phone hacking: a lucrative, but largely hidden history
TRANSCRIPT
Copyright © 2014 Copper Horse Solutions Ltd. All rights reserved.
Mobile Phone Hacking: A lucrative, but largely hidden history
DC4420David Rogers
27th May 2014
http://www.mobilephonesecurity.org
Car Radio Hacking – 1990s / 2000s
PIN locks to deter and remove value of theft Hacking tools reset / calculate / remove security codes
Copyright © 2014 Copper Horse Solutions Ltd. All rights reserved.
Some Phone Terms: SIMlock & IMEI
SIMlock:– used to secure the device to a particular network during the period of the
subsidy, can be unlocked with CK codes by calling operator– Different variants of locks– Recent court case in the US over legality (and lots of other previous fights)
IMEI :– the International Mobile Equipment Identity number– unique to each device– can be blocked if device is stolen
Other interesting information on device that would be hacked– E.g. to change language packs, phone lock removal, text etc.
Big battle between mobile industry and hacking groups between c.1999 and now – has evolved to jailbreak / root community
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‘Unlocking’ and IMEI changing
What is ‘unlocking?– SIMlocks– Most hacking used to be aimed at the SIMlock area
The security area in the handset would protect all sensitive data – including IMEI and SIMlock
What is a dirty hack?– Hacks targeted against the security area would often cause corruption
to data – including the IMEI.– Data such as RF calibration settings would often be wiped out
Hacking tools usually dual-use (SIMlock and IMEI)– Causes problems in countries where IMEI changing is illegal – difficult
and costly to get direct proofMobile Phone Security - David Rogers
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INTERNET
Historic CriminalStructure
EMBEDDEDHACKER
HACKINGGROUP
INTERNETSHOP
SHOP ORSTALL
REPAIRCENTRE
APPLICATIONHACKER
ORGANISEDCRIME
RE-SELLER
END-USERTHIEFDRUGDEALER
MASS THEFT
SUBSCRIPTIONFRAUD
STREET CRIME
BLACK MARKETEXPORTER
(UNLOCKING / IMEI CHANGING)
EBAY
COUNTERFEITING
IP THEFT
‘USER’ CRIMESMURDER ETC.
Mobile Phone Security - David Rogers Copyright © 2014 Copper Horse Solutions Ltd. All rights reserved.
INTERNET
EMBEDDEDHACKER
HACKINGGROUP
INTERNETSHOP
SHOP ORSTALL
REPAIRCENTRE
APPLICATIONHACKER
ORGANISEDCRIME
RE-SELLER
FREE SOFTWARE
END-USERTHIEFDRUGDEALER
VALUE METHOD
£10 - £30 CASHDEBIT / CREDIT CARD
£50 - £500 WESTERN UNIONPAYPALPOSTAL ORDER
£500 - £5000 WESTERN UNION
£5000+ WESTERN UNION
Mobile Phone Security - David Rogers
Historic FinancialStructure
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Examples of Hacking Hardware
Standard service repair equipment– Fraudulent purchasing of manufacturer’s equipment
Mass produced hardware by hacking groups– Griffin Box– UFS-3 (Twister)– Blazer– Clips
Evolution– New equipment was constantly developed as new models were
released– New technologies and hardware security to ensure revenue
Mobile Phone Security - David Rogers Copyright © 2014 Copper Horse Solutions Ltd. All rights reserved.
Mass Manufacture of Hacking Hardware
Mobile Phone Security - David Rogers Copyright © 2014 Copper Horse Solutions Ltd. All rights reserved.
Examples of Hacking Hardware (2)• Most hacks steal their solutions from already existing
hacks— May seem to be 22 hacks available – just old hacks re-packaged.
— Different front-end to software— Different hardware
— the ‘golden’ part of the source code is from 1 hack
• Lots of ‘ghost’ hacks that are aimed at defrauding people— same in 2012 with jailbreaking on iOS6
Mobile Phone Security - David Rogers Copyright © 2014 Copper Horse Solutions Ltd. All rights reserved.
Hardware Hacking Methods
EEPROM cloning or ‘Chipping’– Old method– Copied EEPROM with basic equipment– Main aim to put EEPROM with no SIMlock on– Result: IMEI number was cloned
PIC’s (Programmable Integrated Circuits)– Execute small sequences of commands– Placed in-line to ‘snatch’ or modify data
Flash device hot-swapping (almost impossible now) Exploitation of boundary scan ports External clips and dongles Note: less economical than software hacks
Mobile Phone Security - David Rogers Copyright © 2014 Copper Horse Solutions Ltd. All rights reserved.
In-line PIC Between SIM and Device
Mobile Phone Security - David Rogers Copyright © 2014 Copper Horse Solutions Ltd. All rights reserved.
Software Hacking Methods
Direct change– Breaking a programming algorithm– Finding the correct test interface protocol command
• Still used(!) serial communications / USB monitoring equipment Modifying binary files (software download files)
– Inserting jump code– Hijacking other functions in the code to subvert security– Taking advantage of software design flaws
Abuse of boundary scan to monitor phone processes ‘Dumping’ to logs of data from secure areas Brute force cracking of algorithms Theft of information from Design Centres / Factories / Service
Centres “Voodoo Galaxy SIII SIM unlock” tool required device to be rooted…
Mobile Phone Security - David Rogers Copyright © 2014 Copper Horse Solutions Ltd. All rights reserved.
Typical (Old) Software Hack Methodology
MARKETINGLAUNCH AT
TRADE SHOW
PHONERELEASED
TO MARKET
RESEARCH
THEFT OFEARLY MODEL
NETWORKOPERATORSAMPLES
MANUFACTURER HACKER
OPEN SOURCE INFOAND HACKING TOOLS
TIMESCALE
0 MONTHS
6 - 12 MONTHS
HACKINGSOLUTION
DISTRIBUTEAPPLICATION
PROTECTAPPLICATION
APPLICATIONPROTECTION
TOOLS
PRODUCTSECURITY
DETECTION
Mobile Phone Security - David Rogers Copyright © 2014 Copper Horse Solutions Ltd. All rights reserved.
Use of Hardware Clips – 5 Second Unlocking!
Simple to use, takes it’s power from the handset Contains a Programmable Integrated Circuit Bombards the handset with commands in a repetitive sequence The handset eventually gives up and resets itself – unfortunately
resetting the SIMlock!
This type of attack was used on many different makes of handsets Clips have now evolved and the term is usually used in reference
to dongles
Mobile Phone Security - David Rogers Copyright © 2014 Copper Horse Solutions Ltd. All rights reserved.
“Logs” Used as a method of continually generating revenue for the
real hackers and re-sellers at the top of the food chain – a historical issues for hackers
Original concept by 3 Nokia hackers and dealers from Serbia:– George, Boban (Slobodan Andrics) and Dejan (Dejan Kaljevic)
How do logs work?– Encrypted by hackers to avoid cracking by other hackers– An example:
• Crack the master security locks -> generate an encrypted log of security area information -> close the security lock on the handset again!
‘Logs’ will be available only if the hacking solution is two part– ‘Dumb’ client application to communicate with handset– Data is sent to hacker / re-seller– Corresponding data to unlock / change IMEI received from hacker / re-
seller
Mobile Phone Security - David Rogers Copyright © 2014 Copper Horse Solutions Ltd. All rights reserved.
Some manufacturers and ODMs used symmetric algorithms based on the IMEI number to generate CK codes – Broken and every possible iteration for each IMEI available
Later versions cracked the factory / service tools because they were leaked rather than cracking the handset
Down to poor manufacturer security and breaking principle of no stored, shared secrets!
CK Algorithm Breaches
Mobile Phone Security - David Rogers Copyright © 2014 Copper Horse Solutions Ltd. All rights reserved.
De-capping and Focused Ion Beam Equipment
Mobile Phone Security - David Rogers Copyright © 2014 Copper Horse Solutions Ltd. All rights reserved.
Newer Hardware and System Level Attacks
George Hotz – original iPhone jailbreak– Used hardware flaw to XOR data address and insert jump code to empty
memory where he could execute his own bootloader– Allegedly assisted by European Infineon hacking teams
Rooting– Various methods, exploiting vulnerabilities– Usually used as a staging area for other attacks (e.g. malware)– Examples:
• RageAgainstTheCage, uboot, zergRush, gingerbreak• Other private exploits
– Some manufacturers providing it as a service in order to prevent people hacking
Legal battles around this area (e.g. US copyright office 2010, 2012)– OK to remove SIMlocks and root devices
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Newer Motivations
Main targets / motivations recently have been:
Rooting / jailbreak device – for piracy / other apps / custom OS / spyware
SIM unlocking – break out of subsidy (cheap device) / fraud / export of stolen devices
IMEI changing – re-enable stolen handsets in same country Launchpad attacks – spyware / malware / anti-theft tools / in-
app billing Fixing issues – e.g. old SIMlocked device, can’t contact operator
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2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010/11 2012
EICTA / GSMA 9 Principles
OMTP Trusted Environment:
OMTP TR0
OMTP Advanced Trusted Environment: OMTP TR1
TCG MPWG Specification
GSMA Pay-Buy-Mobile
Fragmented Security
Handset Embedded Security Evolution (to 2012)
Google / Apple Proprietary hardware
security features
Banking / film industryrequirements
WAC
RIM / Nokia proprietary security features
webinos
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Evad3rs, i0n1c, geohot, RedSn0w – iOS6 & iOS7
iOS6 hack “used more zero-days than stuxnet”* Millions of downloads – huge market Evasi0n iOS7 jailbreak rushed out due to competition (and 7.1
release), packaged with Chinese app store (Taig)– Rumoured to be $1million– Rumours of dirty tricks / questionable sources for some holes– Strategic and tactical thinking, all ‘untethered’
Some holes allegedly held back by various teams for future cracks on iOS8
Teams still reverse and hack each others tools (like SIMlock) George Hotz tried to sell to a Chinese team (via a broker) for
$350,000– Audio clip released with negotiation discussions
* Ref: http://www.forbes.com/sites/andygreenberg/2013/02/05/inside-evasi0n-the-most-elaborate-jailbreak-to-ever-hack-your-iphone/
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May 2014 – Root Bounty for Verizon & AT&T
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Kill Switch / Anti-Theft Mechanism Targeting?
Obvious this would happen
Copyright © 2014 Copper Horse Solutions Ltd. All rights reserved.
Copyright © 2014 Copper Horse Solutions Ltd. All rights reserved.
Car Radio Hacking - 2014
Questions?
david.rogers {@} copperhorse.co.uk@drogersuk
Mobile Systems Security course: http://www.cs.ox.ac.uk/softeng/subjects/MSS.html
Mobile Security: A Guide for Users: http://www.lulu.com/gb/en/shop/david-rogers/mobile-security-a-guide-for-users/paperback/product-21197551.html
Copyright © 2014 Copper Horse Solutions Ltd. All rights reserved.
http://www.mobilephonesecurity.org