PHIL/RS 335The Problem of Evil Pt. 2

Hick, “Soul-Making Theodicy” Hick begins by owning up. Unlike Cleanthes, Hick is

willing to testify to the vast amount and range of evils we experience or have knowledge of.

Hick aligns himself with a strategy for addressing the problem of evil that comes from the tradition of rational theology: theodicy.

See the description of theodicy and his conclusion about this description at 266c1. Important qualifications.

Hick is pursuing a Christian theodicy. Theoretical Requirements: 1) internal coherence

(possibility); 2) external consistency with religious tradition and experience (plausibility).

Reviewing the Tradition Hick considers a couple of traditional forms of

Christian theodicy.

1. Augustinian: diagnoses the problem by pointing to the fall from grace which, it is argued, has implications throughout the natural world; responds to it with a free-will defense. It would have been logically impossible for God to

create a world containing free beings but no sin and suffering.

Hick’s criticism: Based on an event that has possibility but not plausibility. Account of natural evil?

2. Irenaean: most clearly represented by the philosopher Schleirmacher; presents a developmental picture of human beings, the requirements of which explain moral and natural evil.

In Image, In LikenessThe developmental picture Hick picks up from

Irenaeus makes a distinction between human beings created in the image of God and human beings who make themselves into likenesses of God. We don’t start in perfection. It is something that has to be accomplished.

One of the real strengths of this account is how well it captures the historical/biological/social realities that we are aware of. Both in our own organism and in our understanding of our species being and development, the human story is a developmental story.

How does this solve the problem? Hick offers us “a contemporary version of the

Irenaean type of theodicy” (268c1-2), that begins with an obvious question: Why would God create us with this gap between image and likeness (capacity and actuality)? Since a key part of this actuality is knowledge of and

relationship with God, it would seem to be better to be created into the presence of God.

Hick insists that this immediacy would render us incapable of independent existence (we would be overwhelmed). So, we need distance, and in particular, an epistemic

distance, the distance of an ambiguous and uncertain world and experience.

Epistemic Distance?As Hick makes clear, this epistemic distance is

necessary in order for a finite, free (rational) creature to “know and love God” (269c1). Hick presents this as a logical necessity: if God

wants us to freely love him, we can’t have been created loving him.

Madden and Hare give this necessity another interpretation: distance as “tough love.” How tough does it have to be? Is the payoff worth it? What are we buying and who are we buying it for? Is there another way to the payoff? What

Moral PerfectionAnother common observation made in the

context of the problem of evil is that it seems both possible and plausible that God could have created us with the necessary epistemic distance but morally perfect (or even very strongly inclined to act morally perfectly).

Hick responds to this possibility by insisting that the virtues that arise from struggle are better than naturally implanted ones (cf. 270c1).

Possible and Plausible?Hick’s theodicy certainly seems internally

consistent. It provides the basis for an account of both natural (?) and moral (?) evil stemming from a common developmental conception of human beings.

Hick recognizes that plausibility is an issue, so he takes up the task of demonstrating that we and our world fit the terms of the Irenaean hypothesis. We and our world are certainly not the only

combination that would fit, but Hick insists that exclusivity is not necessary.

We and our world do fit.

Our Moral Situation“…the general fact of humankind’s basic self-

regarding animality is an aspect of creation as part of the realm of organic life; and this basic self-regardingness has been expressed over the centuries both in sins of individual selfishness and in the much more massive sins of corporate selfishness…social injustice” (271c1).

The development into ‘likeness’ comes through overcoming this animality through worship of God, which Hick glosses as overcoming of selfishness.

Our Natural SituationGiven our moral situation, the question Hick

asks is: “what sort of world would constitute an appropriate environment for this second stage of creation”(271c2).

Referring to experiments done on kittens (?), Hick insists that our moral development requires natural evil: we need to strive, to overcome.

“…a world in which there can be no pain or suffering would also be one in which there can be no moral choices…” (272c2)

Not so quick.Granting for a second the argument, a critic might

ask if Hick can so quickly ‘write off’ natural evil.

Even if pain and suffering must be overcome for us to be moral beings, does it need to be so much? This is the point of the “tough-love” discussion.

Hick’s answer: “judgments of intensity are relative” (274c2).

But what about the indiscriminateness of the suffering? Hick: It’s necessary that it be random for the good

effects to occur (275c1).

One Final ThingSo, Hick has demonstrated how an Irenaean

theodicy can respond to the challenges posed by moral and natural evil.

But, because “likeness” is a developing feature, we are never done becoming like God. Thus we need an eschatology, an account of the end of God’s plan. The Irenaean eschatology is a familiar one:

communion with the divine. Is it plausible? Many would have their doubts, but

Hick thinks an eschatology is necessary to respond to the problem of evil (275c2).

Interesting feature of Hick’s eschatology: universal salvation (only thing that justifies all of the evil).