Control and Resistance:

An exploration of the use and impact of

drones by the Israeli Defense Force in Gaza

Author: Polly Vaughan Lyth Morgan

Advisor: Dr. Kyle Grayson

Submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the

degree of Master of Arts in International Studies

School of Geography, Politics and Sociology, University of

Newcastle Upon Tyne

December 2015

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Abstract

The paper traces the practices of drones by the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) in

Gaza. Focusing on the more micro-scale, subtle effects of drone use, the paper

first investigates how drones are being used to help enforce a ‘system of control’

in Gaza, using a loosely Foucauldian analysis to frame this. It then explores the

ways in which these practices impact the everyday lives of those that reside in

Gaza, centring towards the less visible, and therefore often ignored, impacts of

drones. Despite these mechanisms of control being effective, they are not

passively accepted in Gaza. Thus the paper challenges how everyday Palestinians

are often ignored or framed as ‘powerless’ by arguing that Palestinians do hold

agency and power. It sees that Palestinians resist drone practices (and the

occupation more widely), albeit in ways which seek to disrupt their subject

positions. Thus resistance here centres on Palestinians enabling themselves to

continue to live their lives ‘as much as possible’ within the parameters of the

IDF’s ‘system of control’.

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Acknowledgements First, a thank you to those who proof read my work, Robyn Morgan, Aaron Ben-Joseph and Alice Wakefield. Secondly, thank you to the staff in the Politics department, whom, for over four years, I have gained so much from. Special mention goes to Kyle Grayson who has provided me with support that surpasses what is expected from a supervisor.

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Contents

Abstract…………………………………………………………………………………………………….……... 2 Acknowledgements……………………………………………………………………………………..…… 3 Contents………………………………………………………………………………………………………..…. 4 Abbreviations………………………………………….……………………………………………………..… 5 Introduction………………………….……………………………………………………..………….……….. 6

1. Research aim……………………………………………………………………………………… 6 2. Justification of research……………………………………………………………………… 7 3. Methodology……………………………………………………………………………………… 9 4. Structure………………………………………………………………………………………….. 12

Chapter 1: How the IDF seek to control Palestinians in Gaza using drones.…… 14 1. Introduction…………………………………………………………………………………..… 14

2. Technological features of the drone………………………………………………… 17 3. The IDF’s vision of ‘control’ through drone use……………………………….. 17 3a. Control: legal devices…………………………………………………………. 18

3b. Control: social practices and coercive measures………………... 21 3c. Control: coercive measures that help implement social ……practices…………………………………………………………………………..… 28 3d. Control: bureaucratic apparatuses……………………….…………….. 31

4. Conclusion………………………………………………………….…………………….……… 33

Chapter 2: Everyday Resistance to the IDF’s drone practices in Gaza…….…….… 36 1. Introduction…………………………………………………………………………………..… 36 2. Everyday life in Gaza living under drones……………………………………….... 38 3. Reconceptualising ‘resistance’…………………………………………………….…... 42

3a. Everyday acts of resistance as political…………………………….…. 44 3b. Everyday acts of resistance as simultaneously individual and ……collective…………………………………………………………………………….. 45

4. Forms of everyday resistance to drone practices in Gaza………..……….. 46 4a. Survival and Self-help: evasion and masking…………………….... 48

4b. Resilience ………………………………………………………………………….. 49 5. Conclusion……………………………………………………………………………………….. 51

Conclusion………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 53 1. Introduction……………………………………………………………………………..……… 53 2. Summary……………………..………………………………………………………………….. 53 3. Future research……………………………………………………………………………….. 55

Bibliography……………………………………………………………………………………………………. 57

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List of Abbreviations

CIA Central Intelligence Bureau

HRW Human Rights Watch IDF Israeli Defence Force

ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross

MFA (Israeli) Ministry of Foreign Affairs PA Palestinian Authority

UAV Unmanned Aerial Vehicle

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Introduction

“There are three kinds of zenana. One watches over us and photographs

every move, every person. The second fires missiles at us. And the third

kind…its whole purpose is to annoy us, to drive us crazy.”

Mohammed Shurrab, Palestinian in Gaza (Hass, 2011: 28).

1. Research aim

The Israeli Defense Force’s (IDFs) technological development, production and

frequency of usage of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), often known colloquially

as ‘drones’, has proliferated since their inception in the late 1970s (Rodgers,

2014: 8; Opal-Rome, 2013). Drones, particularly since the Second Intifada, have

quickly become just one, yet a key component, of the system of control

operating in Gaza (Weizman, 2011: 119). The use of drones, alongside other

technologies and methods of ‘control’, has helped shape the shift in the nature

of ‘control’ in Gaza from one of physical occupation to ‘occupying from afar’. This

dissertation argues the IDF are using drones to try and control the minutiae of

daily life for those in Gaza and therefore intends to explore the workings of

power produced by drone use in Gaza and its everyday impact on Palestinians

residing there.

However current traditional conceptions of Israeli-Palestinian power relations do

not provide the mechanisms to cater to this task. They often portray power as

uni-directional, held in this case by the IDF. When Palestinians are recognised as

also commanding power, current discourse often perceives it to be located in the

hands of a few, often in the form of organised and violent groups such as Fatah

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or Hamas (see for example, Darweish and Rigby, 2015: 38; Schanzer: 2008). To

help mitigate this problem, this dissertation applies a loosely Foucauldian, post-

structural conception of power, which sees all Palestinians in Gaza as power-

holding and involved in power processes. It looks at how the IDF uses drones to

try and control those in Gaza, how this impacts the lives of Palestinians, and how

this is resisted. Thus this dissertation argues that through this attempt at control

using drones, a space is created in which Palestinians resist drone practices on a

daily basis.

2. Justification of research

There is an extensive body of research concerning the use of drones in the field

of politics. Despite that when drone practices are condemned it represents an

attempt to help defend victims of drone usage, there is an omission of academic

research that wields sufficient focus on the victims themselves and how drones

impact their lives. For example, Williams (2011) critiques the ‘asymmetries’ of

drones and how they create an unequal battlefield, but then interviews the

drone operators to identify how this impacts them psychologically. Likewise

Zehfuss (2011) and Halabi (2006) both criticise drones by examining their

relationship with ethics and the law. This is not to disregard the importance of

any of these approaches: all are crucial in scrutinising the use of drones

worldwide. But what many omit is a deeper understanding as to why this

matters, namely a focus on those impacted the most: the victims of drone

practices. Drone studies rarely give a platform to the voices of those whom the

drone are designed to observe and to kill: this means we have little sense of

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what life is like on a daily basis for those living under drones. Without these

voices, without letting the ‘subaltern speak’, we cannot help to empower those

we are writing in support of and we cannot know the true extent to which drone

practices are causing harm (Spivak, 1988: 271).

Drone use is increasingly widespread across the globe, but the place that is

victim to the most frequent and extensive use of drones is the Palestinian

population in the Occupied Territories (OT), particularly Gaza. The

Israel/Palestine conflict has spanned many decades and the use of surveillance

and force as a powerful strategy of imperial dominance is not new (Ashcroft et

al., 1998: 28; Rodgers, 2014: 106). Drones mark merely a relatively newer form

of this strategy. To say that studies of drones in the OT have been totally

neglected is an unfair allegation, but considering the extent to which those in the

OT are subjected to drone practices, few devote much attention to their usage.

This is in part due to the well-known secrecy of the IDF, which admits to using

drones but hides the extent of its usage (Pfeffer, 2013; Dobbing and Cole, 2014:

3).

When academics have focused on the use of drones in Gaza, they tend to

concentrate on the missile function of the drone, despite that the majority of

drones are unarmed and used in a surveillance capacity (Halabi, 2011: 197;

Human Rights Watch, 2009; Dreazen, 2014). This is not surprising in some ways

as the destruction of buildings and infrastructures as well as the deaths of

Palestinians are more visibly damaging. But this limits harm to something mainly

physical, as predominantly relevant when ‘large scale’ events occur, such as

when missiles are launched or during particularly concentrated times of war such

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as ‘Operation Edge’ in 2014 (see for example Cooper and Anderson, 2015). Yet

these examinations fail to look at the wider implications of drone warfare as well

as how macro level practices are shaped by micro level patterns, and vice versa

(Scott, 2009: 1). It neglects how for those in Gaza, drones constantly negatively

impact life and that impacts of drone use are long-enduring and long-reaching,

transpiring often in subtle and less direct ways.

3. Methodology

Similar themes emerge when looking at the macro-scale ontological approach

that many take when studying power relations between ‘controller’ and the

‘controlled’ more generally. This applies to the Palestinian context too, where

some are portrayed as violent, and as resisting only in the form of an organised

opposition group. This leaves those who do not directly involve themselves with

these groups to be portrayed as passive and accepting of this control. It also

ignores how ‘subaltern populations and communities of the disenfranchised can

bring about changes in their life-world through their quiet and unassuming daily

struggles’ (Bayat, 2013: 5).

Despite the literature on everyday life, micropolitics and resistance being well

established, many academics still do not consider how everyday forms of

resistance affect how operations designed to control are carried out. This

conception of power is arguably misconstrued and it also means that

understanding the workings of power at play here can only go so far using this

framework. This is why Foucault’s perception of power as diffused, as

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productive, as well as his move away from looking solely at the macro and

instead looking at the subtleties of everyday life is adopted as an ontological

approach here.

Naturally, writing about any contentious political issue wields problems, but few

are as explicitly contentious, sensitive, and (often) polarising as the Israel-

Palestine conflict. For this reason, measures to ensure sources are reliable are

especially thorough. Where substantial claims have been made, references are

triangulated, which involves seeking accounts from three or more perspectives,

using as many ‘independent’ sources as possible from sources largely perceived

as ‘credible’, as a way to cross-check a range of political stances and check for

false allegations (Pierce, 2006: 79).

This interpretivist epistemological stance and philosophy is hindered by some

practical constraints. With no primary access to Palestinians in Gaza, research

instead consists of textual analysis of witness accounts. Empirical claims are

backed using a mix of carefully selected studies from sources such as peer-

reviewed journals and books by academics, as well as NGO reports, and credible

newspaper sources. A key reason for this mix of sources is that NGOs are making

greater efforts to document the everyday impacts of drones in Gaza (see for

example, Saif, 2014; HRW, 2009). However they lack the theoretical

underpinnings that academic papers arguably better provide. At the same time,

due to the nature of the study carried out, some arguments are bolstered using

witness accounts including diaries. These kind of sources provide a window into

the minutest aspects of everyday events that might not be amenable from other

sources (Elliot, 1997: 187). The inclusion of these sources are vital, as they

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contain the voices of those of whom the dissertation is written to help, and

which also best unmask the questions at hand.

Case studies help gain a humanistic understanding and add to existing

experiences (Stake, 2000). Whilst these accounts come from individuals,

naturally individuals interpret and react to things differently. But equally, as

Maynes et al. (2008: 3) recognise, in many ways these accounts are never simply

individual, ‘but are told in historically specific ties and settings, and draw on the

rules and models in circulation that govern how story elements link together in

narrative logics’. Aspects of the system of control in Gaza, in this case drone

practices, impact differently upon each individual Palestinian. But all are targets

of control as they are all de facto subjects of the IDF and it is possible to identify

certain underlying routines and regularities in the behaviours of Palestinians in

Gaza. This tells us something about how the settings are socially organised as

individual responses are always embedded in their context, and therefore

provide unique insights into the connections between individual life trajectories

and collective forces beyond the individual.

It is important to be reflexive here, particularly as this commitment to creating a

valid picture of drone use in Gaza raises ethical issues as to who can speak for

whom as well as the problem of ‘can the subaltern speak?’ (Spivak, 1988: 271;

Clough, 2000: 284). But this research does not seek to ‘speak for’ those in Gaza,

neither does it claim to provide a truly valid insight into the lives of those

concerned. Instead this research shares the moral perspective of Scott (2009:

193) who views the social scientist as standing in a position of privileged power,

and therefore holding a responsibility to raise the voices of the marginalised in

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less powerful positions, otherwise unheard. Whilst it is impossible not to speak

for these marginalised groups as their experiences are always interpreted and

framed in the way the researcher decides, this problem is slightly alleviated by

using the claims Palestinians have made about their experiences to guide each

point. So despite these considerations, it is more important to try and raise these

issues described.

4. Structure

The dissertation is comprised of two chapters, the first focuses on the notion of

‘control’, and the latter looks at the impact these practices have on the everyday

lives of those in Gaza as well as how they are resisted. The first chapter begins by

trying to understand how, and in what ways, drones are being used by the IDF as

a key means to control those who reside in Gaza, defining ‘control’ using drones

as something reaching further than simple coercive measures. This opens room

to explore the array of mechanisms and devices that enable this effort to control

the behaviours and mindsets of those in Gaza. This chapter is heavily theoretical,

using the work of Foucault and other poststructuralist thinkers to help make

sense of the IDF’s actions here.

The next chapter has two key sections. Initially it draws upon the literature

surrounding everyday life to explore the impacts these practices have on those in

Gaza, focusing on the more subtle, often mundane and sometimes unconscious

ways drones are impacting on the livelihoods on those that reside there. Whilst

recognising that power is deeply concentrated in a single direction, the second

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half of the chapter argues that this attempt at control is resisted to an extent,

albeit in forms not usually included in traditional descriptions of resistance.

Finally, the conclusion seeks to pool these ideas together before reflecting upon

the importance and shortcomings of the research as well as the study’s broader

implications.

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Chapter 1: How the IDF use drones to

seek to control Palestinians in Gaza.

1. Introduction:

As described earlier, drones have been used by the IDF in some capacity since

their inception in the late 1970s and many argue that drones increasingly lie at

the heart of the Israel’s ‘system of control’ since the start of the Second Intifada

(Weizman, 2011: 119; Rogers, 2014: 8). This chapter argues the use of drones,

alongside other technologies and methods of ‘control’ have helped shape the

shift in the nature of ‘control’ in Gaza from one of physical occupation to

‘occupying from afar’. As the purpose of this dissertation is to analyse the

workings of power between the IDF and Palestinians in Gaza in relation to drone

use, this chapter seeks to gain a clearer understanding of how the drone enables

the IDF to try and control the everyday lives of those living in the Gaza Strip,

particularly emphasising the connection between Gaza use of drones to

Foucault’s panopticon metaphor.

The production of drones and their use in Gaza are inextricably linked to the

wider system of control Israel exerts over the Palestinian population more

generally. A key part of exerting this control is through employing a colonial style

of surveillance. Whilst the Palestinian Authority has some surveillance

mechanisms commonly associated with the state, these will not be discussed, as

the IDF is the key actor surveying the population of Gaza. Before justifying these

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assertions, it is important to clarify what is meant here by ‘control’. Neve Gordon

(2008: 2) best describes ‘control’ in the Israel/Palestine context as:

‘…not only the coercive mechanisms used to prohibit, exclude and repress people, but rather the entire array of institutions, legal devices, bureaucratic apparatuses, social practises, and physical edifices that operate both on the individual and the population in order to produce new modes of behaviour, habits, interests, tastes and aspirations.’

Gordon’s definition acknowledges the extent to which Israel’s system of control

is all-encompassing, permeating every aspect of life for those in Gaza. It also

recognises the range of levels the system operates on to achieve this. Most

importantly Gordon affirms the significance of non-violent forms of control, as

well as how control is targeted at both the individual and the population as a

whole. Although it is not mentioned in Gordon’s definition, surveillance plays a

prominent role in how these mechanisms are carried out. Wilson (2012: 273)

notices the IDF’s increasing focus on ‘visualization technologies’, demonstrating

how ‘securitisation through surveillance’ lies at the centre of the IDF’s strategy,

demonstrated by the immense assortment and magnitude of its surveillance

equipment. This means whilst the use of physical violence remains part of the

IDF’s repertoire of ‘control’, of increasingly greater importance is the role

surveillance plays.

It is important to stress that Gordon wrote this definition to capture Israel’s

whole system of control. Yet it is a useful definition to apply to different

practices of control employed by the IDF, including use of drones in Gaza. This

considered, this chapter will look individually at each of the mechanisms of

control described by Gordon, applying them to the practice of drones in Gaza,

exploring the power this commands for the IDF. However before these are

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analysed, the technological features of the drones need to be looked at to give

greater insight into the physical instrument that enables these practices to be

carried out.

2. Technological features of the drone

The technological features of the drone should never be considered as separate,

as if the advancement of drone technologies and its features has emerged

irrespective of context. Equally no military technologies should be treated as if

they are something detached from the human beings operating them: the

operator still decides how the visual data will be interpreted and understood

(Macgregor, 2005: 82; Kroener and Neyland, 2012: 145). That said, as long as this

principle is recognised, this does not mean the drone’s technical features cannot

first be analysed here in isolation. It is important to understand the features of

the drone as it helps us to better recognise how drones in Gaza currently

operate.

Essentially there are two main types of drone: surveillance and missile-launching

(De Shaw et al., 2014: 11). Both types are equipped with the former, but only

some can release missiles (Saif, 2014: 8). Whilst drones are unmanned they are

not unpiloted: crew are located at a land base to direct the craft and analyse the

video ‘data’ it collects (Shaw, 2013: 1). Drones can loiter in the skies from as high

as 60,000 feet, often invisible from the ground. Some, such as the Heron TP

remain aloft for up to 36 hours (Benjamin, 2012: 17). Although the Israeli military

will not confirm this, overwhelming evidence and witness accounts suggest

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drones are a permanent presence in the skies of Gaza (Graham, 2010: 42; Li,

2006: 48; Dobbing and Cole, 2014: 3).

Drones are well equipped with a range of sensors on-board. This includes

cameras, image intensifiers, radar, infra-red imaging for low-light conditions, and

lasers for targeting (Haggerty, 2006: 255; Rodgers, 2014: 98). Despite that many

portray the high-quality cameras fitted on drones as enabling drone operators to

‘see’ individuals on the ground with precision, others have proved this to be

largely unfounded, with targets often identified by a ‘blurry spot of colour’ (Saif,

2014: 22). To a certain degree, near-infrared and image-intensifiers gives the

operators some vision at night and through all weather conditions (Szetchman et

al., 2008: 28). These mean that with the removal of Israeli ground troops, the

drone can help the IDF observe terrain otherwise inaccessible.

3. The IDF’s vision of ‘control’ through drone use

Whilst Gordon’s definition of ‘control’ will be used as a guiding framework, two

devices laid out by Gordon are less relevant to this particular case at hand.

Firstly, ‘physical edifices’ in the form of the wall and its checkpoints are

important here, but only as far as the wall acts largely as a container to

Palestinians in Gaza, limiting the parameters the drones need to operate in. In a

similar vein, civil institutions such as educational and medical systems play a role

in relation to Israeli control more generally, but not directly to the practice of

drones here.

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Looking more specifically at the IDF’s operation of drones themselves, they do

not seem (in neither their surveillance nor killing capacity) to serve a single, or

even a limited set of purposes for control. Although discussing surveillance in

general, Lyon (2006: 29) sees how these practices often evolve in ‘unanticipated

ways, not always established in advance’. This belief is also applicable to Israel’s

system of control more generally, as well as the use of drones, particularly their

killing function. Put differently, in most part how the drone is used in Gaza, and

for what purpose, is not always a result of intense planning, but sometimes

determined by the immediate context and circumstances. The drone is just one

key instrument the IDF has employed that enables this reinvention of control.

3a. Control: legal devices

One device that enables the IDF’s drone operation lies with the law. To clarify,

there is a different nature of control in Gaza to the West Bank. The West Bank

has been under ‘full, direct and daily military control’ as well as ‘partial civilian

control’ since around 1967 (Shaul, 2015). In Gaza, the 2005 Disengagement Plan

marked the ‘removal’ of direct military control, meaning IDF troops no longer

had access to the ground (MFA, 2005). However, the Oslo process and Camp

David Negotiations had already granted Israel the right to access the ‘airspace

[over Palestine] and [its] electromagnetic spectrum and their supervision’ (Sher,

2001: 424).

This change in the law could be interpreted as allowing Israel to simultaneously

continue to control the Gaza Strip from afar and free themselves of legal

obligations of responsibility over the welfare of Gaza’s inhabitants. The

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international laws of occupation apply if a state has ‘effective control’ over the

territory in question. These are stated in The Hague Convention (1907) and the

Fourth Geneva Convention (1949), which impose general responsibility to the

occupying state for the safety and welfare of civilians living in this territory (ICRC,

2007). The Israeli government stated that implementing the plan would

‘invalidate the claims against Israel regarding its responsibility for the

Palestinians in the Gaza Strip’, directing them to the PA instead (MFA, 2004).1

The Plan also meant the IDF could benefit from increasing the safety of its troops

by removing them from the ground and be praised for making a step in the ‘right

direction’ towards ending the occupation. Weizman (2012: 11) argues this new

form of control ‘seeks to control the Palestinians from beyond the envelopes of

their walled-off spaces’, a process of ‘partial decolonization’ with one ‘system of

domination’ replacing another. Meaning the plan arguably just changed the form

of control, from a horizontal form to a vertical form from ‘afar’. The

Disengagement Plan therefore used the law as a catalyst to a welcomed shift

that merely reinvented the IDF’s general repertoire of control in Gaza.

As already alluded to, Israel’s relationship with Gaza arguably continues to be

colonial in nature, albeit in a modern form. This is because usually when a power

withdraws it abdicates control over the movement of the people. This would

mean Palestinians in Gaza were free to leave when they choose. However in

Gaza, despite that troops have withdrawn (although there are periodic instances

1 This is not to ignore how many still interpret that Israel still has an obligation under the law as it

still ‘effectively controls’ Gaza (see for example, BT Selem, 2015).

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where they re-enter), Israel is using other means to prevent this movement,

notably in the form of the physical edifice of the wall and its checkpoints, and

increasingly using drones too.

This change in law relied on a modification of military technology. Li (2006: 38)

observes how being largely limited to vertical space, makes airpower an ‘integral,

if not leading component of Israel’s management of the Gaza Strip’. The IDF

explicitly verifies this, with the Head of the Israeli Air Force, Amir Eshel, stating

that the IDF’s ‘vision of air control zeroes in on the notion of control’, adding that

the IDF looks at ‘how you control a city or a territory from the air when it’s no

longer legitimate to hold or occupy that territory from the ground’ (Opall-Rome,

2004). Airpower includes a range of military equipment such as air balloons,

helicopters and military jets, all of which still operate alongside drones (Gordon,

2008: 203; Weizman, 2007: 240). However, as already outlined, the aerial drone

brings unique benefits compared to other forms of airpower and it is these

features that fit so well with the shift in how Gaza is controlled.

Jones (2015: 1-14) points out that this shows how increasingly states like Israel

use the law as ‘a political tool to achieve its own military ends’, seeking to

‘legitimise’ their war tactics through abusing the rule of law, calling this ‘lawfare’.

For example the Israeli Supreme Court interprets targeted killing as falling under

human rights law or under the laws of war when better suited. In fact Israel

publicly proclaims the legality of ‘pre-emptive targeted killing’, with officials

asserting this as lawful on the basis that the ‘laws of war permit states to kill

their enemies’ and that ’Israel needs to protect itself from terror’ (MFA, 2009).

Officials add that with no ground access to Gaza, targeted individuals are ‘ticking

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bombs’ with assassination as a legitimate form of national defence because

suspects could not be arrested (MFA, 2009; Guiora, 2004: 319-334).

Much of this is simultaneously achieved by frequently declaring a ‘state of

emergency’, meaning that various laws to protect Palestinians can be waived,

and Israel can justify certain acts otherwise illegal such as drone strikes (PMO,

2011). In this sense the IDF can be seen as attempting to play into common

discourse that if something is legal it will be regarded acceptable. Alongside

‘lawfare’, and in recognition that not everyone buys in to this means of

‘legitimisation’, the IDF tries to uphold high levels of secrecy in its drone

operations, often denying drone accusations by Palestinians and their

sympathisers (Gordon, 2004: 309). The Israeli state also recognises that, in

incidences where neither of these hold, it can try to justify deadly use of force by

claiming pre-planned kill operations were ‘arrest operations that went awry’

(Strawser et al, 2014: 44; Black, 2014). Put clearly, the Israeli state enables its

drone operation in Gaza through secrecy and by using whichever legal

framework best protects itself in each incidence.

3b. Control: social practices and coercive measures

The law is a key device that enables certain social practices and coercive

measures to be carried out using drones. Social practices refer to everyday

practices and the way these are typically and habitually performed in society

(Reckwitz, 2002: 243). Largely invisible from the ground, the drones’ vertical

access allows the IDF’s control to be more covert than previous forms of warfare,

meaning they can track those on the ground often unbeknown to them. The

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drones’ loitering and camera surveillance function allows the IDF to map

territory and buildings; collect data on individuals over a significant period of

time and track the spaces and places in which people operate their everyday

lives. Graham (2010: 24) notes how the IDF targets ‘essential city infrastructures’

in attempt to ‘demodernize’ societies through the destruction of infrastructure

in Gaza. Drones are used to identify key buildings to destroy. For example, this

was the fate of Gaza’s ‘Al-Aqsa’ media centre and its main power station (HRW,

2012; Lubell, 2014; Black, 2014). Often structures built close to the border are

identified using drones for demolition to extend Israeli territory (HRW, 2004;

Halper, 2015: 44). Besides loss of life and costs of rebuilding, these destructions

make Palestinians feel vulnerable and limit daily practices such as catching-up

with news.

This also means the IDF has a significant advantage over the Palestinians,

granting near-full observation of those in Gaza and having the military advantage

of knowing where Palestinian resistance is located. Of note is the IDF’s

‘swarming’ technique’ whereby an individual is ‘followed’, sometimes for weeks,

by a ‘swarm’ of drones. This allows the IDF to establish the individual’s daily

habits and routines by having a constant visual watch on them, often with the

intent to kill (Weizman, 2012: 241). This covertness also makes it harder for

individuals or opposition groups to monitor and track the drones, making it

harder to protect themselves from surveillance and attack and enabling drone

operations to continue.

The significance of the drone is not just about enabling the IDF to utilise this

access to space vertically. So much of the system of control employed in Gaza

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relies on producing a certain type of asymmetric power. The drone gives

operators the ability to look down over Gaza from above, creating what Donna

Haraway (1988: 29) famously coined ‘the god-trick’. Foucault alludes to a similar

idea in his analysis of a series of paintings of dogs by Paul Rebeyrolle, which

stress the significance of having access to vertical space alone and the

implications on power this has. He writes: ‘In the world of prisons, as in the

world of dogs, the vertical is not one of the dimensions of space, it is the

dimension of power’ (Foucault, 1973: 170). Thus Foucault and Haraway highlight

the superiority of the ability to watch from above to see a larger picture in

contrast to those on the more limiting ground.

But Haraway’s ‘god-trick’ is more than the obvious military advantage of seeing

more than those on the ground, it creates a power dynamic reminiscent of

colonial power whereby judgments are perceived to be made from a superior

source of knowledge and from a perceived objective moral standpoint (Haraway,

1988: 29). Reiterating an earlier observation, the discursive view that technology

brings ‘objectivity’ furthers this assertion. It creates a system that assumes the

watchful eye is an ‘objective’ eye, as if the drone operator does not hold a

subjective ability or an objective agenda to process and interpret what they see

(Ashcroft et al., 2013: 48). This, amongst other things, is likely designed by the

IDF to instil a feeling in Gaza that the IDF’s acts are morally based, attempting to

infuse a vulnerability and a sense of ‘subalternity and powerlessness’ to those

below by making Palestinians feel as if they are being watched (Dahan et al.,

2012: 28).

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In this sense, one way drones are being used is in the form of collective control.

As rather than identifying ‘known’ individuals by tracking their personal

characteristics, the IDF seeks to control the population through identifying

certain patterns of life, to detect groups that need to be monitored by

identifying certain characteristics by dividing up the population. Shaw (2013: 13)

points out how these ‘patterns of life’ are assessed on the ‘potential to become

dangerous’, extending the IDF’s focus from known threats to ‘potential threats’.

This is a form of what Foucault terms ‘biopolitical control’, as power is directed

at the control of the whole population.

This leads to a similar, but importantly distinct point to the two made already,

relating to how the drone is being used to imbue those underneath with the

perception their every move is being observed. This connotes to Foucault’s

interpretation of the panopticon metaphor. Some already note a resemblance to

the image of the drone loitering above the airspace of Gaza and its resemblance

to the panopticon (see for example, Hass, 2011: 28; Dahan, 2012; Sorek, 2011:

113). The panopticon is most often described as a prison hosting a central tower

from which it is possible to see each prisoner’s cell. Central is the notion the

prisoners can be observed at all times, but are never sure or aware of when they

are being observed or exactly who is observing them (Foucault, 1977: 198-202).

The panopticon metaphor is grounded on the aim of increasing efficiency.

Foucault (1977: 20) describes it as a ‘functional mechanism that must improve

the exercise of power by making it lighter, more rapid, more effective’. This

applies to the IDF too. As described earlier, whilst the IDF collects data from a

small number of individuals, it does not track every individual. Although multiple

25

drones can operate at one time there are still limits to what the drone operator

can ‘see’, especially as the drone cannot see through walls or underground. It is

currently not possible to track every person at all times using drones: Gaza is the

most densely populated urban landscape in the world with a population of

almost two million (CIA, 2015).

Not only is it impractical to maintain control this way, this practice alone

commands the IDF limited power. This is why central to the panopticon is the

notion that it is a space whereby each prisoner feels their bodily actions are

being watched under the scrutinising eye of the guard in the central watchtower.

According to Foucault (1977:20) this is a design of subtle coercion whereby

inhabitants feel they must self-regulate behaviour in accordance to what they

perceive is ‘acceptable’ in the eyes of the controlling power, producing a

‘disciplinary’ form of power. Thus disciplinary power aspires to ‘fix’ people’s

‘undesirable’ actions by ‘means of tight control over the minutest acts and

behaviours’ (Handel, 2011: 262). This argues that the IDF see a more efficient use

of the drones than constant-watch is to form a degree of control on their

subjects through shaping their behaviours.

This form of power aims to do more than change people’s physical actions; it

seeks to permeate people’s minds within, which Deleuze criticises Foucault for

failing to recognise. Deleuze (1988: 34) sees that key to the panoptic mechanism

is the aim to ‘impose a particular conduct’. However the objective of the

panopticon metaphor is not just about influencing physical actions, but the

‘potential to instil self-discipline through making the subject aware they are

being watched’ (Sorek, 2011: 113). Thus disciplinary mechanisms ideally aim to

26

gradually change people’s perceptions on whether certain actions are morally

right or wrong, and this in turn, will be internalised by subtly changing their

thought processes, mind-sets and beliefs. This means disciplinary power is

implemented from above but operates from below, in attempt to impose

homogeneity over the population’s individual thoughts and modify their daily

practices. Thus it aims to simultaneously render people ‘docile’ and

‘individualise’ inhabitants by making it possible to detect differences among the

population to pick out those that need to be watched more closely (Mitchell,

1991: 93).

Foucault (1977: 200–202) saw that for panoptic power to compel obedience

power must appear always present and this relied on two things: visibility and

non-verifiability. Elmer (2014: 24) sees this did not mean Foucault saw the

panopticon as all-seeing or all-registered, ‘but a landscape that could at any time

impact in an individual a likelihood of surveillance’. It is a system of non-

verifiable power where one can never be certain if they are being observed but is

sure there is a strong likelihood he will be so (Foucault, 1977: 201).

The notion of ‘visibility’ here is less clear-cut. The ‘swarming’ technique

described earlier considered the advantage of being invisible in terms of its

ability to monitor (and sometimes kill) subjects unbeknown to those on the

ground. When Foucault (1977, 201) describes visibility he comments on how the

inmate will constantly have the tall outline of the central tower from which he is

spied on before his eyes. This suggests the IDF’s strategy relies on one of

invisibility rather than visibility. But arguably Foucault does not define ‘visible’

here as something the eye sees, but visible in the sense of awareness of a

27

presence. In Gaza, when multiple drones ‘swarm’ together at once, those on the

ground can hear the ‘zenana’, or know of their presence due to ‘fuzziness’ on

their televisions (Halper, 2015: 184; Wilson, 2011).2

Even so it is hard to calculate how effective disciplinary techniques the IDF uses

are. For these reasons the panopticon and its disciplinary power are relevant, but

should be taken as a light metaphor, a starting point at how in a dystopic setting

the IDF could control those in Gaza. This will be further examined in the

subsequent chapter. There are other shortcomings to the panoptic metaphor

relevant to the use of drones in Gaza. More generally in surveillance studies, in

many ways for good reason, some shy away from the panoptic metaphor. Many

subscribe to Deleuze’s ‘Postscript on the Societies of Control’ (1995: 4) as a

corrective to Foucault’s panopticon, highlighting what he regards as a shift in the

18th century from ‘disciplinary societies’ to ‘societies of control’. This marks the

panopticon and its disciplinary function as a limited program designed to keep

watch over confined populations, seeing that global societies no longer live in an

‘enclosure’ as Foucault claimed (Deleuze, 1995: 5).

Clearly in one sense Gaza is confined: it is commonly described as an ‘open-air

prison’ as it is so difficult to leave (see for example Tax, 2014; Benjamin, 2013:

74). But what Deleuze alludes to here is the interconnected nature of the

surveillance system of control, rather than a system where the individual passes

from one closed space to another as Foucault asserts. This change to a ‘control’

society means individuals can be permanently tracked. Just because Gaza is a

fairly exceptional case, with the key observer being the IDF rather than its own

2 ‘Zenana’ denotes the name Palestinians give to the ‘buzzing’ sound of the drone.

28

state, this does not mean the panopticon metaphor or disciplinary power is

made redundant but that it needs adapting to Gaza’s context.

3c. Control: coercive measures that help implement social practices

But these disciplinary and biopolitical social practices cannot implement control

through the presence of surveillance drones alone. Another part of the drone

that enables the IDF to attempt to ‘control’ lives in Gaza lies with using coercion

in the form of the drone’s missile function. Achille Mbembe (2003: 11-12)

recognises this, extending Foucault’s writing on power by arguing there is more

to control than disciplinary and biopower power. Mbembe (2003: 11) sees in

large part, ‘the power and capacity to dictate who may live and who must die’ is

the ‘ultimate expression’ of sovereignty and control, coining this ‘necropower’. If

biopower denotes how physical bodies are subjugated and made to behave in

certain ways as a microcosm of social control over the wider population,

necropower is about wielding autonomy over another’s life, a mixture of

disciplinary power and biopolitics (Foucault, 2010: 84; Mbembe, 2003). This

commonality of autonomy over life make biopower and necropower two sides of

the same coin. Although Mbembe was writing before the proliferation of drones,

it is clear drones with their capacity to release ‘targeted’ missiles means the

concept of necropower is still appropriate in Gaza.

Clearly the ability to decide who lives or dies is an important form of ‘control’,

but as mentioned and justified earlier; this dissertation centres on the

surveillance aspect of the drone. Similarly, although drone attacks are fairly

common, in lots of ways directing too much analysis on the killing per se diverts

29

away from the commitment to focus on everyday life. This considered, killing

Palestinians in Gaza helps the IDF to attain the power to control those who

remain alive as evoking a fear of being watched only becomes a reality if a

person feels there is evidence, or reason to believe there are negative

consequences to certain behaviours. It seems this explains in part why violent

attacks are carried out periodically, often using drone missiles to strike

individuals, smaller groups, buildings and infrastructure.

As Weizman (2007: 238) explains, periodic attacks on Palestinians (this should be

extended to include destruction of infrastructure and homes) can no longer be

explained simply as ‘terrorist prevention’ as whilst ‘targeted killings’ are often

carried out on those the IDF perceives as ‘terrorists’, it could be argued the IDF is

aware these killings are not going to ‘protect’ Israeli territory and its people as

they have other mechanisms in place to assure this such as the defensive ‘iron

dome’ (see for example, Armstrong, 2014).

Instead these attacks are best seen as death tactics or ‘thanato-tactics’ as

Weizman (2011: 125) describes them. They are small-scale, but fairly regular

killings, that act as a reminder to the rest of the population that, as individuals,

they must act and behave in accordance to what the IDF perceives as ‘correct’.

They are limited in number, arguably to discourage large-scale retaliation, and to

limit international attention and condemnation in order to preserve Israel’s

political hegemony, but frequent enough to send a message that non-

compliance will be punished by death and destruction (Weizman, 2011: 130).

This military tactic has often been described as ‘cutting the grass’, with those

who advocate this strategy framing it as a defensive tool designed to undermine

30

the ability of terror groups to threaten Israel’s security (Shaul, 2015). For others,

it is a device that enables the IDF to preserve control by continuously ensuring

Palestinians remain weak and vulnerable, as these periodic attacks seek to

spread fear and evoke psychological trauma (Feffer, 2014).

Shaul (2015), a former Israeli soldier and the founder of Palestinian rights group

‘Breaking the Silence’, describes how his involvement in ‘countless operations

aimed at ‘lowering the heads’ of Palestinians’, designed to demonstrate that the

‘IDF are always present in every place’. Again, the buzz or ‘zenana’, of the drone

contributes to this logic, a near-constant auditory reminder of the possibility of

imminent death, an attempt to encourage the Palestinians in Gaza to consider

how they conduct their every move (Hussain, 2013). Mbembe (2003: 40)

captures this sentiment in his description of how necropower ensures ‘vast

populations are subjected to conditions of life conferring upon them the status

of the living dead’.

To go back to Weizman (2007: 210), and to comment more wholesomely on the

role of the missile function of the drone and its relation to influencing social

behaviour and control, the ‘thanato-tactics’ surrounding the drone are intended

to try and maintain a sufficient level of security and political influence in Gaza. It

allows control to be maintained without carrying out too many attacks. This

reduces financial costs as well as limiting international attention and

condemnation. Put differently, it means Israel can attempt to continue its

mission without facing significant political repercussions.

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3d. Control: bureaucratic apparatuses

‘Necropower’ and the ‘killing’ function of the drone are further relevant here. As

already discussed, the argument Israel uses surveillance on Palestinians to secure

itself from threat is not unfounded, but it is clear the system of control it has in

place is disproportionate to the threat posed. This begs the question as to why

such disproportionate force is used and how Israel is able to continue this

process. Arguably the connection here, as Parisi (2004) argues, is with the notion

of ‘life’ which lies central to bio-genetic capitalism, an opportunity for financial

investments and potential profit. This fits into Deleuze’s work on ‘Societies of

Control’ as a significant part of Deleuze’s focus surrounds the relationship

between surveillance and control, and their connection to global capitalism.

The correlation between Israel’s booming international drone industry (and

military and policing technology more generally) and its increased use of drones

and violence in the Palestinian Territories is strong. Put differently, profit can be

gained from exporting missile-launching drones and surveillance technologies.

This has provoked accusations by some that the IDF is using Gaza as a

‘laboratory’, a testing ground for the development of drones as well as other

weapons, security systems models of population control and tactics (See for

example, Halper, 2015: 4; Li, 2006: 38; Dahan, 2012: 29; Graham, 2010: 40).

This claim is not unfounded: Israel is currently a world leader in the

manufacturing and exportation of drones (Kreps and Zenko, 2014: 78; Rodgers,

2014: 99; Li, 2006; Boyle, 2015: 2; Webb, 2010: 33). Estimates on the value of

Israel’s drone industry significantly vary, but as around 40 percent of the world’s

32

drones come from Israel show a glimpse into the extent of profit drones are

wielding (Ben-David, 2013; Boltom et al, 2012).

The fairly unique system of control Israel has over Gaza provides a ‘desirable’

environment for the IDF to carry out these practices. This makes the drone

industry beneficial to Israel for two main reasons. First is its financial income.

Without exporting these weapons, their systems, and their tactics, Israel would

be unable to compete so highly in the international arms and security markets.

No less important is how being a major military power that serves other

militaries and security services across the globe brings Israel a prestigious

international status among global hegemons that would probably not have

otherwise achieved to the same extent (Halper, 2015: 4). Thus how the IDF aims

to ‘control’ the population is partly designed with this in mind. These two

explanations also help understand how Israel largely ‘get away with’ this

politically, as the military benefits for importing countries helps better explain

why internationally there is not more pressure for Israel to end its occupation.

The use of the law and the IDF’s secrecy described earlier help justify this.

These points may seem off-piste from the argument of this chapter, but they

help explain the logic behind the techniques of control Israel uses in Gaza and

how the drones aid this. It also provides the context to understand why Israel’s

drone industry has accelerated so significantly. Without this modern colonial

relationship of control, Israel would have neither the drive nor the conditions by

which to develop, deploy, test and export world-class weaponry and modes of

control. Halper (2015: 36) states this sentiment succinctly: ‘the need to pursue

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an aggressive security politics is what thrusts Israel into wide-ranging global

involvement unusual for such a small country.

4. Conclusion: restricting movement, limiting certain behaviour

It is difficult to assert which came first: the move away from ‘control’ from the

ground or efforts to develop drone technologies and their usage which would

allow control from afar: the two are mutually constitutive and intertwined.

Regardless of this, there has not been a major modification of the means of

control, instead a shift in emphasis of the modes of power used. Drones are one

key technology that have replaced the direct presence of ground troops and

settlements by attempting instead to control by regulating movement through

space.

Applying Gordon’s definition of control to the context of drone use in Gaza has

helped outline the range of devices the IDF has used to try and exert control over

those that reside there. This chapter found that the IDF uses drones to exert

control using social practices to try and internalise Palestinians’ mindsets and

influence their behaviour, enforced using coercive measures in the form of

periodic drone missile attacks. The chapter saw that these practices were

enabled, in part, through using legal devices to help to try to legitimise these acts

in order to try and discursively make it acceptable for the bureaucrats to export

drones to other states to minimise international pressure and condemnation of

its actions towards Palestinians as well as maximising financial profits from these

exports.

34

Whilst Gordon helped define control, Foucault, as well as the body of academics

who have corrected and extended his work, have created a useful theoretical

framework that can be applied to the case at hand. Despite that neither

Foucault’s panopticon metaphor nor Deleuze’s ‘Societies of Control’ match

entirely to the IDF’s use of drones as a means of control over the population of

Gaza, in large part applying these ideas helps explain at least the logic behind the

IDF’s use of drones in Gaza as well as their workings of power and how this is

carried out.

What these drone tactics all have in common are the intent to control the

population of Gaza by creating an environment of uncertainty and anxiety for

those residing there, aiming to disrupt Palestinians in their everyday lives. The

IDF are trying to create an atmosphere of constant persecution by sending a

message to those in Gaza they must limit certain behaviours and restrict

movements or their livelihoods will be disrupted, they may even be killed. The

drone is not a mere weapon, but a tool aimed just as much at regulating as it is

killing. As Mmembe (2003: 29) sums up, there are a ‘concatenation of multiple

powers’ present here: ‘disciplinary, biopolitical and necropolitical’. The drone is

just one technology that makes up these workings of power. Whilst this chapter

cannot explain the entire present logic of the IDF, it tried to demonstrate how a

key part of ‘control’ for the IDF is less about gathering data and information and

is more a tactical logic that aims to disrupt Palestinian political and armed

resistance. So whereas this chapter has looked at the logic and intent of the IDF

35

to control, the next section will delve further into the impact this has on those in

Gaza and how they interact with this workings of power in resistance.

36

Chapter 2: Everyday resistance to the

IDF’s drone practices in Gaza

‘Escaping the imaginary totalizations produced by the eye, the everyday

has a certain strangeness that does not surface, or whose surface is only

its upper limit, outlining itself against the visible.’

De Certeau, 1984: 93.

1. Introduction

Academics and the media mostly frame the impact of the IDF’s use of drones in

relation to the devastating effects the missile strikes have on those directly

struck (see for example Rodgers, 2014; Webb et al, 2010; Loenwenstein, 2007).

This includes those killed, as well as their families and friends who have to deal

with the implications of their destroyed homes and livelihoods whilst mourning

loved ones. Most coverage on this issue documents the extent to which drones

are being used to launch missiles as a way to hold the secretive IDF to account

and alert the world to these practices. This focus is not surprising, neither is it

problematic in large part: death and destruction indisputably impacts those in

Gaza significantly. But by restricting analysis to those ‘exceptional moments of

popular explosion’, we are limiting attention to the more obvious and visible

implications of the drones (Scott, 1996: 323). This traditional ontological

approach cannot capture the impact, significance and implications of the IDF’s

use of drones in a way that recognises how they interact with power on a

minute, mundane and everyday basis.

37

Another problem with focusing on ‘grand events’ in this context lies with how

power is conceptualised, including how it is resisted. It is unhelpful to merely

focus on how the drones are being used to try to ‘control’ life in Gaza, as if this

process is concentrated in an entirely singular direction. As Foucault (1978: 95)

asserts, we cannot speak of power without resistance. This frames power and

resistance not in binary opposition but in a decoupled, circulatory, complex

perpetual ‘dance of control’ (Pile, 1997: 4). Foucault sees neither control nor

resistance are ever produced independently of one another: they are

interrelated and inter-dependent.

Similarly, whilst the IDF’s system of power does not determine the form

resistance takes, it does set the parameters for a distinct type of resistance to

emerge as Palestinian resistance is conditioned within these boundaries (Richter-

Devroe, 2011: 34). This creates a tendency for analysts to focus on the pre-

planned, systematic, organised, or ‘selfless’ practices that have revolutionary

consequences because they are more clear-cut forms of resistance. This

particularly applies to Palestinian resistance groups such as Fatah and Hamas.

However this approach is very one-dimensional, narrow and exclusionary as it

ignores a large section of Gaza’s population, many of whom may not directly

involve themselves with the operations of these groups intentionally or on a

regular basis.

The first section of this paper took a more top-down approach, using a mix of

empirical examples and theoretical approaches to model how the IDF seeks to

‘control’ the everyday lives of those in Gaza. What this missed was a more

empirical look at how this impacts those lives on the ground below and how

38

effectively the IDF have regulated the bodies and minds of Palestinians. Of

course this approach wields problems. First, it is nearly impossible to identify

such subtle changes in behaviour, especially when many are normalised and

done unconsciously. Similarly is it hard to distinguish behaviours that are a direct

consequence of the drones and those which are a result of the wider system of

control employed in Gaza. In the most part, we cannot definitively speak for

Palestinians and know the true extent to the workings of power at play here. But

it is still worth attempting to uncover the workings of power here, especially as

there are examples of the everyday consequences of the drones and how this

practice is resisted.

This chapter plans to help partially mitigate this problem. To understand the kind

of practices used to resist drones, it is essential to understand the context that

produces these kinds of resistance. This chapter first delves into how the drones

impact the lives of those in Gaza on an everyday basis, using the literature on the

‘everyday’ and ‘micropolitics’ to support some examples. This chapter tries to

argue that these practices are resisted, mapping the types of small-scale and

everyday forms of resistance. It seeks to show how in their struggle to regain

normalcy in their lives, Palestinians in Gaza have developed multiple indirect and

direct survival techniques to resist the IDF’s system of control.

2. Everyday life in Gaza living under drones

The study of micropolitics and ‘everyday life’ are not new. Micropolitics is an

established ontological approach associated with post-structuralism, chiefly

associated with Gilles Deleuze, Félix Guattari and Michel Foucault (Scherer, 2007:

39

564). It argues that to understand the political sphere ‘it is not enough to study

the behaviour of large-scale political formations such as the state, instead we

must attend to the political character of the everyday and show how the texture

of day-to-day life produces particular political subjects’ (Glezos, 2010: 884). As

already declared, micropolitics is popular in some research areas, but there is an

omission in applying this to drone use in Gaza. A ‘micro’ approach to power

deems focusing on the missile function itself does not recognise how the IDF’s

use of drones permeates even the minutest levels of life in Gaza, often in subtle

and mundane ways. Just because these ‘grand events’ involving missiles are

fairly common in Gaza, this does not mean they represent the everyday lives of

those residing there.

Drones are preventing people from conducting their normal activities: both

leisure activities and those conducted as part of surviving everyday life. For

example accounts by Palestinians in Gaza report minimising and even cancelling

activities imperative to daily survival, which involve travelling far or even leaving

the house. This includes actions such as going on runs, going to market for

essential items, hanging out washing on rooftops, and travelling in cars for work

or school (HRW, 2009: 6; Macintyre, 2014: 27; Dobbing and Cole, 2014: 16;

Wilson, 2011). These occur primarily when drones are loudly heard overhead,

but some report feeling so fearful they limit their movements more frequently

(Wilson, 2011; Macintyre, 2014: 27). For instance Wilson speaks to a Palestinian,

Hamdi Shaqqura, who started skipping jogs, fearing the drone operators could

interpret the pace of his run as suspicious behaviour. When he did go, he

changed the colour he wore from black to a lighter colour as he heard how if the

40

IDF were to accidently equate his black uniform (the same colour as military

uniform) whilst he was running he would risk attack (Wilson, 2011).

The drones are having similar impacts on social activities too. Palestinians in

Gaza report curbing activities such as meeting with friends, sitting outside their

homes with friends, and prohibiting their children from playing outdoors (HRW:

2009: 5; Saif, 2015: 9; Wilson, 2011). But as demonstrated in the previous

chapter, staying at home does not even guarantee safety. Constant fear of attack

means even the home is not a physical refuge, or a place where social activities

can take place, or a space to escape the reminder of constant conflict.

Furthermore, even when people do conduct these activities at home, they are

often disrupted. When drones fly overhead they frequently affect the quality of

the reception by distorting the screen because the drones use the same satellite

signals (see for example, Saif, 2014: 40; Balousha, 2013). This applies to watching

television, listening to the radio and telephoning friends (Saif, 2014: 41).

Implications here reach further than simply disrupting these activities. First it

cuts off the ability for Palestinians to connect with one another and the outside

world, through limiting activities such as watching the news or phoning family

from further afield. Physical interaction is already limited by restricting how

much people meet in person. The use of drones extends this to non-physical

forms of interaction. This disruption seeks to disconnect Palestinians from one

another. These kinds of activities also help people cope with life in Gaza, acting

as escapism, respite, and a release from living constantly in a battlefield (Cooper

and Anderson, 2015: 7). These combined with factors such as the poverty the

majority in Gaza experience means there are increasingly fewer social spaces and

41

social activities to engage in (see for example Saif, 2015: 58; UN Habitat, 2008:

128). Limiting movement also impedes upon aspects of life such as health and

comfort; some Palestinians in Gaza report spending increasing amounts of time

indoors in order to maximise their safety (Corporate Watch, 2014; Human Rights

Watch, 2009: 14).

We have seen so far that it is the drone’s ‘buzzing’ that seems to trigger the

greatest detrimental impact on Palestinian everyday life (see, Scherer, 2013;

Levy, 2005; Hookes, 2011). Asma Al-Ghoul, talks about the ‘buzz’, adding ‘it does

not want me to see or hear anything around me but its sounds and to think of its

next strike.” (Saif, 2014: 40). Multiple others claim they associate the ‘buzzing’

with imminent death, and that this is key to why high numbers of people suffer

from moderate to severe post-traumatic stress syndrome (Hauslohner, 2013;

Thabet and Thabet, 2015: 1). One Palestinian in Gaza, Bar Sheshet, explains how

the drones constantly put many ‘on edge’, giving an example of a time he took

cover when he heard buzzing then saw a ‘shiny object’ fly past and fearing it was

a missile only to find it was a bundle of birthday balloons (Dreazan 2014).

Simultaneously for some, and at other times for others, people describe the

constant buzzing of the drones as ‘annoying’ (Hass, 2011: 28; HRW, 2009: 28).

There are claims if more than one drone is directly overhead ‘to make a

conversation with the person in the same room is difficult’ (Saif, 2014: 25). This

sentiment is poignant in an interview by Human Rights Watch (2009: 28) where

Mahmud al-Habbash recalls hearing an explosion nearby and feeling

simultaneously ‘annoyed and worried’, before discovering her children had been

struck. The disturbing dualism of this description shows how constant and

42

normalised they are for those that live in Gaza, perfectly capturing the impact of

the drones.

These mark only a few examples, rather than an all-inclusive list, to give just a

glimpse into how drones are disrupting everyday life, impacting on economic and

social structures as well as mental and physical health. This is not to claim it is

the IDF’s direct intent to get a person to change, say, what they wear or how

they transport themselves to work specifically as how people regulate their

behaviour is less important for the IDF. But by encouraging these sorts of self-

regulating behaviours, the IDF is aiming to inject a sense of constant fear and

uncertainty into Gaza, by constantly reminding Palestinians of their presence and

by encouraging Palestinians to consider the implications of each action they

make.

3. Reconceptualising ‘resistance’

Intimately connected to the politics of everyday life is the idea of everyday

resistance. Formal conceptions of resistance portray subaltern groups as passive

and accepting of control (Bayat, 2013: 37-38). This depiction is dangerous: it

suggests the lives these marginalised groups live are not political lives and that

they are docile. Just because the IDF is trying to create a disciplinary structure

and it is effective to some extent, control does not always work in the intended

way, as actors do not compliantly accept this fate (De Certeau, 1984). Instead

Foucault (1978: 95-96) argues when a force actively attempts to discipline the

body, a space is created, producing an array of ways to resist these practices.

This is because resistance is not independent of control but conditioned by it,

43

thus each action by one group creates another reaction from the other (Richter-

Devroe, 2011: 34). Just as tactics are not always necessarily planned out by the

IDF and are instead responsive to changes in context, the same applies to

resistance: this interlock of power is not fixed but historically contingent, (Lilja

and Vithagen, 2009). Weizman (2007: 189) calls this practice ‘mimicry’ whereby

‘the military attempts to adapt their practices and forms of organisation inspired

by the guerrilla forms of violence it is confronted with’, entering a cycle of co-

evolution.

The concept of ‘everyday resistance’ originates with James Scott and his 1984

study ‘The Weapons of the Weak’ but has since been expanded and adapted.

Thus everyday resistance in this context marks how people in Gaza act in their

everyday lives in ways that undermine power and control. Many qualities make

everyday resistance different to more conventional resistance. Besides those

already discussed, everyday resistance tends to be unorganised, less visible,

more subtle, largely un-confrontational, and therefore, safer (Scott, 1989: 34-35;

Lyon, 2014: 364; Gilliom and Monahan, 2012: 410). As Scott (1989: 35-53)

affirms, the relative safety of everyday forms of resistance ‘has much to do with

the small scale of the action’, these acts are ‘below the radar’ as often the main

aim is quietly meeting one's needs, often for vital material gains. For this reason

these acts often go unnoticed as the act can be so minute, common and

normalised that it is not always consciously carried out (Curtis, 2015: 105). This is

why everyday resistance is largely nonviolent (Scott, 1997). These characteristics

of everyday resistance all fit the kind of space they are operating within,

productive of the disparities in power between the IDF and the Palestinians in

Gaza.

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3a. Everyday acts of resistance as political

Due to the subtle and mundane form of everyday resistance, at first glance it

appears difficult to distinguish if an individual’s act should be described as

‘resistance’. Closely related is the dispute over the extent these types of actions

can be counted as resistance with accusations they are trivial coping mechanisms

of self-help rather than ‘politically protesting’ (for example, Hobsbawm, 1984:

282; Genovese, 1974). Scott (1985: 296) broaches this point, arguing isolated and

rare acts are insignificant, arguing only when acts are ‘consistent patterns’

(regardless of whether they are unorganised and uncoordinated) do they

become acts of resistance. Bayat (2013: 48) adds how these kinds of activities

are not carried out as deliberate political acts but out of necessity to survive and

improve life. But this does not prevent these sorts of practices concurrently

fitting into the realm of contentious politics, they just do so ‘quietly’ (Bayat,

2013: 45). Thus Bayat (2013: 20) helps specify how resistance is not about

protesting but the practising of ‘redress through direct and disparate actions’.

Bayat (2013: 45) suggests, as do others, that for something to count as resistance

it must be ‘unlawful’. However he writes in the context of people in post-colonial

Middle Eastern states (in large part) resisting state practices, unlike those in Gaza

who are resisting a colonial power. There is no reason why something must be

illegal to count as resistance, instead it just needs to deviate from what the

controlling power deems as in the realms of acceptability. As Darweish and Rigby

(2015: 37) put it, an act of resistance involves ‘contentious practices that subvert

existing regulations’ of the authoritative power. Just because ‘resistance’ does

45

not have explicit political objectives in the traditional sense’, it is still political

because it ‘creates a tacit challenge and introduces symbolic friction to existing

systems of domination or control’ (Gilliom and Monahan, 2012: 405).

Rightly, others worry that the desire to challenge the portrayal of Palestinians as

weak and uninvolved in the conflict brings a considerable risk of overly

politicising and romanticising resistance, heroifying their actions, branding them

as definitive signs of freedom and a trajectory for change (Abu-Lughod, 1990: 42;

Macleod, 1992). This is not the intent here; especially as it is clear the IDF’s

control over Gaza far surpasses the resistance regular Palestinians are able to

push back as the Israeli side has more resources.

3b. Everyday acts of resistance as simultaneously individual and collective

Many who criticise that everyday resistance does not ‘count’ as resistance

because it is too often in the form of self-help, also make the same allegation on

the grounds that they see the acts as individual and this is in numerous ways.

Despite self-help potentially extending to a group such as family and friends,

these acts are still individual in the sense that no organised unified group has

formed (Darweish and Rigby, 2015: 37). These individual acts are political and

therefore count as resistance. As Foucault (1977: 233) proclaims, it is those

directly involved at each site of action who determine which methods they use

to resist. Each individual has multiple understandings and practices of resistance,

carried out in different ways and to varying degrees (Richter-Devroe, 2011: 44).

Put succinctly, people do not have a collective understanding of resistance. As

46

already alluded to, everyday resistance is also individual in the sense they

frequently resist drones in the form of self-help, often to survive.

This does not prevent everyday resistance in Gaza to be simultaneously

collective too. Scott (1989: 36) sees there is nearly always an element of

collective action involved, even if this just entails an observer turning a blind eye

to a person’s action to help them avoid detection from an act the controller

perceives as deviant. Even if a group’s goal is not the same, and their activities

may be fragmented, their path is similar with their sheer cumulative number

shaping them into an eventual social force. (Darweish and Rigbyn, 2015: 37). For

instance, just because Palestinians are divided as to whether they favour a one-

state or two-state solution, this does not mean they all do not want the use of

drones in Gaza to stop. Even though the specific way and immediate context in

which they are carried out may vary slightly, in large part everyday resistance

embodies similar shared practices of large numbers of ordinary people in Gaza.

Therefore any allegations that these everyday acts do not count as resistance

because they serve no collective effort are unfounded as they are simultaneously

individual and collective.

4. Forms of everyday resistance to drone practices in Gaza

So far the focus has been more theory based. This next section will look more at

what everyday resistance to drone use in Gaza looks like. Just as the role of

space is key to how the drone’s system of control is carried out by the IDF,

naturally the same applies to those in Gaza. In the previous section we saw how

47

the 2005 Disengagement Plan changed the nature of the occupation from

horizontal to a more vertical power, with the IDF having the advantage of an

aerial view of Gaza’s landscape. However this leaves Palestinians with the ability

to use those spaces drones are unable to reach to resist surveillance. Palestinians

report increasingly moving themselves and their daily activities inside buildings,

whilst there is some suggestion Palestinians are also maximising their advantages

of vertical power by transferring their activities below the ground and into cave

networks (Herman, 2014; Rodgers, 2014: 106).

But more than the role of vertical space, yet intimately connected, is how the

organisational environment becomes a resource for those in resistance as

Palestinians begin to learn the tactics of the IDF for protection and survival. Ball

(2006: 3000-1) writes how all resistance strategies involve creating a ‘spatio-

temporal gap’ between watcher and watched by breaking or disrupting the flows

of information and knowledge being transferred about themselves between the

various parties of the dominant power.

Abujidi (2011: 328) supports this sentiment when he declares Palestinians are

knowledgeable and powerful, ‘unconsciously mentally mapping the patterns and

rhythms generated by the control network’. This is how Palestinians formulate

strategies and tactics designed to infiltrate the IDF’s system of control more

generally. In other words, Palestinians learn how to resist the drones by living on

the ground and communicating with one another. This sentiment is not made

blindly of the inequalities of power relations at play, but power does not need to

have lasting persistent effects to count as resistance. But the better-matched

48

resistance tactics are to the environment, the more likely it will succeed (Gilliom

and Monahan, 2012: 409).

4a. Survival and Self-help: evasion and masking

In Gaza, and the context of drone use, power is so dominated in one direction it

seems resistance mainly revolves around maximising safety and protection to

minimise the likelihood of attack. Put differently, much of Palestinian resistance

in Gaza revolves around avoiding surveillance and the ‘thanatotactics’ described

previously. The role of surveillance is increasingly more significant than Scott’s

conception because of the extensiveness and sophistication in Gaza. The

surveillance aspect of the drone is the means in which the IDF uses to decide

where they will launch a missile, therefore resistance to drone surveillance is

central to the repertoire of resistance constantly formed. This includes tactics

such as evading and masking to try and escape the watchful eye of the drones

above.

Saif (2014: 25) and Dobbing and Cole (2014: 16) interviews find examples of

evasion, each noticing how Palestinians have learned to use the drone’s sound to

indicate if there is a significant risk. For instance Nader Elkhuzandar, a Palestinian

from Gaza explains how ‘when the drone engine gets louder and more

persistent’ he should remain inside, as it means there is danger of strike as the

drone is looking for a target. Wilson (2011) interviewed a Palestinian who evades

drones in a different form. For instance he recalls how when the drones are

above him, he meets people face to face rather than taking taxis or cars.

49

These examples also demonstrate how sometimes everyday resistance overlaps

with catering to the benefit of the IDF to the extent these acts actually

contribute to stabilising the IDF’s system. But resistance can have different

meanings, intentions and effects on different power structures. So whilst in

some ways the noise hinders Palestinians through evoking fear and irritation, this

very device to control can also provide Palestinians with the means to resist

attack and break through the network of surveillance albeit to varying success. It

is for this reason that Macleod (1992) reminds us not to conceptualise agency

only within the dichotomies of resistance and conformance, but to see that

frequently an act is simultaneously conforming and subverting.

4b. Resilience: life goes on, life as resistance, injecting enjoyment into life

In addition to this, for many, and to varying degrees, resistance involves

continuing to live life through carrying on activities as usual. The previous

chapter looked at Mbembe’s claim that Palestinian lives are increasingly being

reduced to a status of the ‘living dead’ (2003). Whilst the first half of the chapter

showed this is the case in many ways, this does not mean it is accepted or not

resisted. For some this is a conscious decision, a form of empowerment to send a

message to the Israelis that they will not be controlled. In large part though ‘life

goes on’ to an extent not out of defiance, but because the conflict in Gaza is so

long enduring and continuous, irrespective of the endangerments involved and

people cannot maintain living such reductive lives. Such inequalities in power

make resistance difficult, the drone is even harder to resist because it cannot be

interacted with in the same way as with the ground control. But if a key aim of

50

Israeli drone use is to disrupt Palestinian life, carrying on as normal is an effective

way to resist this practice. In this sense ‘to exist is to resist’, not cooperating

denies a key intent of the IDF’s power. Palestinians call this ‘sumud’, denoting

the ‘steadfast and stubborn insistence on carrying on with life despite all odds’

(Richter-Devroe, 2009). Regardless of either intention, these acts count as

resistance as the IDF’s system of control seeks to limit and discipline movement

and they are rejecting this.

This also includes keeping up hope and laughing despite the death and loss they

have experienced at the hands of the IDF. For example Saif (2015: 99) in his

published diary about life in Gaza mentions how after several days of being

restricted to his home with limited food because of drones overhead, he and his

wife started making jokes up, personifying the drones as if they were alive

animals and joking that the drones must be begging the drone operators to be

allowed to leave as the drones would be hungry too. Just because this pursuit of

everyday enjoyment and normalcy cannot change the material this is

unimportant as it is not the aim here. Richter-Devroe’s (2009) observation,

although made about Palestinian women, is arguably just as applicable to many

Palestinians in general when she writes how they realise that controlling physical

space is impossible, so instead they ‘stress the need to maintain their own

alternative and ideational spaces’. This shows us that resistance is not limited to

practical survival strategies on the material level but extends to more abstract

spaces too.

51

5. Conclusion

The initial half of this chapter showed how Palestinian experience of control by

drone and power more generally has reached into the very core of Palestinian

individuals and their everyday lives, touching their bodies, permeating their

actions and attitudes and changing discourse in many ways. It argued the effects

of feeling constantly watched, of feeling at constant risk of imminent death has

just as significant impact on lives in Gaza as those more obvious impacts

discussed more frequently. The second half of the essay explored how

Palestinians, have widened the scope for what counts as resistance. These two

arguments may have initially appeared contradictory, but instead highlight the

unequal nature of power in the Israel/Palestine conflict and how the IDF’s drone

practice is effective in many ways but is also resisted.

It is hard to definitely separate what acts are a result of drone use rather than a

part of the wider system of control, and which actions are so minute we cannot

map them. However it is possible to identify some clear impacts to drones and

how they are resisted. Therefore everyday resistance is a useful analytical tool to

the case of drone use in Gaza. This demonstrates the importance of looking at

everyday resistance, as considering the kind of acts of resistance that come

about in relation to drone use in Gaza reveal certain things about the ever-

shifting power relations in the conflict. It also demonstrates that the acts of

these groups matter. It is here we see that the kind of resistance carried out is

reflective of both unequal power dynamic but also the length of time things have

gone on: that life must continue and that people are tired of more explicit forms

of resistance and scared of death as a result of non-compliance. Whilst these

52

control practices are resisted to an extent, ultimately the strong power position

of the IDF means that resistance is limited in effectiveness and this locates it

mainly in the realm of resistance to survive. In this sense, power and resistance

in this case is about Palestinians disrupting the positions the IDF is trying to

subject them to, as well as resisting any attempt to internalise this power.

Hammami (2004) captures everyday resistance to drones in Gaza perfectly when

he describes how ‘resistance for Palestinians is about simply getting there’.

53

Conclusion

1. Introduction

Finally, this dissertation returns to the research questions first laid out with the

intent to answer them more succinctly. The key research question asked what

power relations are produced by the IDF’s use of drones in Gaza as well as how

this impacts the everyday lives of those that reside there.

To help answer this question a subset of questions were asked. How does the

IDF’s use drones to help employ a system of control in Gaza? In what ways do

the practice of drones impact the lives of those who reside there and how is this

control resisted? First, a summary of the findings will be offered before exploring

what these findings mean more broadly. The dissertation will end by identifying

some shortcomings to the research, many of which the opportunity to explore

these further could be employed in future research.

2. Summary

The research found that the drone’s power reaches further than simple

annihilation of individual Palestinians, extending to the use of social practices as

a means to try and ‘control’ those that reside there. These social practices are a

mixture of disciplinary, biopolitical and necropolitical powers, all designed at

‘lowering the heads’ of Palestinians and making them feel vulnerable so that the

IDF can encourage Palestinians in Gaza to restrict movement and limit certain

‘undesirable’ behaviours. This is all built on the notion of the panopticon, and is

54

designed to create a more efficient, and more ‘ethically acceptable’, form of

modern colonial control in Gaza, employed ‘from afar’. This process is enabled

using the law to ‘legitimise’ drone practices. It also relies on bureaucratic

apparatuses to minimise international pressure to stop this. Connected to this is

the argument that a key motivation for Israel to continue and expand this system

in Gaza lies with its highly profitable military equipment exportation industry.

The second chapter explored how these practices impact negatively on those on

the ground in Gaza on an everyday basis, albeit in forms not always apparent at

first glance. This showed that in many ways the alleged desire of the IDF to

restrict movement and limit certain ‘undesirable’ movements was working

‘effectively’ for the IDF. It tried to demonstrate how detrimentally encompassing

life in Gaza continues to be, largely as a result of these drone practices. However,

despite this suggesting that the IDF’s attempt to control is effective to a degree,

this does not mean these attempts at control simply make Palestinians ‘docile’.

Although power is dominated in the hands of the IDF, attempts at control always

point to latent possibilities for resistance. These forms of resistance are rarely

presented in a way that would dramatically change wider outcomes. Instead

they tend to disrupt subject positions as a way to enable life to continue as much

as possible, most often in the form of evasion.

Thus resistance here remains to be something that disrupts power, working

within the confines of the control itself. Put differently, even with significant

disparities in power between Palestinians in Gaza and the IDF, there are still

examples of how Palestinians are powerful and resist this practice. It shows that

55

Palestinians are exercising their agency to maximise their own control over their

everyday lives, despite the constraints posed by drone practices.

3. Future research

This study does not, neither did it ever intend to, provide a complete picture of

the workings of power at play here or the ways in which the IDF’s drone practice

impact the everyday lives of those in Gaza. It can only scrape the surface of these

questions due to a number of constraints. Firstly, that the study is limited in

length. Also as research was secondary, the dissertation over-relied on theory

and secondary sources. Other shortcomings are harder to improve in future work

as it is impossible to ever fully map either the impact of drones or how power

materialises. This is due to the nature of the study, especially its ontological

focus to the ‘micro’, meaning power often takes an unobvious, less visible form.

This withstanding, and as this research has tried to show, it is possible to identify

some patterns and example of these. This is why further research would benefit

from a fully ethnographic approach: it would create a richer depth to research

findings, relax reliance on secondary sources and therefore better suit the

ontological and epistemological commitments.

The need for more research of this nature, especially as the use of drones

increase worldwide, reaches beyond Palestinians who live under drones in Gaza,

albeit adapted to fit varied contextual settings. It extends to any individual or

group that persistently encounter drones, and even more widely to those

subjected to control practices. Thus more challenges to the portrayal of such

56

groups as weak and submissive to power need to be forged, with greater efforts

to allow those involved to voice their insights. What this says more widely is a

plea to a greater commitment in this subject area to moving focus away from the

‘macro’, and the more ‘visibly political’, which as of yet have only got so far in

helping to understand power and understand those subaltern groups’ suffering.

13, 200 words.

57

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