fail (de Guzman, 2004; Perez, 1994). It is argued that officers will be less likely to follow departmental rules and cooperate with the oversight body if it is not seen as legitimate (Livingston, n.d.).

Opposition to Citizen Oversight

There is reason to expect police will be apprehensive about the implementation of citizen oversight mechanisms. In general, this reform represents a constraint on the ability of a police organization to

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Col

orad

o C

olle

ge]

at 1

6:49

01

Dec

embe

r 20

14

Journal of Crime h Justice 5

function autonomously (Maguire, 2003). To the extent that police organizations have a desire to operate independently they will likely be resistant to citizen oversight. Indeed, citizen oversight has not expanded without its critics. Although there is greater acceptance of citizen oversight today in the larger policing community (IACP, 2000; Finn, 2001), the costs and benefits of citizen oversight are not well understood and opposition remains important (Finn, 200 1 ; Perez, 1994; Prenzler and Ronken, 2001, Terrill, 1991; Walker, 2001). In a recent national survey of police officers nearly 67 percent of white officers and 30 percent of African American officers reported that citizen review boards were not effective at preventing police misconduct (Weisburd et al., 2000). Police leaders and interest groups, most notably police unions, have and continue to argue against citizen oversight on several grounds. Four objections are routinely raised: 1) citizen oversight is not needed, 2) citizen involvement in this intimate police matter contradicts police professionalism, 3) citizens are not qualified for oversight responsibilities, and 4) citizen oversight uniquely compromises police work.

Opponents contend that, in a general sense, citizen oversight is not needed. Specifically, some have claimed that police misconduct is not a serious problem, existing methods of police oversight are effective, and means already exist for citizen appeals. Absent the pressing need for new methods to hold police accountable for misconduct, the necessity of citizen oversight is weakened. Nevertheless, evidence suggests that internal methods of accountability fail in important ways, avenues for citizen appeals are limited, and misconduct remains an important problem in policing today (Human Rights Watch, 1998; Prenzler and Ronken, 2001; US Commission on Civil Rights, 2000; Terrill, 1991; Walker, 2001; Weisburd et al., 2000).

According to another argument, “citizens should not interfere with police work” (Finn, 200 1 : 109). Citizen involvement in police accountability is counter to the goals of police professionalism, which promote limited external influences in policing. Citizen oversight explicitly seeks to inject citizen input into intimate police matters that have traditionally been hidden. Thus, it seems reasonable to expect a degree of apprehension since citizen oversight represents a significant challenge to the once dominant way of thinking about the nature of police-community relationships and methods for holding police accountable.

Opponents have also contended that specific problems will result because citizens are considered unqualified to conduct reviews and investigations for three reasons (de Guzman, 2004; Finn, 2001; Perez,

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Col

orad

o C

olle

ge]

at 1

6:49

01

Dec

embe

r 20

14


1994; Prenzler and Ronken, 2001; Walker, 200 1). First, opponents claim that lay citizens do not posses the skills and training necessary to conduct thorough investigations (Black, 1968; IACP, 2000). This is a particularly important concern when citizen oversight bodies are given responsibility for leading investigations into alleged misconduct. Second, opponents charge that citizens lack the ability to truly understand and appreciate police work and the difficult decisions oficers must make (Kerstetter, 1985). Finally, opponents fear that investigations and reviews by citizens will be biased against police (de Guzman, 2004; Prenzler and Ronken, 2001 ; Walker, 2001). These three concerns are intimately related to police perceptions of the legitimacy of the oversight mechanism.

A final objection claims that citizen oversight compromises police work. One belief is that officers on the street may begin to second- guess their decisions (Black, 1968; Walker, 2001). When officers believe their actions will be reviewed or investigated by individuals who lack the appropriate knowledge and expertise, they may begin to behave differently during interactions with the public. If officers are concerned about how a citizen oversight body might judge their conduct they may place themselves at risk of harm and/or fail to ensure the safety of others. In addition, external oversight mechanisms are believed to threaten the “authority and responsibility” of police administrators (Black, 1968; Finn, 200 1 ; IACP, 2000; Prenzler and Ronken, 200 1 : 169). The contention is that police administrators may be freed from accountability when external agencies are given primary responsibility for controlling misconduct; the external mechanism would have to be held accountable for misconduct, not police leadership.

In summarizing police objections to citizen oversight, Perez (1994) concludes that police officers do not truly believe the arguments that are put forward. He contends police officers would not accept a system whereby suspected offenders are responsible for their own oversight (similar to a situation in which police solely monitor themselves) and thus, police officers are not truly opposed to mechanisms that provide for open and external oversight. In addition, police officers and many administrators have rarely been directly involved in debates about citizen oversight and they may be largely uninformed about the processes to which they are opposed. Existing evidence supports the idea that officers who have experience with citizen oversight are less opposed to the idea than officers with no experience (Perez, 1994; de Guzman, 2004), implying that apprehension might be derived primarily from myths and the tradition

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Col

orad

o C

olle

ge]

at 1

6:49

01

Dec

embe

r 20

14


of opposition to citizen oversight rather than information and an understanding of the actual procedures and structures.

The degree to which police officers support or oppose specific aspects of citizen oversight remains largely unknown. Evidence of police apprehension toward citizen oversight has been gleaned from debates led by police unions and is based on global support - do not support dichotomies (de Guzman, 2004, is an exception). A more detailed understanding of actual police officer opinions is important for groups, including police agencies, that work to implement external methods of oversight (IACP, 2000; Walker, Archbold, and Herbst, 200257). The current study examines officer attitudes about specific aspects of citizen oversight that have traditionally generated debate and opposition, including the function of oversight bodies, the role of citizens in reviewing police conduct, and outcomes of these mechanisms.

THE CURRENT STUDY

The setting for the current study is Carbondale, IL, a small community of about 18,000 permanent adult residents located in southern Illinois. Carbondale is home to Southern Illinois University Carbondale (SIUC) with an enrollment of nearly 19,000 on-campus students. Since the 1960’s the city has witnessed instances of significant conflict between police and segments of the community, including students and minority residents (“Break In,” 1968; Ferrara and Dillard, 1998; “Gunfire Wounds,” 1970; “Old Main,” 1969; Retter,

An April 2001 incident in which police officers arrested an African American student and maced nearly 80 people on the scene sparked debates about the need for citizen oversight in Carbondale (Nauman, 2001).2 The city responded to the ensuing controversy by creating a task force that examined race relations in Carbondale. In November 2001 the task force recommended to the Carbondale City Council that a local Human Relations Commission (HRC) be created. The most controversial recommendation was the HRC’s responsibility for citizen oversight of police. The Task Force (2001:3) recommended that the HRC “should have substantive authority” to subpoena witnesses and hand down sanctions and to “have the ability to act independently and will hear concerns only aRer the normal appeal process has been exhausted.”

2000).

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Col

orad

o C

olle

ge]

at 1

6:49

01

Dec

embe

r 20

14


The City Council voted to create the HRC in September 2002 and in April 2003 the Council approved an ordinance that authorized an eleven-member body to carry out the following police oversight functions:

To receive and review a semi-annual report from the Carbondale Police Department that shall include a general summary of complaints, dispositions and noticeable trends in human relations in regard to the interaction between the general public and the Carbondale Police Department. . . the Commission may make recommendations to the Carbondale Police Department, the city manager or the city council on how to address negative trends or reduce complaints.

To request an annual report from any law enforcement agency that performs law enforcement duties in the city of Carbondale, which shall include a general summary of complaints, dispositions, and noticeable trends between the general public and the law enforcement agency in the city of Carbondale (Carbondale, Ill., Code Q 1-14-1-3,2003).

The HRC in Carbondale did not alter existing procedures for handling individual complaints about police. Some criticized the Commission for lacking the authority to bring about real change (“Change for Better,” 2002; “Fear not,” 2002) while the City Manager stood by the HRC when he explained that even without subpoena powers and sanctioning authority it could lead to positive outcomes (Doherty, 2002). Through its ability to recommend changes that could “address negative trends or reduce complaints” the HRC has the potential to solve problems and improve police practice (Carbondale, Ill., Code 5 1-14-1, 2003). The Commission can presumably make policy recommendations that hold strong potential to solve problems and improve police practices (Finn, 2001 ; Walker, 2005).

Methods

This study utilizes data that were gathered as apart of a larger research project that sought to obtain information about community and police perceptions of the HRC that city leaders could use during their deliberations. Paper and pencil surveys were distributed to all sworn officers in the Carbondale Police Department (CPD) and the SIUC Department of Public Safety (DPS) in April 2003. Campus police

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Col

orad

o C

olle

ge]

at 1

6:49

01

Dec

embe

r 20

14


officers were included because initial discussions about the HRC assumed the SIUC DPS would be subject to HRC oversight. This was not the final result and the HRC does not have authority over the SIUC DPS, a state agency. It was decided that campus officers would be surveyed because the agency was involved in the ongoing discussions about citizen oversight and the agency was invested in the outcome. At the time of the survey campus police officers’ perceptions were as seemingly important as officers who worked for CPD and there was uncertainty about the HRC’s final structure, mission, and composition. Officers were being exposed to and participating in discussions about a citizen oversight commission in Carbondale, but they lacked experience with a local mechanism at the time of the survey.

It is possible that officers from the two agencies held different attitudes about the specific oversight mechanism that was being debated because the campus agency was not going to be subjected to HRC authority. Comparing officers from the two agencies is not possible because, at the request of police agency administrators, agency affiliation data were not collected. Thus, it is not possible to examine the extent to which officers from one agency differ from those in the other, nor is it possible to estimate the extent to which officers from one agency are driving the results reported here.

Researchers delivered surveys and return envelopes to the Chief of Police in Carbondale and the Director of Public Safety at SIUC, who asked managers in their departments to distribute surveys to sworn officers. Sworn officers were asked to complete surveys, seal them in a provided envelope, and return completed surveys to a designated 10cation.~ Seventy-six officers returned useable surveys, producing an 84 percent response rate (76 / 90).

Measures and Analysis

Global support for citizen oversight was measured with a single item that asked officers the degree to which they supported the Human Relations Commission in Carbondale (“support strongly”, “support somewhat”, “oppose somewhat”, “oppose strongly”). Although this item makes reference to the specific citizen oversight mechanism in Carbondale there are reasons to believe it can serve as a reasonable proxy measure for global support for citizen oversight. At the time of survey administration the exact HRC oversight hc t ions were not well defined. For example, some members of the community publicly called for a commission with the power to subpoena witnesses, a level of

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Col

orad

o C

olle

ge]

at 1

6:49

01

Dec

embe

r 20

14


authority opposed by most local political leaders. When the data were collected the HRC lacked clearly defined roles, structures, and functions; it was established to provide oversight of the police, but it was not clear how this was to be achieved. Thus, when officers responded to survey items there was not an existing system in place that they were forced to consider. The most controversial and publicly debated aspect of the HRC was oversight of the police and the survey was introduced as a study of police attitudes toward citizen oversight. When officers responded to this item they were likely cued to think primarily about the HRC in terms of police oversight. Results should be viewed cautiously since the item was not directly worded in such a way as to measure global support for citizen oversight independent of the Carbondale HRC.

Additional survey items measured respondent views of specific dimensions of functions, processes, and potential outcomes associated with citizen oversight systems in general. Many survey questions were not specific to the HRC in Carbondale; officers were asked to consider citizen oversight in a general sense when responding. These dimensions were grounded in the literature that describes how citizen oversight bodies are commonly structured and operate (Finn, 2001; Walker, 2001 ; Walker and Bumphus, 1992). Respondents rated statements using a six-point Likert scale (“strongly agree”, “agree”, “mildly agree”, “mildly disagree”, “disagree”, “strongly disagree”). Missing data were not a substantial problem for the substantive items of interest here. Non-responses ranged from 1.3 to 5.3 percent on any given item discussed below.

Our purpose here is to describe officers’ attitudes toward common functions, processes, and potential outcomes of citizen oversight mechanisms rather than to test for relationships between attitudes and potential predictor variables. Thus, the analysis is largely descriptive and presents overall levels of support for oversight in general and for specific functions, processes, and outcomes. This analytic approach is also dictated by the limited nature of the current sample and data. We calculate levels of support for three groups of respondents that are defined based on responses to the global item: those supporting the HRC, those somewhat opposed to the HRC, and those strongly opposed to the HRC4 This permits a comparison of levels of support across three groups of officers and provides an understanding of how support for specific dimensions are related to global support for citizen oversight. By considering how perceptions vary within the sample it is possible to identify the dimensions of oversight upon which officers’ opinions vary.

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Col

orad

o C

olle

ge]

at 1

6:49

01

Dec

embe

r 20

14

Journal of Crime & Justice I I

RESULTS

Not surprisingly, a large portion of officers in this sample expressed opposition to the HRC in Carbondale, the current indicator of global support for citizen oversight. Table 1 shows that more than half of the officers reported strong opposition and less than one-quarter expressed some level of support. To understand whether officer opinions vary across specific aspects of citizen oversight and to understand variability between officers, we disaggregated officer perceptions by three aspects of citizen oversight: functions, processes, and outcomes.

Table 1 Officers’ Global Views about Citizen Oversight

N Percent Do you support or oppose the Human Relations Commission in Carbondale?”

support**

Oppose Somewhat

16 22

17 23

Oppose Strongly 41 55 * Two cases are missing data. ** 5.4 percent (n = 4) “support strongly” and 16.2 percent (n = 12) “support somewhat.”

Functions

Table 2 presents officers’ attitudes about common citizen oversight functions. This table reports officers’ beliefs about the functions of citizen oversight in two ways. First, the table shows the aggregate percentage of officers who agreed that citizen oversight committees should be empowered with each specific function. These percentages are presented in the column titled “All Officers.” For example, one percent of the responding officers agreed that citizen oversight committees should investigate citizen complaints against officers. Second, the table contrasts perceptions about each function across the three levels of global support for citizen oversight. For example, six percent of officers who supported oversight agreed that citizen complaints against officers should be investigated by citizen oversight

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Col

orad

o C

olle

ge]

at 1

6:49

01

Dec

embe

r 20

14

12 Journal of Crime &Justice

committees. There was no agreement with this function among officers who reported being strongly and somewhat opposed to citizen oversight.

In the aggregate, officers expressed little support for functions that provide citizens with independent authority to investigate complaints, subpoena witnesses, and recommend sanctions. Officers were also largely opposed to granting citizens the authority to judge police investigations into allegations of misconduct. The greatest level of overall support was for the function that provides citizens with the lowest level of involvement: review findings. A quarter of officers reported supporting a type of reintegrative approach where citizens are involved in mediation.

Table 2 shows a certain level of consensus among officers in their views on specific oversight functions. Officers reported consistent opposition to functions that provide citizens with independent authority to investigate, subpoena and recommend sanctions; yet officers differed in their support for other oversight functions. Citizen oversight mechanisms are frequently viewed as a means to address complaints against police, but they can be invoked to provide agencies with the “consumer’s” voice in considering policy and practice. The final two items in Table 2 (policy review and conflict mediation) are non- complaint functions and received a moderate level of support from officers who expressed support for oversight in a general sense and those who were only slightly opposed to oversight in general. A majority of those who generally supported oversight also reported to support oversight that functions to mediate conflicts between officers and citizens.

Processes

Respondents were also asked about their views toward citizen oversight processes. These items included ideas that police have traditionally used to oppose citizen involvement in oversight (Table 3). On the whole, officers expressed negative views about citizen involvement in the process and agreed with common arguments against citizen involvement. Respondents saw little value in oversight as a means to involve the public in police practice, felt the process lacks fairness, and believed it entrusts citizens with the power to make judgments for which they lacked sufficient expertise.

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Col

orad

o C

olle

ge]

at 1

6:49

01

Dec

embe

r 20

14


Table 2 Officers’ Views about Citizen Oversight Functions by Global

Attitudes

Support Citizen

Oversight

Oppose Oppose Citizen Citizen

Officers Oversight Oversight Strongly Somewhat

“Citizen oversight All committees should...”

Investigate citizen complaints against oficers

Have the authority to subpoena witnesses

Recommend sanctions where complaints are sustained

Review police investigations into complaints

Review findings of police investigations into complaints

Review & recommend police policy

Mediate conflicts between police & citizens

1 % 0 % 0 % 6 %

3 % 0 % 0 % 13 %

3 % 0 % 0 % 13 %

13 % 5 % 12 % 38 %

31 % 15 % 47 % 56 %

16 % 5 % 24 % 38 %

27 % 15 % 24 % 63 %

Table Note: Values reflect the percentage of respondents who indicated they strongly agree, agree, or mildly agree with the statement; percentages are calculated after excluding cases with missing data on individual items.

Results show there is relatively strong consensus among offrcers about the problems that can result from granting citizens authority to

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Col

orad

o C

olle

ge]

at 1

6:49

01

Dec

embe

r 20

14


oversee the police. As would be expected, those who supported oversight generally exhibited less negative views than those who strongly opposed oversight. Nearly half of those who supported oversight in the general sense reported favorable attitudes toward the idea that citizen oversight systems ensure fair handling of complaints and over half reported that citizen oversight provides a valuable means for community input into police practice. While this level of support represents a minority of officers, it also shows the lack of complete consensus in opposition. Those somewhat opposed to oversight in general varied in their beliefs and sometimes shared the views of those who strongly oppose and those who support oversight. For example, “somewhat oppose” officers were in line with “supporters” on the idea that citizen oversight grants too much power to citizens but aligned with “strongly oppose” officers on the items about fairness of complaint handling, citizen lack of expertise, and citizen involvement in matters they do not fully understand.

Outcomes

Table 4 presents officers’ beliefs about potential outcomes of citizen oversight. These outcomes are divided into two categories: officer behavior and departmental outcomes. Respondents indicated that citizen oversight mechanisms will not make positive contributions to officer behavior and will have adverse outcomes. There was relative support for the idea that officers are held to a higher standard of performance by citizen oversight mechanisms, yet there was virtually no support for the notion that oversight improves performance. This contrast may suggest officers believed that citizen oversight mechanisms would hold them to a high standard, but their performance was already commensurate with meeting that standard. A small proportion saw citizen oversight mechanisms as a means to hold officers accountable to the public they serve and prevent misconduct. Not surprisingly, the majority of officers indicated that citizen oversight makes it harder to do the job and makes officers second guess their decisions. Again, there is a degree of variability in officer beliefs. There is a group of officers, those who supported oversight in general, who reported that citizen oversight can make some positive contributions to officer conduct.

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Col

orad

o C

olle

ge]

at 1

6:49

01

Dec

embe

r 20

14

Journal of Crime & Justice I5

Table 3 Officers’ Views about Citizen Oversight Processes

by Global Attitudes

Oppose Oppose Support All Citizen Citizen Citizen Ofticers Oversight Oversight Oversight Strongly Somewhat

“Citizen oversight committees...”

Provide valuable community input into police practice

Ensure complaints are handled in fair manner

Are biased against officers

Lack expertise to judge officers

Give citizens too much power

Allow citizens to review matters they do not fully

23 % 10 % 24 % 56 %

16 % 10 % 6 % 44 Yo

83 % 88 % 77 % 63 Yo

93 % 93 % 94 % 81 %

77 % 83 % 65 % 63 %

82 Yo 81 % 82 % 75 %


Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Col

orad

o C

olle

ge]

at 1

6:49

01

Dec

embe

r 20

14


Table 4 Officers’ Views about Citizen Oversight Outcomes by Global

Attitudes

Oppose Support Citizen Officers Oversight Oversight Oversight

Strongly Somewhat

Oppose All Citizen Citizen “Citizen

oversight committees...”

Offlcer-Specific Outcomes

Hold officers to a high standard of performance

Improve officer performance

Ensure officer accountability to community

Help prevent police misconduct

Make it harder for officers to do their jobs

Make officers second guess decisions

38 % 27 % 29 % 69 %

3 % 0 % 0 % 6 %

18 Yo 12 % 12 % 31 ‘Yo

11 % 0 % 6 % 38 ‘Yo

78 Yo 83 % 77 Yo 56 %

68 % 73 Yo 53 % 63 ‘Yo

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Col

orad

o C

olle

ge]

at 1

6:49

01

Dec

embe

r 20

14


Table 4 Continued

support Citizen

Oppose Oppose All Citizen Citizen

Officers Oversight Oversight Oversight Strongly Somewhat

“Citizen oversight committees.. .”

Department- specific outcomes

Are effective in improving department policy

Ensure depart m e n t accountability to community

Do little to improve the quality of complaint investigation

Improve police- community relations

14 % 10 % 12 % 19 %

20 % 10 % I8 % 44 Yo

88 Yo 88 % 94 % 63 %

27 % 17 % 24 % 56 %


Officers were also skeptical about the chances that citizen oversight mechanisms could achieve goals that would benefit police departments. Citizen oversight mechanisms were not viewed as a way to improve policy; this view may partially indicate that officers focused on citizen oversight as an instrument for punishment, rather than one

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Col

orad

o C

olle

ge]

at 1

6:49

01

Dec

embe

r 20

14

18 Journal ofcrime & Justice

with the potential for organizational improvement. Most officers did not agree that citizen oversight mechanisms enhance accountability to the community and police-community relations, although those who reported support for citizen oversight in general were relatively more agreeable to these possibilities. Respondents agreed that oversight mechanisms would do little to improve the investigation of complaints. Such a result could reflect contrasting beliefs, including the view that citizen oversight mechanisms would produce low quality investigations because citizens are not qualified or that existing investigative practices were already of such quality that improvement is unlikely. In the aggregate, over a quarter of officer respondents agreed that citizen oversight can improve police - community relations.

SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION

The purpose of this research is to add new knowledge about how officers view specific functions and processes that are common to citizen oversight mechanisms and determine the extent to which they support commonly voiced arguments against citizen oversight. This information provides a more specific understanding of the functions and processes that generate the greatest levels of opposition and support. The current study shows that officers are unified in their opposition to certain aspects of citizen oversight but vary, to a certain extent, in their views toward other components.

Some findings reported here are not surprising because they match evidence in the existing literature. Officers in this sample reported many views that are consistent with traditional arguments that have been levied against citizen oversight: a bias against police personnel, the lack of citizen expertise to judge officer conduct, negative impacts on officer conduct, and the inability to improve the complaint-review process. Taken as a whole, these results suggest officers are particularly opposed to aspects of citizen oversight that grant citizens the right to “second guess” the actions taken by officers. While it is speculative, this might also imply that these officers would not believe citizen oversight is legitimate. Officers were also unified in their opposition to aspects of citizen oversight that are associated with greater degrees of independence and authority, including the ability to investigate complaints and subpoena witnesses. These consistent views suggest officers believe police agencies should retain control over “policing the police.”

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Col

orad

o C

olle

ge]

at 1

6:49

01

Dec

embe

r 20

14


Officers did not view citizen oversight mechanisms as a means for preventing misconduct. This finding might indicate officers already believe misconduct is such aberrant conduct that little can be done to dissuade those few who choose this course of behavior. Additional survey items shed light on the misconduct prevention capacity of citizen oversight bodies. The vast majority of officers (97 %) agreed that their department takes a tough stance on improper police behavior. A relatively small portion of officers indicate that their peers often turn a blind eye to improper conduct (14 %) and that their agency’s internal investigations of complaints are biased in favor of the police (6 %). Officers in this sample held generally favorable attitudes toward internal procedures for oversight. Officer attitudes toward alternative mechanisms of accountability may differ in agencies where internal procedures are viewed less favorably.

The distribution of support for specific dimensions of citizen oversight reveals a lack of consensus. In terms of process and outcomes, officers varied in their beliefs about whether citizen oversight can provide valuable community input into police practice (Table 3) and whether citizen oversight can ensure that a department is accountable to the community (Table 4). There were also differences in views about whether oversight bodies should review police investigations and findings, review and recommend policy, and mediate conflicts between citizens and police (Table 2). Those who strongly opposed citizen oversight in the general sense exhibited low levels of support while the remaining officers showed relatively greater levels of support for these functions.

On many items there are important differences between officers who supported citizen oversight in general and those who were strongly opposed. Officers who strongly opposed citizen oversight tended to hold negative views about all dimensions of citizen oversight: they did not support involving citizens in oversight, saw few advantages to the process, and believed there were no positive outcomes. Officers who expressed global support generally believed these mechanisms could serve an auditing and mediation function, saw potential for the oversight process to improve officer and agency performance, and were less cynical about outcomes. Across the items, officers who were somewhat opposed to citizen oversight in general expressed moderate views relative to their peers. This group showed support for citizen oversight as an auditing function, but perceived few advantages to the process, often paralleling the views of “oppose strongly” officers; their views of the outcomes of oversight were generally skeptical, but more moderate than “oppose strongly” officers. Finding a lack of opposition

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Col

orad

o C

olle

ge]

at 1

6:49

01

Dec

embe

r 20

14


consensus about certain aspects of oversight is consistent with existing research that shows variability between officers (de Guzman, 2004; Perez, 1994).

Some have questioned whether a complaint-oriented citizen oversight mechanism (i.e., a primary role is to handle individual citizen complaints against officers) can prevent misconduct and improve the quality of police services (Kerstetter, 1985; Reiss, 1992; Walker, 2005). Among its most significant limitations, complaint-oriented citizen oversight focuses on the lowest ranking employees in the department and overlooks the police organization itself. The questionable presumption is “that misconduct can be controlled by investigating incidents of misconduct and sanctioning those who are found in violation” (Reiss, 1992:77). Reiss (1992) explains that police administrators reduce their department’s vulnerability to the external environment by relying on internal methods of accountability that focus on the conduct of individual officers. The result is a lack of serious attention to organizational failures and generally “cosmetic” changes when organizational failures are uncovered (Reiss, 1992:76).

Walker (2005) argues that the police auditor model of citizen oversight is suited to bring about meaningful reform to police management that can generate longstanding accountability success. The police auditor model differs from more common complaint-oriented citizen oversight mechanisms because the auditor seeks to identify aspects of the police organization, like policy, training, and complaint filing procedures, that may be sources of problems and attempts to design resolutions. Auditors commonly have five fimctions that increase the chances for meaningful change: audit the complaint process and police operations, review policy, engage the community, and create a sense of police openness. (Walker, 2005). The strength of a police auditor also lies in the ability to conduct follow-up investigations and assess whether recommendations have been adopted.

The evidence reported here suggests officers hold mixed beliefs about auditor-type functions and outcomes. In the aggregate, offrcers were somewhat supportive of the idea that citizen oversight bodies could ensure departmental accountability to the community (20 %) and provide valuable input into police practice (23 %), but less supportive of the idea that citizen oversight could improve departmental policy (14 %). Also in the aggregate, officers were not supportive of the power of a citizen oversight body to review and recommend policy (1 6 %), but a consensus of opposition was lacking (i.e., 38 YO of officers who support citizen oversight in the general sense also support the policy review and recommendation fimction). Levels of support for these functions might

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Col

orad

o C

olle

ge]

at 1

6:49

01

Dec

embe

r 20

14


be artificially low because pubic discussions of citizen oversight in Carbondale were explicitly focused on a complaint-oriented model that would handle individual complaints. This framing of oversight may have led officers to hold a rather limited conception of what citizen oversight could entail. We might find that line-level officers would support an alternative oversight mechanism that would focus not only on individual conduct, but also on the performance of the organization as a whole.

If Terrill (1991) is correct in asserting that police opposition significantly impedes the implementation of oversight, then planners would be well advised to consider that officers’ views in a given jurisdiction could largely be a fbnction of a few dimensions of a proposed oversight system; these key attributes could tip officers from support to opposition. While this does not justify catering to the interests of police officers, it may influence the way discussions of citizen oversight are framed, how systems are implemented, and how officers are informed about the reform. In addition, de Guzman (2004) and Perez (1 994) observe that those officers who have had experience with citizen oversight bodies offer more positive assessments of these entities than officers who have not had these experiences. In the process of developing new citizen oversight mechanisms, a period of acclimation may mollifL some resistance and negative views by police officers.

While the current study offers insight into how officers view citizen involvement in oversight processes, methodological concerns mean the results and conclusions must be viewed with caution. We use a proxy measure for global attitudes toward citizen oversight that may have narrowly framed the way officers thought about citizen oversight. The global measure used here is based on officers’ responses to a question about the oversight mechanism being discussed in the local setting. We believe this survey item provides a reasonable proxy for global views because the oversight mechanism in Carbondale was not well-settled upon at the time of the survey and during public discussions a variety of forms and functions were considered. That the oversight mechanism was somewhat vague means the officers may not have only been thinking about the specific model being debated. Nevertheless, results might differ if an alternative measure of global support had been used. Related to this, a sample of officers from agencies that are not directly facing the possibility of a new citizen oversight mechanism might offer different perspectives.

The nature of the sample also means conclusions will suffer from a problem of limited generalizability. The results presented here are

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Col

orad

o C

olle

ge]

at 1

6:49

01

Dec

embe

r 20

14


from surveys of officers employed by two agencies that serve a unique population and region in southern Illinois. To the extent that these officers hold unique perspectives on citizen oversight, findings may not be a valid description of officers’ views in general. In addition, we did not explore patterns of results by rank, duty assignment, education, and years of service because an important percentage of officers did not respond to these survey items.’ For instance, nearly 28 percent of respondents did not report their rank, 16 percent did not report duty assignment, 15 percent did not report highest level of education completed, and 17 percent did not report the number of years of law enforcement experience. Thus, it is unclear to what extent these personal attributes might shape the opinions considered in the analysis.

There is much about citizen oversight that future research must consider. Probably of greatest significance is the lack of systematic information about the outcomes and effectiveness of citizen oversight. Among other things, this deficiency means we are not in a position to understand which forms of citizen oversight and which components are achieving their intended objectives. The verdict is still out on whether citizen oversight represents an effective way to ensure police officers and departments provide quality services. Future research must also work to identify the factors associated with the successful implementation of citizen oversight. The current study represents an early step in the process of describing one factor that might play a role in determining successful implementation: officer attitudes toward the reform. Researchers and practitioners must continue to explore reasons why citizen oversight is successfully implemented in some cases but not others. Systematic information about the implementation of citizen oversight and its outcomes will provide the chance to more completely gauge the validity of some of the criticisms often levied against citizen oversight.

NOTES

1. Other prominent commissions, including the Knapp and President’s Crime Commissions, have investigated instances of serious police misconduct but have not advocated for the creation of citizen oversight bodies (IACP, 2000).

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Col

orad

o C

olle

ge]

at 1

6:49

01

Dec

embe

r 20

14

Journal of Crime d Justice 23

2. The events in Carbondale reflect the larger pattern in which demands for citizen oversight tend follow incidents or allegations of racial discrimination (Terrill, 1991).

3. Carbondale police officers were asked to return surveys in sealed envelopes to the Chiefs administrative assistant and SIUC DPS officers were asked to return surveys in sealed envelopes to a designated lieutenant.

4. Only four officers indicated they strongly supported the HRC. To allow for meaninghl analyses and observations, these respondents were combined with twelve officers who reported they somewhat supported the HRC.

5. Officers were not asked to report gender, race, and ethnicity because certain combinations of responses would make it easy to identify individual officers. For this reason police administrators recommended that these variables be omitted from the survey.

REFERENCES

Black, A.D. (1968). The People and the Police. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company.

“Break-in at Morris’s Office” (1968). The Southern Illinoisan, June 10, 1968:3.

Carbondale, Ill., Code 9 1-14-1,2003.

“Change for a Better Carbondale.” (2002). Daily Egyptian. August 6,2002.

de Guman, M.C. (2004). “One for All?: Philippine Police Officers’ Perceptions of Civilian Review.” Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies and Management. 27: 358-379.

Doherty, J. (2002). “Bars Could Encourage More Diversity [Letter to the Editor].” Daily Egyptian, June 27,2002.

“Fear not the Truth” (2002). Daily Egyptian, June 25,2002.

Ferrara, D. and A.L. Dillard. (1998). “Students to File Charges Against Carbondale Police Department.” Daily Egyptian, October 28, 1998.

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Col

orad

o C

olle

ge]

at 1

6:49

01

Dec

embe

r 20

14


Finn, P. (200 1). Citizen Review of Police: Approaches and Implementation. Washington DC: US. Department of Justice.

“Gunfire Wounds Ten in Carbondale”. (1970). The Southern Illinoisan, November 12, 1970: I .

Human Rights Watch. (1998). Shielded from Justice: Police Brutality and Accountability in the United States. Retrieved from http://www.hnv.orgl reports98/police/ uspo24.htm.

International Association of Chiefs of Police. (2000). Police Accountability and Citizen Review: A Leadership Opportunity for Police Chiefs. Retrieved from http://www.theiacp.org.

Kappeler, V.E., R.D. Sluder, and G.P. Alpert (1998). Forces of Deviance: Understanding the Dark Side of Policing, Second Edition. Prospect Heights, IL: Waveland Press.

Kerstetter, W.A. (1985). “Who Disciplines the Police?” In W.A. Geller (ed.), Police Leadership in America: Crisis and Opportuniv. Chicago, IL: American Bar Foundation and Praeger.

Livingston, D. (n.d.). Citizen Review of Police Complaints: Four Critical Dimensions of Value. Retrieved from http://www.nacole.org.

Maguire, E.R. (2003). Organizational Structure in American Police Agencies: Context, Complexity, and Control. New York: State University of New York Press.

Nauman, B. (2001). “Block Party Ends in Cloud of Mace.” Daily Egyptian, April 23,2001.

Perez, D. (1994). Common Sense about Police Review. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press,

Prenzler, T. and C. Ronken (2001). “Models of Police Oversight: A Critique.” Policing and Society, 1 1 : 15 1-1 80.

“Old Main Fire.” (1 969, June 8). The Southern Illinoisan, p 1.

Reiss, A.J. (1992). Police Organization in the Twentieth Century. In M. Tonry and N. Morris (eds.), Modern Policing. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Col

orad

o C

olle

ge]

at 1

6:49

01

Dec

embe

r 20

14

Journal of Crime & Justice 2.5

Retter, D. (2000). “Carbondale’s Halloween Riots Return from the Dead.” Daily Egyptian, November 1,2002.

Task Force on Race and Community Relations. (2001). Statement ofMutual Understandings and Recommendations. Carbondale, IL.

Terrill, R.J. (1991). “Civilian Oversight of the Police Complaint Process in the United States: Concerns, Developments, and More Concerns.” In A.J. Goldsmith (ed.), Complaints against the Police: The Trend to External Review. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Tyler, T.R. (2001). Trust and Law Abidingness: A Proactive Model of Social Regulation. (Centre for Tax System Integrity, Australian National University, Working paper No. 16). Retrieved from http://dspace.anu.edu.au/handle/ 1885141633.

U.S. Commission on Civil Rights. (2000). Revisiting Who is Guarding the Guardians?: A Report on Police Practices and Civil Rights in America. Washington DC: US Commission on Civil Rights.

Walker, S. (2001). Police Accountability: The Role of Citizen Oversight. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth.

Walker, S. (2005). The New World of Police Accountability. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.

Walker, S. and V.W. Bumphus (1992). “The Effectiveness of Civilian Review: Observations on Recent Trends and New Issues Regarding Civilian Review of the Police. American Journal of Police. 1 1 : 1-26.

Walker, S., C. Archbold and L. Herbst (2002). Mediating Citizen Complaints Against Police Oflcers: A Guide for Police and Communiv Leaders, Web Version. Washington DC: Government Printing Office.

Weisburd, D., R. Greenspan, E.E. Hamilton, H. Williams and K.A. Bryant (2000). Police Attitudes Toward Abuse of Authority: Findings from a National Study. National Institute o f Justice Research in Brief. Washington DC: US Department of Justice.

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Col

orad

o C

olle

ge]

at 1

6:49

01

Dec

embe

r 20

14

police skepticism of citizen oversight: officers’ attitudes toward specific functions, processes,...

Documents