1

Playing Chess in Pyongyang: A brief review of

DPRK’s Foreign Relations.

By Peter Machielse

August 2011

2

“North Korea, for all the peculiarities of Kim Il Sung, is the most

important bastion in the Far East in our struggle against American

and Japanese imperialism and Chinese revisionism” 1

1 A statement of Soviet official during 1984 (Oberdorfer, 2001 p 154).

3

List of abbreviations

DPRK Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea)

ROK Republic of Korea (South Korea)

PRC Peoples Republic of China

NPT Non Proliferation Treaty

IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency

UN United Nations

UNSC United Nations Security Council

4

Index

Introduction 5

The establishment of the DPRK 6

The concept of “Juche” 7

DPRK, PRC and the Soviet Union 8

PRC’s change and rapprochement to the South 9

Rangoon bombing and the 1988 Olympics 10

The collapse of the Soviet Union 11

First nuclear crisis 12

Sunshine Policy 12

Second nuclear crisis 13

Six Party talks 14

Conclusion 15

References 17

5

Introduction

While George W. Bush described the DPRK, together with Iraq and Iran as: “States like these,

and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world” 2.

While this statement calks the relations between the two countries and reveals the new policy

of the Bush administration (De Ceuster & Melissen 2008), it is still unlikely that the U.S. will

invade the DPRK by military means (Howard, 2004). Despite the fact that the DPRK (when

looking at military quantities) is a larger threat than the two other members of the “axis of evil”

the U.S. Prefer to solve the nuclear crisis by diplomatic means rather than military means

(Howard, 2004).

Scholars who try to understand DPRK's policy decision process are often forced to guess, due

to the absence of reliable information. Although an increasing amount of North Koreans

manage to flee to South Korea, the linchpin are “regular” citizens who can shed a light on

North Korea's daily life, but are unable to reveal the policy making process. The last high

ranked defector was Juche architect Hwang Jang-Yop, who left the country in 1997 (Rich,

2010). Byman & Lind (2010) pointed out the means used by the DPRK to prevent the system

to collapse due to internal means. They distinguish the following factors: “preventing

revolution, restrictive social policies, manipulation of ideas and information, use of force, co-

optation, manipulation of foreign government and institutional coup-proofing” (Byman &

Lind, 2010 p 47).

However there are internal treats for DPRK’s regime, this paper rather focuses on external

affairs. DPRK’s behavior cannot be analyzed without taking the international development

into account. The relations of great powers cannot be understood without regional dynamics

(Kerr, 2005). Much of DPRK’s behavior is determined by external developments or other

countries pressure or attitudes. Therefore this paper gives a brief overview of the major

developments the regime faced since its establishment on the 9 September 1948 and how they

responded on those developments. For example what was the effect on the DPRK when the

PRC changed his policy, what happened when the Soviet Union collapsed and why the

DPRK’s regime started to play the nuclear card? This paper tries to give a short introduction

on those matters. Nonetheless to say, this paper is just a short introduction and will not claim

2 http://edition.cnn.com/2002/ALLPOLITICS/01/29/bush.speech.txt/

6

to be a complete overview of the matter. Rather it functions an introduction of international

relations and the way major powers have their interest in the Korean peninsula.

Therefore two questions are central in this research:

1 What major shifts in the global political landscape affected DPRK’s and why did this

affected them?

2 How did the DPRK respond on these shifts?

The establishment of the DPRK

Scobell (2006) describes the DPRK as an eroding totalitarian regime and emphasizes that the

next switch of power from Kim Jong Il to his successor will be the greatest challenge for the

current elite. Scobell (2006) argues that the DPRK meets the six totalitarian characteristics

(Friedrich & Brzezinski, 1956) of: presence of a dictator, presence of a single mass party,

presence of a system of terror, monopoly of means of communication and physical force,

central direction and planned economy through state planning.

On the eve of the end of the Japanese occupation (1910-1945), the U.S., U.K. and China

signed the Cairo agreement. Part of the agreement indicated that after the defeat of Japan,

Korea should be free and independent (Matray, 1978). In February 1945 at the Yalta

conference President F. D. Roosevelt proposed a Chinese, U.S., Soviet trusteeship over Korea,

but only one week before the Japanese surrender (when the Soviet finally declared war to

Japan) the U.S. took care of their postwar policy. The U.S. suddenly realized that the Soviets

probably would occupy the whole peninsula and in haste they did the Soviet a proposal. On

the evening of 10 of August Dean Rusk proposed (based on a National Geographic map) that

the U.S. should occupy the Korean peninsula below the 38 parallel and the Soviets the

Northern part (Oberdorfer, 2001). Surprisingly the Soviets accepted the proposal (Hwang,

2010). The view that the Soviets entered Korea with advanced planning and the U.S. acted in

a haze is countered by Cumings (2004). He indicates that the U.S. planned a postwar

occupation only six months after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor (7 December 1941) and

the Soviets were the ones without a deliberately plan and at that time, usually made ad hoc

decisions.

7

The more Soviet documents became accessible, the more it came clear that the influence of

the Soviets on the political outcome in the North was decisive (the same can be said about

U.S. influence in the South). The Soviets also put Kim Il Sung in charge of the country, thus

the Soviet stake in establishing the DPRK was significantly (Hwang, 2010).

June 25 1950 the modern history of Korea took another dramatic turn, when the Korean War

broke out. For an invasion of the South, Kim needed Soviet and Chinese approval. After a

U.S. statement at the beginning of 1950 that the Korean peninsula was out of their interest,

Kim got permission for the invasion. First he refused Chinese military support, because he

was convinced that he could win the War easily. After the U.S. and U.N. involvement, the

Chinese instantly joined the North Korean forces in November 1950 to prevent the country

from a total defeat, but more importantly to keep a buffer state between China and the U.S.

(Hwang, 2010). The War ended almost at the same place where it broke out (around the 38

parallel), but the Chinese lost 900.000 troops (Oberdorfer, 2001) The great Chinese looses in

the Korean War and the Soviet establishment of the DPRK combined with a great power of

the two countries and a “shared ideology” would determine that the Soviet Union and the

PRC became the most important allies of the DPRK for the next decades (Hwang, 2010).

The concept of “Juche”

To give a comprehensive view of the ideology of the DPRK is beyond the scope of this paper,

but to better understand the way the North Korean regime behaves a very brief summary will

be provided. Due to the strategic position the Korean peninsula is the most often invaded

territory in the world. Invasion of Mongols, Manchurians, Japanese and Han Chinese in the

past made the Joseon Dynasty (1392-1910) build a strong defensive nation to which Kim Il

Sung often refers to (Lee, 2003). During a well known speech in late December 1955, Kim Il

Sung revealed the concept of “Juche” in front of propaganda officials of the North Korean

Communist Party. The core component of self-reliance would make a distinctively Korean

path to socialism with an emphasis on national history and customs (Hwang, 2010). Lee

(2003) states that the claim of “self-reliance” (which can be regarded as a creative Korean

interpretation of Marxism-Leninism) to which many scholar refer to, can be too simplistic.

Juche means “holding fast to an independent position, rejecting dependence on others, using

one’s own brains, believing in one’s own strength, displaying the revolutionary spirit of self-

reliance, and thus solving one’s own problems for oneself on one’s own responsibility under

all circumstances” (Lee, 2003 p 105). An important characteristic is military independence to

8

defend the country from imperialistic powers. In practice the concept of Juche is implemented

by indoctrination of attitudes and an immeasurable personality cult among the “great” and the

“dear” leader. The system uses the analogy of the body with the leader as the brain, the party

as the nervous system and the people as the muscles and the bones (Lee, 2003).

DPRK, PRC and the Soviet Union

Playing the PRC and Russia against each other for their own benefit was an eager used tactic

in Pyongyang. In July 1961 Kim Il Sung visited Moscow to meet Soviet leader Nikita

Khrushchev whom wants to sign a treaty of friendship with the DPRK in order to recruit him

as an ally against China. The treaty confirmed aid and military support in case of a new war.

With this treaty in his hand, Kim traveled to Beijing and asked the Chinese to match it. They

did and they signed an almost identical treaty (Oberdorfer, 2001).

The “Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance” signed between the Soviet Union

and China faced Nikita Khrushchev after Stalin’s death. When he took power in 1956 he

denounced Stalin’s purges, absolute control over the Soviet system and his personal cult.

While Khrushchev took distance from Stalin’s policy, Mao sent a telegram that states:

“immortal beacon of Comrade Stalin will forever illuminate the path on which the Chinese

people march forward”. 3

Mao increasingly questioned the personal cult in Marxism /

Leninism and the relationship between the two leaders seem to weaken (Morey, 2009). To

mention all incidents is beyond the scope of this paper, but the relationship between the

countries became fragile. During 1969 the relations between the two communist superpowers

China and the Soviet Union worsened. The border conflict between the Soviet Union and

China was a tangible prove (Robinson, 1972). Now China found itself both hostile to the U.S.

and even more to the Soviet Union, which seems to isolate China. These events between the

superpowers should definitely affect the DPRK. The end of the 60s also showed a

questionable increase of terrorism conducted by the DPRK. For example the assassination

attempts at the Blue House (1968), the Pueblo incident (1968), plane hijacking (1969) and the

discovery of the first tunnel (1974), increasingly start to play a more important role in

DPRK’s foreign policy.

3 Mao, Telegram to the USSR on Stalin’s Death in The Writings of Mao Zedong, 1949-1976 ed. Michael Y. M. Kau

(Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1986), 327.

9

PRC’s change and rapprochement to the South

In International Relations, major shifts in foreign policies could be a result of small events.

This happened when a visit of a U.S. ping pong team visited China in April 1971. It was the

starting sign of the so called “Ping Pong diplomacy” that resulted in a enforcing of the

relations between the two powers after 22 years of hostility since the Korean War (Hong &

Sun, 2000). In order to prevent complete isolation the PRC successfully tried to strengthen the

relations with the U.S. (Ross, 1986). What started with a secret visit off Henry Kissinger on

July 9 1971 in Beijing (while Kim Il Sung was in China as well) (Oberdorfer, 2001) ended in

the signing of the Shanghai Communique at the 27 of February 1972 (Ross, 1986). This

sudden shift between the two majors power drove both Seoul and Pyongyang to uncertainty.

Kim Il Sung and Park Chung Hee were surprised by the move and left both in doubt about the

continuing support and intentions of their important allies. Despite a statement four months

earlier that negotiations with South Korea will only occur after the ouster of the Park regime,

Kim Il Sung made a huge switch. The uncertainty about the PRC-U.S. alliance drove Kim to

seek for negotiations (Oberdorfer, 2001). At the 6 of August 1971, Kim stated that “we are

ready to establish contact at any time with all political parties, including the (ruling)

Democratic Republican Party, and all social organizations and individual personages in South

Korea” (Oberdorfer, 2001 p 12). Secret meetings in both countries between high officials

resulted finally in a remarkable joint statement on the 4 July 1972 that surprised both Koreas

and the rest of the world (Oberdorfer, 2001). This joint agreement states: “First, unification

shall be achieved through independent efforts without being subject to external imposition or

interferences. Second, unification shall be achieved through peaceful means, and not through

use of force against one another. Third, a great national unity, as a homogeneous people, shall

be sought first, transcending differences in ideas, ideologies and systems (Oberdorfer, 2001 p

24)”.

While Park Chung Hee could benefit domestically from the dialogue with the North, Kim Il

Sung used the joint statement to end his diplomatic isolation. At the end of 1970 before the

dialogue started, North Korea only had diplomatic relations with 35 countries (nearly all

socialistic states). South Korea in contrast had diplomatic relations with 81 countries. An

important result of the dialogue with the South was that short after those dialogues five

Western European countries recognized the DPRK and many neutral countries as well. Four

years after the talks started North Korea was already recognized by 93 states and could

10

compete in that perspective with the South (96). Another major achieved of the DPRK was

that they established direct talks with the U.S. for the first time (Oberdorfer, 2001).

Rangoon bombing and the 1988 Olympics

At 9 October 1983 the world was shocked by a terrorist attack on the South Korean Elites

including President Chun Doo Hwan. The president survived, but seven others did not. After

the bombing, Burma broke diplomatic relation and Japan (which had no diplomatic relations)

imposed sanctions on the North Korean regime. One of the North Korean terrorist who was

caught admitted that they first planned to assassinate Chun during a visit to Gabon, but this

probably would have resulted in a decrease of support from the African countries in the UN

General Assembly. The Rangoon bombing got a strange twist, because the day before the

bombing the PRC served as a messenger between the U.S. (this was a common strategy of the

DPRK) and North Korea with a proposal to participate in three party talks with South Korea

and the U.S. This means that North Korea accepted South Korea as a full participant an

important diplomatic sign (Oberdorfer, 2001). Within two days North Korea played the role

of reconciler and terrorist.

The rest of the 80 the relations between the countries and North Korean behavior can be

characterized by up and downs. Ups were the family reunions during the fall of 1985, but with

the coming Seoul Olympics the DPRK engaged in terrorism again by blowing a Korean Air

airliner and killing all 115 passengers.

Relations with the two communist countries the PRC and the Soviet Union (the biggest

sponsor since the establishment of the DPRK) remained without big changes. Kim Il Sung

was constantly playing China and the Soviets to each other, because he knew that both of the

blocks would not drive them in the hands of the opponent. However they distrusted the Kim

regime, Korea was strategically simply too important. A striking citation of a Soviet official

during 1984 states: “North Korea, for all the peculiarities of Kim Il Sung, is the most

important bastion in the Far East in our struggle against American and Japanese imperialism

and Chinese revisionism” (Oberdorfer, 2001 p 154). When Reagan visited China in 1984 and

China changes his course under Xiaoping, Kim was worried again and responded by inviting

himself to Moscow. When the Chinese heard this they immediately answered by a travel to

Pyongyang in order not to drive Kim to much in Soviet hands (Oberdorfer, 2001).

11

The 1988 Olympics were both a great opportunity to show South Koreas to the outside world

and a great opportunity to seek for diplomatic relations. After the Communist boycott of the

1984 L.A. Olympics North Korea tried to convince their communist allies to boycott the

Seoul Olympics as well. After failing to get a couple of sports to North Korea, they decided to

boycott the Seoul Olympics and responded with a airplane bomb which killed 115 people on

the 7 October of 1987 (Ha, 1998). On the eve of the Olympics Roh Tae Woo launched his

“North Politics” that would change the approach to North Korea and their allies. Especially

relations with the PRC and the Soviet Union was since the start of the 80’s one of the aims of

South Korean foreign policy (Oberdorfer, 2001). In 1987 during Roh Tae Woo’s presidential

campaign he said that “we will cross the Yellow Sea” (Oberdorfer, 2001 p 187). Seoul soon

had relations with Hungary. Kim Il Sung was aware that other Communist countries would do

the same. Under the lead of new Soviet leader Gorbachev the Cold War was melting down

and relations between the U.S. and the Soviet Union start to normalize. Also the relation with

South Korea started with informal meetings. Kim Il Sung hurried to reverse the Soviet

directions, but in vain (Oberdorfer, 2001).

The collapse of the Soviet Union

On the 1 of January 1991 the Soviet Union finally established full relationships with South

Korea, which drove Kim Il Sung even more in a diplomatic isolation. With a languish of

Communism in Europe and a conceived betrayal of the biggest sponsor, North Korea

responded in a way that would be more and more common for the rest of its existence (Kim,

2007). In a statement the DPRK interpreted the alliance as an end of the DPRK-Soviet

alliance and stated: “no other choice but to take measures to provide for ourselves some

weapons for which we have so far relied on the alliance” (Mack, 1993 p 342). The start of the

90s were tough for the DPRK. The Soviet Union demanded hard currency instead of

concessional arrangements and China the most important ally that was left start to gallivant

with the South. On August 24 1992 the geopolitical situation changed dramatically when the

South Korea signed formal relationships with China. In return South Korea had to give up the

relations with Taiwan (South Korea was the only Asian country that still recognized Taiwan)

(Oberdorfer, 2001). In a couple of years Communism disappeared in Europe, the Soviet

Union collapsed and China signed relations with South Korea. Where Kim Il Sung could rely

blindfold on his allies during the last decades, now nothing was sure anymore and playing the

nuclear card was became an evident tool for regime survival (Roy, 2010). During 1991 the

12

support from Moscow was gone, the Chinese ties with South Korea were growing and China

forced the DPRK to agree with a dual entry of both Koreas to the U.N. (United Nations).

Therefore the DPRK felt the pressure to sign two agreement in December 1991. The

agreements concerning an “Agreement on Reconciliation and a Non Aggression agreement

(Oberdorfer, 2001).

First nuclear crisis

During the 90s North Korea starts to see the more and more value in their nuclear program in

relation to the outside world. The first time the nuclear issue became clear was when a U.S.

surveillance satellite photographed a nuclear vessel under construction at Yongbyon. When

U.S. surveillance kept going it became clear that the nuclear program took serious proportions

(Oberdorfer, 2001). The start of the first nuclear crisis had his roots by ratifying the Non

Proliferation Treaty in 1985. In March 1992 it signed the IAEA (International Atomic Energy

Agency) safeguard agreement. This agreement requires North Korea to accept IAEA

inspectors to examine all their nuclear equipment. The IAEA stated that the DPRK was not

transparent in revealing their pre 1992 plutonium production and asked for more inspections

of nuclear waste to determine the right amount (U. S. estimated 8-10 kg enough for two

nuclear weapons). As a response the DPRK withdrew from the NPT and wanted to solve the

problem due to bilateral talks with the U.S. North Korea succeeded in establishing talks with

the U.S. and asked for security assurances as well. Finally the first nuclear crisis was solved

by signing the Agreed Framework in October 1994. This framework pushed the DPRK to stop

their program, but in return they received a light water project. Further in the 90s the DPRK

succeeded in lifting their sanctions if they stopped their long range missiles project too

(Samore, 2003).

Sunshine Policy

A major switch in the ROK foreign policy occurred when Kim Dae Jung took office in 1998.

While former presidents formulated strong policies towards the DPRK, Kim rather focused on

engagement and formulated his famous “sunshine policy” to get the DPRK out of its isolation.

During the sunshine policy projects between the two Koreas were established like meetings of

separated families, two cross border railway connections, Gaesung industrial complex and the

historical meeting between Kim Jong Il and Kim Dae Jung during the 2000 summit (Kwon &

Lim, 2006).

13

During his inauguration Kim Dae Jung outlined the core principles of the sunshine policy as:

‘No armed provocation by the North will be tolerated; a takeover or absorption of the North

will not be attempted; North–South reconciliation and cooperation will be expanded

beginning with those areas which can be most easily agreed upon’ (Mou, 2003a, p 2). While

the start of the sunshine policy was hopeful, soon came clear that the DPRK was not the most

reliable partner. During 2001 little progress was made to strengthen inter Korean relations and

the relations worsened when the DPRK launched a sea attack in 2002. For the DPRK the

sunshine policy was a great opportunity to receive aid and financial support, so it was

important for them to maintain the inter Korean talks for the following reasons: First, the

grouping within the axis of evil forced the DPRK to show the outside world that the U.S. was

wrong in doing so. Second, the DPRK was aware of the 2002 ROK elections and wanted a

president that would maintain the sunshine policy (it happened when Roo Mo Hyun was

elected). Third, to polish the image that is damaged due to domestic suppression. Forth, try to

strategically blame the U.S. as an obstacle for inter Korean progress (Rigoulot, 2003). Inter

Korean relations and the hope of a more peaceful future worsened when the second nuclear

crisis broke out.

Second nuclear crisis

During 2002 the discovery of DPRK’s secret program to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons

triggered the second nuclear crisis. The DPRK responded to withdrawal from the NPT and

decided to expel IAEA inspectors from the country. This is often called the “second nuclear

crisis” The relation between the DPRK and the IAEA since 1992 can be described as a chain

of incidents whereby the IAEA mostly accused the DPRK for a lack of transparency. The

NPT functioned from 1994 till 2002 to force the DPRK to meet the safeguard obligations (De

Ceuster & Melissen, 2008).

From 2002 the Bush administration sought for means to involve China in the talks to

denuclearize the DPRK. Bush's administration preferred multilateral talks to bilateral talks

and was hoping for China using its potential influence on the DPRK (Glaser & Liang, 2008).

Eventually the PRC was not eager to join the talks, but the debilitated 1994 agreement and the

second 2002 North Korean Nuclear crisis made the Chinese aware of the potential hazards.

The U.S. judged that bilateral talks with the DPRK were doomed to fail because of the lack of

leverages. They proposed a multilateral approach including China. China first responded

reserved, because they were not sure they U.S. Claims of the DPRK produces highly enriched

14

uranium was true, they thought that DPRK's nuclear program was mainly used to blackmail

the U.S., they were afraid that the U.S. Wanted to end the Kim Dynasty by any means and

finally, China's role in the political arena during the Xiaopeng era was marginal. During a

press announcement after the meeting between Bush and Jiang Zemin Bush announced that

“we agreed that the peace and stability must be maintained. Both sides will continue to work

towards a nuclear-weapon-free Korean Peninsula and a peaceful resolution of this issue

(Glaser & Liang, 2008). Also bilateral between the U.S. and the DPRK collapsed due to the

crisis and the PRC and ROK initiated a multilateral framework, what resulted in the Six party

talks including PRC, U.S., ROK, DPRK, Japan and Russia (De Ceuster & Melissen, 2008).

Six Party talks

The six party talks shows us that the interest of the neighboring countries and the U.S. in the

Korean Peninsula are high, mainly because of the strategically position of Korea. Like many

times in the happened in the history of the DPRK, diplomatic talks went up and down. The

first round of the six party talks was held in 2003 in Beijing. 2004 saw two rounds and a

breakthrough was realized in 2005 when the countries reached an agreement to freeze

DPRK’s nuclear program and to denuclearize the country. In October 2006 the progress was

thrown back when the DPRK conducted a nuclear test. The regime faced sanctions that were

shared by Russia and the PRC and isolated the DPRK as it never was before. The talks

reached “Agreement on Initial Actions for the Implementation of the Joint Statement” in

February. In 2007 the DPRK allows IAEA inspectors for the first time since 2002 and

bilateral talks with the U.S. were established (De Ceuster & Melissen, 2008). During April

2009 the DPRK launched a rocket and justified is as a satellite launch. The U.S. and its allies

asked the U.N.S.C. for sanctions and after the denunciatory statement of the U.N.S.C.

president the DPRK decided to withdraw from the six party talks (Weitz, 2011). When the

current President Lee Myung Bak was elected a stronger policy against the DPRK was

formulated and incidents like the Gangwha island incident 4 and the incident with a marine

vessel 5 let the ROK government to judge the sunshine policy as a failure.

6 However the six

party talks are stopped, the external pressure on the regime to change can be characterized by

sanctions, which are often very low in achieving the desired results (Ruediger, 2006). The six

4 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-14009913

5 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8589507.stm

6 http://articles.cnn.com/2010-11-19/world/south.korea.sunshine.policy_1_inter-korean-relations-mount-

kumgang-north-korea?_s=PM:WORLD

15

part talks also show that despite the diplomatic isolation and the poor economic conditions

especially China does not want the regime to collapse. The PRC prefers regional stability and

is aware of the strategically position of the Korean peninsula (De Ceuster & Melissen, 2008).

Conclusion

A short description of the historical developments concerning the DPRK shows us a country

that has regime survival as a main goal and it also shows us that the regime will do anything

to succeed in this perspective. Even involvement in terrorism and the development of nuclear

weapons are used for regime survival.

Since the establishment of the DPRK it relied mostly on the Soviet Union and the PRC.

Especially after the ties between the PRC and the Soviet Union worsened, Kim Il Sung used

this to play the great powers constantly to each other. Both countries did not want the DPRK

to rely on the opponent and it seemed that Kim Il Sung understood this very well. However,

developments in the global political area forced the DPRK to change their strategy. The

Soviet Union collapsed and the most important supporter suddenly disappeared. The new

strategy depends mainly on playing the nuclear card. Regional stability is a main aim for the

countries in the Six Party talks and the DPRK with nuclear weapons is a constant treat for the

regional stability. With the nuclear weapons on their side, the DPRK is an important actor and

is able to blackmail other countries in order to ensure in regime survival.

Although the Six Party talks aim on a denuclearized North Korea, the chance that the talks

will have this outcome is unlikely. The existence of the DPRK in the political arena is mainly

build on the possession of nuclear weapons. The country has a small economy and compared

to countries in the Middle East the natural resources are low. So giving up the nuclear

program will weaken the position of the DPRK strongly. Therefore it is highly unlikely that

the country will do so.

Because of the geographical position of the Korean peninsula Korea faced a lot of invasions

throughout the history. Today, ironically it seems a big advantage for the regime to reach their

beloved survival. It is clear that most countries among the six party talks have a great interest

in the Korean peninsula and this placed the DPRK in a “luxury” position. Economically the

DPRK has nothing to offer, but in case of regional stability the country plays a leading role.

By threatening the regional stability with nuclear weapons the country is able to “blackmail”

16

other countries and prevent them from invading the country. Therefore the chance that a fast

end of the “Kim Dynasty” will be caused by external developments is unlikely.

Striking is also the ups and downs in regarding the ROK relations. When the DPRK faced

themselves with a increasing diplomatic isolation like PRC rapprochement to the U.S. they

tried to strengthen the inter Korean relations, resulting in the 1972 joint statement. Also the

collapse of the Soviet Union and the establishment of PRC-ROK relations forced the DPRK

to approach their capitalist southern neighbors for increasing their relationship resulting in the

1991 December agreements.

17

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